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**Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)**
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COVER

Fort Leavenworth will observe its 150th anniversary on 7 May. In honor of the sesqui-centennial, this month's cover is a montage of the fort's history, featuring the frontier soldier as he appeared in 1827. The art was done by staff member Jozet R. Leles, the Sergeant Major of the Brazilian Edition. Sgt Maj Leles joined the Military Review from Brazil in May 1976.

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Peasant Participation

I take issue with Roger Darling's article, "The Unique Capacities of North Vietnam in Achieving Peasant Participation in Revolution," (Military Review, January 1977) that the basic lesson to be derived from our Vietnam experience is that Vietnam was the epitome of social revolution and that the political power of the peasant exposed the weakness of the West.

Of course, South Vietnamese peasant support of the North Vietnamese Army played a part in North Vietnam's successes. And, certainly, the North offered peasants access to some political power. But these factors certainly aren't the most important lessons. The key lesson is that North Vietnam with a well-equipped, extremely patient, attacking army, provided with unlimited sanctuary in Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam, militarily defeated the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, demoralized by waning US support and some disastrous tactical decisions. We shouldn't for a moment think that "social revolution" was the important issue; it was very much subordinate to the military situation.

Lt Col M. J. Taranto, USA

Army Force Structuring

First Lieutenant John C. Binkley's article, "A History of US Army Force Structuring," in the February Military Review is a well-done trip through some of the torturous territory we have traversed in our military efforts to maintain a flexible fighting force. While it is historically accurate as to our efforts in the past, I do not feel it accurately conveys the new "winds of change" now blowing in the US Army. It seems to me that we are attempting to divorce ourselves from the old technique of designing an organization first, then equipping it with weapons with which to fight. This old "add-on" technique is simply too cumbersome and wasteful with our increasingly complex weapons. The latest example of this technique is the TOW which was added to existing organizations creating not only operational but maintenance problems as well. The "new wind" I spoke of earlier is to organize around weapon systems—optimizing their numbers and locations in various echelons, then build a personnel structure to use and support them adequately. Considering the increased cost and sophistication of tomorrow's weapons systems, the revised structuring concept is not only logical, but indeed essential if we are intelligently to employ and maintain our equipment.

Lt Col Harry W. Crandall, USA

Cross Fire Generated

Your Reader Forum is beginning to generate a cross fire reminiscent of The London Times. If I may, I would like to add another round, this one in response to Colonel Frederick Dahlquist's letter in the February 1977 issue. His letter commented on ideas expressed by Lieutenant Colonel George F. Steger and Colonel Dallas Brown.

The original issue was how rigidly Soviet commanders adhere to prearranged plans when conducting operations. Colonel Dahlquist has raised a second issue: What is the duty of the intelligence analyst in advising the commander with respect to current planning dogma?

On the first issue, I must agree with Colonel Brown. The question is not that Colonel Savkin says, "The main effort must be concentrated on the most important axis or sector and at the right time," which is unquestioned Soviet doctrine. Rather, the problem is to identify the main axis given Soviet ability to shift second-echelon forces rapidly. Operational superrigidity on the part of the Soviet Army is a myth. It is true that (continued on page 112)
Soviet planning is centralized and extremely detailed; however, once an operation is under way, commanders are expected to use initiative and imagination.

In the Lwów-Sandomir operation in July 1944, Soviet commanders made two typical changes in plan. When the 15th Corps breakthrough operation did not proceed as scheduled, the 3d Guards Tank Army was committed in the sector ahead of schedule. Even more interesting, when the second planned breakthrough in a sector far to the south did not materialize, the 4th Tank Army was moved overnight a distance of over 100 kilometers and committed behind the 3d Guards Tank Army into the 15th Rifle Corps sector. The width of the breakthrough sector was only 6 to 12 kilometers. This shift of tank forces was accompanied by a massive shift of air power. About 75 percent of the entire frontal aviation was committed in this narrow sector.

The second issue which Colonel Dahlquist raises is more important. He remarks that:

...it is the duty of the intelligence analyst to view the threat in the light of it [the new US doctrine] and to devise ways of helping our commanders read the battlefield.

I would hope the intelligence analyst views the threat in a completely objective light, without reference to our or any other doctrine. Of course, he should help commanders read the battlefield, but, when our doctrine is predicated on an erroneous view of the threat, he should not limit himself to attempts to make it seem workable, but should point out the fundamental errors in premises. Incidentally, in indicating that we should adhere to doctrine, come what may, Colonel Dahlquist unintentionally makes us sound more rigid than the Soviets.

I share Colonel Brown's concern about the effectiveness of a thin, forward-active defense tactic, and for more reasons than just the flexibility of Soviet commanders.

John Sloan
Fort Leavenworth Hall of Fame

General Joseph Eggleston Johnston will be inducted into the Fort Leavenworth Hall of Fame during a ceremony to be held 6 May honoring the former Fort Leavenworth commander.

General Johnston served at Fort Leavenworth from June 1855 to April 1857 and served briefly as post commander in 1855 and again in 1856. Johnston, an 1829 graduate of the US Military Academy, rose to brigadier general in 1860 when he was appointed Quartermaster General. The next year, Johnston, in spite of General Winfield Scott’s persuasive arguments to the contrary, resigned his commission in the US Army and joined the Confederate Army as a brigadier general.

His actions during the First Battle of Bull Run earned him promotion to general. He was the fourth-ranking general in the Confederate Army.

After the war, he sold insurance for 11 years before trying his hand at politics. He was elected to the House of Representatives from Virginia and served from 1879 to 1881. In 1885, President Cleveland appointed him Commissioner of Railroads, a post he held for four years.

Also in 1885, General Johnston served as honorary pallbearer at General Grant’s funeral. Again, in February 1891, he served in the same capacity at General Sherman’s funeral. However, while standing bareheaded as General Sherman’s casket was being moved from his house to the caisson, General Johnston caught a cold which developed into pneumonia. He died on 21 March 1891.

General Johnston, a soldier-statesman, becomes the 30th member of the Hall of Fame, joining his contemporaries Robert E. Lee, Philip H. Sheridan and J. E. B. Stuart.
Terrorism, like leprosy or beri-beri, used to be some sort of exotic disease that struck only in strange places. It couldn't happen here. Not in a country where the drinking water was pure, the telephones had push buttons, and the white bread came sliced.

—From the flyleaf of Clutterbuck's Living With Terrorism

CONTEMPORARY terrorism has experienced three transitions—urban guerrilla warfare, transnational terrorism and international terrorism—while migrating to the industrialized societies. Contemporary terrorism is dynamic, politically motivated violence that frequently employs criminal methods to accomplish its objectives. Today, it poses a real threat to society.

To make matters worse, current indications are that it will become more serious over the coming decade as terrorists capitalize on the advantages of improved weapons technology and growing international support from radical governments. With few exceptions, it has retained the initiative, and governments have had to react to its innovations.

During this action-reaction cycle, terrorists have been forced to cross new thresholds of violence to retain their momentum. This has resulted in the three transitions that will be discussed here: The transition to urban guerrilla warfare in the 1960s in which guerrillas moved their tactics from their traditional battleground to ambush the government in the cities; a consideration of transnational terrorism during which political violence migrated via skyjacked jumbo jets to the industrialized societies in the early 1970s; and, finally, an outline of the emerging transition to international terrorism in which terrorism will be controlled by sovereign states.

Background

Contemporary terrorism has spared neither the developing states of the Third World nor the modern industrialized states of the Northern Hemisphere. In fact, a study recently com-

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completed by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Political Research, which analyzed terrorist incidents over the past 10 years indicates the exponential increase of incidents between 1971-73 and their geographical distribution (see Figures 1 and 2). Its degree of permeation into society's fabric is indicated by the frequency of daily news accounts that cover terrorist incidents and detailed plots of novels such as Black Sunday, The Kidnapping of the President, and The Hour of the Wolf. Even the comic strip character Buz Sawyer has been involved with the terrorist dilemma. Several writers also have shown an inclination to write about "living with terrorism." Some examples: Richard Clutterbuck, a retired British brigadier general, with extensive experience combating guerrillas, has published a book by that title; a more continental view is presented by Theo Sommer; a Newsweek general editor recently presented his thoughts and The Washington Post followed suit. Each author concluded...
that this phenomenon exhibits serious durability, its threat potential is increasing and we should expect to have to live with it for a considerable time. These are not very cheerful prospects.

In spite of Walter Laqueur's well-worded argument in Harper's Magazine that terrorism is futile, it does not appear that terrorists will stop their attacks for the reasons he outlines. Since living with terrorism is an unacceptable condition, surely there are ways in which solutions to the various situations that spawn terrorism ultimately may be confronted and defeated. Countermeasures and responses already have been worked out successfully in some cases. The decline of skyjacking in the United States attests to the success in thwarting one of the terrorist's favorite target dimensions. Moreover, the Israeli success in rescuing the hostages at Entebbe dramatically demonstrates that determined governments can cope successfully with the terrorist threat.

Coping with terrorism is a vitally important subject. It also is a very carefully safeguarded one. Govern-
CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM

ments under attack have announced their overall policies in very clear terms. The US policy of no deals is a good example. However, they are, for many reasons, considerably less prone to discuss how they cope with specific situations—hostages, skyjacking, bombings, and so forth. Privately, they discuss such techniques quite openly among the security forces of the attacked nations.

Most importantly, there are further indications of growing mutual cooperation, not merely agreements to exchange information on terrorists and “ideas,” but, rather, precise exchange of direct assistance such as that noted by Stevenson in his recounting of the Entebbe raid. Many nations, particularly the British, were helpful in the development of “identikits” on the individual terrorists. Overall, the generous provision of intelligence data gave the raid a high probability of success from the very start. One gets the impression that the conduct of the raid was a concern secondary to the driving desire for detailed up-to-the-minute intelligence and the logistical requirements—airlift capability, refueling and medical services. Indeed, Brigadier General Shomron, one of the leading planners, saw nothing unusual about the raid, noting that:

... from the moment that we will be on the ground in Entebbe, we can carry it out easily. We have done things a thousand times more complicated. 4

With the success of Entebbe and more recent successful actions to free hostages, like that of the Egyptian commandos in Cairo, this is a good point in time to review the transitions of terrorism. Some analysts already believe the terrorist threat is beginning to dissipate. To some, the sheer weight of world opinion works against it, and others believe its attempts to change governments have been blunted by legal adaptations such as those applied by the Bonn Government in response to the Baader-Meinhof gang. 15

Obvious progress has been made in the industrial societies without corrupting democratic values or the rule of law. This is plainly not the case in some Latin-American developing societies. 16

Terrorism may have “peaked” for the moment, but, in the opinion of this writer, the situation will not become dormant or disappear.

In consideration of the general situation described above, this analysis of contemporary terrorism proceeds with the thought that what terrorists have done in the past may help prepare us for what they may attempt in the immediate future. A descriptive analysis such as this is not made easier by the fact that the most predictable characteristic of contemporary terrorists has been their unpredictability. Before moving on to the transitions of this modern threat to society, some basic comments on terrorism are required.

What Is Terrorism?

Defining terrorism remains a significant problem. As there is no universally accepted definition, only by adding descriptive adjectives can the magnitude of disagreement be reduced to manageable proportions. By adding political, we develop the descriptive construct of political terrorism, and certain meanings can be ascribed to this term. In turn, we can develop a working definition that implies a number of specific conditions or components.

Establishment of a working definition is acceptable on an interim basis. While aiding research and discussion, it does not resolve the expanding legal
problems occasioned by acts of terrorism or aid its resolution by democratic governments and international organizations. Terror at the international level is complicated by international politics. Continuing efforts by a United Nations' committee to define terrorism mirror these difficulties. Lester Sobel's comment further illustrates the extent of the problem:

In general, the word terrorism is used today to define almost all illegal acts of violence committed for political purposes by clandestine groups. 17

Indeed, journal articles proposing definitions of terrorism seem to have become a veritable cottage industry even though much of it is serious discourse.

Much of the recent research on terrorism has spent more time in outlining the components of terrorism than trying to prescribe a universal definition. A concise definition would help since it would provide a pattern to which we could begin to pin some predictions on the most likely directions this troublesome phenomenon ultimately may take. Since that cannot be done at the moment, we can emphasize that the terrorism being analyzed here is that, as noted above, committed for political purposes. Its commonly ascribed characteristics may be set forth as components of a working definition. This is accomplished very well by Milbank's study which provides some of the best insight on the problem by providing common characteristics of action and then tying them to terrorism with descriptive actions. Milbank's definitions, which follow, are used as the referent definitions and components within this article.

Common Characteristics: The threat or use of violence for political purposes when (1) such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than its immediate victims, and (2) its ramifications transcend national boundaries (as a result, for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution).

International Terrorism: Such action when carried out by individuals or groups controlled by sovereign states.

Transnational Terrorism: Such action when carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states. 18

To put the current transition in perspective, it is helpful first to recount the highlights of its antecedents. Urban guerrilla warfare, a unique departure from classic guerrilla warfare, represents the first transition in this trilogy of transitions.

Urban Guerrilla Warfare

There are numerous clear-cut situations in which guerrillas have moved to urban areas. This has been done in spite of the sage warnings of Mao, Lenin, and even "Che" Guevara and Debray. To establish a reference point, a question must be answered: Why the shift of guerrilla warfare to the cities? Like most of the questions with political connotations and denotations, there is no single answer to this one either. Rather, there are a series of answers to explain the shift. Urban guerrilla warfare represents nothing more than the opening of a second front to challenge the legitimacy of the government in power. Although there is a symmetry in its application in both industrialized societies (North America and Europe) and

CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM
developing societies (Latin America and the Middle East), its results often may prove asymmetrical to the objectives of the guerrillas if they fail to succeed in winning mass popular support.

Urban guerrilla warfare is not significantly different in its application than rural guerrilla warfare. The same requirements hold true for popular support, recruitment, security, and so forth. Alberto Bayo Giroud's *One Hundred Fifty Questions for a Guerrilla* and Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* have great ideas for guerrillas regardless of their operational areas. In the long history of guerrilla struggles, cities frequently have been the scene of clandestine underground activities. Some of these have had tragic results for the participants such as the Warsaw ghetto uprisings. Others have been more successful such as the Maquis in Paris at the end of World War II. In the post-World War II revolutions, cities did not play a dominant role—certainly not in the China experience in which Mao surrounded the cities with a hostile countryside and choked them off. In the 1960s, the Cubans were more successful in their direct application of guerrilla techniques within urban areas.

Yet this does not explain the convincing shift to the cities during the 1960s and 1970s and continuing arguments that future guerrilla struggles will be decided in urban areas. When one considers the increasing technological sophistication of armed and security forces and accepts the fact that access to the people is necessary in order to propagandize, control and obtain security from them, this shift begins to make sense. Without oversimplification, technological superiority of armed and security forces has been a great impetus for the move to urban areas. More importantly, that is where the people are—both the dissidents and their potential supporters.

During his research on urban guerrilla warfare, Robert Moss concluded that, in Uruguay, 80 percent of the population lived in urban areas and almost half of the country's total population resided in the capital city. Moss noted that this urbanization process has gone farthest in Latin America where more than two-thirds of the populations of Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela and Chile lived in towns. For Mexico, Brazil and Colombia, the figure stood at more than 50 percent. Moss' conclusion that "the cities of the third world are like sponges, sucking in the surplus rural populations faster than they can absorb them" illustrates the potential development of a critical mass susceptible to political manipulation.

To a certain extent, one must oversimplify to account for this newer phenomenon regardless of the amount of data. Additionally, the failure of "Che" himself in Bolivia must be added to the growing list of mental "tangible-intangibles." But even considering this event with other "reasons," the primary cause of the shift remains the relatively simple fact that guerrillas shifted their operations to the urban areas because that's where the people are—no less in Latin America than in Northern Ireland. This is not to argue that rural guerrilla warfare is about to pass out of existence. Quite the contrary. It will be around in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia in its typical rural form for many years, and we can expect it to become an ally of urban guerrilla activities within those developing societies possessing large urban populations. The type of guerrilla warfare
will predominate where it has freest access to the people, for guerrillas cannot survive without widespread popular support.

Before leaving this point of discussion, the facts must be emphasized that many of the best targets are in urban areas and that the advantage of anonymity is more available for sympathizers and helpers. Particularly significant during mass activities are the characteristics of crowd behavior and bandwagon approaches to propaganda support to politicize discontent. In a more direct sense, Russell and Hildner provide additional explanations based on an easy access to:

- Terrorist targets such as foreign embassies, diplomatic personnel, police, banks, businesses, and so forth.
- Funds to support operational activities.
- Food.
- Medical supplies and services.
- Arms by purchase or theft.
- Intelligence collection.

The Cuban model provided the basic spirit of contemporary revolution and helps to explain the failure of rural revolution in Latin America.

Leaving aside the activities of the Castro group in the mountains, which are reasonably well-known, we can look for information at the urban side of the struggle. Even though they were vulnerable to government forces, the urban guerrillas succeeded in pinning down about 15,000 troops (roughly half of the government's force) and, more significantly, managed to provoke an intensified use of counterterrorism that resulted in both complete loss of popular support for Batista and further shattered the morale of the armed forces.

With the revolution won, Guevara contributed three fundamental lessons to the conduct of revolutionary movements in Latin America:

- Popular forces can win a war against the army.
- It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.
- In underdeveloped America, the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.

Debray built on this and developed the elitist thesis that revolution could be built from the apex down rather than from the base upward—namely, that leadership alone could create the symptoms of crisis and the understanding which would create popular demand and support for a revolutionary movement, simply by making the people more aware of their needs. The resulting Guevara-Debray thesis downgraded the cities as "lukewarm incubators" where no significant political struggle could take place and led them to the rural areas where their thesis was proved incorrect. Result: "Che" was killed on 8 October 1967, and Debray imprisoned.

The first test of the foco theory in the countryside failed. Yet it has thrived in an urban environment for many years. Thus far, it has not produced an identifiable revolution, and those applying it have ignored the role of popular support while opting for a vanguard movement of elitists. The foco theory has been modified by these revolutionary elites who have hoped for the spontaneous uprisings described by Clutterbuck. Terrorism has been the catalyst for this transition from urban guerrilla warfare to transnational terrorism because it has been a means by which a small group has been able to attack the government and its institutions without overwhelming popular support.
CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM

The Catalyst of Transition

Terrorism is a basic form of guerrilla warfare and, in itself, is not a new weapon. Terrorism is simply a good deal easier to apply these days. According to Mallin:

... terror tactics usually encompass three basic types of activity: killings, bombings and kidnappings (including skyjackings, which are a form of mass kidnapping). 27

Terrorism is facilitated by the dissemination of available literature and a worldwide communication system which spreads the word rapidly on new techniques and successes.

Terrorism provides the primary weaponry in the arsenal of the urban guerrilla. Again, the Cuban model provided some new methods—namely, skyjacking and political kidnapping. In February 1958, Juan Fangio, the popular race driver, was held for several days, and, in June, Raul Castro set a more important precedent with the seizure of 48 Americans and two Canadians. His objective was to get the government to stop air attacks on guerrilla positions in eastern Cuba. 28 He was successful, and the extent of his success was not lost on active and potential revolutionaries. The world has witnessed continued refinement of these tactics since his earlier success.

By the late 1960s, it became apparent to other revolutionary groups that the tactics and methods by which urban guerrilla warfare were being pursued could be expanded to a regional context. With a satisfactory climate, many thought this could be expanded further to a global basis.

Transnational Terrorism

This transition is particularly significant because it transported terrorists to a new stage where they could demonstrate their wares more easily before the mass media, and they could allow their ingenuity and ability to innovate full reach in their new surroundings. Media impact and the success of the activities of urban guerrillas caused the spread of their techniques from the developing countries to the more industrialized societies of Western Europe and North America.

In the early stages, much of this resulted in nothing more than the adoption of urban guerrilla techniques by domestic dissidents. Terrorism was involved, but, initially, it was manageable terrorism associated with hostage cases involving skyjackings and bombings. This changed dramatically as guerrillas became terrorists and began to disregard the agreed conventions of warfare. As parts of the world went to war with terrorism, the problem became increasingly complicated by the presence of two factors:

• "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." 29

• Chalmers Johnson’s “three T’s”—targets, technology and toleration. 30

An excellent example of factor one was provided recently by Libyan leader Moamar al-Gaddafi at the Conference of Nonaligned States when he stated that, if the Palestinian “struggle is terrorism, then we accept the accusation and it is an honor to us. It is the Zionists who are terrorists.” 31

The components of factor two are essentially self-explanatory and illustrate some of the reasons behind the rapid expansion of the terrorist threat to industrialized societies.

Building on the friendly relations established by the Latin-American urban guerrillas, transnational terrorism began to widen its scope in the early 1970s. This development significantly increased the threat of terrorism. Transnational terrorism quickly attained far wider range than urban
guerrilla warfare which remained essentially national in scope. Its ability to conduct extensive regional and limited global thrusts was demonstrated quickly by the Japanese Red Army, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Baader-Meinhof gang. Moreover, the success of transnational terrorism, as perceived by the terrorists, may accelerate the transition to international terrorism.

Transnational terrorism, like other forms of terrorism, is politically motivated. It becomes transnational by virtue of its mobility—it transcends national boundaries. Its ideological foundations, operational techniques and support infrastructure have demonstrated the ability to cross continents with amazing ease. There is nothing particularly novel about this explanation today. What is more unique today is that we now can identify positively three stages of development within the growth or maturation of transnational terrorism as a threat to legitimate governments.

First, there is a stage during which logistics support was provided based on ideological compatibility. Logistics support included weapons, explosives, safe houses, transport, funding and communications. Training soon was introduced, and, while this may be related back to both rural and urban guerrilla warfare situations, there is a noticeable difference. Rather than sending in a training team to guerrillas/terrorists operating in a national setting, terrorists were sent abroad to school in established terrorist training camps. The Baader-Meinhof gang, for example, trained in Jordan with the fedayeen before returning to West Germany and launching their terror offensive in 1972. The intensity of the training led them easily to cooperate in the next stage of transnational terrorism even though, according to Dr. Horchem and others, their training was not a complete success. 31

In the second stage, various terrorist organizations of different nationalities and different ethnic groups cemented their ideological and communal relationships by conducting terrorist operations in support of each other. Some of these operations were of short duration and consisted of the detonation of a single bomb. Others, like the Japanese Red Army's attack on the Lod airport on 30 May 1972, were far more serious. From the perspective of the terrorists, they also were far more effective. To a certain extent, this development caught the general public (and perhaps some internal security forces) by surprise. Russell reports that four successful terrorist operations of this nature were conducted by the Japanese Red Army in support of the PFLP between 1972-74. 34

Much of the time, the terrorists' innovative ability has kept them ahead of those seeking to neutralize or limit their destructiveness. This failure also is displayed in the third stage which is characterized by greater coordination of terrorist attacks and actual participation by third-country nations in the planning, support and conduct of transnational terrorism. 35 One of the most recent examples of this multinational cooperation and apparent coordination by terrorists culminated in the Israeli raid on Entebbe.

Earlier this year, this type of terrorist cooperation was discussed by several journalists and, according to the Associated Press (AP), a NATO report was published stating "an international terrorist network is operating globally with help from radical governments." 36 The AP report listed the
governments supporting terrorists as Iraq, Syria, South Yemen and Cuba. Much of this activity, like the recent Entebbe hostage situation, was tied to the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by other terrorists movements, and we now know that several governments are cooperating with terrorists. 

Today, we continue to see this highly developed cooperation among multinational terrorist teams. It is well-known and well-documented. While some difficulty is being experienced in establishing the limits of coordination effected by the PLO and the PFLP, it is mostly a question of magnitude. Certainly, the PLO is well-organized for such planning and coordination of terrorist attacks as described by Howard. Moreover, it apparently has a well-integrated logistic network extending throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Western Europe.

Since transnational terrorism now is operating in this last stage of development, it is not too early to ponder the emerging transition. Disagreeing with Walter Laqueur who considers terrorism futile over the long-term, one may expect terrorism probably will become a greater threat rather than running itself out. Keeping both possibilities in mind, the latter seems highly improbable during the near-range time frame (the next five years). Countermeasures are becoming more effective against domestic terrorists, and this will have a favorable impact on the security community. However, terrorism is transported easily to the designated target area, and international cooperation against the threat of transnational terrorism is not yet as effective as it ultimately will be. This vulnerability, particularly of industrialized societies, where the targets are, and the ability of terrorists to exploit new technology will provide the impetus for the third transition of terrorism.

International Terrorism

The transition to international terrorism represents its most advanced stage. More damage is done by fewer people with far fewer people watching, and no one knows who is actually responsible until some organization takes credit for the operation. International terrorism embraces the same techniques, perspectives and objectives. However, the salient difference is that a sovereign state (as compared to a nonstate actor such as the PLO) now exercises the command and control function. This relationship makes it possible to designate targets which may result in mass casualty situations. Unlike its antecedents, normative inhibitions will not pose a constraint for international terrorism. Extensive operations near the threshold of conventional war will be accompanied by intelligence exploitation and very sophisticated denial measures within international organizations.

Obviously, when a nation like Libya, for example, "controls" a PLO operation, it probably only has a rather tenuous command of the operation. That notwithstanding, the move to control (such as target designation and attack techniques) is a short step from providing logistics, intelligence and ideological support. Other nation-states have demonstrated this same ability to launch international terrorism. We may be curious about the Irish Republican Army and some European groups, but a variety of sources already have identified Libyans, South Yemenites and Cubans.

As international terrorism begins to pay larger dividends, it will con-
continue to expand its operational area. This expansion will include both the usual criminal expansion, radical governments bent on assisting various revolutionary movements, medium and large powers bent on improving their positions vis-à-vis their neighbors and surreptitious involvement of the superpowers. Not completely out of the question is the type of surrogate operations described by Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation that could take place. Such operations are made to order for the large and powerful, just as they are for the small and weak nations. They can be made nonattributable to the sponsoring nation, for example. Jenkins' analyses have given him the distinction of being a competent "weather vane" among those trying to defeat the terrorist challenge, and his characterization of these operations as a "new mode of conflict" may prove to be an apt title.

Today, terrorists continue to rely on the same weapons they have used traditionally: the bomb and the gun. Of course, as Clutterbuck has explained so carefully, a variety of modern bombs and fuzes and guns exist that are smaller and, like the Uzi, fire faster and are concealed more easily. This will change as terrorists begin to employ the advances in science and technology to assist in accomplishing their objectives. Greater use will be made of man-portable weaponry with a high first-round kill probability, ancillary communications equipment, more destructive demolitions and highly refined intelligence and countersurveillance techniques to avoid detection and compromise.

