TRANSFER OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANAGED SUSTAINMENT PROGRAMS IN IRAQ TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONTROL

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

LAWRENCE R. LEMICK, DEPARTMENT OF STATE MBA, Strayer University, Herndon Virginia, 1995

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Transfer of Department of Defense Managed Sustainment Programs in Iraq to Department of State Control

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United States Military Forces Iraq were under the mandate to withdraw from Iraq no later than December 2011. Upon their withdrawal, 16,500 diplomats, security, and support personnel would remain. The current military sustainment system would transfer to the Department of State (DoS) known as United States Mission Iraq (USMI). DoS does not normally provide this magnitude of support to United States (U.S.) personnel at its worldwide locations, nor is it adequately funded to do so. Further complicating this transition was the fact that Iraq was still considered a non-permissive environment. Furthermore, the Iraqi economy was still relatively immature, requiring the use of external support sources and personnel to provide sustainment. This study specifically examines the transfer of Class I (Subsistence), Class III (Bulk Fuel) and base life support services to support the 15 enduring sites within Iraq. This transition from DoD to DoS was unique and served as a true test of interagency cooperation.

Interagency, Sustainment, Logistics.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
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<td>Aerial Port of Debarkation</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background

By October 1, 2011, the Department will assume full responsibility for the U.S. presence in Iraq, as DoD withdraws its remaining 50,000 troops by December 2011, according to the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.¹ This withdrawal will require the Department to provide security, life support, transportation, and other logistical support currently provided by the U.S. military in Baghdad, at consulates in Basra and Erbil, at embassy branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul, and at other sites throughout Iraq.²

— Office of the Special Investigation
Department of State, May 2011

On November 18, 2008, the United States (U.S.) and Iraq signed a landmark agreement that ended the war in Iraq. The historic agreement consisted of 30 articles, covering all areas in respect of Iraq’s sovereignty, and the continuing diplomatic, military, and internal relationship between the U.S. and Iraq. The articles ranged in subjects from U.S. troop withdrawal, to the way Iraq would govern its judiciary systems, to Iraqi rule of Law, and the status of forces and protections for those U.S. military personnel that were to remain in Iraq and assist in its transition to a civil society. In that agreement was the requirement that all combat and the majority of support U.S. military personnel and military contractors had to be out of the country by December 31, 2011.


On December 1, 2011, all U.S. managed programs would be under Department of State (DoS) control. The basic plan was to build a robust diplomatic and assistance platform in Iraq with 15 enduring sites throughout the country, including the construction of two new consulates and two embassy branch offices. The main embassy would continue to be located in Baghdad within the recently constructed embassy complex. The remaining 14 sites would perform five different functions in support of the unique DoS Iraq mission. First, DoS would establish two embassy branch offices within northern Iraq in the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. Second, consular services would be provided by consulate offices in Erbil and Basra. Third, the Office of Security Cooperation Iraq would manage the foreign military sales program from offices in Baghdad, Besmaya, Taji, Tikrit, and Umm Qasr. Fourth, DoS would continue to develop and train the Iraqi police forces at sites in Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil. Finally, DoS established air hubs in the cities of Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil with Baghdad International Airport serving as the official air point of entry for all arriving U.S. personnel supporting the diplomatic mission. The planned enduring presence locations are depicted in figure 1.

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As of December 31, 2011, all U.S. personnel in Iraq would operate under the authority of the Chief of Mission, also known as the ambassador, for the execution of all diplomatic, humanitarian, and security assistance activities. In addition, the U.S. Government had to transition all the remaining bases where it had a presence to the
Government of Iraq upon withdrawal. There are few precedents or processes upon which to draw for providing base operations, life, and logistics systems for a non-Department of Defense (DoD) customer. In this instance, DoS needed to not only support the Chancery Compound itself, but also any additional enduring remote sites (e.g., consulate locations) as well as established Office of Security Cooperation sites.

The U.S. Congress believed this plan was very ambitious, costly, and unattainable given the terms of withdrawal for DoD personnel. The projected amount for this transition was estimated in excess of a billion dollars in construction costs alone, and millions more in security. The drawdown was intended to save money, not cost more, and the American people wanted to stop the flow of many years of exorbitant expenditures.

Department of State and Department of Defense Interagency Planning

In April 2009, DoS and DoD established an interagency planning effort with the intent that DoS would assume and continue many of the programs and services that DoD used to provide, including support for the Iraqi police training program, designed to build the Iraqi police capacity. DoS also planned to expand the U.S. diplomatic presence, which entailed increasing requirements for security, sustainment, and base support systems. They formed a “Whole of Government” unified approach that enabled the transition from a military-centric combat mission, to the end state of a diplomatic supported mission in support of a sovereign nation. The planning team, called the “Iraq

Enduring Presence Working Group,” consisted of DoS and DoD representatives for all functions that would transition or be affected by transition. This team met daily in person, as well as via video conferencing and telephonic conference calls. As the planning effort began, the working group assumed that there would be a limited DoD presence to assist in the security and operate the checkpoints within Iraq. This assumption proved false when the Iraq Government refused to extend the Status of Forces Agreement, leaving the uniformed soldier without the legal protections under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Additionally, the working group produced a plan finalizing the number of diplomatic and contractor personnel that would remain in country, and upon agreement with the Government of Iraq, the DoS Iraq Transition Coordinator announced in June 2011 that the combined U.S. Government and contractor presence would be limited to a maximum of 16,500 personnel to support the 15 enduring sites located throughout Iraq. This number would support the systematic reduction of sites and personnel. This was a phased approach and further reductions were expected during the following two years. Ultimately, the working group would plan for and coordinate the transition of 310 tasks previously performed by DoD.

Department of State Transition Challenges

There were numerous challenges for DoS in accomplishing a full regional diplomatic presence. DoS had to manage and grow a large-scale police training program, effect multiple security cooperation offices, (under the Chief of Mission’s authority) and continue training and equipping the Iraqi security forces. There were many U.S. Government oversight committees, to include the DoS internal oversight office, the Office of the Inspector General, which expressed concern with this undertaking and its
progress. Of the 310 transition tasks, five areas presented the greatest challenges for DoS. First, DoS had to adjust to the significant loss of freedom of movement and protective security capability for U.S. Government personnel caused by the military’s withdrawal. U.S. military forces had full dominance in Iraq until December 2011 and had established a solid working relationship with the Iraqi military, forming a high level of trust and understanding between the two entities at all levels.\(^5\) The U.S. Army, in cooperation with the Iraqi military and police force, ensured that all personnel and goods maintained full freedom of movement through numerous checkpoints within Iraq, minimizing delays and frustrated cargo deliveries.\(^6\) This relationship also facilitated the unrestricted import and export of goods across Iraqi borders, but these relationships would end once the U.S. military left Iraq, and the freedom of access from air, land, and sea to sustain U.S. personnel would drastically change.\(^7\) The security situation was still contentious with roadside bombings and insurgent rifle, mortar, and rocket attacks occurring frequently against both U.S. and Iraqi Government personnel and facilities. As the U.S. military security capability was gradually reduced, DoS had to increasingly rely more on Iraqi


\(^6\)Ibid.

\(^7\)Although individual Status of Forces Agreements may differ greatly, such an agreement generally provides for the status of U.S. forces in a foreign state. Status of Forces Agreements often describe the rights and privileges of covered individuals, addressing issues such as the applicability of the foreign state’s criminal and civil jurisdiction over U.S. armed forces personnel, DoD civilian employees, and/or contractor personnel working for the DoD. These agreements may also cover a variety of other topics including entry and exit, arming, customs, and the applicability of taxes and duties. According to a Congressional Research Service report, the U.S. Government has agreements that may be considered status of forces agreements with 126 countries in the world.
military support. While the Iraqi military performed admirably in manning checkpoints, DoS was less impressed with their ability to address a number of other security issues, and opted to address some of these concerns by an increase in civilian security capability. DoS intends to hire a total of 7,000 security personnel to mitigate this shortfall. Second, DoS had to create a civilian air transportation system to replace the existing and highly developed military air transport system. This system named “Embassy Air Iraq” had to safely bring personnel in and out of Iraq until Iraq’s air system was fully capable. The DoS air fleet would ultimately consist of 46 fixed and rotary wing aircraft requiring both facilities and maintenance support. Third, DoS had to develop a complete medical care system to replace existing military clinics and care stations. This medical capability would include fully staffed medical facilities providing surgical, orthopedic, gynecological, and mental health care for all U.S. personnel operating at the 15 enduring sites. Fourth, DoS had to develop specialized communication networks and procure sufficient information technology systems to synchronize and control their diverse missions conducted across the 15 enduring sites located throughout the country of Iraq. Lastly, DoS had to develop and manage a sustainment and base life support system to adequately sustain the 16,500 personnel that would remain in Iraq to support future diplomatic and security assistance activities. To accomplish this within the agreed timeline, DoS had to rely heavily on the existing DoD sustainment system and contracts

8Office of Inspector General, MERO-I-11-08, 22-23.
9Ibid.
as they gradually assumed complete responsibility for this support. Chapter 4 will analyze the transition of this support in greater detail.

