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OUR ARMY IS SERVING a Nation at war. This war requires that all elements of our national power be applied in a broad, unyielding, and relentless campaign. This campaign will not be short; it will require deep and enduring commitment. Our Army is a proud member of the Joint Force expertly serving our Nation and its citizens as we continuously strive toward new goals and improve performance. Our individual and organizational approach to our duties and tasks must reflect the seriousness and sense of urgency characteristic of an Army at war. Our Soldiers and our Nation deserve nothing less. This is not business as usual. The purpose of this document is to provide the reader with a short guide to the Army's Way Ahead. It explores how we will obtain a more relevant and ready campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. My intent is to communicate the Army senior leadership’s view of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. I encourage you to become familiar with the ideas presented here so that you can contribute to improving our Army. Are you wearing your dog tags?—Schoomaker1

Introduction

The Way Ahead is an overview of The Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), which as the Army’s institutional strategy represents the Army senior leadership’s vision of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies.2 An analysis of the strategic environment, national guidance, and operational requirements, makes clear the Army must be prepared for operations of a type, tempo, pace, and duration different from those we have structured our forces and systems to achieve.3 Some assumptions made and processes developed for a Cold War Army or an Army with a “window of opportunity” to transform itself, while valid at the time, are no longer relevant to the current security environment.

The Army, as a key partner in the Joint Team, remains fully engaged around the globe in fulfilling its responsibilities to national security. Additionally, the
most salient aspect of the current security environment is that we are a Nation and an Army at war—a war unlike any we have experienced in our history. As the National Security Strategy makes clear, “the enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”

This war is being conducted across the globe and throughout the full range of military operations against rogue states and terrorists who cannot be deterred, but nevertheless must be prevented from striking against the United States, our allies, and our interests. The current conflict did not begin on September 11, 2001, and unlike the great wars of the last century, the sort of tangible events that so publicly signaled the end of World War II and the Cold War may not mark its conclusion.

We must immediately begin the process of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve our Nation. The end result of this examination will be a more relevant and ready force—a campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. Our Army will retain the best of its current capabilities and attributes while developing others that increase relevance and readiness to respond in the current and projected strategic and operational environments. The remainder of this document explores what we must become in order to provide more relevant and ready forces and capabilities to the Joint Team.

The Context for Change: The Current and Projected Strategic Environment

The geopolitical landscape has transformed over the last decade, creating new and growing demands for U.S. leadership across the globe. Protection afforded by geographic distance has diminished, while challenges and threats from the territories of weak and failing states and ungoverned space have grown. It is possible the current trend toward regional and global integration may render catastrophic interstate war unlikely. However, the stability and legitimacy of the conventional political order in regions vital to the United States is increasingly under pressure from a variety of sources. Population growth in developing areas places a strain on government institutions and civil infrastructures. Perceptions of an unbalanced distribution of wealth, power, cultural influence, and resources between the developed and developing worlds aggravate the potential for conflict. Conducting major combat operations against a capable regional adversary or adversarial coalition remains the most demanding mission for the Joint Force.

The diffusion of power and military capabilities to nonstate actors and unpredictable regimes has become another potent threat to our homeland and our interests abroad. Traditional state-based armies, subnational paramilitaries, transnational terrorists, and even sophisticated organized crime syndicates are all becoming more capable and more dangerous. Satisfactorily offsetting the hazards of each, individually or in combination, will likely demand comprehensive, decisive, and often simultaneous actions by the United States and its allies.

The current and projected security environment suggests that America’s leaders will often confront simultaneous challenges around the globe. The events of the past decade present three realities: first, the United States is increasingly challenged by a diverse and dangerous set of potential adversaries that range from rising regional powers to terrorist movements and irresponsible regimes unbounded by accepted restraints governing international behavior; second, the world looks to the United States for leadership in a crisis—to the point of hazarding inaction without American participation; and finally, in many instances, only the United States has the requisite capabilities to affect enduring resolutions and acceptable outcomes for complex crises.

Key Geopolitical Trends

While it is clear that uncertainty remains a challenge, there are a number of trends that can assist Defense and Service leaders and planners. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review identified six geopolitical trends that will profoundly shape the future security environment: (1) Diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance; (2) Increasing threats to regional security; (3) Increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states; (4) Diffusion of
power and military capabilities to nonstate actors; (5) Increasing importance of regional security arrangements; and (6) Increasing diversity in the sources and unpredictability of the locations of conflict.5

The President succinctly described the gravest danger to our Nation and our allies as lying at “the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”6 An analysis of the security environment reveals the nexus of dangerous new actors, methods, and capabilities imperils the U.S., its interests and its allies in strategically significant ways. First, there are now more actors of strategic significance [all emphasis in original]. The state system created by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 remains the basis for international order, and the threat from potentially hostile regional powers remains. Nonstate actors, however, operating autonomously or with state-sponsorship, are increasingly able to threaten regional and global security. For example, insurgents, paramilitaries, terrorists, narco-traffickers, organized criminals—frequently networked and enabled by the same tools and information systems state actors use—are an increasing concern for the U.S. Relatively flat, networked, and cellular organizations such as al-Qaeda have shown themselves willing to exploit the inability or unwillingness of failed or failing states to govern their own territory and capable of decentralized execution of complex, coordinated, and dispersed attacks against the U.S. and its interests abroad.

Second, the world now faces a significant proliferation of dangerous weapons, technologies, and military capabilities employed by a variety of actors. Of particular note is the flood of conventional weapons on the market since the collapse of the previous bipolar system and the diffusion and improvement in existing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or effect. The ability to generate strategic effects is no longer restricted to nation-states. Also noteworthy is the fact that all state and nonstate actors are potentially “space capable” as a result of the commercial sector’s provision of such products as high-bandwidth satellite communications, imagery, navigation signals, and weather data. We must expect both state and nonstate actors to possess and employ a combination of high- and low-tech capabilities.

Third, we can expect our adversaries to increasingly rely on idiosyncratic and dangerous methods: asymmetric approaches, anti-access and area denial strategies, unrestricted warfare, and terrorism. Given American military dominance, some adversaries will seek to bridge their conventional military gap, or lack of a conventional military capability, by adopting methods that capitalize on indirect and asymmetric approaches. For example, our adversaries may try to break our coalitions through blackmail, threats, and attacking members who maintain different policies or national objectives. They will use and exploit information systems and information gained by increased global transparency. They may attack critical infrastructure, information, and communications systems, banking and finance, energy sources, transportation, water, and emergency service facilities. Adaptive adversaries will use battlespace that reduces the effectiveness of U.S. strengths—such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision engagement—and they will seek to deny U.S. operational access to critical areas. The stark reality of contemporary battlespace conditions must be incorporated into our operational readiness training at all unit and institutional levels of training.

Implications for the Joint Force

These geopolitical and international security trends point to a period of increased strategic challenges for the Joint Force. As the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review noted, “to secure U.S. interests and objectives despite the challenges of the future security environment is the fundamental test for U.S. defense strategy and U.S. Armed Forces.”7 Of particular note are six implications for the Nation, the Joint Force, and the Army.

First, there is a demonstrated requirement for full-spectrum capabilities. Full-spectrum capabilities allow our forces to counter any capabilities our adversaries may employ against us. We must be able to rapidly transition between missions with an appropriate mix of forces and capabilities. Second, the changing character of war increases the need for integrated operations. In order to address more diffuse and networked adversaries, we must integrate our own elements of power—diplomatic, military, economic, and information—and while retaining the ability to act unilaterally, we must prepare to act in concert with our friends and al-
Traditional state-based armies, subnational paramilitaries, transnational terrorists, and even sophisticated organized crime syndicates are all becoming more capable and more dangerous. Satisfactorily offsetting the hazards of each, individually or in combination, will likely demand comprehensive, decisive, and often simultaneous actions by the United States and its allies.

Third, the necessity for security cooperation endures. Given the uncertainty of the security environment, the U.S. must remain fully engaged overseas. Security cooperation activities help shape the security environment to prevent conflict and facilitate U.S. operations in regions that may otherwise be difficult to access.

Fourth, transformation of the Joint Force is a strategic imperative to ensure U.S. forces continue to operate from a position of overwhelming military advantage in support of strategic objectives. Fifth, countering threats to U.S. interests in a more interconnected security environment requires mutually supporting regional actions integrated within a global strategy. Sixth, a joint perspective of the Current Operational Environment must serve as the intellectual foundational component of Transformation that supports joint and service concept development and experimentation strategies. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, in conjunction with Joint Forces Command, is leading a community effort to design and develop that framework.

**Toward a More Relevant and Ready Army**

To focus our efforts in increasing the relevance and readiness of our operating and institutional forces, the Army has two core competencies supported by a set of essential and enduring capabilities. The Army’s core competencies are: (1) train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders; and (2) provide relevant and ready land power capability to the Combatant Commander as part of the Joint Team. To further concentrate effort, the Army’s Senior Leadership has established immediate Focus Areas with specific guidance for planning, preparation, and execution of actions aimed at rapidly effecting necessary and positive change. These constitute changes to existing near- and mid-term guidance and are not, nor are they intended to be, all-inclusive. The complete expression of Army Strategic Objectives for prioritizing and programming purposes is defined in Annex B of the ASPG which places the Strategic Readiness System within the context of The Army Plan.
A Campaign-Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset

To successfully prosecute the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and ensure our Nation’s security, the Army must provide the Joint Force with relevant and ready capabilities and forces to support the National Security and Defense Strategies—a campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. The Army provides the Joint Force with the campaign-quality combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) capabilities necessary to conduct sustained land warfare; this is our unique contribution to the Joint Team and it will be maintained. The challenge we must address is how to transform our organizations, processes, doctrine, and culture so that we are better able to provide this contribution to the Joint Force in a more prompt and rapid manner.

Delivering the right Army forces at the right place and time is vital to the Joint Force commander’s (JFC’s) ability to defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations. As the Army repositions and reconfigures its forces, we will expand the JFC’s ability to rapidly deploy, employ, and sustain forces throughout the global battlespace in any environment and against any opponent. A Joint and Expeditionary Mindset recognizes that we are an Army in contact, engaged in ongoing operations and ready to rapidly respond to the next crisis as it evolves. It is an attitude and spirit—infused across all Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) activities—that embraces a forward-leaning, modular, joint interdependent and capabilities-based Army led by aggressive, intelligent, and empowered Soldiers who recognize opportunities and confidently apply the appropriate capabilities of the Joint Force in support of the Combatant Commander.

The Army’s Purpose and Role in National Security

“The Army’s purpose is to serve the American people, protect enduring national interests, and fulfill national military responsibilities.” While we have performed diverse tasks since our establishment in 1775, our nonnegotiable contract with the American people has remained constant: as part of the Joint
Force, we are tasked to fight and win our Nation’s wars. To achieve the objectives of the Defense Strategy, the Joint Force synergistically applies its capabilities to decisively defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations. In support of the Joint Force, the Army provides versatile, robust, and agile combat forces, capable of operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners.

As the source of “trained and ready land forces capable of decisive action across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict,” the Army must keep these goals and our warfighting focus constantly in mind as we perform our Title 10 functions to organize, train, and equip forces for the JFCs. These forces provide the Combatant Commander critical components to set the conditions for strategic and operational success by ensuring the broadest range of military options in a crisis and by providing the ability to decisively conclude conflict on our terms and timeline. Army forces add to the joint force the power to co-opt and coerce, while also providing the unique ability to control resources and populations. Army combat forces provide the means to impose our will on the enemy and to decisively defeat our Nation’s adversaries.

Conducting major combat operations against a capable regional adversary or adversarial coalition remains the most demanding mission for the Joint Force. However, resolving such conflict is only one among a myriad of complex undertakings the force may be required to perform. The Joint Force’s core requirement—dominating the full spectrum of threats and challenges from peace to war—requires the capability and capacity to prevail decisively in combat and at every escalatory step an adversary may take short of war, regardless of geographic location. This dominant capability across the spectrum of conflict also provides the credibility necessary to assure friends, dissuade potential adversaries, and deter current foes.

The Defense Strategy identifies plausible missions for employing forces in the current and emerging security environment. These aims describe the Department of Defense (DOD) vision for the employment of forces and require the Services to organize, train, and equip forces to fight at multiple levels of warfare. The Joint Force must stand ready to swiftly defeat the efforts of adversaries in two overlapping major combat operations and, when directed by the President, decisively defeat an adversary in one of those operations. Additionally, the military must retain the ability to conduct contingency operations in other operational scenarios. The Joint Force must have the adaptability to conduct operations ranging from homeland defense to noncombatant operations.

The Army Focus Areas

- The Soldier. Develop flexible, adaptive, and competent Soldiers with a Warrior Ethos.
- The Bench. Prepare future generations of senior leaders. Identify and prepare select Army leaders for key positions within joint, interagency, multinational, and Service organizations.
- Combat Training Centers/Battle Command Training Program. Focus training at CTC and BCTP to meet requirements of current security context, and Joint and Expeditionary teams.
- Leader Development and Education. Train and educate Army members of the Joint Team.
- Army Aviation. Conduct a holistic review of Army Aviation and its role on the Joint battlefield.
- Current to Future Force. Accelerate fielding of select Future Force capabilities to enhance effectiveness of Current Force. Army Transformation is part of constant change.
- The Network. Leverage and enable interdependent, network-centric warfare.
- Modularity. Create modular, capabilities-based unit designs.
- Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. Retain our campaign qualities while developing a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.
- Active Component/Reserve Component Balance. Redesign the force to optimize the Active and Reserve Component (AC/RC) mix across the defense strategy.
- Force Stabilization. Ensure unit stability and continuity, and provide predictability to Soldiers and their families.
- Actionable Intelligence. Provide situational understanding to Commanders and Soldiers with the speed, accuracy and confidence to affect current and future operations.
- Installations as Flagships. Enhance Installation ability to project power and support families.
- Authorities, Responsibilities, and Accountability. Clarify roles and enable agile decision-making.
- Resource Processes. Redesign resource processes to be flexible, responsive, and timely.
- Strategic Communications. Tell the Army Story so the Army’s relevance and direction are clearly understood and supported.
Ground forces offer a value far greater than forward presence alone. Through Theater Security Cooperation and assistance as well as combined exercises with foreign armed forces, Army forces contribute to lasting alliances, coalitions, and strategic partnerships.

In distant locations. Finally, the Joint Force must have the ability to source a strategic reserve to sustain operations and achieve decisive outcomes even when operations prove more demanding or protracted than anticipated. The Army possesses essential capabilities that directly support the Joint Force in achieving the goals of the National Security and Defense Strategies by—

Providing support to civil authorities at home and abroad. Ground forces provide a broad range of capabilities required to support civil authorities. Whether responding to natural disaster or mitigating the consequences of a WMD attack on the homeland, ground forces fulfill a vital security role. Abroad, ground combat forces establish the security conditions necessary for self-sustaining peace in important regions ravaged by conflict. This multiplies the effectiveness of interagency and international community efforts.

Providing expeditionary capabilities to JFCs. The Army is forward deployed, strategically responsive, and capable of both forced entry and rapid reinforcement operations. Unique command, control, and logistic capabilities allow Army forces to operate on short notice in diverse, austere, and chaotic environments. These expeditionary capabilities provide an inherent enabler for joint, allied, and coalition operations and interagency coordination.

Providing dominant land power forces and capabilities required by JFCs to reassure friends, allies, and coalition partners. Ground combat forces set the conditions for operational success and assure global access. By their very presence, ground combat forces communicate the strongest signal of America’s strategic intentions and commitments. But ground forces offer a value far greater than forward presence alone. Through Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and assistance as well as combined exercises with foreign armed forces, Army forces contribute to lasting alliances, coalitions, and strategic partnerships.

Providing dominant land power forces and capabilities required by JFCs to dissuade and deter adversaries. The proven ability of our Soldiers contributes immeasurably to the Nation’s broader ability to dissuade nation-states and nonstate actors tempted to embark upon strategies or to invest in capabilities dangerous to U.S. interests. Though deterrence has proven increasingly difficult in the current security environment, it remains a strategic goal. The ability of ground combat forces to conduct forcible entry by air and sea in the early stages of a crisis, coupled with their unique capability to sustain combat power is a key component of strategic deterrence.

Providing dominant land power forces and capabilities required by JFCs to compel and decisively defeat adversaries across the full spectrum of conflict. When deterrence fails, ground combat forces are the decisive element of the Joint Force. Ground forces have the ability to render a decisive outcome by closing with and destroying enemy forces. They have the capability to occupy, seize, and control territory, and if necessary, to execute a regime change. This capability allows JFCs to preclude an adversary’s options and to compel him to cease hostile action. Ground combat forces are inherently flexible and adaptable. They are ideally suited to conduct Joint Force operations in all types of terrain and weather conditions across the full range of military operations. When committed, ground combat forces have the capability to rob an adversary of initiative and remove their freedom to continue hostilities. Sea,
Our adversaries may try to break our coalitions through blackmail, threats, and attacking members who maintain different policies or national objectives. They will use and exploit information systems and information gained by increased global transparency.

- Providing dominant land power forces and capabilities required by JFCs to win the peace. To achieve enduring victory, U.S. Armed Forces must be prepared, even before hostilities end, to support post-conflict operations as part of an integrated interagency effort to begin setting the conditions for security, long-term stability, and sustainable development. This effort must leverage coalition partners, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in order to maximize their unique capabilities and contributions. While post-conflict actions and activities are dominated by diplomatic, economic, and information efforts designed to strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions, an integrated political-military plan is vital to enduring success. Although military means alone cannot resolve the underlying social, political, and economic problems that lead to armed conflict, military action can be an effective precursor to achieving a lasting political settlement. The Joint Force must be prepared to transition smoothly from warfighting to maintaining a secure and stable post-hostilities environment that will enable civilian international, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations to rapidly assume their appropriate roles. Army forces, with their inherent ability to control territory, populations, and resources, may initially be the most effective means available to begin the transition to a stable and sustainable political end state. The role of the military in a post-conflict environment will vary depending on circumstances unique to each conflict. Post-conflict activities may include providing security for U.S. and coalition personnel and humanitarian relief organizations, enabling humanitarian relief and essential services to affected populations, working with international and indigenous organizations to establish law and order, and training and equipping indigenous military and security forces.
Providing the Nation a hedge against uncertainty. The future security environment is clouded with uncertainty. At the turn of the 20th Century no one foresaw two devastating world wars. Nor did anyone, for that matter, anticipate wars in Korea, Vietnam, or Afghanistan. Robust, campaign-quality ground forces offer the flexibility required to cope with wars of unexpected intensity and duration, as well as accomplish tasks in support of civil authorities. The value of expandability is even greater in an environment where potential adversaries can, with weapons of mass destruction or effects, cause catastrophic losses.

**The Army: A Critical Component of the Joint Team**

**Joint interdependence.** The Army is a critical component of the Joint Team; we must think of ourselves as indispensable and vital members of that team first and as a Service component second. We must remain aware that the Army always conducts operations—offensive, defensive, stability, and support—in a Joint and Expeditionary context. Prompt, sustained, and decisive land combat power acts in concert with air and naval power to ensure a synergy that gives the Joint Force capabilities and power well beyond the sum of its parts. In a few short years, the Joint Force has moved from independent, de-conflicted operations to sustained interoperability. It must now move rapidly to joint interdependence.

Joint interdependence is potentially the Joint Team’s greatest asset. The Army provides the JFC with unique and complementary capabilities across the full spectrum of operations. These include supporting civil authorities at home and abroad, providing expeditionary forces, reassuring friends, allies, and coalition partners, dissuading and deterring adversaries, decisively defeating adversaries should deterrence fail, and winning the peace as part of an integrated interagency, post-conflict effort aimed at achieving enduring victory. We must examine all the capabilities resident in the Joint Force and determine the Service best positioned to provide that capability to the Combatant Commander. We will then be able to shed excess and redundant capabilities while concentrating our efforts and resources to enhance those capabilities the Army is best suited to contribute to the Joint Team. Both our combat and our logistics formations will become joint interdependent.
Joint operations concepts. The Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) describe how the Joint Force intends to operate 15 to 20 years in the future across the entire range of operations. It provides the operational context for transformation by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities. The JOpsC also provides a unifying framework for developing Service concepts and subordinate joint operating concepts, joint functional concepts, and enabling concepts. This framework will guide joint operations, as well as providing the foundation for joint and Service concept development and experimentation. The JOpsC represents a critical step in the new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), which envisions investment in transformational capabilities based on developing joint concepts that are validated through experimentation and informed by joint lessons learned. Clearly, Army concepts and capabilities must nest within the JOpsC and its unifying framework of subordinate concepts and inform the JCIDS.

The JOpsC builds on the goal of full-spectrum dominance: the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of military operations. Full-spectrum dominance is based on the ability to sense, understand, decide, and act faster than an adversary in any situation. In order to succeed in an uncertain, dynamic future security environment, the JOpsC emphasizes a capabilities-based and adaptable force in order to balance capabilities and manage risk within a global perspective. The JOpsC identifies the future joint force attributes that the Joint Force must embody to achieve Full-Spectrum Dominance.

To accomplish assigned missions, the JOpsC advocates a Joint Force that is capable of conducting rapidly executable, simultaneous, and sequential operations distributed throughout a nonlinear battlespace and conducted in close coordination with interagency and multinational partners. The future Joint Force will be able to rapidly build momentum and close the gaps between decision, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces. This will require the Joint Force to organize and train as capabilities-based force packages, which are quickly tailored and scaled for a flexible array of capabilities across the range of military operations.

To succeed, the Joint Force must adopt a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset, reflecting greater versatility and deployability, while ensuring the necessary capabilities to conduct both sustained combat and potentially simultaneous operations to reestablish stability. As is clear from the Strategic Objectives discussed in Annex B [of the ASPG], we will optimize our forces, capabilities, and organizations to best contribute to the joint capabilities and methods required of each of the joint operating concepts and joint functional concepts.

Train and Equip Soldiers and Grow Leaders

Training and equipping Soldiers. The American Soldier remains indispensable to the Joint Team. Flexible, adaptive, and competent Soldiers infused with the Army’s Warrior Culture fight wars and win the peace. Soldiers remain the centerpiece of our combat systems and formations. American Soldiers, possessed of a fierce warrior ethos and spirit, fight in close combat, dominate key assets and terrain, decisively end conflicts, control the movement of people, protect resource flows, and maintain post-conflict stability. We must never forget that it is the Soldier—fierce, disciplined, well trained, and well equipped—who ultimately represents and enables the capabilities we as an Army provide the Joint Force and the Nation.

We must prepare all our Soldiers for the stark realities of the battlefield. No Soldier can survive in the current battlespace without constant training in weapons and fieldcraft and a continuous immersion in the Army’s Warrior Culture. There can be only one standard of training for our Soldiers, regardless of component or specialty. Our equipment and systems must be cross-leveled as necessary to support the Soldier in the warfight. We must not forget it is our Soldiers who remain the crucial link to both realizing Future Force capabilities and enhancing the effectiveness of Current Forces. We must treat Soldiers themselves as the ultimate combat system and, to this end, conduct a holistic review and analysis of individual Soldier institutional and unit training, equipping, and readiness needs. As a system, Soldiers must be medically protected and sustained for optimum performance throughout their service.

Cellular organizations such as al-Qaeda have shown themselves willing to exploit the inability or unwillingness of failed or failing states to govern their own territory and capable of decentralized execution of complex, coordinated, and dispersed attacks against the U.S. and its interests abroad.
We must prepare all our Soldiers for the stark realities of the battlefield. No Soldier can survive in the current battlespace without constant training in weapons and fieldcraft and a continuous immersion in the Army’s Warrior Culture. There can be only one standard of training for our Soldiers, regardless of component or specialty.

We must likewise prepare our Soldiers, civilians, and families for the sustained challenge of serving a Nation at war. The well-being of our Soldiers, civilians, and families is inextricably linked to our Army’s readiness. Our well-being programs and family support systems must be synchronized with rotation schedules and optimized to support deployed units anchored by flagship installations. We recognize that our Soldiers and their families need an element of predictability and order in their lives. In the current strategic environment, that equates to knowing when they are most likely to deploy and making deployments as equitable as possible across the force. Achieving this will require making necessary adjustment to our mix of [AC] and [RC] capabilities and forces. It will also require the use of Force Stabilization initiatives to provide stability for Soldiers and units while enhancing unit cohesion. This will lead to a more capable force. Finally, it will mean rethinking and adapting our installation programs and facilities to better support our Soldiers and their families. The quality and character of our installations is vital to enhancing the well-being of our Soldiers, civilians, and families, as well as enabling the Army’s ability to provide trained, ready, and strategically responsive forces to the Combatant Commanders.

Growing Leaders. Leader development systems must be optimized to train and educate leaders capable of operating as part of a Joint Team at war—leaders who possess a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. The Army will take action across a broad front to make jointness an integral part of our culture. Our systems will educate and reward leaders with the mental agility to thrive at all levels in modern war. We must develop in our future leaders the right mix of unit, staff, and command experience and training and education opportunities to meet the current and future leadership requirements of the Army and the Joint Force. Our leader development systems and facilities will be redesigned for the current...
and future strategic environment and acknowledge the current and projected pace of operations and deployments. The officer, noncommissioned officer, and DA civilian education systems will be adjusted to reflect our operating environment and deployment patterns, as well as reflecting Force Stabilization initiatives. We will identify, prepare, and assign select Army military and civilian leaders for key positions within joint, interagency, multinational, and service organizations and develop and institutionalize the systems required to sustain these assignments.

To develop and train agile and adaptive leaders able to conduct simultaneous, distributed, and continuous operations, we will refocus [CTC] and [BCTP]. Leader training and development within these events must complement and help develop the Joint and Expeditionary Mindset and further a Warrior Culture. The training will nest within the Joint National Training Capability and accurately replicate the realities of the contemporary operating environment. Finally, our training institutions must better enable commanders to develop subordinate leaders. Leader and unit training must be more joint and must embed the realities of the current strategic and operational environments. We will focus the training center experience on execution and not overly emphasize the deliberate planning process.