Possible employment of mass destructive weapons represents a threat of staggering magnitude for many of the industrialized societies and an increasing number of those in the Third World. With the proliferation of nuclear power plants and other sources of weapons grade plutonium, it will become far easier for terrorists to obtain or construct a nuclear device in the near future. The current debate over the possibility of the use of a nuclear device continues. Jenkins, for example, considers such a possibility unlikely because, among other things, it contradicts the basic objectives of the terrorists. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission also considers the threat unlikely, but, like Jenkins, they agree it cannot be discounted completely. One hopes this threat will not materialize, but a possibility by definition cannot be ruled out. Should the target be perceived as worth the attempt, some terrorist may take the chance.

Less attention has been directed toward the use of toxic substances even though they are easier to develop and disseminate than a nuclear device. In fact, a poison gas factory producing a type of nerve gas (DFP) for use by criminals was uncovered in Vienna this past March. Implications of the threat of international terrorism will expand as this transition progresses and industrialized societies become more popular targets.

This writer expects that terrorists will step up the frequency of incidents, their innovative diversity and their destructive capacity during the coming five years. Stevenson's comment that the PLO was training jet pilots in Uganda is a typical example of how innovative terrorists may become when equipped with more sophisticated weaponry. A safe wager is that frequency of occurrence also will increase as governments and some nonstate actors perceive the effectiveness of this "weapon" against their ene-
CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM

mies. Innovation of attack and destruction capability are correlated highly.

Conclusion

The threat posed by contemporary terrorism to society is recognized by most nations, and countermeasures are being developed to confront it. A successful defense for the long term requires that governments take decisive action with the full support of the citizenry to neutralize and destroy terrorist groups. These actions, when combined with and reinforced by the rule of law, offer the best chance for eliminating the terrorist threat.

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NOTES

1 David L. Milbank, International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis, Report for the Office of Political Research, Central Intelligence Agency, McLean, VA, 1976, pp 11 and 12. The quantitative analysis used to develop the data displayed within this report is based on Project ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) developed by Edward F. Mickolus in 1975. Recent correspondence with the author of this report reveals that followup research on the overall number of terrorist incidents is turning up many more. When completed, this may result in a doubling of the total number of incidents between 1968-75. However, the results of this subsequent analysis will not affect the thrust of this article. For an example of this type of analysis, see Edward F. Mickolus, "Negotiating for Hostages: A Policy Dilemma," Orbis, Volume XIX, Number 4, Winter 1976, pp 190-25.


5 Roy Crane, "Duz Sawyer," The Washington Star, 24 and 29 December 1976, pp D-3 and F-7 respectively.


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14 Ibid, p 76.


16 The case of Argentina appears particularly unique because of right-wing reaction and "death squads." For a recent example, see "15 Slainmen Follow Argentine Bombing," The Washington Post, 4 July 1976; and "Argentine Prisoner of Terror," The Milwaukee Journal, 13 July 1976.

17 Political Terrorism, Edited by Lester A. Sobel, Facts on File, NY, 1975, p 1.


19 For references to these and other key documents, see Jay Mallin, Terror and Urban Guerrillas, A Study of Tactics and Documents, University of Miami Press, Coral Gables, FL, 1972.


26 Clutterbuck, op. cit., pp 21-23.

27 Mallin, op. cit., p. 5.


32 For an early account of this activity, see J. Hempstone, "Are There Links Connecting Terrorists Around the World?", Baltimore Sun, 18 March 1973, p K5.

33 Horchem, op. cit., p. 28.


39 In all fairness to Professor Laqueur, terrorism ultimately may prove to be futile even though current indicators lend this writer to conclude otherwise in the hope for a more peaceful world, his conclusions are far more attractive.


44 Robert A. Jones, "Nuclear Peril Likely to Increase," Los Angeles Times, 9 April 1976, p B1. One is not comforted by the acceptance of this possibility as a growing threat in "U.S. News & World Report, 9 August 1976, p 26, or earlier comments on the long-range terrorist threat by Professor Schelling at the Arms Control Seminar: "Where people are now putting conventional bombs in secret vaults and lockers, by 1999 they will be able to sequester nuclear bombs. I imagine that getting hold of a bomb will not be difficult. Quoted in Stewart Dill McElrude, "Nuclear Arms Study Says a War Is Likely," The Christian Science Monitor, 13 November 1976, p 15.

45 Der Spiegel, 8 March 1976, pp 90 and 92-93.

46 For a discussion of how the United States may be affected by this transition, see John D. Elliot, "International Terrorism: Threat to U.S. Security," Armed Forces Journal International, September 1976.

47 Stevenson, op. cit., p 60.
THE author considers the Army's current efforts to prepare for future armed conflict insufficient. If we accept the common usage of sufficient (that is, enough), it follows that this article must be an argument for more in terms of resources, human or materiel or both. Such is, however, not the case. My purpose is to develop the thesis that the Army's preparation is insufficient in the sense that it is inappropriate. The inappropriateness is the result of a nearly exclusive concern with the less probable forms of conflict.

In order to support this admittedly intuitively derived thesis, it will be necessary to outline some basic parameters for identifying the near-future world-conflict environment; examine currently recognized military needs generated by that environment while showing the current thrust of the Department of Defense (DOD) and, specifically, the Army preparation to meet those needs; and offer some observations as to why the preparatory effort does not support the needs. In brief, the US Army is preparing vigorously for the wrong type of war to the near exclusion of the more probable form.

The World of the 1980s

Global interdependence—that cliché of the post-oil embargo era—will be the éminence grise of world foreign policies for the fourth quarter of this century. While the fact of interdependence is becoming increasingly popularized in the United States, there is reason to suspect that acceptance on the emotional level lags well behind intellectual awareness. It is predictably difficult for a people weaned on the spirit of Manifest Destiny, mass consumption and planned obsolescence to cope with the reality of both finite resources and increasing competition for their use. Only slightly less predictable, but of more immediate concern, is the response of the government
bureaucrat and the elected leaders which essentially is no response at all.

We have no centralized agency to deal with the full range of material problems either domestically or internationally. We have failed thus far to grasp the fact that our bounty is no longer perceived as flowing from the libertarian genius of America which others could hope only to emulate vaguely. The "new" nations of the Third and Fourth Worlds have focused on this bounty as being the result, intentionally or otherwise, of various forms of exploitation, and they are envious and hostile, not awed.

Leaving aside the very real question as to whether a nation can survive for long in a hostile world (that is, a world in which cooperation is forthcoming only as a result of fear), the most significant military consideration following from interdependence is contained in the definition—that is, mutual need. If we need a particular resource that has been denied, there is no gain in destroying the resource or rendering it unusable by the application of high technology military power. Spheres of influence, or more properly spheres of cooperation, do not thrive in an environment where the major partner has only two military options—too much or too little. Failure to take cognizance of this simple logic could cause repeated dilemmas analogous to NATO's Gordian knot—that is, the use of nuclear weaponry to defend the Federal Republic of Germany might destroy that which is being protected.

Military technology alone, and it is clearly not alone as the cause, is adequate motivation to develop and refine new forms of struggle which are, at the same time, more utilitarian and less classically military (that is, more subtle). As technology forces high intensity or general "war" closer to the pragmatically unavailable category, subversion along with economic and psychological "weapons systems" becomes proportionately more utilitarian for all states great and small.

The post-World War II period is replete with instances of US military actions which did not involve war. One compilation shows some 215 "political" uses of the US Armed Forces during the period 1946-75 wherein a continuing contest of arms was neither desired (by the national leadership) nor did it result from employing the military. In all of these instances, the Armed Forces were used within a spectrum ranging from highly restrained (means, objectives and, frequently, duration) conflict through show of force.

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to provision of advisers. They all were intended to influence the actions of other states or contenders in an intrastate power struggle, not vanquish them in the classic sense.

My intent is not to argue the relative merits of political uses of the Armed Forces. Our concern is that such uses constitute options open to our government to influence the political leaders or populace of another society. These should not be ignored simply because they do not fit a preconceived popularized Pattonesque model of “acceptable” military tasks.

The very nature of warfare may be in the process of changing under the impetus of interdependence (need to control not destroy resources), weapons destructiveness and difficulty in containing conflict once it assumes conventional military form. We well could be entering an era where international relations based primarily on military security (for example, US-USSR) will become objects of historical study and not “current” events. I do not infer that man is becoming less acquisitive or aggressive, only that these characteristics may serve mutually to modify the means of expression. The use of force will be different, not necessarily “better” or “worse.”

What then are the probabilities of the United States reaching the year 2000 without becoming engaged in some form of violent conflict? Self-delusion born of our relative resource wealth (fast diminishing) and post-Vietnam introversion is disappearing under the influence of contemporary world events (for example, Angola, enhanced Soviet presence in Africa). Paraadoxically, the awareness of global interdependence seems to be progressing more rapidly than the correlative recognition of the inevitability of some form of US involvement, possibly including military, in this new mutually dependent world.

A brief look at some of the more prominent disruptive influences in today’s world will provide prima facie evidence allowing us to deduce that the probability of the United States remaining aloof from all future violent conflicts is indeed slim. Autonomy, to varying degrees, currently is providing motivation for violence in such widely scattered nations as Spain (Basque and Catalan) and Papua-New Guinea (Bougainville). Separatism enjoys an equally catholic application ranging from Iraq’s Kurds through Canada’s Quebec nationalists to Ethiopia’s Eritreans. Communal bitterness in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, South Africa and Bangladesh recently have reminded us of the extent to which ethnic bitterness can foster violence. Internal political struggles assuming violent form can be found in Thailand, Angola, Portugal and Argentina among others.

If we superimpose on these well-known events the multiplicity of unresolved border claims, festering ethnic animosities, currently latent ideological contradictions and burgeoning economic rivalries, there is little basis for optimism concerning a nonviolent course to the 21st Century. A definitive answer to the question of US willingness to involve itself in some of the probable future conflicts is only peripheral to the basic issue of preparation for all forms of conflict. However, it cannot be ignored since analysis of national will plays such a prominent role in my hypothesis as to why the military leadership is weighing its preparatory efforts toward conventional war to the virtual exclusion of all else.
Public disillusionment with US foreign adventures is a contemporary political fact of life. For the moment at least, this disillusionment encompasses both self-serving and apparently altruistic efforts. The depth of the disappointment can be gauged by a rebirth of the "Fortress America" syndrome and a generally more cynical view of government. To expect a dramatic shift back to Pax Americana or the crusading spirit of the early 1960s would be unrealistic even if it were desired.

Attitudinal shifts, however, could arise from several scenarios (for example, denial of access to a critical resource or blatantly inhumane internal policies coupled with rejection of any economic intercourse). Not necessarily drastic in their suddenness, these shifts to a more aggressive international stance could be dramatic in their completeness. The new elite rising to power in the United States reflects an abhorrence of involvement where there is cost—that is, it is acceptable to tamper so long as no sacrifice is called for. Mindful of Kissinger's acid test for a policy—its ability to obtain domestic support—our prospective adversaries will go to some pains to keep any single episode below the American public's emotional threshold. In spite of this, I suggest that the American polity will maintain its retrenching international stance only so long as business proceeds "as usual." 2 When faced with resource denial to the point that it affects life-style, the American will wax internationally active if not neoimperial.

Current Army Preparation

It is now necessary to establish the position of the Army concerning the interdependent world and the military implications, if any, this changed environment implies.

On the surface, it would seem from public statements that the DOD and Army leadership have recognized the change(s) wrought in the last decade. Statements over the last two years are replete with references to an uncertain future, changed realities, multipolarity and increasing interdependence. Following are several excerpts from authoritative sources which, while brief, reveal an apparent awareness of interdependency and implicitly its national military policy implications (that is, the need to possess a military instrument capable of effectively engaging in all conflict forms).

"No one can foresee where the next armed conflict will erupt, the type and size of force that will be necessary or even whether the United States will be involved. The global range of our country's interests mandates that the Army must be capable of response to a number of contingencies under a variety of circumstances. (Emphasis added.) 3"

"We live in an interdependent world economy, and our foreign economic interests are substantial. . . . Our foreign policy interests are even more extensive. We have . . . interest in seeing that Japan remains independent and that the other nations of Asia are free to choose their own destinies. . . . we have important economic and strategic interests in Latin America. . . . there remains a consensus with the country (US) that we have vital interests in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Persian Gulf, Asia." 4
Since WWII, the United States has moved from near self-sufficiency in natural resources to increasing dependence on imports. . . .  
. . . we will become even more dependent on foreign sources of raw materials over the next decade. 5

That (the International) context has five major implications for defense planning:

—First, military power and the international appreciation of it remain basic arbiters of international disputes and major determinants of our capabilities to achieve the objectives of our foreign policy.
—Second, the United States has political, economic, and strategic interests in the world which must be fostered through foreign policies which are supported by our military posture.
—Third, U.S. interests remain under challenge, primarily by the USSR, which continues to add to its military capabilities qualitatively and quantitatively. These challenges can be seen in Europe, along the Mediterranean littoral, in the Middle East and Africa, in the Persian Gulf and, indirectly, in Northeast Asia.
—Fourth, the United States cannot escape the principal role in defending interdependent interests and maintaining world stability. If we falter or fail, there is no other power to take our place.
—Finally, the United States must maintain a military establishment which permits it—in conjunction with allies—to safeguard its interests in the face of a growth in adversary capabilities. The U.S. establishment must be both nuclear and non-nuclear. Much of it must be ready at all times. Security is not available at bargain-basement rates, and the instruments of security cannot expand and contract on short notice. 6

When examining the general outlines of how this avowedly supple strategy is to be supported, we find a rather subtle and inexplicable inconsistency. The flexibility is defined in terms of strategic nuclear weapons and conventional forces only—that is, dealing exclusively with the upper end of the conflict spectrum. Despite repeated references to the need for worldwide utility of US military forces in a variety of roles, the next step (that is, the force structure and training) addresses only the nuclear triad and conventional forces. Admittedly, the sale of military equipment is accepted, although not uncritically, as a means of influence projection. However, the question of how much long-term influence accrues as a result of sales remains to be resolved.

The observer could be left with the impression that the defense establishment does not recognize irregular or low-intensity conflict as a legitimate form of conflict.

Surely, anyone who has lived through the post-World War II decades could not discount rationally the most common form of armed conflict. Our answer must lie somewhere else. Perhaps in the lower levels of leadership, there is resistance to preparing for employment "in a wide variety of environments against a range of possible foes" despite the Defense Secretary's admonition that general purpose forces must be so prepared. 7

Attitude surveys will be used to establish whether the Army officer corps is generally aware or unaware of the changing world and whether it
is aware or unaware of the military implications I have postulated that this entails. I have examined the surveys in an attempt to identify a particular level (grade) or slice (type of work and grade) of the Army officer corps which rejects irregular conflict and may, therefore, be interpreting service policy more narrowly than their superiors intend.

Examining first the broader sample (Army, Navy and Air Force) gathered by Russett-Hanson and on which Alcala elaborated, several of their questions are germane to this inquiry.

**Question:** Which one of the following major forces do you consider most important as a cause of war?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composite Total</th>
<th>Army Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Army, Navy, Air Force)</strong></td>
<td><strong>In Percentages</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Human nature (aggressive, irrational, selfish, and so forth)</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Nationalism (in developed or less-developed countries)</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Ideology</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Economic (scarcity, drive for profit, technical dynamics)</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Power politics</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question:** How would you estimate the probability of US involvement in war during the next decade?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composite Total</th>
<th>Army Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Army, Navy, Air Force)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(Army, Navy, Air Force)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Highly probable</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Probable</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 50-50</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Improbable</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Highly improbable</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question:** What type of war is most likely to be fought by the United States in the next decade?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composite Total</th>
<th>Army Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Army, Navy, Air Force)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(Army, Navy, Air Force)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Strategic nuclear exchange</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. War with tactical nuclear but no strategic nuclear strikes</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Major nonnuclear war</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Counterinsurgency</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Major domestic civil disturbances in the US that would involve armed forces</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question: Where do you think international conflict in the next decade is most likely to occur?

Composite Total | Army Only
(Army, Navy, Air Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Composite Total</th>
<th>Army Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Between nuclear superpowers (US, USSR, PRC)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Between a superpower and one or more less-developed countries</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Between less-developed countries</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generalizing the perceptions revealed in the selected questions, we can say, with some confidence, that most Army officers predict that the arena for future conflict will be the lesser-developed countries, that causes will be less traditional (that is, other than Cold War bipolarity) and that the form of conflict will be below the conventional threshold.

A more narrowly based survey conducted at the US Army Command and General Staff College during the academic year 1975-76 offers similar general findings and a more pronounced inconsistency. I conducted this survey among 150 randomly selected combat arms and intelligence officers (total population of 435) with 82 responses.

Question 1. The most probable form of conflict involving the US Armed Forces in some active role during the next decade (indicate order of probability, for example, nuclear (1) subconventional (2)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Likely</th>
<th>Least Likely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Nuclear (all out)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Nuclear (limited)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Conventional with great powers</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Conventional without great powers</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Subconventional (US combat forces)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Subconventional (without US combat forces)</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 2. In selecting your priorities for Question 1, which one of the following most influenced your decisions and which one influenced them least (that is, which consideration caused your selection of most probable conflict form, and so forth)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Important</th>
<th>Least Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Superpower competition</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. US domestic politics</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Rich versus poor conflicts over resources</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Struggles-for power in lesser-developed countries</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 3. Given today's budgetary environment and world conditions, rank as most and least important those types of conflicts where you feel the
United States must develop/retain a credible capability to function.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most Important</th>
<th>Least Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Nuclear (all out)</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Nuclear (limited)</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Conventional (great powers)</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Conventional (without great powers)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Subconventional (US combat forces)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Subconventional (without US combat forces)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 4.** List the forms of conflict which you feel the Army is giving the most/least priority in its current organization and training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most Priority</th>
<th>Least Priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Nuclear (all out)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Nuclear (tactical)</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Conventional (great powers)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Conventional (no great powers)</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Subconventional (US combat forces)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Subconventional (without US combat forces)</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 5.** Indicate below the adequacy of emphasis on the different forms of conflict as: (1) should have more; (2) about right; (3) should have less.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Nuclear (all out)</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Nuclear (tactical)</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Conventional (great powers)</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Conventional (without great powers)</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Subconventional (US combat forces)</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Subconventional (without US combat forces)</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in the larger multiservice effort, there is a clear perception of high probability for low-intensity conflict involving the United States. It would seem from Question 2 that the public relations lessons of Vietnam have been impressed prominently in the thinking of the next generation of military leaders. The response for “most important” may be less revealing than those for “least” where the differences are quite inconclusive—that is, there is no clear agreement.

The third question responses seemingly would contradict those for Question 1. Interviews subsequent to the survey lead me to attribute this seeming contradiction to considerations of risk—that is, what the United States could lose as a result of failure in the several forms of conflict.

Question 4 shows an impressive agreement (50 percent) as to the
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Army’s current emphasis in preparation for future conflict. Interestingly, the emphasis perceived by these mid-career officers coincides with neither the form of conflict which they identified as the “most probable nor with the form they perceive as most dangerous.

The fifth question further exaggerates the anomaly by showing general satisfaction with the status quo and even leaning toward more emphasis on those forms of conflict previously identified as highly unlikely. The explanation of this apparent incompatibility of views may lie more in the realm of institutional mind-set than in analysis of needs. Thus, “doing what I do well appropriate or not” could well be the reason for the incongruity of the survey findings as well as for the Army’s preparation.

Why

Turning first to the parent culture—the environment in which the military must function—we find distaste and rejection for the type of conflict which appears to be inevitable. The “type” conflict which I foresee will stem from a perceived need on the part of the United States to influence internal or low-intensity international conflicts when economic and diplomatic pressures fail and when our interests, or the popular perception thereof, are not so critical as to justify the employment of conventional armed forces over a prolonged period.

As the Vietnam involvement wore on, it became increasingly clear that, while there was popular acceptance in principle of American activity in “nasty” little wars, the acceptance did not extend to implementation. Distaste for the ethical implications of insurgent war, as it was then termed, raised questions as to the suitability of the American for employment in that context. Addiction to creature comforts, concepts of fair play, a penchant for efficiency, a morally dichotomous world view and that consuming need to be constantly active (usually termed productive) all combine to cause value conflict and psychological strain in both the society and the individual soldier.

I have found no knowledgeable source willing to claim that the American is by cultural dictate unable to function in the low-intensity environment. We could conclude then that the American is ill-suited for, but not incapable of, operating successfully in this environment. It follows that specialized training and conditioning are requisites for successful employment.

More recently, the trauma of the Vietnam defeat and the fissures in the social fabric which were made evident during the 1960s have led to national introversion and distrust of foreigners who are unlike us. Since no one appreciates us, “let the benighted ingrates go it alone,” summarizes the views of various vocal elements. A “siege mentality” has grown in popularity and, it would seem, permeates the highest echelons of government. The persistence of this view is attested to by the petulant reaction of official Washington to the Thai Government’s attempts to accommodate to the changed realities in Southeast Asia following the Republic of Vietnam’s collapse. Thai statements clearly intended for domestic consumption were viewed as rejection of an American presence.10
Our precipitous withdrawal and subsequently demonstrated lack of interest shows that cultural insensitivity in US officialdom has not been lessened appreciably by Vietnam.

Angola provides a more dramatic example of the effects cultural blindness can have on national interests. As was the case with Mao and Ho, Castro and the Algerian FLN (National Liberation Front), American "experts" concluded as early as 1969 that the insurgent movements in Angola were not "realistic or supportable." Eleventh-hour efforts to gain some leverage managed to create the impression of still another American policy defeat. If the cultural patterns hold, this will lead to increased distaste for foreign entanglements on any but a strictly economic plane.

In brief, America, typified by our national bureaucracy, has failed to modify its world view to accommodate an interdependent world. We cannot indulge ourselves in spasms of self-righteous pique because the world is not acting the way we think it should. The only way to avoid this cyclical self-fulfilling prophecy is to become more aware of how the other players view the world. Knowledge of the other peoples' views should improve our record of anticipating their actions and identifying logical (to them) goals. Currently, progress is infinitesimal. Casual analysis of news media content reveals a heavy domestic bias, and, perhaps more importantly, there is little indication of increasing awareness in the Federal bureaucracy. Project Camelot and the bureaucratic ineptitude which caused its painful demise in Chile taught us little. The "real world" is still confined within the Washington beltway, and "the name of the game" is still inter- or intraagency one-upmanship.

Why would an institution such as the US Army pursue a course of action which is apparently so risk laden? If we discount patently inaccurate slogansque explanations—for example, the "military mind" (paucity of intellectual ability)—the causes must lie in either threat perception or the culture (institutional subculture). Within the military subculture, the explanation of why we are preparing for only one type of war and an improbable form at that can be described best by the psychiatric term—overdetermination. Overdetermined means that there are more reasons to account for the behavior than are needed to understand it.

If called upon to agglomerate under a single label all of the qualities of the subculture which contribute to this apparently incongruous behavior, I would choose—achievement. In the military, this characteristic and the mind-sets that accompany it have been elevated to an article of faith no longer subject to mortal scrutiny. One must achieve, the achievement must be measurable and, having done it, the achievement becomes a rite of passage for one's professional successors. In a world which is at best characterized as being in flux, this golden rule shines as a beacon of solidity for the profession of arms.

The playing field offers an analogy for the conditioning through which our military leaders progress. Teams with the clear definition of who is "us" and who is "them," rules governing the competition and scores to allow instant measure of success all combine to eliminate variables and focus energy on unambiguous goals. Crowds roaring approval give nearly simul-
taneous reward feedback to the successful player further conditioning him to repeat the behavior which gained applause. Couple this with the popularly perceived success relation of "thinking big," make vast resources available to the participants and the result is fairly predictable—an expensive, awe-inspiring, self-rewarding organization.

The Vietnam experience offers a complete, if painful, clinical example of how the characteristic of achievement maintains itself in an environment where the rules are less clear, success less obvious and team affiliations ambiguous. Following are several of the more salient characteristics which Vietnam forced into public view:

- Think Positively—"We went out there with a positive attitude and a ready-made commitment to the program (Strategic Hamlet). This enthusiasm caused reports to be wishful in nature." Inability to cope with any goal but military victory intensified the need to measure success. We were "good" at high-intensity conflict, and that's what we fought whether appropriate or not.

- Demonstrate Success—Demand for measurement of success in quantifiable terms ultimately created an atmosphere of fraud and, even more dangerous, self-delusion. A single example is the Hamlet Evaluation System which was created solely to provide quantifiable measurement of progress in the pacification effort. Analysis of these reports over a period of years shows a widespread pattern of self-delusion on the part of US evaluators. Upon assignment, the officer in his initial evaluation generally reflects a worsened pacification picture followed by a gradual improvement until the evaluator's (advisory) tour ended. The cycle was repeated by the successor. While I am not prepared to classify such value judgments as lies, the pattern suggests that the compulsion to demonstrate how successful he had been was a major factor in false reporting at all levels. Douglas Kinnard's recently published findings on Vietnam, derived from general officer interviews, support the conclusion that systemic imperatives internal to the military and the government bureaucracy in general encouraged self-delusion.

As any particular function faltered, and there were many instances of this since US materiel and plans overloaded Vietnamese capabilities by 1966, Americans became frustrated and rushed to replace their "less competent" allies. This demoralized those Vietnamese who were trying and further reduced their effectiveness. Thus, our enthusiasm and drive (qualities we still place one small step below divinity) became dysfunctional. This was not unnoticed: General Duong Van Minh's (Big Minh) comment that "too many Americans were in the countryside" reflected the logical result of this behavior providing irrefutable evidence of US dominance to the people of Vietnam to the delight of the opponents' propaganda machinery.

- Think Big—In attempting to define and document specific instances of grandiosity, one quickly becomes frustrated. The problems of cost in resources and unneeded effort attributable to this characteristic fall in the category of common knowledge. In many ways, I find it analogous to the search for the Military-Industrial Complex. You see it, you know it's there, but finite definition and delineation continue to elude both the observer and, in most cases, the practitioner.
Cultural Insensitivity—"To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required—not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right." 17 "Right" for the United States may not be "right" for other participants in the international arena since moral principles which transcend cultural boundaries rarely have a prominent part in the formulation of government policy. Americans, in general, fail to consider other cultures, and, if they do, it is usually with an "elevate yourself to my level if you are truly worthy" arrogance.