Exacerbating these challenges was the combination of a rapid turnover of personnel, a retrograding military, and a rapid civilian surge, while simultaneously; the Iraqi Government was in the process of developing procedures and slowly enacting new commercial Iraqi laws, regulations, and policies (e.g., taxes and customs, clearances, security requirements, etc.).

**Department of Defense Transition Challenges**

For DoD, the challenges were numerous as well. After eight years of operations within Iraq, DoD was given the monumental task of redeploying all of its equipment and the majority of its forces, clearing and closing a significant quantity of field operating bases (FOB) and contractor “man camps” that were not designated as enduring presence sites, and for the proper disposition of equipment not designated for return to the U.S. First, DoD had to plan, coordinate, and execute the retrograde of over 100,000 pieces of equipment to seaports and airports in Kuwait and then properly prepare and load these items for sea or air movement. Second, DoD had to plan, coordinate, and execute the redeployment of 138,000 military personnel, and monitor the redeployment of 57,000 contractor personnel through multiple airports within Iraq and Kuwait. This was particularly challenging given the number of tasks required to be completed by December 2011. Third, DoD had developed a robust basing infrastructure to support the many diverse missions required after occupying the country in 2003. Closing these bases was intensive in both time and manpower and had to be carefully synchronized with the planned retrograde of personnel and equipment. In order to transfer these bases back to
the Government of Iraq, materiel had to be prepared for either retrograde or transfer to
the Iraqi military and all base service contracts and lease agreements required
termination. Finally, all unserviceable military equipment and property located
throughout the country required demilitarization and then proper disposal, which
included a significant quantity of hazardous waste. An overarching concern of the
planning team was an attempt to ensure uninterrupted subsistence, fuel, and base life
support for remaining personnel as they completed the multitude of transition activities.

Other U.S. Transitions from Military to Host Nation

What makes this transition unique is that there is no precedence for a U.S.
Government civilian organization assuming control of internal logistical services from an
existing military sustainment system for a country support program. There appears to be
no documented evidence of a U.S. agency to agency sustainment transfer in conjunction
with the effort of nation building and the institution of democratization. In all other
conflict terminations, the transition was direct from the U.S. military to the host nation.
Additionally, for most military to civilian handovers, the primary focus was on the
restoration of basic services and the rebuilding of the war torn infrastructure of the
aggrieved nation. A similar instance in U.S. history that resembles the situation in Iraq
was the end of U.S. military operations within Vietnam. There was a planned transition
from military to civilian rule with a short timeline for military withdrawal, resulting from
a notational agreement reached between the U.S. and Vietnam during the Paris Peace
Talks in 1973. The Vietnamese gave the U.S. 60 days to remove all U.S. troops from the
country.¹¹ There were similar circumstances of U.S. reconstruction and stabilization and assistance efforts to host nations in past conflicts. Programs such as the Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development program during U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the Marshall Plan in postwar Europe focused on handing back complete control to the populace.¹²

This thesis presents an analysis of the DoD and DoS process to continue the life support system that U.S. personnel in Iraq received before the withdrawal of the military. The challenge for DoS was to continue to provide the same service level, with less infrastructure, and with a continuous diminishing military population combined with an influx of diplomatic personnel.

Although DoD and DoS interagency coordination for the transition began late, both agencies coordinated extensively to ensure that all required transition activities were executed as seamlessly as possible. In spite of the magnitude of challenges previously presented, the transfer of base life and support occurred on time. The milestone set by Congress was met before December 15, 2011. The U.S. military did withdraw and DoS did assume the new role of providing internal logistical base life and support to the more than 16,500 U.S. Government employees and civilian contractors. The transformation process is continuing, and the plan is to have more local Iraqis’ employed at the U.S.


¹²CORDS was originally the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program. It was renamed in 1970 and this is the name most commonly used today. Brown, “Vietnam and CORDS,” 30.
missions and consulates, performing administrative and supporting roles in the areas of base and life sustainment.

**Problem Statement**

Determine the process for the transfer of Class I, Class III and base life support services from DoD to DoS to enable the transition from a military operation to a diplomatic support mission.

**Research Questions**

1. What was the process for transferring Class I support from DoD to DoS to enable the transition from a military operation to a diplomatic support mission?

2. What was the process for transferring Class III support from DoD to DoS to enable the transition from a military operation to a diplomatic support mission?

3. What was the process for transferring sustainment services from DoD to DoS to enable the transition from a military operation to a diplomatic support mission?

4. How can the DoS better prepare to conduct these transfers in similar situations in the future?

**Limitations**

1. Some documents stored on the DoS Embassy Baghdad Router Network Sites were no longer available.
2. Classified documents located on SIPRNET, a classified DoD network, and CLASSNET, the DoS’s classified network could not be used for this study.

3. Some key personnel could not be located to conduct email interviews. Other individuals polled, chose not to respond even after many gentle reminders and requests.

Delimitations

All personnel were interviewed for the purpose of historical data and not for statistical modeling. This thesis does not address all the processes involved in the DoD to DoS sustainment transition. This was a deliberate decision to narrow the scope of the investigation.

Significance

This thesis serves as a historical case study on how the DoS and DoD personnel conducted the transition of Class I, Class III, and base life support services in Iraq. Additionally, this document recommends or proposes techniques and procedures that could be adopted by the DoS in similar situations, such as the future transition in the country of Afghanistan.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The overall approach for this review focused on analyzing the roles and procedures of the DoS and DoD as they apply to this thesis. First, this review will examine the DoS from both a national and regional perspective focusing on policies and procedures in support of its critical diplomatic mission. Second, this review will examine the DoD at the operational level, discuss the roles and responsibilities of several key strategic sustainment organizations, and describe the Army sustainment procedures that were in place as the transition began in 2009. Understanding how each department operates, their unique organizational structures, and their methods of support is important as it helps understand the various “cultures” that needed to work together to successfully handover from military to civilian rule.

Department of State

As the lead foreign affairs agency, DoS has the primary role in interagency coordination in the development and the implementation of foreign policy. The DoS is the lead organization in managing the foreign affairs budget and other foreign affairs resources.\textsuperscript{13} The Department leads and coordinates U.S. representation abroad, conveying U.S. foreign policy to foreign governments and international organizations, through U.S. embassies and consulates in foreign countries, and diplomatic missions to international

organizations.\textsuperscript{14} The Department also provides protection and assists U.S. citizens living or traveling abroad.\textsuperscript{15} The Department provides assistance to U.S. businesses in the international marketplace.

The DoS conducts all of these activities with a small workforce of 55,000, comprised of both Civil Service Foreign Service and Foreign national employees.\textsuperscript{16} Overseas, Foreign Service Officers represent the U.S. Government by analyzing and reporting on political, economic, and social trends in the host country, and responding to the needs of American citizens abroad. The U.S. maintains diplomatic relations with about 180 countries and many international organizations, adding up to a total of more than 250 posts around the world. Under the President's direction, the Secretary of State is responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of U.S. Government activities abroad. Missions to countries and international organizations are headed by Chiefs of Mission.\textsuperscript{17} They are considered the President's personal representatives, and with the Secretary of State, assist in implementing the President's constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.

Most overseas missions have personnel assigned from other executive branch agencies in addition to those from the Department of State. The DoS employees at missions comprise U.S. based political appointees and career diplomats, and Foreign Service Nationals. Other executive branch agencies may include Foreign Service Officers

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.
from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture. They may also have military personnel serving within the Defense Attaché Office or the Office of Security Cooperation. There are normally civil servants on excursion tours from the Departments of Defense, and Justice (the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation).  

The DoS has an administrative platform to support those and all personnel assigned to a U.S. mission and provides the basic administrative services for each and every embassy and consulate. Management officers are responsible for all normal business operations of the post, including overall management of personnel, budget, fiscal matters, real and expendable property, motor pools, and acquisitions.

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**Department of State Service and Support to Embassies**

At the embassy, the DoS equivalent to a U.S. Army sustainment organization is the General Services Officer (GSO), which provides logistics and administrative support to all embassies and consulates. The GSO provides support in six primary areas. First, the GSO is responsible to find suitable housing and provides furnishings for Foreign Service and embassy assigned personnel. Second, the GSO negotiates lease agreements

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18Ibid.