Provide Relevant and Ready Land Power Capability to the Combatant Commander as Part of the Joint Team

By developing more modular, strategically responsive organizations and cultivating and institutionalizing a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset throughout the force, the Army will greatly increase the Combatant Commander’s ability to rapidly defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations. Modular, capabilities-based forces will better support Combatant Commander requirements by more effectively enabling the delivery of the right Army capabilities at the right place and time. This is central to optimizing the relevance of Army forces to the Combatant Commander and expanding the Joint Team’s ability to rapidly deploy, employ, and sustain forces throughout the global battlespace in any environment and against any opponent.

Modular, capabilities-based Army force designs will enable greater capacity for rapid and tailorable force capability packages and improve the strategic responsiveness of the Joint Force for full-spectrum operations. Modular CS and CSS units with reduced logistics footprints and sense-and-respond logistics capabilities are essential to responsiveness, and they enhance the versatility of the Joint Force to seamlessly transition to sustained operations as a crisis or conflict develops. Informed by operational experience and Future Force designs, the Army will begin in FY 04 to implement this modularity in two of its AC divisions. These initial conversions will serve as prototypes to help accelerate the modular redesign and fielding of the Current and Future Forces.

Moving toward completely independent echelon-above-brigade headquarters will also enhance modularity. In accordance with the Unit of Employment (UE) construct, a UE$_X$ (higher tactical headquarters) and a UE$_Y$ (operational-level headquarters) will
provide the command and control structure into which modular, capabilities-based Units of Action (UA) are organized to meet Combatant Commander requirements. Both types of UE headquarters, while able to accept joint capabilities such as a Standing

To develop and train agile and adaptive leaders able to conduct simultaneous, distributed, and continuous operations, we will refocus CTC and BCTP. Leader training and development within these events must complement and help develop the Joint and Expeditionary Mindset and further a Warrior Culture.

Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) element, will have an organic capability, depending on the contingency, to perform functions as a JTF [joint task force] or JFLCC [joint force land component command] HQ [headquarters].

The Army’s ability to successfully provide the Joint Team both rapid expeditionary capabilities and the ability to conduct sustained land campaigns across the full spectrum of conflict requires both AC and RC contributions. We will restructure the Current Force, creating modular capabilities and flexible formations while obtaining the correct mix between AC and RC force structure. This rebalancing effort will enhance the Army’s ability to provide the Joint Team relevant and ready expeditionary land power capability (figure 1). Our Active Component will provide rapidly responsive, agile, and expeditionary forces that typically respond in the first 15 days of an operation. The availability of adequate AC and RC follow-on forces provide the JFC the campaign quality combat, CS, and CSS capabilities necessary to achieve operational and strategic objectives and to conduct sustained land operations. Our Reserve Component will provide strategic depth to reinforce the warfight. [It] will also reinforce Support Operations and Stability Operations, and lead our efforts to protect the homeland. Either AC or RC units may provide units of the other component with additional capabilities not normally resident in those forces. To create and maintain rapidly deployable and sustainable campaign capability and depth throughout the force, we will ensure both AC and RC forces are modular, tailorble, and capable of coming together in a number of force and capabilities packages. This will allow us to reduce the time now required for mobilization and training and improve our ability to provide Combatant Commanders with needed forces and capabilities.

Redesigning the force requires a complementary and transformational method of building a cohesive team within those organizations. Force Stabilization for brigade units of action and other modular and scaleable forces will provide Combatant Commanders with more combat-ready formations. We will define and develop a plan to implement Force Stabilization concepts into the Army beginning in FY 04. Army-wide implementation will complement a rotation-based system of sustained global engagement. This system will also take the well being of Soldiers and families into account. Home-basing will stabilize Soldiers and their families at installations for extended tours. While some Soldiers may be sent on unaccompanied tours, they will then return to their Home base.

Battle command capabilities must be leveraged to enable interdependent network-centric warfare, supported by sense-and-respond logistics capabilities, within joint, interagency, and multinational full-spectrum operations. The Army must accelerate the Future Force network to enhance the Joint Battle Command capabilities of the Current Force. We must analyze the development of current network architecture and supporting systems. We will reprioritize development of the Network to focus on top-down fielding to the Current Force. Experiences and lessons learned in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom will be leveraged to enhance Joint Battle Command, including Battle

![Figure 1. Structuring the force.](image-url)
Command on the Move, continuous operations over extended distances, Blue Force tracking capabilities, and logistics connectivity for select Current Force units. Fielding must be linked to unit rotation plans. The Army will partner with Joint Forces Command in all aspects of network development.

**Current to Future Force**

Transformation occurs within a context of continuous change. We will provide for the accelerated fielding of select Future Force capabilities to enable the enhancement of the Current Force. The goal of Army Transformation is to provide relevant and ready Current Forces and Future Forces organized, trained, and equipped for joint, interagency, and multinational full-spectrum operations. Army Transformation occurs within the larger context of continuous change brought about through the interaction of constantly evolving capabilities between Current and Future forces (figure 2).

The Current Force is the operational Army today. It is organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations as part of the Joint Force. Designed to provide the requisite warfighting capabilities the JFC needs across the range of military operations, the Current Force’s ability to conduct major combat operations underscores its credibility and effectiveness for full-spectrum operations and fulfills the enduring obligation of Army forces to fight wars and win the peace. The Future Force is the operational force the Army continuously seeks to become. Informed by national security and DOD guidance, it is the strategically responsive, precision maneuver force, dominant across the range of military operations envisioned in the future global security environment.

The Army must continue to develop Future Forces while simultaneously spiraling-in Future Force capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of the Current Force. In developing the Future Force, three critical challenges must be addressed: (1) the Network (C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] architecture); (2) spiral development and field experimentation; and (3) DOTMLPF. The process of identifying and accelerating selected Future Force technologies for fielding to the Current Force will be fundamental to our success in enhancing the relevance and readiness of our Army.

**Establishing Priorities and Balancing Risk**

Today’s strategic planning and prioritization environment is complicated by the need to balance the near-term operational risk associated with conducting the Global War on Terrorism, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other ongoing efforts such as the Balkans, with the Army’s responsibilities for mitigating force-management risk, institutional risk, and future challenges risk. The Army’s policies and programs must be fully consistent with national security and defense strategic guidance, security objectives, and policies. Army policies and programs must also fulfill the current and future operational requirements of Combatant Commanders (i.e., the joint demand for Army capabilities and forces).

Balancing risk is a dynamic process requiring a thorough analysis of the strategic environment, national guidance, and operational requirements. First and foremost, we must win the current fight and sustain the War on Terrorism. This requires giving priority to capabilities that enhance the relevance and readiness of our Army to the Joint Team today and throughout the next decade. We must ensure the Army is fully prepared, trained, and equipped for the current operational environment. We will identify and selectively accelerate key capabilities and technologies from the Future Force and spiral them into the Current Force to enhance its capability. We will provide for the Soldiers who man our Army so they can dominate across the entire spectrum of conflict. As we move toward Future Force capabilities, we must not permit gaps to appear in the near-term capabilities of the Joint Force on the expectation...
The Joint Force must stand ready to swiftly defeat the efforts of adversaries in two overlapping major combat operations, and when directed by the President, decisively defeat an adversary in one of those operations. Additionally, the military must retain the ability to conduct contingency operations in other operational scenarios.

that these gaps will be addressed at some future point. We must also seek Joint solutions and provide essential capabilities to the JFC. We must rethink our organizations, processes, culture, and institutions to develop and support a more modular, capabilities-based, strategically responsive force inculcated with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.

Conclusion

Our first priority is clear, we are engaged in a war now. This warfighting mindset is essential and must involve the entire Army. Today’s terrorist threat is unprecedented—it is transnational with a vast array of resources and sponsors, including nation-states, nonstate participants, and narco-terrorist organizations. The Army must adapt its forces to meet the threat. Terrorist organizations have had years to quietly build a worldwide infrastructure. Given the fanatical commitment, asymmetric capabilities, and adaptability of the threat, it is vitally important to defeat our enemies wherever they are found. Adapting our forces to meet the challenges of the GWOT will require a capabilities-based, modular, flexible, and rapidly employable Joint-Army team, capable of dominating any adversary and controlling any situation across the full range of military operations. A forward-deployed Army must be positioned around the world with the right composition and size to provide the maximum flexibility, agility, and lethality to conduct operations across the full military spectrum.

Our Nation, the Joint Force, and our Army are engaged in one of the most challenging periods in our history. Failure in the current fight is unthinkable. To defeat the enemies who threaten our freedoms, we cannot remain static, trapped in a web of our own no longer relevant policies, procedures, and processes. Transformation during a time of sustained campaigning will not be easy, but it is a practice that appears many times in the history of our great Army. We must examine, design, and develop new solutions for a new and dangerous world, as we have done so successfully in our past. This will require the deep and personal commitment of every member of the Army team—every leader, every Soldier, every civilian, and every family member.

NOTES

3. For a detailed discussion of these topics, see ASPG Annex A, National Strategic Guidance and Annex D, The Security Environment.
5. QDR.
7. QDR, 7.
9. Enduring capabilities include shaping the security environment, executing prompt response, maintaining the Army’s enduring capabilities, defending the homeland, and support for civil authorities. This represents a change that will be reflected in the next update of Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 2001).
10. See ASPG, Annex B. The Focus Areas are AC/RC Balance; The Soldier; The Bench; The Network; Joint and Expeditionary Mindset; Modularity; Force Stabilization; CTC/BCTP; Leader Development and Education; Army Aviation; Installations as Our Flagships; Current to Future Force; Resource Processes; Strategic Communications; Actionable Intelligence; and Authorities, Responsibilities, and Accountability. For the purposes of The Army Plan, the following definitions are used: “near-term” is within the budget year; “mid-term” is within the program objective memorandum (POM) cycle; “long-term” is beyond the POM cycle.
11. For a detailed discussion of these topics, see ASPG Annex B. The Army’s near- and long-term capabilities and objectives are carefully constructed to appropriately balance the four dimensions of risk identified in the Defense Strategy (operational, future challenges, force management, and institutional risk) within the context of the current and projected strategic and operational environments. Operational Risk is the ability to achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or other contingency. Future Challenges Risk is the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new operational concepts needed to dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. Force Management Risk is the ability to recruit, retain, and equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the force while accomplishing its many operational tasks. Institutional Risk is the ability to develop management practices and controls that use resources efficiently and promote the effective operations of the Defense establishment.
12. The Strategic Readiness System assists leaders in focusing on strategic ends, ways, and means with the assistance of a Balanced Scorecard approach—a process analogous to METL development in tactical organizations. A Balanced Scorecard approach requires organizations to think about and institutionalize their core competencies and essential and enduring capabilities, and to use metrics to measure progress toward achieving strategic objectives. The SRS will enable leaders to monitor and forecast strategic performance. The Army Strategic Map, our institutional scorecard, is aligned with the Army Strategic Objectives described in Annex B of the ASPG. The SRS will, therefore, assist us in successfully executing the TAP by providing a mechanism for ensuring we stay on azimuth toward our strategic objectives. The SRS will identify nonprioritized leaders when objectives, concepts, and resources require adjustment so that The Army can efficiently and effectively accomplish its mission for the Nation. The development and articulation of the Army’s Strategic Objectives is a dynamic and ongoing process. Strategic Objectives are not and are not intended to be, static and unchanging. They will be periodically updated.
13. FM 1-1, 21.
15. The APPG will identify Army-unique capabilities vice capabilities resident in the Joint Force.
17. The seven attributes are: fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, decision superior, and lethal.
18. See the ASPG, Annex B.
19. See the ASPG, Annex C.
20. The Army’s near- and long-term objectives are carefully constructed to appropriately balance the four dimensions of risk identified in the Defense Strategy (operational, future challenges, force management, and institutional risk) within the context of the current and projected strategic and operational environments. The strategic and military risk associated with executing The missions and achieving the goals of the National Security and Defense Strategies is regularly assessed through Periodic Risk Assessment Reports as required by the Joint Risk Assessment System. Operational Risk is the ability to achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or other contingency. Future Challenges Risk is the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new operational concepts needed to dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. Force Management Risk is the ability to recruit, retain, and equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the force while accomplishing its many operational tasks. Institutional Risk is the ability to develop management practices and controls that use resources efficiently and promote the effective operations of the Defense establishment.
Have We Finally Found the Manning Holy Grail?

Lieutenant Colonel S. Jamie Gayton
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The Army has a history of attacking with a vengeance each challenge it faces—and conquering it. In nearly every major Army function, the Army identifies critical needs and then either develops in-house solutions or leverages the power of the Nation’s military industrial complex to apply state-of-the-art technologies to meet these needs.

During the 20th century, Army systems, such as weapons, communications, and logistics, among others, advanced by quantum leaps. The Army has worked hard to improve its capabilities through technological innovation and has been profoundly successful in all areas—save one.

The Army’s Achilles’ Heel

The Army’s glaring shortfall has been in the human resource area—the manning of its units. During the last 100 years, with varying degrees of resolve and resources, the Army has many times sought to transition from an individual replacement system to some type of unit manning system. The aim was to improve unit cohesion and combat readiness; however, all attempts failed, and the Army returned each time to an individual replacement system. The replacement system’s shortcomings have become a ball and chain around the Army’s neck; this primitive manning system hinders Army Transformation.

With force stabilization, the Army is set to cast off the ball and chain and completely transform how it mans units. This new manning initiative, developed by Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker’s Task Force (TF) Stabilization, will propel the Army through Transformation while addressing the shortcomings that led to the many previously failed attempts to implement it. Force stabilization might not be the Holy Grail of Army human resources planning, but it could be the solution to the Army’s manning problems.

To the question, can force stabilization work? Naysayers reply emphatically, No! Often without having seen or read an implementation plan. They say force stabilization has never worked in the past, and ask why ew should expect a different outcome now? Are the Army’s TF Stabilization members any smarter than those who tried unit manning before, and failed?

Many reasons exist for previous unit manning failures. Although some attempts were well thought out, or had the necessary resources and environments for success, or were fully supported by senior leaders, none had all these ingredients at the same time.

But force stabilization is different. The Army developed it with clear guidance from Schoomaker to use fresh thinking to seek innovative solutions and crack the most hardened and encrusted of Army traditions—how we man our units. The mandate was no longer the ambiguous imperative, “increase cohesion.”
Schoomaker wanted to combine the benefits of cohesion with unit readiness, stability, predictability, and continuity during deployments. He encouraged the Army to expand the number of desired outcomes, opening the door to a larger optimization problem requiring a new array of solutions. Rather than trying to force a square peg into a round hole and seeking solutions when one or more critical elements were missing, TF Stabilization developed a plan that aligned these elements to produce new outcomes.

**Force Stabilization Reborn**

Under former Secretary of the Army Thomas White, the concept of unit manning was reborn—with a fervor seldom seen in Armywide initiatives. Schoomaker renamed unit manning, calling it “force stabilization,” and made it one of his focus areas and top priorities for execution.

White and Schoomaker recognized the debilitating effects of turbulence on unit combat readiness and capabilities, and Schoomaker quickly attacked the problem. He stood up TF Stabilization at Fort Monroe, Virginia, in September 2003, and for 7 weeks the task force focused its energy on developing a plan based on the results from a thorough review of past efforts. A cross-section of combat arms, combat support, and combat service support officers and noncommissioned officers kept one goal in mind: providing more combat-ready, deployable, and capable units to combatant commanders. The plan that emerged was two-pronged: first, to slow down and stabilize the force, and second, to implement unit-focused stabilization (UFS), a long-term plan to align soldier assignment and unit operational cycles.

The increased stabilization goal is realized by stabilizing soldiers and families for longer periods of time in CONUS units. Soldiers will only move when required to support: the needs of the Army, their leader development, and soldier preferences. This stabilization allows soldiers to stay together in teams longer, improving combat readiness, horizontal cohesion, and deployability while increasing stability and predictability for their families and them. For short tours, soldiers deploy and return to their installation, keeping their families stabilized during their absence.

Stabilization enables families to develop deeper roots in their community. Children spend extended periods in the same schools, use the same medical and dental facilities, and participate with the same
peers in extracurricular activities. Spouses have enhanced career opportunities, more meaningful support networks, including family readiness groups, and develop a deeper sense of belonging to a neighborhood and community. These benefits allow soldiers to feel that their families are happy and secure with well-developed support networks to help them, especially during the soldiers’ deployments.

Still, stabilization has challenges—the most glaring of which is a lack of continuity during deployments. Under the stabilization policy, soldiers can leave their units in mid-deployment to separate at the expiration term of services (ETS) or to make a permanent change of station (PCS), thereby undermining the training benefits and cohesion that stabilization is supposed to confer.

Unit-focused stabilization extends and enhances the benefits achieved by initially slowing down and stabilizing the force. As the Army methodically implements UFS across brigade combat team equivalents based in CONUS, UFS will align soldier assignments and unit operational cycles; provide dedicated training and ready periods, and ensure the continuity of unit personnel during deployments. For most UFS units, lifecycle management will align soldier and unit operational cycles for set periods (planned for 36 months). Cyclical manning focuses and schedules all transitions (arrivals and departures) into a 1- to 2-month “sustain” period, with ready periods lasting from 10 to 11 months.

Under lifecycle management, leaders and soldiers will arrive in a unit within a 2- to 3-month period, settle their families, sign for equipment, and prepare for a training cycle. Units will then conduct focused, uninterrupted training, beginning with individual and small units and finishing with battalion- and brigade-level collective training that will include a validation exercise.

With soldier assignment and unit operational cycles aligned, there will be no ETS, PCS, or other “programmed losses.” The attrition rate would remain at the historical 5 to 7 percent level because of medical, legal, and other unforeseeable events. This would allow training readiness to exceed current levels because highly trained teams can spend minimal time conducting sustainment training for newly integrated soldiers and maximize the training time devoted to advanced skills.

Following the training phase, units would spend the balance of their 36-month operational cycle, roughly 28 months, in the ready phase. They would then rotate through traditional red/amber/green training cycles and expect to complete one 6- to 12-month unit rotation to an overseas location in addition to any local training and combat training center experience.

**Force Stabilization: Execution Risk**

Complexity of execution, although not necessarily bad in itself, poses some increased risks. To maximize readiness, the Army must stagger the train and ready phases of its 26 CONUS-based brigades (including Hawaii and Alaska) over a 36-month
Stabilization enables families to develop deeper roots in their community. Children spend extended periods in the same schools, use the same medical and dental facilities, and participate with the same peers in extracurricular activities. Spouses have enhanced career opportunities, more meaningful support networks, including family readiness groups, and develop a deeper sense of belonging to a neighborhood and community.

Stabilization

Stabilization’s time appears to have come. Schoomaker has nurtured and overseen the development of a force-stabilization manning model that boasts a solid plan, leader support, adequate resources, and an operational environment that demands change. Although no one can predict the external factors that might affect its implementation, force stabilization successfully addresses foreseeable risks. Implementation will not be easy, and some soldiers might initially feel left out, but the benefits to the Army are worth the costs of the transition. The Army will be stronger and more relevant and ready. Force stabilization can make the Army’s manning system into a strength that leads change instead of a weakness exposed by change.

A Solid Plan

Stabilization

Stabilizes soldiers and their families assigned to CONUS installations for extended periods.
Improves combat readiness.
Increases horizontal and vertical cohesion.
Provides stability and predictability for soldiers and their families.
Allows soldiers and their families to develop deeper community roots.

Unit-Focused Stabilization

—Lifecycle management
Synchronizes a soldier’s tour with the unit’s operational cycle (planned 36 months).
Increases horizontal and vertical cohesion.
Maximizes combat readiness.
Minimizes PCS and ETS attrition during operational cycles.

—Cyclic management
Focuses unit arrivals and departures to 1 to 2 months of a 12-month cycle, “normalizing” the training cycle for units.
Enhances the continuity of operations.
Limits training to sustainment periods.
The Modular Army

Colonel John A. Bonin, U.S. Army, Retired
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Lieutenant Colonel Telford E. Crisco, Jr., U.S. Army
Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth

We deliver relevant and ready land combat power to the combatant commanders and the joint team. . . . Our Army must move toward modular capabilities-based unit designs, nested within the joint networks, and enabled by a joint expeditionary mindset.

—CSA General Peter J. Schoomaker

Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker’s vision for the Army’s Current and Future Forces provides the joint force commander a campaign-quality Army that will dominate this century’s highly complex, uncertain, and dynamic security environments. To do so the Army will reorganize its combat and institutional organizations to best meet the needs and requirements operating today and tomorrow.

The Army seeks to solve the organizational design dilemma by retaining the advantages of relatively fixed structures as the basis for tailoring the force while furthering a commander’s ability to creatively reorganize it to meet specific tasks. To achieve strategic responsiveness, deployability, modularity, and tailorable force systems, the Army needs self-contained combined arms units smaller than current divisions. Now might be the time for the Army to break free of old concepts and refocus on its previous traditional tactical echelon—the brigade

to restructure the Army for the 21st century.

Employing modular, capabilities-based units for rapid packaging into lethal forces for sustained employment by combatant commanders requires the Army to create modular brigade units of action (UA). As the basic combined arms building block for force projection, the UA is smaller and more agile than divisions.

The Army’s organizational design for ground combat has historically swung back and forth from totally fixed structures to totally ad hoc organizations. (See figure 1.) The challenge of organizational design is to maintain the advantages of relatively fixed organizations (strategic deployment, sustainment, and


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<td>Totally fixed structure</td>
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<td>- U.S. Army World War I</td>
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<td>- French Army 1940</td>
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<td>- Soviet Army</td>
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<td>- World War II Regimental Combat Teams</td>
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<td>- Current Brigade Combat Teams</td>
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<td>- World War II German Kampf Gruppe (battle group)</td>
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<td>- U.S. Special Operations Forces</td>
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Greatest internal certainty for—
- Strategic deployment
- Sustainment
- Joint planning
- Training standardization
- Mass leader development
- Interchangeable units

Disadvantages
- Not all organic units needed in all situations
- Contributions to regimentation and lack of creativity by lower level leaders

Greatest Operational Flexibility for—
- Designer units optimized for specific situation
- Creative force packaging
- Contributing to initiative at lower levels

Disadvantages
- Units lack depth for changing circumstances
- Complicates joint planning
- Requires experienced and skilled junior leaders
- Nearly impossible to design sustainment

Figure 1. Organizational design.
Separate brigades, such as Colonel Joseph Wilder’s Lightning Brigade, equipped with Spencer repeating rifles, performed magnificently as Army-level fire brigades. However, brigades, divisions, corps, and armies formed only as needed in wartime and were promptly disbanded during peacetime... Not until World War I did the Army establish permanent tactical units larger than a regiment.

Separate brigades have officially existed since the implementation of the Reorganization Objectives Army Division in the early 1960s, but independent combined arms brigades capable of decisive action existed much earlier in the form of combined arms tactical units smaller than a division but larger than a regiment or battalion.

Early Brigades

Since 1776, the Army has often exercised the operational doctrine of employing elements smaller than a division on independent missions. During the Revolutionary War, General George Washington (who had been a colonial militia brigade commander in the French and Indian War) made the brigade the basic maneuver element of the Continental Army.

After taking command of the rebel army at Boston in 1775, Washington imposed greater organizational flexibility and control by introducing divisions and brigades as administrative echelons between his headquarters and the regiments. In December 1776, during his successful attack on Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey, Washington’s emphasis shifted from the regiment to the brigade as the tac-
Schoomaker, Macgregor, and the Tofflers believe that the brigade, not the division, might be the primary unit of ground combat in future warfare. Separate brigades have officially existed since . . . the early 1960s, but independent combined arms brigades capable of decisive action existed much earlier in the form of combined arms tactical units smaller than a division but larger than a regiment and battalion.

The regiment remained the largest permanent peacetime organization in the U.S. Army until World War I. The Army created brigades and divisions during the Civil War, but as Russell F. Weigley of Temple University says, “All of them were task forces, composed of varying constituent elements as circumstances and accident decreed.” As higher level organizations and designations stabilized during the Civil War, many brigades became proud instruments of battlefield tactics and received their now-famous names—Iron, Stonewall, Orphan, Irish, Texas, and Regular.

Separate brigades, such as Colonel Joseph Wilder’s Lightning Brigade, equipped with Spencer repeating rifles, performed magnificently as Army-level fire brigades. However, brigades, divisions, corps, and armies formed only as needed in wartime and were promptly disbanded during peacetime.

Early 20th century. In 1900, the Army formed the 2,500-man China Relief Expedition, with Major General Adna R. Chaffee commanding, to participate in the international efforts to free the Peking legations from the “Boxers.” Civil War veteran Major General James H. Wilson, second-in-command, was the direct commander of the “Ninth and Fourteenth Infantry, the marine battalion, six troops of the Sixth Cavalry, and Riley’s Battery of six rifled guns, all in excellent condition and constituting as compact and
complete a brigade of fighting men as ever made its appearance in the Far East . . .”11

Chaffee later used separate brigades successfully as his largest units in stability and support operations during the Philippine Insurrection.12 Not until World War I did the Army establish permanent tactical units larger than a regiment (for the American Expeditionary Force). Although the Army activated eight corps for the Spanish-American War, most deployments consisted of brigades as they became ready. During the short campaign for Puerto Rico, an independent regular brigade made the most spectacular advance.13

Mid-20th to early 21st century. During World War II and the wars of the last half of the 20th century, separate brigade-size units performed valuable service. Units such as Task Force (TF) Butler in Southern France and separate brigades like the 173d Airborne in Vietnam performed superbly in direct support to army and corps commanders. Units of this size proved useful in independent missions to “show the flag,” demonstrate American support, or fight alongside allies such as in TF Mars in Burma during World War II, TF 201 from the 24th Infantry Division (ID) in Lebanon in 1958, and more recently, TF Rakkasans with the 101st Airborne Division in Afghanistan. Separate heavy brigades provided additional armor support to the U.S. Marine Corps, as demonstrated by the 1st Brigade, 5th ID (Mechanized [M]) in Vietnam, and the Tiger Brigade of the 2d Armored Division (AD) in Operation Desert Storm.14

Separate brigade-size units also served as auxiliaries to the main tactical element, the division. Entire divisions have been formed in deployed theaters of operation by compositing separate regiments or brigades, as with the Americal Division during World War II and Vietnam.

