
Michael H. Thomson and Courtney D. Hall
Humansystems® Incorporated
111 Farquhar St.
Guelph, ON N1H 3N4

Project Manager: Michael H. Thomson
(519) 836 5911 ext: 301
PWGSC Contract No.: Standing Offer W7711-09-8158/001/TOR
Order No. 8158-01

Contract Scientific Authority:
Dr. Megan Thompson
416-635-2040

The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.

Defence R&D Canada
Contract Report
DRDC Toronto CR 2011-098
March 2011

by:
Michael H. Thomson and Courtney D. Hall

Humansystems® Incorporated
111 Farquhar St.
Guelph, ON N1H 3N4

Project Manager:
Michael H. Thomson
(519) 836 5911 ext: 301

PWGSC Contract No.: Standing Offer W7711-09-8158/001/TOR
Order No. 8158-01

On Behalf of
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

as represented by
Defence Research and Development Canada Toronto
1133 Sheppard Avenue West
North York, Ontario, Canada
M3M 3B9

Contract Scientific Authority:
Dr. Megan Thompson
416-635-2040

March 2011
Author

Michael H. Thomson
Humansystems® Incorporated

Approved by

Dr. Megan Thompson
Contract Scientific Authority

Approved for release by

Dr. Stergios Stergiopoulos
Acting Chair, Knowledge and Information Management Committee
Acting Chief Scientist

The scientific or technical validity of this Contractor Report is entirely the responsibility of the contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011
© Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2011
Abstract

Military missions for the Canadian Forces (CF), including asymmetrical warfare and counter insurgency operations, have become increasingly complex and, as such, there is a greater probability that soldiers of all ranks will confront moral and ethical decisions. As moral and ethical decision making is both challenging in a military operational context (Thomson, Adams, & Sartori, 2006) and argued to be a social activity (Haidt, 2001), military personnel will undoubtedly look to others, including leaders and peers, for guidance or support to make the right choices. To this end, an annotated bibliography was conducted to highlight probably social and leadership factors that will influence moral and ethical behaviour. A number of social factors were identified, including moral disengagement mechanisms (such as displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, and dehumanization); ingroup/outgroup differentiation; group identity; group cohesion and loyalty; compliance and conformity; false consensus effect; and normative social influence (or social contagion). Leadership factors included the impact of different kinds of leadership (e.g., transactional, transformative, ethical, etc.), ethical role modelling, and leader-member interaction. This report also included a preliminary data analysis of CF subject matter experts (SMEs) first-hand accounts of moral and ethical decisions made in operations to highlight any social and leadership factors that had an influence on this process. It provided some initial insights into some of the social and leadership factors influencing moral decision making, including the false consensus effect, top-down normative social influence, the role of others in moral judgement, moral disengagement, compliance through leader participation, group loyalty and ingroup policing policies, and ingroup/outgroup differentiation. Moreover, participant responses showed strong evidence of ethical leadership and how this impacted decisions. A few participants implied that one leader priority is showing care for the welfare of the troops, which may shape moral and ethical decisions in operations (e.g., favouring ingroup over outgroup).
Résumé

Compte tenu de la complexité croissante des missions militaires des Forces canadiennes (FC), y compris les opérations de guerre asymétrique et de contre-insurrection, il y a plus de chances que les soldats de tous grades feront face à des décisions morales et éthiques. La prise de décisions morales et éthiques étant à la fois difficile dans le contexte d’opérations militaires (Thomson, Adams et Sartori, 2006) et, semble-t-il, une activité sociale (Haidt, 2001), le personnel militaire orientera sans aucun doute sa conduite en fonction de celle d’autrui, entre autres des leaders et des pairs, et comptera sur leur aide pour faire les bons choix. À cette fin, une bibliographie commentée a été dressée pour mettre en lumière les facteurs sociaux et les facteurs de leadership qui auront vraisemblablement une incidence sur le comportement moral et éthique. Un certain nombre de facteurs sociaux ont été cernés, dont les mécanismes de désengagement moral (par exemple, le déplacement de la responsabilité, la diffusion de la responsabilité et la déshumanisation); l’établissement d’une distinction entre l’endogroupe et l’exogroupe; l’identité de groupe; la cohésion de groupe et la loyauté envers ce dernier; le respect et la conformité; le faux effet de consensus et l’influence sociale normative (ou la contagion sociale). Parmi les facteurs de leadership, mentionnons l’impact des divers styles de leadership (p. ex. transactionnel, transformationnel, éthique, etc.), les modèles de comportement éthique et l’interaction leader-membre. Le présent rapport comprend également une analyse provisoire des comptes rendus de première main des experts en la matière (EM) des FC faisant état de la prise de décisions morales et éthiques dans le cours des opérations en vue de mettre en lumière tout facteur social ou lié au leadership ayant eu une incidence sur le processus décisionnel. Cette analyse donne un aperçu initial d’un certain nombre de facteurs sociaux et des facteurs de leadership exerçant une influence sur la prise de décisions morales, entre autres le faux effet de consensus, l’influence sociale normative venue d’en haut, le rôle des autres dans le jugement moral, le désengagement moral, la conformité à travers la participation des leaders, la loyauté envers le groupe et la ligne de conduite de ce dernier relativement au maintien de l’ordre et l’établissement d’une distinction entre l’endogroupe et l’exogroupe. De surcroît, les réponses des participants indiquent fortement l’existence d’un leadership éthique et l’incidence de ce dernier sur les décisions prises. Quelques participants ont laissé entendre que le souci du bien-être des troupes était la priorité d’un leader, d’où la possibilité que ce facteur façonne les décisions morales et éthiques prises dans le contexte des opérations (p. ex. accorder la préférence à l’endogroupe plutôt qu’à l’exogroupe).
Executive Summary


Michael H. Thomson and Courtney D. Hall, Humansystems® Incorporated; DRDC Toronto CR2011-098; Defence R&D Canada – Toronto; March 2011

Military missions for the Canadian Forces (CF), including asymmetrical warfare and counter insurgency operations, have become increasingly complex and, as such, there is a greater probability that soldiers of all ranks will confront moral and ethical decisions. As moral and ethical decision making is both challenging in a military operational context (Thomson, Adams, & Sartori, 2006) and argued to be a social activity (Haidt, 2001), military personnel will undoubtedly look to others, including leaders and peers, for guidance or support to make the right choices. In fact, one of the tenets outlined in the 2009 CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine is the link between high moral grounding with CF esprit de corps and leadership. Consideration to the social and leadership factors that shape moral conduct should be advanced.

This annotated bibliography reviewed the current literature pertaining to the impact of social and leadership factors on moral and ethical decision making in military operations, with a particular emphasis on challenges to or failures of moral and ethical decision making. To conduct our literature review, a number of core concepts were identified, relating specifically to the social and leadership factors that influence moral and ethical decision making. Efforts were made to select articles that linked the core social factors (e.g., dehumanization, ingroup/outgroup, conformity) and leadership factors (e.g., ethical leadership, leader follower) to morals and ethics, and also were recently published (2000 – 2010, with the exception of 2).

This report reviewed a number of articles showing the impact of social factors on moral and ethical decision making. These included moral disengagement mechanisms, such as displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility (i.e., bystander effect), and dehumanization; ingroup/outgroup differentiation; group identity; group cohesion and loyalty; compliance and conformity; false consensus effect; and normative social influence (or social contagion). The report also examined the impact leadership can have on moral and ethical decision making of subordinates. The review includes articles that highlight the different kinds of leadership (e.g., transactional, transformative, ethical, etc.) and leadership theory, ethical role modelling, and leader-member interaction.

This report also included a preliminary data analysis of CF subject matter experts (SMEs) first-hand accounts of moral and ethical decisions made in operations to highlight any social and leadership factors that had an influence on this process. Data was collected at CF bases across Canada with 10 CF junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who had operational experience. The preliminary data analysis provided evidence of some social and leadership factors that influence moral and ethical decision making in CF operations. Specifically, social processes that implicated moral and ethical decision making included the false consensus effect, top-down normative social influence, the role of others in moral judgement, moral disengagement, compliance through leader participation, group loyalty and ingroup policing policies, and ingroup/outgroup differentiation. Moreover, participant responses showed strong evidence of ethical leadership and how this impacted moral and ethical decision making. A few
participants implied that one leader priority is showing care for the welfare of the troops, which may shape moral and ethical decisions in operations (e.g., favouring ingroup over outgroup).
Sommaire

Facteurs sociaux et facteurs de leadership exerçant une incidence sur la prise de décisions morales dans le contexte des opérations militaires canadiennes: bibliographie commentée

Michael H. Thomson et Courtney D. Hall, Humansystems® Incorporated; RDDC Toronto CR2011-098; Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada – Toronto; mars 2011

Compte tenu de la complexité croissante des missions militaires des Forces canadiennes (FC), y compris les opérations de guerre asymétrique et de contre-insurrection, il y a plus de chances que les soldats de tous grades feront face à des décisions morales et éthiques. La prise de décisions morales et éthiques étant à la fois difficile dans le contexte d’opérations militaires (Thomson, Adams et Sartori, 2006) et, semble-t-il, une activité sociale (Haidt, 2001), le personnel militaire orientera sans aucun doute sa conduite en fonction de celle d’autrui, entres autres des leaders et des pairs, et comptera sur leur aide pour faire les bons choix. En fait, l’un des principes exposés dans le document intitulé PIFC 01- Doctrine militaire canadienne, datant de 2009, est le lien qui existe entre les fortes raisons d’ordre moral et l’esprit de corps et le leadership au sein des FC. Il faudrait également examiner de plus près les facteurs sociaux et les facteurs de leadership qui façonnent la conduite morale.

La présente bibliographie commentée passe en revue les publications récentes traitant de l’incidence des facteurs sociaux et de leadership sur la prise de décisions morales et éthiques dans le contexte d’opérations militaires, en insistant en particulier sur les problèmes et échecs liés à la prise de décisions morales et éthiques. Aux fins d’examen des publications sur le sujet, nous avons cerné un certain nombre de concepts fondamentaux ayant trait aux facteurs sociaux et de leadership qui influent sur la prise de décisions morales et éthiques. Nous nous sommes efforcés de sélectionner des articles récemment publiés (entre 2000 et 2010 exception faite de deux d’entre eux) dans lesquels un lien est établi entre les facteurs sociaux fondamentaux (p. ex., la déshumanisation, l’endogroupe et l’exogroupe, la conformité) et les facteurs de leadership (p. ex. leadership éthique, leader-suiveur) d’une part, et la morale et l’éthique d’autre part.

Le présent rapport passe en revue un certain nombre d’articles illustrant l’incidence des facteurs sociaux sur la prise de décisions morales et éthiques. Entre autres facteurs, signalons les mécanismes de désengagement moral, comme le déplacement de la responsabilité, la diffusion de la responsabilité (c.-à-d. l’effet du témoin), et la déshumanisation; l’établissement d’une distinction entre l’endogroupe et l’exogroupe; l’identité de groupe; la cohésion de groupe et la loyauté envers ce dernier; le respect et la conformité; le faux effet de consensus et l’influence sociale normative (ou contagion sociale). Le rapport étudie également l’incidence du leadership sur la prise de décisions morales et éthiques par des subalternes. Sont également passés en revue des articles mettant en lumière les divers styles de leadership (p. ex., transactionnel, transformationnel, éthique, etc.) et la théorie relative au leadership, les modèles de comportement éthique et l’interaction leader-membre.

Le présent rapport renferme également une analyse provisoire des comptes rendus de première main des experts en la matière (EM) des FC faisant état de la prise de décisions morales et éthiques dans le cours des opérations en vue de mettre en lumière tout facteur social ou lié au leadership
ayant eu une incidence sur le processus décisionnel. Les données ont été recueillies sur les bases des FC un peu partout à travers le Canada auprès de dix officiers subalternes et sous-officiers supérieurs (s/off) des FC possédant une expérience opérationnelle. L’analyse provisoire a fourni la preuve de l’existence de quelques facteurs sociaux et de leadership qui influent sur la prise de décisions morales et éthiques dans le contexte des opérations des FC. En particulier, entre autres mécanismes sociaux mettant en cause la prise de décisions morales et éthiques, mentionnons le faux effet de consensus, l’influence sociale normative venue d’en haut, le rôle des autres dans le jugement moral, le désengagement moral, la conformité à travers la participation des leaders, la loyauté au groupe et la ligne de conduite de ce dernier relativement au maintien de l’ordre et l’établissement d’une distinction entre l’endogroupe et l’exogroupe. Qui plus est, les réponses des participants indiquent fortement l’existence d’un leadership éthique et l’incidence de ce dernier sur les décisions prises. Quelques participants ont laissé entendre que le souci du bien-être des troupes était la priorité d’un leader, d’où la possibilité que ce facteur façonne les décisions morales et éthiques prises dans le contexte des opérations (p. ex. accorder la préférence à l’endogroupe plutôt qu’à l’exogroupe).
Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... III
RÉSUMÉ ................................................................................................................................................ IV
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... V
SOMMAIRE .......................................................................................................................................... VII
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES.......................................................................................................... IX

TABLES ................................................................................................................................................... XI
FIGURES ................................................................................................................................................ XI

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 BACKGROUND................................................................................................................................. 1

1.2 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 2

1.2.1 Keywords .................................................................................................................................. 2

1.2.2 Databases .................................................................................................................................. 2

1.2.3 Literature Search ....................................................................................................................... 3

1.3 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................. 3

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT ........................................................................................................ 5

2. SOCIAL FACTORS INFLUENCING MORAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING .................. 7

2.1 HAIDT (2001) ................................................................................................................................. 7

2.2 BANDURA (2002) ........................................................................................................................... 8

2.3 SHOREY (2001) ............................................................................................................................... 9

2.4 ZYGLIDOPoulos & FLEMING (2008) ............................................................................................. 10

2.5 GINO & BAZERMAN (2009) ............................................................................................................ 11

2.6 LEIDNER, CASTANO, ZAISER & GINER-SOROLLA (2010)....................................................... 12

2.7 ČEHAJić, BROWN & GONZÁLEZ (2009) ...................................................................................... 13

2.8 FORSYTH, ZYZNIEWSKI, & GIAMMANCO (2002) .................................................................... 14

2.9 SILKE (2003) ................................................................................................................................. 15

2.10 BOND (2005) ................................................................................................................................. 16

2.11 WINSLOW (2004) .......................................................................................................................... 17

2.12 TYLER & BLADER (2003) .............................................................................................................. 17

2.13 HOPMAN & VAN LEEUWEN (2009) ........................................................................................... 19

2.14 JOSEPH (2005) ............................................................................................................................... 20

2.15 KING & HERMODSON (2000) ...................................................................................................... 22

2.16 WESTERMAN, BEEKUN, STEHDAM & YAMAMURA (2007)................................................. 23

2.17 GINO, AYAL, & ARIELY (2009) ................................................................................................... 24

2.18 GINO, GU, & ZHONG (2009) ......................................................................................................... 25

2.19 COHEN, MONTOYA & INSKO (2006) .......................................................................................... 26

2.20 SAUCIER, McMANUS & SMITH (2010) ....................................................................................... 26

2.21 KERR, RUMBLE, PARK, OUWERKERK, PARKS, GALLUCCI & VAN LANGE (2009)............. 27

2.22 LAHAM (2009) ............................................................................................................................. 28

2.23 CIALDINI & GOLDSTEIN (2004) ................................................................................................ 29

2.24 WATSON & BERKLEY (2009) ..................................................................................................... 30

2.25 JONES (2004) ................................................................................................................................. 31

2.26 KARASAWA (2003) ....................................................................................................................... 32

2.27 MYERS & LAMM (1976) .............................................................................................................. 32
2.28 OHTSUBO, MASUCHI & NAKANISHI (2002) .............................................................. 34
2.29 ESSER (1998) ........................................................................................................... 34
2.30 TREVIÑO, WEAVER & REYNOLDS (2006) ............................................................ 35

3. LEADERSHIP FACTORS INFLUENCING MORAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING... 39
3.1 BARTONE (2010) ....................................................................................................... 39
3.2 AVOLIO, WALUMBWA & WEBER (2009) ................................................................. 39
3.3 HANNAH, UHL-BIEN, AVOLIO & CAVARRETTA (2009) .......................................... 41
3.4 BROWN, TREVIÑO & HARRISON (2005) ................................................................. 42
3.5 BROWN & TREVIÑO (2006) .................................................................................... 43
3.6 BROWN (2007) ........................................................................................................ 45
3.7 WEAVER, TREVIÑO & AGLE (2005) ..................................................................... 46
3.8 BROWN & TREVIÑO (2009) .................................................................................... 47
3.9 MAYER, KUENZI, GREENBAUM, BARDES & SALVADOR (2009) ......................... 48
3.10 MAHSUD, YUKL & PRUSSIA (2010) .................................................................. 49
3.11 TURNER, BARLING, EPIROPARKI, BUTCHER & MILNER (2002) ....................... 50
3.12 KRISHNAN (2003) ............................................................................................... 51
3.13 SCHMINKE, WELLS, PEYREFITTE & SEBORA (2002) ........................................ 52
3.15 HINRICHS (2007) ............................................................................................... 54
3.16 WHITE & LEAN (2008) ....................................................................................... 54
3.17 WONG, BLIESE & MCGURK (2003) ..................................................................... 55
3.18 PETERSON (2001) ............................................................................................... 56
3.19 ROTHWELL & BALDWIN (2007) ....................................................................... 56

4. SME DATA ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 59
4.1 SOCIAL FACTORS ................................................................................................. 59
4.2 LEADERSHIP FACTORS ..................................................................................... 61
4.3 SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... 63

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 65
List of Figures and Tables

Figures

FIGURE 1: SOCIAL AND LEADERSHIP FACTORS INFLUENCING MORAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING ................................................................. 4
FIGURE 2: SOCIAL INTUITIONIST MODEL OF MORAL JUDGEMENT (HAIDT, 2001, P. 815) .......................................................... 7
FIGURE 3: MECHANISMS THROUGH WHICH MORAL SELF-SANCTIONS ARE SELECTIVELY ACTIVATED AND DISENGAGED FROM DETRIMENTAL BEHAVIOUR AT DIFFERENT POINTS IN THE SELF-REGULATORY PROCESS (BANDURA, 1986; CITED IN BANDURA 2002, P. 103) ........................................................................................................................................... 9
FIGURE 5: THE GROUP ENGAGEMENT MODEL (TYLER & BLADER, 2003, P. 354) ...................................................................................... 18
FIGURE 7: PEER REPORTING MODEL (KING & HERMODSON, 2000, P. 321) ................................................................................................. 23
FIGURE 8: SUMMARY OF CONCEPTUAL SCHEME (MYERS & LAMM, 1976, P. 619) ........................................................................... 34
FIGURE 9: CATEGORIES OF INFLUENCES ON BEHAVIOURAL ETHICS OUTCOMES (TREVIÑo ET AL., 2006, P. 953) ............ 36
FIGURE 10: TYPOLOGY OF EXTREME CONTEXTS (HANNAH ET AL., 2009, P. 899) ................................................................. 41
FIGURE 11: MODEL OF GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL INFLUENCES ON CONFORMITY OF ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS (SCHMENKE ET AL., 2002, P. 281) ............................................................................................................................ 52
FIGURE 12: HOW LEADERS CREATE MORAL DISENGAGEMENT (BEU & BUCKLEY, 2004, P. 557) .................................................. 53

Tables

TABLE 1: KEYWORDS ............................................................................................................................................................................ 2
TABLE 2: SIMILARITIES WITH AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LEADERSHIP CONSTRUCTS (BROWN & TREVIÑó, 2006, P. 598) ............................................................................................................................................................ 43
TABLE 3: CHARACTERISTICS OF ETHICAL ROLE MODELS (ADAPTED FROM WEAVER ET AL., 2005, P. 316) .................. 46
This page intentionally left blank.
1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Military missions for the Canadian Forces (CF), including asymmetrical warfare and counter insurgency operations, have become increasingly complex and, as such, there is a greater probability that soldiers of all ranks will confront moral and ethical decisions. Ethics must be at the core of CF military service. Indeed, as Chief of the Defence Staff General Walt Natynczyk stated “It would be hard to imagine sending our men and women into operations without a solid grounding in ethics. It would be unthinkable to train our folks to use force without also training them in the ethical obligations that come with the use of force” (Journal of the Defence Ethics Programme, December 2009). As moral and ethical decision making is both challenging in a military operational context (Thomson, Adams, & Sartori, 2006) and argued to be a social activity (Haidt, 2001), military personnel will undoubtedly look to others, including leaders and peers, for guidance or support to make the right choices. In fact, one of the tenets outlined in the 2009 CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine is the link between high moral grounding with CF esprit de corps and leadership. As such, considered exploration of the social and leadership factors that shape moral conduct should be a focus of inquiry as an important means to foster the highest ethical climate.