Post-Vietnam analyses are replete with examples of cultural insensitivity and the contribution this characteristic made to individual and collective failure. 18 Less vividly noted, but more meaningful in its implications, has been the failure to profit from the experience of others (we did not fight a nine-year war, we fought one year nine times). The massive report prepared by the French Army after the Indochina War in which virtually every pitfall which the Americans encountered was identified and analyzed was not even available in English until 1967. 19

When the communications obstacles became a major impediment at all levels of American bureaucracy in Vietnam, studies in cultural differences were undertaken. These efforts, though late (1967-68 time frame), were valuable but used primarily to prepare the junior military man for his Vietnam tour. Senior officers rarely received any cultural training thus largely negating the benefits of having juniors become more culturally aware. 20

Observing how the military leadership has profited from previous experience, it is interesting to note that cultural anthropology and more specifically intercultural communication are all but nonexistent in the curricula of the Army school system today. Ethnic studies involve some familiarization with communications obstacles inherent in subcultural interaction, but the material is highly group specific (Chicano, black, Appalachian) and the broader applicability is left to individual interpretation.

Institutional Cohesion—cuius regio eius religio (The religion of the realm must be that of its ruler)—A "democratic" army is a contradiction. The need to produce and maintain cohesion within the profession of arms is not only recognized universally as legitimate, but also as a functional necessity. While few would question this military truism, there are serious (for the institution and the society) shortcomings inherent therein. For purposes of this inquiry, only internal, upward communication and discrimination inadequacies resulting in unidirectional effort are germane.

A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report on Vietnam reported: 21

... within the American mission, below the very senior level, there are definite differences of opinion and disagreement on the facts and their interpretation. The same is true in the military. (Emphasis added.)

Since poor communication, in its broadest sense, has been identified as particularly common in Vietnam, the only aspect of current interest is the causes. Soldiers have differed with their superiors and among themselves about how best to fight since organized warfare began. However, when there is widespread disagreement not only on how to fight, but concerning
the facts upon which to base decision, something is wrong. That wrong generally can be described as lack of flexibility and lack of analytical ability. Since the US Army takes inordinate pride in its flexibility, some explanation is required.

The flexibility so highly regarded by the US Army might be better described as doing the same old thing in an innovative way. Rarely has an analysis been made to see if the thing to be done is, in fact, worth doing or appropriate to the circumstances. Why should there have been? The practitioners had been rewarded for doing the same thing before, so obviously it was perceived as the "right" thing to do. If it did not seem to be effective, we will do it again only better. The United States does not have military malpractice suits. Thus, if one stays within the parameters of "accepted practice," you can hardly fail in the eyes of the institution. Admittedly, there may be less success (unless it is redefined to encompass only the form not the substance), but spurious success is better than none at all and far more tolerable than "failure." So it was that we played out our bag of tricks over and over again with each player going home in glory, and, on occasion, a player went back to gain more glory by playing the same trick in the same place, thus "succeeding" more than once.

Inability or rather unwillingness to analyze in light of the objective circumstances led to such long-term dysfunctional activities as stressing combat operations. It took 12 years, until 1968, to shift significant effort and resources in a coordinated approach to pacification. At that, it took a trauma (Tet 1968) to shake the faith in "more firepower" as a universal panacea. As late as 1975 in informal discussions, I have heard senior officers (colonels and generals) claim that another infusion of manpower and another year would have brought us "victory" in Vietnam. Such costly folly is inexplicable except in terms of institutional mind-sets.

The United States had had extensive experience with irregular war in assorted forms (Seminoles, Philippines, Mexican War, and so forth). In all of these, the ineffectiveness of attempts at purely military solutions were manifest. Study of other nations' experiences support this finding, and it still took the present generation of leaders 12 years to reconfirm a truism of political conflict. Why? Was it mass myopia, ignorance or institutional conformity? I find no evidence to support the claim of physical or even intellectual myopia. Ignorance was self-imposed—there was experience to call upon, but too few called. It is only the latter—the bureaucratic mind-sets which Robert Komer so adequately describes in his 1972 Rand Corporation study—that offers a rational explanation for the lemming-like inability to evaluate circumstances as they were and not as they should have been. I suggest that the same causes are driving our current unidirectional preparation efforts.

An example of the current manifestation of these mind-sets and a fundamental indication of the Army's rejection of low-intensity war is found in the recently promulgated Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, dated 1 July 1976. In this basic doctrinal work, we find the same problem I have identified elsewhere—a vague recognition of the need for forces capable of employment in a broad range of conflict environments, but, when discussing
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Specifics, only conventional and nuclear conflict are considered. The following is extracted from FM 100-5 and exemplifies both the essence of the philosophy of the manual and the inconsistency mentioned earlier:

**Future Battle**

The US Army may find itself at war in any of a variety of places and situations, fighting opponents which could vary from the highly modern mechanized forces of the Warsaw Pact to light, irregular units in a remote part of the less developed world. Wherever the battle begins, the US Army is equipped, organized and trained to undertake appropriate military missions. The purpose of military operations, and the focus of this manual, is to describe how the US Army destroys enemy military forces and secures or defends important geographic objectives.

Battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw Pact is the most demanding mission the US Army could be assigned. Because the US Army is structured primarily for that contingency and has large forces deployed in that area, this manual is designed mainly to deal with the realities of such operations. The principles set forth in this manual, however, apply also to military operations anywhere in the world. Furthermore, the US Army retains substantial capabilities in its airborne, airmobile, and infantry divisions for successful operations in other theaters of war against other forces.

From these introductory paragraphs to the final period, FM 100-5 addresses one conflict form against one type of opponent. Since this manual will drive the preparation of all other tactical manuals, conventional high-technology war will be the only "comfortable" environment for the US Army within a very few years. Where then is our "flexibility"? I am reminded of General Gavin's painfully prophetic 1959 comment:

... if in the past ten years we had spent even a small part of what we have spent in readying our forces for a one-strategy war, in developing and procuring the means of dealing with limited war, we could have settled Korea and Dien Bien Phu quickly in our favor.

FM 100-5 also is indicative of the high-technology fixation in that there is no mention of the opponent's political will as an object of military action. When this is coupled with the current slogan "win the first battle," there are grounds for legitimate concern that the psychological conditioning of the Army will produce such an all-pervasive expectation of early victory that a protracted struggle will be intolerable. The Israelis suffered from a touch of the short war psychosis between 1967 and 1973. General Peled's comment on preparing "for a 15-round win on points not knocking out a bum in a dark alley" indicated that their military establishment has diagnosed at least some of the symptoms and are applying therapy.

Less obvious, but nonetheless indicative of the Army's institutional inclinations, is the "atmosphere" concerning preparation for future conflict. I have mentioned the lessening of intercultural communications instruction in the service school system. Psychological operations (PSYOP) is another victim of the "new look," although it is difficult to identify reductions in PSYOP instruction since it was never a favorite with the Army school system's hardware-oriented clientele.
The accompanying table reflects in broad terms comparisons of selected school courses time devoted to internal conflict and is offered in support of my contention that the trend is away from studying low-intensity conflict.

**US ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total academic hours</th>
<th>1969—1186</th>
<th>Hours devoted to IDAD—5.4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Officer Advanced Course</td>
<td>1975—986</td>
<td>Hours devoted to IDAD—0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of total hours reduction</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>Percent of IDAD reduction 100</td>
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**US ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total academic hours</th>
<th>1972—1072</th>
<th>Hours devoted to IDAD—34</th>
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<tr>
<td>Officer Advanced Course</td>
<td>1976—845</td>
<td>Hours devoted to IDAD—34</td>
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</table>

NOTE: Of the 34 hours, 7 are devoted to planning a battalion IDAD (Internal Defense and Development) operation and 12 to execution of a battalion strike mission in an IDAD environment. These instructional elements are mechanical in nature offering minimal understanding of the nonmilitary aspects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer Basic Course</th>
<th>1972—401</th>
<th>Hours devoted to IDAD—elective only</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976—557</td>
<td>Hours devoted to IDAD—none</td>
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**US ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Total Academic Course</th>
<th>1974—1052</th>
<th>Hours devoted to IDAD—5.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer Advanced Course</td>
<td>1975—829</td>
<td>Hours devoted to IDAD—0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total hours reduction</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>Percent of IDAD reduction 100</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Officer Basic Course</th>
<th>1972—532</th>
<th>Hours devoted to IDAD—2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975—350</td>
<td>Hours devoted to IDAD—0</td>
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**US ARMY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Academic Hours</th>
<th>1974—1052</th>
<th>Hours devoted to IDAD—22</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer Advanced Course</td>
<td>1975—829</td>
<td>Hours devoted to IDAD—31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total hours decrease</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>Percent of IDAD increase 40.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer Basic Course</th>
<th>1972—338</th>
<th>Hours devoted to IDAD—2</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975—361</td>
<td>Hours devoted to IDAD—4</td>
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NOTE: As in the case of the infantry advanced course, significant portions of IDAD instruction are functional/technical (for example, the US Army Security Agency support in IDAD operations), instruction which does not increase basic understanding of IDAD operations.

The indicators I have outlined do not "prove" that low-intensity conflict has been disavowed by the Army as a legitimate form of conflict in which the Armed Forces could be called upon to pursue national objectives. Coupled with the Special Forces training emphasis being shifted to resistance forces in support of conventional operations, they do suggest that such could be the end product of the nonbenign neglect which to date has progressed quite far along.

In the first part of this article, I drew an outline picture of a world in which the successful application of military power requires a more pre-
cise and flexible instrument than an army prepared only for conventional high-intensity conflict. The disparities between what tasks one logically can anticipate the US Army being called upon to perform and those it is preparing to perform are as great as those between the surgeon's scalpel and the Varangian ax. Next, I tried to establish the existence of an inexplicable lack of agreement within the army of today and finally explored some of the cultural and institutional bases for such a fundamental divergence of views. Now, we must look beyond purely cultural causation to risk analysis and budgetary imperatives in order to attempt to explain the apparent incongruous policy of preparing for the least likely form of land force employment to the virtual exclusion of the more likely.

Risk analysis, in its simplest form, involves what one party can gain or lose as the result of an action or reaction by an adversary. From such determinations, the instruments to execute policy are derived logically. It is possible to consider that the “loss” of Europe, in the event of armed Soviet aggression, would be so overwhelming that it must be defended against at all costs regardless of the low probability of such overt action. The validity of such a conclusion is called into question by two major factors:

- We are commercially and culturally tied to Europe, but does Europe offer resource availability to justify its becoming the area we are prepared to defend now and in the future? The same can be asked of Japan in the commercial context.

- US forces are in the most defensible terrain in Central Europe. With weaker forces on the least defensible terrain and still weaker on the flanks, why would the Soviets attempt to overcome US resistance? “Fixing” US forces and encircling them would appear to be a more economic approach.

Using the same risk analysis, increased hostile influence in any given nation outside the Europe-Japan-US economic triangle probably would involve less immediately discernible “loss” for the United States. Would the same be true cumulatively? I submit that influence degradation in a collection of many less-developed countries would surpass in impact a lessening of US influence in Western Europe. Even if surpass is too strong a descriptive, can the United States afford to be squeezed out of the developing world through military nolo contendere?

As early in our history as the 1790s, Americans were exposed to the costs which can accrue to those who cannot project appropriate forms of power. We paid Algiers in excess of $600,000 and an annual tribute of over $21,000 to gain the release of captive US citizens. Our fledgling fleet later redressed this inadequacy of power projection, but we had to build it first. The Soviets, it would seem, derived a similar lesson from the events of the 1960s and have taken steps to enhance their “projectability.”

Budgetary considerations are, on the surface, the least significant factor in the question of training for the less likely form of conflict to the exclusion of the more likely. Low-intensity conflict is probably the most cost-effective of all conflict forms, providing you do not fight it as we did in Vietnam. A handful of people and a few relatively unsophisticated weapons cannot be categorized seriously as a budgetary extravagance in an era of $100-billion military budgets. When considering that the people so trained
and weapons used could be employed in any form of conflict, such argument becomes even more spurious.

It is not inconceivable that the "mind-sets" I referred to earlier contribute to a threat analysis wherein the enemy is the Soviets, and, if we share the force levels and weaponry to deter them, the same will suffice for any other use. "Success" is hard to measure in peace. One's share of the budgetary pie is one way to make such a measurement, thus satisfying both the need to "achieve" and the penchant to "quantify" the achievement. It is of interest to view General Maxwell Taylor's recent work on future US strategy (Prevarious Security) in the budgetary context. The general eloquently recognizes the turbulence of the next decade and the crises for US interests this entails. But, in his argument for a larger military budget, as a clearly discernible indication of national resolve, he touches upon only so much of the spectrum of armed force which ranges from conventional through strategic nuclear capabilities.

Having examined two of the most common arguments against preparation for subconventional conflict heard within the Army, we are no further in identifying rational explanations for the failure to prepare than when we started. Is it conceivable that there are no rational explanations? Is it possible that the trauma of having been found fighting the wrong kind of war has so deeply disturbed the Army's leadership that they (who, after all, are men who made their careers in that military aberration) actually have "erased the tapes," expunged the unpleasant memory and are resuming the conventional deterrent role they played in the late 1950s?

We like to fight in an industrial match but may not be able to do so in the future. Is it prudent, then, to continue to train exclusively for the technocratic arena? The explanation may hinge more on the removal of an option from the policymakers than on rational threat analysis—that is, if we do not have the capability to engage in subconventional war, that option simply is not available to the government.

During the period that I was working on this article, The Kansas City Star published an interview with Lieutenant General Starry, commander of V Corps (Sunday Magazine, 15 August 1976). In the interview, General Starry touched upon several of the points I have attempted to establish. He said:

After getting out of Vietnam, the Army looked around and realized it should not try to fight that kind of war again elsewhere.

The questions were:

On what battlefield should the Army be ready to fight, and what would that battlefield look like? Is it possible to win outnumbered?

He is convinced that wherever that war might erupt it would be of short duration. Starry said:

A prolonged war in Europe is probably a least likely circumstance. Fear of crossing the nuclear threshold early and the basic Soviet conviction that they can win without using nuclear weapons will encourage very early negotiations.

Such a short thrust demands highly trained, extremely mobile forces capable of rapid deployment, he said:
Here again, winning the first battle is essential. The long-term sustainability of the forces would not be so important as in the past.

He described what the Army believes the modern battlefield will look like:

The problem we're up against is one of masses of armor and armored vehicles fighting a war between almost anyone and the Soviet Union, or a Soviet-trained and equipped enemy. There are masses of armored vehicles of all kinds . . . the numbers of which are larger than anyone has ever put on a battlefield before. And they will be fighting an enemy who believes that numbers can win. We can never hope to cope with the enemy's numbers.

The first paragraph discards the longest armed conflict in our history and ignores the enemy's role in selecting place and form of conflict. The ensuing battlefield description is difficult to envision in any locale except Europe.

In sum, I submit that the Army, while generally following DOD direction, is all but ignoring that form of conflict and those portions of the globe where future markets and resources compel us to an active role. Striking at an opponent's weaknesses is an ancient principle of conflict. I question the prudence of announcing to the world that we will not participate in certain forms of conflict then sealing the invitation for those who wish us ill to practice those forms by rendering ourselves virtually impotent.

NOTES


2 The application of the Byrd Amendment could prove illuminating in this context.


7 Ibid., p 89.


10 Jeffrey Race in an unpublished memorandum on Thai-US relations for the Institute of Current World Affairs, dated 30 June 1975, elaborates on how dysfunctional these long-term culturally calloused analyses by US officials can be.


15 Douglas Kinnard, "The Vietnamese War in Retrospect: The Army General's View," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Spring 1976. See Table 3, p 23, wherein 61.1 percent of those interviewed considered that the body count was often inflated and 62 percent indicated that the system of progress measurement should have been used as a management tool rather than as a measure of progress.


18 Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, US Army, Retired, in an interview with the author on 3 March 1976 stated that the Army staff did not take any cognizance of cultural limitations when considering early US commitment in Vietnam.

19 The report, Lessons of the War in Indochina, is credited to General Paul Ely and was published first in English by The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, in 1967.

20 See Lessons From the Vietnam War Report of a Seminar Held at the Royal United Services Institute on Wednesday, 12 February 1969, for a particularly devastating analysis of the operational effects of this shortcomings. Note also the failure to learn from Nationalist China's experience in the early 1930s. In the campaign (against the Soviet regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area) following three disastrous defeats, Chiang Kai-shek felt constrained to conduct a school for his senior officers. The subsequent campaign resulted in Mau's defeat and the "Long March."


24 James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, Hutchinson, London, Eng., 1969, p 128. While Gavin is attacking the Department of Defense's massive retaliation policy, his comment proves prophetic as an intra-service criticism as well.


THE European Continent may be the crucial square in the world chess game, but all the superpowers are involved directly in Asian affairs, and any disruption of Asia's delicately stable balance of power would endanger global peace.

The Asian power balance centers on Japan; any major shift in that nation's foreign policy would cause reverberations throughout the world. A dramatic increase in military spending, a decision to join the nuclear club, a new relationship with the Soviets (designed to supply Japan with petroleum from Siberia), a turn to isolationism, an accommodation with mainland China (designed to thwart the Korean dagger), a dispatch of Japanese troops from the homeland (even as a peacekeeping force)—any move of this nature would alter international relationships.

Although Japan vigorously pursues a multilateral diplomacy, close alignment with the United States has been the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Japan-US relations have not provided much in the way of newspaper headlines during the past several years. This lack of headlines indicates that Japan-US relations have been generally stable, friendly and devoid of any significant differences of opinion. However, the international situation is ever-changing, and sometimes a nation's basic foreign policy goals are altered without any accompanying publicity.

Persons concerned with Japan-US relations would do well to give thought to the moves mentioned above—not in the context of their being probabilities but in the context of their being possibilities. An insight into future relations may be found in a recently issued Defense White Paper (see MR, April 1977, p 75).
New Defense White Paper

Although most other government agencies issue White Papers on an annual basis, the 1976 Defense White Paper is only the second White Paper ever issued by the Japanese Defense Agency. In releasing the new White Paper, Michita Sakata, minister of state for defense, commented:

I think this is a basic first step in enhancing national awareness of the subject of national defense and I plan to issue a Defense White Paper every year in the future.

The 1976 White Paper is especially important in view of events since the first White Paper was issued in October 1970: the Communist successes in Indochina, the Nixon shocks, the reversion of Okinawa, the continuing tension on the Korean Peninsula, Peking's admission to the United Nations and the buildup of Soviet military presence in the Far East.

The current White Paper has not raised any international eyebrows, perhaps because it is devoid of any highly controversial statements such as the one in the first White Paper proclaiming the Peace Constitution did not prohibit nuclear weapons:

It is possible for Japan from a legal point of view to possess small nuclear weapons if they are within the framework of minimum necessity for self defense and if they do not pose the threat of aggression to other countries.

This startling interpretation of the constitution was not backed up by a call for Japan to develop a nuclear arsenal; rather, nuclear arms once again were ruled out. Even so, Peking voiced alarm over the 1970 Defense White Paper, alleging that it heralded a revival of Japanese militarism. Subsequently, Peking and Tokyo have opened diplomatic relations, and the People's Republic of China now seems willing to condone a Japanese military force of limited size and capability.

The current White Paper renewed the pledge contained in the 1970 White Paper that Japan has no interest in joining the nuclear club. Japan probably has the money and the technology to build 50 to 100 nuclear weapons in a short time if it chose to do so; it also has the delivery potential. But Japan recently closed out its nuclear option. This option was foreclosed with apparent reluctance; the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty finally was ratified in 1976 by the House of Councillors, six years after Japan signed it. Even before becoming the 96th signatory to the treaty, Japan officially adhered to a three-point nonnuclear position:

- It would not build nuclear weapons.

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It would not take possession of nuclear weapons.
It would not permit nuclear weapons to be held on Japanese soil.

Japan, more than any other superpower, is vulnerable to total destruction in any nuclear war. Unlike the other superpowers, Japan's land space is so small and its industrial facilities are so concentrated geographically that it would be destroyed by a moderate scale nuclear attack. This vulnerability provides good reason for holding to its nonnuclear position.

Evolution of the SDF

Japan's Armed Forces numbered about 6 million at the close of World War II. In the immediate postwar period, the United States was determined to dismantle Japan's Armed Forces and its industrial base. The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive stated:

Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. ... Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police organization, or any civil aviation. ... Militarism and ultranationalism, in doctrine and practice, including paramilitary training, shall be eliminated from the educational system.

The United States saw to it that Japan's 1947 Peace Constitution renounced war as an instrument of national policy. The importance the United States attached to Article 9 (the no-war clause) was expressed by General Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander for the Allied Powers:

Foremost of its provisions is that which abolishing war as a sovereign right of the nation, forever renounces the threat or use of force as a means of settling disputes with any other nation and forbids in the future the authorization of any army, navy, air

force, or other war potential or assumption of rights of belligerency by the state. (Emphasis added.)

In this period of history, Japan was the defeated enemy. The United States and Russia were allies. Mao had not yet taken control of China. But international relationships changed dramatically in the next few years, and the United States soon welcomed Japan as a partner in opposing Communist expansionism.

The outbreak of the Korean War led the United States to urge Japan to create a 300,000-man military; instead, Japan opted for a less militaristic 75,000-man National Police Reserve (NPR). The NPR was formed to protect the Japanese Government from any internal threat and to protect the US bases in Japan and the 250,000 US military dependents whose husbands and fathers had been ordered to Korea. NPR groups, not unlike infantry divisions, were organized, equipped and trained quickly by US troops.

Allied occupation of Japan ended in 1951, and a Security Treaty was signed that provided for continued stationing of US forces in Japan. The treaty, which committed the United States to the defense of Japan, also gave the US control over the Ryukyu Islands. Nuclear weapons on Japanese soil were forbidden, but Okinawa under US jurisdiction could serve as a forward repository for nuclear weapons.

In August 1953, after a Korean Armistice had been signed, the NPR was renamed as a Security Force. In July 1954, another new name was coined—the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The SDF was authorized a total strength of just over 150,000. A Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was concluded in 1954 that permitted US
principle calls for close association with the United States but does not bind Japanese foreign policy to imitate blindly US foreign policy.

Japan and the United States signed a Mutual Security Treaty (MST) in 1960. President Eisenhower had planned to visit Japan the year the treaty was signed, but after his invitation to the USSR was canceled as a result of the U2 incident, demonstrations and strikes in Japan precluded a visit to that country. The treaty was ratified by Japan only amid great controversy which ultimately brought about Prime Minister Kishi’s resignation. Unlike treaties the United States has concluded with other allies, the MST does not require Japan to deploy forces outside its own territories in support of any attack against US forces.

The SDF gained a new mission—the defense of Okinawa—in 1972. Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands had been under US control since their capture by US forces in 1945. The future status of Okinawa was a point of friction in Japan-US relations until 1969 when Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon agreed that Okinawa would be returned to Japan in 1972. Although US military bases and personnel remain on Okinawa, defense of the area is now the responsibility of the approximately 6,500 SDF personnel stationed there.

The SDF today consists of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). The all-volunteer SDF is 260,000 strong and equipped with modern weaponry. There are 180,000 active duty personnel in the GSDF, 40,000 in the MSDF and 40,000 in the ASDF.

Recent additions to the SDF are a
tank brigade, an antiaircraft artillery group, a surface-to-air-equipped guided-missile destroyer, a submarine, a squadron of F4EJs and a squadron of C1 transports. SDF leaders are seeking to replace the F104s with F15s during the early 1980s. The proposed force of 123 F15s would cost in excess of $3 billion and is certain to be debated extensively in the Parliament.

Japan's spectacular economic growth has permitted defense expenditures to decline as a percentage of the government budget—from 13.61 percent in 1955 to 6.22 percent in 1976. Despite this halving of the portion of the federal budget allotted to national defense, the growth in national wealth actually has permitted a sizable increase in defense spending and resulted in modernization of the SDF.

Japan ranks in the top 10 among all nations in defense expenditures, yet its ground, air and naval forces consume less than one percent of the gross national product (GNP). Japan's per capita expenses for defense in 1975 amounted to only $41; this compares to $126 for Canada, $184 for England, $260 for the Federal Republic of Germany and $298 for Sweden.

Economic Superpower

In the 30 years since World War II ended with Japan as the vanquished, this small island nation of 112 million people has become an economic superpower. Once reliant on a cottage industry producing such labor-intensive goods as toys and doll clothes, Japan today exports automobiles at the rate of 300,000 monthly and has become the world's leading steel exporter ($4.3 billion annually).

Japan's achievement in becoming the world's third largest industrial nation has caused some to characterize Japan as an international trading company ("Japan, Inc.") rather than a nation-state.

Large quantities of war-related goods were produced for the United States during the Korean War, and by the time of the Korean truce, Japan had a significant defense industry. Some years later, the Japanese economy benefited with tens of millions of dollars in war contracts as the United States committed more and more troops to the effort in South Vietnam. By 1970, Japan was able to build tanks, fighter planes and most of the other war materials needed to equip the SDF. Nevertheless, production of nonmilitary goods has far outpaced armaments manufacture, and no large corporation is dependent on military orders for survival.

During the past decade, the real growth rate of the GNP in other leading industrial countries ranged from 2 percent to 6 percent while Japan achieved a remarkable 10.4 percent in the 1965-69 period and 7.1 percent in the 1970-74 time frame. The Japanese Government expects the GNP to increase at an annual rate of 13 percent in the 1975-80 period; with consumer prices increasing about 6 percent annually, Japan's GNP would experience a real growth rate of 6 percent annually.

Since Japanese industry is almost wholly dependent upon imported oil, continued economic growth hinges on avoiding an energy crisis. For this reason, Japan can be expected to seek accommodations with oil-producing nations in the Middle East and elsewhere with little concern over the political institutions governing those countries. The "elsewhere" conceivably could include the Soviet Union. Kissinger's successors never will be able to convince Japan to adopt a foreign
Newly developed Type 74 main battle tank

Type 60 self-propelled 106mm recoilless rifle
policy course that might jeopardize the flow of petroleum into Japan.

**Japanese Politics**

The conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), after holding a majority in the Lower House for over 20 years, suffered losses in the December 1976 general elections. It generally is agreed that the LDP’s involvement in the Lockheed scandal hurt the party. After former Lockheed executives admitted $9 million had been spent secretly in promoting the sale of Lockheed aircraft, several officials were indicted, charged with accepting bribes in return for promoting Japanese purchase of Lockheed aircraft. As a result of the LDP’s problems, Miki resigned as president of the LDP and announced he would step down as premier. Surprisingly, former Prime Minister Tanaka and former Transportation Minister Hashimoto were re-elected to the Parliament in spite of being indicted on Lockheed bribery charges. Miki and Hashimoto ran as independents but can be expected to vote with the LDP.