Separate brigades have augmented divisions for combat, as for example, the 24th ID with the 197th Infantry Brigade (M), and the 1st ID with the 2d AD (Forward [F]) in the Persian Gulf. Using separate brigades for appropriate missions provided flexibility and agility and avoided dismembering divisions for smaller missions.

The Army currently manages several programs at the brigade level. Because of costs, brigades will continue to be the largest echelon to rotate and conduct “live” training at the combat training centers. The brigade is the primary echelon for prepositioned equipment in Europe, Korea, the Middle East, and afloat.
Members of Task Force Rakkasans investigate a mountainside animal pen for possible hidden weapons during Operation Anaconda, July 2002.

Brigade combat teams recently deployed in the Global War on Terrorism, sometimes with the parent division headquarters (as with TF Falcon during Operation Iraqi Freedom) and sometimes without (such as TF Rakkasans during Operation Anaconda). Tailored brigade combat teams have conducted military operations in Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Tailoring the Modular Army

To meet the demands of the contemporary operational environment with a lethal, deployable force, the Army must transform the way it organizes and deploys forces. Force tailoring, the process of arranging a force through task organization of units to meet specific mission requirements or constraints, allows the Army to fully support the needs of the combatant commander with a discreet set of mission capabilities.15

Force tailoring—

- Is central to the organization and employment of modular brigade UAs, the building blocks of the Army’s new Units of Employment (UEs).
- Allows planners to draw from available Army and joint forces to create UE formations designed to meet the specific requirements of the contingency to which that UE has been committed.16
- Allows a deploying force with modular units to be closely scaled to meet a regional combatant commander’s (RCC’s) needs.

The force’s modular building blocks are drawn from a pool of available Army forces, such as units assigned to a joint force provider (most likely Joint Forces Command), which has not been allocated to an RCC but that might be force tailored to it for a particular mission. The joint force provider’s Army component staff would control the tailored force in a role similar to that of the current U.S. Army Forces Command.

Force tailoring applies to the Current and Future Force. A UE does not have a fixed subordinate structure or large, permanent, standing formations. Brigade-size UAs are flexibly allocated to UEs based on the RCC’s contingency planning requirements. Army forces stationed or deployed outside the United States are assigned or attached to that RCC and might also be suballocated to his assigned or attached UEs.

Force tailoring depends on the creation of modular, standing organizations that include maneuver and nonmaneuver units. At least three major factors influence the stationing of those units: the training
cycle, deployment considerations, and implementation of force stabilization plans.

Force tailoring from the pool of available forces presumes the association of units with one or more higher headquarters. The relationship of available forces with a higher headquarters is not necessarily linked directly to unit stationing; unit relationships in garrison might differ significantly from relationships in contingency operations.

Modularity, which is fundamental to the design of units for effective force tailoring, is a new organizational paradigm that will enable the UE to rapidly tailor the precise capabilities needed for each operating environment. Modularity requires self-contained organizations that can plug into and unplug from unit formations with minimal augmentation or reorganization.

The Army must keep modularity at the forefront of its design focus as it develops its organizations, including all command and control (C2), tactical, and support elements. A headquarters element must be self-contained and capable of receiving subordinate units or modules without augmenting its C2 capabilities. Similarly, modularity requires unit building blocks that can be plugged into a C2 module without reorganization or external support.

Organizational design should consider the types of units and at what level they are compatible for C2. Parameters for unit modules must establish for whom they can work, which types of headquarters they support, and the extent of their joint interoperability. Not all modular units will be universally compatible with all potential headquarters because the resources required to achieve universal modularity are prohibitive.

A common doctrinal foundation for the modular force, including the full spectrum of operational doctrine from unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) to how units fight, is fundamental to success. This doctrine must be the same among all units in the same modular construct. For example, the SOP for ammunition storage in one unit must be exactly the same as that of another unit in another location. Maximizing commonality of design and systems and building multifunctional organizations with discrete sets of capabilities will contribute to a modular construct that enables rapid force tailoring before and during deployment as well as increasing force versatility and operational flexibility.

Modularity applies to all types of units, supports strategic responsiveness, and facilitates affiliation, training, and deployment of mission-tailored UEs. Modular forces provide functional building blocks to support specific mission sets for the tailored force. The Army has no mandated size of unit building blocks; module size will vary within each functional category. Some modules might be organized at the company level; others might be organized at platoon, section, or team levels. Forces might be managed by echelon, region, or the joint functional concepts of C2, battlefield awareness, force application, protection, and focused logistics. They will normally be assigned to a specific UE for training, support, and readiness.

The modular force embodies the spirit of a new design philosophy that allows multiple Army units to be temporarily aggregated and placed under the command and control of an established senior UE headquarters without designating permanent UAs. This approach represents a major leap forward in flexibility and affords Army commanders the opportunity to rapidly tailor the precise mix of unit capabilities. The result is smaller, more deployable force packages for any given mission. (See figure 2.)

When alerted for deployment, the UE would rapidly identify mission requirements, then be allocated specific subordinate forces through the force tailoring process. Each UE is unique and without a fixed organization of subordinate units and relies on ha-
bital peacetime training associations to facilitate the development of cohesive, effective formations. (See figure 3.) The tailored force would consist of a combination of Joint, Current, or Future Forces organized by echelon, region, or joint function.

Modular forces must be designed for operational maneuver from strategic distances. Future Force units will execute immediate deployment with cascading force application into employment without waiting for a protracted buildup, thus emphasizing lethality and speed of maneuver over mass. Sustainment modules and other force enablers, including joint assets, must be incorporated as part of the deploying force to ensure it can maintain operations at an overwhelming pace that provides continuous pressure on the opponent.

**Building Force Packages**

Building fully tailored force packages requires creative new approaches from current procedures for preparing and organizing for combat. Approaches must become more adaptive and responsive to the designated joint force commander’s needs. Because they would have multifunctional, combined arms capabilities organic to them, UAs would require minimum force tailoring or task organization and retain the option to task organize creatively.

The UE will become the unit that rapidly deploys and accepts the plug-in of modular mission-allocated UAs. The mix of maneuver UAs and support UAs will vary based on the joint functional areas’ capabilities to perform each mission. Multifunctional modules of combined arms, strike, aviation, reconnaissance and surveillance, protection, and sustainment will largely comprise the pool of available forces.

Tailoring force packages will also incorporate augmentation by Reserve Component units and staffs. This diverse mix of forces will require innovative command and support relationships, specific designs, and a joint expeditionary mindset for how the Army manages available forces.

The full spectrum of threats in this new century requires the Army to change its organizational basis from the division. Historically, the Army has not been based on the division; in fact, for the past 100 years, the Army has successfully employed self-contained combined arms brigades during numerous operations. To continue delivering relevant and ready land combat power to combatant commanders, the Army must move toward even more modular unit designs to solve the organizational design dilemma posed by the need for relatively fixed organizational structures as the basis for tailoring while empowering commanders to creatively reorganize capabilities for specific tasks. **MR**

**Figure 3. Examples of unique UE-**

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### NOTES

1. GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, speech at the Eisenhower Luncheon, Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C., 7 October 2003.
2. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Antiwar (Boston, MA: Little & Brown, 1993), 77.
4. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 97, 98.
7. Ibid., 112.
8. Ibid., 151.
10. Ibid., 189, 306.
11. MG James H. Wilson, Under the Old Flag, vol. II (NY: Appleton, 1912), 519-34.
Expanding Roles and Missions in the War on Drugs and Terrorism: El Salvador and Colombia

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The War Against drug trafficking and terrorism in Colombia continues to entice and perplex the United States, but the average Colombian citizen in Bogotá regards the current U.S. administration's commitment to Colombia as tentative and insincere. The last case of sustained U.S. military support to a Latin American government under siege was in El Salvador in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush supported a small, limited war (from a U.S. perspective) while trying to keep U.S. military involvement a secret from the American public and media. Present U.S. policy toward Colombia appears to follow this same disguised, quiet, media-free approach.

In the 1980s, El Salvador became a “line in the sand.” The U.S. pledged to defeat Cuban-inspired and supported insurgencies in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala. U.S. policy today appears to want to take a similar stance in Colombia. U.S. support to El Salvador included a sustained commitment of military advisers and a security assistance package guaranteeing U.S. support for the long haul. The monetary commitment was hefty—$6 billion in security assistance over the course of the war. But the U.S. military commitment of “boots on the ground” in El Salvador was even more important: it was a concrete manifestation of U.S. resolve to El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) and the El Salvador government.

If the United States is serious about countering terrorism and drug trafficking in Colombia, it might be worthwhile to dust off El Salvador archives and examine the model used there to create the necessary organization and structure with which to respond. Other military services played important roles during the El Salvador conflict, but 90 percent of the advisory support effort came from the U.S. Army.

Therefore, the Army should be the focal point of any advisory effort brought to bear in Colombia.

The El Salvador Model

United States support to El Salvador began in 1981. Three mobile training teams (MTTs) of military advisers provided infantry, artillery, and military intelligence instruction. Service support advisers on 1-year tours augmented these limited-duration (3-month) MTTs. Typical service branches were infantry, Special Forces (SF), and military intelligence officers, usually majors, captains, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), or warrant officers with linguistic capabilities. Some were Latin American foreign area officers, and most SF personnel had served exclusively in Latin America.

U.S. military advisers populated the entire ESAF from joint headquarters to brigades. Two officers (operations and intelligence) were assigned to each of the six ESAF infantry brigade headquarters in six geographical areas of the country. Personnel were also assigned to the ESAF artillery headquarters, the logistics center, and the national training center. Their mission was to support their Salvadoran counterparts in establishing training programs and to assist in the military decisionmaking process and in staff and operational matters. In San Salvador, El Salvador’s capital, U.S. Army combat and combat support majors and lieutenant colonels supported key ESAF joint staff elements while quietly and discreetly prosecuting the war operationally and with intelligence.

As early as 1983, the Salvadoran military intelligence effort received—

- Target folder packages from the Central American Joint Intelligence Team of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
- Aerial platform intelligence support from Howard Air Force Base in Panama and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras.
The U.S. Army sought to improve ESAF professionalism by emphasizing the importance of an NCO corps. As an experiment, cadets from El Salvador’s military academy were assigned to platoon leader or sergeant positions in their last 2 years of school so they could apply leadership skills in the field. Those who survived became officers with degrees and 2 years of combat experience.

All-source intelligence analysis from the U.S. Southern Command J2 through its liaison officer at the U.S. Embassy.

Intelligence from an advisory team assigned to the Salvadoran J2.3

These elements worked in harmony to produce actionable intelligence from within and outside El Salvador in direct support of the ESAF.

Reagan and Bush pulled out all the stops when it came to ESAF unit and collective training. Entire Salvadoran immediate reaction infantry battalions went to Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for advanced infantry training. Another battalion trained at the U.S. and Honduran training facility in Puerto Castillo/Trujillo, Honduras, until a training center was established at La Unión, El Salvador. Also, SF personnel trained ESAF infantry battalions and brigades in country. Many Salvadoran officers and NCOs went to the former School of the Americas (now the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation) at Fort Benning to learn the basics of warfighting—from U.S. Army staff planning doctrine to infantry tactics.

As noted in 1993, the ESAF’s new professionalism and the dramatic improvement of its human rights record affected how the populace, the international community, and even the FMLN viewed changes in Salvadoran political conditions and served to legitimize the gains made by the Salvadoran government in its creation of a climate in which the political left could voice
Military advisers populated the entire ESAF from joint headquarters to brigades. [Operations and intelligence officers] were assigned to each of the six [geographically based] ESAF infantry brigade headquarters. . . . Personnel were also assigned to the ESAF artillery headquarters, the logistics center, and the national training center . . . to support their Salvadoran counterparts in establishing training programs and to assist in the military decisionmaking process and in staff and operational matters.

A U.S. trainer and Salvadoran soldiers examine a commercial metal detector, 1986.

opposition without fear of military reprisals or death-squad murders."

U.S. military advice and assistance also helped create a secure environment in rural areas. U.S. Army advisers trained peasants in basic marksmanship then united them with the police and the military in local self-defense units. These self-defense forces kept insurgents from harassing small towns, provided security, and became instruments of a democratic government. They were well-received and remained in place from the late 1980s until the early 1990s.

Human rights benefited most from the U.S. Army advisers’ presence. Required to report any human rights violations to the American Embassy, U.S. Army advisers paid close attention to field reports emanating from ESAF combat units. As a result, atrocities or abuse during ESAF military operations did not reach the levels of violations in Guatemala. Guatemala’s army, which was not supported by a U.S. Army advisory program, has been accused of committing atrocities. ESAF personnel suspected of atrocities had to answer any charges levied by the United Nations Commission on the Truth for El Salvador.

U.S. Army advisers were not allowed to accompany Salvadoran units on combat operations to verify reports of atrocities. Much could have been gained from doing so, but not doing so kept U.S. military and civilian casualties to only 20 during 10 years of conflict. In future conflicts, the Army must make a cost-benefit analysis to weigh the policy’s pros and cons.

Despite positive indicators of the military advisory program’s benefits, a debate continues as to whether the war ended as a direct result of the program or as a consequence of the negotiated settlement between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government. What is certain is that the ESAF’s improvement on the battlefield (and on the front pages of newspapers) put the Salvadoran government in a stronger negotiating position at the peace talks. The military advisory program deserves at least some of the credit for this.
Advice and assistance also helped create a secure environment in rural areas. U.S. Army advisers trained peasants in basic marksmanship then united them with the police and the military in local self-defense units. These self-defense forces kept insurgents from harassing small towns, provided security, and became instruments of a democratic government. . . . military assistance vastly improved the ESAF’s ability to use its equipment and perform combat operations and clearly contributed to putting an improved Salvadoran military on the battlefield.

The Colombian Conflict

Placing an El Salvadoran template over Colombia presents challenges, chief among which is Colombia’s geographical size. Colombia is the size of Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico combined. El Salvador is only as big as Massachusetts and fits easily into southern Colombia’s Caqueta and Putumayo departments. The towering, snow-capped Andes Mountains bisect Colombia from north to south, and a dense jungle in the south competes with the Amazon’s rain forest. Rivers crisscross southern Colombia and swamps make movement of military units difficult or next to impossible.

Another difference between Colombia and El Salvador is the nature of the Colombian insurgency. The National Liberation Army and Colombian United Self Defense Forces are at war with Colombian government forces, but the tenacious, 15,000-man strong Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), which has fought the Colombian government since the 1960s, overshadows them. FARC has evolved from a classic guerrilla group to a terrorist and drug-trafficking organization. This is significant because with substantial drug-financed resources, FARC is better equipped and supplied than El Salvador’s FMLN was. FARC can purchase state-of-the-art communications equipment, weapons, and ammunition through international black markets and even keep its members in new uniforms and boots.

FARC’s lucrative drug business almost puts it into the category of a drug cartel or illegal corporate enterprise with its own CEO, middle-management executives, sales and distribution infrastructure, and security force. Today’s FARC is a mafia with well-established connections in the drug underworld supported by a large army of hit men as ruthless as any Los Angeles, California, gang. Terrorists in the classic sense, FARC insurgents target civilians, kidnap prominent members of the establishment, and murder people in cold blood to maintain millions in drug revenues and to provide a more-than-comfortable lifestyle for their leaders.

FARC’s tentacles extend beyond Colombia to influence every aspect of drug production, transport, and delivery throughout Latin America. It is no exaggeration to say that all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have a permanent FARC presence or that FARC influences them in one way or another. The 40-year-old insurgent organization has roots deeply embedded in the political, social, and economic fiber of Colombia, is ubiquitous, and foments anarchy. FARC finances, arms, trains, and equips radical groups and inspires them to take violent action against elected governments. FARC
The Colombian departments of Caqueta, Putumayo, and Amazonas are similar to the Mekong Delta region of the Republic of Vietnam, and the extensive river networks that crisscross the area are main FARC logistics and drug-trafficking routes. Because the absence of adequate pick-up and landing zones limits heliborne air assault operations’ effectiveness, the best way to interdict FARC movements is to attack river transportation. A standing naval infantry advisory presence would enhance the Colombian Navy.

Salvadoran patrol craft prepare for arms interdiction operations, November 1991.

US Army

insurgents monitor all aspects of their huge drug empire and aim to create a narco-superstate in the southern hemisphere.

FARC thrives on chaos. The more chaos it creates, the more easily it can produce and transport drugs. FARC uses drug money to buy the services of Latin American politicians, judges, ministers, police chiefs, and armed forces commanders. The social consequences of drug addiction in Los Angeles or Miami are minor compared to the consequences of allowing FARC to destroy political freedom, law and order, and civilization in Colombia.

One of the great challenges of the war is how to dismantle FARC. How does the military take on a mafia? Would the U.S. Army be capable of taking on the Chicago or New York mafia? If it did, where would it apply combat force? While it is not an impossible task, it is certainly a formidable one.

A professional army’s job is to win its nation’s wars. In Colombia and neighboring countries, “winning” the war on drugs can only be measured by sporadic battlefield victories resulting in guerrilla casualties, the successful chemical spraying of coca fields, or the seizure of large drug shipments. The ultimate military victory would be FARC’s destruction, the dismantling of its entire coca drug network, and the end of the war on drugs in the United States. These will be achieved only when Colombia, neighboring Latin American states, and the United States are totally committed to defeating drug traffickers. The job is simply too large for the Colombian military alone.

In El Salvador, FMLN chose to negotiate for peace. The government and FMLN negotiators decided to end the war for the sake of creating a future for their beleaguered country, and a negotiated settlement to the war led to the signing of peace accords. But FARC has no allegiance to Colombia. It is a criminal organization that does not desire a future for Colombia other than as a territory for business operations. As a Salvadoran government official told us, “Negotiations always serve a beneficial
Placing an El Salvadoran template over Colombia presents challenges, chief among which is Colombia’s geographical size. Colombia is the size of Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico combined. El Salvador is only as big as Massachusetts and fits easily into southern Colombia’s Cauca and Putumayo departments. . . . Another difference between Colombia and El Salvador is [that] FARC’s lucrative drug business almost puts it into the category of a drug cartel or illegal corporate enterprise.

Taking on FARC militarily is not a question of winning, but of keeping FARC from winning. The ESAF is fighting to preserve Colombia’s political, economic, and social infrastructure and to maintain security for its citizens. If the Colombian military does not take the battle to FARC, FARC will completely dominate rural Colombia and major urban population centers.

The Colombian government has prudently combined its military and national police operations. Because drug trafficking and terrorism are criminal activities, the government has put the national police in charge, with the Colombian military in a supporting role. This strategy and the use of village defense forces combined make a good recipe for success, one that keeps the government on a higher moral ground.

The Colombian military is in combat against the FARC cartel’s military arm, all other FARC combatants, and associated field drug-producing and refining operations. The Colombian military can put pressure on FARC’s leadership by killing as many of its members as it can, blocking supply corridors, and destroying drug-producing and processing areas, but the war will only end when attrition depletes FARC’s ranks and it loses the will to fight. There can be no final victory until all Latin American countries put pressure on FARC transit routes, and the United States and Europe’s insatiable demand for drugs subsides. The Colombian military can and must take the battle to FARC, and U.S. Army advisers can play a significant role in this war. The U.S. Army can make considerable contributions to improve all aspects of the art of warfare through the advisory program. This is where the El Salvador model comes in.

Exporting the El Salvador Model

To apply the El Salvador model in Colombia, the United States must include U.S. Army advisers at the military joint command level within the Colombian military and, perhaps, even to Colombia’s police forces. The Colombian military’s equivalent to
A flexible, rotational approach toward manning could fill one-third, two-thirds, or all of the Colombian army’s infantry divisions and brigades with advisers as the mission dictated. This approach follows the current U.S. approach in support of Plan Colombia, which Colombia developed as an integrated strategy to meet the most pressing challenges it must confront.

With this structure in place, advisers could flow down to the 6 Colombian army combat divisions and approximately 20 brigades, with one operations adviser (combat arms or SF captain or major) and one military intelligence adviser (captain or major) assigned to each combat division and subordinate brigade headquarters. Such assignments would take personnel outside of Bogotá into rural areas, so they would serve unaccompanied 1-year tours. A nationwide VHF radio net using multiple repeaters, a SATCOM UHF radio system, or cellular phones would link the advisers. Advisers could be placed at selected locations such as military schools or regional training centers.

If not enough U.S. Army personnel are available to man all divisions or brigades, the priority of effort should be to the geographic areas or units that will benefit the most from an advisory presence. This flexible, rotational approach toward manning could fill one-third, two-thirds, or all of the Colombian army’s infantry divisions and brigades with advisers as the mission dictated. This approach follows the current U.S. approach in support of Plan Colombia, which Colombia developed as an integrated strategy to meet the most pressing challenges it must confront. As in El Salvador, the advisory program should use specialized MTTs, particularly SF personnel, to provide tactical training to Colombian soldiers.

The United States should also create a military intelligence analytical advisory effort for Colombia’s joint and army intelligence centers by assigning two to three U.S. service members at each level. Intelligence personnel (captains, lieutenants, warrant officers, or senior NCOs) should thoroughly understand how to develop collection plans; integrate intelligence preparation of the battlefield; and thoroughly employ all-source analysis, particularly the fusion of signals, imagery, and human intelligence. An effective military intelligence advisory effort should have experienced personnel with multiple tactical unit tours, combat experience, and even extensive training center rotational experience. Obviously, Spanish-language expertise remains key.

The U.S. joint staff (J-staff) is the department staff (D-staff). Placing U.S. Army combat, combat support, and combat service support colonels or lieutenant colonels in the D1 through D5 staff sections will ensure support to personnel and logistics matters as well as to operations and intelligence matters. Assigned to the USMILGP on a 1-year unaccompanied or 2-year accompanied basis, these officers would have additional duties to the USMILGP commander as subject matter experts and would form the nucleus of an ad hoc advisory task force headquarters. This U.S. Military Advisory Task Force—Colombia (USMATFC) headquarters would manage the day-to-day advisory operations for the USMILGP commander.

Placing military advisers with the rank of major or lieutenant colonel at the Colombian Army’s general headquarters is the next step. The ejército, or army, staff (E-staff) is equivalent to the U.S. general staff (G-staff). The U.S. Army should assign officers who are fluent in Spanish to support ejército staff sections. Like D-staff advisers, the officers would assist in manning the USMATFC headquarters.

The United States should also create a military intelligence analytical advisory effort for Colombia’s joint and army intelligence centers by assigning two to three U.S. service members at each level. Intelligence personnel (captains, lieutenants, warrant officers, or senior NCOs) should thoroughly understand how to develop collection plans; integrate intelligence preparation of the battlefield; and thoroughly employ all-source analysis, particularly the fusion of signals, imagery, and human intelligence. An effective military intelligence advisory effort should have experienced personnel with multiple tactical unit tours, combat experience, and even extensive training center rotational experience. Obviously, Spanish-language expertise remains key.
In the Colombian departments of Caqueta, Putumayo, and Amazonas, USMC and USN advisers could help in riverine warfare operations. The area is similar to the Mekong Delta region of the Republic of Vietnam, and the extensive river networks that crisscross the area are main FARC logistics and drug-trafficking routes. Because the absence of adequate pick-up and landing zones limits helicopter air assault operations’ effectiveness, the best way to interdict FARC movements is to attack river transportation. A standing naval infantry advisory presence would enhance the Colombian Navy.

In El Salvador U.S. military advisers were prohibited from accompanying their Salvadoran counterparts on combat operations—even though on some occasions, U.S. military advisers broke the rules and did just that. These occurrences were the exception and not the rule, and the USMILGP command did not endorse them. However, by not participating in field operations, U.S. advisers had difficulty establishing their reputations and remaining a viable part of operations. To enhance U.S. advisers’ influence and professional standing with their Colombian counterparts, U.S. advisers should accompany their host-nation counterparts when they take the field.

Even limited deployments would probably result in U.S. advisers being killed or wounded in action in numbers greater than those killed or wounded in El Salvador. Nonetheless, U.S. advisers would certainly be more effective, viable, and responsive, and Colombians might regard anything less than adviser participation in combat operations as a less-than-firm U.S. commitment to the war against drug trafficking and terrorism.

Showing U.S. Resolve

The advisory program functioned reasonably well throughout the Salvadoran conflict, fulfilled its intent, and directly affected the war’s outcome. U.S. military personnel—

- Were present at all major combat unit headquarters.
- Assisted in unit operations planning.
- Provided tactical intelligence analysis.
- Developed individual and unit training programs.
- Acted as subject matter experts in support of ESAR commanders and staffs.

The U.S. ambassador or the USMILGP commander could count on trained professional U.S. military personnel to observe and report on events in the war zone.

In El Salvador, the physical presence of U.S. military personnel was proof of a firm U.S. commitment to support a besieged government. Salvadoran soldiers saw the evidence of the U.S. commitment when America’s fighting men stood beside them. No other type of security assistance could have replaced this concrete example of U.S. resolve. Colombian soldiers will feel the same way. A former Colombian army commander responsible for Plan Colombia counterdrug and combat operations said, “Your [U.S. military advisers]’ presence is yet another indicator of your support. Your presence and support are indicators of your confidence in our operations. Your physical presence here—eating and sleeping, and sharing the war effort—demonstrates your trust in our ability to protect the force, as we prosecute the mission.”

A robust U.S. military advisory program might not bring the Colombian war to a negotiated settlement as it did in El Salvador, nor will it ensure an ultimate military victory for the Colombian military; however, it can buy time to achieve victory by preventing the destruction of Colombia’s political, economic, and social infrastructure by an armed, well-organized criminal group. If this safeguards U.S. national interests in Latin America, then the mission is worth executing. **MR**

**NOTES**

3. Ibid., 70.
6. Ibid.
7. The authors obtained the views expressed through their discussions with Latin American military counterparts. The perspective on the regional threat from FARC and its foreign ties is in direct contrast to the view that the Latin American area is a safe, benign environment posing no immediate threat to the United States and its national interests.
9. Plan Colombia’s objectives are to promote the peace process, combat the narcotics industry, revitalize the Colombian economy, and strengthen the democratic pillars of Colombian society. For more information, see on-line at <www.state.gov/p/wha/fs/2001/1042/htm>, accessed 25 February 2004.
10. MG Mario Montoya Uribe, Colombian Army, former Commander, JTF South, interview with the authors, Tres Esquinas, Caqueta Department, Colombia, July 2001.
The Significance of Conventional Deterrence in Latin America

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The armed forces of Latin America must determine their new roles in a changing environment of new threats and opportunities. Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru have been searching for their strategic destinies in a world that grows more conflict-ridden yet interdependent each day.