19Ibid.


and provides real estate management services for both residential and commercial properties.\(^{22}\) Third, the GSO provides the customs clearance and shipping services for all goods both inbound and outbound, and is responsible for the tax free purchase of imported commodities.\(^{23}\)

Fourth, the GSO acquires and manages a fleet of vehicles, also known as the motor pool, to move personnel on official land travel.\(^{24}\) Fifth, the GSO employs warranted procurement officers with the responsibility to negotiate and sign level one simplified acquisition contracts for supplies, services, and minor construction. Contracts of items costing over 250,000 USD (U.S. Dollars) are centrally managed at a regional or national level because they normally exceed the local contracting officer’s purchasing warrant. Large construction contracts and new embassy construction projects are centrally managed at the DoS level from Washington D.C. The office also forecasts the embassies needs with a spending and development plan, and the yearly implementation administrative support needed to ensure effective operations at its more than 200 diplomatic and consular posts abroad. ICASS, through which over 300 Government entities receive bills for shared services, is a break-even system; the charge to the customer agencies equals the cost of services.


\(^{23}\) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. Done at Vienna on 18 April 1961. Entered into force on 24 April 1964. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500, 95. Specific reference is Article 231, “The sending State and the head of the mission shall be exempt from all national, regional or municipal dues and taxes in respect of the premises of the mission, whether owned or leased, other than such as represent payment for specific services rendered.\(^{8}\) The exemption from taxation referred to in this article shall not apply to such dues and taxes payable under the law of the receiving State by persons contracting with the sending State or the head of the mission.”

of an ongoing program of support; to develop budget and workforce requirements for General Services Operations. Finally, the GSO office manages the storage, accountability, maintenance, and disposition all DoS procured equipment.25

Unlike the DoD, DoS does not contain sufficient organic capability to provide large-scale sustainment in support of its mission. While the DoD has the capability to operate dining facilities, produce and distribute potable bulk water, and procure and distribute large quantities of bulk fuel, the DoS normally provides this type of support through the use of host nation contracts. This capability difference sets the stage for the areas of sustainment that had to be replicated for an 18 month period until DoS could accomplish similar arrangements.

Department of Defense Title 10 and Department of State Title 22

In addition to the transition of sustainment from DoD to DoS, operational authority within Iraq converted from Title 10 to Title 22. Title 10 and Title 22 are United States Code and comprise the legislative foundation of U.S. National Security. These pieces of legislation describe, structure, and constrain the operation of the country’s national security. United States Code Title 10, titled “Armed Forces,” governs the form, function, duties, and responsibilities of all U.S. Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, as well as the Reserve Components. United States Code Title 22, titled “Foreign Relations, and Intercourse,” governs how the U.S. conducts its foreign diplomatic relations and includes provisions on the DoS, foreign assistance, and

public diplomacy efforts. Normally, the DoS retains operational authority for all U.S.
personnel and activities within a foreign nation under Title 22. During contingency
operations such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, Title 10 provides the DoD designated
Geographic Combatant Commander, operational authority for military activities and
personnel equal to the DoS under Title 22.

The transition from a DoD Title 10 military operation, to a DoS Title 22
diplomatic mission significantly changed the manner in which U.S. organizations and
personnel would operate. All judicial, territorial, and governance control came under the
host nation (in this case, Iraq) leadership. The refusal of the Iraq Government to renew
the Status of Forces Agreement forced the immediate transition from a Title 10 to a Title
22 system. This affected the personnel remaining within Iraq in a variety of ways. Simple
things such as unimpeded travel via the DoD Common Access Card and the authority to
carry weapons were no longer permissible.26 The DoS was now required to perform its
transition mission in the same manner as it does in any other country with which the U.S.

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26 Vienna Convention addresses the operation of diplomatic missions within
receiving states, including the privileges and immunities afforded various classes of
members of the mission staff. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18,
1961, 22 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force with respect to the U.S.
December 13, 1972). Under the Vienna Convention, administrative and technical staff of
the mission enjoy several privileges and immunities, including: freedom from arrest or
detention; inviolability of person, papers, and property; immunity from the receiving
State’s criminal jurisdiction; immunity from the receiving State’s civil and administrative
jurisdiction, except for acts performed outside the course of their duties; and exemption
from certain dues and taxes. See Article 37, 2, Articles 29-35. Under Article 10, the
receiving state must be notified of the appointment of members of the mission. See
Article 10. Senior DoD officials suggested that the only thing the Vienna Convention
does not guarantee is the right of military personnel to carry a gun or wear their uniforms.
State maintained that, if permitted by Iraqi law, OSC-I personnel may wear uniforms and,
as appropriate, carry weapons.

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has diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the DoD planned a robust post-2011 presence of over 1300 personnel as part of an Office of Security Cooperation operating under Chief of Mission authority. The Iraqi Government did not agree with this proposal and this presence was reduced to less than 100 military personnel. It was still unclear the amount of DoD support needed after the military withdrawal occurred.

Further complicating this transition was the fact that the Iraqi governance and judicial system were neither mature nor solidified. Rules would change daily in areas such as commerce, economics, and labor law. This instability affected the codification of passports, travel, importation of goods and services, taxes, and so on for all U.S. expatriate citizens. Contractors and DoD civilians who were in Iraq under the Status of Forces Agreement had to reapply for visa and work permits and endure lengthy wait times for Iraqi approvals. There were still areas of Iraqi law not developed and inculcated to the mid and lower levels of ministries. The Iraqis were also unprepared for certain aspects of the border and checkpoint control within the country, thus frustrating the freedom of movement into, out of, and within the country. Due to the fluid nature of the transition process, there were political ramifications on both the U.S. and the Iraqi sides that were beyond the ability of DoS and DoD planners.

27Section 3927 of Title 22 of the U.S.C. provides that the chief of mission to a foreign country shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in the country, except for certain employees, including those under the command of a U.S. area military commander. See 22 U.S.C. § 3927(a). The USF-I Operations Order relating to OSC-I provides for execution of certain functions pursuant to chief of mission authority for security assistance activities and command direction from CENTCOM in matters that are not functions or responsibilities of the ambassador. USF-I Operations Order No. 11-01, Annex V, Appendix 4, January 6, 2011.
Department of Defense and Combatant Commands

The Unified Command Plan establishes the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the eight designated Combatant Commands (COCOMs) within the DoD. These eight COCOMs consist of five geographic commands and three functional commands. The geographic COCOMs provide command and control for all U.S. Armed Forces operating within their region of responsibility, as outlined in the Unified Command Plan. Functional COCOMs operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide unique capabilities to the other COCOMs. U.S. Central Command has responsibility for military operations primarily in the Middle East, to include Iraq and Afghanistan. During the Iraq transition U.S. Central Command would relinquish control to the DoS.

Department of Defense
Global Sustainment

The DoD has several strategic level sustainment organizations that provide support to the military services as well as the geographic COCOMs. Sustainment within an operational area is the responsibility of the geographic COCOM who leverages the unique sustainment capabilities provided by the military services. Each COCOM has the authority to direct the military services, to provide common sustainment for all or some of the other services operating within their geographic area of responsibility in order to gain efficiencies. In the case of military operations within Iraq, the U.S. Army had the preponderance of the sustainment responsibilities. This review will highlight those

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sustainment organizations, programs, and procedures that have specific relevance to this thesis.

Strategic sustainment entails the acquisition of goods and services with both governmental and commercial entities to resource the force. The DoD developed an executive agency program in order to gain efficiencies in the procurement of common goods and services. “The DoD Executive Agent (EA) Program defines and codifies the Secretary of Defense’s assignment of specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to the head of a DoD Component.” Executive agents are tasked to provide specifically defined levels of support for missions or activities that involve two or more DoD components or the DoD and other agencies and are responsible for all aspects of planning, procurement, and management of assigned responsibilities.

Defense Logistics Agency

The first defense organization involved in the transition was the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The DLA is the DoD designated agent for strategic logistics, providing a variety of supply, acquisition, and technical services for the military services. The DLA evolved over several decades, starting as the Defense Supply Agency in 1961. For the first time, all the military services bought, stored, and issued items using a common nomenclature. DoD officially created the DLA in 1977.

\[^{29}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[^{30}\text{Ibid.}\]

The DLA supplies the majority of all consumable classes of supply both to military and civilian entities, leveraging their purchasing power by buying in bulk. The DLA is a $36.8 billion global enterprise, providing critical combat support to the war fighter. The DLA is a joint military and civilian organization with approximately 26,000 military (17 percent) and civilian (83 percent) employees located in 48 states and 28 countries. The DLA manages nine supply chains consisting of over 5,000,000 items through its four major supply centers; Defense Logistics Agency-Troop Support (DLA-TS) located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, DLA Energy located in Fort Belvoir, Virginia, DLA Aviation located in Richmond, Virginia, and DLA Land and Maritime located in Columbus, Ohio. Through its subordinate organization, DLA Distribution located in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, the DLA receives stores, and issues supplies through 26 worldwide distribution centers. The DLA also provides the military and civilian customer base with reutilization and marketing, information, document, and transaction services. Additionally, the DLA maintains forward locations within the various geographic COCOM regions to facilitate customer support.\(^{32}\) The DLA is the DoD executive agent for subsistence, clothing and textiles, construction and barrier materials, bulk fuel, and medical material. All DoD organizations must purchase these commodities through the DLA. For this study, DLA played a key role in the transition of subsistence, bulk fuel support, and the disposition of excess military equipment.