The conservative decline probably will continue when Upper House elections are held in July 1977. These changes will require US diplomats to exercise great care in future dealings with Japan’s elected officials. Accustomed to dealing almost exclusively with the LDP, the challenge now will be to be more attentive to Japanese public opinion, for national consensus sometimes will side against the LDP in the future.

**The Same Kind of World**

Japan seeks the same kind of world we do, and toward that end, Japan is dedicated to a “diplomacy of peace.” In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1976, Foreign Minister Kosaka expressed Japanese foreign policy in this way:

...Japan has decided to rely solely on peaceful means for the settlement of international disputes, and to avoid firmly any recourse to military means. Japan prescribes only a minimum need of self-defense, and seeks to contribute to world peace and prosperity through its diplomacy of peace.

Japan is a forceful participant in world affairs—it can exert financial, diplomatic, commercial and ethical pressure in an effort to sway events. The only instrument of national strategy Japan lacks is a credible fighting power. 1 It seems clear that Japan is highly unlikely to create a military force that could project military power beyond Japanese soil, provided the United States does not weaken its posture in the western Pacific or otherwise abandon its commitment to the defense of Japan in overzealous pursuit of détente.

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**NOTES**

1 Japanese-US friendship suffered but survived two Nixon shocks—the US-forced re-evaluation of the yen and the Nixon visit to mainland China, a visit carried out without advance consultation with Japan.

2 President Ford's historic visit to Japan in 1974—the first Chief Executive to visit Japan while in office—and the US visit of the Japanese emperor and empress the following year contrast with the mode of the Japanese in 1960. The leftists staged massive demonstrations in 1960, but the treaty was renewed quietly in 1970, and President Ford was welcomed warmly in 1974.

3 Data on force structure and weapons can be found in the annual publication, *The Military Balance*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Eng.

4 What we term as national strategy is called grand strategy by Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the Clasewits of the 20th Century. Liddell Hart stated that “Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also, the moral resources—forces to foster the people’s willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power... fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy—which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least, of ethical pressure to weaken the opponent’s will.” B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, Praeger Publishers, Inc., NY, 1968, p 336.
CONFESS that I do not know what détente means. There seems to be an impression about that at some time around 1970 there was a sharp change in US-Soviet relations, marking a new phase in the relationship to be known as détente; that this was based on some sort of an agreement or understanding not only between these two countries but between Moscow and the West generally; but that recently the Soviet leaders have failed to live up to this agreement because they have continued to build up their armaments, intervened, if only indirectly, in Angola and failed to relax the restrictions on their own citizens. I know of no justification for any part of this belief.

The idea that there was some sort of sharp change in policy and in the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s was a myth propagated by the Nixon administration for its own internal-political purposes. This was supported and in-
flated by the Western press—or large parts of it, and happily sustained by the Soviet Government—once again, for purposes of its own. I do not mean that there were no improvements in the Soviet-Western relationship at the time in question or that these improvements were not of serious value. But, in almost every case, they were changes that were under discussion or in course of preparation well before Mr. Nixon came to office and well before anyone thought of using the term détente in the sense to which we have become accustomed. Circumstances just happened to be favorable, in the early 1970s, to their completion.

There was never any general agreement envisaging a basic change in relations. There were a number of specific agreements which—so far as I know—the Russians have observed quite faithfully: agreements for academic exchanges, expansion of consular representation, collaboration in the exploration of outer space, and so forth. Beyond this, there were only the usual cloudy and high-sounding communiqués that follow summit meetings, and there was, of course, Helsinki.

At no time, to my knowledge, did the Russians ever enter into any agreement or understanding of a general nature to halt the development of their armed forces. At no time did they ever encourage us to believe that “détente” would mean the end of their efforts to promote the success of left-wing forces in the Third World. On the contrary, they reminded us a hundred times, if they did so once, that “détente” did not apply in the ideological field. And as for changes in their internal policies: yes, if you want to take seriously the vague generalities of the Helsinki documents; but I must say that it took the wildest naiveté—a naiveté unworthy of serious statesmen or journalists—to suppose that language of this nature, negotiated in the manner in which it was negotiated, would really cause the Kremlin to relax the severity of the dictatorship “of the proletariat.” For years, I have tried to warn our government against agreements with the Russians involving general language—general terms such as “democratic,” “peace loving,” and so forth—and particularly when such agreements are negotiated before the public eye, with the press in attendance; for the Russians tend then to view them as what they call Demonstrativnye peregovory—demonstrative negotiations, conducted not for the benefit of the people in the room but through the window, so to speak, for the crowd outside; and, in this case, they negotiate

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in a spirit of caveat emptor. I can find no sympathy for statesmen and journalists who so recklessly disregard the lessons of history as to believe that the Helsinki talks were really going to change something important in Soviet behavior.

Expect No Basic Changes

Now, as for what the Russians are doing today: can it not be finally understood and accepted in Western diplomacy that the Soviet relationship to the advanced West is a complicated one in which there is not much room for maneuver? For many years, ever since the development of the Russo-Chinese conflict in the late 1950s, the Soviet leadership has been driven, in this relationship, by quite contradictory impulses. On the one hand, these men see in the development of their commercial relationship with the West the quickest and most convenient road (not, mark you, the only road, merely the quickest and most convenient) to the overcoming of certain of the most painful deficiencies in their own industrial and economic development. Beyond this, they feel a strong need to demonstrate to the Chinese, not just once but constantly and repeatedly, that they are not dependent on their relations with China: that they have other favorable alternatives, that they can live very well, thank you, without China. For this reason, they want the appearance of a good and cordial relationship with the West. But they are realists enough to recognize that they cannot have the appearance without having, in some measure, the reality as well. They have been willing to make certain compromises along these lines—compromises which have taken the form of certain of the real Western gains of the détente period.

On the other hand, these same men are concerned very deeply for their relations with the remainder of the international Communist movement and with the left-wing national liberation movements of the Third World—an area in which they, of course, are being subjected to the heaviest sort of pressure from the Chinese. For the reasons I have just cited, they want at least outwardly good relations with the advanced West; but for reasons of the weightiest sort—reasons having to do both with their innate distrust of the capitalist world and with their own image of themselves and of the significance of their own movement—they would dread a situation in which their security had no other support than their relations with the West. So they feel compelled to defend themselves in every way they can against the Chinese charge that they are not good Marxist-Leninists, that they are selling out the holy faith, and so forth. This means that they must continue to talk and to behave, whenever put to the test, as good, principled Marxist-Communists, favoring anti-European, anti-American and anti-Western movements, encouraging any political development that even gives the appearance of leading toward radical-socialist revolution. The West has no right to expect them to behave otherwise. It has no right to expect them to discourage, outwardly, a triumph of the Portuguese Communists or of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in Angola, or

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what you will. They may hope, secretly, that one or another of these movements will not succeed (I suspect that this was the case both with respect to the Portuguese and the Italian Communists); but they cannot admit this publicly, for the Chinese instantly would take advantage of it.

The Soviet leaders have attempted to resolve this contradiction by offering to the Western Powers, in effect, relaxation of tensions and greater collaboration on the bilateral plane while insisting on the right to behave like a traditional Communist power in their relations with third countries and areas. This is not ideal, from the standpoint of the West. But it is better than nothing; the gains thus made represent fairly important improvements over what existed 20 or 30 years ago; and there is no reason to turn up one's nose at limited improvements just because one cannot have total ones.

Conventional Weapons Increase

All this has little or nothing to do with the question of military preparations. Here, too, there is a contradiction—or at least the appearance of one. On the one hand, these Soviet leaders are well aware (much better aware than the Western press seems to be) of the appalling danger represented, not just for themselves but of humanity at large, by the unconscionable quantities of nuclear overkill now in existence and by the rapid proliferation of the power of disposal over such weapons. They would like to see this danger mitigated; and they, therefore, are willing, as is evidenced in the SALT talks, to pursue discussions to this end. The fact that they are handicapped in such discussions by their own pathological preoccupation with secrecy does not necessarily mean that they would not like to see some positive result flow from them.

At the same time, they remain committed to the development and maintenance of conventional weapons on a scale far greater than anyone else can see the need for. The reasons for this reach deeply into the Russian past. The maintenance of inordinately large ground forces was a feature of Russian life in the time of Nicholas I, in the time of Alexander III and in the time of Stalin. Even in the 1920s, Russia was maintaining by far the largest ground forces of any European power although Germany was prostrate and the French—2,000 miles away. One must assume that this has to do with a certain inner insecurity; with an awareness of weaknesses assiduously concealed from the outside world; but also with a need to keep large portions of young manpower at all times under disciplined control and available, if needed, for internal use.

I do not mean for a moment to deny that this is a serious problem for the Western Powers. On the contrary, I think the West should have made more of an issue of it, in its relations with Russia, than has been the case. But it is not a problem that arose with "détente" or indeed that has anything to do with "détente"; and the fact that it remains unsolved, today, should not be regarded in the West as the result of failure on the part of the Russians to live up to some general agreements under this heading.

The fact that difficulties continue to exist is no reason for despairing of the
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whole effort to achieve a better relationship with Russia and for returning to all the sterile rigors of the Cold War.

Russia is a country ruled today by an old and tired bureaucracy, caught up in the habits and policies and concepts of the past, dimly aware of the inadequacy of all these concepts in the face of the problems of the present, but fearful of change and devoid of constructive ideas. Its leaders, mostly people in their late 60s and early 70s, are not inclined toward major innovations of policy, particularly not risky or adventuresome ones. They face many serious internal problems, and their whole motivation in external relations is basically defensive: defensive against the Chinese political attack, defensive against the disturbing implications of continued Western economic and technological superiority. It is absurd to picture these men as embarked in some new and dark plot to achieve the subjugation of, and the domination over, Western Europe. They are committed, to be sure, to a whole series of habitual postures, reactions and rhetorical utterances that may appear to bear in that direction. But none of these manifestations of Soviet behavior are new; none are inspired by any belief in the possibility of their early success; and there are none that should occasion any greater anxieties for Western statesmen than they were experiencing—say—10 or 15 years ago before détente ever began to be talked about.

Here, as in the military field, I am not denying that the outlooks and policies and professed purposes of the Soviet leadership do not present serious problems for Western statesmanship—problems which demand their most thoughtful and responsible attention. But I am saying that this is nothing new—that things have been this way for over half a century. And I am saying that Western statesmen will not be aided, in their effort to cope with this problem, by persuading themselves that what they have to contend with is some new and menacing departure in Soviet diplomacy and strategy. They will not be aided by trying to blame the Soviet Government for changes in the balance of political forces that are overwhelmingly the consequences of the failures of Western society itself. They will not be aided by first neglecting the development of their own conventional forces and then blaming the Soviet Government because the military balance runs in Western Europe's disfavor.

Poor old West: succumbing feebly, day by day, to its own decadence, sliding into debility on the slime of its own self-indulgent permissiveness: its drugs, its crime, its pornography, its pampering of the youth, its addiction to its bodily comforts, its rampant materialism and consumerism—and then trembling before the menace of the wicked Russians, all pictured as supermen, 8 feet tall, their internal problems all essentially solved, and with nothing else now to think about except how to bring damage and destruction to Western Europe. This persistent externalization of the sense of danger—this persistent exaggeration of the threat from without and blindness to the threat from within: this is the symptom of some deep failure to come to terms with reality—and with one's self. If Western Europe could bring itself to think a little less about how defenseless it is in the face of the Russians, and a little more about what it is that it has to defend, I would feel more comfortable about its prospects for the future.

Military Review
MAO Tsetung is dead. In contrast, as the International Defense Review was able to see on a recent visit, the People's Republic of China (PRC), which he founded 27 years ago on the war-torn ruins of the world's oldest and perhaps most cruelly oppressive feudal civilization, is young and reasonably healthy though occasionally doubled up by internal development pains.

In terms of its actual and potential future importance in both regional and global affairs, China is no child. It has the largest population of any nation on earth (920 million, according to latest US estimates); covers the third largest surface area after the USSR and Canada; has some of the world's greatest potential oil resources; has one of the largest (though by no means the best-equipped) armed forces in the world; possesses nuclear weapons and a small, but credible, deterrent ballistic-missile force; is seated in the UN Security Council; and is the acknowledged champion of independence and nonalignment with either superpower among the nations of the Third World.

Ideologically, Mao's Marxist-Leninist philosophy is far more militant than that of the USSR, but China has not yet achieved the economic status considered as a necessary prerequisite for embarking on an active campaign to promote that version of world socialism. China's estimated

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gross national product (GNP) of $202,000 million in 1974 translates into a mere $220 per head (both figures in constant 1973 dollars), way down in the ranking of developing countries.

Meanwhile, the PRC's leaders already command the respect normally accorded only to the superpowers. As in ancient China, Head of State Mao did not visit abroad; until his retirement from public life in June 1976, foreign presidents and princes came to him. Chou En-lai, who did visit abroad, was regarded universally as one of the most accomplished statesmen and diplomats of our time.

Peking's representatives also are treated with considerable deference. There are many reasons for this. On a personal level, whether dashing the hopes of Japanese steel exporters for increased PRC orders in 1976, urbanely fielding questions in private sessions with foreign journalists or explosively arguing with Soviet delegates at the UN Law of the Sea Conference, they tend to remain vocally true to their principles and the party line while tempering them with a pragmatic shrewdness born from thousands of years' practice in political maneuvering and intrigue.

Diplomatic Coups

Such capabilities have enabled China to maintain its desired impenetrability and to exploit the advantage of surprise in pulling off a number of brilliant diplomatic coups in recent years. These have ranged from the tactical about-face of opening a dialogue with the United States, through the minimal but politically highly significant gift of military equipment and spares to Egypt at the moment of President Sadat's rupture with the Soviet Union (which also may enable Chinese technicians to examine some of the newer types of equipment deployed on the Sino-Soviet border), to the radical amendments successfully proposed by Yugoslavia to the draft document for Moscow's cherished summit conference of European Communist Parties, including opposition to any criticism, even indirect, of China.

Foreign deference is due even more, however, to the remarkable progress made in feeding such a large and impoverished nation and to an awareness of the country's enormous potential as a political, military and economic power. Added to these factors must be capitalist hopes of breaking into what could be the world's biggest market for industrial (and perhaps military) technology and equipment, and, above all, the growing belief that the PRC possibly is the only nation other than the United States which is visibly willing and perhaps also able to withstand the military might of the USSR.

China's national policy objectives never have been published officially and probably never will be. If they were, it would remove the ambiguity which gives the Peking administration its necessary freedom of maneuver. These objectives generally are believed to be: maintenance of national security; achievement of great-power status, able to be sustained without allies; achievement of a preponderant regional influence (currently restricted to excluding the influence of opponents, primarily the USSR, from East and Southeast Asia); rectification of China's frontiers (including the reassimilation of Taiwan, recognition of Peking's claims to the offshore island groups of the South China Sea and on the Sino-Soviet border); and the leader-
ship of all true Marxist-Leninists in the world.

It is the last of the objectives which was the root cause of the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s. The rift must be accepted as permanent unless there is a complete reversal, under Hua, of China's claim to be the only true proponent and center of a new Marxist-Leninist world order.

The split left the PRC in a double-adversary situation, faced by two "imperialist" superpowers. It was imperative for China to force both potential opponents, if they chose to attack, to fight on its terms by conventional invasion on the ground. This would allow the PRC to maximize its only military advantages—enormous space and manpower—advantages which Mao stressed as the foundations for his essentially land-based strategy of People's War.

As Mao wrote in 1945:

This army is powerful because of its division into two parts, the main forces and the regional forces, with the former available for operations in any region whenever necessary and the latter concentrating on defending their own localities and attacking the enemy there in cooperation with the local militia.

The People's War concept presupposes the denial of a forward-based strategy and the forging of a link between the army, the 5- to 8-million-strong militia and the proletarian masses from which it is taken. This link is provided by the static nature of the regional forces (which undertake many auxiliary production tasks locally) and, more essentially, by the party. Mao not only taught that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun," but also "our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to control the Party." All Chinese military leaders who have opposed the dual command system and attempted to abolish the posts of party commissars or to reduce their extensive powers in normally purely military matters have been dismissed summarily.

Conventional Invasion

The means adopted to force a potential aggressor to choose conventional invasion rather than nuclear strike have been threefold: first, dispersal of vital installations; second, a nationwide civil defense program including nuclear shelters and underground grain storage silos (which continues to be run as a psychological program since it reduces popular fear of nuclear war and supports the Maoist theory that men are more important to military victory than weapons); and, third, the accelerated development of China's own survivable nuclear deterrent.

Between 1964 and 1971, China exploded 12 nuclear devices at Lop Nor in Sinkiang. These ranged from early 20-kiloton fission warheads using locally produced uranium 235 to 3-megaton thermonuclear charges using plutonium. Seven of the devices were airdropped (all save one by Tu-16 bombers), and one was missile-delivered (by a modified Soviet SS4).

On 24 April 1970, the Chinese launched their first satellite, followed a year later by a second. Both were put in orbit by modified, multistage, intermediate-range ballistic missiles. By then, China was estimated to have deployed up to twenty 700-mile-range ballistic missiles in the northwest (Sinkiang) and northeast (Manchuria or Heilungkiang). It also had begun to use a new missile test site in Heilungkiang allowing ballistic flights
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up to 2,000 miles into the Sinkiang desert.

The 1964-71 period was crucial for Chinese strategic policy. It encompassed the Cultural Revolution (1965-69); imposition of martial law under the regular army to restore order out of the utter chaos created by the Red Guards and revolutionary rebels; use of the situation by Defense Minister Lin Piao to accumulate personal power; the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; first Soviet fleet penetration into the Indian Ocean in 1968 and the subsequent buildup of Russian influence there; mounting pressure by the Soviets on the Chinese northeastern and northwestern borders leading to armed clashes in 1969; the Soviet-Indian Treaty of 1971 and the ensuing Indo-Pakistani War; growing détente between the United States and the USSR; the final toppling of “pro-Soviet” Lin Piao in 1971; the Vietnam War and increasing Soviet influence in Hanoi; and popular disillusionment in the United States with the Vietnam War.

Indications

This list is far from exhaustive, but it indicates that Peking saw itself, by 1971, as isolated and outmaneuvered by an expansionist Soviet Union which appeared to be using détente to “buy off” US intervention. At the same time, it was becoming ever more clear that US public opinion would never sanction an American attack on China unless Peking initiated a large-scale external military adventure which endangered vital US interests.

However, no such thing applied to the closed society of the Soviet Union. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia and formulation of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” (which justifies Russian intervention in other socialist states in the interests of what is now termed “proletarian internationalism”), the Chinese had watched with publicly expressed alarm as Soviet ground forces on their mutual border were quadrupled from 11 divisions in 1968 to 45 by 1971.

Border Clashes

The escalating 1969 border clashes on the Ussuri River occasioned considerable trepidation in Peking which ordered its troops not to fire until they actually had taken casualties themselves and until they were convinced that the firing from the Russian side was not an accidental outburst. The Chinese trepidation was understandable since the Cultural Revolution had not run its full course and the PRC remained on the brink of civil war.

It now appears that on the Ussuri, and in subsequent lesser incidents on the ill-defined Sinkiang border in the summer of 1969, the Soviets were as much intent on probing Cultural Revolutionary China’s resolve as anything else. But the clashes confirmed to Mao and Chou En-lai that Russia had to be treated as the first-priority threat.

Accordingly, the defense procurement budget nearly was doubled from 1969 to 1971 to allow deployment of the more advanced weapon systems advocated by Lin Piao (longer-range nuclear ballistic missiles, improved tactical aircraft and a construction program for Luta class guided-missile destroyers and Kiangtung class guided-missile frigates), and additional Chinese Army units were moved into the northern military regions bordering the USSR. By 1971, when reinforcement was completed, nearly half of the army’s total manpower

50. Military Review
### PRC Military Expenditure, Population and Armed Forces, 1965-74 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military Milex Per Capita (Constant Dollars)</th>
<th>Armed Forces (Per 1,000 People)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expenditures (Milex) (Million Dollars)</td>
<td>People (Million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>747,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>763,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>7,500</td>
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<td>878,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>899,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>920,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


of three million was deployed in defensive positions in these northern regions.

The powerful Lin Piao apparently was of the opinion that the United States, as leader of the capitalist world, still should be regarded as a major threat, but it was evident that China could not confront both "imperialist" superpowers at once without overextending its conventional forces and still very limited nuclear deterrent and economic resources. In view of its concentration on the threat from the north, China was in no position to attempt any military confrontation with US forces around its southern and eastern periphery. While continuing publicly to denounce "hegemony" and support nationalist movements, Peking was quite content for the increasingly less hostile United States to attempt to maintain the status quo in Korea, Japan (where the US presence denied the excuse for China's erstwhile invader to re-build its defense forces) and Thailand since it prevented the Soviet Union from increasing its influence as it had in North Vietnam and Laos.

The winding down of the Cultural Revolution and reassertion of party control enabled Lin Piao to be unseated in 1971. Rather conveniently, he died in an air crash shortly after being deposed, while allegedly fleeing to the USSR following an abortive coup against Mao. Meanwhile, feelers had been put out to Washington, and Kissinger had started his "Ping-Pong diplomacy." In 1972, President Nixon visited China.

The dual Shanghai communiqué which resulted was of considerable strategic importance for the Chinese. Apart from laying the groundwork for
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

peaceful reincorporation of Taiwan into China and the eventual establishment of full diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking, the communiqué declared that neither power sought hegemony in east Asia and that both would oppose any such attempt by a third power (that is, Russia).

Other Advantages

Other advantages for the Chinese were that it provided an implicit short-term assurance of American friendship, introducing the possibility—however faint—that the United States might intervene on China's side in any conflict with the USSR; that it gave tacit US approval to China's aims of becoming a great power so long as US "interests" were not endangered; and that it lowered US resistance to Chinese purchases of advanced technology and equipment from the West, some of which was needed for military purposes.

Since 1972, China's relationships with the United States and the USSR have changed little, and it has been able to continue strategic policy along established lines. By the end of 1972, the army's 2d Artillery had deployed what Peking considered a sufficiently credible nuclear deterrent to a Soviet first strike, the civil defense program was well-advanced and the high procurement funding for nuclear missile systems consequently was reduced. The emphasis went back to research and development on longer-term programs and improving the effectiveness of conventional forces.

Instead of relying on foreign sources, the military High Command decided initially to improve existing forces by using China's own limited industries.

Stress was placed on increasing production of the T59 tank (the 1963 Chinese version of the Soviet T54A). Production of the Chinese M1967 tracked armored personnel carrier was stepped up, and the indigenously designed F9 twin-engined derivative of the MIG19 was put into advanced development. While Lin Piao's "expansionist" blue-water programs for new guided-missile destroyers and frigates were halted, building of Soviet-type Romeo class patrol submarines and gun/missile armed fast patrol boats (FPBs) for coastal defense was continued at the rate of four to six submarines and about 85 FPBs per year. About the only order for foreign military equipment at this time was a 1973 contract with the French firm Aérospatiale for 13 Super Frelon helicopters, 12 of which were equipped with Omera-Segid surveillance radars.

These were delivered in 1974-75.

The years 1973 and 1974 were relatively quiet for the Chinese military who concentrated on consolidation of existing programs to counter the Soviet threat to national security. An exception was the battle of the Paracel Islands of January 1974 when the Chinese Navy, in conjunction with armed fishing boats and shore-based fighter-bombers operating out of Hainan Island, beat off a South Vietnamese naval attempt to displace Chinese fishing settlements.

The incident served as a sharp reminder to the PRC that it would have to be prepared, if necessary, to defend its claims to the island groups of the potentially oil-rich South China Sea and to a 200-mile offshore economic zone. Both Hanoi and the Philippines recently have decided to begin oil exploration around the Spratly Islands which are at the limit of the Chinese Navy's current operational range. Somewhat embarrass-
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

Artist's impression of the Shenyang F9 all-weather interceptor and fighter bomber

The M1967 tracked APC, designed in China, is expected to replace outdated Soviet BTR152 wheeled vehicles and progressively equip a large number of mechanized infantry units.
**SECURITY REQUIREMENTS**

Ingly for the Chinese, the warships best suited to "protect" the Spratlys are their 17 destroyers and frigates, notably the newer _Lutas_ and _Kiang-tung_ s programed by the disgraced Lin Piao.

With Chou En-lai seriously ill and Mao entering a state of physical decline, Chou's protégé Teng Hsiao-ping assumed greater responsibilities in 1975. A blunt and pragmatic man with none of Chou's flair for internal and external political diplomacy, Teng enraged the radicals by pressing for a "reactionary" rationalization of industry, for reversion to more traditional methods of education and for pushing technological development at the expense of ideology. In the military sector, a significant contract worth £60 million was placed with Rolls-Royce for Chinese-licensed production of the military version of the _Spey_ turbofan engine, suitable for both the _F9_ and the _MIG21_. Three more Chinese satellites were launched, all into orbits suitable for photoreconnaissance. One of them ejected a capsule which was recovered.

**Reappraisal Undertaken**

At the same time, the High Command undertook a reappraisal of PRC strategic policy, drawing lessons from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the battle of the Paracels and the Vietnam War. All had proved the primordial requirement for tactical air power and the necessity for relatively advanced weapons and equipment to achieve victory against a fast-moving modern conventional aggressor.

While Mao's basic posture of countering the two extremes of a Soviet nuclear first strike and/or all-out invasion was accepted, it seems that, in the light of new intelligence estimates, recommendations were made to provide additional options to meet a range of more limited threats. These are thought to include:

- Sudden Soviet seizure of a limited, but vital, area of China such as the industrial northeast.
- Abrupt seizure of disputed border territory or island groups so as to present the PRC with a _fait accompli._
- A "knock-at-the-door" escalation of border tensions with a show of force designed to intimidate Peking.
- Interference with China's maritime lines of communication.

All of these newly perceived threats require good intelligence and an immediate response capability if aggression is to be deterred or, failing that, repulsed. In the case of such threats on land, the regular army main force units need instant mobility to be able to move in time from their defensive layback positions to meet the threat at the frontier, and they require significantly more up-to-date weapons systems to defeat the initial onslaught from the Soviet Union's modern conventional forces.

At sea, apart from its 17 destroyers and frigates, the navy is lacking severely in surface vessels capable of deterrence except in the PRC's immediate coastal waters. Although submarines may be reasonably effective against an unsophisticated enemy, the shallowness of the China Sea must make them vulnerable to antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations except at longer ranges from the coast. The Chinese also are weak in their own ASW capabilities. The most obvious solution to providing an instant initial response both on land and at sea is air power although this must be backed up rapidly by credible surface forces if hostilities are imminent.
Despite this reappraisal, the high priority placed on agricultural and economic development and the need to provide at least some material incentives (in the form of improved living standards) to the masses are considered by certain official Western analysts as inhibiting any dramatic expansion of China's limited military industrial capacity in the immediate future. Such a move, they reason, could be made only at the expense of progress in the civil sector, thus upsetting the well-balanced forward planning of the Peking administration.

