The Interagency Education System

By

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United States Army War College
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The Interagency Education System

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The Interagency (IA) education system remains ad hoc, inefficient, and sometimes ineffective. In the last decade, calls for transformation have been submitted, to include the introduction of Congressional legislation to establish programs to develop a National Security Professional, who can operate effectively in the IA continuum. The Whole-of-Government (WoG) approach requires codification, institutional training and education, and most importantly, a cultural paradigm shift. More times than not, the interagency process is driven by key personalities, who build ad hoc organizations with representatives of multiple agencies/departments to solve complex problems. Why does the U.S. Government continue to operate in this manner? In order to implement change, we have to establish training and education early in an individuals’ respective career field in order to expose them to different organizational structures, missions, capabilities, and most importantly, cultures.

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Why does the U.S. Government continue to operate in this manner? In order to implement change, we have to establish training and education early in an individuals’ respective career field in order to expose them to different organizational structures, missions, capabilities, and most importantly, cultures.
"The military Services are but a part of the national machinery of peace or war. An effective national security policy calls for active, intimate and continuous relationships not alone between the military services themselves but also between the military services and many other departments and agencies of Government."

--Ferdinand Eberstadt to James Forrestal, 1947

Background

Over the course of the last decade, I have been fortunate to serve in multiple positions that required interaction in the interagency (IA) process. These opportunities have led me to the Washington D.C. area, multiple U.S. Embassies in the Middle East, Africa and Iraq. Initially, I was concerned that my lack of experience with the other departments and agencies that support the National Security framework would be troublesome. As a result, I participated in what I term as “IA 101”. This was a compilation of short visits to the primary actors I would be working with in order to become familiar with their organizational structure, roles, responsibilities, and most importantly, capabilities that I could leverage in support of our assigned mission.

As I became immersed in the interagency process, I quickly determined that the majority of the other participants were much less familiar with not only the structure, roles, responsibilities and capabilities of the Department of Defense, but also those of the other departments and agencies inherent in the IA process. Additionally, our whole-of-government partners did not have any type of orientation to familiarize them with the respective actors who contribute to the designated overall mission. This is most notable in the context of our National Security framework, but is certainly applicable in multiple
contexts, given the complex environment of 21st Century diplomacy, negotiation, and global business.

During the seven years from 2005 to 2011, I became known as a “repeat offender”, one who is assigned, detailed, or volunteers to repeatedly operate in the IA environment. I was one of a few dozen mid-career to senior level personnel who were designated as such. Unfortunately, as I continued to rotate through various positions of responsibility within the IA process, I witnessed more and more of the repeat offender positions devolve to first-time personnel. They possessed minimal, if any, orientation on the organizational structure, roles, responsibilities and capabilities of the respective IA participants. Ironically, after years of the IA operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, the government continues to call for improved interagency collaboration. There are multiple articles by leading experts, and various studies and commissions which claim we are not much better than we were at the turn of the century. This includes documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2012 National Defense Strategic Guidance (NDSG), and the FY11 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Congressional legislation and multiple military doctrinal manuals outline the need for improved interagency collaboration, not only now, but well into the future. Yet the Government does not possess a framework for educating and training our professionals at the basic, intermediate, or senior levels that builds upon each preceding level of education. In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the whole-of-government approach is emphasized:
We are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly. We are also improving coordinated planning and policymaking and must build our capacity in key areas where we fall short. This requires close cooperation with Congress and a deliberate and inclusive interagency process, so that we achieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitor operations, policies, and strategies. However, work remains to foster coordination across departments and agencies. Key steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination.

Clearly the need for the education and training of our interagency personnel is paramount. Some of our government agencies recognize this requirement and have developed customized curricula to orient and train designated personnel in the IA process. The U.S. Army Capstone Concept presents our Army’s requirements in the 2016-2028 timeframe. It describes “How the future all-volunteer Army will conduct operations as part of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational team.” I believe that we are trying to institute such increased control over the process that respective institutions (agencies and departments) resist this change due to the respective organization’s cultures.