Defense Contract Management Agency

The second defense organization involved in the transition is the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). The DCMA is the DoD’s strategic oversight entity that provides administrative contract services and oversight for contracts awarded by all DoD components and other designated federal and state agencies, and foreign governments. The DCMA is responsible for assuring that procured materiel and services are satisfactory, and delivered when and where needed. Before a contract is awarded, DCMA provides advice and information to help construct effective solicitations, identify potential risks, select the most capable contractors, and write contracts that meet the needs of DoD customers, Federal and allied government agencies. After a contract is awarded, DCMA monitors contractors' performance and management systems to ensure that cost, product performance, and delivery schedules are in compliance with the terms and conditions of the contracts. For Iraq, the DCMA undertook a separate contingency role and was identified as a separate combat support agency under DoD and deploys its own command structure when supporting contingency operations.

U.S. Army Materiel Command

The U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) is the Army’s provider of technology, acquisition, materiel development, logistics power projection, and

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sustainment to the total force, across the spectrum of joint military operations. USAMC proudly claims that “If a Soldier shoots it, drives it, flies it, wears it or eats it, AMC provides it.” USAMC is responsible for a variety of missions in its role in supporting the Army’s Title 10 responsibilities. USAMC provides life cycle management for all Army procured equipment, such as weapon systems and vehicles, through its Life Cycle Management Commands; Communications Electronics Command, Tank and Automotive Command, Aviation and Missile Command, and Joint Munitions and Lethality Command. USAMC also conducts materiel research and development, and operates 20 depots, arsenals, and ammunition plants across the U.S. The USAMC provides oversight of the Army Security Assistance Command (Foreign Military Sales), managing the multibillion-dollar business of selling Army equipment and services to friends and allies of the U.S., and negotiating and implementing agreements for co-production of U.S. weapons systems by foreign nations. The command serves as the DoD executive agent for the chemical weapons stockpile and for conventional ammunition.

USAMC operates a network of Army field support brigades and battalions, logistics support elements, and brigade logistics support teams which are controlled through its subordinate organization, the Army Sustainment Command. These organizations assist Army units in identifying and resolving equipment and maintenance


38Ibid., 1.
problems as well as materiel readiness issues. In addition to serving as the USAMC’s “face to the field,” Army Sustainment Command is responsible for materiel management, managing the Army Preposition program, and coordinating the redistribution of Army equipment in support of the Army Force Generation process. Finally, the Army Sustainment Command is the proponent for the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), one of the Army’s external support contracts which will be discussed in greater detail in operational contract support.

**Operational Contract Support**

OCS plays an increasing role in operations and is an integral part of the overall process of obtaining support across the spectrum. Contract support is used to augment other support capabilities by providing an additional source for required supplies and services. These services include but are not limited to; mortuary services (within specific parameters), showers, laundry, clothing repair, dining facility (DFAC) services, sanitation, and transportation. The extensive use of contracts during recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted both the utility and challenges involved in the use of contracts to support contingency operations.

OCS consists of three different categories; systems support, theater support, and external support.\(^{39}\) Systems support contracts are typically initiated as part of the materiel acquisition process by the acquisition program manager in coordination with one of USAMC’s Life Cycle Management Commands. Field service representatives employed by the original equipment manufacturer perform maintenance and scheduled services on

\(^{39}\)Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 4-10, 1-7.
the equipment during the time period specified in the contract. Upon termination of the contract, the military services assume responsibility for these tasks. Theater support contracts provide necessary supplies and services for the military services as they support geographic COCOM requirements.40 These contracts are the responsibility of military service contingency contracting officers and are normally awarded to host nation vendors. USAMC’s subordinate organization, the Expeditionary Contracting Command, is responsible for the management, training, and deployment of contingency contracting officers to provide support for operational requirements. The Expeditionary Contracting Command provides each COCOM a Contract Support Brigade that can deploy Contract Support Battalions and Contingency Contracting Teams as required to support the needs of the deployed force.41 External support contracts are negotiated by the military services and designed to provide access to essential services in support of all COCOMs. These contracts provide a variety of services such as interpreters, security, and logistics support. The three major logistics support contracts are the Air Force Civil Augmentation Program, the Navy Global Contingency Contract, and the Army LOGCAP.42 As mentioned previously, the Army Sustainment Command is the program manager for LOGCAP.43

40Ibid., 3-11.

41Ibid.

42Ibid., 3-9.

43Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 4-94, 1-10.
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

The principal objective of LOGCAP is to provide combat support and combat service support augmentation to commanders. This program provides the basic life support services the uniformed soldier previously performed. The program provides for the civilian type tasks of cooking, cleaning, dispensing of fuel, and the daily calculations for reorder. The program also has a full vehicular maintenance system that provides both field and sustainment maintenance. LOGCAP has supported a variety of missions to include major combat operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peace keeping operations, peace enforcement, and conflict mitigation.

LOGCAP services have been authorized by the Department of the Army for use in supporting other military services, coalition and-or multinational forces, and other governmental and non-governmental agencies such as the DoS in Iraq. This program is a multi-service, indefinite quantity, definite time contract specifically designed to support a range of military operations. LOGCAP services provided to both the Army and DoS in Iraq included; clothing exchange and bath, laundry, clothing repair, food service, mortuary affairs, sanitation to include hazardous waste, billeting, facilities management, morale, welfare, recreation activities, and postal operations.

44Ibid., 7.

Army Theater Sustainment

The Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) is the senior Army logistics headquarters for each geographic COCOM and is assigned to an Army Service Component Command. The TSC commands and controls all Army sustainment organizations deployed in support of a joint or multinational force.\textsuperscript{46} They command and control sustainment operations through their subordinate Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, Sustainment Brigades, functional groups and battalions, and multi-functional Combat Sustainment Support Battalions. They are responsible for conducting Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration of personnel and equipment, the distribution management of supplies, providing sustainment services, such as personnel and financial, and ultimately the redeployment of the contingency forces. The TSC deploys functional sustainment companies and platoons with sufficient capability to perform all sustainment tasks in support of the operational requirements. The remainder of this review will focus on the TSC’s role and procedures in the distribution of Class I (Subsistence) and Class III (Fuel), the key commodities involved in the transition from DoD to DoS support.

Class I Distribution

As the DoD executive agent, DLA is responsible for the acquisition and transport of Class I to a theater of operations. These items are transported directly from the contracted vendor or from one of DLA’s distribution centers. The mix of perishable and semi-perishable rations depends upon the Operational Commander’s Feeding Policy, the availability of refrigerated storage, and the capability of the deployed Subsistence

Platoons. Class I stocks brought into the theater of operations will be moved to the Subsistence Platoon which resides within Quartermaster Support Companies, normally subordinate to a Combat Sustainment Support Battalion. The commander’s supply policy will determine the number of days of Class I supplies to be maintained at various levels and locations.\textsuperscript{47}

Class I is transported from the strategic level to the operational level in 20 or 40 foot refrigerated and non-refrigerated containers. The TSC maintains the predominance of theater Class I supplies, which are managed by the Subsistence Platoon(s) of the Quartermaster Support Companies. At this location, the Quartermaster Support Companies Subsistence Platoon(s) will normally distribute three days of supply at a time to the supported units located throughout the theater. Rations are normally distributed in bulk from the operational level via internal single temperature refrigerated containers or leased refrigerated containers on semi-trailers.

\textbf{Class III Distribution}

As the DoD executive agent, DLA is responsible for the acquisition and transport of Class III to a theater of operations. The U.S. Army has executive agent responsibilities for inland petroleum distribution for all military services in support of geographic COCOM requirements. Quartermaster Petroleum Pipeline and Terminal Operating Companies establish the theater petroleum support base for products received from ocean tankers at marine petroleum terminals by operating fixed pipeline and terminal facilities for the receipt and storage of up to 2.1 million gallons of bulk petroleum. The petroleum

\textsuperscript{47}Department of the Army, Field Manual 4-93-2, 2-7.
support base serves as a hub for receiving, temporarily storing, and moving fuel to Petroleum Support Companies at the operational and higher tactical levels.48

At the operational level, Petroleum Support Companies have the capability to store 1.8 million gallons of fuel and establish a habitual working relationship with Petroleum Truck Companies capable of transporting in excess of one million gallons per day to requesting activities at forward locations, using unit or throughput distribution methods as appropriate to the tactical situation.