Aircraft Industry

Only in the military aircraft industry, it seems, can output be expected to rise significantly since present production (of the MIG19) does not use anything like the full capacity. China bought large quantities of aircraft-suitable aluminum on the depressed world market in 1975, and completion of the Spey engine production plant (reportedly at Sian in central China) should enable Spey-powered F9s and/or MIG21s to be manufactured at a high rate once flight trials with the new engine are completed.

If other military hardware requirements are considered by the High Command as demanding immediate fulfillment, it is possible that orders might be placed abroad. China's credit is extremely good, and its dwindling balance-of-payments deficit well could take a turn into the black if the choice is made to export part of the potentially huge future output from the newly discovered Takang oil field.

While the United States seems to be out of the running as a supplier of any overtly military systems on ideological grounds (as confirmed by the recent negative report of a visiting Congressional delegation), Western Europe and Yugoslavia might be considered acceptable sources for initial deliveries, probably followed by licensed production in the PRC. The contract signed with Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm on 5 June 1976 for four BO105 multipurpose helicopters and an option on 16 more indicates a continuing Chinese willingness to "walk on two legs." Interest also has reportedly been shown in German submarines, British vertical and short take-off and landing Harriers, Franco-German Alpha Jets, French AMX30 tanks and Swedish antitank weapons.

It is difficult to predict accurately other priorities the High Command will place on future hardware requirements. There are countless options, but most remain only educated guesses by the experts. It is recognized, however, that force modernization is an important consideration in the PRC and undoubtedly will be so for years to come.

Any major policy changes almost certainly can be discounted for the foreseeable future. There will be developments and probably some change in direction to emphasize raising the standard of living. There also will be some concern for the security aspects of reassimilating Taiwan, probably involving troop movements. But the main lines of China's balanced and integrated policies in diplomacy, economics and defense have been followed for at least the last 10 years, and they look a long way ahead. Though their outward appearances may change, they are unlikely to alter fundamentally until China begins to perceive itself once more as the major power envisaged by the great helmsman Mao.
JUST how effective are the Reserve components (RC) in performing their mission? Indeed, what missions do they actually perform? These two key questions hide a host of others, far more subtle.

The American Reserve system derives from American history. The Army National Guard (ARNG) traces its ancestry back to the colonial militia while the US Army Reserve (USAR) is succored by the traditional American distrust of standing armies. Both the USAR and ARNG are rooted in the concept of the citizen-soldier. Moreover, over many years, both have achieved tremendous political clout—clout which almost certainly assures their survival regardless of their effectiveness.

If one were designing a national military force structure in the last third of the 20th Century, would the Reserve components be included? That is, ignoring tradition and political necessity, is a force structure which includes a major Reserve component cost-effective? The answer to this question is to be found both in theory and in the experience of others.

First, the case is always that the part-time soldier is cheaper than the regular. At every grade, from private through general, the RC member's base pay and allowances amount to only that portion of his active duty counterpart's during which the former is in pay status. This usually amounts to about 39 paid duty days per year. Some of the savings, of course, are offset by TDY (temporary duty), travel and per diem for annual training (AT) and active duty for training (ADT). These lost savings, in turn, are balanced by the fact that many reservists are not in units and, therefore, do not put in the full 39 paid duty days per year. On balance, it has
been calculated that one member of the Active Army costs 13.1 reservists.\textsuperscript{1}

The answer, however, is not cost but effectiveness. If the reservist cannot carry out the assigned missions, then all the money paid out for the part-time soldier is wasted. Although most nations have some sort of reserve system, only a few have been battle-tested relatively recently. In general, the experience has not reflected well on the reserves. The US experience is not atypical.

In our early history, the reputation of the militia was not high. In World Wars I and II, in Korea, in the Cold War and in Vietnam, little or no training time was saved by Reserve call-ups. Although RC units performed well in all cases, they did so only after thorough training which generally took as long as for raw recruits.\textsuperscript{2}

The one nation which has a reserve system that seems to work as expected is Israel. But, except for a small cadre, the entire Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) is a reserve force.\textsuperscript{3} Are Israel's circumstances of living under the constant threat of total annihilation the factor which has determined the success of the IDF, or can their system be adapted to other circumstances?

Before attempting to answer this question, let us explore, somewhat, the effectiveness of the current US Reserve structure. In the present circumstances, the Reserve components are organized in a variety of ways. There are training divisions, maneuver battalions, combat service support companies, strategic military intelligence detachments, civil affairs units and a host of others all in a hodge-podge of USAR and ARNG structures. In addition, there are individual reservists in control groups or mobilization designee (MOBDES) assignments. Finally, some USAR and ARNG units are designated to "round-out" Active Army divisions in the event of mobilization.

As might be expected, the effectiveness of these individuals and organizations varies greatly. Even within a single round-out brigade, I have observed a great deal of difference in quality among company-size units. This variability extends throughout the system so that it is hard to generalize. With this caveat, let me proceed to do precisely that.

In general, combat support and combat service support units within the ARNG tend to have higher morale, higher retention rates, higher accession rates, and so forth than their counterparts within the USAR.\textsuperscript{4} The reason for this very well may be the local nature and tighter command

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structure of the ARNG which is located entirely within single states. In the words of its slogan, "The Guard belongs." It belongs not only because of its local base, but because it has a series of state emergency missions which are perceived by its members as relevant to their security. These include, but are not limited to, flood and riot control work.

By contrast, the USAR units of a similar stripe have nothing more to offer than a second job and the appeal of military life, such as it is. Thus, the USAR seems to be competing with the Active Army for its enlisted personnel (and losing) while the ARNG competes with the USAR but not with the Active Army.

Specialized units such as strategic military intelligence detachments (MIDs) and civil affairs units along with MOBDES individual USAR assignments seem to be highly competitive with accession and retention rates comparable with the ARNG. USAR school units seem to generate like results.

RC Mission

The question of whether the Reserve components are effective or not depends on the definition of their mission. The mission of the RC is to augment the Active Army in a national emergency. Clearly, if given time, the RC can do this, but will such time be available? That seems unlikely.

The standard, worst-case scenario for the next war calls for a Soviet attack in Western Europe. Such an attack is expected to be met with forces inbeing augmented by selected Reserve units. RC units and individuals, in the scenario, will not have 30 days to mobilize and 30 days to deploy. They will be needed immediately, yet the evidence indicates that units will not be ready. At the same time, many MOBDESs, will be ready and fully able to augment their proponent agencies, but their advance emergency order to active duty states that their reporting date is 30 days following the declaration of a national emergency. The waste is obvious: units, which under present conditions, cannot be ready are relied upon while individuals who are ready can only be mobilized 30 days after they are needed.

How can these inconsistencies be resolved? A realistic approach would involve making units ready for immediate mobilization and getting the authorization to mobilize relevant individuals and units on much shorter notice. To be effective, the individual reservist should be ready to report to his unit within 24 hours after the declaration of a national emergency. An RC unit should be deployable within 72 hours. This, of course, implies a much higher state of readiness than exists at the moment for most, if not all, RC units. It further speaks of the necessity of using the high state of readiness of the individual reservist, particularly the MOBDES. Let me address the readiness of the MOBDES (and certain specialized units such as strategic MIDs) first. The MOBDES, at least in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence program, was selected for his assignment on the basis of a combination of civilian and military skills acquired over a long time. Given one day of duty time with his proponent agency, he familiarizes himself with the changes that have taken place in the agency since last year, is "read on" to new classified material and, the next day, is prepared to assume the job he would be doing if he were mobilized. The strategic MID merely needs time to accomplish necessary ad-
ministrative functions.

In these examples, training time is at a minimum—the individual and unit are capable of contributing immediately to the Army mission. This kind of reservist is a priori cost-effective. Indeed, the terms “annual training” and “active duty for training” are misnomers. Eight of the 10 working days of AT or ADT are spent augmenting the capabilities of the Active Army (the other two involve in- and out-processing).

Combat and support units, by contrast, need training time desperately. In their two weeks of AT, the same two days are spent in- and out-processing as for the MOBDES, and the middle weekend is, essentially, time off. Thus, of theoretically two weeks, only eight days (one week and one day) actually are devoted to mission-related training. One additional day sometimes is gained by making Sunday the reporting day, but this is a limited gain for what is perceived by the reservist as a major inconvenience.

Weekend drills (inactive duty training (IDT)) are less effective in increasing unit readiness than AT. Indeed, more than one observer has noted that, of the 12 annual weekends of IDT, all easily may be devoted to other than mission-related training. One additional day sometimes is gained by making Sunday the reporting day, but this is a limited gain for what is perceived by the reservist as a major inconvenience.

What is contemplated, then, for the US Reserve components is a similar program of 30 consecutive training days each year. This month of AT would begin, to take an arbitrarily chosen example, on 1 August 1977 (a Monday) and end on 30 August 1977 (a Tuesday). In- and out-processing would cost two training days, and weekends could cost up to eight more. Thus, a minimum of 20 mission-related training days would be available as compared to the present eight days. More importantly, one or all four weekends could be used giving a maximum of 28 “good” training days. The decision to use any or all of the available weekends for training should de-
PEND on the type of unit, its particular mission and demonstrated proficiency. Are nine additional days of IDT needed? I suggest that, for most USAR units, all but one weekend could be eliminated easily except for the officer and noncommissioned officer cadre which would be needed for planning. The rationale is that IDT is generally a very inefficient use of training time and that, since unit equipment would be located either at the training site or the location of an affiliated Active Army unit, no IDT to prepare for "camp" or for "post-camp" equipment maintenance is needed. One weekend during the year should be retained to test the ability of the unit to meet its mobilization deadline. To minimize inconvenience yet retain a certain amount of realism, the members of the unit should be informed that it could be any one of three specific weekends during the year.

Some additional IDT for the ARNG should be retained. This would be used to train specifically for state missions. Perhaps some of the costs of this IDT then could be shifted to the states.

Several of the effects of such a restructuring of the RC training year are readily apparent. First, it would tend to make Reserve service less desirable and more of a burden and, therefore, drive out some individuals. This, in turn, would result in a leaner Reserve force, a not undesirable result in itself. Second, it would upgrade significantly the quality of the RC. Third, the RC would be less expensive both because of smaller size and because of eliminating six training days per year. Fourth, such a force would be cost-effective. Finally, because such a restructuring would be an upgrading of the RC (and would not tamper with the command structures of the USAR and ARNG), it would raise few, if any, of the kinds of political objections that other restructuring plans have produced.

This is not to say that such a plan would meet no objections, for it surely would. Moreover, it could not be accomplished without some new legislation. Among its pitfalls is the prospect of driving out too many good reservists, and some additional statutory protection would be needed in this area. When all is said, however, 13.1 reservists to one member of the Active Army looks very appealing.

NOTES


7 Gans, op. cit.; Neimania, op. cit.; and Abramowitz, op. cit.

8 My own advance emergency order so reads.


10 Ibid.

11 Heymont and Rosen, op. cit., pp 84, 85, 92 and 93.

12 Ibid., p 93.

13 Abramowitz, op. cit., p 61.
ON A WARM August morning at Northampton, a scheduled session of the court system of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was convening for the conduct of routine business. The formal calm of the courtroom was shattered suddenly by the intrusion of an unruly armed mob of local citizens, some of whom were veterans of the war which ended only three years before. The court was forced to adjourn. On 5 September, the scene was re-enacted at Worcester as the state supreme court sat in session. It, too, adjourned of necessity. The mob, now 500 strong, struck again on 26 September at Springfield, forcing the adjournment of another supreme court session. Because of the proximity of the federal arsenal at Springfield, Congress saw fit to intervene. Before a force could be organized and brought to bear, the band dissolved. The day after Christmas, it struck Springfield again, this time fully armed, organized and following a leader, with the intent of taking the arsenal.¹

This sequence of events could have been reported by the press during the last decade. It actually took place in 1786. The leader was Daniel Shays, a former captain in the Continental Army. Shays' Rebellion was a violent protest against the failure of our young nation, still a confederacy, to provide a sound medium of exchange and, in the absence thereof, the refusal of the state courts to allow taxes and court costs to be paid "in kind."

From the events of 1786 to this day, our history has been punctuated regularly with episodes of domestic violence in various forms. Some reached the level of insurrection such as John Brown's 1859 attack on the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry. Violence on a large scale has been perpetrated over elections, prison con-
SOLDIER AND CIVIL DISORDER

ditions, labor grievances, student activism, draft inequities, racial oppression, economic deprivation and unpopular foreign policy. The military has been committed to quelling these incidents and can expect more of the same in the future. From 1945 through 1972, the Army National Guard was committed to the streets 345 times. Federal troops, in this same period, were called upon 12 times. This represents an average frequency of more than once a month for the national guard and about once every two and one-quarter years for regular forces. Because Americans possess the propensity for violent reaction to injustice, real or imagined, we are involved. Missions of this type are as likely to arise as are conventional missions against foreign military forces.

The mechanics of dealing with mobs and street violence have been refined and developed into excellent techniques. However, more effort is needed to prepare troops and their commanders philosophically and psychologically for duty on the streets. This training will enable them to cope better with and, therefore, to accomplish more acceptably a civil disturbance mission. Philosophy develops attitude. The attitude of the soldier during incidents of civil disorder must be commensurate with the requirements, expectations and concepts of our free society.

The professional soldier avoids political involvement, leaving these matters to the civilian; so it should be. However, the root causes of civil disorder lie within the politics of society and government. These are matters which must be understood fully by the soldier if he is to enhance his effectiveness in quelling civil disorder. He must understand the broad spectrum of opinion in our society concerning its acceptance of civil disorder as a vehicle of social change. In the final analysis, however, he must understand that the mission is not debatable at H-hour, regardless of the causes and issues generating the disturbance. His grasp of this and his ability to keep a proper perspective will temper his performance and aid him in understanding why he is on the street.

The commitment of the military to this type mission is a legitimate function of our government. Philosophical and legal precedents were established in our earliest history. Some of this philosophy is reflected in law and survives today. Some of it is forgotten in the emotion-packed climate of heated issues as

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protest becomes violent and lines of battle are drawn between the dissidents and the law enforcement authorities. Let us go back in history and pick up the threads of the story of Shays' Rebellion and see how this philosophy developed.

To the dismay of the weak national government, it discovered that the Articles of Confederation were inadequate and too cumbersome for quick, decisive action by the federal government in response to a civil disorder requiring its intervention. It was not until the end of January 1787 that the rebellion could be arrested and then only with the limited forces and resources of the state militia. The federal government was unable to muster a force of its own, even to protect its property. It managed to send General Benjamin Lincoln with a few cannon to augment and command a state force led by the militia commander, General William Shepard.

This one event brought into focus the need for a stronger central government and was most instrumental in catalyzing the ultimate creation of the Union. It hastened the work of the Philadelphia Convention which produced the Constitution of the United States. The convention stood firmly behind the concept of protecting property rights from rioters and insurgents. The assaults of Shays' rebels were considered to be the result of an "excess of democracy." The works of John Locke became the gyroscope for the delegates on this subject. Locke considered the protection of private property the principal task of government. The delegates found comfort and verification of their position in the works of Aristotle who saw extreme democracy as leading first to chaos and then to tyranny.

The concept of the new constitution with its provision for a strong central government represented heresy in the minds of most of the citizenry which jealously guarded the sovereignty of strong state governments from the omnipotence of a central federation. The concept had to be sold. An outstanding literary effort was undertaken to inform the citizenry of all aspects of the proposed constitution. Eighty-five articles were written analyzing the constitution, its meaning and intent. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay wrote these articles under the collective pseudonym, Publius. They were published sequentially in the New York Independent Journal and other newspapers. We know them as the:

Federalist Papers... an authoritative analysis of the Constitution of the United States and an enduring classic of political philosophy that takes its place in history beside the Constitution itself.

These papers address, in depth, the problems posed by civil disorder, rebellion and instability. They develop the philosophy of the solution to such problems in a free society. This subject is discussed no less than 25 times in the 85 papers.

Along with the constituted power of a strong union, it followed that a means of imposing that power had to be available to the central government when its laws were broken willfully by a state or combination of citizens. This called for a standing army in peacetime, a concept feared by and repugnant to the citizens of the young republic. This matter was discussed at length by Publius, citing the need for a large
army for use in suppressing insurrections and espoused the concept of law still in use today: that federal forces should be called upon when the state in which the disorder exists cannot or will not enforce the law. He explained the mandatory nature of the right and duty of the federal government to enforce its laws should the state refuse. His strongest argument for the establishment of a peacetime army was the safety of the community from civil disorder.

On 2 July 1788, Congress declared the constitution in full force and effect after ratification by the required number of states. Six years later, its power was tested when an eruption broke out in western Pennsylvania. Dissension among the western settlers led President Washington to believe that they may have wanted to secede from the Union. These settlers were grain farmers who could not afford to transport their grain eastward to market unless they converted it to whiskey. When Alexander Hamilton, then secretary of the treasury, authored an excise tax on whiskey, the settlers suspected that it was aimed at them. There was an element of truth in their suspicions because the tax represented a means of expressing and enforcing federal authority in the West. In protest, the settlers eventually raised an army, attacked revenue agents and, in general, created havoc. This, the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, was an overt challenge to law and order. The State of Pennsylvania refused to act.

President Washington federalized the militia, added regular troops to the force, close to 15,000 men in all, and committed it against the rebellion. Allegedly; Hamilton welcomed this opportunity to demonstrate the power of the federal government. There were 200 arrests. Sometime later 25 of the insurgents were tried and convicted. Because of the unnecessarily large force deployed and its corresponding overapplication of force, the settlers now were convinced that the national government meant them no good. To prevent further polarization and to demonstrate the good will of the national government, President Washington pardoned all of those convicted.

Dissent has been a cherished tradition in our culture and long predates the episode of 1794. Is civil disobedience, therefore, with its potentially violent results, a justifiable vehicle of social change? A broad spectrum of opinion exists among jurists, political scientists and philosophers in answer to this question. This range of opinion is worthwhile knowledge for the troop commander in developing an understanding of the dissenter and his objectives. A commander must realize the potential results of the manner in which he executes his domestic disturbance mission. If the end result of his actions makes it more difficult for those responsible to find rational solutions to the causative problems, the method of executing the mission may not have been justitied.

The Russian Revolution began more dramatically and definitely with a single event... street riots in Petrograd in March 1917... than did any of our other revolutions.

Perhaps the outcome of that incident would have been different if the established authority and its troop commanders had understood its potential.

During the social upheavals of the 1960s, Abe Fortas, former associate justice of the US Supreme Court, wrote a widely read essay on the
subject of civil disobedience. He examined the validity of violence as an instrument of social change where due process of law is available to the dissenter. He concluded that "we have alternatives to violence." He recognized the right of dissent and protest being exercised only to the limit of the law but not beyond that point. He cited "extreme exceptions," however, where even he would violate the law in order to focus upon an oppressive aspect of legal authority, but would expect to be punished appropriately for his actions. He recognized that the American colonists were "violent revolutionaries" and that slavery endured until it was abolished by force of arms. However, he considered these analogies too simplistic to apply as a generally acceptable concept of behavior. He stated that:

... violence is never defensible ... and it has never succeeded in securing massive reforms in an open society where there were alternative methods of winning the minds of others to one's cause and securing changes in the government or its policies. In the United States these avenues are certainly available.15

Fortas is answered in an equally absorbing essay by Howard Zinn of the Department of Government at Boston University. Mr. Zinn's essay cites "nine fallacies" of law and order as opined in Fortas' work. In essence, these "fallacies" totally reject the traditional law and order point of view. They are:

First Fallacy: that the rule of law has an intrinsic value apart from moral ends. (By "moral ends" I mean the needs of human beings, not the mores of our culture.)

Second Fallacy: the person who commits civil disobedience must accept his punishment as right.

Third Fallacy: that civil disobedience must be limited to laws which are themselves wrong.

Fourth Fallacy: that civil disobedience must be absolutely non-violent.

Fifth Fallacy: that the political structure and procedures in the United States are adequate as they stand to remedy the ills of our society.

Sixth Fallacy: that we can depend on the courts, especially the Supreme Court, to protect our rights to free expression under the First Amendment.

Seventh Fallacy: that our principles for behavior are to be applied to individuals, but not to nations; to private parties in the United States, but not to the United States in the world.

Eighth Fallacy: that whatever changes are taking place in the world, they do not require a departure from the traditional role of the Supreme Court playing its modest role as a balancer of interests between state and citizen.

Ninth Fallacy: that we, the citizenry, should behave as if we are the state and our interests are the same.16

Between the two extremes of opinion on the legitimacy of disobedience as a vehicle of social change in our system lies the point of view of Dr. Ralph W. Conant which developed from his work as director of the Institute for Urban Studies at the University of Houston, as president of the Southwest Center for Urban Research in Houston and as the former associate director of the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University. He rejects the extreme result of civil disobedience—revolution.17 However,
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in his discussions on violent forms of protest, he takes the position that such action reduces the pressures that produce revolutionary action. He states:

Civil protest in all its forms, both violent and non-violent, is an indispensable corrective ingredient in a democratic polity. In the United States civil protest traditionally has been as much a functioning institution in the body politic as have representative legislatures, courts of law, administrative offices and lobbying groups.

Dr. Conant's views are the product of personal involvement with and the study of social upheaval in this country during the 1960s. His views strike points of tangency with those of the other two. The contrast among the three points of view and attitudes toward this subject evolves from the origins of their respective opinions. Mr. Fortas' view is the progeny of constitutional law with minor emphasis from those gray areas arising from the reality of the day-to-day problems that loom large in the eyes of the protester. Mr. Zinn's views are almost allegorical in nature, philosophical in origin, and understate the reality of life—that to maintain and perpetuate the humanistic philosophy of the constitution requires a reasonable set of constraints on human behavior to allow it to do its work.

Together the three views span the spectrum of American thinking on this subject. All points in the spectrum give some acceptance to civil disobedience as a vehicle of social change even with its potential for violent civil disturbance.

The importance of this spectrum of opinion to the control force commander lies in his realization that a particular citizen who is an adherent of Mr. Fortas' opinion may change his perspective when he becomes emotionally aroused over a social issue dear to his heart; one that strikes "home." If he is aroused to the point of violence, he most likely will think in terms of the "nine fallacies" espoused by Mr. Zinn. This double standard often has surfaced over the segregationists' reaction to integration of schools, of late over the issue of bussing in Boston. The presence of a military control force on the street in such situations will not force this citizen to revert to the advocacy of law and order; it only can return him to the state of order. At that moment, the social issue most likely is unresolved yet, but the matrix of control is restored. Only after reaching this point can the causative issues be resolved effectively. The impact of the violence will or will not create productive response by those leaders of government holding the authority to resolve the grievances, a matter beyond the duty and prerogative of the military. However, the performance and behavior of the control force during the restoration of order will leave their mark on the dissidents and will affect their attitude when the effort is made to resolve the grievances through more conventional means.

By the time the control force commander arrives at the scene of a disorder, the highborn purpose of the initial protest probably will be lost in the mass anger, rage, confusion and the unruly characteristics of the violence—both to the rioter and the soldier. Many persons at the scene may be there by circumstance rather than by design. Fear will abound. The force commander, therefore, must understand that he is not facing a
monolithic force as he would expect to encounter on a conventional battlefield. He must act accordingly: with restraint and innovation.

The performance of the 18th Airborne Corps of Task Force Detroit is a prime example of the application of understanding and innovation on the part of the force commander. The Detroit riot started on Sunday morning, 22 July 1967. It was ignited by a series of confrontations with the Detroit police totally unrelated to the long-smoldering root causes of the disorder. By late afternoon, Governor Romney committed the Michigan National Guard. It began arriving at 7:45 p.m. The intensity of the situation continued to balloon; control continued to deteriorate. By 2:15 a.m. Monday, the governor and Mayor Cavanagh decided to request that the President commit federal forces. The President responded to the request by noon that day by federalizing the national guard and ordering federal troops to intervene.

Lieutenant General John L. Throckmorton arrived Tuesday morning with elements of the 18th Airborne Corps and took command of all military forces. There were almost 5,000 national guardsmen in the city then.

It appeared that the National Guard had not been warned regarding the danger of overreaction and the necessity of great restraint in using their weapons. The young troopers could not be expected to know that their lack of fire discipline made them a danger not only to the civilian population but to themselves. 20

At the time of deployment of Task Force Detroit:

... according to Lieutenant General John L. Throckmorton and Colonel A. R. Bolling of the Task Force, the city was saturated with fear. The National Guardsmen were afraid and the police were afraid. Numerous persons were being injured by gunshots of undetermined origin.

From the time of arrival in the city, General Throckmorton and his staff felt that the major task of the troops was to reduce fear and restore an air of normalcy. In order to accomplish this, every effort was made to establish contact and rapport between the troops and the residents. Troopers... began helping to clean up the streets, collect garbage, and trace persons who had disappeared in the confusion. Residents in the neighborhood responded with soup and sandwiches for the troops. In the areas where the National Guard tried to establish rapport with the citizens a similar response was reported.

Within hours after the arrival of the paratroops, the area occupied by them was the quietest in the city, bearing out General Throckmorton's view that the key to quelling disorder is to saturate an area with 'calm, determined, and hardened professional soldiers.' Loaded weapons, he believes, are unnecessary. Troopers had strict orders not to fire unless they could see the specific person at whom they were aiming. Mass fire was forbidden.

During the five days in the city, 2700 Army troops expended only 201 rounds of ammunition, almost all during the first few hours... after which even stricter fire discipline was enforced. General Throckmorton ordered the weapons of all military personnel unloaded... 21

Forty-three persons were killed during this riot, and more than 7,200 were arrested. Of those killed:

Action by police officers accounted for twenty and, very likely, twenty-
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one of the deaths. Action by the National Guard accounted for seven and, very likely, nine. Action by the Army was responsible for one.

The remainder were from non-authority sources. Of those arrested or killed, “an unaccounted number were people who had been merely unfortunate enough to be on the wrong street at the wrong time.”

The constitution defines in relatively broad terms the right and duty of the national government to intervene in the restoration of law and order. The manner of quelling disorder and the degree of force appropriate are matters left to law and to the judgment of the leadership charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order.