The U.S. government does not need to build another organization to provide oversight to the interagency, but rather institute systems and processes that forge an interagency curriculum within each organization. The curriculum should be introduced at the basic education level to all professionals and continues through the intermediate and senior levels of an individual’s professional career in the organization. This
curriculum will introduce other actors within the interagency, their respective roles and missions, how they contribute to the overall goal of the U.S. Government (USG) and, most importantly, how each respective organization can leverage the other organizations’ capabilities to contribute to their mission. Such a curriculum will create cultural change within each department or agency at the entry level. The cultural change will build upon itself as professionals acquire diverse experience and are exposed to other government departments and agencies throughout their careers and will be reinforced through formal education processes at the mid-career and senior levels of service.

The benefit of such education and training programs impact not only national security professionals, but all governmental professionals. The one thing that is certain about our future complex environment is that the USG will continue to operate across multiple agencies, intergovernmental and multinational alike, whether dealing with national security threats, globalization, or climate change. Given the nature of the global environment, our fiscal challenges and force restructuring to eliminate redundancy, the importance of interagency coordination and collaboration significantly increases.

Reform is Difficult

Why is the interagency process so challenging? One would think that in today’s complex environment, the USG would be able to set aside bureaucratic differences in order to accomplish the goals and objectives of “Team America.” Dr. Richard Stewart, the Chief Historian of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, functionally lays the blame on the creators of our Nation. “The Founding Fathers were more interested in preventing an efficient government than they were in creating something that would
function smoothly.”4 The separation of powers ensures checks and balances across the branches of government. It also provides the framework for the respective cabinet leaders to respectfully protect their organizational interests and not adhere to directed policy initiatives with which they may disagree.5 “This underlying dynamic ensures interagency friction and presents an institutional and cultural barrier to force different parts of the Interagency to work together.”6

If we consider a few of the agencies represented in the scope of national security (Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Treasury and the Intelligence Community (IC)), we see that the cultures of these organizations are vastly different. Let’s consider the Department of State (DoS), who is responsible for all U.S. interests abroad, not just in the national security realm. They possess a fraction of the number of people employed and their budget is a small percentage as compared to the Department of Defense (DoD). Similar comparisons can be depicted of the other agencies, except for the intelligence community budget which has grown significantly during the last few years (FY2006 $40.9 Billion, FY2013 $52.6 Billion).7,8 As a result of significant budget differences and the ethos of organizations, little if any resources are devoted to the education of the other actors in the interagency.

So what do we do in the absence of legislation that would take 20 years to affect the various cultures involved in the interagency process? Our focus should be on improving the quality of all government professionals through “the expansion of training and educational structures, opportunities, and funding.”9 We should not have to wait another twenty years if legislation were passed today.
**National Security Act of 1947**

The National Security Act of 1947 essentially established the requirements for interagency coordination. It prescribes that this legislation will "provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security."\(^{10}\) It directed the reorganization of the foreign policy and military departments of the U.S. Government. This reorganization created the framework to assist the Executive Branch in developing and enacting foreign policy. The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council and Staff, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency.\(^{11}\) It is also the system on which our IA process was founded. It is over 65 years old, developed primarily to use DoD capabilities, and it nested with the national security strategy of the period. Today's national security strategy emphasizes the whole-of-government approach to advance U.S. goals and objectives.

**Cultural Differences**

As we look at the various writings on the interagency, one of the significant common denominators is the existing cultures of the respective agencies and departments who participate in the IA process. Problems identified with the IA culture are stovepipes, redundant capabilities and ironclad protection of resources. This will become more prominent as the fiscal realities of the future become clearer. As we tackle these realities, we have to look hard at the root of this cultural issue as described by the scholar Sunil Desai, "The interagency community is dominated by individual agency cultures rather than a common interagency culture."\(^{12}\)
Each of the agencies possesses their own organizational culture which is characterized by Desai as “different sets of values, goals, policies, and procedures, as well as leadership and decision-making methods.” Progress has been made in areas of counterterrorism with the establishment of various Joint Interagency Coordination Groups and Task Forces, yet in order to effectively integrate a whole-of-government approach to all policy and strategy initiatives, paradigm shifts will have to occur internally. Each agency will need to adopt a vision of the common interagency culture versus the parochial individual culture. They can retain the characteristics that make them unique, but in order to truly see progress, they need to join “Team America.”