An advance toward real integration is desirable because that is how countries create synergies that bring them out of prostration and underdevelopment. Concrete integrating forces exist, but progress is slow because of problems arising from historic mistrust, asymmetrical economies, and political instabilities. Strategic documents show that these countries prefer conventional (classical) deterrence as the political and strategic model of choice, but the documents raise questions.

Pure and simple deterrence is more than just an adequate political and strategic model; it can be the motive for an arms race. Reconciling cooperation with deterrence is difficult. Cooperation and deterrence are each other’s opposites.¹

What is Deterrence?

When French General André Beaufre published An Introduction to Strategy and later Deterrence and Strategy in the early 1960s, his insight greatly influenced deterrence-theory analysis within international-relations circles.² B.H. Lidell Hart characterized An Introduction to Strategy as the most complete strategy treatise published in that generation. The Vatican analyzed the papers extensively at the fourth session of Vatican Council II in 1966 and later commented on them in the “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World.”³

Beaufre defined nuclear deterrence as the only kind of deterrence that produces the effect it seeks—to avoid or to end war—as the Cold War demonstrated. The following facts confirm Beaufre’s assertion:

- The United States destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki with two atomic bombs, which led to Japan’s surrender. Atomic weapons were outlawed, but the use of conventional arms continued.
- Nuclear proliferation has been slow, but the phenomenon of global terrorism and nuclear development in countries like North Korea could end this situation.
- Wars have continued throughout the world despite conventional deterrence.

Understanding what deterrence is, however, is complicated. Deterrence is often confused with the desire to avoid aggression, which is the natural attitude of a country that feels equal or inferior to another. Not having experienced war for a long time complicates the issue. These attitudes are themselves the consequences of deterrence.⁴ Nevertheless, deterrence as a methodology to achieve peace succeeds to the degree that a country has a sound strategic political model. Thus, deterrence is not random or casual; it is the result of concrete actions.
With a certain amount of regularity, Latin American countries profess that because there have been no wars for a long time there has been a successful execution of deterrence. This argument is debatable. There are innumerable causes that have effectively prevented conflicts, such as the presence and intervention of international bodies or of a great power; economics; lack of internal support . . . and so on.

Some fundamental requirements of deterrence are the physical capability to inflict damage, the ability to demonstrate power, and credibility. A country only obtains credibility through the political will to employ force. The political will to use force is the breath of life of deterrence. If the will does not exist, a potential adversary will perceive this and render the other two requirements—the ability to demonstrate power and the capability to inflict damage—inert.

Deterrence has no “first name”—in the sense of being defensive or offensive. We should not attach adjectives such as “defensive” or “offensive” to the word “deterrence” because if deterrence is successful there will be no need for defensive or offensive action. Deterrence’s objective is secret, only for domestic consumption, or for later revelation by history. Since the politics of defense is by nature secret, what can a country do to demonstrate that it is not eager to attack another nation-state or to gain objectives in foreign territories?

Deterrence is an “effect.” Its results depend on the opinion the opponent has of his adversary’s capability to win. This explains why it is difficult to deter those who have different cultures or lifestyles. French General Eric de la Maisonneuve asked, “How can we deter the Liberian gangs, the Khmer Rouge, or Somali clans?” Weapons, whether conventional or nuclear, do not intimidate such groups.

In Deterrence and Strategy, Beaufre sets forth the precepts on which a strategy of deterrence is based. Because he developed his work in the context of the bipolar world of the Cold War where the threat of nuclear war was effective, he states, “No explanation for the current strategic situation is satisfactory without a definition of the nuclear situation; no definition of the nuclear situation is possible without knowledge of the laws that rule deterrence.”

The existence of a threat causes a psychological result and prevents adversaries from taking up arms. An adversary must measure the risk he runs if he unleashes a crisis, because the response will produce political, economic, social, and moral damage from which recovery will not be easy; material damage and psychological factors play a decisive role in deterrence.

Beaufre believed that military action should be avoided in a nuclear scenario and that victory should be won by paralyzing the adversary through indirect action. It is not simply a matter of terrifying the enemy; it is also a matter of hiding one’s own fear by executing those actions that show the opposite. This equilibrium-through-terror axiom ruled during the Cold War and prevented a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Maintaining the peace and the territorial status quo; limiting the intensity and extent of conflicts; and paralyzing the actions of the enemy are only possible through deterrence. If we take what Beaufre proffers and transfer it to current situations, we can clearly see that deterrence remains highly desirable.

For Beaufre, deterrence was above all the threat of nuclear war. The actions of the past 40 years prove him right. The atomic threat guaranteed peace better than conventional arms did. Of course Beaufre saw the problem principally from the French strategic viewpoint. He was not convinced by conventional deterrence: “The classical arms race creates instability, just as the nuclear race creates stability.” This might be true, but not in countries led by terrorists or fanatics possessed by messianic visions or that have no political or strategic discipline.

Beaufre’s thesis, that the threat of using atomic weapons is the only means for worldwide stabilization, is pessimistic. His pessimism lies in the contradictions between nuclear and conventional deterrence. When one party develops greater offensive capability than another, instability results.

Victory in a conventional war is unilateral; in a nuclear war, destruction is bilateral. The simple expectation of success by one party can unleash aggression in his adversary. Beaufre develops this idea in more detail in a theory called “the dialectic of the expectations of victory.”
Classical Deterrence

Beaufre’s thought is not restricted to a defense of nuclear deterrence. Elsewhere in his treatise he reflects on the possibility of combining nuclear deterrence with conventional deterrence. He summarizes his concept in this manner: “The nuclear and classical levels tied to each other, essentially with classic atomic weapons, brings to the latter the stability it lacks and returns to the former the elemental risk of instability that it needs in order to continue its role as the great stabilizer.”

Beaufre is saying that nuclear and conventional deterrence are “Siamese twins” because the instability the conventional mode provokes makes nuclear deterrence necessary, precisely in order to obtain stability. In sum, true deterrence is obtained only through nuclear deterrence. The Cold War proved this, and history provides not even one example of successful conventional deterrence.

A new, post-Cold War interpretation of deterrence in a globalized world is known as “persuasion.” Persuasion supersedes bilateralism or even the multilateralism of traditional deterrence. Persuasion is deterrence in all azimuths. Maisonneuve defines persuasion in *The Coming Violence? Essays on Modern Warfare*: “Persuasion is simultaneously the expression of a universal potentiality without the designation of an adversary, and a posture of neutrality that guarantees the absence of war between powers of the same level. . . Potentiality and neutrality that will lead, nevertheless, to intervening in one way or another to prevent a disturbance provoked by third parties.”

For Maisonneuve, the deterrence of persuasion is the foundation for a future strategy and the first argument for a renewal of collective security. The projection of security replaces the projection of force. Maisonneuve is proclaiming a strategy of prevention.

With a certain amount of regularity, Latin American countries profess that because there have been no wars for a long time there has been a successful execution of deterrence. This argument is debatable. There are innumerable causes that have effectively prevented conflicts, such as the presence and intervention of international bodies or of a great power; economics; lack of internal support; illegitimacy of causes; internal weakness of a state; and so on.

Strategic equilibrium of measurable and quantifiable nuclear materials is a factor in deterrence. No one doubts that this material should be quantified; it is important to measure its potential effects in combat, not in a vacuum. Classical war, with its many factors that relativize, potentialize, or reduce the use of arms, is complex. The concepts of friction, waste, multiplier effects, and other concepts have particular weight. While no one has experienced nuclear war, it is presumed that other variables govern it. The effect of arms in their absolute form is a “bonus.”

For countries with low or medium national power, however, the only solution seems to be to bet on classical deterrence—using conventional arms to prevent aggression. I believe such deterrence is uncertain and insecure and will only achieve success relative to how much of a rapid-action force is employed and who carries out the action.

The Armed Forces and Conventional Deterrence

Deterrence requires the capability to carry out effective conventional military operations with speed, force, and power, with adequate logistical support, and an efficient general staff that can make swift decisions. In opting for strategic deterrence, armed forces need to integrate deterrence into the political dimension by employing force, political stability, and economic development.

The first capability that armed forces need to achieve deterrence is an offensive capability. Armed forces should possess mechanized armor and infantry; aircraft with an active radius that permits the capacity to take out distant targets; and ships
Strategic equilibrium of measurable and quantifiable nuclear materials is a factor in deterrence. . . . For countries with low or medium national power, however, the only solution seems to be to bet on classical deterrence—using conventional arms to prevent aggression. I believe such deterrence is uncertain and insecure and will only achieve success relative to how much of a rapid-action force is employed and who carries out the action.

with an attack-and-destroy capability.

To have a deterrence capability, armed forces should also have social prestige and their society’s support, recognition, and respect. An aggressor might see a country whose armed forces project a poor public image as an easy target. Also, the prestige of defense institutions as seen by their own population is fundamental to achieving deterrence because it cultivates continuity and loyalty in a restless force.

In terms of conventional deterrence, the armies of developed countries tend to structure themselves as rapid-deployment forces (RDFs). The slogan of the now historic French RDF of “Far, Strong, and Fast” summarizes what a conventional deterrence strategy should be in order to achieve success. In effect, it is a question of instilling an appropriate level of fear in the adversary. To reach this objective, it is important to project unity with the ability to attack rapidly at the heart of the state—or better yet, its resources—with force and lethality. This type of conventional operation produces damage that is the closest to nuclear damage and is a sure and efficient method to neutralize an adversary. In the future, all states with a deterrence strategy will have to structure their armies to have some RDF-projection capability.

The Future of Conventional Deterrence

History has proven Beaufre right. Nuclear deterrence and its “equilibrium through terror” prevent conflicts. However, we cannot say the same for conventional deterrence. During the past 50 years, it has not been able to prevent wars. Deterrence conducted by classic military forces is onerous. Today’s forces, equipped with great technology and sophisticated armaments, are offensive forces. Deterrence comes through quality, not necessarily quantity, and through political stability, economic development, prestige, history, and an effective military.

Modern armies are projections of a state’s foreign policy and have three functions: the constitutional mission of defending territorial integrity: deterrence; and the projection of peace and stability. Added to these missions are others derived from so-called “new” threats, which each country must evaluate based on its particular situation.

The modernization of armed forces in Latin America will need a force design that can confront new strategic definitions. Depending on the strategic challenge, forces might vary from a few battalions to a number of brigades. Large units like divisions or corps are expensive and archaic. A military force must always support the strategy of deterrence. Large territorial armies do not necessarily possess a deterrence capability. Latin America, which is not likely to create a collective security system, should endeavor to achieve an environment of security based on mutual trust, bilateral or multilateral cooperation, and reduced military spending. 

NOTES

1. For more information see “Bases for a New Strategic Modality for Chile,” Armed Forces and Society Magazine (Flacso) (January-March 2001): 24-47.
4. Situations in countries that feel equal or inferior to others or that have not experienced war for a long time can be recognized only as “natural” deterrence or, in some cases, an event dependent on contingency deterrence.
5. Chile, Argentina, and Brazil clearly express the defensive objective that motivates them.
8. Ibid.
9. For a more in-depth study, see Beaufre.
10. Ibid., 42.
11. Ibid., 74.
12. Ibid., 86.
13. Ibid.
14. Edward N. Luttwak, Le Paradoxe de la Stratége (The paradox of strategy) (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1989), 245 and following pages. Deterrence in a 360-degree view is also known as deterrence in all azimuths. To be more linguistically precise, see Pedro Felipe Monlau and Joaquín Gil, eds., Etymological Dictionary of the Spanish Language (Buenos Aires, Argentina: 1946), 1,056. “Suadir” comes from the Latin word “suadere” or “to persuade.” From the word “suasus” comes “suasible” (“suasibilis”) and “suasorio” (“susreros”).
16. In 1982 and 1983, I worked on the “Regulation for the Computation of Army Potential in Chile” (publishing data not given). I can verify how difficult it is to evaluate qualitative factors in military units, where quantitative factors (having measurable information) and qualitative factors (complex and difficult to estimate) were separated. A great difference exists between nuclear and conventional valuation. Most of the countries that I am familiar with compute forces, including large units, but do not estimate qualitative factors because they are subjective and difficult to quantify.
Improving Strategic Leadership

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The contemporary operational environment (COE): force design; political and military complexity on the battlefield; joint and combined operations; and mission execution have caused changes that require leaders who can understand strategic implications earlier in their careers than has been required in the past. Therefore, the U.S. Army must begin educating officers for strategic leadership positions earlier in the leader development process. The context within which the U.S. Army executes its responsibility under U.S. Code, Title 10, “Armed Forces,” has expanded in an unprecedented fashion.

The increase in the number, variety, and complexity of missions places a greater demand on the Army than ever before and creates great ambiguity in the methodology for successful mission accomplishment. Therefore, the Army must redefine its traditional paradigms of leader development associated with traditional echelons of execution. In fact, the boundaries between echelons of leadership have become so blurred that they overlap almost to the point of invisibility.

The need to develop tactical leaders into strategic leaders and to empower them to lead in such a challenging environment has never been more apparent. Strategic leaders responsible for large organizations, thousands of people, and vast resources cannot rely on lower level leadership skills for future success.

The Army Strategic Leadership Course is a giant step toward developing strategic leaders who can effectively manage change. The course could expand its current target audience of brigadier and major generals to include former brigade commanders, division chiefs of staff, corps G3s, and other senior colonels.

Developing strategic leadership skills using a set of finite leader competencies with broad application as a foundation is necessary to provide a common direction that transcends all leadership levels. Broad competencies span boundaries and provide continuity for leaders when they must function at multiple levels simultaneously. The Army needs competent, confident, adaptive thinkers to exercise battle command. Senior leaders must develop the skills and confidence necessary to apply military means in a strategic environment of global economies and instant communications.

Leaders must acquire operational- and strategic-level skills earlier in their careers to successfully meet future challenges. The Army must begin strategic leader development sooner to prepare leaders to understand and execute successful strategic leadership and to accomplish the mission.

The COE is now more complex and unpredictable, and the future operational environment (FOE)
promises to be equally so. The ambiguity of contemporary crises and military events demands that the Army begin developing officers early in their careers who can—

- Predict second- and third-order effects.
- Negotiate.
- Understand globalization.
- Build consensus.
- Analyze complex and ambiguous situations.
- Think innovatively and critically.
- Communicate effectively.

The COE has been becoming more complex and unpredictable for some time. An asymmetrical environment or a noncontiguous battlespace was as much an experience during the Vietnam war as it is in the post-11 September 2001 world. The Army needs an officer corps that can operate in any environment, not just the current one. The Army must prepare for future environments as well. General officers clearly need such skills, but company commanders and field grade officers must also be aware of the strategic implications of their actions in a complex COE.

Operational assignments are the norm. Many who become generals have only one nonoperational assignment, which allows little time for reflection and assimilation of skills. Brigadier General David Huntoon said, “We are rushing officers through promotion gates too fast to ensure they are amassing the experience and expertise necessary to be able to summon up the instincts, insights, foresight, and wisdom essential to success in a complex battlespace.”

**Why Change is Required**

Army culture contains many challenges and obstacles that hamper the development of strategic leaders and can sometimes be a double-edged sword—facilitating efficient tactical military operations while stifling the communication necessary to operate effectively at the strategic level. The traditional hierarchy often teaches officers to protect their turf and to stovepipe, filter, and control information.

- At the strategic level, communication requires—
  - Sharing information, not controlling it.
  - Open dialogue, not rank-determined discussions.
- Flexible perspective-taking, not turf protection.

The Army’s leadership training for preparing officers for tactical or operational roles is generally sound, but its training for preparing leaders for their strategic role is incomplete at best. Some leaders consider it unsoldierly to have a strategic focus.

Many officers who attend senior service colleges never emerge from the realm of tactics. Some never develop leadership skills other than direct ones. Division commanders and assistant division commanders supervise the tactical operations of the commands in which they serve on a daily basis. Developing strategic awareness does not become a top priority until late in an officer’s career. Few, if any, quality exercises exist in the Army’s curricula that involve strategic issues for company and field grade officers.

The Army’s rapid operational pace provides few opportunities for improvement in subjects that are not of immediate utility, but the COE requires unit leaders to shift rapidly from a tactical context into a strategic context and employ their units with equal skill. Can we afford to continue this pattern when we know future doctrine will require this ability earlier?
The ambiguity of contemporary crises and military events demands that the Army begin developing officers early in their careers who can predict second- and third-order effects; negotiate; understand globalization; build consensus; analyze complex and ambiguous situations; think innovatively and critically; and communicate effectively.

Strategic leadership requires understanding all three levels of war and how the military functions as part of a larger whole. Consider the current Global War on Terrorism. CSA General Peter J. Schoomaker reinforced the idea of transcending military boundaries when he said, “We have harvested the opposition [to the Taliban] to do our will in Afghanistan.” His concept is a keen insight into the environment—one that far exceeds what is taught at any war college.

The ambiguity that characterizes recent conflicts demonstrates the need for skills that far exceed simple tactical-level leadership. Given the far-reaching military, economic, political, and diplomatic implications of the operations, no military center of gravity exists that requires leaders to operate at all levels while simultaneously maintaining a strategic perspective.

The Army generally promotes and selects for senior command those who succeed at the direct level of leadership. The implicit and somewhat tenuous assumption of this selection process is that those who are successful at the direct level of leadership will acquire, as they rise to higher echelons of command, the requisite skills and experiences for strategic leadership.

A review of general officers’ resumés reveals that they often have little time for assignments that provide opportunities for quality reflection and study. Operational assignments are the norm. Many who become generals have only one nonoperational assignment, which allows little time for reflection and assimilation of skills. Brigadier General David Huntoon said, “We are rushing officers through promotion gates too fast to ensure they are amassing the experience and expertise necessary to be able to summon up the instincts, insights, foresight, and wisdom essential to success in a complex battlespace.” Most colonels serving as executive officers, as well as general officers serving on the Army staff, do not gain the perspective that colonels on the joint staff or in the Department of Defense gain. Officers whose duties take them into daily contact with people from the Department of State, National Security Council, CIA, and NATO develop broader perspectives and a nuanced understanding of strategic issues.

Coupled with education, experience in the interagency process is increasingly useful for senior leaders. Operations with increased strategic and political implications, as well as joint, interagency, and multinational execution early in an officer’s career, will become the norm. This suggests the need to change how to manage midlevel assignments. The Army must provide experiences to those officers most likely to rise to positions of strategic responsibility. The Army might also reconsider what assignments are nominative and how much latitude branches have in assignments to develop future strategic leaders.

Clearly the Army must carefully manage the assignment process to ensure the development of requisite strategic leadership skills. The Army can improve the assignment process by identifying and carefully managing worthwhile assignments during appropriate windows of opportunity. Developing higher level skills places increased importance on educating Army leaders at all levels in both the institutional and operational Army in subjects that augment strategic leadership skills.

Improving Army officers’ strategic leadership skills should begin with accession and precommissioning and continue through the general officer
level. Becoming a competent general officer takes a lifetime of education, training, and experience. The Army’s goal should be to develop an officer corps that has the requisite skills and has learned to correctly perform actions crucial to strategic leadership.

Much anecdotal and systematic evidence suggests that some strategic leaders engage too readily in micromanagement, indicating over-reliance on the direct leadership mode. Micromanagement stifles creativity and can create an environment that rewards permission-seeking, relegating such maxims as “be bold” and “take risks” to mere rhetoric. Educating officers early on about strategic leadership will make the requisite transition to it more likely.

**Improving Strategic Leadership**

The Army’s current officer education system begins the development of strategic leaders at the U.S. Army War College (AWC) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has also added a track of study for strategists. Given the changing context within which the Army fulfills its responsibility to the Nation and the inherent requirements in this new operating environment, developing strategic leaders at the War College level comes too late.

The leader development process requires progressive training and education that produces leaders who possess appropriate skills at the appropriate time, and clearly, the sooner strategic leadership development begins, the better for the officer, the Army, and the Nation.

The Army currently does not have a concerted methodology to develop strategic leaders, although it does have some excellent institutional courses. Unfortunately, the courses are based on past paradigms that wait for leaders to achieve certain developmental gates before training them for the skills associated with the next level of performance and that rely on success at lower levels of performance to predict future success.

Filling the gap in education and training that exists today will require paradigm-breaking, multilevel leadership skill development. The Army can better use education to leverage skill development. The Army can require that officer assignments exercise and develop strategic leadership skills. The Army and the leader can use self-development to reinforce skill development.

**Institutional opportunities.** The Army should strengthen strategic leadership instruction in Army schools and courses and not limit this effort to general officers or AWC courses. The Army should introduce elements of strategic-thinking skills during Intermediate Level Education and expand them at the Army War College. Curricula should be periodically reviewed based on feedback and on a changing operating environment. A review of the training available through the General Officer Management Office (GOMO) shows that there is useful, focused tactical- and operational-level training but little strategic-level work. The current GOMO training message offers 11 courses, but only three touch on strategic leadership issues:

1. The Brigadier General Training Course (BGTC) introduces new general officers to the general officer experience, although discussions about strategic leadership skills are anecdotal. Three days is not enough time to train a strategic leader. BGTC could easily add a session focused on strategic leadership.
In Bosnia and other peace operations, even junior officers face challenges in which their tactical decisions are likely to have immediate strategic consequences. Therefore, they need to develop strategic awareness that lower levels of institutional education and training do not offer.

The Capstone Course is 6 weeks long, but much of that time is spent visiting commands worldwide. The course offers no true strategic-level leadership training other than a 3-day exercise at the Joint Warfighting Center at Suffolk, Virginia. Any strategic wisdom general officers gain from their 15 days of overseas travel is serendipitous at best and depends on the senior mentor and the balance struck between tourism and concentrated study time.

The Army Strategic Leadership Course is a giant step toward developing strategic leaders who can effectively manage change. The course could expand its current target audience of brigadier and major generals to include former brigade commanders, division chiefs of staff, corps G3s, and other senior colonels.

Other opportunities. General officers can also acquire knowledge by participating in strategic-level programs at the Kennedy School of Government or the Fletcher Conference. Joint, multinational, and interagency war games also provide useful education and training. The Army should expand opportunities to participate in these programs where possible. The Center for Creative Leadership seminars, a mandatory program for all brigadier generals, concentrates on strategic-level issues. Most attendees are direct- and organizational-level leaders in civilian industry.

Opportunities to partner with academic institutions that offer strategic educational programs have increased since 11 September 2001. The links to Georgetown, American, George Washington, and other Universities and to the think tanks in Washington, D.C., also provide useful opportunities. GOMO’s partnership with Syracuse and Johns Hopkins Universities through the National Security Leadership Course is a good example of collaborative efforts. Quality distance-education technology allows users similar opportunities, to a greater or lesser extent, worldwide. Still, opportunities for senior officers to attend such courses in the face of the extraordinary operational pace in every command are difficult to arrange.

In the past, fellowships offered opportunities for select officers to gain a strategic perspective. The contemporary operating environment requires that strategic leaders understand the many instruments of national power and the asymmetrical nature of current and future threats. The Army must overcome a bias against education in both teaching and learning in order to make quality time for reflection. The Army should consider increasing the quantity and quality of officers in educational positions and in its schools and allow a select few to serve for extended periods as master educators. According to Huntoon, “There is also a need to provide greater opportunity for our field grade officers to complete a focused master’s to doctorate-level education. The latter can be provided by either the Army’s senior institutional centers or through quality civilian graduate centers, through resident, distance-learning, or a hybrid means.” If the Army is going to develop more and better strategic leaders, it must invest and commit to changing Army culture. The institutional Army plays a critical role in preparing strategic leaders.

Operational opportunities. Operational opportunities should include strategic staff rides and strategic training and evaluation, such as a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) evaluation for nondivisional unit or corps commanding generals. BCTPs and the combat training centers could include a strategic planning phase for division and assistant division commanders. The forum, which would be a general officer-level forum run by senior retired officers, Senior Executive Service members, or other subject matter experts, would compel participants to learn strategic thought well in advance.
of warfighting and mission-rehearsal exercises for operational deployments.

General officer-level workshops on strategic and operational challenges around the world could become a norm. We can do this in the new general officer pre-command course (PCC) at Fort Leavenworth. Staff rides that include a consideration of the strategic dimension of such operations as Normandy or the Ardennes would also be beneficial. Officers could also do some strategic-level work during battalion and brigade command PCCs as well.

To expose leaders to the strategic environment, we can leverage internships, fellowships, and assignments to joint staffs or the National Security Council staff. Such assignments would allow officers some time to study and reflect in a strategic environment. For this to work, the Army must make a cultural shift to balance such assignments with traditional operational assignments. The Army must also reward or recognize those who serve in positions that cultivate the broad perspectives that are necessary to acquire strategic leadership skills.

**Self-developmental opportunities.** Self-developmental opportunities should include directed readings or functional modules delivered by distance or distributed learning. Self-development is a critical foundation for lifelong learning. Self-development is a primary means to complement institutional or operational opportunities and to develop critical, creative thinkers who can serve as leaders managing strategic change.

Current military professional reading lists include few books about strategic leadership. Strategic leaders should refine their reading lists to include the best available material on the strategic environment and leadership as well as books that discuss the moral dimension at the strategic level. Army leaders should encourage dialogue by publishing articles or writing books on strategic leadership.

Given the complexity of strategic leadership, a holistic approach for improving how we develop strategic leaders is important. We must also include joint, interagency, and multinational perspectives. Generals Tommie Franks and Schoomaker believe we should give more value to joint assignments. Huntoon said, “We must break the Army-centric view. Army strategic leaders need to think asymmetrically. Future missions are dynamic; sometimes the threat of force is more useful, other times it is not.”

The Army needs leaders who understand this vision and can convey it to their subordinates, to the American people, and to the U.S. Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. Schoomaker recommends changes in operational assignments and education that will change the Army culture and “allow for subordinates to be creative.”