Based on this literature review, it is apparent that DoS and DoD have distinctly different roles in U.S. National Security. Their sustainment systems are designed with distinct capabilities and procedures to support these roles. DoD has a robust capability to sustain itself within an operational theater, and has well developed doctrine and procedures to synchronize the effort. Additionally, they had many years to both build their capacity and refine their procedures within the Iraqi Theater. The DoS transition challenge was to replicate this capability albeit, at a smaller scale, with far fewer resources at their disposal.

48Ibid., 4-43.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Introduction
This chapter explains the research design used to analyze the data gathered to address the problem statement and answer the research questions. Additionally, this chapter describes the approach used, how data was collected and analyzed, an assessment of the research strengths and weaknesses, and a summary.

Questions to Answer
The thesis problem statement began as a professional desire to understand the complexity involved in the transition of a robust military sustainment system to a diplomatic system normally designed to provide limited support. The four research questions were designed to analyze the transition process for three key sustainment areas, and to determine how DoS could better prepare itself to conduct similar transitions in the future.

Approach Used
There are two primary methods of research, quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative approach involves the investigation of a human or social problem, and tests the theory based on the collection of variables, numerically measured, and then analyzed with statistical procedures, to determine whether the predictions of the theory are substantiated. Qualitative analysis, on the other hand, deals with the comprehension of a human or social problem based on detailed, first-hand experiences in a natural
environment. Qualitative research is the study based in natural settings in an effort to interpret an event based on human experience and influence. Qualitative research is preferred when there is a need for a detailed understanding, to a question that is complex. There are strengths and weaknesses to both research approaches. One advantage of the quantitative approach is that this approach makes it possible to measure the reactions of a large number of people to a limited set of questions. This allows comparison and statistical aggregation of the findings. This enables the quantitative approach to provide a strong basis for generalization of the results and is usually depicted in a histogram or other pictorial. Qualitative methods are used to produce detailed information about a much smaller number of people or situations. A major weakness of qualitative research studies is the ability of the researcher’s personal bias upon final interpretation of the research.

There are five main methods of qualitative research consisting of: (1) the narrative study, (2) the phenomological study, (3) the grounded theory study, (4) the ethnographical study, and (5) the case study. The case study method consists of the study and analysis of a particular case or situation, which can be used as a basis for drawing conclusions in similar situations. Based on the four research questions, the author chose the case study method as the best way to define the problem, develop the


50Ibid., 40.

background, identify the pertinent issues, explain the situation, and finally to describe the results.

**How Data was Collected**

A review of DoS policies and procedures, and DoD (primarily U.S. Army) sustainment and distribution policies, doctrine, and procedures was conducted to obtain an understanding of the topic. The data collected provided basic information on who the key players were, what their mission was, how they operated, and what their standards were. The researcher attempted to conduct interviews with both civilian and military sustainment personnel, considered to be subject matter experts in their respective fields, and directly participated in the Iraq transition. The two interview questions were:

1. In your opinion, how successful was the food, fuel, and base life support transition process from DoD to DoS in Iraq?

2. What lessons did you glean from your participation in this process that would be useful in a similar situation?

After obtaining the requisite permissions from CGSC, the interview questions were emailed to 35 DoS, DoD, DLA, DCMA and LOGCAP employees located worldwide, primarily focusing on those individuals currently serving in Iraq. Email was selected as the method of data collection due to the time and distance involved in obtaining the responses. Unfortunately, the participant response rate was extremely low, and the information obtained from those that did respond provided little to no value in answering the research questions.
**Research Strengths**

As the research developed, several strengths emerged from the literature search. First, DoD and U.S. Army sustainment policies, doctrine, and reports were available and accessible through the Combined Arms Research Library (also known as CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in both print and online format. Second, numerous Military Art and Science theses that discussed topics concerning military operations in Iraq were readily available and provided significant insight from a DoD perspective.

**Research Weaknesses**

First, a major challenge in the research process was the availability of relevant information that directly supported the thesis research questions. There was a significant amount of available literature describing how the military provisions and sustains itself in an operational environment, but little information available that discusses how a civilian agency would provision itself in a post-conflict situation. Perhaps, this is due to the fact that civilian organizations do not normally accept ownership of a military sustainment system, which in past operations, typically reverts immediately to a host nation responsibility. Second, due to security classification of data by both DoS and DoD, some relevant information pertaining to the research questions could not be used within a thesis to be published at an unclassified level. Third, there was an inadequate response rate and lack of useful information obtained from the interview participants. Information from individuals directly involved in the transition could have provided additional insight or perspective in answering the research questions.
Summary

This chapter provided an overview of the research problem and questions, and research design options available to answer these questions. Next, the chapter described the research design specifically chosen to answer the four research questions and its applicability. Third, this chapter discussed the manner in which data was collected and specifically addressed the method of conducting the interview process. Finally, the chapter addressed both the strengths and weaknesses in the conduct of the research. The following chapter will detail the analysis and the presentation of the data.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter provides an analysis of the sustainment transfer process in Iraq from DoD to DoS through three case studies designed to answer the first three research questions. First, to set the overarching context for the three case studies, this chapter will provide an overview of the DoS transition implementation plan. Second, a case study titled “The Class I Transfer Concept” will examine the organizations, procedures, and challenges involved in the transfer of subsistence support. Third, a case study titled “The Class III (B) Transfer Concept” will examine the organizations, procedures, and challenges involved in the transfer of bulk fuel support. The final case study titled “The Sustainment Services Transfer Concept” will examine the organizations, procedures, and challenges involved in the transfer of services in support of the 15 enduring sites.

Department of State Transition Implementation Overview

The DoS transition mandate was to perform by itself and not depend on DoD contracts. The end state was to not replicate the DoD sustainment process because it was both manpower intensive and costly, and DoS would not be funded in the out years to support this. Once the transition was complete in December 2011, DoS planned to implement a “Glide Path” methodology. Glide Path was designed to reduce U.S. contractor and U.S. direct hire presence in Iraq, replacing the majority of these personnel with local Iraqi hires. The target was 50 percent Iraqi employment throughout the country.
by the end of Fiscal Year 2012. This rightsizing effort had to be factored into the
calculus of the transition planning and implementation methodology. To do this, the Iraqi
Enduring Presence planning group utilized the Economy Act of 1932 as the fastest,
most efficient way to transition sustainment from DoD to DoS in the Iraq Theater.

DoS proceeded to implement self-contracting mechanisms in parallel with DoD
Indefinite Requirements Contracts Iraq, in the spirit of becoming self-sufficient. In order
to assist DoS in the transition, DoD planners provided, for a fee, interim support. The
primary organizations used to transition from military sustainment to a civilian contract
model were DLA, the USAMC, LOGCAP, and DCMA. In order to establish the
appropriate legal relationship for DoS to use DoD contracts, an interagency agreement
was written and accepted by both organizations. This Memorandum of Understanding
established the services and the parameters on how DoD could use those contracts to
assist DoS in Iraq. For an annual fee of over a billion USD, both parties agreed that DoS
would continue to receive Class I subsistence, Class III fuel, and sustainment services for
all 15 enduring sites. There were grave differences in how the DLA and the DoS

52Ambassador Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary For Management, U.S.
Department of State, Statement Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland
Defense, and Foreign Operations House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, “Assessment of the Transition from a Military to a Civilian-Led Mission in Iraq,”
June 28, 2012 “The country-wide goal is to have 50 percent of our life support contractors
be Iraqi. Having started at virtually zero, we are currently at 24% and that number
continues to climb each month.”

53Economy Act of 1932, as amended (31 USC 1535), authorizes an agency to
place orders for goods and services with another government agency when the head of
the ordering agency determines that it is in the best interest of the government and
decides ordered goods or services cannot be provided as conveniently or cheaply by
contract with commercial enterprise.

54See Appendix B for the DFAC locations and dates of transfer.
operated, which created challenges for the planners from both sides, who worked diligently to understand each other’s perspective.