Additionally, each agency puts minimal effort into education opportunities. Culture perpetuates this lack of effort. Agencies prefer to send their professionals, not to long term education courses, but rather short term courses and on-the-job development by mentors. The belief is that the majority of personnel who work for their respective agencies are not going to be associated with the IA process, thus there is not an overwhelming need to implement programs that appeal to the masses.

The common interagency culture, which Desai writes, can only be implemented internally by each agencies leadership. “A strong interagency culture would provide the fundamental basis for the interagency community to work together as a cohesive whole without merging or marginalizing individual agencies.” This would increase the effectiveness of the collaboration and coordination that takes place between agencies.

In order to implement cultural shifts, the agencies have to be exposed to other agencies in standardized environments, not just ad hoc organizations put together to solve specific problems. This exposure, through assignment, detail, or exchange allows
our IA professionals to understand firsthand the roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and cultures of the IA organizations. We will discover that we are more similar than different. This will build a unity of effort that transcends over time and hierarchical levels of the bureaucracy. The “repeat offenders” previously identified have experienced this dynamic. They also return to their parent organization and provide insight to the other personnel on their experiences, which in turn is an informal education system. Over time, the common interagency culture becomes more important than the individual agency culture.

**Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 Part 2?**

Numerous experts have called for interagency legislation comparable to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act was a result of multiple commissions that identified the individual services of the U.S. military were extremely parochial in nature, the Joint Chiefs of Staff lacked jointness, and the responsibilities and authorities of the unified and specified commanders were not commensurate with their assigned missions.\(^{15}\) This was experienced during the Vietnam War, demonstrated during the failed mission to rescue American citizens being held hostage in Iran in April 1980, and saw little improvement during military operations in Grenada in October 1983. The Goldwater-Nichols act provided multiple purposes to improve the effective and efficient joint warfighting capabilities of the U.S. military. It created unity of effort for planning and the operational employment of all military assets. This unity of effort is not inherent in IA operations.

An issue that we have to consider with regards to a Goldwater-Nichols like initiative within the interagency is the amount of time required to truly change cultures.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act has taken over two decades to be implemented across our services, which are effectively like-minded with respect to education and culture.\textsuperscript{16} For example, the Navy granted joint education and assignment waivers for Flag officers as recently as 2005, nine years after Goldwater-Nichols required it.\textsuperscript{17} If we apply this type of time consideration, how many decades will it take for the U.S. Government to inculcate the IA process into each of the organizations responsible for the interagency?

Some experts suggest legislation the solution is a combination of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 for the entire U.S. Government. Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard suggest such “legislation would institutionalize the interagency process by mandating structural and cultural changes”.\textsuperscript{18} Additionally, they state, this type of legislation would “develop policy options, implement strategies, and integrate Government actions.”\textsuperscript{19} As previously discussed on how reform is difficult, our nation does not have two decades to institutionalize such legislation, even if it could be approved.

One of the other purposes of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, many experts feel is comparable to today’s interagency challenge, is the identification and management of joint officer qualification and assignment. Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act established a joint officer specialty code. This directed specific personnel management practices to ensure that the best officers were properly educated in the appropriate joint schooling, assigned to joint duty positions, and the resulting promotion rates would be, at a minimum, equal to the promotion rates of their peers within their respective armed force.\textsuperscript{20} Over the course of the past 25 years, the Goldwater-Nichols act has attracted or compelled many high quality officers to perform duties on joint staffs. These experts
believe that a similar mandate for the interagency professional would increase the education and training opportunities, incentivize the promotion opportunities, and affect the gradual shift of cultures that is required.