Developing an officer corps capable of strategic leadership involves accepting a shift to **skill development** complemented by **experience** and **reflection** and to acquiring strategic leadership skills through the education and experiences gained from specific career patterns. Developing enduring competencies rather than teaching perishable skills is the key. To develop officers capable of strategic leadership, the “first of the critical areas to be examined is the identification of strategic leader skill sets.” Developing these skills will produce officers who are confident, doctrinally competent, cognitively resilient, and comfortable with ambiguity. After fully identifying leadership competencies, many of which already exist in leadership doctrine, the next step is to institute ways to develop them, such as embedding skill-development programs throughout the officer education system and in the operational Army.

Officers need to know that the Army expects them to develop strategic-leadership skills early in their
careers. The value of the broad-based competency approach to skill-development is that competency will transcend leadership levels. When the Army trains junior officers to be conceptually competent, they will understand that the Army expects them to display conceptual competency throughout their careers.

Long-term solutions might focus on providing appropriate educational opportunities throughout an officer’s time in service. Educational opportunities that allow officers to reflect on past experiences are valuable and might include teaching as well as student assignments.13

**Serving the Nation**

The COE/FOE and the future Army will need doctrinally competent leaders who possess conceptual as well as interpersonal competence. Effective strategic leaders realized this long ago. George C. Marshall, reflecting on his appointment as the Chief of Staff of the Army, wrote, “It became clear to me that at the age of 58, I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in the military manuals or on the battlefield. In this position I am a political soldier and will have to put my training in rapping out orders and making snap decisions on the back burner, and have to learn the arts of persuasion and guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills.”14

One aspect of skill acquisition that many agree on is that waiting until one becomes a general officer to acquire strategic leadership skills might be too late. Indeed, developing conceptual and interpersonal competence must begin much earlier. However, assignments that include broadening educational opportunities and providing time for reflective thinking are key to strategic leader development; developing strategic leaders for tomorrow will require change.

To transform and succeed in the COE/FOE, the Army must be adaptive. To improve strategic leadership, Army leaders must venture forward boldly. Leading change is always difficult, but the Army’s success depends on moving forward. The Army must challenge and change part of its culture.

The Army must view strategic leadership as a subject worthy of study, learning, understanding, and applying. It must embark on a path that includes developing strategic leadership skills throughout an officer’s career. Army Transformation provides this opportunity. Now is the time, as the Army transforms the officer education system, to introduce strategic concepts and leadership competencies earlier in an officer’s career and more frequently in the courses.

An officer corps whose education is based on developing confidence and enduring competencies will lead an Army able to win in any environment. These officers will provide a full complement of self-aware, adaptive strategic leaders who are constantly improving themselves and always ready to serve the Nation. **MR**

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**NOTES**


5. Michael D. Pearlman, in Warmaking and American Democracy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 25, says, “At best, said the commandant of the National War College in 1953, the Armed Forces ‘presume there is something unsoldierly about university Press of Kansas, 1999), 20, says, “At best, said the commandant of the National War College in 1990, the Armed Forces ‘presume there is something unsoldierly about

6. GEN David Huntoon, “General Officer Strategic Development,” Information paper, 4 October 2001. Few officers have spent significant time in joint and multinational assignments that could broaden their perspective and give them the opportunity to learn how the Department of Defense, the Executive branch, and foreign militaries operate. The Army does not always consider officers who have spent considerable time in joint assignments as being as ‘competitive’ as officers who remain in Army billets. The Army must value their experiences in tangible ways.

7. COL James Greer to LTG James C. Riley, E-mail, “Train (Training) strategic leaders,” 12 July 2002.

8. Huntoon.

9. Ibid.; Joseph Gerard Brennan and Admiral James Bond Stockdale gave a series of lectures known as the Stockdale Course for senior military leaders at the Naval War College, Annapolis, Maryland. The result was “The Foundations of Moral Obligation,” a useful work on ethics and morality for strategic leaders. Two other notable, relevant titles include Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (NY: Basic Books, 2000) and Paul Christopher’s The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues (Paramus, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1998), which deal directly with moral issues related to the Army’s public charter—the ethics of killing.


11. Schoomaker, 29 November 2001. The idea that we need to provide more education as well as training experiences has broad support.


13. GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower often noted that his experiences as a teacher helped him prepare for high levels of leadership. Generals Tommie Franks, Eric K. Shinseki, and Montgomery C. Meigs had similar educational and leadership experiences with opportunities for quality reflection—that have helped them develop the requisite skills for successful strategic leadership.

Since it became an independent nation in 1948, Israel has fought six wars against its Arab neighbors. The 1948-1949 conflict, called the War for Independence, demonstrated that the new nation could stand on its own despite violent opposition to its existence. In the 1956 war in the Sinai, Israel proved that a preemptive strike could delay an enemy’s preparation for war for years.

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) reached its apogee during the Six-Day War of June 1967 and demonstrated the value of intelligence and planning. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 revealed the dangers of Israeli overconfidence. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon 9 years later produced internal dissent and conflict between military and political objectives. But Israel’s longest war, the War of Attrition, fought between Israel and Egypt from 1967 to 1970, is hardly remembered at all.1 When people do remember it, they usually remember it only as being a prelude to the Yom Kippur War.2

The Six-Day War resulted in Israel’s occupying the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt sought to force Israel to withdraw from the territories conquered in the Six-Day War; Israel sought to retain its foothold on the Sinai Peninsula to prevent an Egyptian or pan-Arab offensive and to achieve a regional cease-fire. Combat operations were generally limited to cross-border shellings, raids, ambushes, naval and air strikes, terror, and sabotage.3

The War of Attrition was Egypt’s first attempt to force Israel to recognize that its continued occupation of the Sinai Peninsula was not in its best interests. The war was also a testing ground for Egypt and Israel to gauge the effectiveness of weapons that they would use again in 1973.4 The war profoundly affected Egypt’s and Israel’s perceptions of each other’s combat effectiveness and deterrent power, which in turn, had far-reaching effects in the next struggle.

Egyptian President Gamal Abd el-Nasser’s purpose in initiating the War of Attrition was to compel Israel to withdraw from the east bank of the Suez Canal and, eventually, from the Sinai Peninsula. Nasser based his decision to begin hostilities on an analysis of Israeli strengths and weaknesses. In his view, Israel’s one notable weakness was a small population relative to Egypt’s. Because of this, Nasser concluded that Israel could absorb fewer casualties than Egypt could. He also knew that Israel did not have a large professional army but relied largely on citizen-soldiers. Not only would casualties significantly affect Israel’s economy, so would mobilization for war.

Nasser’s strategy was to inflict a level of casualties that would be unacceptable to the Israeli people or to escalate the conflict so Israel would have to mobilize for an extended period of time. Nasser assumed that political and economic considerations would compel Israel to withdraw its armed forces behind its pre-1967 borders.
Anticipating Egypt’s strategy, Israel changed its strategy. Following the Six-Day War, the Israeli high command devised a way to defend its newly occupied territory in Sinai against an Egyptian crossing of the Canal. Major General (MG) Israel Tal and MG Ariel Sharon proposed a system of defense in depth. Sharon wrote, “[M]aintaining an Israeli presence at the western edge of the Sinai did not mean we had to sit down along the entire length of the Canal. We could carefully choose one or two locations, on the Great Bitter Lake, for example, where we would not be directly under their guns. . . . I proposed that we should base our defense on the natural line of hills and dunes that runs parallel to the Canal [5 to 8] miles to the east and dominates the Canal plain. A second line with our mobile reserves should be established [15 to 20] miles from the Canal, where the mountains begin and the Mitla and Gidi passes cut toward the interior. Between the first line and the Canal we should run mobile patrols, keeping on the move constantly and unpredictably so that we would not be sitting ducks for ambushes, snipers, and artillery.”

**Nasser aimed to take armor out of the equation by striking the Israeli front along the Suez Canal with massive artillery bombardments and commando raids. He hoped the physical barrier of the Canal would limit Israel’s response to these attacks. If Israel wanted to strike back, it would have to cross the waterway, risking heavy casualties, possibly provoking Soviet intervention.**

Nasser also proposed to turn the IDF’s major strength—its doctrine of flexible mobility—against itself by forcing Israel to use unfamiliar tactics. Israel’s successes in 1956 and 1967 largely resulted from Israel’s ability to rapidly bring decisive force to bear on enemy centers of gravity, relying heavily on the use of armor.

During the War of Attrition, Nasser aimed to take armor out of the equation by striking the Israeli front along the Suez Canal with massive artillery bombardments and commando raids. He hoped the physical barrier of the Canal would limit Israel’s response to these attacks. If Israel wanted to strike back, it would have to cross the waterway, risking heavy casualties, possibly provoking Soviet intervention, and further lengthening its already overextended lines of communication.

**The Bar-Lev Line**

In spite of these and similar arguments, MG Yeshayahu Gavish and IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Chaim Bar-Lev overruled Sharon and Tal. Gavish and Bar-Lev advocated building a long series of static fortifications, subsequently known as the Bar-Lev Line, on the east bank of the Canal. Most Israeli soldiers were not familiar with this type of defense and had never used barbed wire, mines, or sandbags. The defense also nullified Israel’s advantage in mobility and made the War of Attrition possible.

Nasser’s strategy appeared sound, but it did not work. Thousands of Egypt’s artillery shells impacted Israeli positions on the Bar-Lev Line, but even as Israeli casualties mounted, no general cry for an end to the war went up in Israel. Nasser had underestimated Israel’s will to fight. Although a group of high school students wrote to Prime Minister Golda Meir suggesting that the government was too content with the idea of keeping the nation in a state of war, and mobilize for an extended period of time. Nasser assumed that political and economic considerations would compel Israel to withdraw its armed forces behind its pre-1967 borders.

Nasser also proposed to turn the IDF’s major strength—its doctrine of flexible mobility—against itself by forcing Israel to use unfamiliar tactics. Israel’s successes in 1956 and 1967 largely resulted from Israel’s ability to rapidly bring decisive force to bear on enemy centers of gravity, relying heavily on the use of armor.
that it was difficult to reconcile their upcoming mandatory military service with the notion of “ein breira” (Hebrew for “no choice”), Israel’s students proved willing to endure the War of Attrition. The conflict’s costs never became a political issue.9

New Weapons

The War of Attrition was an opportunity for both countries to try out their newest weapons. Egypt had received hundreds of Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks to replace the T-34s and T-54s lost during the Six-Day War, but the war was not to be one of large-scale tank battles. As it happened, the T-55’s most noteworthy appearance occurred when the Israelis crossed the Canal with a unit of six captured T-55s, thus attacking Egyptian positions with Egyptian tanks.10

Naval technology played only a minor role in the conflict, although it did have major repercussions for the future of warfare. On 21 October 1967, two Egyptian missile boats, anchored inside Port Said harbor, launched three Soviet-supplied Styx surface-to-surface missiles at the Israeli destroyer Eilat, the flagship of the Israeli Navy. Eilat was patrolling off the Sinai coast when all three missiles struck and sank it, killing 47 and wounding 90. This was an important event in naval history; it was the first time a surface-launched missile sank a ship. The attack prefigured the missile boat battles of the Yom Kippur War and the Exocet attacks on British shipping in the Falklands War a decade later.11

The War of Attrition also marked the first use of drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance. An Israeli major serving in IDF intelligence suggested mounting cameras on remote-controlled toy aircraft, which were too small to hit with antiaircraft fire, and sending them over the Canal as reconnaissance aircraft. Israel purchased three such drones from the United States for $850, and trial runs conducted over Israeli positions demonstrated the concept’s validity. When the first UAV flew over Egyptian positions, the Egyptians did not even fire at it, and it returned with excellent photographs. Advanced versions of these vehicles have since become important to the intelligence-gathering process.12

Evaluating Technology on the Battlefield

Egyptian and Israeli air forces used the War of Attrition to conduct major evaluations of technology. The Egyptian Air Force (EAF) accepted over 100 MiG-21s and hundreds of other aircraft from the Soviet Union to replace Egyptian aircraft that Israel had destroyed on the ground in its preemptive strike.

[Major General Sharon wrote that] “[M]aintaining an Israeli presence at the western edge of the Sinai did not mean we had to sit down along the entire length of the Canal…. We should base our defense on the natural line of hills and dunes that runs parallel to the Canal [5 to 8] miles to the east and dominates the Canal plain. A second line with our mobile reserves should be established [15 to 20] miles from the Canal, where the mountains begin and the Mitla and Gidi passes cut toward the interior.”
The crew of an SA-3 Goa surface to air missile rushes to their station during a training exercise.

IAF pilots flew in below the level of Egyptian radar and took out the SA-2s along with the Egyptian artillery positions. Nasser begged the Soviets for help. Reluctantly the Soviets sent additional SA-2s, batteries of the newer SA-3s, and radar-guided antiaircraft batteries, which Soviet soldiers networked and operated.

Still, neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis gave up. In fact, both sides escalated the strikes. Nasser begged the Soviets for help. Reluctantly the Soviets sent additional SA-2s, batteries of the newer SA-3s, and radar-guided antiaircraft batteries, which Soviet soldiers networked and operated. The batteries were effective against targets flying at any altitude and were sufficiently dispersed so that Israel could not easily attack them from the air. When Israel sent its new F-4 Phantoms to neutralize these batteries, Egypt shot two of the Phantoms down in a single day.

The United States reacted by sending Israel more Phantoms and Skyhawks as well as jamming pods for the Phantoms. The pods, designed to confuse the SA-2s’ radar, worked—but only against the SA-2s. During the first raid in which Israel used the jamming pods, SA-3s hit one Phantom and shot down another. Still, Israel destroyed 4 of the 10 batteries it targeted.

Throughout the war, the Soviets blamed Egyptian losses on operator cowardice or failure to understand Soviet training. They chided the Egyptians for having lost numerous pieces of high-technology military equipment to the Israelis, including T-55 and T-62 tanks and a P-12 radar. In July 1970, the Soviet Union decided to teach Israel a lesson by patrolling the Canal Zone with MiG-21s. The Israelis responded by shooting down five Soviet MiGs on 30 July. Three of the aircraft that scored MiG kills were older Mirages. Israeli planes were not better than Russian aircraft, but IAF pilots were better than their Russian counterparts.

Neither side could afford continued escalation. Israel had humiliated the Soviets, but the Soviets could not afford to raise the stakes against one of the United States’s major allies. Similarly, Israel had gained a tactical victory but could not afford to pressure the Soviets further. Egypt and Israel accepted a cease-fire, which went into effect on 8 August 1970.

A Hollow Victory

Both Egypt and Israel claimed victory, and there were arguments to be made for both sides’ claims. Although Nasser’s purpose in prosecuting the war...
had been to compel Israel to withdraw from the Canal Zone, at war’s end, Israelis remained on the east bank, secure in the knowledge that they had suffered far fewer casualties than had the Egyptians. Still, despite the high cost of human life, Egypt felt it had won at least a moral victory.

Unlike in 1967, when Egyptian troops had fought disgracefully, the Egyptian Army and Air Force had stood their ground against the superbly trained IAF, and the average Egyptian regained some lost pride. This was thought to have been an important factor when the Egyptian Army invaded Sinai 3 years later.

Almost everyone in Israel claimed victory, but the real problem for the Israelis was what they had failed to learn. For example, they clung to the concept of static defense, despite the fact that static defense had proven costly and had not stopped Egyptian shelling. This fault in Israeli military doctrine was further exposed 3 years later when the Bar-Lev Line failed to prevent a massive Egyptian crossing along the entire length of the Canal.

Also, when the war ended, the IAF had less command of the air than when the war had begun. The Egyptians and their Soviet allies had built a defensive missile umbrella. After the war ended, they moved the umbrella to the edge of the Canal where it would be more effective against the IAF. The umbrella disrupted the strategic bombing and interdiction that were normal parts of Israel’s doctrine of taking the war to the enemy as quickly as possible, it also impeded the progress of Israeli ground forces because the IDF favored close air support rather than artillery support.

Israel believed it had won the war and assumed the Egyptians knew they had lost it. Israeli belief that Egypt would not fight again until it had an air force equal to Israel’s. This, of course, was not the case. Israel’s mistaken conclusions led it to become complacent, which allowed Egypt to surprise Israel with an attack in October 1973. Former Commander of the IAF Ezer Weizman wrote, “It is no more than foolishness to claim that we won the War of Attrition. On the contrary, for all their casualties, it was the Egyptians who got the best of it. . . . We, with our own hands, smoothed Israel’s path to the Yom Kippur War.”

NOTES


4. The phrase borrowed the name “The War of Attrition” on the conflict.


9. Sharon with Chanoff, 231-32; Shlaim, 294-95.


15. Ibid., 273-76.

16. Ibid., 281-88.

17. Ibid., 292-97; Nordeen, 118.


Constitutional Covert Operations
A Force Multiplier for Preemption

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The first and best way to secure America’s homeland is to attack the enemy where he hides and plans.
—President George W. Bush

The United States is the most powerful nation on earth—the most powerful nation in the history of nations. From ancient Greece through Roman times to the age of Pax Britannica, no nation-state has influenced the world as greatly as the United States has.

Much of the power America possesses directly results from its military capabilities and its willingness to use them to protect its national interests. The United States won World Wars I and II, used the first atomic weapons, and stared down the Soviet Union’s numerical superiority in conventional and nuclear weapons with high technology.

America continues to possess the largest and most technologically superior fighting force in history. At the tip of this powerful spear is a galaxy of satellites and sophisticated intelligence and information systems poised to deliver the latest in military, economic, and political intelligence.

The events of 11 September 2001 demonstrate that a new breed of enemy exists—sinister conspirators who use asymmetric warfare to bring death, destruction, and terror to Americans at home and abroad. To defeat this new generation of foes, the United States must alter its geostrategy and relax its self-imposed constraints on the use of U.S. military, political, and social power. The United States can no longer rely on strategic nuclear deterrence, standing conventional armies, and fleets of carrier battle groups arrayed around the globe to ensure its citizens’ safety and liberty. The international terrorist threat demands a proactive approach—preemptive action against terrorist groups and all nations that sustain and shelter them.

The U.S. Constitution contains an interesting dichotomy. Congress is responsible for raising an army, maintaining a navy, and declaring war, but the President, the Chief Executive of the United States, is the Commander-in-Chief who controls the actual deployment and use of military force. While Congress declares war’s legal status and controls the funding of U.S. military forces, the President directs their conduct.

Congress and the President, in theory, share authority over the exercise of military power. In practice, war has not been “declared” by a U.S. Congress in more than 60 years. The President, as
Commander-in-Chief, can send U.S. troops anywhere in the world with only a perfunctory requirement to notify Congress. This presidential power is vital if the United States is to win the Global War on Terrorism. American forces must act swiftly and decisively, at a moment’s notice, to preempt attacks by the international terrorists who have brought or who want to bring devastation and mass murder to our shores.

As Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, the President possesses the constitutional power to engage in “little wars,” “secret wars,” and actions short of war to protect the Nation. The President’s constitutional power permits him to train, fund, and arm pro-U.S. indigenous forces in other nations or to deploy special operations forces anywhere in the world to fight the Global War on Terrorism. Although the United States is the most powerful nation on Earth, time, force structures, geography, and even alliances sometimes prevent direct military assaults that might quickly end a hostile threat.

The Constitutional Authority to Conduct Covert Actions

The control of covert operations is at times a source of conflict between the President and Congress. Each proclaims power over the other to authorize and execute such operations, and each cites provisions in the Constitution to support its claim. The struggle between Congress and the President over the authority to execute covert operations involves three questions:

1. Does the Constitution require that the President notify Congress before every covert operation?
2. Must the President go beyond mere notification and actually consult with and seek the approval of Congress?
3. Must the President inform Congress and involve it in the operational details of every operation, once the President has authorized a covert action?2

Under the Constitution, Congress has the power “to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.”3 Specifically, Congress has the power to “declare war, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on land and water.”4 Congress is also charged, as part of its legislative and appropriations functions, “to raise and support Armies” and “to provide and maintain a Navy.”5 Another provision that influences how America conducts its covert operations is the Constitution’s “necessary and proper” clause, which states that Congress shall “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”6 The Constitution provides for the Senate to approve all treaties and the appointment of ambassadors and executive officers.7 Of its enumerated powers, Congress’s two strongest arguments for requiring congressional authorization for covert operations are its power to declare war and the appropriations power, or “power of the purse.”8
The Constitution gives sole power to “declare war” to Congress, yet in 200 years, U.S. presidents have ordered hundreds of overt and covert military deployments, seeking formal declarations of war from Congress on only 5 occasions.9 Considerable debate surrounds the framers of the Constitution’s intent concerning the control of U.S. covert operations. Proponents of congressional dominance cite earlier drafts of the Constitution that specified a congressional power to “make war” rather than “declare” it as proof that the framers’ intent was that Congress exercise control over all forms of warfare.10 Clearly, the framers wanted some congressional control over the power of war rather than vesting it solely in one person.11

The debate over the power to wage war has not checked the President’s dominance in controlling covert operations, but Congress’s use of appropriations provisions has. In the past 20 years, the most effective method Congress has employed to rein in Presidential power over covert operations has been tailoring appropriations bills to prohibit certain acts by the President.12 Two clear examples are the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and the Boland Amendment.13

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 states that a President must issue a finding that an authorized activity is “important to the national security interests of the United States” before appropriated funds may be used.14 The Boland Amendment and its subsequent editions proscribe the President’s actions in Nicaragua.15

In its first edition, the Boland Amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1983 prohibited the use of any funds to support any military or paramilitary group whose aim was to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.16 Subsequent Boland amendments placed a cap of $24 million in aid to the Contras in Nicaragua and prohibited any aid at all after February 1985.17 The Boland Amendment led to the Iran-Contra scandal because operatives within President Ronald Reagan’s administration sought alternative sources of funds outside congressional appropriations to continue funding covert resupply operations.18

Invoking the “war declaration” clause has been ineffective in checking executive dominance over covert operations; invoking the appropriations clauses has been an indirect check on presidential power. Congress can demand prior notification and has the power to stop all aid—overt and covert—to a region. Under this clause, congressional power is not really dominant; it is obstructionist.

In theory, Congress has authority over covert operations through a reinterpretation of the Constitution’s “letters of marque and reprisal” clause. The origins of this clause and the framers’ intent appear to fit quite well with modern notions of irregular warfare and nations engaging third parties to fight for them.19

Historically, letters of marque and reprisal were authorizations to privateer sailors to fight the Nation’s enemies.20 A letter of marque or reprisal is a license for a private individual to arm his vessel, destroy or capture enemy vessels, or seize foreign supplies and individuals.21 Although this power has not been used since the War of 1812, these letters presumably apply to situations of incomplete, imperfect, or limited war; that is, in conflicts that are not quite full-scale wars against a foreign state.22

Resuscitating the letters of marque and reprisal clause and using it as the constitutional basis for Congress to assert sole authority over covert operations has never been adopted as official policy by the current Congress, or any other in more than 190 years.23 Thus, in an environment in which Congress rarely exercises its enumerated war-making powers (preferring to use only its appropriations power), the President enjoys broad powers to conduct covert operations. Under current law, the President can authorize covert operations subject only to notification requirements imposed by Congress.

The Constitution gives the President broad unenumerated powers to conduct foreign affairs.24 If a particular foreign affairs power is considered an executive function, and no provision in the Constitution has assigned it to Congress or prohibited it to the President, the power belongs to the President.25 Presumably, this power includes the power to authorize covert operations. The daily decision-making required in conducting covert operations means that, in practical terms, such actions cannot be accomplished when governed solely by an entity such as Congress. The Constitution, moreover, must not be interpreted in a way that is inconsistent with the Presidential foreign affairs power.26
An analysis of the President’s enumerated powers in the Constitution reveals no specific grant of authority in the area of covert actions. The Constitution states that “executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”27 In addition, “the President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and of the militia of the several states when called into the actual service of the United States.”28 Among the Chief Executive’s responsibilities are that he make treaties—with the “advice and consent of the Senate.”29 The Constitution also says that he “shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”30 All these powers are sources of the President’s authority to conduct covert operations.

The U.S. Supreme Court has provided valuable guidance when the President’s exercise of power conflicts with congressional legislation or prohibitions. In the United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that to successfully exercise his constitutional powers in the field of international relations, a president must often be accorded a degree of freedom from statutory restriction that would not be admissible if domestic affairs alone were involved.31 According to the Court, the President, “not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries . . . , especially in time of war.”32 The Court’s opinion provides strong support to the position that the President alone should decide when to authorize a covert operation against a foreign power because Congress lacks the constitutional authority to decide such issues.33

While Congress has the direct, enumerated authority to declare and conduct war and can punish a President who fails to heed its instructions, it lacks clear, exclusive control over the power of conducting foreign affairs.34 The Constitution gives the
military and covert actions by the President through the War Powers Resolution and the Hughes-Ryan amendments, which require, respectively, that the President either brief Congress or authorize actions through a finding.\(^{38}\)

The President, however, is not acting outside his authority when he conducts a covert operation without the specific authorization of Congress.\(^{39}\) Through the Constitution, the American people have entrusted their President, as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive, with the conduct of foreign policy and the use of military forces; he must answer to them for his every action or failure to act; there is no avoiding blame.\(^{40}\)

The Constitution defines little in the area of covert operations. These operations occur in the constitutional shadows cast by the President and Congress. While the President and Congress claim dominant authority over covert operations because of their enumerated constitutional powers, the actual practice is quite different.

**Covert Operations and Indigenous Movements**

During World War II, bringing the fight to the Japanese homeland devastated the enemy’s morale, precluded the need for an invasion, and led to the surrender of a foe that shared the same fanatical, suicidal dedication to its cause as our present enemies do. Historian Victor Davis Hanson noted, “Advocacy for a savage militarism from the rear... dissipates when one’s house [is] in flames.”