Indeed, a number of psychological researchers have identified the importance of social and leadership factors in decision making in general and moral and ethical decision making specifically. With respect to decision making and behaviour in general, Cialdini (2005, p. 158) stated, “[a]s a rule, people grossly underestimate the guiding role that others play in personal choices.” He argues that people are frequently oblivious to the influence of others’ behaviour on their own, and that modelling can play a large role in conformity. Jones and Roelofsma (2000) also identify a number of social processes that can potential influence group decision making, including the false consensus effect, groupthink, and group polarization. Pertaining to the moral domain in particular, Bandura states that “[m]oral actions are the products of the reciprocal interplay of personal and social influences” (Bandura, 2002, p. 115, emphasis added). Zimbardo (2007) too emphasizes the role of the situation and social processes on our moral conduct. When considering the immoral actions of the American soldiers in Abu Ghraib, he implicates a number of social processes, including deindividuation, dehumanization of the outgroup, conformity and obedience, etc. Others have suggested that leaders can influence moral and ethical decision making (Ciulla, 2004; Castro & McGurk, 2007), underscoring the importance placed on leaders for setting an ethical tone within the organization. As Zimbardo (p. 229) states,

“Consider the possibility that each of us has the potential, or mental templates, to be saint or sinner, altruistic or selfish, gentle or cruel, submissive or dominant, sane or mad, good or evil. Perhaps we are born with a full range of capacities, each of which is activated and developed depending on the social and cultural circumstances that govern or lives.”

Of course, this does not exonerate the individual from moral responsibility. Indeed, there are a number of classic examples of individuals overcoming social forces to do what is right (e.g., Hugh Thompson’s heroics at My Lai). We all have the ability to make our own choices irrespective of the pressures of the situation. Nevertheless, we need to consider to a greater extent the social processes and situational variables that may significantly contribute to otherwise moral people’s immoral behaviour. In other words, “we need to recognize more fully the complex of situational
factors that are operative in given behavioural settings. Modifying them, or learning to avoid them, can have a greater impact on reducing undesirable individual reactions than remedial actions directed only at changing people in the situation” (Zimbardo, 2007, p. x – xi).

This report is devoted to increasing a basic understanding of this issue through the compilation of an annotated bibliography that reviews the current literature examining the impact of social and leadership factors as they relate to moral and ethical decision making in military operations, with a particular emphasis on challenges to or failures of moral and ethical decision making. In addition, this report also examines CF subject matter experts (SMEs) first-hand accounts of moral and ethical decisions that they made in operations to highlight any social and leadership factors that had an influence on this process.

1.2 Annotated Bibliography

1.2.1 Keywords

The keywords were developed to focus the literature search. The research team identified a number of core concepts, relating specifically to the social and leadership factors that influence moral and ethical decision making (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Concepts</th>
<th>Related Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral*, immoral</td>
<td>disengagement, dehumanization, diffusion, displacement, responsibility, deindividuation*, exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethic*, unethical</td>
<td>leader*, leadership, professionalism, unprofessional, transformational leadership, transactional leadership, superior, manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision making</td>
<td>social, social influence, social control, conformity, obedience, compliance, agreement, false consensus, group, group affiliation, group polarization, ingroup, outgroup, jury, numbing, desensitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision*</td>
<td>torture, “bad apples”, Abu Ghraib, My Lai, failure, humanity, victim, perpetrator, instigator, whistleblowing, wrongdoing, inhuman*, transgress*, altruism*, prosocial, empath*, injustice, unjust judgment, behaviour, perceptions, action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devian* (deviant, deviance)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After establishing the core concepts, related keywords were then developed. The core concepts were the most important words used in the search as they represented the broad constructs relevant to the research questions. The related keywords ensured sampling of literature from several different domains within the core construct, and their use was guided by what emerged from the core concepts. The related keywords were used in combination with the core concepts to further focus the results around social and leadership factors influencing moral and ethical decision making. This had the result of narrowing the search to the most relevant articles.

1When adding an asterisk in the search, it locates all of those words that have the lettering before the asterisk. It is a means of encompassing derivatives of a word (ex: moral* will get search results that include moral as well as morality and morals).
1.2.2 Databases

Searches were conducted in the following databases and sources:

- PsycINFO
- Google Scholar

PsycINFO is a resource maintained by the American Psychological Association (APA) that offers products to aid researchers in locating psychological literature. The database is based on Psychological Abstracts and contains non-evaluative summaries of literature in psychology and related fields (e.g., human factors, education, business and social studies). The database contains over one million electronically-stored bibliographic references with authors, titles, publication information, and abstracts or content summaries, covering material published in over 45 countries since 1967. References include journal articles, dissertations, reports, and book chapters.

Google Scholar is a specialty search engine maintained by Google which contains academic articles and presentations. Many disciplines are represented, and sources include articles, books, and abstracts from academic publishers, professional societies, online repositories, universities, and other web sites. Google scholar attempts to rank documents based on the full text of each document, where it was published, who it was written by, how recently it was cited, and how often it was cited in other scholarly literature.

1.2.3 Literature Search

The databases were systematically searched using the core concepts specified above. In order to manage the number of references, we systematically added the related keywords to refine the search. We also identified articles cited in the reference lists of the articles obtained for the review on the basis of their potential relevance to social and leadership factors influencing moral and ethical decision making. Once a number of potentially suitable articles were identified (approximately 150), we reviewed the abstracts and selected those that addressed the core social (e.g., dehumanization, ingroup/outgroup, conformity) and leadership (e.g., ethical leadership, leader follower) factors and those that were recently published (2000 – 2010, with the exception of 2 articles).

1.3 Qualitative Analysis

Following the literature search, the research team met to develop a preliminary framework of social and leadership factors influencing moral and ethical decision making (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Social and Leadership Factors Influencing Moral and Ethical Decision making
This framework was then used to conduct a preliminary qualitative analysis of CF subject matter experts (SMEs) first-hand accounts of moral and ethical decisions made in operations. Data was collected from a previous study conducted under a Service Level Arrangement by Royal Military College (RMC) for DRDC Toronto (Applied Research Program 14de Moral and Ethical Decision Making in Operations). SME discussions were conducted at various CF bases across Canada. Participants were 10 CF junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who had operational experience (e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia, Ethiopia, etc.). The preliminary analysis was meant to identify social and leadership factors that influenced moral and ethical decision making. Core social and leadership factors included moral disengagement, conformity, obedience/compliance, and leadership type.

1.4 Structure of the Report

The report is broken down into four parts. The first part consists of those articles that were found relating to the social factors that influence moral and ethical decision making. A short description of each article is included. These can be found in chapter 2. The second part consists of those articles relating to the leadership factors that influence moral and ethical decision making. A short description of each article is included. These can be found in chapter 3. The third part highlights some of the core themes that emerged from an initial analysis of discussions with non-commissioned officers describing moral and ethical decisions they made in CF operations. This can be found in chapter 4.
This page intentionally left blank.
2. Social Factors influencing Moral and Ethical Decision Making

This chapter presents the reviews of selected articles pertaining to the social factors that influence moral and ethical decision making.

2.1 Haidt (2001)


In this paper, Haidt (2001) describes his Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement (see Figure 2).

![Figure 2: Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement (Haidt, 2001, p. 815)](image)

Specifically, this model seeks to downplay the private, autonomous reasoning of individuals in actual moral judgements and emphasizes the impact of social and cultural influences, such as group norms and beliefs. According to Haidt, a person’s context and culture shapes moral intuitions by making culturally supported ethics sharper and more easily accessible, and through gradual shaping in which acceptable cultural processes and behaviours are progressively modelled and rewarded. This is said to occur at both a societal level and in interactions with peers. Haidt suggests that an individual’s moral reasoning is driven by important goals, which bias and direct the moral reasoning process. For example, he argues that people are influenced by the need to represent views that are consistent with those of significant others (relatedness motives). He explains that a moral community has a set of shared norms regarding appropriate conduct within the group, and these arise from long-standing affect-laden intuitions. The strength of these norms lies in the ability of the community to impose costs on violators and benefits on co-operators. In short, Haidt argues that decision making in moral and ethical situations is not a purely rational or an orderly process, but navigates through a complex of influences, such as moral intuitions, shared reason, and culture.
Ultimately, he emphasizes the role social processes play in shaping moral judgement and decision making.

2.2 Bandura (2002)


Bandura (2002) considered moral disengagement mechanisms and its relation to moral agency. He describes a number of social and psychological processes that might help explain why decent, moral individuals can at times engage in destructive immoral behaviour. According to Bandura, the ability to self-regulate one’s own behaviour is a critical human capacity. Through self-observation (i.e., comparison of one’s behaviour with standards that are judged to be important) and responsiveness to this personally evaluated conduct, people work to ensure that their own behaviour is in line with both their own goals and with the demands of their environment. This self-regulation process can work to promote critical prosocial behaviours. However, these same self-regulatory mechanisms can also prevent us from engaging in humane activity. Through these self-regulatory mechanisms, people judge their position relative to their own internal standards, and monitor and guide their own behaviour in accordance with these standards. When these mechanisms are in place, acting contrary to these standards results in self-condemnation. But, according to Bandura, when these mechanisms break down, moral disengagement can enable people with the same moral standards to behave in very different ways.

Bandura (2002) identifies several different processes that can work to promote moral disengagement. These include cognitive restructuring of destructive conduct, diminishing one’s perceived role in causing the harm, and dehumanizing the recipient of the destructive conduct. Cognitive restructuring of destructive conduct, Bandura explains, can take many forms, including moral justification (portraying destructive conduct as acceptable because it serves noble ends), advantageous comparisons (comparing one’s actions with more undesirable alternatives), and euphemistic labelling (using more desirable labels – “collateral damage”).

Moral disengagement can also occur by diminishing one’s perceived role in the unethical conduct. As Bandura (p. 106) argues, “[m]oral control operates most strongly when people acknowledge that they are contributors to harmful outcomes.” However, if they can obscure their role in the victim’s harm and have strong responsibility to authority, then they successfully disengage and are “spared self-condemning reactions” (p. 106). This can be accomplished, Bandura explains, through displacement of responsibility, i.e., viewing one’s actions as emerging from the authority of another decreases personal responsibility and reduces the likeliness of self-condemning thoughts and feelings. Another way to diminish one’s role in harmful action is through diffusion of responsibility, i.e., shirking or sharing the blame for unethical action. Bandura suggests subdividing tasks or group decision making can lead to anonymity, thereby weakening personal responsibility. Another means of diminishing one’s perceived role in unethical conduct is to distort or downplay the consequences.

Bandura (2002) argues that moral disengagement also occurs through the process of the dehumanizing or reducing identification with the target. Dehumanization involves stripping away a victim’s distinct human qualities and moral entitlement, often by way of derogatory labels (such as referring to Somalis as “skinnies” or Afghan insurgents as “twins”). Dehumanization may be facilitated by strong ingroup/outgroup delineation (i.e., us vs. them). Transferring blame to circumstances or adversaries (e.g., believing that the other person had it coming or left no other alternative) is also an effective means of distancing oneself with the target.

The process of moral disengagement is graphically depicted in Figure 3.
To provide support for his social cognitive theoretical framework of moral disengagement, Bandura (2002) presents a number of useful examples, some of which are classic military examples of immoral conduct (such as My Lai).

Unlike cognitive restructuring, both diminishing one’s role and reducing identification with the target require the influence of other people within the immediate situation to generate moral disengagement. Considering the impact of social processes on moral and ethical decision making, therefore, the two most relevant mechanisms of moral disengagement would be the process of diminishing one’s role in the unethical behaviour (i.e., self-exonerating through displacement of responsibility and diffusion of responsibility) as well as the process of reducing identification with the recipient of the unethical behaviour (i.e., dehumanization).

### 2.3 Shorey (2001)


In this article, Shorey (2001) examines the lack of intervention of Canadian Forces personnel who were in close proximity to the torture killing of Shidane Arone on 16 March 1993 in the Canadian compound near Belet Huen, Somalia. Providing testimony from the Somalia Inquiry, he identifies four possible social-psychological factors that may explain the non-intervention by other CF personnel, including the bystander effect (diffusion of responsibility), authorization (authorities accepting typically unacceptable conduct), the victim-bystander relationship (psychological distance between the victim and witness), and personal consequences (the pros and cons of aiding someone in need).

According to the bystander effect, individuals take their cues on how to respond to a particular situation, such as helping someone in need, by observing the actions (or non-action) of others around them. He reports that the underlying attitudes and behaviours toward CF base infiltrators during the mission to Somalia was that “some punishment” was justified in order to deter future infiltrations by Somali youth. Non-intervention then is perceived as the appropriate response or norm in this situation to “some punishment,” and acting counter to this, Shorey explains, can lead to negative evaluation or disapproval from other observers (or group members). This normative
social influence, he continues, diminishes the probability that other CF personnel would intervene to help the victim, so that the onus does not fall with any one particular person.

Moreover, Shorey (2001) highlights testimony received during the Somalia Inquiry from the Officer Commanding 2 Commando authorizing physical force with Somali youth who were infiltrating the CF base. The formal authorization from a legitimate authority sanctions behaviour that would otherwise contravene international moral standards for handling detainees.

A third potential social-psychological factor is the victim-bystander relationship. Shorey (2001) explains that using terms such as “thief” “infiltrator” or “looter” coupled with the ongoing security threats in and around the CF base and differences in socio-culture between Canadians and Somalis helped to psychologically distance the CF from Arone (and other Somalis). Dehumanization (labelled by derogatory terms and categorized as dangerous, inferior) and attribution of blame (they got what was coming) are plausible psychological mechanisms that reduce identification with the victim, which Shorey argues allows those in the vicinity of the victim to morally disengage. The process of reduced identification may have the effect of promoting ingroup and outgroup identities and stripping individuals who are members of the outgroup of their claim to moral rights.

Finally, Shorey (2001) argues that the personal consequences of helping or not helping influence a bystander’s response to the immediate situation. He explains that the costs associated with helping may lead to being negatively perceived as disloyal and weakening the solidarity of the unit or resisting the authority of those who formally or informally condoned the abuse. He states that “cohesion should not be underestimated as a force that may have prevented bystanders from helping Arone” (p. 26).

According to Shorey (2001), the combination of these four social-psychological factors are powerful mechanism that may have contributed to the non-intervention of those CF personnel who were in close proximity to the torture and killing of Shidane Arone. Left unchecked, these forces can contribute to unethical conduct in demanding and dangerous situations. Shorey concludes that close personal and unit monitoring is necessary in order to uphold professional values and conduct, especially as this type of situation will likely pose a constant challenge for deployed CF personnel in future asymmetric and counterinsurgency operations.

2.4 Zyglidopoulos & Fleming (2008)


Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2008) consider the concept ‘continuum of destructiveness’ (Staub, 1989; cited in Zyglidopoulos & Fleming), i.e., the slippery slope of wrongdoing, in corrupt organizations. They poset that there are four types of people along the continuum of destructiveness, including the innocent bystander (no participation), innocent participant (moral participation), active rationalizers (immoral participation that is justified, cognitive strategies fade moral reality), and guilty perpetrators (immoral participation not justified). What advances people along this continuum, Zyglidopoulos and Fleming argue, includes both the social and institutional factors and the ethical distance between an act and its consequences. Counter to the bad-apple approach, they argue that there are a number of institutional and social factors that edge individuals on to carry out unethical behaviour. This occurs through “rituals and processes that inexorably destroy an individual’s ordinary sense of ethical propriety” (p. 267). Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2008) describe Smeeuler’s (2002; cited in Zyglidopoulos & Fleming) four stage process of the continuum of destructiveness, including the preparation stage, exposure stage, crossing the line stage, and habituation and normalizing stage. In addition, ethical distance (temporal and structural) may be the catalyst for individual transformation as individuals move along the continuum. Ethical distance can be construed as temporal, that is to say, the consequences of the act are not immediate...
seen or felt by the perpetrator. In this sense, the immediate benefit overshadows the actual harm of the act, which is explained away by its distance in time. Ethical distancing can also be construed as structural, meaning that an individual’s behaviour is viewed as inconsequential given the sheer size and complexity of the organization.

As shown in Figure 4, ethical distance plays a role in the transition between types of participants.

![Figure 4: The role of ethical distance in the transitions between the type of participants (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008, p. 270)](image)

Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2008) argue that innocent bystanders can transition to innocent participants when the ethical distance between the act and consequences is large. For example, an organizational focus on short-term effects will make the consequences of an unethical action seem too far in the distant future to be considered. Vagueness and uncertainty about the future will also contribute to ethical distance. Furthermore, participants may be unaware that they are participating in the overall unethical act due to organizational structure and compartmentalizing tasks. Similarly, innocent participants can transition to active rationalizers when the ethical distance between the act and consequences is large. People are able to justify their actions when they do not see the immediate consequences, when everyone else is performing the same action, and when their task seems insignificant, but contributes to the corruption. The transition from active rationalizers to guilty perpetrator requires the ethical distance between the act and consequence to be small, i.e., they can see clearly the consequences of their actions. Furthermore, socialization techniques such as peer pressure, and institutional factors such as a supervisor’s orders, will also influence the transition between types of participants (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming).

In sum, Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2008) identify the socialization practices that may lead one down the continuum of destructiveness, but also introduce and operationalize the concept of ethical distance as a factor that helps prompt this. When considering corrupt organizations and unethical behaviour, they suggest considering the system as a whole, rather than simply identifying bad apples.

2.5 Gino & Bazerman (2009)


Gino and Bazerman (2009) compared acceptance of unethical behaviour when it changed abruptly to when it changed gradually (i.e., the slippery slope effect of ethical judgement). Based on previous research, the authors suggest the acceptance of gradual unethical behaviour may occur because people use past actions as benchmarks to evaluate new actions (e.g., Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), or because unethical behaviour can seem routine or normal when it slowly develops over time (e.g., Ashforth & Anand, 2003; both cited in Gino & Bazerman). Gino and Bazerman hypothesize a greater acceptance of unethical behaviour is likely when it has developed
gradually than when it has occurred quickly. Moreover, they propose that this acceptance may be partially due to implicit biases outside of one’s awareness.