**Proposed National Security Professional Legislation**

Over the last few years, Representative Geoff Davis of Kentucky has been a significant advocate of Congressional legislation to increase efficiency and effectiveness of the interagency process. He has co-authored multiple articles and two pieces of legislation pertaining to the interagency. In September of 2010, Rep. Davis and Rep. Ike Skelton introduced the “Interagency National Security Professional Education, Administration, and Development (INSPEAD) System Act of 2010 (H.R. 6249).” On 23 June 2011, Rep. Davis and Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced the “Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 (H.R. 2314, S. 1268)” into their respective houses of Congress. H.R. 6249 was referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform where it subsequently died. H.R. 2314 has not progressed past the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, yet S.1268 did pass, in the Fall of 2011, through the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental. The Rotational Act requires personnel who serve in positions with interagency components to “participate in training and education to further break down cultural hurdles interagency operations face.” If the Rotational Act is implemented, it will enhance the understanding of our interagency professionals by exposing them to “the roles, functions, authorities, cultures, and resources of agencies involved, and ensure maximum interagency cohesion.” It is similar to the INSPEAD Act (H.R.6249). Six months passed after it was sent to the Senate for consideration, and the Senate
took no action. This is indicative of the majority of efforts to reform the interagency process; it languishes with little action, is ignored, or dies, which is another indicator of the difficulty to reform this most difficult process.

**The Joint Operating Environment**

Multiple military documents describe what our leaders envision as the future environment in which our military forces will be present and active. The common denominators of the future global environment are complex, ambiguous, and partnered.\(^27\) The partnership is not only with Host Nation offices, but primarily interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national organizations. Also, the use of military forces is but one option on the menu of national power.\(^28\) We know from current and past conflicts, and the environment we envision in the future, that in order to be successful, the U.S. Government agencies and departments require common visions, goals, and purposes to create synergy for success.\(^29\) Synergy can only be achieved with each of the interagency actors understanding the roles and core competencies of the other actors in order to fully leverage each other’s capabilities.

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) lays out broad principles for our joint forces. These principles are not entirely military centric, but also apply to the organizations of the interagency. The first principle the CCJO cites for all successful operations is “Achieve and maintain unity of effort within the joint force and between the joint force and U.S. government, international, and other partners.”\(^30\) Of course there are implications pertaining to educating and training the military as we adhere to the concepts of the CCJO. One of the identified implications is that we have to “markedly
improve the ability to integrate with other U.S. agencies and other partners." In turn, the U.S. Army cites the following within the Army Operating Concept:

*Army forces must be able to communicate with and employ interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partner capabilities at the lowest practical echelon. Army leaders must understand both the capabilities and limitations of partners to integrate them effectively in the planning and execution of operations.*

These documents clearly articulate the requirements for the introduction of interagency actors into the professional military education system at the entry level in order to build upon accumulated training and experiences in the challenging future environment. Since the military recognizes and identifies these requirements, the other IA organizations would be well served to establish education programs that educate their professionals at different points in their respective career paths.

**Existing Educational Programs**

The events of the last decade have increased the emphasis and visibility of interagency education opportunities. These opportunities primarily exist within the Department of State and the Department of Defense, yet according to career Foreign Service Officer John Dyson, there are “no codified set of courses and/or assignments that lead to professional-level education in interagency operations.” In May of 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order 13434 (National Security Professional Development) stating “it is the policy of the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions (security professionals) in executive departments and agencies (agencies).” As we can see, the requirement for interagency education has visibility from the highest levels
of government. We now need to implement that requirement into programs that sufficiently educate our professionals.

There are multiple types and levels of courses that relate to the interagency. In 2010, Congressman John Tierney, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, requested a Government Accountability Office study on the available professional development opportunities for improved interagency collaboration. He requested the report due to his concern over “the limitations of agencies’ ability to communicate effectively and the agencies’ capacity to collaborate.” Interagency professional development opportunities vary in length and focus, of which DOD and the State Department are the primary providers. The report provides insight into the interagency professional development programs. The programs and courses vary across the different agencies from online web based education to resident education at a university or military institution. A number of Congressmen and Senators endorsed the GAO report as they seek to provide our national security professionals the necessary education and training to operate outside the lines of their respective agencies.