President significant powers that he can exercise independently in the field of foreign affairs—powers both enumerated in the Constitution and attributed to him through interpretation of the Constitution.\(^{35}\)

The President is within his power to deploy troops and ships, which Congress provides, into situations that might be just short of or leading into war without exceeding his constitutional authority.\(^{36}\)

As it did during covert operations in Nicaragua, Congress can pass legislation to regulate the funding of covert operations, and the President must comply with it.\(^{37}\) Also, Congress receives notification of destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. . . . Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities. Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time and in every place. . . . There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty. We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name.”\(^{41}\)

Because of multiple threats to U.S. national security interests around the globe, America should consider eliminating certain targets without involv-
The Boland Amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1983 prohibited the use of any funds to support any military or paramilitary group whose aim was to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Subsequent Boland amendments placed a cap of $24 million in aid to the Contras in Nicaragua and prohibited any aid at all after February 1985.

ing U.S. Armed Forces at all. Training pro-U.S. rebel groups, supplied with U.S. weapons, is one option that the United States should consider to counter international asymmetric threats. Any discussion of covert military, political, and economic aid must focus on the CIA—the principal tool that presidents use in covert actions.

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 requires the CIA to conduct covert operations only after a president has expressly authorized them. For a president to authorize such actions, and to receive funds from Congress for them, a president must find that such operations are necessary to U.S. national security. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment makes a president accountable for all covert operations the CIA or other agencies or forces under his control conduct. The amendment also imposes a duty on the director of the CIA to report these actions to congressional intelligence committees before they are implemented. There are, however, exceptions.

A president can limit notification to just the intelligence committees’ senior members and the majority and minority leaders of Congress if he feels it necessary to limit disclosure for national security reasons. If the President prefers not to provide prior notice to the intelligence committees, he must inform congressional oversight committees of the action in a timely fashion and provide a statement of his reasons for not giving prior notice. As the law now reads, the President must notify the intelligence committees in advance of all covert operations, save for these exceptions.

The laws that regulate the conduct of those covert operations that do not directly involve deployments of U.S. forces give considerable discretion and authority to the President. If the President so
Direct action by the U.S. military or by CIA paramilitary forces involves the use of the President’s war powers and chief executive powers, but such operations are rare. . . . Going beyond merely providing aid to forces battling terrorism and regimes that support terrorism raises the question of whether this is an act of war. If so, what role does (or should) Congress play?

chooses, he could covertly supply weapons and aid to forces fighting terrorist regimes while only notifying select members of Congress. He would not need prior congressional approval. Covert operations supported by full written presidential findings are constitutionally acceptable.48

Direct Covert Operations Against Hostile Targets

In response to the Global War on Terrorism, the President has articulated the doctrine of preemption as America’s main battle plan: “We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants. . . . If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. . . . The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”49

This concept in action, however, demands that America be willing to act swiftly and decisively to assault its enemies anywhere in the world. During World War II, bringing the fight to the Japanese homeland devastated the enemy’s morale, precluded the need for an invasion, and led to the surrender of a foe that shared the same fanatical, suicidal dedication to its cause as our present enemies do. Historian Victor Davis Hanson noted, “Advocacy for a savage militarism from the rear . . . dissipates when one’s house [is] in flames. . . . [Enemy] soldiers who kill, rape, and torture do so less confidently when their own families are at risk at home.”50

Direct action by the U.S. military or by CIA paramilitary forces involves the use of the President’s war powers and chief executive powers, but such operations are rare. They have two basic goals: to deal directly with a threat to U.S. national security, and to deal with it in ways that will not directly im-
Constitutional Covert Operations

The Constitution gives sole power to "declare war" to Congress, yet in 200 years, U.S. presidents have ordered hundreds of covert military deployments, seeking formal declarations of war from Congress only 5 occasions.

In the Global War on Terrorism, some nations allied with the United States might prove to be allies in name only. For all practical purposes, the United States cannot rely on allies who are unwilling to root out terrorist cells within their own borders. Nor can the United States rely on allies in countries where the will to fight terror is strong, but the capability is not. The United States should consider using direct-action covert raids as an option to put its preemptive doctrine into effect. Where traditional military action is not possible or feasible, direct-action covert operations might be the only definitive way to preempt or prevent asymmetric attacks on the United States.

NOTES

4. Ibid., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 11.
5. Ibid., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 12; Ibid., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 13.
6. Ibid., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 18.
7. Ibid., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1.
8. Ibid., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. See also Silverberg, 577, 581.
9. Silverberg, 578.
12. Ibid., 691.
13. Ibid.
17. Silverberg, 583.
22. Ibid., 67-69.
23. Ibid., 1,040-41.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
28. Ibid., art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 1.
29. Ibid., art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 2.
30. Ibid., art. 2, sec. 3.
31. 299 USC 304, 319 (1936).
32. Ibid.
33. Silverberg, 587.
34. Sofaer, 38.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. See also War Powers Resolution and Hughes-Ryan Act.
39. Ibid., 53.
40. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 419, 420, 597.
44. Silverberg, 596.
45. 50 USC, "War and National Defense," sec. 413 (a) (1) (B) (1982). See also Silverberg, 599.
46. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 255.
49. Bush, graduation address.
53. 50 USC, sec. 1544 (b). See also Silverberg, 575, 588.
54. Franck and Glennon, 565.
55. Silverberg, 589.
56. Ibid., 580. Silverberg notes that there were proposed amendments to bring CIA paramilitary actions under the War Powers Resolution. See also Newell L. Highsmith, "Policing Executive Adventurism," Harvard Journal on Legislation 19 (Summer 1982): 327, 331, 36-54.
John Keegan’s book *Intelligence and War: Knowledge of the Enemy From Napoleon to Al-Qaeda* can best be described as a thoroughgoing critique of the contemporary fetish for looking at intelligence as a silver bullet that will win battles, capture terrorists, and successfully resolve crises. Keegan casts a skeptical’s eye on intelligence. He states, “In the familiar campaigning grounds of Europe, during the great wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic empire (1792-1815), intelligence rarely brought victory solely by its own account.”

The book’s central theme is simply that knowledge is not power. Power alone is power, and in a series of eight incisive case studies, framed with introductory and concluding chapters, Keegan seeks to demonstrate this tautology.

The case studies begin in the 19th century with Admiral Horatio Nelson’s victory on the Nile and the General Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign in 1862. Keegan also cites three 20th-century case studies of naval campaigns or battles, covering the use of wireless in naval engagements in World War I and analyzing the battles of the Atlantic and Midway during World War II. He also looks at the 1941 battle of Crete and the use of human intelligence in the effort to discover Nazi Germany’s secret weapons programs. He concludes with a look at developments of military intelligence after 1945, focusing especially on the 1982 Falkland Islands war.

To Keegan, intelligence is, at best, an enabler; it cannot in itself bring victory. For example, he notes that even during the Spanish Peninsular War, when one would think intelligence would have been of most use, it seldom brought an edge simply because intelligence traveled too slowly to confer any real-time advantage.

Even when intelligence is complete, it can be virtually without value. The British possessed near perfect knowledge of what the Germans were going to do in Crete in 1941. Keegan says, “OL 2/302 [the crucial ENIGMA decrypt that revealed German plans] was an almost comprehensive guide to Operation Merkur, one of the most complete pieces of timely intelligence ever to fall into the hands of an enemy.

Merkus revealed the timing of the attack, the objectives, and the strength and composition of the attacking force. Moreover, as the success of Merkur depended on surprise—as all airborne operations must do—the revelation of the operation order to General [Bernard] Freyberg [the Allied commander] was particularly damning.”

Nonetheless, the Germans won the battle of Crete. Keegan particularly demonstrates how limited was the value of intelligence before U.S. troops deployed to Iraq. Keegan says, “A potential international law-breaker had been obliged to open his borders to officially sponsored investigators of his suspected wrong-doing and yet they remained unable to dispel the uncertainties surrounding his intentions and capabilities. In absolutely optimum conditions, in short, intelligence had failed.”

Rethinking Clausewitz?

*Intelligence and War* is in many ways a deft and readable book. Keegan powerfully demonstrates the limits of military intelligence in each case study. His narrative skill is evident throughout, and his wonderful one-paragraph description of the Shenandoah Valley could be in an operations order; it is a superb verbal map, rich in details, yet also clear in exposition.

Keegan can capture a relatively minor figure in history, such as Captain Thomas Troubridge, one of Nelson’s favorites, in a few deft strokes. Keegan also has a quiet wit, as for example, when he comments on the scholars who accompanied Napoleon on his campaign to Egypt: “Some of the academics who were to accompany the expedition began to boast, a notorious failing of clever men leading unimportant lives.”

The method Keegan uses to prove his thesis is also interesting. It is best described as “Clausewitzian” even though the Prussian philosopher of war is never mentioned in the book. The strange, unanswered questions of *Intelligence and War*, then, are these: has Keegan rethought Carl von Clausewitz, or has he somehow unconsciously appropriated Clausewitz’s ideas and insights?

Readers might recall Keegan’s 1994 book *A History of Warfare* in which he makes a sweeping attempt to grasp the nature of war. His thesis is that war is not an instrument of statescraft so much as an expression of culture. In presenting his war-as-cultural expression idea, Keegan also presents his dissent—and outright disdain—for Clausewitz. In the first sentence of the book he asserts: “War is not a continuation of policy by other means.”

Keegan goes on to say that in *A History of Warfare* that Clausewitz’s influence on military theory and on the course of world events has been disastrous: “The purpose of war was to serve a political end; the nature of war was to serve only itself. By conclusion, his logic ran, those who make war an end to itself are likely to be more successful than those who seek to derate its character for political purposes. The peace of that
most peaceful of century [sic] in European history was held ransom to this subversive idea, which bubbled and seethed like the flux of an active volcano beneath the surface of progress and prosperity.16

In Intelligence and War, however, Keegan proves his thesis regarding the limited utility of using intelligence to win wars by using Clausewitzian language. Keegan states, “Only force finally counts.”17 Near the end of the book, he asserts, “War is ultimately about doing, not thinking. The Macedonians beat the Persians at Gaugemela in 331 B.C., not because they took the enemy by surprise . . . but by the ferocity of their onslaught.”18 This sounds much like the Prussian philosopher-general, who believed in defeat by arms through decisive clashes, not through Sun Tzu-like stratagems of trickery and deception, and not through Jominian demonstrations of tactical finesse. Keegan elsewhere uses language that is even more explicitly Clausewitzian: “War always tends toward attrition, which is a competition in inflicting and bearing bloodshed, and the nearer attrition approaches to the extreme, the less thought counts.”19 Keegan sounds as if he has adopted a theory of war that might be called “hyper-Clausewitzian.” Apparently, Keegan has taken Clausewitz’s idea of absolute war—the purely theoretical model that Clausewitz developed to capture the logic of war in the abstract—one step further by assuming this abstract, idealistic notion actually applies to the reality of war.20 This irony is compounded when one considers that this conflation of absolute war and real war—the thing he attributes to Clausewitz as being pernicious—he seems now to accept.

Keegan and Clausewitz on “Command”

Just as Keegan does, Clausewitz likewise refers to intelligence skeptically: “Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false; and most are uncertain.”21 This kind of information is inherently unrelatable and transient.22 Far more important for Clausewitz is the good sense of a commander “guided by the laws of probability” who keeps his head and who must “trust his judgment and stand like rock on which the waves break in vain.”23 Clausewitz’s estimation of intelligence and the role of the commander are consistent with the rest of On War. Friction and fog obscure the value of technology. The individual commander’s sense, coup d’oeil, and moral courage are far more critical to winning a battle.

In Intelligence and War, Keegan views commanders in much the same way as does Clausewitz. Often, Keegan presents two opposing commanders as if they are the only ones who really matter: “In what may be characterized crudely as a personal struggle between [British Prime Minister Winston] Churchill and [German Grand Admiral Karl] Dönitz.”24 Keegan asserts that throughout the battle of the Atlantic (September 1939 to December 1941), “Churchill can . . . be seen to have been outbuilding and outchartering Dönitz.”25

An English predilection for seafaring cannot be the only reason why Keegan devotes at least half his book to sea battles. Clearly Keegan uses sea battles because they have always better illustrated head-to-head clashes of wills between individual commanders than have land battles.

The only outright intelligence successKeegan includes in the entire book is his second case study on Jackson’s 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign. Jackson, the epitome of theClausewitzian commander, is self-contained and Napoleonic. He holds no councils of war with subordinates or staff. He relies on his own judgment, intuition, and innate genius (the coup d’oeil). He masses troops at decisive points. And he clearly recognizes the linkage between war and politics: his soldiers wreak far greater psychological havoc in Washington, D.C., than the size of his force should have allowed.26

Keegan and the Center of Gravity

The real tactical (and at times strategic) blunders Keegan describes are not, by implicit admission, intelligence failures. They are failures to mass decisively, but more important, they are ultimately failures by commanders to grasp the enemy’s center of gravity—the Schwerpunkt. Clausewitz mentions over 50 times in On War: “A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow.”27

Keegan repudiates the Sun Tzu-inspired idea of dispersion and deceit as keys to winning battles and wars. In the sixth case study he notes the needless hypercomplexity of the Japanese operational methods during the Battle of Midway: “They had failed to rid themselves . . . of ancient Asian notions of the value of complexity and diffusion.”28 Keegan shows that Admiral Osami Nagumo’s fate at Midway was not decided by superior U.S. intelligence but by his inability to grasp the enemy’s center of gravity.29 Nagumo vacillated over whether the center of gravity was Midway Island or the U.S. fleet that was protecting the island. Clearly it was the latter, especially given that the thrust of Japanese strategy was to destroy the U.S. fleet in the Pacific, not simply to secure the island. At the critical juncture, Nagumo committed the fatal error of diffusion: he sought to attack Midway Island itself. Later, on hearing that the U.S. fleet really was nearby, he compounded his error by trying to take the island and to attack the U.S. fleet simultaneously.30

In the study of the German Crete campaign in May 1941, Keegan again points out the danger of failing to grasp the Schwerpunkt. The British defenders knew quite well that the Germans were going to invade Crete. They knew when it would occur and what the German order of battle would be. The courageous and resourceful British soldiers were led by General Bernard Freyberg, a man renowned for his personal bravery. Yet, the Germans won. They realized that the center of gravity—the focal point to the entire airborne assault—was Maleme airfield. They fought ruthlessly to secure it, going so far as to make nearly suicidal crash landings of glider troops onto it. Freyberg and his subordinates, who lacked that ruthless clarity, abandoned the airfield and, in so doing, lost the island. Keegan writes, “[A] defending force . . . however well informed it may be of the general risk, is at a
disadvantage against an enemy who has his aim clearly in mind.”24

A Clausewitzian Critique

Intelligence and War is an effective, even powerful critique of the current craving after technological gimmicks and James Bond-like ploys that will somehow save the United States and its Allies from peril or destruction. In Keegan’s analysis, what matters more than technology is a commander’s unique abilities, the use of sheer force, and the ability to mass that force decisively at the right place to force defeat. Keegan does not argue that these are outdated or quaint notions of a rapidly fading world of nation-states. Keegan could have argued, contra Clausewitz, that individual military prowess counts less than a variety of impersonal forces, that cultural factors play a greater role than a commander’s will; that or deception and cunning mean as much as brute force and relentlessness. But he does not.

Debunking Clausewitz and his ideas has been a cottage industry for the past 10 years or so.25 But at least in Intelligence and War the Prussian general’s ideas are set forth by one of his most noted detractors. Whether Keegan has changed his mind about Clausewitz or not, his book can certainly be called “Clausewitzian.”

NOTES

2. Ibid., 4.
3. Ibid., 15.
4. Ibid., 169.
5. Ibid., 315.
6. Ibid., 74.
7. Ibid., 45.
9. Ibid., 21-22.
10. Keegan, Intelligence and War, 349.
14. Ibid., 229-30. Keegan might be considered a disciple of Clausewitz as interpreted by the military scholar A. C. A. Cat in The Origins of Military Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Cat contends that Clausewitz’s aim in writing On War was to create a text for armchair warfare and that he held absolute war as a conceptualization that did not simply exist in the mind but as a potentially a commander should strive for. But if Clausewitz advocated such “knockout” war, why all the distraction in On War between absolute and real war? And why the insistence that war had to vary with the political objective and that for war to have limited objectives was a limited form?
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Keegan, Intelligence and War, 244.
19. On War, 102. In Clausewitz’s discussion of military genius, he says ‘Coup d’oeil therefore refers not alone to the physical but, more commonly, to the inward eye... Stripped of metaphor and of the restrictions imposed on it by the phrase, the concept merely refers to the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.”
20. Ibid., 485.
22. I am cognizant of the current debate over the application of centers of gravity in U.S. warfare doctrine: Claiming no expertise whatever, I rely on LTC Antulio Echevarria II’s essay, “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: It’s Not What We Thought.” Naval War College Review (Winter 2003): 118, for providing focus to my thoughts on the subject.
23. Keegan, Intelligence and War, 213.
24. Ibid., 15.

McClernand: Politician in Uniform

Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr.
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Kiper’s book fills an important gap in the history of the Civil War, and the Fletcher Pratt award is certainly well deserved. The book, which is informative and well researched, chronicles and analyzes McClernand’s war service.

Voted by war scholars as one of the 10 ugliest (in appearance) Union generals, McClernand succeeded remarkably well for a politician cum soldier, who disproved the maxim that “war is too serious an endeavor for amateurs.” McClernand did extremely well for an amateur. He secured his commission as a senior leader solely through political connections in Illinois. He had no prior military training as a leader and had seen only minimal service during the Black Hawk war.

McClernand reputedly organized and led his brigade, division, and finally, corps in skirmishes and battles of the Western Theater. Within 5 months of the beginning of hostilities, McClernand had achieved the rank of brigadier general. In light of the times and the rapid growth of the U.S. Army, this was not unusual, but his penchant for political manners irritated his peers and senior officers, who resented McClernand’s Illinois connections to President Abraham Lincoln.

A seemingly “fast study,” McClernand quickly picked up the science of war. However, his inability to master the art of military customs and traditions caused him to make enemies outside his immediate command and precipitated massive problems with his commander, General Ulysses S. Grant, who held McClernand in low esteem.

McClernand believed a West Point cabal was responsible for many of his difficulties. Kiper, a West Point graduate himself, provides a balanced and fair view of how West Pointers obviously did much to stifle and ruin McClernand’s career. Using strong circumstantial evidence, Kiper shows that, for not so thinly veiled military reasons, Grant and Generals William Tecumseh Sherman and James Birdseye McPherson were out to rid the Army of McClernand.

The book’s strength is its insightful analyses and its extensive bibliography. Kiper offers perspectives that only seasoned soldiers can have. His insight into tactical and operational decisions is rather unique in bibliographical works of Civil War generals. Kiper aptly shows that
McClelland, even though he was largely successful on the battlefield, made some bad decisions off the battlefield. His constant correspondence to Washington, D.C., aggravated Lincoln and Secretary of War Henry Stanton, who often did not respond to McClelland’s messages, and produced the opposite reactions than McClelland had intended. McClelland’s bitter recriminations about how he was treated garnered little support from Stanton or Lincoln who, in true political form, “hung McClelland out to dry.”

Kiper’s in-depth coverage of McClelland’s corps during the Vicksburg Campaign, which became McClelland’s undoing, is the highlight of the book. McClelland’s inability to practice humility and hold his tongue precipitated his relief. Grant made no apology for removing McClelland and promptly replaced him with a West Pointer, which only bolstered McClelland’s sense of paranoia. With his reputation tarnished, McClelland eventually regained command of his corps, leading it during minor actions in Louisiana and Texas before he became so seriously ill that he had to be replaced.

Had McClelland been able to muzzle his ego, he might have become one of the war’s more outstanding Union generals. McClelland’s unbridled ambition is no different from that displayed by some senior officers today. Yet, his lack of humility and over-zealous desire to be his own best advocate provides excellent lessons to those who wish to advance their careers through self-aggrandizement. His downfall came when he violated chain-of-command prerogatives once too often. Grant became his lifelong adversary, and like Grant’s other nemesis, General William Starke Rosecrans, a fellow West Pointer, McClelland’s wartime service is not remembered for its successes as much as for its failures.

The U.S. Army has changed substantially since the Civil War, and full-time professional soldiers continue to be the foundation of a professional military. However, Kiper’s book shows that McClelland’s citizen-soldier traits of volunteerism and patriotism are also important to the success of the nation’s military.

**Suggested Reading for Military Professionals**

Major Dennis P. Chapman
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The U.S. Marine Corps’ book, *Warfighting*, tells us that “Self-study in the art and science of war is at least equal in importance—and should receive at least equal time—to maintaining physical condition . . . after all, an officer’s principal weapon is his mind.”

During my recent work as an Assistant Professor of Military Science at Michigan State University (MSU), I compiled a short, annotated bibliography that could be of interest to military professionals, especially junior officers. While at MSU I sought to foster in cadets an interest in continuing intellectual growth and development through professional reading. I discovered that from the cadet’s perspective, the pool of professional material is rather limited and aimed at a mass audience. Most offer little intellectual content or literary value. To bridge the gap, I gave the students a professional reading list drawn from books that I found useful.

Learning to track down good books takes practice, especially on topics of interest to Army officers. But the most important reason for not being able to find good military-related material is the officer corps’ unintentional reticence to share what we learn from our professional reading and study. In this omission, we forfeit much of what we might gain from our efforts.

The reading itself is not where the chief benefit lies; it is in the subsequent development of what we read through discussion and debate with our peers. In the words of Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Dialogue and debate, especially in times of dynamic change, are indispensable for developing and refining ideas. From these debates spring the seeds of change. [O]nly through a reasoned and vigorous give-and-take will we be able to refine the ideas that are vital to the continued evolution of our army as we prepare for war in the twenty-first century.”

This bibliography is not definitive or complete. There are thousands of valuable books available to military professionals. My aim is to encourage young officers to get into the habit of lifelong learning. I also want to offer readers a different perspective on a few familiar titles as well as others that might otherwise escape the reader’s notice.

In the superb book *Just and Unjust Wars*, Michael Walzer proceeds from an essentially antiwar position rooted in opposition to the Vietnam war. Nonetheless, Walzer’s incisive analysis of the ethics of war gets to the heart of profoundly important ideas about the moral and ethical considerations in the conduct of warfare. Some of us have already reached and accepted some of his conclusions on an intuitive level. Whether you agree with his arguments or not, this book is still valuable because it enunciates his ideas in a clear, concise, thought-provoking form that is accessible and useful, not just to legal scholars and philosophers, but to the thoughtful, informed layman as well.

Victor Suvorov, a Soviet defector using a pseudonym, wrote *Inside the Soviet Army*, published in 1982, in the bitterly disillusioned tone...
of a one-time true believer who discovers that his cause has been a sham. This readable and interesting account gives a vivid, inside view of a major military force founded on premises alien to the American military tradition but which suited the political system and society it served. Suvorov depicts an organization where noble ideals and high standards suffocate under the weight of hard-nosed pragmatism at best and corrupt, cynical opportunism at worst. Suvorov concludes with a plaintive cry for the citizens of the West to awaken to the steadily encroaching power of the Soviet Union. Despite being overtaken by events, this book is still worth reading.

"The Fight for the 'Malvinas': The Argentine Forces in the Falklands," by Martin Middlebrook, is an unusual book that tells the story of the Falklands war from the Argentine perspective. The book exposes the ineptitude of senior Argentine leaders during the war (particularly that of the high command in charge on the islands) while serving as a poignant tribute to the loyalty, courage, and dedication of the junior officers who struggled to lead their men under abysmal circumstances. The ineffective efforts of Argentine ground forces in the face of the invading British demonstrate the limited utility of pitting short-service conscripts against well-trained regular forces. The bumbling performance of the senior Argentine leaders, preoccupied with domestic politics since seizing power in 1976, demonstrates that Argentine Armed Forces had lost their fighting edge. They had to learn the hard way what Denis Hart Mahan, Dean of Engineering at West Point, taught in the early days of the Republic: officers who involve themselves in politics will not have the time they need to maintain their professional competence.

"Platoon Leader," by James R. McDonough, is a vivid memoir of small-unit leadership in Vietnam. This classic book describes the coming of age of a lieutenant fresh from West Point as leader of an infantry platoon in Vietnam. Refreshing in its honesty, and a wonderful resource for every aspiring leader, this book is important for all young officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

"Once A Warrior King," by David Donovan, is a great companion to "Platoon Leader." The book tells the story of a lieutenant serving as a military adviser to local militia forces in a South Vietnamese district. As the highest-ranking American in the area, he faces extremely complex military and political challenges. Another refreshingly honest and inspiring memoir, this book is highly recommended for young officers and NCOs.

"Inside the VC and NVA," by Michael Lee Lanning and Dann Cragg, is an account of the Vietnam war from the North Vietnamese perspective. This book is surprising in that it reveals an important similarity between America and its erstwhile opponents. In popular imagination, we understandably impute to the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) traits attributable to the communist system that it served—cynicism, brutality, and callous indifference to the suffering of its servants. Yet in their vivid and detailed descriptions of life among the ranks of the NVA, Lanning and Cragg produce a vision, not of an army driven by a set of remote and hard-hearted ideological zealots indifferent to the suffering of their men, but rather one characterized by a strong bond between leader and led, whose officers were imbued with a deep concern for the comfort, safety, and well-being of their soldiers. Lanning and Cragg demonstrate that this is one feature that America and its former enemies hold in common.

"Guardians of the Republic: A History of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps of the U.S. Army," by Earnest F. Fisher, Jr., is one of the few histories of the U.S. Army NCO corps. He traces the corps’ evolution from when NCOs were appointed or dismissed at the commander’s whim to today, when NCOs are centrally selected and hold their rank permanently. Today’s NCOs enjoy the benefits of formal professional education and training programs to prepare them for increasing responsibility, and they are recognized by their commissioned colleagues as full-fledged professionals in their own right.

"The War of the Running Dogs: The Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960," by Noel Barber, is the story of Great Britain’s triumph in Malaya over the Cold War’s first communist insurgency. Barber describes the bitter 12-year struggle that involved mostly police, politicians, and propagandists who were dealt decisive blows in what was mostly a political struggle, while conventional military forces played a supporting role.