To test this hypothesis, seventy-six participants estimated the monetary amount of a virtual jar of pennies, as well as approved other participant’s estimations. Participants received a percentage of their monetary estimation if approved and a percentage of the estimation they approved, but received nothing for estimations that were not approved. A third party would randomly check approvals. If the approved estimate was within 10% of the actual value, nothing would happen. However, if the approved estimate was outside of the 10% range and should not have been approved, the approver would lose money and the estimator would get nothing. Thus, participants would be guaranteed to make money only if estimates were within 10% of the actual value and were approved. However, participants could make more money if their high estimates were approved or they approved high estimates without getting caught. When participants were in charge of approving estimates, they either experienced the estimates suddenly increase well outside the 10% range, or gradually increase over time. As expected, results showed that participants were more likely to approve gradual increases rather than sudden increases (study 1). Subsequent studies replicated the approval of gradual changes, even when the approvers knew that the estimations were wrong (study 2), had no incentives to approve the estimations (study 3), and when approvers had incentives to detect fraud (study 4). Furthermore, these studies examined the role of implicit biases on approval through word completion tasks and reaction times. Gino and Bazerman hypothesized that participant’s approving gradual changes would use less unethical words and approve estimations faster than abrupt change approvers, the latter dependent variable in particular suggesting a greater implicit and automatic acceptance in unethical behaviour. Results supported this hypothesis showing in fact that unethical approval occurred outside of the participant’s awareness. Overall, the results show that individuals will accept a change from ethical to unethical behaviour more when it occurs gradually than when it abruptly changes. Moreover, this acceptance may be attributed to implicit biases such as prejudice, ingroup favouritism, and conflict of interest (e.g., Banaji, Bazerman & Chugh; cited in Gino & Bazerman).

Gino and Bazerman (2009) recommend that further research is needed to investigate situational factors and potential mediators of the slippery slope effect. Until then, this research suggests incentives for detecting unethical behaviour may not be enough when unethical behaviour occurs gradually over time.

2.6 Leidner, Castano, Zaiser & Giner-Sorolla (2010)


Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, and Giner-Sorolla (2010) attempt to identify aspects of ingroup identification that prevent individuals from demanding outgroup justice. More specifically, Leidner et al. investigate the role played by social identification and moral disengagement strategies that are believed to underlie one’s opposition to justice for victims who have suffered at the hands of one’s ingroup. Social identification is comprised of glorification and attachment (Roccas, Klar & Liviatan, 2006; cited in Leidner et al., 2010). Ingroup glorification occurs when a member praises their own group, while simultaneously considering other groups as inferior (e.g., nationalism). Attachment, on the other hand, considers the common fate of the group, permitting one to be critical towards their ingroup in order to promote its survival (Leidner et al.). Leidner et al. consider two moral disengagement strategies in relation to social identification, including

---

2 Actually fixed estimations and not by an actual participant.
emotional minimization (i.e., diminishing the victim’s suffering) and dehumanization (i.e., seeing the victim with fewer human attributes and less moral entitlement). They hypothesize that ingroup glorification will decrease the need for victim justice (both perpetrator punishment and victim compensation) when the participants share the same group as the perpetrators. Furthermore, moral disengagement will modify this relationship.

Leidner et al. (2010) had 308 American participants read about American (ingroup) or Iraqi (outgroup) soldiers mistreating Iraqi prisoners (outgroup). Participants were measured on emotional minimization (perception of victim’s emotional intensity), explicit dehumanization (Iraqi people compared to other populations), justice (punishment and compensation), and national attachment and glorification. Results showed that ingroup glorification (when participants belonged to the same group as the perpetrators) predicted less desire for outgroup justice. Moral disengagement strategies, namely emotional minimization and dehumanization, mediated ingroup glorification. That is, ingroup glorification led to greater minimization of the victim’s emotions and more reporting of the victims as less than human. Furthermore, ingroup attachment results trended the opposite way, such that ingroup attachment decreased emotional minimization. Subsequent studies replicated the results while controlling for social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism, both constructs having similar features to glorification. The follow on studies varied the outgroup (i.e., Australian instead of Iraqi soldiers and victims) and the ingroup (i.e., British instead of American participants and soldiers).

In conclusion, glorification of one’s ingroup led to greater use of moral disengagement strategies, such as dehumanization and emotional minimization. In turn, this led to less appeal in victim justice when the perpetrator was part of one’s ingroup. Leidner et al. (2010) suggested that glorification is different from other forms of ingroup identification, such as attachment, because of its connection to moral disengagement processes and the potential unethical consequences to outgroups.

2.7 Čehajić, Brown & González (2009)


Čehajić, Brown, and González (2009) examined how ingroup responsibility and dehumanization predicted the level of empathy for victimized outgroups. Empathy is “a capacity to be affected by the emotional experience of the other” (Vetlesen, 2005; cited in Čehajić et al., 2009, p. 715), and has been found to elicit forgiveness for offender group wrongdoings (Čehajić, Brown & Castano, 2008) and to increase willingness to provide compensations for ingroup transgressions (Brown & Čehajić, 2008; both cited in Čehajić et al., 2009). Čehajić and colleagues suggested that after being reminded of ingroup responsibility for wrongdoing, individuals may morally engage by feeling empathy for the victim outgroup or morally disengage by dehumanizing victims. They explain that defences against ingroup responsibility (group identity threatening situations) include the refusal of negative elements into their collective ingroup image or subtly dehumanizing the outgroup to avoid strong feelings of empathy.

Čehajić and colleagues (2009) examined two conflicting hypotheses: after being reminded of ingroup transgressions, they argued that participants will 1) perceive their ingroup responsible for the transgressions against the outgroup, thereby feeling more empathy for the outgroup (i.e., moral engagement), and 2) dehumanize the victims, undermining their empathy (i.e., moral disengagement). One hundred and twenty-four undergraduates read a description of the suffering of a relevant outgroup. Participants were told the suffering was the result of their ingroup as a whole or a few members of their ingroup. Participants were assessed on their perception of ingroup
being reminded of responsibility for atrocities perpetrated by one’s ingroup led to higher degree of perceived ingroup responsibility and at the same time victim dehumanization, which both impacted feelings of empathy. Čehajić and colleagues (2009) suggest that failure to ascribe the victim with human status (able to feel pain and suffering), thereby reflecting a subtle dehumanization process, indicates the importance of empathy in moral judgements and actions. Moreover, dehumanization has been shown to negatively influence support for reparation policies (Zebel, Zimmerman, Viki, & Doosje, 2008; cited in Forsyth et al. & González). Given that reminders of ingroup responsibility evoke two antagonistic processes (engagement and disengagement), Čehajić and colleagues suggest that individualizing the suffering of a victim of the outgroup may arouse emotions such as empathy and prevent victim dehumanization. This may in turn lead to greater moral engagement and reconciliation processes for victims of wrongdoings.

2.8 Forsyth, Zyzniewski, & Giammanco (2002)


Forsyth, Zyzniewski, and Giammanco (2002) examined diffusion of responsibility (feeling less accountable for actions or inactions when part of a group than when alone) in groups with specific reference to group size, group roles, and performance outcomes. They begin by examining some of the literature relevant to patterns of responsibility (related to group size), concentration of responsibility (related to group roles), and egocentric tendencies in responsibility allocation (related to performance outcomes) as potential explanations for the occurrence of diffusion of responsibility. They show that research concerning responsibility patterns has produced inconsistent findings. In some cases, individuals are more influenced as group size increases (e.g., Milgram, Bickman & Berkowitz, 1969), whereas, in other cases, a ceiling effect occurs. For example, in many conformity studies, individuals conform more when the group consists of 3 members compared to 2, but increments in size of the group beyond 3 shows only small patterns of conformity (Asch, 1955; both cited in Forsyth et al.). With respect to the concentration of responsibility, research has shown that group roles may influence responsibility allocation (i.e., more responsibility is allocated to the leader by subordinate members of the group and members tend to agree with responsibility claims, as in the case of leaders, Caine & Schlenker, 1979, cited in Forsyth et al., 2002). Forsyth et al. also looked at research examining egocentric tendencies in responsibility allocation and found that members take more personal responsibility for group success than they attribute to other group members, whereas the opposite is true for group failures. Forsyth et al. suggest this egocentric tendency can be offset by a sociocentric tendency, where members emphasize group responsibility for success and group admonition for failure (e.g.,
Forsyth, Berger & Mitchell, 1981, cited in Forsyth et al.). These findings suggest that individuals are motivated to view themselves positively when interpreting good or bad outcomes from group activities.

Following a review of the literature on responsibility in groups, Forsyth et al. (2002) predicted that diffusion of responsibility would increase as group size increased, would increase if the group failed, and would be unevenly distributed on account of group roles (i.e., members would allocate more to certain members of the group, those who thought they occupied more central roles would claim more responsibility, and fewer members would claim leadership roles when groups failed). They also examined the level of agreement among group members evaluation of members contribution. Participants completed two tasks: a multiple-choice subjective test completed individually and graded collectively, as well as a decision making test completed as a group two, four, six or eight, and graded collectively. After the tasks were complete, participants received successful or unsuccessful feedback. Participants then assessed their group on a number of measures including responsibility, contribution, roles, group performance, and attraction towards the group.

Results showed that diffusion of responsibility in fact occurred in groups, but was not equally distributed among members. Members overrated their contribution and allocated responsibility more for some members and less for others as a result of role allocation. Group members assigned less responsibility to themselves when their group had a leader. Results also indicated that performance outcomes influenced diffusion of responsibility only in groups of 2 and 4. Specifically, members of dyads gave themselves more responsibility after a success (egocentric tendency), while team members of quads took more responsibility after a failure (sociocentric tendency). Lastly, group members reported that they liked their group and were more cohesive after success than failure, irrespective of size.

For the purposes of the topic of the current report, this research suggests that CF personnel, often working in groups numbering 4 (assault groups) and 8 (sections), may be similarly susceptible to diffusion of responsibility, making it possible to override typical self-censoring mechanisms and morally disengage. Moreover, results showed that greater responsibility will be passed up the chain of command when leaders are clearly demarcated, again making it potentially easier to behave unethically for subordinates. When considering moral disengagement, it will be important to examine the patterns of responsibility (related to group size), the concentration of responsibility (related to group roles), and egocentric/sociocentric tendencies in responsibility allocation (related to performance outcomes).

2.9 Silke (2003)


Previous research (Watson, 1973; cited in Silke, 2003) has found that warriors who hide their identity (i.e., painted their bodies or faces) before a battle were more likely to kill, mutilate and torture their victims than those who did not conceal their identities. Referred to as deindividuation, concealing one’s identity, especially within a group, leads to the loss of control or typical inner constraints because people are not viewed as an individual (Festinger, Pepitone & Newcomb, 1952). The process of deindividuation can be accelerated, according to Zimbardo (1969; both cited in Silke), by physical arousal, anonymity, and group presence. Silke (2003) examined anonymity and aggression of 500 violent attacks by members or supporters of paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland. Using media reports and press releases, he compared the behaviours of 206 disguised attackers to the remaining non-disguised attackers (294). Means of disguise included masks, balaclavas, hoods, and other clothing used to conceal the attacker’s face. Silke hypothesized that
attackers who masked their identity would be more violent and aggressive than attackers who did not hide their face. The attacks were coded based on level of injury (mild/moderate or severe), vandalism, number of victims, and victim exile (ordered to leave their home). The results showed that attackers that concealed their face, i.e., their identity, were more likely to inflict serious injuries on their victims, attack multiple victims, engage in vandalism, and exile their victims after the attack. However, this is a correlational study and no direct causes can be confirmed. Nevertheless, it has implications for moral and ethical decision making. That is, the process of deindividuation may facilitate moral disengagement, specifically the diffusion of responsibility, which in turn may lead to unethical conduct (e.g., excessive use of force).

2.10 Bond (2005)


Bond (2005) reviews literature pertaining to group size and conformity. He argues that the relationship between group size and conformity is complex and will vary according to the type of social influence (i.e., normative or informational), the type of interaction individuals have with the majority group (i.e., direct or indirect), and the type of response by an individual (i.e., public or private). Based on previous research (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; cited in Bond), Bond hypothesizes that normative influence (i.e., rewards and punishments by the group; Deutsch & Gerard) will occur when individuals’ responses are publicly available to the majority group and when they have direct, face-to-face interactions with the majority group. Likewise, informational influence (information from the group; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; cited in Bond) will occur when individuals’ responses are private and they have indirect communications with the majority group.

To this end, Bond (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of 62 reports with a total of 125 conformity studies. Results were not able to conclusively define how normative and informational influences impacted the group size and conformity, due to the lack of available literature examining social influences. However, results did show that group size and conformity were influenced by an individual’s interaction with the majority group and the publicity of their responses. Regardless of type of interaction (direct or indirect), when individuals’ responses were available publicly to the majority group, individuals conformed more as the majority group increased in size. When individuals’ responses were not available publicly and their interaction was not face-to-face (indirect) with the majority group, individuals conformed more as the majority group increased size. On the other hand, when individuals’ responses were not available publicly and their interaction was face-to-face (direct) with the majority group, individuals conformed less as the majority group increased size. However, this relationship was only based on 4 studies. It is important to note that of the 125 studies considered, group size did not exceed 9 people. Moreover, results are consistent with Asch’s (1951; cited in Bond) position that a group size of 3 is sufficient for conformity. Bond recommends that future research is needed to further examine the relationship between group size and conformity, especially the exact size of the group.

2.11 Winslow (2004)


From a cultural anthropological perspective, Winslow (2004) describes the possible reasons for the breakdown of discipline in the CF deployments to Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, specifically the events in Bacovici. She argues that at the core of the “incidents” (the torture killing of Shidane Arone in Somalia and the allegations of misuse of alcohol, sexual misconduct, insubordination, violence and black marketing in Bacovici) is military culture within the particular units,
specifically “exaggerated loyalty to the group.” Winslow describes the formal and informal socialization process in the military that promotes dependence of the soldier on the group or unit, facilitating group identity. Within the regimental system, these include an emphasis on teamwork in training, initiation or hazing rituals, adherence to particular Regimental customs and traditions, competition with other Regiments, looking out for one’s own, passing only good news up the chain of command, and deployments to foreign lands that promote group cohesion. These formal and informal processes, she continues, foster shared attitudes and beliefs about the world, and can be viewed as proving grounds for group loyalty. Winslow concludes that exaggerated group loyalty combined with military Regimental culture can potentially lead to wrongdoing and prevent whistleblowing. As such, solidarity must be fostered, she holds, in an environment of strong leadership and discipline.


Current trends in the justice literature have shifted from a focus on fairness in distributed outcomes to fairness in the procedure itself (Tyler & Blader, 2003). According to Tyler and Blader (2003, p. 351), justice as “rules used in the distribution of resources in a group,” has been supplanted by justice as linked to the “quality of treatment” (e.g., dignity) arising from social interactions. And justice understood in these terms, they argue, should consider the impacts it has on eliciting cooperation and commitment. They believe that procedural justice provides “identity security” (p358).

Tyler and Blader (2003, p. 352) present the group engagement model, which has at its core “the relational implications of justice evaluations.” It considers aspects of Lind and Tyler’s (1988) work on the group-value model of procedural justice, which captures the antecedents of procedural justice, and the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992; both cited in Tyler & Blader), which emphasizes interpersonal treatment. According to Tyler and Blader, the interpersonal aspects of procedures reflect people’s concerns of being heard and treated fairly by others. The group engagement model suggests that procedures shape social identities, which in turn can positively influence attitudes, values, and behaviours, including cooperative behaviour in groups. They explain that people focus on the procedural elements related to the value of interpersonal treatment because these carry the most social identity-relevant information. Their model underscores the prevalence of justice in social settings and the desire to promote prosocial outcomes, such as building trust, encouraging responsibility and obligation, generating intrinsic motivation and creativity, and stimulating voluntary cooperation with others (Tyler & Blader, 2000; cited in Tyler & Blader). As shown in Figure 5, the model contributes to our understanding of people’s motivations of belonging to a group and their subsequent behaviour as a consequence of identity evaluations.
As shown in the figure, Tyler and Blader (2003) argue that procedural justice is the primary antecedent to cooperative behaviour within a group, which proceeds through identity judgements. The four distinct components of procedural fairness are the formal and informal quality of decision making process and the formal and informal quality of treatment, which, they hold, represent independent justice evaluations. Other antecedents to cooperative behaviour include distributive justice and outcome favourability. Distributive justice and outcome favourability also influence resource judgements. It is argued that resource judgements are the gains and losses from group membership and will impact loyalty to that group (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996; cited in Tyler & Blader, 2003). Although resources do not directly impact engagement, according to the model, they influence social identity. In other words, “people evaluate their identity and status in a particular group by the level of resources that they are receiving from that group” (Tyler & Blader, p. 355). Furthermore, identity judgements are influenced by procedural justice, and in turn influence engagement of the individual (i.e., psychologically and behaviourally). Identity judgements include pride (evaluation of the group – its values, rules and authorities), respect (evaluation of status or reputation within the group), and subsequent identification (“the degree to which people cognitively merge their sense of self and their evaluations of self-worth with their judgments of the characteristics and statuses of their groups”, p. 354). What influences group cooperation most, Tyler and Blader argue, is the creation and maintenance of a favourable group identity. They hold that a willingness to cooperate stems from the information people receive from the group and this, they posit, comes from procedural fairness evaluations. People will then choose to psychologically engage with the group and, furthermore, engage in particular behaviours (e.g., ethical or unethical behaviour). Behaviour can be mandatory, as required by the group through rewards and sanctions, or discretionary, motivated by the values and attitudes of the individual. It is hypothesized that mandatory behaviours are construed as more prototypical and associated with pride, whereas discretionary behaviours as more idiosyncratic and associated with respect. For Tyler and Blader, then, identity judgements are the primary factors shaping attitudes, values and cooperation in groups, whereas resource judgements only influence these indirectly through identity judgements.

Tyler and Blader (2000; cited in Tyler & Blader, 2003) tested the model’s various hypotheses and found support. For example, they found that identity judgements influenced attitudes, values and cooperative behaviours, and there was a greater influence on discretionary (voluntary) behaviour compared to mandatory behaviour, stemming from identity judgements. They also found resource judgments shaped attitudes, values, and cooperative behaviours indirectly through identity
judgements. Also, procedural justice was found to be the primary antecedent to identity. The group engagement model suggests that social identity is a motivation behind psychological and behavioural engagement, including cooperation in groups, and this can be promoted by a sense of procedural justice within groups.

2.13 Hopman & van Leeuwen (2009)


Hopman and van Leeuwen (2009) examined social identity and whistleblowing (i.e., exposing a transgressor to terminate the behaviour). Specifically, the authors considered the circumstances that would encourage someone to blow the whistle on transgressions, including social identity (strong or weak), group status (high or low), and target group (ingroup vs. outgroup). Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) state that part of one’s identity comes from group membership, and membership to a group that has been positively appraised in comparison to outgroups (intergroup differentiation) will promote a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; all cited in Hopman & van Leeuwen).

Hopman and van Leeuwen hold that an ingroup’s standing can be increased when learning negative information about an outgroup. After hearing about an outgroup member’s transgression, they predicted that low status groups would inform their ingroup (e.g., gossiping) and high status groups would inform the outgroup (e.g., reprimanding). In both cases, Hopman and van Leeuwen believe that ingroup members will consider whistleblowing to be loyal to their group, thereby enhancing (low status) or confirming (high status) their group’s standing. Talking negatively about another group “serves as a status-enhancing mechanism” (McAndrew & Milenkovic, 2002; cited in Hopman & van Leeuwen). And this effect was thought to be more pronounced for those that identify strongly with their ingroup.