**The Class I Transfer Concept**

As discussed in chapter 2, the DLA is the DoD Executive Agent for all subsistence support. The DLA-TS is the DLA’s responsible agency for procurement and management of subsistence through established contractors called Subsistence Prime Vendors (SPV). There were discussions on changing the SPV and how long this DLA-DoS relationship would last. A concept of operations was developed by DLA-TS Liaison Officers (LNOs) with input from a DoS management team. From this concept and in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, the DLA-TS would continue to be the responsible agency for the management of the SPV. Anham LLC, who was contracted to procure, package, and ship the foodstuffs to the 13 DFACs within Iraq.

The DLA-TS LNOs served as Contract Officer’s Representatives, assisting DoS by monitoring the SPV contract and by providing oversight on all sustainment orders, vendor performance, and production reports on behalf of the embassy management team.

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55 Anham LLC was under investigation by Defense Contract Auditing Agency for price gouging on a separate services contract. DoS considered a different subsistence vendor however, for brevity of the time for transition; they continued the relationship with DLA.

56 US Mission in Iraq (USMI) Logistics Support standard operational procedures. September 11, 2011. Document was not published and was used as a guide to assist DoS in the assumption of DoD managed contacts pertaining to all classes and services. However for this thesis the relevance is to Food and Fuel. Anham was the company that provided food to DLA. DoS contacted through DLA for Class 1 food purchases and delivery to all dining facilities.

57 In the original plan there would be 16 DFACS, however within 6 months, 3 sites were shutdown.
LOGCAP personnel were an integral part of this process by providing such services as daily aggregate head counts and subsistence storage on hand, tabulated from all DFACs.

Using the DLA’s vast experience while operating within Iraq, DoS agreed to maintain a minimum of 10 days of supply of at each location. This stockage level was imperative and compensated for the expected 21 day order lead time. In the event that the SPV could not deliver the goods for any variety of reasons, such as instability and volatility within Iraq, a 10 day stockage of ready to eat meals, (also known as MREs) would be available at each location. These stocks would allow DoS to continue to feed 16,500 people until the normal sustainment system could resume. DoS would continue to use the Army Food Management System, a DLA-TS program to perform the routine ordering for each of the individual DFACs. They also used the DLA’s Subsistence Total Order and Receipt Electronic System which translates subsistence orders to vendor orders and provides a billing mechanism. DoS and DoD agreed that LOGCAP personnel would continue to be responsible to perform the daily tasks using the Army Food Management System and Subsistence Total Order and Receipt Electronic System.

While the subsistence ordering and management processes were well developed, the distribution process within Iraq proved to be a challenge. First, all subsistence would arrive through seaports in Kuwait in both dry and refrigerated containers, and then be

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58See Appendix C for DFAC’s their locations and capacity for Days of Supply (DOS).


60Ibid., 25.
moved overland by truck across the Iraq-Kuwait border to two logistics hubs located in Taji and Kirkuk. One result of the non-renewal of the Status of Forces Agreement was that the U.S. was no longer able to import and clear its own cargo through the border checkpoint known as “K-Crossing” (Status of Forces Agreement agreed crossing from Kuwait into Iraq). The Government of Iraq officially closed the K-Crossing on December 31, 2011 and established its own border checkpoint at Safwan, a dormant Iraqi border town located approximately 30 miles from the previous checkpoint. This new border crossing site was not fully developed, lacking sufficient infrastructure and personnel to effectively manage daily commerce, as well as cargo destined for the previously mentioned U.S. logistics hubs. Additionally, all U.S. goods not Vienna Convention qualified or diplomatic in nature would be subject to all Iraqi customs and duties. Once customs cleared, U.S. cargo would continue to the two hubs and wait for clearance to deliver their cargo to its final destination. The two hubs were controlled by USM-I and operated by LOGCAP. Each hub consisted of a Movement Control Team and a Convoy Support Center. Services included a parking area, food, water, fuel, showers and latrines for up to 23 trucks at Taji and 10 at Kirkuk. These hubs were established to compensate for varying wait times to offload the trucks and to accommodate the Iraqi clearance process to enter a number of the enduring sites. For example, a common occurrence was a recurring delay for clearance from the Iraqi police to allow the SPV vehicles to enter the Green Zone within Baghdad. The clearance process itself normally took five days, and required the DoS Logistics Management Cell to prepare documentation that matched driver identification cards with vehicle registration data, and then provide these
documents to the Iraqi Police. Additionally, DoS was required to pay expediting fees to streamline this process.

The second distribution challenge was the DLA SPV contract requirement that all convoys have armed Security Escort Teams. To alleviate this dilemma, a separate line task order was established from the Security Support Services-Iraq base contract, managed by Army Contracting Command. The terms were negotiated and then agreed upon to allow continued subsistence support. The Security Support Services-Iraq program consists of five separate task orders to provide armed convoy special engagement teams to replace military personnel who previously performed that function. The DoS requested task order was available for a one year period and renewable with month to month options up to one additional year.

The next step in this process is to eventually separate from the DLA and provide subsistence support for the DFACs through a new DoS Indefinite Requirements Quantity contract. This new contract program is called the Baghdad Life Support System-Iraq.

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61 LMC was the Logistics Management Cell, an operations center, dedicated to tracking sustainment and Fuel shipments. The cell consisted of DoS, DLA, and the SPV, on a 24/7 basis.

62 SSSI was a task order set up to protect convoys for supplies, LOGCAP movements, and Class 1 food. DLA insisted that Convoy support continue or they would not support DoS for class 1 delivery. Class 3 Fuel did not require convoy support.

63 Interagency Agreement Between The United States Department of State and Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq (OSC-I) and the Defense Logistics Agency on behalf of the United States Department of Defense, September 2011, article 6.

This contract also contains many of the services that LOGCAP previously provided. Currently, the contract request for proposal document is available for potential vendors, and is posted online, on the Federal Business Opportunities webpage, a U.S. Government business opportunity web site.\textsuperscript{65} The proposed award of this contract will be in late 2013, providing there is no protest from any LOGCAP contractor, which could potentially delay the award and implementation.

**The Class III (B) Transfer Concept**

As discussed in chapter 2, the DLA is the DoD Executive Agent for all bulk fuel support. The Defense Logistics Agency-Energy is DLA’s responsible agency for procurement and management of fuel through established contractors called Prime Vendors. The Prime Vendors are responsible for procurement and distribution to the locations in Iraq. Although Iraq is an energy rich country, the DLA continued to purchase fuel from Turkey and deliver southward to Iraq. DoS agreed with the DLA assessment that the Iraq wholesale to retail system was immature and could not provide dependable support to meet the current demands. Furthermore, DoS agreed that they would follow all DLA contractual provisions and purchase the minimum quantity or be in default. Once the situation in Iraq begins to stabilize and the retail system matures, DoS intends to purchase increasing quantities of fuel from the local economy and distribute on a site-by-site basis.

DLA energy LNOs and DoS agreed to institute a control mechanism for monitoring fuel consumption in order to provide timely ordering. The DoS continued to

\textsuperscript{65}Solicitation and details of the BLISS DoS contract see U.S. Department of State, “Baghdad Life Support Services (BLISS).”
use the LOGCAP contract to manage fuel operations for each enduring site. The LOGCAP site manager was responsible for reporting daily consumption, conducting a daily inventory, ensuring the availability of storage capability for incoming shipments, and documenting and reporting fuel deliveries.  

This data was transmitted daily from all sites to a LOGCAP fuel analyst, who in turn, would consolidate the data and provide reports to the Baghdad Embassy. To order fuel, The LOGCAP site manager, in coordination with the USM-I site manager, would submit a recommended site fuel order to the LOGCAP Fuel Analyst and USM-I GSO. Upon DoS approval, the orders were entered in a Defense Logistics Agency-Energy system called the Ground Paperless Ordering & Receipt Transactions Screen. After a fuel shipment is received at the storage site, the LOGCAP site manager, using the Ground Paperless Ordering & Receipt Transactions Screen system, verified the shipment receipt, made changes to the shipping document as required, and then submits them to the GSO for payment. Defense Logistics Agency-Energy LNOs assisted DoS personnel in understanding the process and trained new personnel in the use of the ordering and monitoring the system.

As in the case of Class I, Class III (B) distribution presented some challenges. Fuel tankers would arrive from Turkey at the Iraq border checkpoint known as Habur Gate. The fuel distribution process typically required a 21 day order to delivery cycle. The customs clearance process for all fuel trucks coming from Turkey took approximately 10 days. Upon order submission, the LOGCAP contractor would notify the Logistics Management Cell, who would prepare and submit the required customs

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clearance documentation. In order to minimize tanker disruptions at the border, the DLA insisted that USM-I provide an expediter to facilitate the clearance process. Once cleared, the tankers would proceed to the Taji or Kirkuk logistics hubs and wait for clearance to deliver the fuel to its final destination. In the event that a truck did not reach the intended delivery site as scheduled, the contracted vendor was responsible to replace the tanker as quickly as possible.