Bob Woodward’s book, "The Commanders," is about the tension during the 1991 Persian Gulf war between the forces of bureaucratic inertia on one hand and moral and political vision on the other. Woodward’s most striking revelation is that in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, virtually no one, including such luminaries as then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell and former Secretary of State James Baker, wanted to act. Although President George H. W. Bush’s advisers were content to rely on such routine measures as diplomatic condemnation and economic sanctions in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, only Bush had the vision to fully comprehend the moral significance of the Iraqi invasion or to envision action on a scale grand enough to reverse it. While military leaders, including Powell and Admiral William J. Crowe, framed their reservations and concerns in terms of potential U.S. casualties, one wonders if they were not motivated as much by a reluctance to upset the diplomatic routine—an orderly progression of events to which they were accustomed—as by not wanting to move beyond their comfort zones. In politics, as in physics, a body at rest tends to remain at rest unless forced into motion by a leader’s clearly articulated and vigorously pursued vision.

When U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941, by Andrew J. Birtle, was first published in 1998, the United States was still adjusting to the dangerous realities of a new and unstable post-Cold War world. At that time it was ar-
gue that the peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and domestic support missions being assigned to the military with increasing frequency were distracting the military from its traditional role of defeating enemies on conventional battlefields. Birtle’s work shows that, far from being a new phenomenon, the Army has been deeply involved in stability and support operations since the founding of the Republic. The military routinely conducted an array of missions, such as administering civil government in the occupied South following the Civil War; rebuilding physical infrastructure and conducting political institutions in Cuba and the Philippines; or conducting counterguerrilla and constabulary operations on the Western frontier and across the globe. Birtle demonstrates that the proliferation of such missions since the Cold War is unusual; rather, it is the United States’ intense Cold War focus on preparing for large-scale conventional war that is the true historical anomaly.

Robert R. Leonhard’s innovative book Principles of War for the Information Age proposes a radical change to the intellectual underpinnings of the military profession. Criticizing the nine traditional principles of war (maneuver, offensive, mass, economy of force, objective, security, simplicity, surprise, and unity of command) as contradictory and obsolete, Leonhard proposes their abandonment. He offers instead a new philosophical system derived from three laws of war: the law of humanity, the law of economy, and the law of duality. His new principles of war, which would support the three laws of war, would include—

- The independent principle of knowledge and ignorance.
- Two principles of aggression (dislocation and confrontation, and distribution and concentration).
- Two principles of interaction (opportunity and reaction, and activity and security).
- Two principles of control (option acceleration and objective, and command and anarchy).

In The Tank Debate: Armour and the Anglo-American Military Tradition, John Stone catalogs the lengthy list of predictions made since World War I of the imminent demise of the main battle tank. After carefully exposing the flaws that made these predictions premature, Stone rather surprisingly adds his own proclamations of the end of the tank. Conceding the near omnipotence in the tactical fight of monstrous machines like the M1 Abrams, Stone argues that the sources of its strength—massive firepower, nearly invulnerable armor, and great tactical mobility—carry the seeds of its demise. The reason? Weight. According to Stone, the hardware that makes this tactical prowess possible comes with a weight penalty so large that it actually detracts from the tank’s operational effectiveness, decreases its road speed, restricts its movement to routes whose roads and bridges can bear its gigantic mass, and creates fuel-guzzling proclivities that tie the tank to an increasingly short logistical leash.

Former Secretary of the Navy James Webb’s book, A Sense of Honor, is set in the U.S. Naval Academy at the time of the Tet Offensive in 1968. The book describes the struggles midshipmen faced at the U.S. Naval Academy amidst the turmoil of the Vietnam war. Webb depicts the physical abuse of plebes at the hands of upperclassmen, a practice that has been abolished, but he still vividly captures the sense of honor that pervades U.S. service academies.

In C.S. Forester’s classic tale Rifleman Dodd, set during the Peninsular wars in Portugal during Napoleon’s reign, Dodd, a British soldier, finds himself cut off from his regiment. He attaches himself to the local inhabitants and, with and without their help, proceeds to wreak havoc in the rear area of the French army. Aside from its entertainment value, the book offers at least two insights to the professional military officer. First, it establishes the historicity of asymmetrical warfare, particularly the friction that a few guerrillas pose for a conventional army dependent on a long logistical tail. Second, it serves as a reminder of the tragic toll war takes on innocents who find themselves caught in the crossfire between contending armies. Another riveting tale by C.S. Forester, The Gun, also depicts the nature of guerrilla warfare against Napoleon’s army in Spain. The book’s value lies in its harrowing depiction of the havoc a guerrilla war can inflict on the society in whose midst it is fought, shredding the fabric of society; destroying personal, professional, and economic relationships; and creating a political vacuum into which rush a hoard of warlords, gangsters, bandits, and every variety of thug. Anyone seeking to understand what the brutish existence of the Afghan people must have been like after the Soviet invasion of 1979 need look no further than the terrifying vision of war and the resultant anarchy, chaos, and turmoil depicted in this book.

Originally published in 1931, The Rise of U.S. Grant, by Arthur L. Conger, is a unique book that takes a different and illuminating approach to the study of Union General and President Ulysses S. Grant. Where other books focus on Grant’s great victories, his titanic struggle with Confederate General Robert E. Lee, his drinking, or the purported dichotomy between his brilliant successes in the field and his supposed failings as President, this book examines Grant’s development and growth as a military commander during the crucial early years of the Civil War. Focusing largely on Grant’s career in the West, Conger carefully examines Grant’s rise through the ranks, from the time of his appointment through his command of the 21st Illinois, his promotion to brigadier, and his actions at Belmont, Henry, Donelson, Shiloh, and Vicksburg. Conger’s work stands apart, however, in its tight focus, not on what Grant did at each key juncture, but on what he learned and how he applied these lessons to future actions.

Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, by Wayne P. Hughes, is an excellent book that offers key insights into the nature of war at sea, particularly as it differs from war on land. Hughes describes naval combat as wholly attrition-based, its fundamental imperative being “attack effectively first.” In support of these observations, Hughes introduces us to Lancaster’s Square Law, which
A FRATERNITY OF ARMS: America and France in the Great War, Robert B. Bruce, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2003, 400 pages, $39.95.

In this era of fear and loathing of all things French, it is wise to pull back from the contemporary rancor and examine the historic events that unite and divide France and the United States. In A Fraternity of Arms, Robert B. Bruce explores the relations between the two nations during World War I. Bruce argues that France was America’s most important coalition partner and supplied the U.S. Army with much of the weapons and training that the United States required to fight a modern war. He also notes that military necessity and mutual respect forged a martial bond between the United States and the French that proved decisive to the defeat of Imperial Germany.

When the United States entered the war in April 1917 the Army was ill-prepared to fight a modern war. Bruce points out that the United States not only lacked tanks, machine guns, artillery, modern aircraft, and the other tools of industrial warfare, it also lacked the know-how to employ these weapons effectively. The French, weakened by 3 years of heavy casualties, the “mutinies” of 1917, and an increasingly war-weary population, gladly offered the United States their weaponry and expertise in the hope that the U.S. Army would boost French morale and help turn the tide of the war.

On arrival in France, most U.S. combat units received training on their new French weapons and were then “seasoned” to combat by serving with French divisions on quiet sectors of the front. Bruce notes that U.S. General John J. Pershing disagreed with French infantry doctrine and Allied efforts to amalgamate U.S. units into existing French and British formations. But, for the most part, France and the United States benefited from their mutual equipment, training, and assignment arrangements. Bruce also notes that the French were so anxious to see the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) succeed that they provided some of their own divisions, tank units, and aviation squadrons to support the U.S. Army’s St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives.

While military necessity pulled France and the United States together, the alliance was truly cemented by the mutual regard and affection that the soldiers and officers of both nations held for one another. Bruce argues that shared democratic beliefs, the common heritage of the American Revolution, and the respect for each other’s martial virtues welded the Franco-American coalition into the fraternity of arms that defeated Germany.

Although Bruce is absolutely correct in noting the importance of the symbiotic relationship that developed between the American and French armies during World War I, his argument that the doughboys were generally enamored with France is a bit too overstated. Many Americans certainly liked the French, but there is ample evidence to suggest that an equal number believed that their Allies were rapacious, backward, and ungrateful. Some Americans certainly agreed with Private Ira Wilkinson’s observation that France is surely God’s country—because he is about the only one [who] would have it . . . , except the Frenchmen.”

AEF General Hunter Liggett later characterized the doughboys’ relations with the French as a “broken romance” and stated that “France itself was a sorry disillusionsment to the American soldier.” Despite these shortcomings, A Fraternity of Arms is an excellent work that should be studied by anyone interested in World War I, Franco-American relations, or coalition warfare. Bruce has succeeded in highlighting the vital role that France played in ensuring the viability and success of the AEF.

LTC Richard S. Faulkner, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Sarah J. Purcell’s book, as a work on the idea of public memory, establishes how Revolutionary War heroes were integrated into the burgeoning political culture of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. This is no small task, because many consider political culture an area that is soft among a soft science like history and has a tendency to scare people off.

Purcell uses numerous sources to buttress her arguments in favor of the idea of Revolutionary War heroes and their effect on the early years of the United States. She specifically discusses “Palmetto Day” in Charleston, South Carolina, and annual events in Bennington, Vermont.

Purcell also writes about some of those who fell during the Revolutionary War, such as Doctor Joseph Warren, who died at Bunker Hill, and Richard Montgomery, who died during the Quebec Campaign. Purcell even strives to assimilate the roles of women and Blacks in the Revolutionary War, putting special emphasis on Marquis de Lafayette’s recognition of African-American soldiers.

The main problem with the book is that Purcell fails to draw a line where Revolutionary War heroics end. She mentions the quasi-war with France and the battles in the Mediterranean against various Barbary states, and she even discusses the War of 1812, if only to denigrate its militarism. Therefore, this poetic outsiderism in the Great War

The broad themes of the 150 poems of this anthology touch on issues still relevant today—institutionalized violence, political repression, militarism, and international relations. I agree with Van Wienan’s assessment that the most important legacy of these poems is the war’s dissident voices, since in them lies the true expression of American pluralism and democratic tolerance. This fact alone makes this book a valuable contribution to the study of wartime poetry.

MAJ Jeffrey C. Allfer, USAF, Ramstein Air Base, Germany


Masking Terror: How Women Contain Violence in Southern Sri Lanka, by Alex Argenti-Pillen, is a study of how discursive styles in social interaction serve to influence violence in southern Sri Lanka.

Udahenagama (hill-garden village) is a pseudonym for a conglomerate of five neighborhoods where Argenti-Pillen conducted fieldwork with the support of a team of research assistants and interpreters. The primary audience for this book is for academics, mental health professionals, and humanitarian workers.
The methodology of the work draws on postmodernist approaches, which leads to a suspicion of modern knowledge, such as Western trauma methods and an acceptance of indigenous superstition at face value. This in turn leads to interesting conclusions, such as the distinction between modernist violence directed at a universal enemy and the traditional violence of Udahenagama, which is rooted in context and particularity. The significance of this conclusion is that ethnic hatred is not the source of violence in Sri Lanka (and perhaps other conflict zones); rather, the militarized state, created through propaganda campaigns and other means, is the setting for large-scale violence. Ultimately, however, this methodology might have more resonance with academics in research than with military practitioners in the field.

Argentiti-Pillen’s exploration of discourse on violence in the five neighborhoods provides an opportunity to see indigenous natives as people in a context rather than as “exoticized others.” After relating various situations (mostly superstitious) and ways of coping with them, *Masking Terror* discusses discursive strategies, including ambiguity, such as the use of the referential pronouns “these” and “that,” and distance in reported speech—keeping one’s own voice distinct from the source of reported information.

The author is critical of mental health nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including NGOs that focus on the Western concept of political versus domestic violence, and thereby, limit services; the reliance on Western discursive techniques in counseling (structured conversation with eye-contact, sitting face-to-face, and the use of touch); and most significant, the introduction of a sense of facelessness that might ultimately prolong the violence cycle by removing constraining factors identified in Udahenagaman field work.

One of the book’s major arguments is that modern trauma discourse leads to the destabilization of the containment of violence by eroding the basis of local, cautious discourses. This ethnography is a contribution to the existing literature on Sri Lanka and traditional ways that women contain violence in non-Western societies. The book is probably not required reading for the military professional, but for those interested in these topics. My skepticism of postmodernist methodology, the book is authoritative, well-written, and supported by in-depth and quality research.

**CPT Matthew J. Morgan, USA, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii**


To old Cold War warriors, Berlin duty had a particular appeal. Berlin, once located 110 miles inside East Germany and in the middle of 22 Soviet divisions, gave an immediacy and sharper focus to soldiering. A small group of skilled military personnel had even closer contact with the Soviets. Some 14 officers and men were assigned as part of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) to the Group of Soviet Forces in East Germany. They lived outside Berlin in the city of Potsdam and performed various liaison functions for Soviet and U.S. theater commanders and, unofficially, collected information throughout East Germany.


Normally, USMLM officers spoke Russian, and the enlisted drivers spoke German. The Soviet Military Liaison Mission was stationed in Frankfurt, West Germany, and the British and French Military Liaison Missions were stationed outside of Berlin.

During 1960 and 1961, Commander John A. Fahey was assigned to the USMLM. Fahey was a U.S. Navy officer with an extensive Russian-language background. As the sole Navy officer in an organization primarily staffed with Army and Air Force personnel, he had little Naval information to gather, but he helped in the Army effort.

While Fahey was evidently an effective gatherer, he was also a fish out of water. Much of the book catalogs his complaints about various Army officers, Army regulations, control of enlisted drivers, military police, and wearing the uniform. When Fahey is not complaining, he provides a good deal of information. He discusses some tradecraft, detentions (arrests) by the Soviets (in which he led the mission), and history. He had his share of surviving dangerous car crashes, being shot at, escaping a burning automobile, and he was a direct observer at an important time of Cold War history—the erection of the Berlin Wall.

Fahey’s book is not the first about the mission, but it is the only book in print. Written in the 1950s-style of *Argosy* magazine, it is author-centric but easy to read. *Licensed to Spy* is a good look at a hush-hush organization that did a great job for the United States. Perhaps more books about the USMLM will follow in time.

**LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


Who were the 100 most influential figures of World War II? This simple question immediately sends one in search of pencil and paper. Howard J. Langer gives the answers in *The World War II 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Figures of the Second World War*.

Langer, a noted author and journalist, gives readers three precursors before they review and analyze his list. First, the word “influential” is defined as having the power to bring about change. Second, he pleads guilty to seeing things as an American and is understandably biased. Finally, he will listen to anyone’s argument about his ranking from 9 to 100. However, if 1 through 8 are debated, he will turn a deaf ear.

The people who comprise Langer’s list are truly an eclectic group, running the gamut from civil-
ian and military leaders to scientists and inventors to journalists and chaplains. Langer does justice to each person on his list by presenting a well-researched and well-written vignette of that person’s career. He then justifies why the person deserves his position on the list. Langer’s book, which certainly inspires interesting debate and begs curiosity, gives the reader hours of enjoyable reading.

LTC Rick Baillargeon, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ANOTHER VIETNAM: Pictures of the War From the Other Side, Tim Page, Douglas Niven, Christopher Riley, eds., National Geographic, Washington, DC, 2002, 240 pages, $50.00.

In Another Vietnam: Pictures of the War From the Other Side, the editors, who were combat photographers during the Vietnam war, contacted their counterparts in the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA), and rescued unpublished images that showed the other side of the war. Photos range from troupes of entertainers to combat footage. The book is valuable because of the rarity of its subject; one source shot only 70 individual pictures during the entire course of the war.

The truly interesting aspect of the book is that the editors believe that since their sources were also combat photographers, they shared a worldview and purpose. The U.S. photographers were accustomed to conveying the war’s reality. The Vietcong and NVA photographers were trained under a socialist-realist school and sought to convey the party’s view of reality. Even the combat photos show heroic, victorious revolutionaries. There are no pictures of dead Vietcong, except for the obligatory dead child. This is not to suggest that the photos were staged, only that the photographers were trained to produce only photos that supported the propaganda message. These images were the major weapon of the enemy forces. The editors seem to fail to understand them in that context.

Kevin L. Jamison, Attorney at Law, Gladstone, Missouri


The latest work of Michael Beschloss, America’s leading presidential historian, is The Conquerors: Truman and the Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1941-1945. Beschloss illuminates the political maneuvering in Washington, D.C., when the United States was waging war against Nazi Germany. Although Beschloss began writing the book in 1991, he waited for the opening of Winston Churchill’s papers and archives from the newly defunct Soviet Union before he continued. His delay is our gain.

Using powerful mini-biographies, Beschloss provides an unmatched look into the personalities of the key players. Although the information that Beschloss provides is little different from other accounts of the events, he manages to weave the various threads into a single coherent narrative. Written for the educated, informed individual, the book does not get bogged down in dry information.

Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury and long-time friend of Roosevelt, was little concerned with Jewish issues until his aide, Henrietta Klotz, forced him to come to grips with his own Jewish heritage. Morgenthau risked his close relationship with Roosevelt by asking the President to do something about the atrocities against the European Jews. Roosevelt had long known about the atrocities and finally admitted to the Nation that “the wholesale, systematic murder of the Jews of Europe goes on unabated every hour.” The Morgenthau Plan, a draconian measure, would have converted the industrial nation of Germany into a totally agricultural nation. Secretary of War Henry Stimson vigorously and successfully opposed Morgenthau’s proposals.

Although then Vice President Harry Truman’s name is included in the title, he was not a main actor in events until late in the war. A more accurate title would have mentioned Morgenthau’s name since he and Roosevelt are the focus of the book. Despite these quibbles, The Conquerors is a real contribution to understanding Roosevelt’s true views of Jews and the events that led to a peaceful, democratic Germany. For most readers it will undoubtedly be a real page turner.

Glen F. Welch, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Take a minor footnote uncovered in U.S. military archives—a mere scrap of paper pinpointing a 1971 helicopter crash in Laos—and add a grainy black-and-white photograph that had lain in an attic for decades. From these small clues, Pulitzer Prize-winning photographer Horst Faas and veteran Associated Press (AP) correspondent Richard Pyle put together their own ad hoc missing in action (MIA) search for four wartime friends and colleagues. Lost Over Laos: A True Story of Tragedy, Mystery, and Friendship documents Faas and Pyle’s odyssey.

The authors’ return to Southeast Asia brought closure to the lives of four combat photographers: Larry Burrows of Life Magazine (the Robert Capa of his day); AP’s Henri Huet; United Press International’s Kent Potter; and Newsweek’s Keisaburo Shimamoto. In 1971, this foursome rode a Huey into oblivion.

In addition to the main story, a number of subcurrents flow through the book. Pyle and Faas examine and try to put into context the war’s 1969 to 1971 extension into Laos and Cambodia. This major historical contribution provides a rare view into the lives and motivation of those who reported and photographed the war. The 20 pages of photographs Faas has assembled should intrigue readers. Faas himself was seriously wounded while following Capa’s maxim: “If your pictures aren’t good enough, you’re not close enough.”

Unfortunately the book’s organization jumps around in time and subthemes. Understandably perhaps, where emotion plays a large role, the passages are sometimes overwritten. Less understandable is that
the writing occasionally sinks to the level of cliché.

As a highly personalized story of enduring friendship and, moreover, as a look at pre-digital war reporting using “typewriters” and film cameras, *Lost Over Laos* deserves its place on the bookshelf, but do not expect it to compare with such classics as Bernard B. Fall’s *Street Without Joy* (Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1994).

Pyle and Faas’s search came to an end 27 years after the crash, when they and an MIA excavation team examined a possible site. The clues they found were enigmatic: a locket, some Mildewed film without images, assorted Nikon lenses, and a misshapen, scorched Leica camera. Clearly, though, these artifacts were enough to convince the authors—and the photographer’s families—that on a remote Laotian hillside near the deserted Ho Chi Minh Trail their search was over.

George Ridge, J.D.,
University of Arizona, Tucson

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Before dawn on 26 January 1929, during an exercise called Fleet Problem Nine, the USS *Saratoga* launched a 70-plane strike force toward the Panama Canal. Shortly after the strike began, the *Saratoga* encountered four “enemy” battleships. Rather than come about and outrun the slower battleships, the *Saratoga* ignored the battleships and continued toward the planned rendezvous site for the returning strike force.

Rear Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves, who commanded the carrier group, had no alternative. That era’s poor communications and a paucity of tools for airborne navigation prevented the *Saratoga* from fleeing the enemy battleships if she were to recover her aircraft.

Unaware of the *Saratoga’s* dilemma, the strike force “attacked and destroyed” key locks on the Canal and returned safely to the carrier. Despite the limitations of the era’s technology, the exercise ended as an equivocal success.

In *All the Factors of Victory*, author Thomas Wildenberg illuminates the career and character of Reeves during the years from the Spanish-American War to the end of World War II. Reeves invented the concept of the carrier battle group, which continues to afford the United States virtual sovereignty over the seas and assures responsive carrier-based airpower anywhere. Reeves was an unlikely radical. Fastidious in his appearance, almost hidebound in his devotion to the Navy, and conservative in most things he did, Reeves saw the potential of aviation and fought hard to assure the carrier’s future in an era when battleship admirals held sway.

Reeves’ story is compelling. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1894 and joined the fleet as it was transitioning from sail and steam ironclad ships to the big-gun battle­wagons. Commissioned as an engineer when the Navy sharply divided engineers from deck officers, Reeves served aboard the USS *Oregon* as it led the chase to destroy the Spanish squadron sortieing from Santiago de Cuba. Reeves proved particularly talented at getting the most out of coal-fired power plants in turn-of-the-century warships.

Reeves was a brilliant engineer, and he became a brilliant line officer. Later, after transitioning to the line, he became an expert in the arcane problems of naval gunnery. In 1925, perceiving the potential of aviation, Reeves trained as a naval aviation observer and became the first aviation officer promoted to flag rank. Ultimately Reeves, who was a thoughtful, superb analyst and a proponent of aviation, commanded the fleet and supported the development of carrier aviation.

In publishing the first biography of this remarkable officer, Wildenberg does the Navy and military history a valuable service. Reeves left few papers behind, so Wildenberg uses a variety of sources, ranging from newspapers, official documents and accounts of Reeves in secondary sources, to piece together a compelling, lucid account.

Wildenberg’s contribution to understanding the Navy and the matter of transformation generally is valuable. Change that appears revolutionary in retrospect seems evolutionary. Reeves’ conceptual thinking not only outpaced the technology of the day, but to some extent it also drove technical innovation. His story reveals as much about the means of change as it does the effects.

Reeves’ view of the world and his obligations as an officer are best illustrated by an observation he made to his chief of staff the night before the “strike” on the Panama Canal. His chief opined that there were plenty of “brass hats” who wanted to see Reeves and the air strike fail. Reeves replied, “I know, but a commander who stops to appraise the effect of a military decision upon his personal fortunes has no right to be entrusted with a command.”

COL Gregory Fontenot, USA,
Retired, Lansing, Kansas

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In *The Weary Boys: Colonel J. Warren Keifer & the 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry*, author Thomas E. Pope blends facts and anecdotes into a readable account of the maligned 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, nicknamed “Milroy’s Weary Boys. According to Pope, the nickname was undeserved, prompting him to correct previous inaccurate portrayals of the regiment and brigade.

During operations leading up to Gettysburg, standby elements of Union General Robert Milroy’s division at Winchester, Virginia, were directly in the path of Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and did not fare well. Milroy was court martialed.

Although this book chronicles the exploits of what might be perceived as minor players in the Civil War, I recommend it to die-hard Civil War buffs.

CDR M.A. McAleenan, USNR,
N&MCRC, Denver, Colorado

Only those who were there can appreciate the horror of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Only those who survived can even attempt to explain it. Sadly, the numbers of those who survived Pearl Harbor are diminishing rapidly. Many books are available that capture the remembrances of World War II veterans. Most notable are Tom Brokaw’s books, The Greatest Generation (Random House, Westminster, MD, 1998) and The Greatest Generation Speaks (Random House, Westminster, MD, 1999).

Harry Spiller adds to the legacy with oral accounts of 24 servicemen who were at Pearl Harbor on that fateful December morning. Even though he offers no new insight into the battle or the indomitable human spirit, there is something compelling in his accounts from men who continue to feel anger, pain, and loss more than 60 years after the attack. For those who think only in terms of history and tactics, strategy and battles, this book reaffirms the triumph of the human spirit.

LTC David G. Rathgeber, USMC, Retired, Fallbrook, CA


In American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us, which is based on the 1994 Public Broadcasting System documentary “Jihad in America,” Steven Emerson reveals the fact that Islamic militants are living and thriving in the democracy they profess to abhor. Because many Middle East regimes have tough internal security services that snuff out political dissent and give no quarter, many radical organizations find it difficult to operate. They need freedom from scrutiny to raise funds, recruit, publish, and meet. Many organizations have bases in the United States and several European nations.

Emerson reveals that organizations such as Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group, Egypt’s Gammal al-Islamiyah, Lebanon’s Hizbollah, and the Pales- tinian Hamas have held major conventions in Kansas City, Oklahoma City, and Bridgeview, Illinois. Such conventions offered radical groups opportunities to strategize on a global scale.

Many Muslim advocacy groups are actually organizations for money laundering, recruiting, and pamphleteering. The organizations also target moderate or nonradical Muslims, both inside and outside the United States, for harassment or worse.

According to Emerson, the Islamic Committee for Palestine associated itself with the University of South Florida and posed as a mainstream religious group. It enjoyed a tax-exempt status, bolstered the university’s multicultural program, and escaped the scrutiny of law enforcement. In actuality, it was a haven for Palestinians supporting militant activities in the name of liberating Palestine. This kind of militant activity casts a shadow on legitimate Muslim student associations that offer members a chance to practice their faith in peace.

At an Islamic militant conference in Oklahoma City in 1988, Abdullah Shiekh Azzam, one of the first clerics to openly advocate the teachings of radicals like Muhammad Faraj, declared that “Jihad means fighting, only fighting with the sword!” One cannot understand al-Qaeda without understanding Azzam’s teachings.

Azzam, the “grandfather” of al-Qaeda, influenced Osama bin-Laden to take up the jihadist struggle.