In Hopman and van Leeuwen’s (2009) first experiment, 87 participants were told that their ingroup (i.e., their university) scored lower on a number of traits compared to an outgroup (i.e., rival university). Participants then read a description of an ingroup member exposing an outgroup member’s transgression to either a fellow ingroup member or an opposing outgroup member. Participants were assessed on how strongly they identified with their ingroup and the extent to which the whistle blower was loyal to their ingroup. The results showed that participants who identified strongly to their low status ingroup perceived the whistle blower more loyal to their ingroup when they informed the ingroup of the transgression compared to informing the outgroup. Expectedly, participants who identified strongly to their high status ingroup perceived the whistle blower more loyal to their ingroup when they informed the outgroup of the transgression compared to informing the ingroup. A subsequent study examined if these results would be consistent with actually engaging in the whistleblowing behaviour. The results confirmed that participants who identified strongly to their low status ingroup informed their ingroup of the transgression, while participants who identified strongly to their high status ingroup informed the outgroup of the transgression. The findings suggest participants did this out of loyalty to their ingroup. Hopman and van Leeuwen (2009) propose that high status groups will profit most from reprimanding the low status group’s on their behaviour. This would assert the high status group as superior and righteous over the low status group. On the other hand, low status groups will profit most from gossiping to their ingroup, maintaining their differentiation from the outgroup. These findings are pronounced when people identify with their ingroup.

This research provides evidence of the status-enhancing mechanism for ingroup/outgroup rivalry through negative social comparisons. Those groups with high status will call out an outgroup’s moral transgressions in order to demonstrate ingroup loyalty and affirm ingroup moral standing. Indeed, as Hopman and van Leeuwen (2009) argue, the confrontation highlights the outgroup’s
weakness and permits the high status ingroup to police the norm-violation behaviour, essentially legitimizing and maintaining the status quo. On the other hand, the low status groups will engage in negative internal gossip about the outgroup, which may facilitate collective action (Hopman & van Leeuwen, 2009). As Hopman and van Leeuwen suggest, “people who care highly for their ingroup’s standing engage in internal deliberation upon information that questions the legitimacy of their group’s lower status position” (p. 614-5).

Though promoting one’s ingroup through status-enhancing mechanisms builds loyalty to the group and fosters group identity, it could also serve to detrimentally reinforce ingroup/outgroup alienation and rivalry. Strong intergroup differentiation could then lead to unfavourable constructions of the outgroup, especially around morality (e.g., dehumanization) and when transgressions reflect dispositional information about the outgroup rather than situational or idiosyncratic information. Moreover, status-enhancing mechanisms include keeping misconduct within the group. As Hornsey et al (2005; cited in Hopman & van Leeuwen) point out, reporting negative ingroup transgressions to outsiders goes against the implicit rule that criticism should stay within the group to avoid any unnecessary damage to ingroup standing. And intragroup whistle blowers sometimes face retaliation and social rejection (Near & Miceli, 1985, 1986; Williams, Forgas, & von Hippel, 2005; cited in Hopman & van Leeuwen). Excessive ingroup loyalty then may lead to covering up moral transgressions committed by ingroup members.

2.14 Joseph (2005)


Previous research has suggested that individuals learn from their co-workers’ behaviour. However, research has not examined the details regarding how co-workers and managers influence moral and ethical decision making. Using the current literature, Joseph (2005) builds on theories and models regarding ethical decision making, and considers the relationship between co-worker’s behaviours and individuals’ moral and ethical choices. He examined symbolic interactionism, employee socialization, reference group theories, social comparison theories, organizational climate, organizational culture, social information processing, and group decision making. Based on his examination of available theories and previous models (e.g., Jones, 1991; cited in Joseph), Joseph created a model of peer influence on ethical decision making (see Figure 6).
As illustrated above, peer influence occurs at all four stages of the ethical decision making process. Due to the available data, however, Joseph focuses on peer influence on ethical outcomes in two stages: moral awareness and moral action (reporting misconduct). Joseph hypothesized that co-worker’s ethical communications will be positively related to and predict employee’s moral awareness; influence moral awareness under uncertainty; be positively related to and predict employees reporting misconduct; predict employees reporting misconduct among young employees with low tenure; be negatively related to and predict employees observing misconduct; and be positively related to and predict employee satisfaction of misconduct reporting. Furthermore, Joseph also hypothesized that employee advice seeking will predict employee moral awareness and moral awareness will be positively related to employees reporting misconduct.

Joseph (2005) analysed data from 1503 telephone surveys conducted by the Ethics Resource Centre. Participants were adults who were employed and working a minimum of 20 hours per week. During the survey, participants were assessed on demographic variables, tenure, employee level, organization size, organizational transition (e.g., merger), ethics programme scale (formal ethical systems), management ethical communications (communication of ethical norms by management), supervisor sanctions (supervisors rewarding unethical behaviour), advice seeking from supervisors (employees seeking advice of supervisor), co-worker ethical communications, co-worker sanctions, advice seeking from co-workers (employees seeking advice of co-workers), employees moral awareness, employees reporting misconduct, employees observing misconduct, and satisfaction with organization after reporting misconduct.

Results showed that co-workers can be influential at specific phases of ethical decision making. Joseph (2005) found that co-worker’s ethical communications were positively related to and predicted employee’s moral awareness and reporting misconduct, after controlling for individual variables, organizational variables, formal ethics programmes, and management ethical communications. In other words, employees reported misconduct and were aware of moral issues more when they interacted with co-workers who considered moral issues, discussed the issue’s importance, and supported the organization’s ethics. Moreover, employees who sought advice were more likely to be morally aware than those who did not seek advice, indicating that employees are not only passively influenced by their co-workers. The rest of Joseph’s hypotheses were not supported.

Taken together, these results suggest that co-worker’s moral and ethical beliefs and behaviour influenced employee’s decision making at the moral awareness and moral actions stages. Peers, therefore, may have a critical impact on one’s moral and ethical decision making. However, further research is needed to understand if peers influence the other two stages of ethical decision making, namely moral judgement and intention as this study was constrained to moral awareness and moral action.

2.15 King & Hermodson (2000)


King and Hermodson (2000) considered the qualitative factors that influenced a peer reporting unethical behaviour. Peer reporting differs from whistleblowing in that the reporter and wrongdoer are peers and co-workers, whereas a whistle blower tends to report senior or organizational transgressions. Following the interactionist model by Treviño (1986; cited in King & Hermodson), they considered the individual, situational, and organizational factors that may impact exposing a
wrongdoing. One hundred and ninety-seven nurses answered two open-ended questions: describe a wrongdoing they observed or had knowledge of in their organization, and their reasons for reporting it or not reporting it to officials.

King and Hermodson (2000) present a decision tree for reporting unethical behaviour, based on Miceli and Near (1992; cited in King & Hermodson) whistleblowing process (see Figure 7).
Figure 7: Peer reporting model (King & Hornbecker, 2000, p. 321)
As shown in the figure, the results confirmed that individual characteristics, situational factors, and organizational issues all influenced whether or not a peer would report a colleague’s transgressions. Although these specific categories were not the focus of the current project, King and Hermodson describe them in light of a social context (i.e., group setting). Individual characteristics include ethical code, tenure, and perceived power. For example, employees that belonged to professional organizations (e.g., American Nurses Association) that had an ethical standard were more likely to report a wrongdoing. On the other hand, those who were new to the organization and who presumably did not understand the social norms, as well as those who did not feel that they had the power to produce change were less likely to report a wrongdoing. Situational factors include severity of the transgression, social norms, and group policing. Employees were more likely to report an unethical act when it was severe, such as drug or patient abuse. The social norms of a group and organization may also influence an employee’s reporting behaviour (i.e., normative social influence). For example, if the norm is never report peer wrongdoings, employees that go against this may face “overt retaliation or ostracism” (King & Hermodson, 2000, p. 322). Furthermore, some wrongdoings were able to be repaired by an internal group discussion. This group policing method ensured the issues did not go beyond the group to the supervisors. Organizational issues implicated in ethical decision making included the legality of the transgression, compliance with policies, and personal issues. For example, criminal acts were more likely to be reported as well as activities that did not comply with company policy or procedures. However, employees did not report wrongdoings when the organization had a retaliatory climate, such as a fear of losing one’s licence.

King and Hermodson (2000) found that peers would more often report unethical conduct when their professional organization had a clear ethical code, when the act was severe and/or illegal, and when the act went against company policy. At the same time, group policing practices ensure that wrongdoings are settled at the group level, ensuring that this does not reach the supervisor. There may be value in investigating group policing practices to determine if these are likely to exist in small military teams (e.g., sections). Loyalty to the ingroup and strong group cohesion may in part be facilitated by ingroup policing norms, which may then prevent reporting unethical conduct. Moreover, retaliation from the organization appeared to prevent reporting. Ingroup policing and fear of organizational retribution may be social influences that restrict desired moral and ethical decision making within the CF.

2.16 Westerman, Beekun, Stedham & Yamamura (2007)


Recently, decision making literature has focused on the antecedents of making an ethical decision (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2003). Westerman, Beekun, Stedham, and Yamamura (2007) use social identity theory as a basis to examine culture and peer influence as antecedents to ethical decision making. According to the social identity theory, “an individual’s choice of the communities, within which one associates, can lead to an internalization of the group’s norms, duties, and commitments into the individual’s self-definition or identity (Kekes, 1983; cited in Westerman et al., 2007, p. 240). An individual’s referent choice (i.e., peer) may be more influential than one’s culture. For example, an individual may refrain from bribery, even though it is culturally accepted, because one’s peer believes it is unethical (Westerman et al.). The authors hypothesized that one’s culture and peers influence ethical intentions. Based on research by Hofstede (1980; cited in Westerman et al.), Westerman et al. also hypothesized that cultures categorized as individualistic and lower power distance will be more influenced by peers, while collectivistic and high power distance cultures will be less influenced by peers. Westerman and colleagues point out that people from
individualistic cultures (e.g., Germany and Italy) are concerned with their own interests, rather than the collectivistic interests of the community (e.g., Japan). Power distance refers to how power is distributed. For example, high power distance cultures (e.g., Japan and Italy) have an unequal distribution of power (i.e., more vs. less wealth), whereas low power distance cultures (e.g., Germany), have a more equal distribution of power. Participants were 165 graduate students from Germany, Italy, and Japan. After reading three ethical scenarios, participants reported how they would have behaved in the scenarios as well as how their peers would behave.

Results showed that national culture and peers influenced ethical decision making. However, peer influence was found to have a much stronger impact, especially when cultures were both high on individualism and power distance (e.g., Italy). Compared to an individualistic, high power distance culture (e.g., Italy), a collectivistic culture moderately high in power distance (e.g., Japan) was less influenced by peers with respect to ethical decision making. Although individualistic low power distance cultures (e.g., Germany) were more influenced by peers, this was not significantly different than collectivistic moderately high power distance cultures (e.g., Japan). One major limitation of this study was that Hofstede’s (1980) research on cultures was from 1960’s and 1970’s (cited in Westerman et al.). Further research would be needed to fully understand the cultural dimensions with respect to influencing ethical decision making. Nevertheless, the overall results of this study suggest that one’s peers can influence ethical decision making.

2.17 Gino, Ayal, & Ariely (2009)


Gino, Ayal, and Ariely (2009) investigated the impact of witnessing unethical behaviour. Specifically, they examined the impact social norms and salience of ethics have on ethical behaviour in contrast to a cost-benefit analysis, which holds individuals consider if the benefits of behaving dishonestly outweigh the costs (e.g., Hill & Kochendorfer, 1969; cited in Gino, Ayal & Ariely). For example, research shows that after reading the Ten Commandments, i.e., when ethics are made salient, people cheated less (Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; cited in Gino, Ayal & Ariely). Moreover, some suggest individuals may behave unethically when the social norms permit unethical behaviour (e.g., Cialdini & Trost, 1998; cited in Gino, Ayal & Ariely). The degree to which social norms will influence an individual’s behaviour, Gino et al. argue, will depend on how strongly he or she identifies with those exhibiting the behaviour (i.e., social identity theory). As such, they hypothesize that ingroup unethical behaviour will increase participant’s unethical behaviour (i.e., the ingroup members behaviour reflects the standard group norm), but outgroup unethical behaviour will cause participant’s to want to distance themselves, in turn, decreasing participant’s unethical behaviour.

One hundred and forty-one participants were asked to solve math problems for money. Participants were allowed to keep a certain amount of money for each correct answer, but had to return any unearned money. Math problems had to be solved individually, but participants were in a room with others. Participants experienced one of four conditions: unable to cheat (unearned money was checked by an experimenter); able to cheat (unearned money not checked by experimenter); able to cheat and witnessed an ingroup member cheat; and able to cheat and witnessed an outgroup member cheat. The confederate cheated by announcing they solved everything and they had no unearned money after a short time past, too short to have completed the problems. For the two witnessing conditions, the confederate’s group status was manipulated by the t-shirt they wore: a plain t-shirt was considered an ingroup member and a different university t-shirt was an outgroup member (e.g., Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher, 2005; cited in Gino, Ayal, and Ariely, 2009). The authors measured ethical behaviour by examining how many problems participants solved in relation to how much unearned money they returned. Results supported the social norm hypothesis.
Participants cheated the least when the confederate was an outgroup member, moderately when there was no confederate, and the most when the confederate was an ingroup member. Thus, participant’s unethical behaviour increased when unethical behaviour was their ingroup social norm and decreased when unethical behaviour was the outgroup social norm.

A subsequent study examined the salience of ethical behaviour by having the confederate ask if cheating was allowed, but did not actually cheat. Results showed that unethical behaviour decreased when the confederate asked about cheating. Specifically, participants who were able to cheat did, but those who were exposed to the salience of cheating, cheated less.

Taken together, the results from Gino et al.’s study suggest that ethical behaviour is influenced by the dishonesty of others and, more significantly, is dependent on social norms and the saliency of ethics. These findings highlight the significance of external cues in the environment when individual’s make moral decisions. Unlike cost-benefit analysis, expecting individuals to rationally weigh the pros and cons of unethical behaviour, results from Gino et al.’s study show how individual’s look to ingroup members to model behaviour in particular situations. Results underscored the impact of normative social influence. On the other hand, their research also showed that unethical behaviour can be countered when ethical standards (e.g., Ten Commandments) are made salient. In the case of the CF, perhaps regular discussions pertaining to the Statement of Defence Ethics may help facilitate moral and ethical conduct as the social norm.

2.18 Gino, Gu, & Zhong (2009)


Gino, Gu, and Zhong (2009) examined if the presence of outgroup witnesses would change one’s ethical behaviour. Specifically, they investigated if the presence of outgroup witnesses would show contagion of the ingroup’s unethical behaviour as in previous research (Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2009; cited in Gino et al.) or produce compensation for the ingroup’s unethical behaviours. In their study, each participant was put in a room with three confederates: one from the participant’s ingroup (same university affiliation) and 2 from the participant’s outgroup (different university affiliation). Participants were asked to anonymously allocate $10 between themselves and their counterpart in another room. Participants experienced either the ingroup confederate or one of the outgroup confederates announce that they were taking all the money. Results showed that participants who witnessed an ingroup member take all the money, compensated by giving more money to their counterpart than participant’s who witnessed an outgroup member take all the money. Participants also reported they would feel guilty if an ingroup member took all the money. Subsequent studies, however, showed this effect occurred only when there were outgroup witnesses.

This research shows the impact of ingroup members’ unethical behaviour on ethical conduct. When the ingroup is behaving unethically, an individual may behave unethically as well. Keeping transgressions within the group may be a means to uphold the ingroup image. However, large compensatory behaviours can occur when outgroup witnesses are present as an attempt to make up for ingroup transgressions. Outgroup witnesses to unethical behaviours may be a powerful motivator for encouraging subsequent ethical behaviour within the ingroup. In fact, Gino et al.’s (p. 1301) research showed that in some cases, to rectify ingroup transgressions, individuals will “go the extra mile,” perhaps to restore the group image or to distance themselves from the ingroup member (Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; cited in Gino et al.). Given participant responses, the findings also suggest that compensatory behaviours could be invoked by feelings of guilt. Irrespective of cause, Gino et al.’s study contributes to the importance and relevance of ingroup/outgroup differentiation on ethical conduct.
2.19 Cohen, Montoya & Insko (2006)


Cohen, Montoya, and Insko (2006) considered group morality and intergroup conflict. Cohen et al. (2006) defined morality as the “standards of right and wrong conduct or, alternatively, as rules governing behavior” (p. 1559). While individual moral codes encourage cooperation (e.g., Pemberton, Insko & Schopler, 1996; cited in Cohen et al., 2006), they argue that group moral codes encourage behaviour that is good for the group, regardless of outgroup consequences. Indeed, anthropologist Margret Mead said that groups delineate outgroup behaviour against ingroup behaviour (Bloom, 1997; cited in Cohen et al., 2006). Cohen et al. posit that group morality deems acceptable hostile behaviour toward outgroups. And this, they argue, is more pronounced when ingroup and outgroup interests differ widely (i.e., noncorrespondent), because this entails “hurting” the outgroup to promote ingroup interests.

To examine the relationship between group loyalty and intergroup conflict, they used data from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (Murdock & White, 1969; cited in Cohen et al.). This cross-cultural sample included data from 186 societies between 1850 and 1950. The authors predicted an interaction between group loyalty and intergroup violence. The societies were measured on their attitudes toward ingroup and outgroup violence, attitudes toward same ethnic group and different ethnic group violence, frequency of war between communities and other societies, frequency of violence between same ethnic groups and different ethnic groups, value of war (3 point scale), ingroup loyalty, and same ethnic group loyalty. The results showed that ingroup loyalty increased an attitude for outgroup violence more than ingroup violence. In other words, as loyalty to one’s community increased, the frequency of war between societies and valuing war increased. Similarly, as loyalty to one’s same ethnic group increased, there were positive attitudes toward different ethnic group violence, as well as an increased frequency of different ethnic group violence. Thus, ingroup loyalty (community and ethnic) moderates the relationship between ingroup and outgroup violence. A subsequent laboratory study found that guilt-prone ingroup members who were asked to be empathetic to their ingroup were more competitive with the outgroup than those asked to remain objective. These results suggest that individuals that are assumed to be moral (i.e., those who experience the moral emotion guilt), were the most likely to act in accordance to the group moral, in turn, acting more competitively for the good of the group.

Together, the results suggest that group morality can encourage negative behaviour (i.e., violence and competition) towards an outgroup. Cohen et al. (2006) argue that this negative behaviour may be due to the actual or perceived noncorrespondence in the group’s interactions. They explain that in interdependence theory, noncorrespondence occurs when the increase of one’s group outcomes results in a decrease of another’s group outcomes. In summary, Cohen and colleagues propose that those who are violent and/or competitive with outgroups are not immoral, but rather acting consistent with the moral standards of their ingroup.

2.20 Saucier, McManus & Smith (2010)


In this chapter, Saucier, McManus, and Smith (2010) shed light on the role of discrimination on helping behaviour. Specifically, the authors described a meta-analysis (Saucier, Miller & Doucet, 2005; cited in Saucier et al.) that examined the available literature in helping behaviour with racially different outgroups. Saucier et al. argued that racism still exists, although in a much more
subtle and socially acceptable form (e.g., not helping an outgroup financially). Individuals helping an outgroup member are not doing so necessarily because he or she is unprejudiced. In fact, they argue that one could help an outgroup member to look unprejudiced. Similarly, not helping an outgroup member may be because the need for help was not obvious. Research needs to consider the specific situations of helping, rather than just the helping behaviour. To this end, Saucier and colleagues include a meta-analysis of the literature regarding White ingroup decisions to help their White ingroup members or Black outgroup members.

Saucier and colleagues (2005) employed Gaertner and Dovidio’s (1986; both cited in Saucier et al. 2010) aversive racism theory (i.e., being in the presence of other races produces aversive feelings such as uneasiness) and Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Clark’s (1981; cited in Saucier et al., 2010) cost-reward model of helping (i.e., helping or not helping produces feelings of arousal such as guilt) to explain that subtle discriminatory behaviours, such as avoidance of helping, are used to prevent negative feelings. Moreover, Saucier et al. (2005; cited in Saucier et al., 2010) used the justification-suppression model of prejudice to predict that individuals will help their same race ingroup more than their different race outgroup. The justification-suppression model suggests that everyone is prejudice, but suppresses overt actions due to social norms. Prejudice becomes visible when justifications exist such as time cost, risk effort, difficulty, financial cost, proximity, emergency need, and ambiguity. Thus, Saucier et al. (2005; cited in Saucier et al., 2010) predicted that ingroup members (i.e., White) would be less inclined to help outgroup members (i.e., Black) than ingroup members when justifications were available.