President Washington’s experience in the Whiskey Rebellion demonstrated the result of overreaction: an intensification of polarity. Subsequent experience through our history reveals that, except for the Civil War and other isolated incidents, episodes of protest that have degenerated into violence have not been perpetuated in the interest of overthrowing governments. They usually have been directed at an unpopular policy, social injustice or anomaly inadvertently created by the complexity of government. Dr. Conant points out that protest movements in the preponderance of cases:

... have limited their aims to the nation’s opportunity structure; they have striven for mobility within the system equal to the capacity of the individual to close the gap of relative deprivation.

Added to this are those movements targeted against elements of our national policies, foreign and domestic. No matter how sensitively oriented toward the needs of the people a system of government may be structured, there is bound to be a variation in the degree that the system serves the interests of the various elements of society. James Madison recognized this in his philosophical analysis of justice in which he stated:

It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.

Unfortunately, this republic, though dedicated to these principles, has not always functioned in this manner. When continued injustices are inflicted upon a sector of society, it will react in due time. If the aggrieved sector has adequate political strength, it is able to react successfully through the traditional machinery of the system—the polls. Often, it will attempt to reach the power centers of government through lobbies, pressure groups and by enlisting sympathetic aid from other sectors of society. However, when such avenues leading to expeditious and positive redress are vague, unavailable or unattainable, it will react outside of the formal process by exercising its right to protest. It may use both means simultaneously. Once it is clear that the preferred nonviolent means of obtaining redress are not producing the desired results, the vehicle of protest can coast easily downhill to an ultimate collision with the inertia-bound monolith of the law and order system. This is the critical point in the confrontation.

If the system is operating within the constraints of its legally defined limits and if the leadership within the government is insensitive or un-
responsive to the grievances of the protesting element, the seeds of violence are sown and perhaps already sprouting. The genealogy of domestic violence thus begins with dissent and protest in a disorganized and often scattered pattern. It then develops an organized base complete with spokesmen, leadership, formalized complaints and demands. Next, it embarks upon its first confrontation with the law—civil disobedience. Premeditated and organized acts of lawbreaking take place such as sit-ins, mass demonstrations and disruptions to the daily routines of the community. Civil disobedience is characterized by its non-violent nature.

If the results of the civil disobedience do not bear fruit, anger and resentment replace premeditated action and volatility replaces reason. The dissenter, though he may not realize it, now is sitting on the brink of violence, on the threshold of civil disturbance manifested by mass anger, rage and riot. More often than not, this level of behavior is reached without premeditation and generally is ignited by an incident which may be unrelated to the root issue but which is symbolic of the power of the legitimate system. At this juncture, polarity becomes intense. Any vestige of constituted authority becomes the “enemy.” Conversely, the authorities can lapse into the same attitude; the rioters become their “enemy.”

The federal control force commander can expect to be confronted with a runaway situation upon his arrival at the scene. The evaluation of the situation at this level of the disorder is an intricate and vital process. It will have a decided effect on his course of action. The presence of the federal force is a significant event for several reasons. First, the commitment of these forces is the ultimate step, the last resort. There is no higher authority to call upon if these forces fail in their mission. Only two courses remain: to escalate the military action or to withdraw all forces and allow the disorder to burn itself out. Neither of these are acceptable alternatives. The behavior of the control force in accomplishing its mission will enhance or impede the efforts of civil authority to delineate the perpetrators after order is restored. The force commander carries a tremendous responsibility in such situations. Thus, the commitment of federal troops to a disorder requires diligent planning, thorough training beforehand and sophisticated orchestration in the execution of the mission.

The American soldier is a clear example of the concept “...of the people, by the people, and for the people ....” He is of the citizenry; he is a soldier by virtue of the support, consent and will of the citizenry; and he serves for the benefit and well-being of the citizenry, not to control and suppress it. When he is committed to the street, the soldier is there merely to restore order, just that and no more. He is not there to overwhelm, to crush or to “teach a lesson” to the rioter. There is a significant difference. He is not there to manifest his opinion of dissension. At all levels of the control force, there must be understanding and cognizance of the basic philosophical precepts required of the soldier on the street:

Though his mission is to restore law and order, the soldier must realize that law and order are not necessarily synonymous with justice. It is not the soldier’s job to judge the justice or
injustice of the situation, but he must recognize that the causative issues of the disorder are not necessarily categorizable into clear "rights" and "wrongs."

Polarization fuels the intensity of civil disorder. The uniformed trooper is a vivid symbol of authority which, in the eyes of the enraged rioter, represents the opposite pole at that moment. Everything realistically possible must be done to reduce polarity.

Because of his imposing presence in uniform, under arms and in organized array, he is in sharp contrast with the unruly condition of the mob. Maintaining a state of strict discipline, control, calm but firm reaction to the unruly behavior of the mob, and the implied presence of vast firepower provide the soldier with his greatest asset in facing the disorder—an image of quiet dignity and strength. Before force is applied, this image can have a calming impact on the rioters.

The concept of the application of force in a domestic operation is the antithesis of the traditional military mission on the battlefield, "the destruction of enemy forces." Here the concept is "zero kill." This requires a measured response.

Suppression is an act imposed upon people whereas restoration is the act of returning a condition to a desired former state. The latter is the true objective of the control force. The operation is not a contest of relative strength.

The successful accomplishment of a mission to restore order in a domestic disturbance without bloodshed or injury to the perpetrators is a noteworthy military achievement consistent with the traditional role of the soldier in this free society. This is the implied task of every such mission.

NOTES

1 The Bicentennial Almanac, Edited by Calvin D. Linton, Thomas Nelson, Inc., NY, 1975, p 38.
2 US Army Command and General Staff College slide, Number 6050-1/4-z, Fort Leavenworth, KS
3 The Bicentennial Almanac, op. cit., p 40.
6 Ibid., Paper Number 16.
7 Ibid., Paper Number 21.
8 Ibid., Paper Number 26.
9 Bragdon and McCutchen, op. cit., p 167.
10 The Bicentennial Almanac, op. cit., p 60.
12 The Bicentennial Almanac, op. cit., p 60.
14 Abe Fortas, Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience, New American Library, NY, 1968, p 120.
15 Ibid., p 80.
18 Ibid., p 4.
19 Ibid., p 3.
21 Ibid., pp 48, 52 and 53.
22 Ibid., p 53.
23 Conant, op. cit.
Khrushchev and the Military:

A Study

of Party-Military

Relations,

1955-64

Major Paul T. DeVries, United States Army

The problem of relations between the professional military and civilian control probably is nowhere more articulated than in the totalitarian governmental structure of the Soviet Union. The history of the modern Red Army since its beginning in 1918 includes a parallel history of cyclic conflicts between the professional military and the Communist Party. These conflicts chiefly have centered on the efforts of the party apparatus to impose rigid political controls on the military. By its inherent nature, the Soviet Armed Forces represent a power element with which the party must contend. The failure to maintain sufficient control could spell out the political demise of any given Soviet regime.

In *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, Samuel Huntington defines the modern officer corps as a professional body and the modern military officer as a professional man. This professionalism distinguishes the military officer of today from the warriors of previous ages. The existence of the officer corps as a professional body gives unique cast to the modern problem of civil-military relations.

The military of any state views its position as being responsible for the state military security. This responsibility leads the military to view the state as the basic unit of political organization; to stress the continuing nature of the threats to the military security of the state and the continuing likelihood of war; to favor the maintenance of strong, diverse and ready military forces; to emphasize the magnitude and immediacy of the security threats; and to oppose the extension of state commitments and the involvement of the state in war except when victory is certain.
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Naturally, when international tensions are high, when a threat of war exists or during an actual war, the role of the military enjoys first priority. During times of détente, diplomatic and political passivity, or when the socioeconomic needs of the state are paramount, the role of the military becomes secondary in importance. While undoubtedly as patriotic as officers of other national armies, the Soviet officers have their urgent and immediate objectives centered on the institutional interest of the military and within this broad category on the individual officer's personal and professional interests. Therefore, the military continually impresses upon the political decisionmakers the urgency of maintaining a large and efficient military establishment; of assigning the military a prominent, or at least a positive social role, and of subordinating other social and economic objectives, and the allocations necessary to their achievement, to the paramount demands of national defense.

Military Aims

The continuous conflict and dialogue between the Soviet military and the party essentially concern the military's aims to:

- Maintain the degree of professional authority and institutional independence that will enable military leaders to formulate strategic doctrine, conduct military planning at the highest level and execute established military policy.
- Retain command authority at all levels of the military hierarchy instead of a system under which the political control organs bestow and withdraw such authority and thus wield a powerful instrument for keeping the commanders malleable and preventing elitism.
- Cultivate a positive, even noble, image of the military as the defender of state and people, as the main contributor to past victories over external enemies and as the bulwark of the party in its pursuit of policy.

With these three aims in sight, this article focuses on one portion of the party-military epic. The Khrushchev era was chosen for several reasons: first, because Khrushchev was a leader who was generally acceptable initially to the professional Soviet officers; secondly, because, during the period of Khrushchev's stewardship, the party and the military both enjoyed periods of relative superiority; and, thirdly, because this period encompasses the emergence of a new identity in the Soviet military, the technocrat.

On 8 February 1955, Premier Georgi Malenkov was replaced as premier of the USSR. His downfall had been planned carefully by Nikita Khrushchev, secretary general of the Communist Party, who subsequently assumed complete control of both party and government. This was the end of the legacy of collective leadership which began after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953.

While a study of the reasons for Malenkov's downfall is not the object here, it is useful to point out certain facts. In 1953, Malenkov had announced that, since so much progress had been made in heavy industry, the industrial capabilities of the USSR would be turned to the production of more consumer goods. Also that year, Malenkov saluted the USSR because of the progress it had made in easing international tensions, strengthening peace and preventing war, presumably to provide the rationale for the proposed
curtailment of military allocations. He further stated that Soviet thermonuclear capability represented an effective deterrent to Western aggression. The statement that international tensions had eased on one hand and that future wars would be a futile exercise constituted a radical departure from traditional Soviet views on war and undermined the interests of the military establishment. In both 1953 and 1954, the Soviet budget allocations for defense declined sharply. In addition, Malenkov alarmed the military by using funds from the state reserves to speed up the consumer program even though these reserves were intended to be held for emergencies, especially the possibility of war. All these steps had angered the military who saw them as threats to the military position.

A high level of investment in heavy industry was essential because this sector of the economy was the foundation of the defense industry. Maintenance of a certain level of international tensions was important because this was the rationale for the large defense budgets. Revised military budgets would cripple existing military programs and curtail future military activities.

Khrushchev, who presumably had a feel for the rationale of the military, openly embraced the views of the military concerning Malenkov's reforms, and this alliance of party and military removed Malenkov. Having aligned itself with the party to oust Malenkov, the military was rewarded by Khrushchev. Marshal Zhukov was promoted from first deputy minister of defense to minister of defense. Marshal Bulganin, a political general but a champion of the military, was appointed premier. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Soviet promoted 11 generals to the rank of marshal. The entire military establishment enjoyed the new freedom bestowed upon it by Khrushchev. Having had its views on heavy industry, the international situation and higher defense allocations recognized, the military began to concentrate on the internal scene. It now sought greater freedom to practice its profession free from the burdensome party controls. It wanted a more active role in creating military strategy and theory, and the historical military image to be more positive by correcting former Premier Stalin's version of the military participation in World War II.

Fear in the Party

The military's external goals did not cause much friction with the party, but this was not the case with its internal goals. The military's opposition to party scrutiny, its desire for extensive autonomy and an elitist officer corps and its desire for freedom to reject accepted doctrine by participating in the formulation of new doctrine engendered a fear in the party that the military might become a powerful political rival and thus an institutional counterweight to the party in the Soviet state.

Marshal Zhukov used his new position for the increased benefit of the military. According to Zhukov's lead, the power of the Main Political Administration (MPA) was weakened considerably by the removal of political officers (Zampolits) at company level and the assignment of political indoctrination to the company commander. Since the most effective control of troops is at company level, this meant that the officers now had more control over their men. The number of hours of political
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Indoctrination for troops was reduced and was made voluntary for officers. Several prominent Soviet marshals published articles denouncing the backwardness of Soviet military theory and criticizing its isolation from military thought outside the USSR. The sterility of Soviet theory was criticized, and Stalin was taken to task for not providing the military with a better set of guidelines in World War II and after. Articles also were published pointing out the military's actual participation in the successes of World War II whereas, before, the military was portrayed as responsible only for the war's initial failures.

The Stalingrad Group

Much of Khrushchev's popularity among the military was due to his wartime association with a group of officers at the Battle of Stalingrad where Khrushchev served as senior political officer. During this period, Khrushchev had supported the field commanders in their handling of the battle in opposition to the General Staff (Stavka) which attempted to control the battle from its relatively isolated position in the rear. Because of this, he had established strong loyalties among these officers. Furthermore, he maintained this loyalty by appointing them to various positions of responsibility in the military establishment and in government. Khrushchev had no intention of being dependent entirely upon Zhukov for military support, and he secured his flanks by surrounding Zhukov with members of the Stalingrad group.

Strangely enough, the first signs of increasing antimilitary pressures in the party came from within the military itself. Members of the Stalingrad group, divided between loyalties to Khrushchev and the military institution, struck out against Zhukov and the "separatist" military interests and objectives he personified. During the Battle of Stalingrad and most of World War II, Zhukov had been a member of the Stavka and thus unpopular with the officers of the Stalingrad group. Despite Zhukov's loyal support for Khrushchev in the attempt at his ouster by the "antiparty group," he had to become more subservient to Khrushchev or inevitably come into conflict with the party. Khrushchev regarded himself as the personification of the party, and this meant Zhukov would have to go. His ouster from both the Presidium and the Central Committee on the charges of obstructing party political work in the armed forces signaled an end to the military's emergent individuality. Khrushchev replaced him with an old associate, Marshal Malinovsky, a member of the Stalingrad group. Khrushchev, supported by the Stalingrad group, now not only controlled most of the military establishment but also the bulk of the military's representation on the Central Committee of the party.

Together with Zhukov's ouster, the party announced new reforms for the military. The objectives of these reforms seemed to be:

- To break down barriers between ranks and to inhibit elitist tendencies in commanders by reducing their disciplinary powers.
- To establish party supremacy in the military by introducing a dual principle at command level.
- To strengthen the party's channels of control by embracing the role of the MPA.
- To involve members of the military in local party and social organizations.
● To establish the party’s authority to define military theory, doctrine and strategy.\(^{\text{14}}\)

Naturally, the military did not receive these reforms with equanimity, and the rift between the party and the military widened. Finally, Marshal Malinovsky officially acknowledged the deterioration of party discipline and the damage done by party political organs and demanded that commanders be given authority to carry out their duties and that the political organs cease their disruptive activities. A de facto truce was arranged between the military and the party when the 21st Party Congress provided for curbing political organs, especially when their control functions interfered with the training and readiness of the troops; greater stress on collectivist methods of military administration, with strong emphasis on the role of the party collectives in the units; and the upholding of “Leninist principles,” with their stress on egalitarianism, the rejection of elitism curbs on the disciplinary rights of officers and a breaking down of barriers between the ranks.\(^{\text{15}}\) Although this was a partial relaxation of party controls, it in no way approached the autonomy desired by the military.

Changes Announced

On 14 January 1960, Khrushchev announced planned changes in the military forces. Several of his reasons were reminiscent of Malenkov’s attempt at military reform in the mid-1950s. Khrushchev proposed reducing the Soviet Armed Forces by 1.2 million men. Furthermore, he decried the value of conventional forces, pointing out that even the air force and navy had been made obsolete by rockets and nuclear arms.\(^{\text{16}}\) Lastly, not only would the size and the role of the conventional forces be reduced, but also they would be subjected to a party-engineered policy of military shefstvo (employment of military personnel from the conventional forces in civilian agricultural and industrial establishment) which would be administered and controlled by the political organs in the military.\(^{\text{17}}\)

The announcement of the massive cut in the Soviet Armed Forces together with the formal change in Soviet doctrine and the reduced role of the conventional forces left the military in a state of shock. These events accelerated the deterioration of relations with the party leadership and caused a split within the ranks of the Soviet High Command. Even members of Khrushchev’s select Stalingrad group began to have second thoughts about him.

Apparently, Khrushchev had become convinced of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrents and the unlikelihood of unprovoked attack from the West. Therefore, he was attempting to cut allocations to the conventional forces so that he could use these funds for the development of the strategic forces and for the civilian economic sector.\(^{\text{18}}\) He probably expected the implementation of his policies to be easy because he felt that the military community as a whole had been cowed so thoroughly by the political controls and indoctrination imposed since 1957.

Actually, Khrushchev had forced an alliance between opponents of strong political controls and egalitarianism and those who objected to the reduction and denigration of the conventional forces as well as those who objected to the party’s taking the right to define strategic doctrine. In anticipation of any resistance to the new policy, the party intensified political controls, announced
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the severance of 250,000 officers from service with priority going to "undesirable elements" and gave credence to Khrushchev's strategic doctrinal pronouncements by recognizing him as a war leader and military genius.

The Military Opposition

The military's opposition was against Khrushchev's restrictive strategic doctrine and the interference of the political organs. Senior military leaders began to criticize Khrushchev's doctrine. One of the most important of these was Marshal Malinovsky who publicly dissociated himself from Khrushchev's doctrine and attempted to press a moderate line emphasizing the less extreme proposals of the conservative and progressive schools of thought. The conservatives were those officers who essentially were found within the theater or conventional forces. Many of these were senior officers who served in World War II and who limited their concept to theater force and continental warfare. The progressives were predominantly members of the strategic and technical forces whose interests were furthered by Khrushchev's new strategic views. Also, party members supporting the ruling party elite were to be found in this group.

Obviously, the technocrats also were found among the progressives. The technocrats viewed traditional command and disciplinary practices of little use in modern armies, and they stressed technical expertise and efficiency as vital criteria. While advocating views popular with the party, the technocrats represented another source of conflict within the Soviet military. Since they regarded themselves as a professional technical elite, they were not disposed to spend their time engaging in political activities.

Therefore, on the issue of political indoctrination for the military, the party's political officers found themselves facing a coalition of the conservatives, most of the progressives, the commanders and the technical officers. This coalition, while committing no overt breach of discipline, threw up a wall of resistance by allowing military discipline to deteriorate severely, by hindering political officers in the performance of their duties, by ignoring political indoctrination and by questioning openly the qualifications of the nonprofessional political personnel in the officer corps and political organs.

These antipolitical activities were recognized and appreciated by Khrushchev and, in August 1961, ostensibly because of the growing crisis over Berlin, he announced a halt in the reduction of the conventional forces.

The Party Counterattacks

While openly making conciliations to the military's resistance to his reforms, Khrushchev contrived to strengthen the party's grip on the military. In May 1962, he replaced Marshal Golikov, a military professional, with General Epishev as head of the MPA. Epishev, another Khrushchev confidant, was an old member of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and clearly a political general. He stressed tighter controls in the central apparatus of the armed forces. This meant stronger controls over marshals and top generals. Epishev appears to have been brought in for the express purpose of weakening opposition to Khrushchev's ideas in the top levels of the military.

The outcome of the Cuban missile
crisis was a disaster for Khrushchev. Not only had the United States forced the USSR to back down, but it confirmed the usefulness of conventional forces. The US had planned to invade Cuba with a sizable conventional force despite the threatened use of nuclear weapons. The party now attempted to use the Soviet military as its scapegoat while members of the military used this period to strengthen their opposition to the party.

To the military, the Cuban debacle spelled the end of all hopes of catching up with the American strategic buildup in the near future. Also, it seemed to indicate that Khrushchev would shift from a militant to a détente-oriented foreign policy. This latter measure would destroy the military's chances of larger defense budgets and a more prominent role in party councils.

Clearly, the military was not happy. Even members of the Stalingrad group spoke out against Khrushchev's handling of the affair. The most obvious indication of the rift in the group was on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Salingrad. Writing articles for military journals, several of the marshals of the group extolled Khrushchev's part in the battle while others made no mention of him at all.

In the aftermath of the crisis, the Central Committee and the party impressed on the military that military means served political ends and that these ends were determined by the party. In an obvious attempt to contain the military's opposition, Khrushchev appointed Marshal Biryuzov as chief of the General Staff. Biryuzov was the most loyal of all the marshals to Khrushchev and the only high officer who supported military shefstvo. Naturally, he adhered closely to Khrushchev's military policies.

At this time, the party and the military apparently reached a modus vivendi. The party leadership, through the MPA, abandoned its rigid position on strategic doctrine and accepted the views of the conservatives and moderates. It satisfied at least partially some of the military's objections by lifting certain controls and reducing indoctrination. However, the party reaffirmed its authority to speak for the military in matters of strategic policy and doctrine and secured the military's consent to cease its criticism of many party measures.

Khrushchev Is Replaced

On 16 October 1964, Khrushchev was removed officially as the first secretary of the Communist Party. There is no indication that the military was responsible for his political demise; however, there was a good indication that the military did exert some direct or indirect pressure to have him removed. Khrushchev's readily yielding to US demands during the Cuban crisis was strongly disapproved by the Soviet High Command. In addition, his military reforms, introduced in 1960, posed a serious threat to the military's traditional interests. Although initially appearing as a pro-military national leader, he had become identified by much of the military as the individual responsible for the party's increased interference in military affairs. He had caused a schism in his once loyal Stalingrad group, a critical fact in his fall from power. And lastly, he had trodden on sacred ground when he had assumed himself a strategist and had himself portrayed as the hero of Stalingrad. Moreover, he, like Malenkov, forgot to keep the Soviet power scale weighted in his favor.
PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

Conclusion

The Khrushchev era provided a good illustration of the cyclic conflicts between the party and the Soviet military establishment. As Khrushchev assumed absolute power in the USSR, the military enjoyed relative freedom from party controls. But, as Khrushchev consolidated his position, increasing controls were placed on the military in an attempt to ensure its political reliability. However, having once tasted the new breath of autonomous professionalism, the military resisted the increased demands placed on it by the party apparatus. The reaction to Khrushchev’s military reforms in 1960 caused a serious rift in the military profession which divided loyalties and caused many Soviet professional officers to choose between support of the party or the military community. The Cuban missile crisis seemed to convince both party and military alike that Soviet military policy was far too important to be left to one individual and, at least for a time, ensured a modus vivendi between the party and the military.

The study of Soviet party and military relations during this brief period affirms the fact that the military establishment in the Soviet state is an element of considerable political power. The party and the military have been and will continue to be in continuous conflict over responsibilities for strategic doctrine and the degree of political controls exercised over the military by the MPA. The Soviet military is similar to other military establishments of the world in its pursuit of professional goals and political autonomy. The loyalty demanded by the Soviet leadership need not necessarily surpass the loyalty to military professionalism. The military will resist vigorously any attempt to modify radically or to change completely the traditional goals of the military establishment.

The party’s leadership may find it progressively more difficult to manipulate the military by the frequent intensification of controls. The technocrat represents a new element for the party to contend with in the military establishment. The continuous reaction and interaction of the party and the military forces the military to become an unwilling political entity in USSR politics. When the party is weakened by internal dissent or threats from outside, the military’s assistance is sought. However, when the crisis is passed, the party leaders rescind any concessions made. Naturally, significant military or political defeats the USSR incite members of the military elite to criticize the party’s handling of the crisis.

The soldier is at war even in peacetime. But the soldier serves his prescribed time and departs into the Reserves. The officer, however, is also a soldier, but he is at war for a lifetime. How many inconveniences, how many trials! But the officer withstands all. He does not lose courage. He holds high his honor, the honor of the officer and the citizen.

Major General Makeev, Izvestiya, 12 February 1963
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NOTES


2 ibid., pp 64-65


4 ibid., p 107

5 ibid., pp 107-8

6 Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev, Praeger Publishers, Inc., NY, 1960, p 358


8 Kolkowicz, op cit., pp 112-13


10 In May 1919, the MPA replaced the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars as the party's control apparatus in the military. It was this organization that exercised control of the political officers and was responsible to the party for all military political activities.


12 The Development of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1917-1966, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1966, p 77

13 Kolkowicz, op cit., p 131

14 ibid., p 138

15 ibid., p 148


18 Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, op cit., p 152


20 ibid., p 3

21 ibid., p 4


23 ibid., pp 171-72.

24 ibid., p 173.
COMMUNIST victories in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have altered profoundly the balance of power in Asia and brought about a flurry of political changes to meet this drastic power change. No country has been affected more closely by these changes than Thailand. For years a staunch ally of the United States, Thailand now finds itself confronted by a region of potentially hostile countries of great military strength. Thailand faces Communist countries along 1,000 miles of land borders and now must face an era of new realities in the region, an era in which the old agreements and alliances of the past must be reappraised.

Background

Thailand is fiercely proud of its long and illustrious history as an independent kingdom. It is the only nation in Southeast Asia never to have been colonized by Western countries. The Thai people are proud of their ability to have maintained independence in an era of strong and competing major world powers. The nation’s leaders have been adept at maintaining the proper relationship with more powerful nations. The changes in the political situation in Southeast Asia will pose major new challenges to Thailand’s policies and diplomacy.

The dilemma is complicated further by changes that have taken place in Thailand’s internal politics. In October 1973, the military regime of Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn was swept out of power in the wake of student demonstrations, and a three-year “experiment with democracy” began. Between October 1973 and October 1976, Thailand had six governments, headed by Sanya...
Military leaders

Last October, the Thai military once again seized power after bloody clashes between right and leftwing student groups. Thailand's leaders are military-oriented, more conservative and more cautious toward the region's Communist powers than were the leaders of the civilian governments. It remains to be seen how closely they will adhere to policies and trends initiated by their predecessors.

Most Thai citizens were relieved and satisfied that the military has assumed power again. The populace was weary of three years of unstable coalition government that seemingly was unable to deal with pressing domestic problems in economics, agriculture, education and industrial development. The scope and nature of these problems cannot help but have a major impact on the formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of relations between formerly hostile powers in Southeast Asia. That Thailand has been able to keep foreign policy and domestic considerations in coordination in such an atmosphere has been, in itself, a significant accomplishment. Close coordination of these facets of national interest can be expected to continue.

The Thai approach to foreign policy must take into account the new political realities in Southeast Asia. Generally, three major areas of concern become apparent. First, Thailand has entered a new relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Second, Thailand must develop new relationships with the governments in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Third, Thailand must re-evaluate its policies toward its traditional allies, including the United States and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in view of the changed balance of power in Asia. This article examines the United States-Thailand association only in its context of influence in the regional arena. Emphasis in this article is on Thailand's approaches to its immediate neighbors.