During the 1980s Azzam founded the al-Kifaah network, also called the Maktab al-Khadamat (the services office), which brought order and organization to thousands of Arabs who had volunteered to go to war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Azzam’s organization provided safe houses, training, orientation, and transportation from the Middle East to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan.

After his assassination, Azzam’s organization grew into al-Qaeda, with Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri as its leaders.

Emerson’s book is important because it helps differentiate between the militant from the moderate Muslim and articulates the threat militant Islamic groups pose to Americans as well as to moderate and liberal Muslims. Unfortunately, Emerson tends to be lumped with Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, whose book The Rage and the Pride (New York: Rezollo International Publications, Inc., October 2002) focuses on proving the superiority of Western civilization and feeds the Islamic militant’s notion of a worldwide conspiracy against Islam.

Books such as Fallaci’s do not solve the problem of terrorism or help identify genuine threats against the United States. Still, counterterrorism specialists and Middle East foreign area officers should read this book.

LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN, Gaithersburg, Maryland


Most historians consider Confederate General George Pickett’s infantry charge at Gettysburg to be the final, desperate act of the bloodiest battle of the Civil War. In The Cavalry Battle that Saved the Union: Custer vs. Stuart at Gettysburg, Paul D. Walker reveals the apparent genius behind the plan: Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s grand scheme was to attack with infantry from the front while Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry swept into the rear of the Union formations.

In an engagement rarely mentioned in histories of the battle, Union Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer—outnumbered and at a decided disadvantage—counterattacked with 5,000 Union cavalrymen. As Confederate forces massed opposite Cemetery Ridge for the decisive assault, four brigades of rebel cavalry and artillery attacked from the rear, with the outcome of the Civil War at stake.

Walker, a 30-year veteran of armored cavalry formations, was inspired to write The Cavalry Battle that Saved the Union while a student at the Army War College. There he learned that despite involving nearly 13,000 cavalrymen from both sides, the battle rarely receives mention in

If the cavalry engagement between Stuart and Custer was so significant, why does it receive such little attention? The author does not answer the question. Quite possibly, most historians and scholars have concluded that the cavalry engagement was minor in comparison with Pickett’s charge and has been treated accordingly. But so little documented evidence exists on Custer’s and Stuart’s clash in the wooded hills south of crest ridge that Walker’s account is a valuable addition to Gettysburg’s history.

The book offers a new perspective to readers and will doubtless intrigue Civil War scholars. Followers of Civil War cavalry and the exploits of a young Custer will likely find that this volume suits their taste for mounted action. Walker’s writing style is crisp and gritty, and each page is alive with the smell of old leather. The book is an excellent niche book for those already familiar with the events of Gettysburg and a worthwhile addition to any library dedicated to documenting the battle.

MAJ Steven Leonard, USA, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

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In *Disobedience and Conspiracy in the German Army, 1918-1945*, Robert B. Kane investigates why some German military leaders obeyed and some defied German Chancellor Adolf Hitler during World War II. Kane methodically and thoroughly examines the relationship between Prussian and German militaries and political activities in the centuries before the rise of Hitler and the Third Reich.

By 1944 there were three types of military leaders in the Third Reich: conspirators, best exemplified by Colonel Klaus von Staufenberg, leader of the 20 July 1944 assassination plot; nonconspirators; and followers, such as Hitler sycophants Colonel General Alfred Jodl and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. In Kane’s view, most of the officers were nonconspirators. They were not reconciled totally with the National Socialist ideology, but they were disinclined to actively defy Hitler. In many instances, they were aware of anti-Nazi activities and did nothing.

Kane seeks to answer the dual questions of what made conspirators willing to risk their lives to resist Hitler and why nonconspirators were unable or unwilling to do so. His detailed analysis concludes that conspirators were driven primarily by a “liberal, humanistic education, a familial environment that encouraged . . . intellectual development, and a spiritual Christianity” that made moral considerations central to their lives. As for nonconspirators, their military oath of loyalty, first given in 1934, was the primary reason for their unwillingness to act. Kane focuses specifically on the importance of the oath as being representative of a mentality: it was a symbol of the relationship between the nation, its leader, and the army that overshadowed all others.

Kane’s informative, interesting, and useful study is a valuable addition to professional knowledge. He tackles the difficult issues of morality and duty and shows how officers in Hitler’s Third Reich dealt with them.

MAJ Michael A. Boden, USA, Hohenfels, Germany

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In recognition of the 60th anniversary of Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle’s raid on Japan, Brassey’s has reprinted Ted W. Lawson’s classic *Thirty Seconds over Tokyo*. Most likely, World War II enthusiasts have already read Lawson’s superb account of his role in the raid and his dramatic escape out of China. The review from the *New York Herald Tribune* of the original edition sums up the book perfectly: “It is a manly young American’s simple, straightforward record of events and impressions gathered on one of the most desperate and colorful adventures of modern times.”

I would, however, like to highlight the things Brassey’s has added to the reprint. There are twice as many photographs as in the original 1943 edition, which gives the book a more personal touch. Peter Meresky, a well-known military aviation author, has written an excellent foreword that focuses on the raid’s importance and the changes it brought to the psyches of the men on both sides. Meresky also draws the obvious parallels between Pearl Harbor and the Doolittle raid and the events of 11 September 2001 and operations in Afghanistan.

Ellen Lawson adds an introduction to her husband’s book, and although her words might have had a better effect at the end of the book (as a concluding chapter), her viewpoint adds significantly to the story. Since she was so much a part of her husband’s determination and will to escape from China, it is appropriate that we read about her feelings on the events. Such additions make an outstanding book even better and give readers a better understanding of the raid and of Lawson himself.

LTC Rick Baillergeon, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Sandwiched between the more famous battles of Sharpsburg and Chancellorsville, the Union debacle at Fredericksburg receives relatively less attention. George C. Rable rectifies this shortfall.

Rable’s approach is unusual in some ways, as he takes pains to establish the political context of the battle. He also devotes a great deal of attention to the experiences of the common soldier leading up to the battle. This approach has drawbacks, however, as Rable relates repetitive tales (from both sides) of bad food, cold weather, and exhausting marches during the weeks before the battle. After dealing so extensively with the political context and the experiences...
of common soldiers, Rable devotes only 80 pages to the actual fighting of 13 December 1862.

When Rable does focus on the actual combat at Fredericksburg, the results are excellent. His narrative is detailed, yet comprehensive. The courageous, yet hopeless, Federal assaults against Marye’s Heights is inspiring. Rable’s narrative is similar to the opening of the film Saving Private Ryan (DreamWorks, Glendale, CA, 1998) with soldiers wearing blue instead of green. The soldiers of Fredericksburg deserve to have their story told; Rable tells it well.

LTC D. Jonathan White, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


For much of the Civil War, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick C. Newhall served as provost marshal and staff officer for Union cavalry commander Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan. Written in 1866, Newhall’s memoir records events fresh in his mind. As erudite as he is at times, Newhall’s enthusiasm for Sheridan—complete with quaint limericks—borders on fawning. However, his doting does not blur the book’s primary value—demonstrating Sheridan’s excellence at the operational level of warfare as he directs the maneuver of divisions and corps to interdict Confederate troop movements and deny them the use of march routes and approaches.

Throughout the narrative, Newhall conscientiously records Sheridan’s part in key battles, including Saylor’s Creek, Dinwiddie Court House, Five Forks, and Appomattox. His inclusion of Sheridan’s troop dispatches is a valuable part of this historical record. He details Sheridan’s pursuit of retreating Confederate forces, but also sorts out divergent accounts of the same battle, where various Union generals take credit for victory.

Editor Eric J. Wittenberg, a historian and lawyer, is an expert on Sheridan and the author of Glory Enough for All: Sheridan’s Second Raid and the Battle for Trevilian Station (Brassey’s, Inc., Washington, DC, 2002). He includes several enlightening appendices to Newhall’s original work. The first one is a helpful order of battle for Union and Confederate forces in the Appomattox Campaign. A second appendix includes Union Major General Gouverneur K. Warren’s defense of his conduct at the Battle of Five Forks on 1 April 1865. (Sheridan had relieved Warren as V Corps commander for slackness in responding to attack orders.) A third appendix is Newhall’s answer to Warren. Wittenberg includes brief and interesting biographies of Union and Confederate soldiers in his footnotes, explaining obscure terms and summarizing the combat actions Newhall cites.

Another factor that makes this reprint interesting is that Newhall wrote his memoir just a year after the war’s end. His weaving Sheridan into florid literary analogies makes one wonder if Newhall was writing a preemptive broadside against Sheridan’s potential detractors.

Wittenberg is an expert historiographer, making this book an outstanding addition to studies of generalship in the Civil War’s final campaigns. By bringing Newhall’s memoir back into print, Wittenberg has done readers of this formative time in American history a genuine service.

MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF, Ramstein Airbase, Germany


The Demon in the Freezer is another medical thriller from Richard Preston, the author of the 1994 bestseller The Hot Zone: A Terrifying True Story (Anchor Press Ltd., Nelson, New Zealand, 1995). Preston shifts fire from Ebola to smallpox and from natural epidemics to manmade calamity.

Preston begins his tale with a detailed history of smallpox and its subsequent eradication via strategic vaccination. The variola virus, which causes smallpox, was officially confined to only two storage depots, one in Russia and the other at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia. These were to be the only live virus samples in the world and they were to be kept to aid in developing a better vaccine and for scientific study. Unfortunately the virus was not confined to these repositories and research was not restricted to scientific purposes. Inspections in 1991 revealed that the Russians had bred the virus, “weaponized” it, and had even developed missile delivery systems for its use as a biological weapon. The dissolution of the Soviet Union further complicates the true status of the presumably extinct virus. Who has the bug now, and who is still working on it as a weapon? Preston is convincing in putting forth the case that the genie is out of the bottle and is probably residing in weapons in Russia or China.

Preston also delves into the post-11 September 2001 anthrax attacks, using the attacks to illustrate how easily a devastating assault with smallpox could occur here. The message is ominous and sobering. Biological weapons are all too easy to acquire, develop, and employ. Sponsor states and amorphous apocalyptic terrorists like al-Qaeda could come together in a deadly combination to wreak terrible damage.

Preston writes his true tales in the same manner that Tom Clancy writes his fictional tales. Preston humanizes his scientific expertise by focusing on individual scientists, patients, physicians, and government workers. He gives an entirely dramatic account of these compelling topics, writing in a clear, forceful, engaging manner.

LTC John R. Sutherland, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Robert A. Pastor, a well-known authority on Latin America, served on President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Council and later monitored elections in Nicaragua. In Not Condemned to Repetition, The United States and Nicaragua, he emphasizes the importance of engagement
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Pakistani's leaders range from democratically elected to military dictator, from enlightened to venal, yet their effect on society has been slight because Pakistan's institutions are weak. Pakistan lives in permanent economic and social crisis. Corruption is rampant, tax avoidance common, justice problematic, decent education scarce, and social welfare programs nonexistent.

Pakistan is a poor country with a 45 percent adult literacy rate. The country has a large population of young people who have little education or prospects. The best and brightest students go abroad for university education — and do not return. Pakistan's upperclass is split between the West and those in Pakistan who run the family businesses.

Pakistan's first allegiance is to its ethnic groups and clans. The military holds the country together and often takes over the government when politicians seem unable to govern efficiently. Military government, while not particularly efficient, has proven more effective and capable of delivering change. In many respects, the military is the state.

The current leader, General Perez Musharraf, is a modern, intelligent leader who seized power and rules through the military yet hopes to reinsert democratic rule. He opposes Islamic fundamentalism and the establishment of a theocracy, yet his initiatives fail to make headway against rising radical Islam. His opinions are limited and Pakistan's problems are many, so it is difficult to be optimistic about the future of Pakistan or the region.

This is one of two books that will help the reader understand Pakistan. The other is Brian Cloughley's A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000).

Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Stephen J. Cimbala’s book The Dead Volcano: The Background and Effects of Nuclear War Complacency discusses nuclear relations between the United States and the Russian Federation in the wake of the Cold War. The title is significant; it is based on a parable the author provides: “Just because people live on the side of a volcano and the volcano has not erupted for some time does not mean that the volcano will never erupt.” Just because nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 does not mean that they could not be used again.
Most of the book deals with the various treaties (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Antiballistic Missile Treaty, and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) between the United States and the former Soviet Union. As the successor state to the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation controls the majority of the nuclear weapons that belonged to the Soviet Union. Agreements to reduce the numbers of these weapons have been ongoing for some time.

Although Cimbala lays out Dead Volcano thematically, he has arranged it chronologically, detailing exhaustive calculations relating to the hypothetical use of nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia. The book’s weakness is that the topic of nuclear relations changes quickly, and it is arguable that there is more of a threat from smaller states than from Russia.

The book’s main strength lies in hypothetical facts and figures, and the chapter about the spread of nuclear weapons to countries outside the current nuclear family is quite relevant, since it is based on current world events. The chapter discusses the possibility of nonnuclear countries producing nuclear weapons with special attention given to North Korea and Iraq. Cimbala underscores the fact that Pakistan and India, which have nuclear weapons now, are striving to produce more powerful weapons that have longer ranges.

Dead Volcano adds value to the defense community in its analysis of nuclear relations; something everyone in the defense community should be at least familiar with and concerned about. The book might not appeal to a general audience because of its technical tone, but it is relevant, and anyone with an interest in peace studies, foreign policy, or military affairs should read it.

CPL David J. Schepp, Fort Benning, Georgia


Serving Two Masters: The Development of American Military Chaplaincy, 1860-1920, is a history of U.S. military chaplaincy in the Army and Navy. Richard M. Budd analyzes six periods in the chaplaincy’s development: colonial, Civil War, post-Civil War, Spanish American, World War I, and post-World War I. He discusses how the chaplaincy evolved and how the military relates to chaplains. He also examines the different denominations and how they relate within the Chaplain Corps and the Armed Forces.

The book gives a keen perspective on Army chaplaincy. Discussions concerning rank, uniforms, relationships with enlisted soldiers, and relationships with commanders sound familiar although the dialog might have occurred 100 years ago.

I recommend this book to all chaplains and their assistants, especially those new to the Chaplain Corps. It should be on the reading list for the Chaplain Officer Basic Course and the chaplain’s assistant Advance Individual Training.

CH (LTC) Thomas C. Condry, USA, Conyers, Georgia


Gerald Nicosia, a former draft resistor who felt he had “a moral duty not to fight in Vietnam,” tells how a handful of disillusioned veterans formed the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). The book addresses an area in the war’s history that has received little attention. Over a 10-year period, Nicosia interviewed 600 men who had served in the Vietnam war and who became active in the antiwar movement or worked as veterans’ advocates.

Although Nicosia is not a historian, one would expect that he would handle the topic in a fair, objective manner; however, he did not. The perception that he would be unbiased was quickly dispelled when he described in the prologue the “dreaded lifelong stigma of the Vietnam veteran.” Such emotional generalizations pervade the book, revealing that Nicosia is more advocate than anything else. He clearly empathizes with VVAW leaders such as Jan Barry, Larry Rottman, Scott Camill, Al Hubbard, and Ron Kovic and is almost fawning in his description of what he calls their “thirty years of activism, readjustment, and healing,” paying scant attention to other less confrontational Vietnam veterans groups.

Nicosia also addresses the battles that returning veterans had with the Veterans Administration (VA). Many abuses occurred in the treatment of Vietnam veterans at the hands of the VA and other government agencies over the issues of Agent Orange and post-traumatic stress disorder. However, Nicosia throws away any chance to provide an objective critique of these abuses by continually citing the stereotypical statistics about Vietnam veterans and their rates of drug abuse, homelessness, suicide, unemployment, and crime. In most cases, these statistics have been proven grossly inaccurate. Lapsing into an emotionalism that pervades this large book, Nicosia passionately attacks the VA when he could have been more effective by simply stating what happened. Unfortunately, his message is lost in all the passion.

Veterans who came back from Vietnam and protested against America’s continued involvement in the war certainly had the hard-won right to organize and protest if they so chose. Their story deserves to be told in a fair and objective manner. Nicosia has failed in his effort to do so. For this reason, I do not recommend the book.

James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


What is the space shuttle’s future? How will NASA recover from the February 2003 space shuttle disaster? Are the answers to these questions hidden in the past?

To Reach the High Frontier: A History of U.S. Launch Vehicles describes the history and the tragedies and triumphs of NASA and the military. The book details how science fiction has turned into reality. The
heroes are the scientists, inventors, designers, project managers, and visionaries who saw the potential of rockets. The biggest hero is President John F. Kennedy, whose national goal of sending a man to the moon and back energized the development of rockets and encouraged civilian and military cooperation.

This well-footnoted book details the history of U.S. rockets and propellants from World War II to modern space flights when there were amazing advances in fuels, engines, targeting, materials, and rocket bodies; however, the high cost of these developments forced the space program to develop a reusable platform—the space shuttle.

The space shuttle is America’s primary vehicle into space for the near future. The best way to help NASA recover from the latest disaster is to have a goal that can again inspire and captivate the Nation into looking even further into space.

MAJ Herman Reinhold, USAF, Yokota Airbase, Japan.


Written by a former business professor at George Washington University (GWU) and two Air Force captains who earned their masters’ degrees at GWU, Continuity Management: Preserving Corporate Knowledge and Productivity When Employees Leave tackles a pressing issue for military units: personnel turnover. Major Donald Vandergriff previously called attention to the problem of personnel turnover in The Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs (Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 2002), and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker argued for a move to “unit manning” in a speech at the Association of the U.S. Army Annual Meeting in October 2003.

Hamilton Beazley and Captains Jeremiah Boenisch and David Harden propose a solution to this problem. In some ways, unit standing operating procedures and continuity files accomplish some of the objectives that the authors develop in Continuity Management, but the authors take the subject of personnel turnover much further. Citing evidence about the productivity and resources lost through personnel turnover, they make a strong case for the dangers and costs of lost knowledge. For Army officers and noncommissioned officers who have seen the difficulties that turnover creates in units across the Army, this is hardly a difficult case to make.

As the authors proceed with their proposal, it becomes clear that continuity management will take considerable time and effort for organization’s choosing to adopt the strategy. The authors argue that the practice of continuity management is more than just another management fad, but I am not entirely convinced.

Although the book is fairly easy to read, it might not hold the attention of Army readers who cannot implement these serious reforms. Readers with interests in preserving unit knowledge might find the book useful and integrate the practices into their work. For the most part, however, continuity management seems too ambitious for most leaders or staff officers to adopt.

In the future, as information operations become more critical for Army units and private corporations, these techniques might be part of larger information management or knowledge management responsibilities. However, it is unlikely that continuity management will dominate unit policies to the extent the authors advocate.

CPT Matthew J. Morgan, USA, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
to Korean, U.S. military, and Soviet source documentation. Armstrong reviewed over 1.6 million pages of documents that U.S. forces captured during the Korean War. The book is not easy to read, but it provides a wealth of factual information and historical background that increases the persistent reader’s understanding of North Korea’s communist history and present idiosyncrasies.

Armstrong attempts to dispel the traditional Western view that communist North Korea is the creation and puppet regime of the Soviets. He delineates an important, yet limited, Soviet role in the early years of North Korea’s communist government. In Armstrong’s view, the Soviet and North Korean relationship is better defined as the “Koreanization” of Soviet communism, rather than the “Sovietization” of North Korea. While Armstrong acknowledges Soviet and Chinese influences in the formation and early development of communist North Korea, he argues that there was an independent and uniquely Korean adaptation of Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese influences that resulted in the complete transformation of North Korean society between 1945 and 1950.

Armstrong devotes substantial attention to other important facets of North Korea’s history, including the cult of Kim II Sung; the role of film, literature, and education in shaping the North Korean people to a communist model; the Korean participation in Chinese guerrilla activities in Manchuria against Japanese occupation forces; and the communists’ effective use of land reform and other programs to garner party support from the lower societal classes.

The book is probably more appealing as a reference or a serious reading assignment for avid political science or Korean history enthusiasts than it is to military historians or soldiers. However, while the average reader might not want to read the entire book, he will find that Armstrong has divided the book into logical chapters that make specific aspects of North Korean history readily accessible.

CPT Jeffrey J. Kuebler, USA, Lexington, Kentucky


Peter Singer’s One World: The Ethics of Globalization deals with global warming, world trade, international law, and the concept of community. The book concludes with a call for a better world. If all this sounds familiar, it should. Globalization has been extensively examined from the political perspective. However, Singer takes an ethical rather than the customary political approach in his writing.

To Singer, ethics is a modified utilitarianism, something he calls “consequentialism,” which requires that benefits must outweigh cost; even legal actions can be unethical if they violate this rule. Under consequentialism, the nation-state falls short because it is unjust in matters of ecology, economics, justice, humanitarian aid, and other human concerns. Current world organizations are insufficient. Even the UN is invalid because it is not based on any expression of popular will.

Throughout the book, Singer uses the United States as the epitome of what needs to change, and sees such actions as ethically unacceptable in a world becoming increasingly international. For example, he stresses that the United States—

- Refuses to ratify the Kyoto Treaty on global warming and is by far the worst emitter of greenhouse gases.
- Contributes little foreign aid or charitable giving and what it does give is pathetically inadequate.
- Participates only in world bodies it dominates.
- Operates under the obsolete nationalistic cliché that “might makes right.”

The book might seem peripheral to the concerns of the military because the military is one of the last bastions of nationalism in an increasingly international world. However, the military of the future has to support those interventions that the international community finds valid. Those who put their lives on the line would be wise to have a legitimate, livable rationale for what they do. They will be committing themselves to war for people far away—true strangers, culturally and religiously. The simplistic fighting for “the good old U.S.A.” is sliding into the dustbin of history, and those who live in the 21st century should be aware of this.

John H. Barnum, Ph.D., Yukon, Oklahoma


Herman Knell, a retired Canadian citizen, was a teenage German boy during World War II. The Allies “area bombed” his hometown of Wurzburg, Germany, during the last weeks of World War II, killing 5,000 civilians and leaving 90,000 homeless.

Knell’s personal experiences of losing his family home in one area and his family’s business in another gave him a lifelong desire to find out why his particular city was bombed, even though it had no apparent military value and its destruction served only to impede the Allies’ post-war recovery efforts. He also wanted to know whether the concept of city bombing has any moral or legal support. The former question is a footnote to history, but multiplied a hundred times or more, it raises serious questions for historians when they evaluate the decisions of war. The latter question has implications to all who conduct war now and in the future.

Knell gives a tight, simplified version of the development of air war strategy by the Allies, from World War I through World War II. He describes how the British, victims of German area bombing in World War I, had to disproportionately transfer resources from their military venture to protect citizens and how, at first, German terrorism seemed to determine even high-level British war policy.

Britain advocated intensive area bombing to destroy enemy morale, while America advocated daytime precision bombing against key industrial targets. Knell’s research shows a lesser known point: elements of the U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) also advocated area bomb-
Ethical Decisionmaking

BRIG N.B. Grant, AVSM, Retired, Pune, India — In "Officership: Character, Leadership, and Ethical Decisionmaking" (Military Review March-April 2003), Major Charles A. Pfaff poses the following problem: “A platoon is on a rescue mission. Two members of the platoon are trapped on a hill and under fire. Both soldiers are seriously wounded; within a few hours, they will be dead. Between the platoon and the two soldiers is a minefield, which the platoon must breach or go around if they are to get to the trapped soldiers in time. As the platoon leader ponders his options, he notices a civilian picking his way through the minefield. Obviously he knows where the mines are. The lieutenant detains the civilian, but the man refuses to lead the platoon through the minefield. The lieutenant offers several enticements to get the man to cooperate, but the man continues to refuse. There is no way he is going back through the minefield. The lieutenant must make a decision that he had hoped to avoid. There are rules for situations like this, but if he follows them, good men will die... “The lieutenant in the scenario has a choice. He can torture or threaten to torture the civilian into cooperating, or he can decide to not torture or threaten to torture the civilian and effectively leave his men to die. Unfortunately for the lieutenant, the decision is not a simple one. If he chooses the first option, he violates the law of war. If he chooses the second option, he will have directly contributed to his men’s deaths”[66].

My answer to the lieutenant’s dilemma is simple; follow the Indian Military Academy’s credo, attributed to Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode: “The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time.” (See on-line at <www.image.org/>, accessed 19 November 2003.)

By threatening or torturing the civilian into cooperating, thereby saving the lives of his men, the lieutenant best serves the interest of his country and the men under his command, even if this means violating the law of war—and possibly paying the price with his career.

Deuce-Four Lacking

Ferdinand E. Banks, Department of Economics, The University of Uppsala (Sweden)—In September-October 2003, Military Review published “The 24th Infantry Regiment: The ‘Deuce-Four’ in Korea,” by Lieutenant Colonel Bradley Biggs, [U.S. Army, Retired], who commanded a company in the 24th Infantry Regiment—an all black company—during the Korean war.

Biggs described equipment shortages in his company when it arrived in Korea. According to Biggs, the company lacked everything except personal weapons. These days it is possible to hear a great deal about
things like the lack of training in Japan and equipment shortages in Korea.

I left the 24th Infantry Regiment about 7 months before the Korean war started. During my 15 months with the regiment, I was a squad and section leader of machineguns and 75-millimeter recoilless rifles. I was also in the 81-millimeter mortar platoon. I do not remember any equipment shortages in our company or any other company in the regiment.

As for the training, after I was fired from my engineering job in Los Angeles, I reenlisted in 1953. I do not recall the training I received at that time as being any better than that I received when I was in Japan.

Since my days with the 24th, I have held professorships in economics and finance in about 10 countries, and I expect to receive another visiting position soon. Much of my time is spent researching military sections of libraries, and I am amazed at the nonsense that is printed about the Korean and Vietnam wars. What you do not expect, however, is to find this kind of nonsense in the Military Review.

Let me solve the mystery of why things were the way they were in the early days of that war. The United States did not immediately send every combat aircraft they had to Korea. As for the reason why they did not—well, as a former member of the “deuce-four” who considers himself the best economics teacher in the world, I am not interested.

Rebuttal—“Duece-Four”

Lieutenant Colonel Bradley Biggs, U.S. Army, Retired — I will not reply in detail here [to Mr. Banks]. I do not want to start a “slug-fest.”

Kudos for “Duece-Four”