The results showed that help was given to both ingroup (i.e., Whites) and outgroups (i.e., Blacks) similarly. However, when discrimination did occur, it depended on the situational factors. In support of the aversive racism theory, the cost-reward model, and the justification-suppression model, ingroup members helped outgroups less when justifications were available such as time cost, risk effort, difficulty, and decrease proximity. However, contrary to the cost-reward model, emergency need was negatively related to helping behaviours. In other words, as the need for helping increased, actual helping decreased. In summary, Saucier et al. (2005; cited in Saucier et al., 2010) found that making the decision to help outgroups was less frequent when there was a justifiable reason not to help. Even when the need to help was great and there did not appear to be a justifiable reason to not help, helping outgroups was low.

2.21 Kerr, Rumble, Park, Ouwerkerk, Parks, Gallucci & van Lange (2009)


Previous research has shown a ‘bad apple effect,’ meaning a few uncooperative group members, or ‘bad apples,’ are more influential than a comparable number of cooperative group members (e.g., Colman, 1982; cited in Kerr, Rumble, Park, Ouwerkerk, Parks, & Gallucci, 2009). Moreover, research has shown that, facing social dilemmas, group members’ behaviours are influenced by the expectations and observations of other group members (e.g., Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Braver & Barnett, 1974; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992; Messick et al., 1983; Schroeder, Jensen, Reed, Sullivan, & Schwab, 1983; Yamagishi & Sato, 1986; all cited in Kerr et al.). Adding to this bulk of research, Kerr et al. were interested in just how many uncooperative group members it took to influence others to be uncooperative and how it can be prevented. The authors presented two studies examining the relationship between the number of uncooperative group members and the likelihood of cooperation as well as the impact of a social exclusion threat, a social control mechanism. Social exclusion threat is the possibility that an individual will be excluded from the group if they do not conform to group beliefs and actions, and
this threat has been shown to be highly aversive (e.g., Williams, 2001; cited in Kerr et al.). There is a human need to belong or be included in the group (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; cited in Kerr et al.). Kerr et al. consider whether social exclusion threat will counter participants desire to follow the example of ‘bad apples.’

For the first study, 356 undergraduates participated in a 4 (Number of uncooperative people: 0 vs. 1 vs. 2 vs. 3) x 2 (Exclusion threat: high vs. low) between subjects factorial design. Participants were first put in bogus groups and asked to complete an investment game. They had to make decisions on whether to be cooperative (put money into their group account) or uncooperative (put money into their individual account). Before they started the game, participants were shown the allocations of a previous group where zero, one, two, or three group member(s) put $0 into their group account, in turn deeming them uncooperative. Participants were then told that either they were anonymous and their allocations were not visible to their group (low exclusion threat) or their name and allocations were visible to their group members and they had the chance of being kicked out of the game by their group (high exclusion threat). The results showed that one uncooperative person was not enough to reduce cooperation when the social exclusion threat was high, thus, it acted as a deterrent from uncooperative behaviour. However, regardless of social exclusion, three uncooperative group members reduced cooperation. The second study varied group size and the number of uncooperative people in a group. Specifically, group size increased to 4 or 8 and participants were shown either 1 or 2 uncooperative group members, respectively. Results showed that the threat of social exclusion was only effective in groups of 4 and not in groups of 8.

Social exclusion threat prevented individuals from following the footsteps of a few bad apples, countering the evidence from research that shows one bad apple can spoil a barrel (Kurzban, McCabe, Smith, & Wilson, 2001; Rutte & Wilke, 1992; both cited in Kerr et al., 2009). However, this threat was effective only with small numbers of defectors and small group sizes. Despite being a powerful tool to control groups, Kerr et al. (p. 611) argue, it should be used with “great care,” because unlike experiments, “many real group members can simply leave the group for another, more welcoming group if threatened with exclusion.” Still human beings, they argue, avoid marginalization and ostracism from groups, thus suggesting that social exclusion threat remains a powerful social control mechanism.

2.22 Laham (2009)


Laham (2009) examined how types of mind sets, inclusion versus exclusion, influenced one’s moral circle, i.e., “the boundary drawn around those entities in the world deemed worthy of moral consideration” (p. 250). One’s moral circle encompasses that which is considered deserving of moral regard. The studies presented by Laham suggest that one’s moral circle can change depending on whether someone is thinking of who/what to include in the circle versus who/what to exclude. For example, an inclusion mind set focuses on who/what “should be included in the circle,” while an exclusion mind set considers who/what “should not be included in the circle” (p. 250). Based on previous research (e.g., Maoz, Yaniv & Ivri, 2007; cited in Laham, 2009), Laham hypothesized that exclusion mind sets would produce larger moral circles than inclusion mind sets. Ninety-five undergrads were asked to decide who/what is deserving of moral regard. Half of the participants were asked to circle people (e.g., fetus, young girl) or animals (e.g., gorilla, fish) that were deserving, while the other participants were asked to cross out those undeserving. Participants who considered who or what to exclude ended up with larger moral circles than those who considered who or what to include. A subsequent study had participants complete the same inclusion/exclusion task and then asked to rate whether they had moral concern for various out groups (e.g., people who practice a different religion). Results showed that excluders rated more
out groups as deserving compared to includers. Thus, the size of one’s moral circle can influence subsequent moral judgements.

Laham’s research suggests that considering who to exclude in contrast to who to include from moral regard can increase who one considers worthy. He suggests this may be in part because not having a reason why to include someone may be enough not to include them, but not enough to exclude them. Borderline cases are more likely to be counted with excluders because they cannot be definitely excluded from the list. In conclusion, when approaching a moral dilemma, instead of asking “Why should I treat this being with moral concern,” Laham advises asking “Why shouldn’t I?” as a strategy to attribute moral worth (p. 252).

### 2.23 Cialdini & Goldstein (2004)


Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) review significant developments in the social influence literature with a special focus on compliance and conformity research published between 1997 and 2002. The former refers to a particular kind of response to a request, whereas the latter refers to changing one’s behaviour to be consistent with the situation and others. Cialdini and Goldstein argue that an individual’s susceptibility to these social influences can be understood in terms of three potential underlying motivations, including forming accurate perceptions of reality and acting accordingly, maintaining positive relationships with others, and maintaining a positive self-concept. They examine compliance and conformity in terms of these motivations.

With respect to developments in the area of compliance research and its relation to the human desire to be accurate, Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) show that research centres on the following: the role of affect and arousal state (e.g., avoid negative feelings like shame or guilt) in determining the response to a request; the ‘that’s-not-all technique’ (i.e., taking advantage of individuals limited ability to make well-informed judgements in a short period of time, thus adding more to the initial request); disrupt-then-reframe techniques (disrupting an individual’s ability to evaluate and resist the request, by reframing it); the power of authority (based on expertise or title); and the influence of social norms as guidance for accurate understanding and responses to social situations.

Considering the connection between conformity and the desire to be accurate, Cialdini and Goldstein present research that focuses on perceived consensus to beliefs, attitudes and behaviours of others; dynamic and complex systems (i.e., within a given social space, adopting the attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of the majority); and automatic activation (through priming).

They then presented research connecting the human motivation for affiliation and compliance. Cialdini and Goldstein showed that compliance research focuses on liking and approval of others as well as the norm of reciprocity. Relevant studies linking conformity and the goal of affiliation include behavioural mimicry (matching voice, facial expressions, postures, and mannerisms of another largely unconsciously) and gaining social approval.

Finally, Cialdini and Goldstein examined compliance in terms of the desire to maintain a positive self-concept (i.e., through consistency in action, statements, beliefs, etc.), which included research such as the foot-in-the-door technique (i.e., seeking a larger request followed by a smaller fulfilled request – people ascribe characteristics to themselves underscoring their recent actions) as well as and consistency and commitment (e.g., remaining consistent and committed to sense of self). The process of conformity and desire to maintain one’s self-concept includes research investigating the impact of majority and minority influence as well as deindividuation effects (e.g., salience of collective or group identity increases conformity to the group’s norms).

Compliance and conformity to social influence may be exacerbated under time pressure, ambiguity and uncertainty.
2.24 Watson & Berkley (2009)


Watson and Berkley (2009) examined how conformity values and situational factors influence compliance of unethical decision making. Previous research has shown that situational factors influence one’s ethical decision making (e.g., Trevino, 1986; cited in Watson & Berkley). According to the person-situation model, however, high moral reasoning can buffer the influence of situational factors. The person-situation interaction model proposes that situational variables, such as punishments and rewards, will influence unethical compliance. Moreover, dispositional variables, such as stimulation, traditionalism, and conformity, will mediate this relationship as well as directly influence unethical compliance. Because dispositional variables are not of interest to the current project, only conformity will be examined in relation to moral and ethical decision making.

Watson and Berkley (2009) consider conformity as maintaining social norms, such as behaving ethically, on the other hand, non-conformity would show a rebellion against social norms, such as participation in unethical behaviour. They investigate the person-situation interaction model in relation to the effects of conformity (i.e., restraining actions that violate norms; Schwartz, 2006; cited in Watson & Berkley) on unethical compliance, in combination with situational factors (e.g., rewards and punishments). Watson and Berkley hypothesize that 1) agreeing with an unethical decision will be related to the type of moral situation, positively related to rewards and negatively related to punishments; 2) conformity will be negatively related to agreeing with an unethical decision, as well as moderate the punishment and compliance relationship, and reward and compliance relationship; and 3) a three way interaction will occur with reward, punishment, and conformity.

One hundred and twenty students participated in a 2 (moral situation: environmental dumping vs. revenue falsification) x 2 (reward for unethical behaviour: bonus vs. no recognition) x 2 (punishment for unethical behaviour: reprimand vs. no punishment) factorial design. Participants were assessed on their values (Schwartz Value Survey) and their compliance with unethical behaviour in a variety of scenarios. Although results showed that the moral situation (environmental dumping and revenue falsification) was not related to unethical decision making, rewards such as bonuses increased unethical compliance and punishments such as reprimands decreased unethical compliance (H1). High values for conformity were shown to decrease unethical compliance and moderate the relationship between punishment and compliance, but not rewards and compliance (H2). Specifically, those low in conformity complied with unethical behaviour more than those high in conformity, especially when there were no punishments. Finally, there was a three-way interaction between reward, punishment and conformity (H3). Regardless of reward, those who do not value conformity and who were not presented with a punishment complied with unethical decisions more than those high in conformity and who had punishments. The overall results supported the person-situation interaction model such that multiple situational and dispositional variables influenced unethical compliance.

Taken together, individuals who valued conformity beliefs (e.g., maintaining social norms) are less likely to comply with unethical decisions and more likely to focus on the presence of punishments rather than rewards. In other words, those who conform to social norms are less likely to agree with a manager’s decision to behave unethically, thereby going against the social norms. However, it is unclear whether this disagreement will transfer to 1) complying with unethical behaviour of a group, when such behaviour is consistent with the group norm (i.e., the social norm is to behave unethically) or 2) the individual behaving unethically, rather than complying.


According to Ross, Greene, and House (quoted in Jones, 2004, p. 417) the false consensus effect occurs because people “see their own behavioural choices and judgements as relatively common and appropriate to existing circumstances, while viewing alternative responses as uncommon, deviant, and inappropriate.” In this article, Jones (2004) examined why ingroup false consensus exceeds outgroup false consensus. Specifically, he considered the effect social categorization (ingroup vs. outgroup) has on false consensus and if that effect is mediated by perceived social distance, i.e., an individual’s perception of the similarity between themselves and a member of a group (ingroup or outgroup). He also examined false consensus in relation to individual’s opinions and abilities. Jones hypothesized that 1) ingroup false consensus should be stronger with more outgroup social distance, 2) perceived social distance will occur for opinions and abilities, and 3) ingroup false consensus should be stronger for opinions than abilities.

Ninety-eight participants comprising three separate groups (psychology undergraduates, economics researchers, and information technology analysts) completed a questionnaire assessing their abilities (e.g., telling jokes), their opinions (e.g., more people should read the Bible), the percentage of people in each group sharing their abilities and opinions (i.e., false consensus), and their perceived social distance of each group (e.g., I think I can get along with undergraduates). Results showed that perceived social distance mediated the social categorization effect such that ingroup false consensus was greater when outgroup social distance was greater. In other words, when individuals perceived more distance between themselves and an outgroup member, they did not assume that they shared the same abilities and opinions. The effect occurred for real, non-competitive groups, as well as for both opinions and abilities. Regardless of group, false consensus for opinions was stronger than abilities. Consequently, individuals believed others (both ingroup and outgroup members) shared the same opinion as them, but not necessarily the same abilities. Individuals attributed positive abilities to others, regardless of their own abilities.

In summary, Jones examined the factors that influenced why individuals assume others share their abilities and their opinions. Jones found that ingroup false consensus occurred when outgroup social distance was greater. Perceived social distance and social categorization, as well as abilities and opinions influenced the false consensus effect. In terms of moral and ethical decision making, individuals who perceive the outgroup as distant from them may assume their ingroup share the same opinions. During times of uncertainty, individuals may assume their moral and ethical thoughts and actions are the norm, in turn, increasing acceptance of these thoughts and actions.

2.26 Karasawa (2003)


Karasawa (2003) examined social projection, specifically the false consensus effect, of patriotism (i.e., the love for one’s country) and nationalism (i.e., the belief that one’s country is dominant/superior compared to others) with ingroups and outgroups. Based on previous literature (e.g., Marks & Miller, 1987; cited in Karasawa), Karasawa describes social projection and the false consensus effect as perceivers’ inflated “estimates for the prevalence of their own beliefs, [etc], among other people” (p. 103). The false consensus effect is prominent within one’s own ingroup, rather than an outgroup. Karasawa hypothesized that participants who are high in patriotism and nationalism will rate others as being high, and those who are low in patriotism and nationalism will rate others as being low. And this effect will be more salient for ingroup projections. Moreover, ingroups will project positive feelings (loving and dominating) to the ingroup (cognitive
consistency theory) and higher ratings of nationalism will lead to more positive feelings of the ingroup (social identity theory). These hypotheses are based on the assumption that beliefs belonging to ingroup members should be similar because they belong to the same group (i.e., cognitive consistency theory; e.g., Allen & Wilder, 1979) and differentiate them from an outgroup (social identity theory; e.g., Spears & Manstead, 1990; both cited in Karasawa).

Three hundred and seventy Japanese participants assessed themselves, Japanese citizens (ingroup), and American citizens (outgroup) on patriotism and nationalism. Participants were assessed on their own patriotism and nationalism (National Identity Scale) and their political beliefs and behaviour (ratings on Japan and US). Then participants rated either Japanese or American citizens on their patriotism and nationalism levels. Results showed that participants’ assessments of citizens were similar to assessments of themselves, and this effect was more prominent for ingroup members. Outgroup members, on the other hand, were stereotyped as having extreme opinions. Consistency theory was supported in that individuals assume their ingroup shares their same patriotic and nationalistic beliefs. Social identity theory was also supported in that nationalism projections were a direct outcome of the individual’s perception of themselves.

Individuals falsely projected their beliefs onto ingroup members. In terms of moral and ethical decision making, assuming one’s ingroup shares the same opinions may influence a decision (either positively or negatively). Perhaps the assumption of similar beliefs, coupled with strong group identity, may lead to the assumption of similar decision making. Individuals may feel more comfortable making an (im)moral/(un)ethical decision when they believe that his or her comrades would do the same.

### 2.27 Myers & Lamm (1976)


Myers and Lamm (1976) examined a group polarization phenomenon that occurs during group discussions. The group polarization hypothesis is described as “the average postgroup response will tend to be more extreme [and] in the same direction as the average of the pregrou response” (Myers & Lamm, p. 603). After Stoner (1961; cited in Myers & Lamm) revealed that groups tend to be more risky than individuals, group polarization was thought of as the risky-shift phenomenon. Myers and Lamm attempt to prove that group polarization can be generalized to non-risk group interactions. To this end, the authors categorize and summarize the risky-shift experiments and construct a conceptual scheme outlining attitude change within groups.

The research reviewed by Myers and Lamm (1976) suggests that group polarization exists using other measures that were not risk specific. For example, research with groups investigating attitudes, jury decisions, ethical decisions, judgements, person perceptions, and negotiation behaviour were found to show group polarization. The literature suggests that group polarization is not due to diffusion of responsibility, reduction of uncertainty, or leadership ability and risk taking. The literature, rather, suggests that group polarization may be due to group decision rules (e.g., majority rules; contradictory results), interpersonal comparisons (social motivation; mixed results), or informational influence (argument preference; strong support). Myers and Lamm (1976) created a conceptual framework that incorporates interpersonal comparisons and informational influence to describe emerging attitudes during group discussions (see Figure 8).
As shown in the figure, social motivation can change attitudes by interpersonal comparison and the motivation to verbalize arguments that are socially desirable. An individual is said to be motivated to express socially desirable arguments consistent with his/her ideals (social motivation). When these arguments are bordering the acceptability range, the individual’s ideals will be tested (action commitment). The act of expressing these arguments provides rehearsal for the individual and an opportunity for the group members to hear and respond to the information (cognitive foundation). Each of these components can change an individual’s attitude in a group setting.

In summary, Myers and Lamm (1976) present a conceptual scheme to explain attitude change in group dynamics. The group polarization research examined by Myers and Lamm shed light on attitude change in social situations, as well as possible preventative actions against social factors that may influence ethical decision making. For example, Myers and Lamm suggest that techniques that reduce group polarity may also reduce groupthink. The literature suggests having individuals write down both sides of an argument prior to discussing the issue within a group will reduce group polarity and possibly groupthink (Myers & Lamm). In conclusion, having individuals think and confirm their opinions prior to group discussion may alleviate social factors that can hinder ethical decision making.

2.28 Ohtsubo, Masuchi & Nakanishi (2002)


Ohtsubo, Masuchi, and Nakanishi (2002) tested Davis’ (1996) Social Judgment Scheme model with group polarization tasks. Ohtsubo et al. hypothesized that group polarization will be negatively correlated with the initial judgement skewness. Judgements that are evenly distributed and not skewed (e.g., 1, 3, 5) are not polarized. Polarized groups can be positively (e.g., 1, 2, 6) or negatively (e.g., 1, 5, 6) skewed. Fifty-five same sex groups of three participated in group
polarization tasks. Participants were asked to individually answer questions on a Likert scale for a number of moral dilemmas, and then discuss the answers in a group and achieve consensus. Results showed that Davis’ Social Judgment Scheme model was valid for group polarization tasks. More importantly, Ohtsubo et al. found that the skewness of the initial judgements (positive or negative) varied in relation to group polarization. Specifically, when initial judgements were positively skewed (e.g., 1, 2, 6), group polarization occurred and the final judgments became smaller, toward the majority. Likewise, when initial judgements were negatively skewed (e.g., 1, 5, 6), group polarization occurred and the final judgments became larger, toward the majority. In summary, results showed that the majority did influence group decisions, despite initial judgements.