One of the major diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the government of Kukrit Pramoj was the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC. Recognition of the PRC was extended in 1974, and, simultaneously, diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China (Taiwan) was ended. Formal recognition of the PRC had a major impact on thousands of Thai residents of Chinese descent who, for
various reasons, had not taken up Thai citizenship. Often residents in Thailand for several generations but formally citizens of Taiwan, they were given the choice of immediate Thai citizenship or obtaining citizenship status with the PRC.

Thailand obviously has recognized the importance of the PRC as a major economic and military power in Asia. The two countries exchanged several official visits on the ministerial level prior to establishing diplomatic relations. Like the United States, Thailand sent athletic teams to the PRC. In 1974, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Chatthai Chunhawan set up the groundwork for diplomatic recognition during a visit to Peking.

Thailand seems determined to make a success of its diplomatic relations with the PRC despite several potentially serious problems between the two countries. The Communist Party of Thailand, illegal under Thai law, has received enthusiastic covert support from the PRC. Chinese logistical support has reached guerrilla forces operating in northern Thailand and along the border with Malaysia. The Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT) beams programs from powerful facilities in southern China and Laos. Broadcast in the Thai language as well as in several tribal dialects, VOPT has urged support for the Thai guerrilla movement. The Thai Government also is worried about roads being constructed with Chinese support in neighboring regions of Laos. One such road runs from the China border to within 20 miles of Thailand’s mountainous and porous northeastern frontiers. The roads are used mostly to carry supplies and laborers, but the government is well-aware that the roads could be used as a major infiltration route into northern Thailand.¹

Former Prime Minister Kukrit received a royal reception during his visit to Peking in 1975, including an audience with Chairman Mao. At almost the same time that Kukrit was getting the “red carpet” treatment in Peking, VOPT attacked his government and repeatedly called for his overthrow. When asked about the coincidence, Kukrit replied that:

... the broadcast ... is completely a party affair and had nothing to do with the Chinese Government nor does it affect the very good relationship we have with China right now.²

Maintenance of the “very good relationship” was high on the list of priorities of Kukrit’s successor, Seni Pramoj. But the thin line between the government friendship of the PRC and the enmity of the Chinese Communist Party’s activities is an issue that will not be ignored by the new government.

Prime Minister Thanin Kraiwichien, a former Supreme Court judge selected by the Thai military to head the new Thai Government, is expected to take a harder line on communism than his civilian predecessors. What remains to be seen is whether Thai hopes for a lessening of support for Thai insurgents will come to fruition. Thailand is anxious to develop economic markets in China,
particulary for its bounteous agricultural output. Major economic overtures between the countries have included PRC assistance in the purchase of petroleum from the Middle East. Thailand appears willing to press quietly for a lessening of tensions while developing the potentially advantageous commercial contacts.

Another factor as yet unaddressed publicly by any Thai Government, but which has importance to Thailand, is the position that the PRC may take as a restraint on the more aggressive governments in Indochina—particularly the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). A new balance of power in the region, including the PRC, ASEAN, the influence of the United States and the Communist governments in Indochina, seems inevitable. Thailand, therefore, needs at least outward friendship with the PRC on a country-to-country basis in order to benefit from such a power balance.

Thailand and Laos share a close cultural and social heritage. Their languages are similar, and millions of residents of northeast Thailand are ethnic Lao. Of all the countries in Southeast Asia, Thailand probably feels most at ease with Laos. In the recent past, however, Thailand sent thousands of “volunteers” to fight against the Pathet Lao in Laos and gave active support to the centrist and rightist factions there. In view of these strong ties to the past, the Thai Government is concerned over the directions to be taken by the Pathet Lao Government and is worried about the close ties that new Laotian leaders have with the DRV.

Friction along the Mekong River border between the two countries has been sporadic. Clashes on the river resulted in a unilateral Thai decision to close the border in November 1975. That decision had a severe economic impact on landlocked Laos which had transshipped the great majority of its imports through Thailand. In early 1976, Thai authorities reopened the border crossing between the Thai city of Nong Khai and the Laotian capital in Vientiane. Other crossings have been reopened on a selective basis, but, officially, most of the border is still closed.

The most worrisome topic between Thailand and Laos concerns Pathet Lao support for the Thai insurgents in northern and northeastern Thailand. Laotian advisers have been reported inside Thailand for several years, and logistical support for the insurgency flows virtually unchecked across the border. Thailand is most anxious to halt the flow of personnel, advisers, munitions and other supplies to the growing insurgent movement. At the same time, there is great concern that the Pathet Lao are merely fronts for a more powerful DRV support system. This is a critical point, for, while the logistical support resources of tiny Laos are small, the DRV is the heir to a wealth of US arms and materiel captured in 1975.

A great furor arose in Bangkok in 1975 when several news papers printed details of an alleged Pathet Lao operations plan for conquest of the 13 provinces of northeast Thailand. While it is
doubtful that the rulers of poor Laos are eager to add millions of impoverished northeast Thai residents to their worries, the existence of such a plan would be cause for concern. Cessation of combat in Laos has freed thousands of battle-tested Pathet Lao troops for potential use in Thailand, either as guerrillas or as an overt combat force. The latter possibility is unlikely, but the Pathet Lao would find it relatively easy to strengthen the Thai insurgent movement.

The Thai Government is anxious to develop friendly ties with Laos. From a security standpoint, quiet along the long Thai-Laotian border would be beneficial to both countries. Close ties between Laos and the DRV will lessen the degree of Laotian dependence on the Thai port and transportation system, but it is in the best interests of both nations to keep the commercial and business ties active. It should be noted that the road system between Vientiane and the Vietnamese port of Vinh have not been rebuilt following extensive wartime interdiction.

Thailand has made several conciliatory gestures toward the Pathet Lao Government and has taken several opportunities to show friendship. Perhaps the most publicized contact between them concerns the issue of Thai volunteers missing in action from expeditionary forces sent into combat in Laos. More than 500 Thais were believed taken prisoner in Laos, but, during prisoner of war exchanges in 1974, only 216 Thais returned home. At that time, Royal Thai Army Chief of Staff General Bunchai Bamrungphong stated that Thailand “wants to show that it can live with the new Lao . . . government.” 3 Civilian governments in Thailand did not press the issue. General Bunchai is now a deputy prime minister and a leading member of the National Committee of Reform. Whether this particular issue will become heated again is a matter for conjecture, but the new Thai Government can be expected to move somewhat slower in restoring full friendship with the Laotian Government. However, a gradual thaw in the relations between Thailand and Laos seems likely to continue.

Thailand has made good progress in its relationship with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Thailand was the first non-Communist country to establish diplomatic relations with the Khmer Republic after the Khmer Rouge took power. The formal recognition took place after several high-level discussions in Bangkok between the Thai foreign minister and Ieng Sary, a major power in the Khmer Rouge movement. Thailand initiated contact with the new government early after its rise to power. The aged steel railroad bridge linking the Thai town of Aranya Prathet and the Cambodian town of Poipet was the scene of contacts between low-level officials within days of the end of fighting in Cambodia.

Thai officials expressed shock and dismay at reports of massacre and starvation in Cambodia. A steady flow of refugees has fueled concern with stories of atrocities, executions and mass
starvation although the accuracy of many of those reports has been questioned. In recent months, this type of reporting has decreased, however. The Thai Government was distressed particularly by the reported execution of former Cambodian leader Long Boret whose courageous refusal to board an American evacuation helicopter was reported widely in the Thai press. Thai officials now are looking beyond the reports of refugees. Indeed, the thousands of Cambodian refugees in Thailand have become a source of embarrassment to the Thai Government, and some sort of accommodation has been sought to allow the refugees to return to their country without reprisals. Similar negotiations also have been conducted with the DRV and Laotian Governments.

Thai attempts to mollify the Khmer Rouge began as early as March 1975 when then Prime Minister Kukrit stated that the United States "had no right" to transship war materiel to Cambodia through Thailand and that Thailand would no longer allow the United States to use Thai bases for that purpose. The vehement Thai protests of the use of U-Tapao Air Base as a staging area for the Mayaguez operation served as a major signal to the Khmer Rouge that Thailand was willing to be friendly with the new government. Finally, it should be noted that Thailand refrained from seizure of the Kao Phra Vilharn temple ruins, a much-revered religious complex on a salient into the northeast Thailand plateau, during the final days of the Lon Nol government. Long a source of displeasure in Thailand, Cambodian sovereignty over the ruins was reaffirmed by that restraint, and another gesture of friendship was signaled.

Thailand has offered food and essential supplies to overcome food shortages and is anxious to exchange ambassadors with Cambodia, a move stalled so far by Khmer Rouge inaction on the matter. Exchange of ambassadors between Bangkok and Phnom Penh would be a major step in establishing some semblance of normalcy and friendship between the two countries.

The most worrisome problem for Thailand's foreign policy and military strategists is the DRV. Having emerged from the Indochina War as the strongest and most aggressive military power in Southeast Asia, the DRV is a threat that Thailand cannot afford to ignore. The Vietnamese leadership has not forgotten that Thailand dispatched a full division and a separate brigade to fight in South Vietnam, that Thailand provided the bases from which most of the bombing missions and tactical air support was flown against them or that Thailand and Vietnam are hereditary enemies.

Thailand has made several gestures of good will to Hanoi, virtually all of which were rebuffed. A major reason given for the continued hard line by the Hanoi leadership has been the issue of aircraft flown into Thailand by escaping Vietnamese Armed Forces personnel. Dozens of warplanes and helicopters were flown into Thailand, and most of them were removed immediately from the country by
the United States. The United States claimed that the property was legally US property since it had been “given” to South Vietnam under various aid agreements. Thai authorities protested, but, by the time US officials stopped the removal of aircraft, all that remained behind were old and outdated transports. The valuable and most modern aircraft were long gone. The DRV was angered by apparent Thai acquiescence to the removal of most of the airplanes. For its part, the Thai Government has insisted that the removal was done against its wishes and without its knowledge. The Thai Government was extremely embarrassed by the issue.

Significantly, the first delegation sent abroad by the People's Revolutionary Government in Saigon went to Thailand. Led by Ambassador-at-Large Nguyen Minh Phuong, the visit, in May 1975, indicated that the Vietnamese placed great importance on their relationship with Thailand. The major topic for discussion revolved around the Vietnamese claim of sovereignty over the aircraft flown from South Vietnam to Thailand. They strongly requested that the remaining aircraft be returned to Vietnam.

Two days after the South Vietnamese visit to Bangkok, a 13-man delegation from Hanoi arrived in Thailand. Initially arranged by DRV and Thai ambassadors to Laos, the talks lasted for over a week. The delegation was led by Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien, and, again, the major issue was the return of aircraft. While no concrete results came from the discussions, Hien did make a significant statement on resumption of diplomatic relations between Bangkok and Hanoi:

*In our view... conditions are now favorable for negotiations to normalize the relations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Thailand.*

The semiofficial Hanoi newspaper *Nhan Dan*, in coverage of the visit of Hien delegation, re-emphasized the issue of war materiel when it reported:

*This is the right moment for the Thai Government to manifest its goodwill by practical deeds. First of all, by returning to the Peoples Revolutionary Government all the planes, warships, and other property of South Vietnam which have been taken to Thailand by members of the puppet army and administration. ... The Vietnamese people may forget the past misdeeds committed principally by the former dictatorial militarist administration in Bangkok, but will not tolerate any further actions of this kind.*

The pointed reference to the military government of Thanom is significant. Thai leadership between 1973 and 1976 repeatedly emphasized that their governments were not bound totally by the policies and agreements of the Thanom government. Vietnamese willingness to "forget the past misdeeds" and to differentiate between policies of the Thanom government and those of the civilian era played the single most important role that enabled the two countries to establish diplomatic relations.
Observers of the Thai political scene believe that the insistence of the Thai civilian governments that the United States withdraw its military forces from Thailand was tied directly to Thai desires to meet demands imposed by Hanoi. The presence of US combat troops in Thailand long was a major point in the resumption of relations between Thailand and the DRV. As early as November 1974, DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh declared that:

... the only obstacle to normalization was Thai pursuance of a policy aimed at furthering the US imperialists' designs of aggression and intervention in Indochina. 

Hanoi, according to Trinh, would be ready for immediate negotiations on normalization if the Thai Government were to:

... give up its policy of collusion with the US, put a complete and definite end to the presence of US troops and US military bases in Thailand, and really respects the fundamental rights of the peoples of Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries. ...

Despite these very real differences, the DRV and Thailand established diplomatic recognition in August 1976. This major action was accomplished during a visit to Hanoi by then Foreign Minister Phichai Rattakul and marked a shift in the formal enmity that has existed between the two countries. However, the extent to which the glacial state of affairs may improve in the short run is problematical. Much depends on the reception Hanoi accords to the new military-backed government in Bangkok. Many of the leaders in the Thanin government were active in Thanom's government as well. On a practical basis, both Thanin's and Thanom's governments were conservative, military-backed governments. In that Hanoi chose to make a distinction between Thanom's military backing and subsequent civilian governments, a case also can be made that the new government in Thailand is "different" as well and not formally associated with the Vietnam War and the policies followed by Thanom. In the nuances of diplomacy, the new Thai Government is not the same as those of the past. Symbolism is important in international diplomacy. Hanoi chose the symbolic issue of the warplanes to assert dominance over the Thai civilian regimes (the DRV had far more aircraft than it could use and certainly did not really need those planes back). Should the symbology hold true, a gradual thaw in relations with the DRV could continue if the marked conservative nature of the Thanin government does not cause difficulties. Generally, it would be to Thailand's advantage to achieve some degree of friendship, or at least correctness, with the DRV Government.

Major issues at stake between the two countries vary from military to commercial. Thailand must take into account the strength of the DRV. The military stores it captured in 1975 are enough alone to equip the armed forces of many countries. They would be of great value to the Thai insurgency and, in such use, a disaster to the Thai Government. Suffice it to say that Thailand must con-
sider its contacts with the DRV in light of its military power. Other
issues that Thailand would like to resolve include the presence of
many tens of thousands of Vietnamese refugees who fled to Thai-
land in the 1950s and who continue to sympathize with Hanoi. Sev-
eral hundred refugees have entered Thailand since 1975; they, too,
are a problem for Thai authorities.

An exchange of ambassadors would be of material assistance in
normalizing relations between Thailand and the DRV; such a step
between the two countries also would be of major benefit to the
hopes for peace in the region.

Obviously, the factors outlined above will cause adjustments in the
association between Thailand and the United States. Negotiations
for withdrawal of US forces from Thailand began soon after the
caretaker government of Sanya Thammasak came to power in 1973.
The phasedown of the war effort made most of the withdrawals an
academic issue. The United States withdrew its forces from bases
at Ta Khli and Nam Phong in 1973, from Ubon Ratchathani in
1974, Nakhon Phanom in 1975 and from Udorn, Korat, Ramasun
and Ko Kha in early 1976. A final round of negotiations in March
1976 resulted in closing the final two bases at Samaesan and U-Tapao
by July 1976. In a recent development, the United States was
granted permission by the Seni government to conduct refuel and
maintenance operations at Ta Khli in support of flights to and from
the base at Diego Garcia. A small logistic detachment now operates
there, and a small military advisory group is stationed in Bangkok.

The waning presence of the United States in Southeast Asia
had a strong impact on Thai policies. Departure of combat forces
was expected, but the closing of communications and electronic
monitoring facilities at Ko Kha and Ramasun was more surprising.
Those closings met with anxiety in Thai military circles, and the
issue of US withdrawals played a major role in the 1976 Thai elec-
tions that resulted in the downfall of the Kukrit government. There
was anticipation that Seni would halt the almost total phaseout of
US forces. But Seni surprised his right-leaning supporters when
he reaffirmed the policies of the previous government. After several
weeks of intense debate, the government announced its decision to
require United States' withdrawals by the original deadline of 20
July 1976. The government announcement was delivered on Thai
television and radio stations on 1 June 1976, and the spokesman
took pains to announce that the decision was unanimous and taken
with the support of all three branches of the armed forces. 10

Subsequent events have made it clear that the decision was not
really "unanimous" and that the Thai military had grave reserva-
tions about the issue. However, at the time the decision was made,
the civilian leadership determined that the benefits in keeping US
forces and facilities in Thailand were outweighed by the political
realities in Southeast Asia. The withdrawals were couched in terms
of Thai sovereignty rather than military necessity. Prime Minister Seni Pramoj received strong statements of support from student leaders, left-leaning political leaders and the majority of Thailand’s newspapers. Ex-Prime Minister Kukrit declared that the decision demonstrated the government’s concern for the sovereignty of the Thai nation.11

In an editorial column in the influential vernacular newspaper Siam Rath, probably the most respected and influential newspaper in Thailand at the time, several statements of significance appear. Although written under the pen name Khawankasen (a common practice in Thailand), the editorial clearly reflected the views of the newspaper’s publisher, Kukrit. Extracts of the editorial included:

... we must be pleased that the government has decided correctly on this issue in a manner that recognized that the independence and sovereignty of the nation was the most important thing. ... If the present government had allowed the United States to remain ... Thailand would see itself branded as without national pride or authority. ... The change will clear up diplomatic relations with neighboring countries completely, because they will know that it is not acceptable for us to be a servant of the Americans.

* * *

... in that we have not allowed [the US] to maintain their listening posts in our country, does not mean that we have announced ourselves to be an enemy with them. The United States of America is likely to understand well the changes that have taken place in Indochina, and that it is necessary to change our outlook in this manner.

* * *

The United States of America probably will not change their policy to one of enmity with Thailand, because doing something like that would be extreme and would force Thailand into the opposite camp. The United States would not desire that at all, because at the very least the United States wants to have at least one friendly country remaining in Indochina’s region; that one is Thailand. Therefore in the future Thailand can still maintain friendly relations with the United States and can still join hands with them as in the past.12

The editorial is a clear statement of the reasons for a change in Thailand’s foreign policy and signaled the civilian government of Seni’s intention to take a small step back from the giant embrace with the United States that characterized Thailand’s policies throughout the Indochina War. Certainly, the issues mentioned are of importance: the issue of national sovereignty; the need to demonstrate independence from the United States; the necessity for improving relations with, and pleasing, the regional Communist governments; and the fact that relations with the United States are not likely to change in any material way.
At this writing, the changes in the Thai-US relationship that may be instituted by the Thanin government are not clear. It is not likely that major changes will result, however. Return of large numbers of US military forces is almost out of the question; strengthening of the advisory group is more within the scope of changes that may take place. Attitudinally, a return to the close friendship that characterized pre-1973 governments is a distinct probability. The Thai military is supplied largely by the United States and will require continued access to US weaponry and spare parts. Large numbers of Thai students and military personnel continue to be educated and trained in this country. The close ties will remain.

However, Thailand has lost the major strategic weapon that a US military presence would have provided. Thai military leaders had hoped that a residual US military force would deter aggression and free the Thai military to concentrate on counterinsurgency operations. Despite all the changes in the region, the Thai insurgency is still the greatest threat to the country. A combination of American reluctance to become involved even remotely in combat on the Asian mainland and a Thai desire to opt for friendship with its neighbors in Indochina have wrought a shift in the thrust of Thailand's foreign policy.

Regionalism

Thailand is interested in strengthening the concept of regionalism as a stabilizing factor in Southeast Asia. ASEAN can be expected to grow in influence and stature as maneuvering to replace the United States continues. Several benefits will accrue from this. First, the member states will be encouraged to interact with each other on a much closer basis, with resulting improvements in economic, political and social ties. Second, the Communist nations in the region have an input into the organization and thus a forum for regional communications. A few approaches to the Communist countries to become members in ASEAN have been discussed unofficially, but this step is probably some time off. Third, a strong ASEAN will act as a stabilizing factor in the absence of the United States and will be a helpful agency for maintaining a stable balance of power between the PRC, the Indochina nations and ASEAN members.

Thailand will proceed with efforts to normalize relations with the PRC and to establish effective ties with Cambodia, Laos and the DRV. While it would be naive to expect instant friendship, Thailand can be expected to push for a posture of correctness and at least polite nonaggression. Thailand also can be expected to push gently for a more cohesive policy among ASEAN nations toward dealing with the new Communist powers in Southeast Asia. Formulation of regional policy goals will attempt to gain new markets for the Thai economy, to foster trade among nations in the region that was prohibited during the wartime years and to move toward a regional neutralism that recognizes the ascent to power of the
Communist governments in the region. The net result will be a foreign policy designed to maintain overt peace in Southeast Asia. At the same time, Thailand will seek to maintain strong ties with the United States as a power lever in the region. While the powerful Communist neighbors cannot be overlooked, the Thanin government probably will move more slowly than its predecessors in normalizing relations with them. But the government of Prime Minister Thanin in all probability will continue within the same general bounds of the policies begun by the Kukrit and Seni governments.

Thailand has a long history of adaptation to change. In postwar Indochina and Southeast Asia, Thailand will move toward accommodation with its neighbors while retaining strong ties with the United States. Despite the probable increase of anti-Thai propaganda by the Communist governments because of the return to power in Bangkok of a military-backed government, an increase in military tensions are unlikely. The ultimate goal for Thailand's regional foreign policy will be peace in the region and stability at home.

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Notes


2 Interview with Kukrit Pramoj in Newsweek, 15 September 1975, p 56.


4 Quoted by Norman Peagam in Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 April 1975.


6 Ibid.

7 Quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 May 1975.


9 Ibid.

10 Extracted from Khao Thai (Thai News), a weekly extract of Thai vernacular press accounts published by the Royal Thai Embassy in Washington, DC, 11 June 1976.

11 Ibid.

12 Khawankasem, Siam Rath, Bangkok, Thailand, 8 June 1976. Translated by Major John B. Haseman.
Does Nonwar Preserve Freedom?

By Horst Prayon

Discussion is built on controversy and doubt. Perhaps it is good that there are so few discussions on the credibility of defense capabilities, but it seems more likely that this lack of discussion indicates a misunderstanding of the problem.

There are gaps in our concept of deterrence. This concept would be much more credible if our defense had the means to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor and could keep these same means out of his hands. This concept also would be more credible if all partners in the alliance had the same capabilities. This would force the enemy to divide his resources to combat these means. Unfortunately, such is not the case for any European member nation at this time.

It is generally well-known that the West is numerically inferior in the area of conventional weapons. There is a calculable bottom limit under which we cannot fall without losing credibility. However, the West seems to play down this deficiency by emphasizing its modern weapons technology and the threat of a nuclear battlefield. The first excuse will only work for a few more years. The second is still only theoretical and would shift the conduct of war to an extremely problematical level.

Differences among alliance member armed forces concerning structure, training, commitment laws, weapons systems and equipment also contribute to hindering defense cooperation. We must seriously consider whether or not nuclear powers actually would use their nuclear weapons to defend nonnuclear countries. Realistically the question is no longer one of the resources we have available to annihilate the enemy but to what extent the enemy really believes we would use them.

Have all measures been taken to ensure that West Germany does not become the battlefield for the next war? I think not. Our defense needs a more active form. The only defense plans which can provide real deterrence are those which prove to the aggressor that we can retaliate immediately with enough troops and conventional weapons to stop an attack, even carrying the fight back...
into the aggressor's own territory. Otherwise, the enemy will still control the situation.

Our present defense strategy can be undermined. Current policy stresses maintaining a state of nonwar. But this type of defense planning does not provide protection against terrorists who infiltrate in small groups to build networks of communication, training and arms procurement and distribution. Once they have set up the structure and groundwork, they bide their time, recruit new sympathizers from the universities and prisons and wait for the right set of political and economic circumstances to seize control. In West Germany alone, there are 105,000 people who are members of extreme leftist organizations.

The terrorists' interim goals are deterioration of the effectiveness of the police and justice systems and creation of an atmosphere of fear among the population. In a climate of increased terrorist activity, the country's government with all of its available classic potential would have little chance against small, highly organized and trained groups. Actually, such a threat is more credible than the use of nuclear weapons because it creates the desired revolutionary climate for attaining the enemy's objectives, while the use of nuclear weapons brings only annihilation.

We easily could lose another war before it starts because the strategy of nonwar is no longer adequate. We need to train the police, the border patrol and the Bundeswehr to be prepared for subversive forms of conflict, with the territorial army receiving priority. What we do not need are more special units to handle terrorist activities.

The only way we can maintain freedom is by being able to react to all possible forms of conflict. In our emphasis on defense, we can no longer ignore the threat of terrorism. Preventive measures should provide not only retaliation but deterrence.
FREEDOMS FOUNDATION CONTEST

The 1977 Freedoms Foundation letter-writing contest for Armed Forces members has opened with the selection of the theme—"My Responsibilities in Keeping My Country Free."

Soldiers on active duty or in the Reserve components have until 1 November 1977 to submit their 100- to 500-word essays, poems or articles on the 1977 theme to the Awards Administration, Freedoms Foundation, Valley Forge, PA 19481.

All entries from members of the Armed Forces are in a separate competition called "Valley Forge Patriots Awards" and must include name, rank, Social Security (service) number, service designation, military address and permanent address.

Principal winners will receive the coveted, encased Honor Medal and a $100 US savings bond, with other winners receiving savings bonds.

One of the basic goals of the foundation is to contribute to the development of responsible citizens and the practice of responsible citizenship, making Americans proud of their country.

The Freedoms Foundation presents its principal awards in ceremonies on George Washington's birthday at Valley Forge.

The MILITARY REVIEW and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College assume no responsibility for accuracy of information contained in the MILITARY NOTES section of this publication. Items are printed as a service to the readers. No official endorsement of the views, opinions, or factual statements is intended.—The Editor.
20MM GATLING GUN AND AMMUNITION IMPROVED

The 20mm *M61* Gatling gun (Figure 1) and *M50* family of ammunition, developed after World War II for high-altitude air-to-air combat and bomber defense, remain the first-line system in US aircraft.

The *M61* system is under modification at the US Air Force Systems Command's Armament Development and Test Center at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, for use in air-to-air combat against modern highly maneuverable targets.

The *M61* in current use has a firing rate of 6,000 shots a minute through the six rotating barrels.

The gun system will have an increased rate of fire of 7,200 shots a minute. It also will disperse the projectiles more uniformly over a larger area for increased target hit potential.

The existing family of ammunition for the 20mm *M61* gun is the *M50* series which consists mainly of the *MK5* target practice rounds for training and the *M56* high-explosive incendiary for combat. The new ammunition will be designated *PGU17/B* for the combat round and *PGU18/B* for the training round. It will have a significant increase in capability with a higher muzzle velocity, a shorter flight time to target and increased effectiveness upon impact.