The following two charts provide an overview of the types of courses and programs available to the interagency. Significant participation data within these two tables is represented in the last column “Percentage from Other Agencies.” It identifies many programs and education courses are limited in the scope of participants. Even though we espouse “whole-of-government” externally, we still find it difficult to identify, select, and send the right people to the courses. The majority of courses and programs have very few attendees, if any, from the other agencies within our government.
Ironically the one course that had 100% participation from other agencies was on Food Security sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This may be an indicator of how we view the IA education system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Providing agency</th>
<th>Program name</th>
<th>GS-7 – 12; FS 6-4; O-1 – O-4</th>
<th>GS-13 – 15; FS 3-1; O-5 – O-6</th>
<th>SES; SL/ST; SFS; O-7-O-10</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage from other agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Defense Senior Leader Development Program</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Not open to other agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Executive Leader Development Program</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Defense Information Systems Agency Executive Leadership Development Program</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Not open to other agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD/NDU</td>
<td>Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Program for Emerging Leaders</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD/NDU</td>
<td>Information Resources Management College, Advanced Management Program: Government Strategic Leadership Certificate</td>
<td>GS-12</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Ambassadorial Seminar</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Not open to other agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission/Principal Officer Seminar</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Not open to other agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Interagency Effectiveness: Strategies and Best Practices</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Interagency Policy Seminar Series</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Senior Executive Threshold Seminar</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>National Security Executive Leadership Seminar</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Chart 1.)
### Participation Levels and Selected Characteristics of Short-Term Training Courses by Providing Agency Approximate FY 2009 participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Providing agency and subject matter</th>
<th>Number of Courses</th>
<th>Participant time commitment (range)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage from outside of providing agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Online Courses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS’s Emergency Management Institute</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30 minutes – 5 hours</td>
<td>226,590</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Response Framework, National Incident Management System, Incident Command System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1-57 hours</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint military and humanitarian operations, roles and responsibilities of partner agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total online courses and participation levels</strong></td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td>228,460</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Classroom courses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State or State’s Foreign Service Institute</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2 days – 12 weeks</td>
<td>9,050</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction and stabilization, foreign assistance, predeployment orientation, economic and commercial activity, crisis management abroad, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1–4 weeks</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction and stabilization, homeland security planning, planning in a collaborative environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 days and 2 weeks</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict mitigation, reconstruction and stabilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 week</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement, explosives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co provided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 day – 8 weeks</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear safety and security (DOE and DOD), physical security (DOD and State)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons safety and security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5 days</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of nation’s food supply</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26 hours</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist financing and financial crimes policy issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not open to other agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total classroom courses and participation levels</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Choice between classroom and online</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD NDU Information Resources Management College</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5 days classroom or 10-12 weeks online</td>
<td>190e</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications, organizational culture, and national security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Chart 2.)
Analysis

Throughout the course of my research on this topic, it is widely recognized that the need for increased and improved interagency education and training exists on a large scale, but we have made it too difficult to execute. Congressional initiatives, comparisons to the Goldwater-Nichols Act for joint military education and training, and multiple studies and commissions recommend the development and implementation of a better system for educating our interagency professionals, yet the members of the Interagency are hesitant to initiate standardized education to their professionals. With respect to the national security professional, various courses have been developed and customized for specific requirements. Many of these courses exist online, thus not providing the level of subject matter interaction and experience that would be expected of our professionals.

An additional challenge that exists throughout our whole-of-government educational approach is the lack of capacity for personnel investment in the IA educational effort. Educational opportunities exist across a variety of topics and programs, but the numbers of available personnel are limited due to organizational priorities and requirements. Departmental priorities will require realignment in order to increase the number of people becoming educated in the interagency process. This will become ever more difficult as resources become scarcer, requirements increase, and the need to protect one’s “rice bowl” intensifies.

Other than the topic of national security, our government conducts a broad spectrum of other business that requires interagency knowledge, coordination, and collaboration. These requirements should drive the need for the development of
interagency education, outside the national security framework, disaster relief or large scale humanitarian assistance efforts. The defense specialist James Carafano writes, “No Federal activity requires a more solid grounding than operations involving multiple agencies, requiring great coordination. The capacity of agencies to act collectively has become a core competence of government. Today, however, few individuals in government have the skills needed to create national enterprise solutions to national problems.”

Introducing the interagency actors and process to the respective professional education programs would develop a common understanding of knowledge and of problem sets, which in turn creates trust and confidence across organizations. Without the education of our professionals, we will continue to lack the knowledge of the other IA actors, particularly as the budget is decreased and organizations restructure. As Carafano notes, “Doctrine does little good unless it is taught to people who are capable of and practiced in executing it.”