2.29 Esser (1998)


Groupthink occurs when group members are more concerned with matching their thinking and decision to those of other group members in order to secure consensus as opposed to critically evaluating the information to make a well informed decision (Janis, 1971; cited in Esser, 1998). However, since its inception, critics have argued that the theory is flawed (Longley & Pruitt, 1980; cited in Esser, 1998). In this article, Esser summarizes and compares 25 years of case studies and laboratory studies in groupthink research, as well as highlights the contribution of the research. The historical groupthink cases include the Pearl Harbor defence, the Korean War escalation, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Vietnam War escalation (Janis, 1972), the Watergate cover-up (Janis, 1982), the Cuban Missile Crisis (McCauley, 1989), the Kent State gymnasium (Hensley & Griffin, 1986), the Space Shuttle Challenger launch (Esser, 1995), the Iran-Contra affair (Hart, 1990), and the appeasement of Nazi Germany (Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang & Feld, 1992; all cited in Esser, 1998). Each case study is examined in terms of what antecedents were present, what groupthink symptoms occurred, and what poor decision making strategies were employed. It should be noted that researchers do not agree which, if any, antecedents, symptoms, and poor decision making symptoms are required for groupthink.

The laboratory research on groupthink has focused on five antecedents: group cohesion, group insulation, lack of impartial leadership, lack of methodical decision making procedures, and high stress from external threats (Esser, 1998). After evaluating the available lab research, Esser suggests group cohesion was not found to be necessary for groupthink (little support) and group insulation requires more research (mixed support). Moreover, leadership (consistent support), decision making procedures (some support), and high stress (some support) seem to impact groupthink to some extent. Comparing case studies and lab studies, the research indicates that cohesion was not a predictor of groupthink, but structural and procedural issues were (e.g., insulation, leadership, homogeneity, decision procedures).

Although several groupthink lab studies were available, there was no standard decision task and the constructs were operationalized differently. Esser (1998) recommends that future research is needed and should consider identifying the situations necessary for groupthink (e.g., collective avoidance and collective overoptimism), as well as employing decision tasks that are important, are difficult, are involving, require discussion, and have many answer possibilities. Moreover, questionnaires should focus on the behaviours/attitudes of the individual. Thus far, groupthink research has identified a number of cases, antecedents, and symptoms of groupthink, as well as symptoms of poor decision making. These antecedents can be used to predict possible groupthink, and when identified, prevent groupthink from occurring. When facing tough moral decisions, groupthink is a phenomenon worth considering as it can potentially lead to ill-informed group decisions. Examining potential antecedents (e.g., group insulation or leadership) and symptoms
(e.g., belief in the morality of one’s own group and negative stereotypes of the outgroup) might highlight the social phenomena that may promote groupthink.

2.30 Treviño, Weaver & Reynolds (2006)


Treviño, Weaver, and Reynolds (2006) review the literature in organizational ethical behaviour, specifically individual, group, and organizational influences on ethical behaviour. The authors emphasize the key points of the current literature, highlight the gaps, and recommend future research. Treviño et al. limit behavioural ethics to individual acts that are judged according to social moral norms and include literature that has had a significant contribution to the organizational ethical behaviour domain. As shown in Figure 9, Treviño et al. discuss various categories that may influence behavioural ethics.

![Diagram of Categories of Influences on Behavioural Ethics Outcomes](image)

Figure 9: Categories of influences on behavioural ethics outcomes (Treviño et al., 2006, p. 953)

Figure 9 shows that there are various individual factors that influence ethical behaviour. For the purposes of this project, only contextual/organizational factors will be discussed. The contextual/organizational factors that Treviño et al. considers are language, rewards/punishments, ethical infrastructure, ethical climate/culture, and leadership.

Language was found to influence ethical behaviour. For example, individuals in organizations that openly discussed ethics predicted organizational ethical behaviour (Treviño, Weaver, Gibson & Toffler, 1999; cited in Treviño et al.). Not surprisingly, previous research has found that unethical behaviour increases when rewarded (e.g., Tenbrunsel, 1998; cited in Treviño et al., 2006). Moreover, weak punishments may be worse than no punishments at all (e.g., Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; cited in Treviño et al.). Ethical infrastructures include ethics codes and policies, communication, training, monitoring systems, sanctions, rewards, and attention to ethical climates/cultures (Treviño et al., 2005; cited in Treviño et al.). Although ethical infrastructures are theorized to influence behavioural ethics in organizations, only a minimum amount of research has been conducted due to the sensitive nature of the topic. Ethical climate and culture are both found to influence ethical behaviour (Treviño et al.). Culture dimensions such as leadership, reward system, and code support, as well as a climate focused on self-interests have a significant influence on unethical behaviours.
Brown, Treviño, and Harrison (2005, p. 120; cited in Treviño et al.) define ethical leadership as "the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision making. Schminke, Ambrose, and Neubaum (2005; cited in Treviño et al.) found that leaders who utilized their moral judgement influenced the ethical climate in groups. Brown et al. (2005; cited in Treviño et al.) suggest that ethical leaders promote ethical behaviour via social learning. For example, followers will want to reciprocate their ethical leader’s supportive behaviour with ethical behaviour (i.e., social exchange theory; Brown et al., 2005; cited in Treviño et al.).

In conclusion, Treviño et al. (2006) suggests that future research should focus on theory development, methodology, neglected areas (e.g., group level analysis), and application for practitioners. They report that not enough conclusive research has been conducted regarding ethical decision making in groups. Group level research may show significant findings that would not otherwise be at the individual level. Overall, the review presented by Treviño and colleagues has shed light on both the organizational and contextual factors that may influence ethical behaviour in organizations. These factors include language, rewards/punishments, ethical infrastructure, ethical climate/culture, and leadership in organizations.
This page intentionally left blank.
3. Leadership Factors Influencing Moral and Ethical Decision Making

This chapter presents the reviews of selected articles pertaining to the influence of leaders on moral and ethical decision making.

3.1 Bartone (2010)


In 2004, several disturbing photos were displayed to the world showing the abuse of Abu Ghraib detainees (Bartone, 2010). How did seemingly moral soldiers make immoral decisions? While some described the incident as an isolated case of a few soldiers, others reported widespread cases involving abuse (e.g., Guantanamo; Morris, 2006; cited in Bartone, 2010). In this article, Bartone describes the situational factors which led soldiers to abuse detainees, including a failure of leadership.

According to Bartone’s (2010) analysis, the leaders at Abu Ghraib were not visible and, moreover, soldiers were unclear about their chain of command. Leaders also did not communicate the “standards, policies, and plans” to the soldiers guarding inmates (Bartone, p. 164). For example, standards of behaviour, such as saluting and proper dress, were not enforced (Taguba, 2004; cited in Bartone). Bartone suggests that soldiers faced ambiguous rules of engagement, laws, and orders, which led to unethical conduct. This was exacerbated by the fact that soldiers did not have appropriate training regarding the Geneva Conventions prior to deployment. Moreover, other teams at Abu Ghraib (e.g., CIA) operating under different rules increased this confusion (Schlesinger, Brown, Fowler & Horner, 2004; cited in Bartone). Leaders did not recognize or attempt to relieve this confusion and the psychological stressors faced by the soldiers, such as ambiguity, isolation, powerlessness, danger, boredom (Bartone, Adler & Vaitkus, 1998; cited in Bartone), and workload. Bartone also mentions the extreme pressure put on soldiers to gather intelligence from detainees could be an antecedent to immoral behaviour. Taken together, soldiers at Abu Ghraib were unprepared for deployment, undisciplined by leaders, and unsure how to conduct their behaviour. Bartone argues that military leaders have a responsibility to establish a moral and ethical social climate, as well as model and reward positive behaviours.

3.2 Avolio, Walumbwa & Weber (2009)


Avolio, Walumbwa, and Weber (2009) shed light on current developments in leadership research. Specifically, they discuss what is known, what is unknown, and possible ideas for future research. Although the authors do not examine leadership with a focus on moral and ethical decision making, they do define various leadership types, some of which will be considered in this section. For the purpose of this report, we will outline the various definitions and relevant available research regarding types of leadership, namely authentic, transformational, ethical, new-genre, transactional, cognitive, complexity, shared, servant, spiritual, cross-cultural, and e-leadership.

*Authentic leadership* considers the dimensions of ethics and decision making. Authentic leadership is described as a “pattern of transparent and ethical leader behaviour that encourages openness in sharing information needed to make decisions while accepting followers’ inputs” (Avolio et al.,
This type of leadership is characterized by an internalized moral perspective, in other words, authentic leaders are regulated by their internal moral standards. Walumbwa, Avolio, and Zhu (2008; cited in Avolio et al.) found that authentic leadership was distinct from transformational leadership and ethical leadership. Furthermore, authentic leaders have been found to increase organizational citizenship behaviours, commitment, and satisfaction with supervisors and performance (Walumbwa et al., 2008; cited in Avolio et al.). Transformational leadership entails behaviours that encourage followers to go beyond what is expected of them while promoting their organizational interests (Avolio et al., p. 423). Ethical leadership is described as acting appropriately in situations and relationships, and promoting this behaviour to followers.

In the past 20 years, the literature has shifted from a focus on transactional leadership to new-genre leadership (Avolio et al., 2009). Transactional leaders provide followers with rewards and punishments based on follower’s behaviour (Avolio et al., p. 427). On the other hand, new-genre leaders have charisma, vision, inspiration, ideology, and moral values. Leaders who embody these characteristics provide followers with individual attention and intellectual stimulation, which Avolio et al argue is consistent with transformational leadership behaviours. Research has found that charismatic and transformational leadership was positively correlated with a leader’s effectiveness (e.g., Judge & Piccolo, 2004; cited Avolio et al.). Furthermore, followers will show loyalty, obedience, and compliance when their leaders are charismatic and their relationship with the leaders is personalized (Howell & Shamir, 2005; cited Avolio et al.).

The remainder of the leadership types have not yet received substantive examination in the literature. These include Cognitive leadership, which considers how leaders and followers think and process information (Avolio et al., 2009). Complexity leadership, based on complexity theory, assumes leadership is an “interactive system of dynamic, unpredictable agents that interact with each other in complex feedback networks, which can then produce adaptive outcomes such as knowledge dissemination, learning, innovation, and further adaptation to change” (Uhl-Bien, Marion & McKelvey, 2007; cited in Avolio et al., p. 430). Shared leadership, also known as collective or distributed leadership, is a type of leadership that develops within a team. Specifically, team members lead and influence each other reciprocally.

Other leadership types include servant and spiritual leaders. According to Spears (2004; cited in Avolio et al., 2009), servant leaders listen, are empathetic, heal, are aware, persuade, conceptualize, have foresight, have stewardship, are committed, and work towards building a community. Furthermore, Russell and Stone (2002; cited in Avolio et al.) add that servant leaders have a vision, are honest, are trustworthy, are service oriented, are role models, appreciate service, and empower others. Spiritual leadership has been defined by Fry (2003; p. 711; cited in Avolio et al., p. 437) as “comprising the values, attitudes, and behaviours that are necessary to intrinsically motivate one’s self and others so that they have a sense of spiritual survival through calling and membership.” Spiritual leadership emphasizes the combination of body, mind, heart, and spirit to influence performance, commitment, and serenity in others (Fry, 2003; cited in Avolio et al.).

Studies in cross-cultural leadership moves beyond typical research in the Western world to multicultural contexts (Avolio et al., 2009). One large scale research project examining cross-cultural leadership is project GLOBE (global leadership and organizational behavioural effectiveness), which includes over 60 different societies (see House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004 for more information; cited in Avolio et al). GLOBE’s goals included, but were not limited to, establishing cultural dimensions at the organizational and societal level of analysis based on Hofstede’s work and investigating cultural beliefs regarding effective leadership. Lastly, e-leadership is leadership in a virtual world. Teams are typically distributed in various locations and interactions occur through technology mediums, such as phone or computer.

Avolio et al. (2009) examined the trends and directions in various types of leadership research. The current trends indicate that leadership research is becoming more holistic; considering not only
leadership behaviour, but also the cognitions, contexts, and relationships experienced by leaders and followers. They reported that leadership interventions, such as training, positively influenced work outcomes (e.g., perceived leader performance; Reichard & Avolio, 2005; cited in Avolio et al.). Avolio et al. (2009) suggested that more research is needed regarding these numerous leadership types and the influence on subordinate behaviour.

3.3 Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio & Cavarretta (2009)


Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio and Caverretta (2009) propose a framework to examine leadership during extreme contexts. They define leadership in extreme contexts as:

“adaptive and administrative processes of influencing others to understand and agree about what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish shared objectives and purpose under conditions where an extensive and intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological, or material consequences may exceed an organization’s capacity to counter and occur to or in close physical, social, cultural, or psychological proximity to organization members” (p. 913).

Hannah et al. consider four types of organizations impacted by extreme contexts namely trauma (e.g., medical), critical action (e.g., military), high reliability (e.g., police), and naïve organizations (e.g., hotel). They argue that training and leadership responses would differ in each of these organizations.

As shown in the following figure, there are five dimensions of extreme contexts that may impact an adaptive leadership response, including location in time, magnitude of consequences, probability of consequences, physical or psycho-social proximity, and form of threat.

![Figure 10: Typology of extreme contexts (Hannah et al., 2009, p. 899)](image-url)

Hannah et al. (2009) argue that effective leadership will change throughout the planning of, response to, and recovery from the extreme event (location in time). Moreover, as the possibility and extremity of consequences increase, so does the need for competent leaders (magnitude and
probability of consequences). Proximity includes the physical, psychological, and/or social distance of leaders and followers, as well as group members in relation to the extreme event. Lastly, whether the threat is physical (e.g., injury), psychological (e.g., post-traumatic stress), or material (e.g., fire) can change a leader’s response (form of threat). Hannah et al. (2009) also considered factors that attenuate (i.e., psychological, social, and organizational) and intensify (i.e., time and complexity) the dimensions.

Hannah et al. (2009) suggest that their proposed framework may guide future studies examining leadership in extreme contexts, such as military operations, as this is the least studied area in leadership research. There framework includes a number of dimensions also found on Jones’ (1991) model of moral intensity. Understanding how effective leadership changes during an extreme context, for example war, may shed light on follower’s responses to these changes.

### 3.4 Brown, Treviño & Harrison (2005)


In this article, Brown and colleagues (2005) proposed an ethical leadership construct, based on their finding that research on the ethical aspect of leadership was limited. First, they reviewed available literature to distinguish ethical leadership from similar constructs, and then base ethical leadership in social learning theory. Brown, Treviño, and Harrison (2005) propose that ethical leadership is related to, but also distinct from transformational leadership, leader honesty, and considerate/fair treatment. For example, transformational and ethical leadership share the dimension of idealized influence (i.e., role models; Avolio, 1999; cited in Brown et al.). Although ethical leadership uses transformational leadership to influence employee’s behaviour, it may also use transactional leadership strategies, such as rewards and punishments (Treviño, Hartman & Brown, 2003; cited in Brown et al.). Moreover, ethical leadership is theoretically based in social learning theory, which suggests that leaders influence followers through invoking role model behaviour (e.g., subordinate observation, imitation, and identification; Brown et al.). In order for a leader to be considered an ethical role model, Brown et al. suggests they must be perceived as attractive, credible, and legitimate. A comprehensive definition for ethical leadership was developed based on the literature review and social learning theory. Brown et al. (2005, p. 120) defined ethical leadership as “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions of interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision making.”

Finally, Brown et al. (2005) tested the Ethical Leadership Scale to assess ethical leadership, examine the connections to other variables, and predict outcomes. Specifically this measure examined the association between ethical leadership and variables such as personal characteristics (age, gender, perceived similarity with supervisor), philosophies of human nature (cynicism and trust), social desirability, idealized influence, consideration behaviour, honesty, trust in the leader, interactional fairness, and abuse supervision. Specifically, 7 studies were performed with over 1700 participants, examining the ethical leadership measure. As Brown et al. predicted, personal characteristics, cynicism and social desirability did not relate to ethical leadership. However, the philosophies of human nature trust variable did have a small, positive correlation, despite the fact that Brown et al. expected it to be unrelated. This suggests that judgements of ethical leadership may be influenced by “the general expectations that people have about the ways in which other people generally behave” (Wrightsman, 1991, cited in Brown et al.) and not merely by the observed behaviour and interactions with the particular leader (social learning perspective). They argued that further research is needed to explain this finding. Expectedly, the results showed idealized influence, consideration behaviour, honesty, trust in the leader, and interactional fairness
was positively related to ethical leadership, while abuse supervision was negatively associated with ethical leadership. Furthermore, Brown et al. tested ethical leadership’s predictive validity for employee outcomes. The results supported predictions and showed that ethical leadership predicts perceived leader effectiveness, follower’s job satisfaction and commitment, and willingness to report problems.

In conclusion, ethical leadership was found to relate to, but be distinct from other leadership styles and characteristics. This article suggests that followers of ethical leaders are more satisfied in their jobs, are more committed in their jobs, and are more willing to report problems. Furthermore, ethical leaders are seen as more effective. Although more research is needed, Brown et al. (2005) suggested that pairing new managers with senior ethical leaders may develop ethical leadership early on in one’s career.

3.5 Brown & Treviño (2006)


Drawing upon both the ethics and the leadership literatures, Brown and Treviño (2006) conducted a review investigating the construct ethical leadership. Citing previous research (Treviño, Hartman, & Brown, 2000; Treviño, Brown, & Hartman, 2003; cited in Brown & Treviño), they explain that ethical leadership can be viewed in two ways. The first describes the observable traits, characteristics, and motivation that ethical leaders have and display. Ethical leaders are said to be caring, honest, trustworthy, fair and principled when making decisions, and they behave ethically both in their personal and professional lives. Brown and Treviño refer to this aspect of ethical leadership as the moral person. The second aspect of ethical leadership is referred to as the moral manager, which, according to Brown and Treviño, “represents the leader’s proactive efforts to influence follower’s ethical and unethical behaviour” (P. 597). They explain that the moral manager ensures ethics is a part of everyday discourse at work by communicating values and standards, emulating behaviour consistent with these, exercising a reward system to promote ethical conduct, and holding follower’s accountable for their behaviour.

To further delineate the construct ethical leadership, Brown and Treviño (2006) also compare it to other leadership constructs, including transformational, authentic, and spiritual, highlighting the similarities and differences (see Table 2).

Table 2: Similarities with and differences between leadership constructs (Brown & Treviño, 2006, p. 598)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Construct</th>
<th>Similarities with ethical leadership</th>
<th>Differences from ethical leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authentic leadership</td>
<td>Key similarities:</td>
<td>Key differences:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Concern for others (Altruism)</td>
<td>– Ethical leaders emphasize moral management (more transactional) and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Ethical decision-making</td>
<td>“other” awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Integrity</td>
<td>– Authentic leaders emphasize authenticity and self-awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Role modeling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual leadership</td>
<td>Key similarities:</td>
<td>Key differences:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Concern for others (Altruism)</td>
<td>– Ethical leaders emphasize moral management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Integrity</td>
<td>– Spiritual leaders emphasize visioning, hope/faith, work as vocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Role modeling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformational leadership</td>
<td>Key similarities:</td>
<td>Key differences:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Concern for others (Altruism)</td>
<td>– Ethical leaders emphasize ethical standards and moral management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Ethical decision-making</td>
<td>(more transactional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Integrity</td>
<td>– Transformational leaders emphasize vision, values, and intellectual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Role modeling</td>
<td>stimulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As detailed in the table above, all of the leadership constructs assume good and effective leaders are altruistically motivated, act with integrity, and care for others. However, according to Brown and Treviño, with the exception of ethical leadership, none of the other leadership constructs
“focuses on leaders’ proactive influence on the ethical/unethical conduct of followers in the context of work organizations. Ethical leaders explicitly focus attention on ethical standards through communication and accountability processes” making it more “transactional” than the other constructs (p.600).