Due to the amount of uncertainty involved in the fuel distribution process, DoS established two contingency methods of resupply to ensure the uninterrupted supply of fuel to all enduring sites. First, they established of Blanket Purchase Agreements with local vendors to allow for emergency resupply in limited quantities. Second, they established a redistribution process from the regional Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq sites. The DoS site manager would notify the GSO of the requirement, who would, in turn, task the LOGCAP contractor to satisfy the requirement with internal resources.

The DoS end state is to eventually end this very manpower complex arrangement, and procure fuel from local Iraqi companies using blanket purchase orders. DoS leadership is eager to expand the local supply strategy for fuel, and continues the process of awarding small business contracts to assist the GSO office in the purchase, storage, consolidation, and delivery of fuel throughout our diplomatic sites in Iraq.

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67Ibid., Articles 6 and 7.

68Kennedy, June 28, 2012.
The Sustainment Services Transfer Concept

LOGCAP played a primary role in supporting wartime Iraq and was a significant contributor to the military to civilian logistic transition process. Before 2009, DoD was the sole funding source for LOGCAP services. DoS and DoD agreed that the best way forward for transition was to continue this arrangement, using LOGCAP as a bridge situation utilizing two parallel task orders, DoD TO-159 and DoS TO-151.\(^6^9\) With this agreement, Iraqi support costs would be split 52 percent for DoD and 48 percent for DoS. This arrangement would be modified in December 2011 and DoS would assume all financial responsibility.\(^7^0\) This arrangement, while expedient, could not be sustained on a long-term basis due to DoS personnel and funding constraints. DoS and DoD provided Contract Officer Representatives to monitor LOGCAP’s performance services and pricing practices for all services and supplies contracted. The DoS Chief of Mission Contract Officer Representatives were responsible for the daily oversight of the ordering, receipt, and acceptance processes for all LOGCAP services.

All required services were within the LOGCAP contract statement of work and described in detail in the performance work statement, which identified each service and

\(^{6^9}\)State noted that without life support provided through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) managed by the Army Sustainment Command, State would be forced to redirect its resources towards developing, implementing, and overseeing a massive new life support infrastructure in Iraq. State requested to continue to receive contract management and oversight support from DoD and to remain on LOGCAP for the short term, until either local conditions improved to permit supply and support through more traditional means, or until State could establish its own life support infrastructure through its own contractors. GAO, \textit{IRAQ Drawdown}, 40.

\(^{7^0}\)This was negotiated between senior managers of DoD senior acquisition and technology secretary Gary Motsek and Under Secretary for Management Kennedy for DoS, in 2009/2010.
subservice, the associated performance metrics, and the compliance measures. The
enduring presence transition team, a combination of LOGCAP trusted agents and DoS
management personnel were tasked to analyze over 300 performance work line items.
Each service was evaluated and then re-validated to produce an acquisition concept
matrix. This matrix documented each LOGCAP service and its projected termination
date.\textsuperscript{71} The acquisition concept matrix is located at Appendix A. At the designated
termination date, services would be provided by a combination of DoS solicited
Indefinite Requirements Quantity, concession contracts, or simply discontinued.

LOGCAP provided a variety of services for the DoS in addition to the Class I and
Class III (B) support mentioned previously. First, they were responsible for the
production, packaging, storage, and distribution of bulk water. Second, they were
responsible to provide common-user land transportation for the movement of materiel
and equipment in support of programs and projects located throughout Iraq. This
included both transportation asset management and movement control. Third, LOGCAP
continued to provide billeting, medical support, and food services for transient personnel.
Fourth, they provided environmental management services, to include the handling and
disposal of hazardous materials. Fifth, they initially managed the postal operations
through the Army Post Office system and then transitioned the service to accommodate
the Diplomatic Postal Office system. Except for some specific Diplomatic Postal Office
restrictions, these two systems operate in a similar fashion. Finally, LOGCAP continued
its support of morale and welfare activities for each enduring site. DoS, however, lacked

\textsuperscript{71}See Appendix A for an example of US Embassy Iraq acquisition strategy.
the internal capacity to provide proper oversight of these services throughout such a vast area, and therefore, called upon the DCMA-Iraq to provide contract management support.

The DCMA provided Contingency Contract Administration Services in Iraq for both DoD and DoS. Without DCMA support, DoS would have been unable to execute a separate task order through the LOGCAP program. DCMA’s main focus was to monitor the LOGCAP program in Iraq, providing contract oversight and quality assurance on behalf of the DoS. The DCMA provided Administrative Contracting Officers to manage, and if necessary, modify the contract to meet customer needs. The DCMA provided a number of additional functions such as the oversight of contractor billing and the proper accountability and use of government furnished or funded equipment. Contract oversight was decentralized to a management team consisting of DCMA Administrative Contracting Officers, DCMA Quality Assurance Representatives, and USM-I Contract Officer Representatives located at each enduring site. Each team was responsible to review the change management process and ensure that requested services were valid and that funding was available. Site Contract Officer Representatives conducted inspection performance audits, performed technical evaluations for new requirements, reviewed and approved contractor work hours, and participated in monthly contractor performance reviews. Written performance reviews were consolidated monthly on the premise that they would improve contractor performance at all sites. LOGCAP services and the
associated DCMA support will terminate by the end of 2013, upon implementation of the DoS Baghdad Life Support System-Iraq contract.\textsuperscript{72}

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study examined the DoD to DoS agency to agency transfer of Class I subsistence, Class III bulk fuels, and sustainment services support in concert with the military withdrawal from Iraq in December, 2011. Both the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* and the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 clearly articulate the need for, and direct unity of effort. The transition of these three functions provides an excellent example of interagency cooperation in an environment that was neither permissive, nor mature. Both DoS and DoD faced considerable challenges in order to continue these functions; to include a continuous diminishing military population, a continuous increase of diplomatic personnel, and a variety of mobility restrictions as a result of the host nation policies and procedures. While this transition can be deemed successful, DoS can gain insights from this experience and should consider three

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74 The proposed combined DoD and State presence in Iraq after December 2011 would be unprecedented. In light of this unprecedented challenge, in a justification and request accompanying an April 2010 memorandum, State noted that without life support provided through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) managed by the Army Sustainment Command, State would be forced to redirect its resources towards developing, implementing, and overseeing a massive new life support infrastructure in Iraq. Thus, recognizing the expertise of DoD, State requested to continue to receive contract management and oversight support from DoD and to remain on LOGCAP for the short term, until either local conditions improved to permit supply and support through more traditional means, or until State could establish its own life support infrastructure through its own contractors.
recommended actions in order to better prepare to conduct these transfers in similar situations in the future.

First, DoS and DoD should develop a Whole of Government unified plan and not just an elaborate checklist of tasks to be mutually accomplished.\textsuperscript{75} This plan must be written in a manner that it is easily understood and accessible to all members of the transition team. The plan must include a sustainment roadmap, using common doctrine, language, and references to allow for a smoother transition process. The plan must address which services are truly needed rather than desired, and must account for DoS resource constraints.\textsuperscript{76} Finally, the plan must consider the implications involved in both the change in the security environment and the implementation of host nation policies and procedures upon the withdrawal of military forces.

Second, DoS logistics planners and implementers directly involved with the day-to-day sustainment transition efforts should be afforded the opportunity to participate in various DoD education and training programs. One example could be the Army Logistics University, located at Fort Lee, Virginia. This university provides a number of commodity specific courses such as subsistence and fuel, as well as a variety of courses that address joint and service specific processes in developing and maintaining a military sustainment system. These courses could give the DoS logistician valuable insights in the understanding of how the Army sustains itself in both permissive and non-permissive

\textsuperscript{75} Tony Cappacio, “Audit: Iraq Postwar Plan Poor,” \textit{Arkansas Democrat Gazette}, (July 28, 2008).

environments. Another option is for DoS to consider sending more GSO personnel to attend the Command and General Staff College located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Through an interagency agreement with the DoD, DoS receives several allocations per year to attend this 10 month course, but primarily chooses Foreign Service Officers as the recipients of these allocations. The course curriculum provides education on a variety of topics spanning the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Additionally, a number of lessons focus specifically on interagency capabilities, coordination, and integration. GSO employees could benefit immensely from courseware in the areas of logistics, contracting, and force management provided throughout the standard curriculum, and also available within the college electives program. These courses would provide the DoS logistician the opportunity to better understand how DoD develops, resources, and maintains a sustainment system capable of supporting military operations. Armed with this understanding, a DoS logistician can be better prepared to plan future transitions of this nature.