Cutaway examples of the old and improved 20mm ammunition (Figure 2) show modifications which will give the improved high-explosive incendiary round greater speed and more destructiveness at the target. The elongated, sharper nose of the improved round (top) houses a slower-acting fuse—the pin in the center must travel a greater distance after impact, allowing the round more time to penetrate before detonation.—US Air Force release.
Efforts are underway at the US Army Tank-Automotive Materiel Readiness Command (TARCOM) to develop several high-mobility tactical trucks to meet Army vehicle requirements of the 1980s. The trucks will be designed to provide support for armor and other combat vehicles operating in forward areas.

Unlike current high-mobility tactical trucks which use numerous systems and components designed exclusively for military application, the new vehicles will use commercially available components wherever possible to reduce vehicle purchase and life cycle costs.

An artist's concept of the 4-ton 8 x 8 vehicle is shown here. The truck, proposed by Pacific Car and Foundry Company of Washington, will have a maximum highway speed of 65 miles per hour and a range of 350 miles. It will weigh around 26,000 pounds.

The same company has been awarded a $700,000 contract to provide TARCOM with two prototypes of a similar 10-ton model. The prototypes are expected to have a cruising range of 500 miles, a top highway speed of 55 miles per hour and will be able to ford water nearly 4 feet deep.

Both cargo vehicles are being considered as substitutes for the much-maligned M520 Goer.
### NATO

**DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES IN THE 1970S**

(Current Prices)

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Forecast (Millions)</th>
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*Information not available.

Source: NATO Press Service.

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### AUSTRALIA

**DEFENSE ACADEMY**

The Australian minister for defense has announced the construction of a new defense forces academy for the three armed services. The academy will be built at a cost of US $55.8 million and will adjoin the present Royal Military College in Canberra. In a statement to Parliament, the defense minister said the academy will provide education at university level for about 1,200 selected students from all of the services. Three smaller colleges now in operation will be merged into the new institution.

The academy is due to open in 1982.—Australia Bulletin.
FRANCE

TROOP REDUCTIONS

The number of French troops in West Germany is scheduled to be reduced by 10,000 this summer. Approximately 53,000 men will remain in the 2d Army Corps at Baden-Baden.

This planned reduction is part of an overall reorganization program which is being undertaken within the French Army.—Armées d’aujourd’hui, ©1976.

USSR

EXPERIMENT WITH BALLOON-CRANE

Engineers have designed and built the first-known Soviet balloon-crane. The new apparatus is in the early stages of testing. The experiments are being conducted under the direction of the Soviet Ministry of Specialized Machinery. Initial testing with the small experimental model is with payloads of instruments and sensors weighing less than 50 kilograms. It is anticipated that, after further development of the prototype model, larger models with capacities ranging from 1 to 15 tons will be built eventually.

The Soviets believe the balloon-crane will have an initial maximum controlled operational height of 100 meters and will offset inherent limitations of the conventional crane and heavy-lift helicopters.

The first report of the Soviet Union’s attempt to develop a fully operational balloon-crane does not indicate a new technological development. The US logging industry has been using this type crane for a number of years. The US Army is experimenting with the cranes for ship-to-shore transfer of 20-foot containers, more commonly known in the Army as Milvans.—AFSTC news item.
VENEZUELA

FAST PATROL BOATS

Venezuela's new squadron of six 37-meter fast patrol boats (FPBs) is nearing completion at the Portsmouth, England, shipyards of Vosper Thornycroft, Limited (MR, Aug 1975, p 95). Two of the boats already have sailed for Venezuela, and the remaining four are being fitted or undergoing sea trials.

The FPBs were designed by Vosper Thornycroft to meet the specific requirements of the Venezuelan Navy. The contract for their design and construction was placed in April 1972. Completions are on or ahead of schedule, in spite of the fuel shortage and three-day workweek during the winter of 1973-74.

The boats have steel hulls and are driven by two diesel engines at speeds up to 30 knots. Three of the six carry a 76mm Oto Melara gun mounting with associated Nuova San Giorgio NA10 fire control system and smaller weapons. The remaining three are to carry a twin Otomat antiship missile system and 40mm gun.

Main propulsion engines are twin MTU Type MD 16V 538TB90 diesels, having a sprint rating of 3,540 brake horsepower each.

These new boats for Venezuela are a good example of the compact and powerful type of FPB which modern gun and missile systems have made possible. Built at relatively modest cost, they will form an effective addition to the Venezuelan Navy's fleet.
UNITED KINGDOM

MILAN ATGM FOR ARMY

The British Army soon hopes to add MILAN antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) (MR, Apr 1976, p 94) to its infantry units. Production has been delayed, however, while agreements for producing components of this Franco-German weapon in Britain were worked out. This deal, however, will allow the installation of a British-designed autopilot in each MILAN round. The autopilot, originally developed for the British Swingfire ATGM, prevents overcorrection by the gunner and so increases accuracy. It is unknown when the units in Germany will receive it, but it is hoped that this will be soon. The British would like to issue one MILAN to each infantry section, but it is feared that recent economic trouble will limit the scale of issue to one per platoon, replacing the Carl Gustaf 84mm recoilless rifle (MR, Jan 1975, p 93) used at that level.—Strategy & Tactics, © 1977.

YUGOSLAVIA

ORAO COMBAT AIRCRAFT

Yugoslavia and Rumania have agreed to develop and build a twin-engine combat aircraft called Orao. Engines, equipment, landing gears, avionics and other systems will be procured in France, Sweden and England. The Orao is a conventional high-wing monoplane with simple take-off and landing assists. The power plant intakes are not adjustable and are designed for a range of speed of mach 1.6. The performance of the prototypes corresponded to that of the Aeritalia/Fiat G91Y and the McDonnell Doug-
"The Status and Future of the Montreux Convention," Barry Buzan. When the Soviet aircraft-carrying cruiser Kiev steamed through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles and into the Mediterranean this past summer, it violated the 30-year-old Montreux Convention prohibiting the passage of aircraft carriers through the straits under any conditions. Author Buzan fills us in on another classic example of Soviet dérartche and how they interpret agreements as the occasion dictates. —Survival, November-December 1976.


"Questionable NATO Assumptions," CAPT John H. Morse, USN, Retired. Morse, a consultant for a number of governmental and private agencies, contends that nearly all of the assumptions on which the planning for the conventional defense of Europe is based are outmoded. He suggests ways to correct the situation.—Strategic Review, Winter 1977.

"Military Transit System Not Needed: Whitehurst." A Clemson University professor, Clinton Whitehurst has concluded in a study undertaken for the American Enterprise Institute that the Defense Department can no longer afford to maintain military transportation capabilities that parallel capabilities present in the private sector. He recommends that the Department of Defense group all transportation operating agencies under a single manager for defense transportation to increase efficiency.—AEI Memorandum, Winter 1976.

"American Magazine Coverage of Objectors to the Vietnam War," Stuart W. Showalter. Employing statistical methods, Showalter tests a number of hypotheses concerning media attitudes toward various categories of war protesters. He concludes that American magazines exercised a great deal of freedom in covering an ideological minority and that magazines can incorporate viewpoints which run counter to national policy in time of war.—Journalism Quarterly, Winter 1976.

"Intervention in Yugoslavia: An Assessment of the Soviet Military Option," Graham H. Turbiville Jr. The political and strategic advantages to Moscow of a Soviet-dominated Yugoslavia are considerable. However, Yugoslavian World War II experience and its concept of total national defense would make a Soviet invasion a difficult undertaking despite the fact that the Soviets and their allies could mass the necessary power.—Strategic Review, Winter 1977.
The story behind this remarkable chronicle is more interesting than any review I would be able to write.

It begins with the friendship between President Abraham Lincoln and a young Chicago artist, Louis Kurz. History says it was Lincoln himself who sent Kurz to the major battlefields to record in sketches the progress of the Civil War. Kurz did and, after the war with an associate, Alexander Allison, produced a series of 36 chromolithographs based on the battlefield sketches. Using the now all-but-forgotten process of stone lithography, the project took over 10 years to complete. Each plate required the use of a massive Bavarian lithograph stone weighing 200 pounds, and each print was done in as many as 10 colored inks. All but two of the original stones have been lost since, and the handsome chromolithographs so laboriously produced by Kurz and Allison are rarities—true collectors' items if they can be found at all.

One of the most ardent admirers of these Civil War prints was C. Armitage Harper, owner of a printing and lithography company in Little Rock, Arkansas. Fascinated by the old prints, and aware of their unique place in the great saga of the Civil War, he set out in the early 1950s to reproduce the complete series as a memorial appropriate to the coming centennial celebration of that epoch. He traveled widely to find and obtain rights to the chromolithographs; had a special high-rag 120-pound cover stock produced that would duplicate the paper used on the originals; painstakingly lithographed the prints; and directed the reproduction of each.

Harper then sought out leading Civil War researchers and historians
to write the narratives explaining the battle scene depicted by each print. He also persuaded Robert E. Lee IV and Major General U. S. Grant III—direct descendants of their namesakes—to provide introductions to this work.

Unfortunately by then, Harper ran out of money and was unable to have his project appropriately published and distributed. Although a few copies were produced, the work attracted little or no attention, and the Civil War centennial came and went without recognition of this remarkable effort.

Harper's death in 1975 again brought the project to light, and Oxmoor House finally brought the dream of C. Armitage Harper to fruition. Oxmoor bought the remaining prints and, from the limited quantity available, was able to produce fewer than 8,000 copies of the book. The restrictions thus imposed undoubtedly will enhance the value of the collection as the years pass.

*Military Review* was fortunate enough to receive one of the copies, and it has become a respected addition to our small library. I personally can't recall having seen a more magnificent set of bound art, and, in this business, that is a hard statement to make. The accompanying narratives, a separate volume in itself, are authoritative and well-written. Each explains in detail the events leading to the battle scene, the conduct of the fray and its effect on the war *in toto*. This volume will be published soon for separate purchase.

At $250, I can't encourage everyone to rush out and buy his own set of Kurz and Allison, but, for the true collector and devotee of that era of our country's history, this is an opportunity that shouldn't be overlooked.—JWW
ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA by T. Stephan Cheston and Bernard Loeffke. 147 Pages. MSS Information Corporation, NY. $3.75.

In these days of publish or perish, good books which add substantially to available knowledge in any one field or discipline are extremely rare. Aspects of Soviet Policy Toward Latin America is a most significant new work. It simultaneously treats the inner workings of the Soviet Politburo and those aspects of political life in Latin America—events and personalities—that trigger Soviet response.

This is a most unusual and ambitious book wrapped in a small package. The footnotes, tables, graphs, copies of contracts and verbatim transcripts of country-to-country negotiations are impressive. The thought, however, that a sizable portion of that footnoted information is largely unavailable to the general researcher and the relative obscurity of the MSS Information Corporation may serve to either corroborate in the reader's mind that this book is a significant find (this reviewer's reaction), or it may become a source of doubt as to the author's relative objectivity or motives.

The policy of any one superpower toward a major area of the underdeveloped world is a multidimensional subject requiring deft handling to ensure that no one factor or group of factors is allowed to color the final work unduly. In this book, the authors are extremely careful to outline the parameters of their study—the economic, political and ideological aspects of present-day USSR involvement in Latin America—and the method of treatment.

Section I, "Marxism-Leninism," deals with the particular way in which the Communist philosophy relates to the Latin experience and is a collection of well-documented though abbreviated case studies of how Communist parties and leadership developed in a host of countries.

The opening narrative, which primes the reader to understand the general ambiente in which the local Communist actors perceived themselves and their society, gives way to a country-by-country rundown of the facts, figures and personalities of the Communist movement in each nation of the Southern Hemisphere. Again, one marvels at the detail, for not even the 1,000-man membership of Costa Rica's outlawed Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) escapes mention. Naturally, the "bighies" such as the Communist parties or their fronts in Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay and Argentina are described in stark, bureaucratic detail.

The latter part of the book, Section II, deals with Soviet strategies in Latin America and actors in policy formulation toward that region. Of greater general interest to the Sovietologist or casual reader of Latin-American affairs, this portion of the book describes in clerical detail chilling aspects of exactly how Soviet leadership looks on Latin America, especially its relations with the United States. Needless to say, the Soviets believe that the Monroe Doctrine is effectively a dead expression of US foreign policy resolve in this hemisphere. Numerous examples are cited to prove that Politburo leadership, far from embarking on risky or adventurous courses of action, has, in fact, assayed correctly the tenor of American diplomatic mettle regarding its own back yard.

This can't be everyone's book, but, for Kremlin watchers and Latin Americanists, the book is must reading.
Various leftist polemicists, critical of US support of anti-Communist dictatorships in Latin America, also would do well to read this book. However, due to unavoidable conclusions that would have to be drawn by these critics after exposure to the painstakingly documented details of Soviet purpose and penetration of the Western Hemisphere, they most surely will not.

LT COL GEORGE T. TALBOT JR.,
Department of Unified and Combined Operations, USACGSC


"Is detente in the American interest?" This is the critical question and focus of this edition. The volume contains the thoughts and often the recommendations of many of today's most respected defense and foreign affairs experts. The book is edited by former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert Pranger. It presents some well-written arguments for improving relations with the USSR and forsaking a lingering and dysfunctional Cold War attitude, and provides some compelling, highly contrasting views that interpret the Soviet gains which resulted directly from US timidity and the sham of détente.

The volume has more than food for thought. It includes the most important agreements between the US and the USSR in this decade, including the SALT I/antiballistic missile agreements, Vladivostok and the May 1972 Basic Principles of Relations agreements.

Some articles, notably the Rosecrance piece "Detente or Entente," are expository and well-footnoted. The article by Zbigniew Brzezinski, "US Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," may be one of the best-written and most sanguine pieces. Both the "power realist" view and that of the so-called planetary humanist are described and defended in equal light. With an operational plan to meld them, the views are almost reconciled. But it is difficult to be convinced.

The article, "Is Detente in the American Interest?", written by 11 scholars including Robert Conquest, John Erickson, Richard Pipes and Leonard Shapiro, is the pièce de résistance. The authors present their understanding of the aims of Soviet foreign policy in the period of détente. The reader wants to remain objective, but their arguments are clear and forceful. They deal with results, extracting the heart of the article, yet not sacrificing contest.

The experience of détente in action during the period since it was proclaimed as a string of Western disappointments... There has been since then a general weakening of the Western position, strategically, economically, and politically. [In Western Europe]... there was a chain reaction to the treating of allies as a nuisance and enemies as friends. ... When détente has clearly not brought any quid pro quo for all the Western concessions made for its sake, when the newly recognized East Germans are occasionally resuming tactics of traffic obstruction (a problem which détente was supposed to have solved) the picture of political disunity, both within Europe and between Europe and America can only gladden the hearts of Soviet leaders.

True détente can arise only from fundamental and internal Soviet changes, possibly in response to con-
certed public opinion and awareness of the issues. Other authors also suggest putting some teeth into the now sad euphemism of "detente."

Finally, the chapters dealing with actual defense postures and interpretations of adequacy are superb. They are documented, using well-constructed tables and charts. The debates and exchanges between members of Congress are lively. The analyses are usually somber. This book is recommended highly to the serious student of national security affairs, as well as senior US officials whose interpretations of these and other analytical positions affect policy.

A. W. McMaster III,  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Readiness and Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command


Germany, after 1918 and before 1933, was a troubled nation whose catastrophic defeat in World War I left it nearly shattered. The Western Powers, too, were reeling from the war and the ensuing chaos of revolution and violence sweeping Europe between 1918-19. Yet the Allies and Germany found respite in the 1920s after the Versailles Treaty went into effect. Part of the legacy of Versailles was the League of Nations and the ephemeral triumph of France over its age-old rival on the Continent.

In Christoph Kimmich's study of Germany and the League of Nations, the restoration of Germany as a power within the league framework was the result of Gustav Stresemann's brilliant but tragic diplomacy in cooperation with Britain and France. This diplomacy and subsequent German league tragedy makes this book important and timely.

The seven years between 1919 and 1926 were hard ones for Germany—adjusting to defeat, reparations and democracy under the Weimar Republic. But with Stresemann working with Briand of France after Locarno (1926) to have Germany enter the League of Nations, it seemed that Germany would regain some semblance of power. The Stresemann era stabilized Germany's position in Western Europe from 1926 until his death in 1929 and the onslaught of the Great Depression.

Kimmich shows how Brüning, Schleicher and Von Papen all worked against Stresemann's domestic and foreign policy designs as the Weimar Republic tottered between the radical left and right forces within Germany. He explains how Germany's membership did not help the league, and its previous revisionist aims caused the Balkans to reassess their role in post-war Europe and encouraged Hungary, Poland and Italy eventually to defy their contractual obligations to Versailles and the league. When Hitler came to power and withdrew Germany from the league, the final stage was set for the disintegration of the Versailles "European order."

This is an important book for the perceptive student of international affairs and strategy. Diplomacy in a setting of defeat can accomplish few miracles; the Herculean tasks confronting Stresemann of Germany and Briand of France in the late 1920s still provide lessons on how the fruits of victory could sour easily with mistrust and disillusionment. Nevertheless, democratic states today have much to learn from those times.

Joseph R. Goldman,  
University of Kansas

“There are more books upon books than upon all other subjects.”
—Montaigne, Essays, 1568

This is Anderson’s way of introducing us to Montaigne and to his chapter on “Bibliographies.” But Anderson’s own bibliography is richer and more comprehensive than any listed in his chapter. His contains 1,385 annotated entries, 10 times the number in the next largest annotated bibliography.

The author, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, served as the chairman of an inter-agency task force that evaluated the report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force.

The researcher interested in military manpower procurement policy will be impressed with the scope of literature reviewed, but not critiqued, by Anderson. Entries include books, unpublished manuscripts (mostly theses and dissertations), articles, pamphlets, reprints, speeches and government documents.

The history of conscription is represented in the following chapters: “United States History,” “General History,” “General Work,” “England” and “Other Foreign Countries.”

Manpower procurement policies are discussed in the literature covered under these rubrics: “All-Volunteer Armed Force,” “Selective Service,” “Universal Military Training” and “Universal National Service.”

Scholars interested in Reserve manpower affairs will find useful the 12-page chapter entitled “National Guard and Reserves.” Other issues are discussed in these remaining chapters:

“Economics,” “Law and the Constitution,” “Philosophy,” “Conscientious Objection,” “Race” and “Miscellanea.”

While the chapter headings are somewhat vague and the table of contents illogically organized, the author compensates for this flaw by including a comprehensive index of titles and an index of authors. These indexes are most useful in helping the researcher identify the prolific scholars (for example, Janowitz), the relevant journals (for example, Military Review) and popular book publishers (for example, Praeger, Putnam).

The annotations are descriptive, and the author does not critique or evaluate the literature. Nevertheless, this is an outstanding contribution to the literature on conscription.

CAPT LOWNDIES F. STEPHENS, USAR,
College of Journalism, University of South Carolina


This book is fascinating, especially for those who had anything to do with the intelligence files of German officer personalities during World War II. It covers the period from 1932 to 1945 and describes the effects of the Reichswehr’s release from the “shackles” of the Versailles Treaty, its adjustments to the Nazi regime and its growth as the Wehrmacht. The reactions of the various generals to Hitler’s desires for expansion into Poland, the West, Scandinavia, North Africa and Russia are interesting.

The bulk of the material consists of a short précis on each field marshal or general, followed by an analysis of his campaigns, tactics and strategy, and his reactions to the Führer’s meddling
orders. Of the commanders so described, almost all had difficulties with their commander in chief, some more, some less. Their amount of agreement with him depended on their personal commitment to National Socialism and to Hitler's personal mystique.

Most, however, were in disagreement and secretly objected to being told what to do by *dem Gefreiten* ("that corporal"). Hitler relieved from command or summarily sacked eight. Three were arrested and punished. One was hanged and another was shot. Three committed suicide, one forced to take poison (Rommel) and one killed in an air raid. Most of them were captured or surrendered at the end. Five of these were tried at Nuremberg. Two were sentenced to death by hanging and three to long imprisonment.

This volume is the work of three British military historians: Christopher Chant, Richard Humble and William Fowler. The military consultant was Brigadier Shelford Bidwell. Brigadier General James Lawton Collins Jr., chief of military history, wrote the foreword.

One cannot avoid noting occasional "side criticisms" of US forces in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and north France. These may be disturbing to American participants. After Al-Qasrayn (Kasserine), Gafsa, Al-Guettar, even Sicily, I had supposed that some of us were at least as qualified as many of the British units. Personally, I was in all of these places.

One thing our British friends do not quite understand is the greatness and the resiliency of the American Army. Historically, we have been schooled in continental-type warfare, long-distance movement, massive maneuverability and small unit tactics since the Civil War. It is interesting to note that the German officers carefully read the tactics used by many of our Civil War generals. This information was picked up by the listening devices which monitored conversations in the prison camp for officers in England.

On the whole, it is refreshing to read such a fine account of the German generals and their campaigns. The authors were very fair in their remarks about those who were more gentlemanly, scrupulous and honorable such as Gerd von Rundstedt and Erwin Rommel. This volume includes many photos, illustrations and maps.

**Col Frank W. Marshall Jr., AUS, Retired**

**ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. 308 Pages Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Atlantic Highlands, NJ. 1976. SwKr. 82**

*Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age* published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) represents a collective effort by the SIPRI staff to prepare a summation of the institute's decade of research and publications. The contents include discussions on the current status of world armaments, trends in nuclear weapons, chemical and bacteriological warfare, military armaments research and development, environmental warfare, the economic consequences of armaments and arms control and disarmament efforts. These thought-provoking discussions are supplemented by excellent graphs and tables which illustrate the trends in arms trade, US-Soviet nuclear force levels and world military expenditures.

SIPRI is an independent institute for research into problems of peace and conflict. The data used by the in-
stitute are drawn from unclassified sources and are acclaimed widely for its accuracy. SIPRI normally is considered as a primary source for data at the university graduate level. For these reasons, this book is recommended highly for those with interests in the subject area, and it should be available for use in the conduct of meaningful research.

Maj Robert F. Helms II,
Department of Unified and Combined Operations, USACGSC


The Nuremberg trials of 22 members of Nazi Germany's leadership began on 20 November 1945 and ended on 1 October 1946. The defendants were tried before the International Military Tribunal composed of judges from the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Each defendant was tried on one or more of four counts: conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Of the 22 defendants, 12 were sentenced to hang (including Martin Bormann who was tried in absentia), two were found not guilty and the others received sentences ranging from 10 years to life.

Bradley Smith, scholar of the Nazi era, has provided what probably will become the definitive study of the Nuremberg trials. As the title implies, this is a scholarly examination of the trials from the early decision to place the Nazi leaders before a legal tribunal through the discussions among the judges leading to sentencing. The focus of the study is on the judges, how they were selected, their strengths, weaknesses, prejudices and conduct throughout the trials.

**Smith generally is very critical of the entire proceedings at Nuremberg.** The selection of defendants was accomplished partially as political trade-offs between the major powers. In their conduct of the trials, the judges could not abandon their national and personal prejudices. The sentences handed down were inconsistent and based partially on the personal prejudices of the judges and the backgrounds of the defendants. The author concludes that the trials had little lasting significance and are a poor mechanism for the victor to use in punishing a defeated enemy.

The general reader as well as the serious student of World War II history will enjoy this readable account of what many have called the most important trial of the 20th Century.

Lt Col John A. Hardaway,
Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade, US Army Communications Command, Korea


"War is waged by men; not by beasts, or by gods. It is a peculiarly human activity." *Her Privates We*, Frederic Manning.

Curtis Tarr was drafted in 1943 and spent three years as an enlisted man in the United States Army. This book represents his recollection of that formative period of his life.

I was one of those private soldiers, one who experienced the discomfort, loneliness, tragedy and occasionally the danger common in the lives of my contemporaries.

By his own admission, Tarr's experiences in the European theater were not spectacular and certainly not heroic. He was an average artillery-
man in an armor division.

He writes of the common and average events that make up the private soldier's service which professionals might overlook. He stresses for instance that "without question, mail call was the [major] event of the day" and that "no experience emphasizes loneliness as does guard duty." Especially poignant is his description of his friendship with a Dutch child who had known only war her entire life.

It should be evident that the professional soldier will learn nothing new about war or the military. Tarr merely offers the opportunity to re-establish contact with the world of men who are manipulated by decisions and actions of professionals. Nor is the book a notable literary achievement. The book is not intended to find a place alongside Guy Sojer's Forgotten Soldier or Frank Gilroy's Private, both exceptionally keen portraits of private soldiers.

Far more important than his experiences as a private soldier are the personal impressions which Tarr carried into later life when he held key government defense positions. He was Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, when President Nixon appointed him director of the Selective Service System. He served two years with the Selective Service before moving to the Department of State as undersecretary of state for security assistance.

Tarr's book serves as a reminder of the gap that exists between the private and professional soldiers. Professional military men are diligent in application of military science. Through the labyrinth of command and staff positions and military schools, the professional soldier tends to develop a broad and sophisticated view of military service. He also develops expertise, experience and confidence and believes that he is very much in control of his career and professional development. Each command assignment, staff job or military school is a rather transitory episode of professional development which molds the professional for higher levels of responsibility.

There is a strong possibility that the professional soldier might lose sight of the fact that the private soldier approach is very different. The private soldier has no organized and forward-looking attitude toward his service in the armed forces. The experience for him is oriented more toward the mundane tasks that make up each day. His experience with the military is total. The experience fills his consciousness, directs all his actions while on duty and greatly circumscribes and influences his actions while off duty. It is safe to say that military life totally dominates the private soldier. The professional soldier is at fault if he overlooks this critical facet of the military profession.

It is significant that Tarr's most recent association with the military reflected his previous experience as a private soldier. He was chairman of the Defense Manpower Commission which convened in April 1974 to examine manpower problems. (See the September 1976 issue of Military Review for a discussion of the commission's findings.) The commission's final report reflected a strong awareness of personnel considerations and stressed that manpower is the keystone to national defense. Not surprisingly, the commission concluded by saying: "The overwhelming lesson of this report is that human considerations now have become primary in planning for the nation's defense."

MAJ JAMES T. PRICE, USACGSC
NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

This listing is published to bring new professional books to the attention of readers. Review copies have already been sent to reviewers.

Books are not offered for sale through the Military Review.


SOLDIERS AS STATEMEN. Edited by Peter Dennis and Adrian Preston. 184 Pages. Barnes & Noble, NY. 1976. $17.50.


I SHOULD HAVE DIED by Philip Deane. 185 Pages Atheneum, NY. 1976. $7.95.


PFERD UND REITER IM II.WELTKRIEG by Janusz Piekalkiewicz. 256 Pages. Südwest Verlag, Munich, West Germany. 1976. DM 36.


SHIPBOARD DAMAGE CONTROL by Allen M. Bissell, E. James Oertel and Donald J. Livingston. 169 Pages. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1976. $15.95.


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