**Conclusion**

It is critical to develop, initiate, and execute interagency education and training into our whole-of-government efforts within each agency. All agencies must open the opportunities to other agencies and promote the benefit of understanding and participating in the IA process. This will create momentum for our interagency actors to recognize that the whole-of-government effort is necessary for successful conduct and execution of U.S. policy and strategy. Each agency must introduce the interagency concept early in a professional’s career and build upon the basic foundation throughout one’s career with educational opportunities at military institutions, civilian universities and the development of internal programs within departments and agencies that allow
all professionals access to education. We should not wait for our professional officers to be senior in rank before exposing them to the interagency. Investment in our human capital is a requirement. Exposing our personnel early and often to the interagency process will allow them to gain foundational knowledge of the other interagency actors, develop a broad network of professionals outside of their respective agency, and provide a return on investment for our Nation as we continue to meet complex challenges in the future environment.

Endnotes

1 In a letter from Ferdinand Eberstadt, former chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board to James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy and later first Secretary of Defense. Quoted in David J. Rothkoph, *Running the World*, Public Affairs, New York, 2005.


13 Desai, “Solving the Interagency Puzzle”.

14 Desai, “Solving the Interagency Puzzle”.


To create a system to educate, train, and develop interagency national security professionals across the Government; to require personnel selected for senior-level interagency national security positions to meet interagency education, training, and experience requirements; to provide appropriate interagency training, education, and assignment opportunities for national security professionals throughout their careers; and to authorize funds and create program structures for implementation of the system.


To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Government by providing for greater interagency experience among national security and homeland security personnel through the development of a national security and homeland security human
capital strategy and interagency rotational service by employees, and for other purposes.


The foreseeable future promises to be an era of persistent conflict -- a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate entities, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political ends. The future is unlikely to unfold as steady-state peace punctuated by distinct surges of intense conflict. Rather, the major initiatives of U.S. foreign policy -- major war, strategic deterrence, foreign humanitarian assistance, security cooperation, and so on -- are all likely to unfold against a global backdrop of chronic conflict.

28 DoD, CCJO, 1.

Military force is only one element of national power, moreover, and in the complex environment of the future, it rarely will succeed alone. Instead, joint forces typically will operate in conjunction with other agencies of the U.S. and partner governments, and the success of the endeavor will depend on the success of that partnership. Depending on circumstances, the joint force may lead the national or multinational effort or may support other agencies, usually by creating the security conditions that allow nonmilitary agencies to operate.

29 DoD, CCJO, 6.

Surmounting these challenges often will exceed the capabilities of any single agency of government, including the joint force. Instead, successful future military operations typically will require the integrated application of all the instruments of national power. Future joint forces may find themselves operating as the military element of an integrated national task force or at least in close conjunction with other agencies of government.
The problem of achieving and maintaining operational coherence is more important and difficult than ever before given the requirement to operate in multiple domains simultaneously in conjunction with other national agencies, international partners and nongovernmental organizations. The challenges of the future will require joint forces to achieve this same level of unity between different joint forces and with other governmental and nongovernmental actors, both U.S. and international, even when formal unity of command is infeasible.

Two basic situations apply. Where military considerations predominate, the joint force likely will integrate the national effort and will have to incorporate partners into its command and control processes. Where other considerations predominate, some other government agency likely will integrate the national effort, with the joint force adapting itself to that agency’s procedures. Even in this case, the joint force, because of its resources and well-established planning methods, will likely provide significant support to the lead agency.

This concept identifies the requirement for integrated national and multinational operations, which in turn will require close cooperation with partners with potentially very different organizational processes and cultures in a variety of standard and nonstandard relationships. This broad implication has potentially dramatic impact on manning, communications and other technological interoperability, common techniques and procedures, and interagency and multinational training, among other requirements.

Agencies must engage in a whole-of-government approach to protect the nation and its interests from diverse threats such as terrorism and infectious diseases. However, GAO has reported that gaps in national security staff knowledge and skills pose a barrier to the interagency collaboration needed to address these threats. Training and other professional development activities could help bridge those gaps.

37 Tierney, Press Release on Efforts to Improve Interagency Collaboration, 2.


41 Carafano, Five Missteps in Interagency Reform, 119.