Third, future transfers will require the early identification and preparation of DoD LNOs to participate in the transition process. While DoD LNOs are extremely familiar with the operation of a military sustainment system, they lack an understanding of DoS operations and processes. In particular, LNOs should gain an understanding of how the GSO provides embassy sustainment in a typical diplomatic environment. This could occur through a personnel exchange program agreement between the two departments. These exchanges should facilitate understanding and cooperation between these two organizations, resulting in an improved quality of effort during future transitions.
Recommendations for Further Research

Since this study was limited in scope, considering only the transfer of subsistence, fuel, and services, other aspects of the transition process are worthy of additional research and analysis. First, the interagency transfer of U.S. Government owned equipment left behind was particularly challenging due to the compressed military withdrawal and transition timeline. Standardized procedures should be developed between the two organizations to enable a streamlined process that satisfies each of their accountability requirements.77 Second, this study did not adequately consider the challenges involved in the transition of military provided security, air transportation, and medical support. Study of these critical functions may help alleviate some of these challenges encountered in Iraq. Finally, DoS relied heavily on the Army LOGCAP program to bridge the capability gap between DoD and DoS sustainment. Perhaps DoS should consider a similar, but less robust contract capability that will enable them to conduct the transition of services more efficiently and at a lower cost. Adequately addressing these issues will be extremely useful in shaping the upcoming DoS and DoD transition in Afghanistan or future transitions of a similar nature.

77The Department has always coordinated closely with DoD on the accountability, transfer, and support requirements for items that the Department has custody. We re-purposed thousands of containerized housing units (CHUs), as well as generators, water purification units, dining facility equipment, and the like. We are applying our lessons learned and best practices to the transition efforts in Afghanistan. Our primary lesson was that the timing of equipment transfers was critical and presented challenges due to the compressed military withdrawal and transition timeline in Iraq.
GLOSSARY

Area of Responsibility (AOR)—Those geographic boundaries in which a CINC/ASCC or other Department of the Army organizations has an assigned mission to provide complete military planning, operations, and support functions.

Calendar Days—Every day of the year including weekends and holidays. This includes 365 days in a year, 366 days in a Leap Year.

COCOM—Non-transferable command authority established by Title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.

Concept Plan (CONPLAN)—An operation plan in concept format.

Contingency Contract—A properly executed contract under which the contractor would be required to maintain an acceptable level of readiness during peacetime. The contract would also include one or more options for performance during specified wartime or other situations. If such a situation should occur, a duly authorized contracting officer would exercise the option(s).

Contracting Officer (KO)—A Government employee, physically on site, with full authority to contractually commit the Contractor on all matters pertaining to contract performance, administration, and funding.

Contracting Officer's Representative (COR)—A Government employee, physically on site, who is authorized to represent the KO in technical phases of the Contractor work, but is not authorized to change any of the terms and conditions of the contract.

Corrective Action—The analysis and implementation of required improvements and corrections by the Contractor for the nonconformance to or nonconformance of the contract requirements. The analysis and implementation actions will address both the effected service and the process used for the service to preclude future nonconformance.

Customer—Authorized Government employee that uses services provided by the Contractor.
Customer Complaint—A method of surveillance which is initiated by a written or verbal notification of dissatisfaction with the Contractor’s performance.

Day—Shall be construed to mean a normally scheduled workday.

Defect—An instance of noncompliance regarding a contract requirement. A defect may be the result of either non-performance or poor performance.

Deficiency—An instance of noncompliance as relates to the contract requirements. A single deficiency may or may not constitute a defect.

Emergency Work—Work which takes priority over all other work and requires immediate action, including diverting employees from other jobs if necessary to cover the emergency. This work is necessary for protection, safety, or to meet a critical operational mission requirement.

Engineering Services—Applies to engineering, design, and construction services, and real property maintenance activities (facilities engineering).

Evaluation—The process of comparing an observed performance indicator to an established standard. Various techniques are used in the evaluation process including inspection, testing, physical measurements, review of records, and validation of complaints.

Event—Contingency conditions from heightened international tensions or states of military readiness through period of armed conflict up to and including a Congressionally declared State of War.

Force—Military personnel and DoD civilians necessary to fulfill a mission.

Functional Plan—Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of U.S. citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense Agency. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of CINC initiated plans is not normally required.

Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)—Government furnished equipment provided to the Contractor for use in fulfilling the terms of this contract only maintained by the Contractor and returned to the Government at contract conclusion and/or termination in the same condition received less normal wear.
Government Furnished Facilities—Buildings (or parts thereof), storage facilities, and parking areas designated by the Government for the exclusive use of the Contractor in fulfilling the terms of this contract only.

Government Furnished Material—Equipment, replacement parts, and other consumables provided to the Contractor for the maintenance and/or repair of the installation real property.

Government Furnished Property (GFP)—All equipment, facilities, and material provided by the Government for exclusive use of the Contractor in fulfilling the terms of this contract only.

Hazardous Materials—Any material having hazardous characteristics, i.e., combustible liquids, corrosives, explosives, flammables, and compressed gases. They are classified according to the level of danger they present.

Hazardous Wastes—Hazardous Wastes are defined by USEPA as ignitable, corrosive, reactive, or toxic and may include specific substances cited in U.S. 40 CPR, Part 261 or EPA Regulation, Title 35, Subtitle G, Part 721, and/or present a significant hazard to human health and the environment. Special handling procedures and disposal facilities are required for their disposal by turn-in to DRMO-RI as described in the Hazardous Waste Disposal information issued by the RIA Environmental Coordinator.

Host Nation Support (HNS)—Civil and military assistance rendered in peace and war by a host nation to allied forces which are located on or in transit through the host nation’s territory. The bases for such assistance are bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded between the host nation and nation(s) having forces operating in the host nation’s territory.

Inspection—The procedure or process by which critical examination of a structure, mechanism, system, or procedure of service output is inspected to discover discrepancies and/or inefficiencies.

Interagency Coordination—Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008)

Logistics—Activities that support the movement and sustainment of a force. The five functional elements of logistics are supply, maintenance, transportation, services, and facilities.

On-Board Review—Conferences designated by the PCO to review Contractor progress or evaluate Contractor submitted documents. All On-Board review conferences will be held where designated by the PCO.
Operation Plan (OPLAN)—Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file.

A. OPLAN—An Operation Plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC’s Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats.

B. CONPLAN—An Operation Plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.

C. CONPLAN with TPFDD—A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces.

Performance Work Statement (PWS)—A document that identifies functional requirements and established standards for custodial services, including Statement of Work, Performance Requirements Summary, Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan, Attachments, governing directives, estimated workload, and general tasks and requirements.

Prepositioned Equipment—Equipment procured by the Government and/or the Contractor, and prepositioned prior to activation of an Event.

Quality Assurance (QA)—Those actions taken by the Government to inspect or check goods or services to determine that they meet or do not meet the requirements of the contract.


Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan—A written plan that details what is to be evaluated, how evaluations are to be accomplished, frequency of evaluations, evaluation
parameters, sampling guides, inspection checklists, and other information that QAE should have in order to provide effective QA.

Quality Control (QC)—A method used by the Contractor to control the quality of goods or services produced.

Surveillance—The process of monitoring Contractor performance by direct evaluation, observation, or other information sources.

Surveillance Plan—A written document used for quality assurance surveillance. The document contains sampling guides, checklists, and decision tables.

Umbrella Contract—A broad contract that covers many functional areas in one or more locations. One prime Contractor with a suitable management structure could provide services by using a combination of organic assets, HNS, and third country contractors.

Unitized Group Rations—There are currently 4 options in the UGR™ family: the UGR-Heat and Serve (H&S) consists of precooked, shelf-stable food issued in lightweight polymeric trays; the UGR-B is the primary group ration of the Marine Corps, and contains shelf-stable ingredients to prepare complete meals that meet the Corps’s expeditionary requirements; the UGR-A consists of both shelf-stable and perishable components—it delivers the highest-quality, most fresh-like group field feeding meals available anywhere refrigeration is available; the unique UGR-Express (E) uses chemical heating technology to provide hot food anywhere on the planet, without the need for specialized field feeding equipment.

Work Plan—A written schedule of tasks or activities designed to satisfy a defined requirement within specified time from and at a predetermined cost.
Source: Created by Randy LeCompte, COMCOR, with collaboration with author, June 2012.
### APPENDIX B

#### DFAC SITES IRAQ

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<th>Site Code</th>
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*Source:* Concept of Support for the U.S. Mission in Iraq (USM-I), Unpublished September 2011.
## APPENDIX C

### REMAINING ENDURING DFACS IRAQ

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<th>Dining Facility Site Location</th>
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*Source: Concept of Support for the U.S. Mission in Iraq (USM-I), Unpublished September 2011.*
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