Brown and Treviño (2006) identify three situational factors that may influence employees’ construal of a leader as an ethical leader and promote ethical leadership. Based on a social learning perspective (i.e., individuals learn by watching and acting similarly with people who are viewed as credible and attractive) and recent research (Brown & Treviño, 2006; cited in Brown and Treviño), they argue that having an ethical mentor in one’s career contributes to both becoming an ethical leader oneself and being perceived by followers as an ethical leader. Second, they point out those organizations that have proclaimed ethical codes of conduct and formal reward systems increase ethical attitudes and behaviour. An organization with a strong ethical context or infrastructure will, they argue, promote ethical leadership. Finally, Brown and Treviño state that leaders who work in strong moral contexts that maintain ethical behaviour will be better able to handle moral intensity (especially magnitude of the consequences and social consensus, Jones, 1991; cited in Brown & Trevino, 2006), demonstrating their ethical leadership. They suggest these situational factors provide learning opportunities for ethical development.

This article also identifies a number of individual characteristics that might enhance the attractiveness and credibility of leaders, making them more likely to be ethical role models for subordinates. Brown and Treviño (2006) hypothesize that of the Big Five personality traits agreeableness (altruistic, trusting, kind, cooperative) and conscientiousness (dependable, responsible, dutiful, determined) are positively related to ethical leadership, whereas neuroticism (anxious, hostile, impulsive and reactive to stress) is negatively related. They also argue that leaders who use their power to help others, can reason about moral issues at a high level and illustrate this reasoning ability in action are associated with ethical leadership. Brown and Trevino suggest a positive relationship between those with high internal locus of control (responsible for their own actions) and ethical leadership. Finally, they suggest that self-monitoring will moderate the relationship between ethical context and ethical leadership.

Ethical leadership has an impact on follower conduct “through modelling and vicarious learning process” (Brown and Treviño, 2006, p. 606). For example, Brown and Treviño (2006) argue that ethical leadership will lead to ethical decision making, prosocial behaviour, and a reduction in counterproductive behaviour in followers through social learning and social exchange processes (reciprocating positive behaviours). They also believe that ethical leadership will foster follower satisfaction, motivation and organizational commitment. Considering the outcomes of ethical leadership, they propose that ethical leaders should support ethically related behaviour in subordinates because, as “legitimate models of standards and conduct, employees should learn what is expected and be inclined to comply” (Brown and Treviño, p. 607).

They conclude their review by proposing four approaches to support the development of ethical leadership in organizations. These include a selection process that identifies potential ethical leaders, the use of role modelling and training, and an organizational culture and social processes that demand adherence to ethics.

3.6 Brown (2007)


In this article, Brown (2007) notes that most research has found that leadership in organizations is fairly positive, despite the “popular perception” that business people are “morally bankrupt.” He argues that negative information is more easily processed and negative conduct says something
about a leader’s lack of moral character. He sets out then to dismantle a number of misconceptions about ethical leadership. Specifically, he presents 5 misconceptions of ethical leadership and provides recommendations to overcome these.

The first misconception is ethical leaders do not have to worry about the perceptions of others. As he points out, however, follower’s ratings of their leaders predict outcomes more than leaders’ self-ratings. Leaders’ self-ratings, Brown argues, can show a self-serving bias. Brown encourages leaders to learn how they are perceived, invite feedback from followers, and demonstrate ethical action. The second misconception is employees do not need guidance from their leaders. In these instances, leaders assume subordinates know how to behave ethically and therefore rely on formal policies, procedures, and training as a substitute for ethical leadership. However, people are influenced by those around them and they need encouragement and support to act ethically. Brown reminds leaders that responsibility cannot be delegated, ethical communication requires frequent iterations, and ethical leadership can be transferable. Brown explains that the third misconception is to focus on the law rather than ethics. Some leaders may consider abiding by the law is more important than acting ethically. Brown suggests that leaders should not assume legal actions equal ethical actions. He recommends that employees should be encouraged by their leaders to act ethically and leaders should be sincere when managing ethical behaviour. The fourth misconception is an ethical leader cannot be effective. Successful leaders are typically portrayed as ruthless and cutthroat. But Brown argues that ethical leaders can be effective, unethical leadership is difficult to maintain over the long run, and that leaders should “do the right thing,” regardless of the consequences. The final misconception that Brown raises is that leaders assume their personal lives will not influence their work reputation. Leadership theories, such as authentic leadership, suggest that personal morals and values should be followed in both work and play. Brown encourages leaders to strive for consistency, remember that they are always on the job, and that their personal reputation is an asset.

3.7 Weaver, Treviño & Agle (2005)


Weaver, Treviño, and Agle (2005) examined the ethical role models in organizations. They argue that, based on previous observations, people predict how their ethical role model would act in specific situations and then act correspondingly. Specifically, “people use role models to define themselves and guide their own behaviour” (p. 314). To further understand ethical role modelling, Weaver et al. interviewed 20 participants from various organizations, including the military, to elicit perspectives on their ethical role models. Participants were asked to describe the relationships they had with their role models, the characteristics and behaviours that made them suitable role models, the faults of their role models, and how the role models were seen by others. Based on the qualitative data analysis, four themes emerged regarding ethical role models (see Table 3).
Participants reported having frequent interaction with their ethical role models. Moreover, role models were not necessarily successful in business (based on their position in the organization) but were respected by others in the organization because they were “willing to pitch in and work alongside others,” even if this required self-sacrifice (p. 325). Rather than being focused on high performance and ethical action or communication, role models were in part role models because he or she was humble and hard-working, while respecting other’s contributions (Weaver et al.).

Weaver et al. (2005) also discovered that ethical role modelling and ethical leadership, although sharing similar characteristics (e.g., fairness, respect for others, honest, etc.), have different elements. For example, they point out that ethical role models apply ethical standards to themselves, accepting their own wrongdoings with a high degree of transparency and responsibility. Ethical role models also accept others’ failures and view failures as learning experiences, encouraging high standards through observation and coaching. On the other hand, Weaver et al. state that ethical leaders typically use the formal organizational reward system to encourage ethical conduct.

In summary, ethical role models are ethical, caring, personable, and fair. They hold themselves and others accountable for ethical actions, and are hardworking and self-sacrificing. Though they may not be senior in the organization, ethical role models were respected by others and importantly accessible.

### 3.8 Brown & Treviño (2009)

Previous research suggests that shared values are associated with positive outcomes (e.g., Ashkanasy & O’Connor, 1997; cited in Brown & Treviño, 2009). Brown and Treviño (2009) examined the relationship between socialized charismatic leaders and team values, specifically the similarity in values between leaders and followers. Schwartz (1996; p. 2; cited in Brown & Treviño, p. 478) defines values as “desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives.” Brown and Treviño explain that socialized charismatic leader theory argues that charismatic leaders convey a value-based message and establish value congruence between leader and follower. These leaders leverage their charisma, meaning they persuade through idealized influence (embodied values are emulated) and inspirational motivation (offer value-laden vision of the future) (Brown and Treviño). Moreover, being “socialized” rather than “personalized” means these leaders are viewed as altruistically motivated and influence by values internalization (Kelman, 1958, cited in Brown and Treviño). Previous research, they point out, has been inconsistent in demonstrating such value congruence. Research, rather, suggests follower’s values are difficult to change. To further understand this relationship Brown and Treviño examined data from 1, 293 nurses, nurse managers, and hospital administrators. Participants were given surveys assessing their values (adapted from Schwartz, 1996), occupational membership (nurses, nurse managers, or hospital administrators), and in the case of leaders, socialized charismatic leadership behaviour (Multi-Factor Leadership Questionnaire; Avolio, Bass & Jung, 1999; both cited in Brown & Treviño).

Brown and Treviño (2009) hypothesized that values will vary depending on occupational membership (nurses, nurse managers, and hospital administrators). For example, nurse and nurse managers are proposed to have stronger self-transcendence (i.e., collective interests associated with altruism and justice) and conservation values (i.e., upholding traditional duties and obligations) than hospital administrators, as well as weaker self-enhancement (i.e., individual interests associated with ambition and success) and openness to change values. The authors also predicted that socialized charismatic leadership would elicit leader and follower value congruence. Results supported the hypothesis that values varied depending on occupational membership. Along with nurse and nurse managers showing high levels of self-transcendence and conservation values, hospital administrators were strong in self-enhancement and openness to change. The results also supported that three of the four follower’s values (all except conservation) were congruent with their leader’s values. Brown and Treviño (2009) suggested two methods to achieve value congruence, both supported by the findings. Specifically, value congruence could have occurred by follower’s adopting their socialized charismatic leader’s values and/or by leader’s conveying values consistent with their follower’s values. In any event, their research suggests that developing and employing socialized charismatic leadership may promote shared values among followers, especially focusing on how values are communicated. However, they also found that occupational context and employee values were strongly related, which led them to conclude that values-based leadership styles must be considered in terms of both the occupational context and the pre-existing values that subordinates bring to the workplace.

3.9 Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes & Salvador (2009)


Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, and Salvador (2009) examined the relationship between ethical leadership and employee outcomes, both counterproductive (i.e., deviance) and positive behaviours (i.e., organizational citizenship behaviour), at the work group level. They explain these two particular outcomes in the following way: group deviance is “voluntary behaviour by members of a work group in the aggregate that violates the norms of the work group and threatens the well-
being of the work group” (Robinson & Bennett, 1995, 1997; cited in Mayer et al., 2009, p. 3); whereas, organizational citizenship behaviour is “behaviour that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization” (as cited by Organ, 1998, p. 4 in Mayer et al.). Available literature reveals two arguments regarding the influence of ethical leadership on employees. On one hand, researchers have suggested that top management has the most critical influence on employees’ ethical behaviours (e.g., Barney, 2005; cited in Mayer et al.). On the other hand, direct supervisors are argued to be the largest influence because they control rewards and punishments (e.g., Davis & Rothstein, 2006; cited in Mayer et al.). The current study proposes that ethical leadership at the management level indirectly influences employee’s behaviour, while ethical leadership at the supervisor level directly influences behaviour. Mayer et al. suggest that ethical leadership trickles down each organizational level, starting with top managers, then flowing to supervisors, and influencing employee behaviours.

Based on the idea that employees may feel indebted to ethical leaders (social exchange theory; Blau, 1964; cited in Mayer et al.), Mayer et al. (2009) hypothesized that ethical leadership will be negatively related to employee deviance and positively related to organizational citizenship behaviour. They also hypothesized that because people learn from rewards and punishments, and model other’s behaviour (social learning theory; Bandura, 1977; cited in Mayer et al.), manager’s ethical leadership will have a positive relationship with supervisor’s ethical leadership. Lastly, Mayer and colleagues hypothesized that supervisory ethical leadership will mediate the relationship between management ethical leadership and group outcomes. Nine hundred and four employees and 195 managers were assessed on ethical leadership at the top management and supervisory levels (ethical leadership scale; Brown, Treviño & Harrison, 2005); group deviance (Organizational Deviance Scale; Bennett & Robinson, 2000); group organizational citizenship behaviour (scale measuring helping behaviour; Smith, Organ & Near, 1983); and control variables such as group-level employee tenure, group-level employee organization tenure, group size, organizational size, full/part-time status, supervisor gender, supervisor group tenure, supervisor organizational tenure, and supervisor and employee social desirability bias (Crowne-Marlowe scale; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972; all cited in Mayer et al.).

The results showed a negative relationship between ethical leadership and deviance. When top management and supervisors showed ethical leadership behaviours, employee’s deviant behaviours decreased. Likewise, there was a positive relationship between ethical leadership and organizational citizenship behaviour, such that ethical leadership from top managers and supervisors increased employee’s helping behaviours. The overall results supported the trickle down theoretical model. Specifically, the results showed that ethical leadership by management was directly and positively related to ethical leadership by supervisors. Furthermore, the relationship between manager’s ethical leadership and group outcomes was mediated by supervisory ethical leadership, suggesting top management only influence employee behaviour through supervisors.

This article shows that both management at the top levels and supervisors can influence employee behaviour. Specifically, manager’s ethical leadership directly influences supervisors’ ethical leadership, which in turn, influences employee’s deviant and helping behaviours. With that being said, employee’s behaviours are directly influenced by those they have the most contact with, namely their supervisor. Mayer et al. (2009) recommended hiring ethical leaders or training ethical leadership to existing managers and supervisors as a way of promoting prosocial behaviours in the workplace.
3.10 Mahsud, Yukl & Prussia (2010)


Previous research has suggested that effective leadership is influenced by leader empathy, ethical values, and relations-oriented behaviour. Mahsud, Yukl, and Prussia (2010) are the first to examine how leader empathy, ethical values, and relations-oriented behaviour are related to leader-member exchange quality. To Mahsud et al., empathy, an interpersonal skill, requires acknowledging and understanding other’s feelings. The values attributed to ethical leaders “include concern for the welfare of subordinates and willingness to protect, help, develop, and empower them” (Mahsud et al., p. 563). They suggest that a relations-oriented leader-subordinate relationship is psychologically supportive, where contributions are recognized, skills are developed, ideas are consulted, and responsibility is delegated. Leader-member exchange theory suggests that leaders and subordinates will develop a relationship over time where various outcomes can be exchanged (e.g., Diensche & Liden, 1986; cited in Mahsud et al., 2010). High exchange relationships are characterized by the leader providing benefits (e.g., interesting tasks) to the subordinate in exchange for commitment and loyalty. In turn, the leader and subordinate trust, like, and respect one another. Low exchange relationships are characterized by the leader not providing any benefits to the subordinate in exchange for the subordinate only doing what is required of them (Mahsud et al.).

Based on previous research, Mahsud et al. (2010) hypothesized a positive relationship between relation-oriented leader behaviours and 1) leader-member exchange quality, 2) leader empathy, and 3) leader’s ethical values. Furthermore, leader relations-oriented behaviours were predicted to mediate the relationship between leader-member exchange quality and 1) empathy and 2) ethical values. Two hundred and eighteen leaders and subordinates rated leader empathy (emotional intelligence questionnaire; Wong & Law, 2002), ethical values (various scales by Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2005; Craig & Gustafson, 1998; De Hoogh & Den Harog, 2008), leader relations-oriented behaviours (Managerial Practices Survey; Kim & Yukl, 1995), and leader-member exchange quality (LMX-7; Scandura & Graen, 1984; all cited in Mahsud et al., 2010).

Results of Mahsud et al.’s (2010) study showed relation-oriented leader behaviours, leader empathy, leader’s ethical values, and leader-member exchange quality positively correlated with each other. For example, subordinates who are supported, recognized, develop their skills, input their ideas, and have responsibility, also have empathetic and ethical leaders who provide them with benefits in exchange for loyalty and commitment. Leader relations-oriented behaviours were also found to fully mediate the relationship between empathy and leader-member exchange quality. In other words, there was no correlation between leader empathy and exchange quality unless the relations-orientated behaviours were considered. Leader relations-oriented behaviours were also found to partially mediate the relationship between ethical values and leader-member exchange quality. The direct effect of an ethical leader on quality of an exchange relationship was not included in this analysis and Mahsud et al. argue should be analysed further. They suggest that an ethical leader is one who can be viewed as a role model, who sets ethical standards, and who ensures people are accountable for their behaviour.


In this article, Turner, Barling, Epitropaki, Butter, and Milner (2002) set out to determine if there is a moral dimension to leadership styles. To accomplish this, they considered the relationship
between moral reasoning and type of leadership, i.e., the leader’s moral reasoning and perceived transformational and transactional leadership behaviours. Turner et al. hypothesized that leaders with higher levels of moral reasoning capacity would also show more transformational leadership behaviours compared to those with lower levels of moral reasoning. Transformational leadership behaviours include “communicat[ing] a collective vision and inspire[ing] followers to look beyond their self-interests for the good of the group,” whereas transactional leadership is marked by “controlling followers’ behaviours and eliminating problems by using corrective transactions between leader and subordinate” (Turner et al., p. 305). They also predicted that transactional leadership would not be related to moral reasoning.

One hundred and thirty-two leaders and 407 subordinates participated. Leaders were assessed on their moral reasoning using the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1990), while subordinates reported their leader’s behaviour using the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (Bass & Avolio, 1995; both cited in Turner et al., 2002). Results showed that leaders who were at the highest level in moral reasoning (i.e., post conventional) had higher levels of transformational leadership behaviours than leader’s with the lowest level of moral reasoning (i.e., preconventional). However, those at the mid-level of moral reasoning (i.e., conventional), did not significantly differ from those with high or low levels of moral reasoning. As expected, transactional leadership behaviours did not relate to moral reasoning. Taken together, these results suggest that higher moral development is associated with transformational leadership. It is unclear, however, if moral reasoning causes one to be transformational or vice versa. Turner et al. (2002) suggest that further research is needed to understand if leadership training should include training in morality, i.e., can ethics training help prepare people for leadership roles. Moreover, they suggest including other moral constructs, such as moral awareness, moral character, moral intent, to provide a complete account of moral development.


Krishnan (2003) examined the influence leadership type had on follower outcomes and power. Specifically, leadership types such as moral, transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire were examined in relation to follower outcomes such as extra effort, effectiveness, and satisfaction. Krishnan explained that moral leaders promote follower growth. Similarly, transformational leadership promotes change of values and motivations (Krishnan). Transformational leaders are charismatic, motivating, intellectually stimulating, and give their followers individualized attention (Bass, 1985; cited in Krishnan).

Krishnan (2003) examined 1) the relationship between moral leadership and transformational leadership attributes (e.g., charisma, idealized behaviour, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized attention); 2) transformational leadership and the relationship between moral leadership and follower’s outcomes (e.g., extra effort, effectiveness, and satisfaction); 3) transformational leadership and the relationship between moral leadership and leader’s power; and 4) the agreement between leader’s and follower’s perceptions of the leader’s transformational behaviour. One hundred and sixteen managers rated their supervisor’s leadership behaviour and power (followers) or their own leadership behaviour and power (supervisors). Participants were assessed on transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire leadership behaviours (MLQ Form 5x; Bass & Avolio, 1991), three follower outcomes: extra effort, effectiveness, and satisfaction (MLQ Form 5x; Bass & Avoilio, 1991; cited in Krishnan), moral leadership (8 items), and power (one item). Agreement between a follower’s and supervisor’s ratings of the supervisor’s behaviour and power was also measured.
Results of Krishnan’s (2003) study showed moral leadership may form the basis of transformational leadership. For example, moral leadership was significantly and positively related to the transformational leadership attributes (e.g., charisma, idealized behaviour, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized attention). Furthermore, transformational leadership was found to mediate moral leadership and follower’s outcomes, as well as moral leadership and power. Specifically, the correlations between moral leadership and extra effort, satisfaction, leader’s effectiveness, and leader’s power, disappeared when transformational leadership was controlled. This suggests that there is some association between moral leadership and transformational leadership. Krishnan also categorized the agreement regarding a supervisor’s behaviour as the supervisor overestimating their behaviour, underestimating their behaviour, or in agreement with the follower. It was found that moral leaders were more likely to underestimate their transformational behaviours than agree with their followers and overestimate their behaviour, respectively. Moreover, there was a high correlation among moral leadership and power with respects to underestimation, such that moral leaders who underestimated their behaviour were rated as having power.

Follower’s perceptions of leader’s who underestimate their behaviour are favourable (Krishnan, 2003). Leaders who underestimate their transformational leadership abilities were rated as moral leaders, effective, and powerful. Follower’s were more willing to put in extra effort and showed more satisfaction (Krishnan). Leaders who are critical of themselves and continue to strive to be a transformational leader may yield the most power over their followers.

### 3.13 Schminke, Wells, Peyrefitte & Sebora (2002)


Previous research has shown that one of the strongest influences on ethical behaviour is leadership behaviour (e.g., Arlow & Ulrich, 1988; cited in Schminke, Wells, Peyrefitte & Sebora, 2002). However, little is known about process of this influence. To this end, Schminke and colleagues (2002) examined leadership style and personal ethics within groups. As described by the authors, leadership styles can include either an active leader, who is engaged with people and tasks, or a passive, unengaged leader. The personal ethical frameworks that were considered in this study are formalism (rule based) and utilitarianism (results based). Previous research suggests that active leaders tend to guide atypical members toward the group norm. Thus, the authors hypothesize that active leaders will elicit greater conformity within the group, despite personal ethical frameworks. Moreover, Schminke et al. proposed that group cohesion will mediate this relationship.

Schmenke et al. (2002) presented a model showing the relationship between leadership and decision making conformity (see Figure 11).
Figure 11: Model of group and individual influences on conformity of ethical frameworks (Schmenke et al., 2002, p. 281)

To test the model, 36 work groups, each with a leader, made a series of ethical and non-ethical decisions. Participants were assessed before and/or after their decisions on their active leadership style, type and strength of ethical predisposition, ethical conformity, cohesiveness, group performance, age, and strength of initial conviction. Results showed that teams with formalist and utilitarian ethical frameworks conformed when exposed to active leadership. Formalists were also influenced by group cohesion and team performance. That is, cohesive and higher performing teams developed similar formalist frameworks after making their decisions. However, formalists who had strong initial predispositions seem to conform less than their utilitarian counterparts. In summary, formalists, those with rule-based ethics, conformed when their team was cohesive and high performing, but not when their initial predispositions were strong.

Overall, Schminke et al. (2002) concluded that ethical conformity occurred with active leadership, regardless of ethical frameworks. Schminke et al. describe active leaders as those who engage in person-oriented (e.g., respects team member’s ideas) and task-oriented (e.g., emphasizes goal achievement) behaviours.


Examining the literature, Beu and Buckley (2004) consider what leadership styles combined with psychological mechanisms (moral disengagement) may account for subordinates committing crimes of obedience (i.e., “acts considered illegal or immoral by the larger community, which are performed in response to orders from authority” Kelman & Hamilton, 189; cited in Beu and Buckley). They speculate that transactional (those who focus on the transactions, or exchanges, between themselves and subordinates) and personalized (those who expect loyalty and obedience) leaders who are politically astute (i.e., having the ability to adapt to various situations in a way that fosters trust, seems genuine, conceals any potential unsavoury motives, and yet successfully influences others – Ammeter, Douglas, Gardner, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2002, cited in Beu & Buckley) and have lower levels of moral reasoning ability (as defined by Kohlberg, 1976; cited in Beu & Buckley) will be more likely to guide their subordinates into unethical behaviour than politically astute transformational (those who focus on transforming, or changing, their subordinates into leaders) and socialized (those who encourage independent thought and questioning authority) leaders who have higher levels of moral reasoning ability. Moreover, invoking mechanisms of moral disengagement (see Figure 12), Beu and Buckley postulate that
leaders can construe immoral behaviour as morally justified and beneficial to both the subordinate and the organization as well as frame unethical behaviour in such a way that the consequences are not seen as negative and those negatively affected by the behaviour are neutralized.

![Figure 12: How leaders create moral disengagement (Beu & Buckley, 2004, p. 557)](image)

They also argue that by utilizing their power and status leaders can create an environment that diminishes a subordinate’s sense of agency and hence responsibility for the consequences of their actions. In other words, subordinates merely carry out their jobs, given their limited decision making power.

According to Beu and Buckley (2004), this capacity to influence subordinates through leadership styles and invoking moral disengagement mechanisms has ramifications within a military environment, because obeying a leader’s orders is often critical to survival and to disobey an order is illegal. Some military cultures may, therefore, be an ideal environment for subordinates to follow orders unquestioningly, assuming that the consequences of their actions are part of the bigger picture. They suggest finding the line between disobeying unethical orders and following orders for survival may be difficult to interpret. Graham (1995; cited in Beu & Buckley, 2004) suggests that raising individual moral judgement capacity can be achieved by encouraging moral dialogue, fostering stakeholder concern, and inspiring diversity within the organization.

### 3.15 Hinrichs (2007)


Instead of considering the types of leaders likely to influence crimes of obedience, Hinrichs (2007) examines the types of followers likely to commit crimes of obedience. In this theoretical article, Hinrichs presents a number of propositions that are based on previous research. Thus, Hinrichs proposes that followers who are at risk to commit a crime of obedience are those:

- who believe that leaders have more responsibility for ethical decisions and behaviours than followers;
• with low leadership self-efficacy (e.g., believe they cannot be a leader);
• with high affective and high social normative motivation to lead (e.g., determined to be promoted to leader);
• with high romance of leadership disposition and who overestimate leader contributions (e.g., believe leaders have better abilities to deal with complex situations).

Furthermore, she argues that the relationship between moral responsibility and committing crimes of obedience are moderated by self-monitoring, power distance, and culture. For example, the relationship between moral responsibility and committing crimes of obedience will be stronger with high-self monitors (those that adapt their behaviour to fit a situation), with high power distance, and those coming from a collectivist culture.

Based on previous research, Hinrichs (2007) posits that group members who are not the designated leader, but who see themselves as leadership material, are more likely to commit crimes of obedience than their counterparts. Specifically, she argues that followers who view themselves as having leadership material and hold leaders in high esteem are more likely to see leaders as having more responsibility for ethical decisions and behaviour than followers. Hinrichs suggests that followers with affective motivation to lead (MTL) may obey unethical behaviours as a way to ingratiate themselves with the leader to increase their chances of becoming a leader themselves. Obedience also maintains the hierarchical differences between leaders and followers that those with social normative MTL accept. Hinrichs suggests that those with a MTL may commit crimes of obedience because as followers they displace responsibility (moral disengagement) for their own conduct on to the leader. She argues more moral psychological research needs to examine the behaviour of the follower rather than the leader as much research concentrates on the latter and not the former.

3.16 White & Lean (2008)


Previous research has shown that effective leaders display integrity (e.g., Craig & Gustafson, 1998; cited in White & Lean, 2008). Furthermore, an individual may learn his or her ethics from peers and managers (e.g., Zey-Ferrell, Weaver & Ferrell, 1979; cited in White & Lean). However, White and Lean point out that very little research has been conducted examining team member’s ethical decision making. To this end, they examined the influence team leader’s integrity has on team behaviours. They hypothesize that as the perceived levels of team leader’s integrity increase, there will be a decrease in unethical intentions that negatively impact team members, the team as a whole, and the organization. Participants in their research were 245 students who were divided in several small groups over the course of two years. Each group consisted of 5-7 people and included one team leader. Participants were given 12 ethical dilemma scenarios involving a teammate acting unethically. These unethical actions would directly impact team members, the team as a whole, or the organization. Participants rated how immoral the scenarios were, the severity of the damage, and how they would behave in the same situation. Participants were also assessed on perceived leader integrity (Craig & Gustafson, 1998) and social desirability (Andrews & Myers, 2003; both cited in White & Lean). Results showed an interaction between team leader integrity and team member’s ethical decisions. Specifically, team members who perceived their leaders to have high integrity were less likely to report that they would behave unethically in situations that would hurt their team members, their team as a whole, or the organization, demonstrating the impact of leadership integrity on subordinates moral conduct. White and Lean’s (2008) study shows that having team leaders with high levels of integrity may prevent unethical behaviour within a team. In teams where the team leader is not perceived to have integrity, more intervention to prevent unethical behaviour may be required.


Wong, Bliese, and McGurk (2003) reviewed the literature on military leadership. Wong et al. examined military literature that included the various aspects of Hunt’s (1991) multilevel leadership model. Hunt’s model presents leadership in terms of roles, rather than relationships (see Figure 13).

![Figure 13: Hunt's extended multilevel leadership model (1991 cited in Wong et al., 2003, p. 661)](image)

As shown in the figure, the model considers leadership at the systems (e.g., 3 and 4-star flag officer), organizational (e.g., general or colonel), and direct (e.g., colonel and captains) levels with a specific focus on critical tasks, individual capabilities, organizational culture, and effectiveness at each level. The available literature in military leadership was reviewed, categorized, and discussed according to each level and corresponding variable.

The available literature suggests that the external environment can influence military leadership at the systems level. For example, the literature has focused on the influence of civil-military relations on military leadership, both society as a whole and the media (systems level). Moreover, it was reported that the military leadership is facing new ethical issues, in terms of combatants who do not adhere to the same moral standards. Critical tasks were found in the literature to influence military leadership at all levels. Specifically, tasks can be extremely complex and range from war fighting to humanitarian assistance (systems), network centric warfare (organizational), and developing soldier’s skills (direct). Individual capability in leaders has been widely researched. Effective leaders are suggested to have knowledge of cross-service relationships, understanding of the military organization, problem solving skills, networking skills, and consensus achieving skills (systems; Lucas & Markessini, 1993); communication motivation, social adaptation skills, and innovation, (organizational; Mumford, Marks, Connelly, Zaccaro & Reiter-Palmon, 2000); as well as dominance, energy, internal control (Bradley, Nicol & Charbonneau, 2002), conscientiousness, and extraversion (direct; Judge, Bono, Ilies & Gerhardt, 2002; all cited in Wong et al., 2003). The military’s organizational culture and subculture were suggested to be shaped by military leaders as well as influence leadership styles. For example, joint doctrine (systems) has become an emerging culture for the military shaped by leaders, while the technology culture was found to influence leadership style (organizational; Shamir, Goldberg-Weill, Breinin, Zakay & Popper, 2000; cited in Wong et al., 2003). Lastly, organizational effectiveness has typically been measured by wartime victory and military readiness (systems), and can be influenced by unit member task cohesion (direct; Wong et al., 2003).
After a review of the literature regarding military leadership, factors such as critical tasks, individual capabilities, organizational culture, and effectiveness were found to be studied at the systems, organizational, and direct levels of leadership. This review highlights research on military leadership, rather than how military leadership influences moral and ethical decision making.

3.18 Peterson (2001)


Peterson (2001) reviewed the classic social psychology literature on social influence and recommends a new direction for future research on social influence and ethics. Peterson first located the ethical underpinnings of classic social psychological examples, including Asch’s conformity study (1955), Janis groupthink investigation (1972, 1982), Tajfel ingroup/outgroup studies (1978), and Milgram’s compliance to authority study (1974) to name a few (all cited in Peterson). This article considers group membership pressure, leadership and small groups, and obedience and compliance with authority. Specifically related to leadership influence, for example, Lewin (1935; cited in Peterson, 2001) found that democratic leadership (i.e., discussing issues with the team) elicited more ethical behaviour than authoritarian leadership (i.e., telling the team what to do). Following his review of the literature, Peterson recommends that future research should investigate indirect social influences, rather than direct social influences. For example, he documents Hoyt and Garrison’s (1997, cited in Peterson) attempts at delineating leader’s indirect social influences on decision making process, including structural manipulation (changing the composition of the group), shaping the discussion (agenda setting, framing, controlling information, parameter setting), and interpersonal manipulation (playing people off one another). Another indirect social influence Peterson raises is “looking fair” and “inclusive”. Again, he argues that more research needs to consider these indirect influences on group dynamics, especially group decision making contexts.


Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) examined the code of silence in police agencies. Specifically, they investigated the relationship between ethical climates and blowing the whistle on unethical acts (i.e., reporting peer misconduct). Ethical climates are described as “the ethical dimensions of organization culture that members perceive to be the ethical norms and identity of organizations” (Cullen, Victor & Bronson, 1993, p. 103; cited in Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007, p. 342). Rothwell and Baldwin are the first to compare the code of silence within police and civilian agencies. Previous research suggests that whistleblowing can improve efficiency and effectiveness, and provide solutions within an organization (Miceli, Near & Schwenk, 1991; cited in Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007). They point out that, unlike their study, most research examining ethical climate consider only ethical intentions and not actual ethical behaviour.

One hundred and ninety-eight police officers and 184 civilian employees filled out questionnaires measuring their willingness to blow the whistle (vignettes by Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver & Haberfield, 1997); willingness to blow the whistle on minor violations, major violations, misdemeanours, and felonies; frequency of blowing the whistle, including observing and reporting
misconduct; organizational ethical climate type, including interests in law and rules (e.g., the first consideration is whether a decision violates the law), team (e.g., our major consideration is what is best for everyone in the agency), social responsibility (e.g., it is expected that you will always do what is right for the customer and the public), company profit (e.g., the most efficient way is always the right way in this agency), and independence (e.g., in this agency, people are guided by their own personal ethics; Ethical Climate Questionnaire; Cullen et al., 1993; both cited in Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007); and various control variables including supervisory status, tenure, and agency size.

Results of Rothwell and Baldwin’s (2007) study showed that civilian and police supervisory status predicted both willingness and frequency of blowing the whistle for minor violations, major violations, and misdemeanours. Although team climate predicted a willingness to blow the whistle for minor violations, misdemeanours, and felonies, this climate did not predict the actual behaviour (i.e., frequency) of whistleblowing. Furthermore, company profit and social responsibility climates predicted whistleblowing for minor violations. Interestingly, civilian employees were more likely to maintain a code of silence than police. Police were more likely to report minor violations, misdemeanours, and felonies. This could be due to the variation in punishments each personnel would receive. For example, police officers would be violating their oath and committing a felony to maintain the code of silence, whereas civilians would likely be disciplined by their organization internally (Rothwell & Baldwin). In sum, the best predictor of reporting misconduct is supervisory status. Supervisors, regardless of organization, tended to report employee misconduct on a number of violations. Moreover, those who took an oath to report unethical actions (i.e., police officers) were more likely to report misconduct.
This page intentionally left blank.
4. SME Data Analysis

The following chapter is a preliminary qualitative analysis of SME feedback discussions, examining the social and leadership factors influencing moral and ethical decisions made by CF personnel in operations. Data was coded using the social and leadership factors identified on the mind map (see Figure 1).

4.1 Overview of Participants and Method

Data was collected from a previous study conducted under a Service Level Arrangement by Royal Military College (RMC) for DRDC Toronto (Applied Research Program 14de Moral and Ethical Decision Making in Operations). SME discussions were conducted at various CF bases across Canada. Participants were 10 CF junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who had operational experience (e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia, Ethiopia, etc.). The preliminary analysis was meant to identify social and leadership factors that influenced moral and ethical decision making. Core social and leadership factors included moral disengagement, conformity, obedience/compliance, and leadership type.

4.2 Social Factors

Participant responses indicated some social processes influencing moral and ethical decision making. For example, data suggest that the false consensus effect, i.e., people “see their own behavioural choices and judgements as relatively common and appropriate to existing circumstances, while viewing alternative responses as uncommon, deviant, and inappropriate” (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; quoted in Jones, 2004, p. 417), influences moral and ethical decision making. For example, following a description of a moral dilemma that one soldier faced in operations, he was asked if he thought that others in the same trade and rank level would have acted in the same way that he had in trying to resolve it. He replied “I think a lot of people would have tried to do the same thing that I did. I don’t think I have any more of a moral character than anyone else.” He believed that his moral conduct in the particular circumstances was neither uncommon nor unique given the dilemma he faced.

There was also evidence suggesting top-down normative social influence. For example, one participant said that while on tour, he indicated that he picked up the slack of his Sgt by complying with his requests “to go out on patrol while he [the Sgt] and the MCpl hung out in camp.” He explained that the Sgt “made it sound like it was a training thing for me, but I don’t really believe that...I felt proud the first time like they trusted me, but then I caught on. I felt a little used.” After explaining that he did not have many options available to him, like refusing the orders or reporting it, his response was to “cut a couple of those patrols short.” He said that he spent less time patrolling because he “considered it a waste of time. If other people are hanging out back at camp, why should I waste my time showing the flag while they are watching movies?” Looking back, he shared his post-decision regret at having cut his patrols short and failing to fulfil his responsibilities. His reaction at the time, he argued, arose from being “pissed off” at the “laziness” of his leaders and did not consider the example he was setting to others below him. In this case, the subordinate seemed to adopt the leaders’ lazy behaviour by not fulfilling his responsibilities, which implies a normative social influence on conduct.

A couple of examples demonstrated the power of others in making moral and ethical decisions at the time and post hoc, providing evidence for Haidt’s (2001) model of moral judgement. Living with tough decisions and counterfactual thinking may be lessened by seeking the consultation of peers. One participant recalled a decision he made to send soldiers on patrol during his tour in
Afghanistan and, as a result, two of them were killed. He said “if they didn’t go out, the situation could have been different...if I told them to take this route, the outcome could have been different.” Nevertheless, he concluded that he had “made the right call” and this conviction, in part, arose out of “talking to other guys who had to make decisions like that.”

Input from others can also come at the point of ethical decision making, where one seeks the input from others regarding one’s moral judgement. One participant spoke of an incident where he was patrolling at night and one of his comrades became separated in dangerous terrain and suffered life-threatening injuries. There were no means to save the seriously injured soldier. Nonetheless some other soldiers kept saying ‘Let me [go after him]!’ The participant realized that sending another soldier would risk another almost certain death with virtually no chance of success in rescuing the first soldier. He recalled saying “No!”, explaining that “We would just lose another soldier.” “I said, ‘Does everyone agree that we cannot send someone else…? They said, ‘Yes sir.’” Moreover, following the incident, the soldier related that his commander as well as the deceased soldier’s family believed that he and his unit did everything they could. So even though his decision was rationally justified (“Automatically, you want to [save him]. But [the danger is too great].”), the input and feedback from others may have helped in the making of, making and the living with this incredibly difficult decision, at least to some extent. Nonetheless, thinking back he said, “You feel so helpless that you could not do anything…I never thought…I would have to be making such a decision.” Certainly this example illustrates the importance of support from comrades and the higher CF chain of command when facing extremely tough ethical situations in the field.

One participant described a situation regarding dress regulation and how he elicited the opinion of others to help confirm his decision to go against regulations. He explained he was doing work up training in Edmonton for Afghanistan and the soldiers purchased tan boots. He said that he received “an email from the [senior officer] saying... ‘Soldiers cannot wear those tan boots outside of Afghanistan. I emailed him back and said ‘Don’t you think it would make sense if they wore them now to break them in and see if they fit properly?’ ” Explaining the process he took to counter orders, he said that he would gather with his fellow soldiers to “hear the grumbling especially on the infantry side, and I listened and thought what they were saying was correct.” He further explained that “we were split up all over the place and the [senior officer] would not be able to go visit every soldier. I knew we would be out of here before then anyway. I just decided we would wear the boots and take the flack that was going to come from it down the road. In the end there was not any...Common sense kind of prevailed.” His initial intuition regarding the right course of action was affirmed in a social setting with input from his comrades and peers, which then mobilized his moral action.

It is said that leader participation in group activity is an effective way of eliciting similar behaviours among group members to ensure compliance (Hare, 1953; Komaki, 1997, 1998; Gellerman, 1976; Thrasher, 1960; Chemers, 2000; all cited in Porter & Alison, 2005). One example points to this group phenomenon. One participant spoke of the challenge he faced getting ‘buy in’ from his troop for a risky mission to escort a VIP to “no man’s land” at the end of his unit’s rotation in Afghanistan. He explained that “It was a long distance to travel with only one way in and out, so once we passed through an area, an IED could have been planted for us to hit on return...Had to go...must have been 50 kilometres...We didn’t have maps for that area...” He mentioned that the soldiers under his command “thought it was a dumb mission,” because “The guys did not want to go out with the chance to get blown up...When you know your flight date to go home you don’t want to go outside the gate. You know it’s your job though and you have to lead.” He recalled having to “sell that it wasn’t [dumb].” He said that, given the importance of the task, he took the lead “because, as an officer, you are supposed to lead. It was expected of me...I would not send someone else unless I was willing to go myself.” Moreover, he told the soldiers that “it was important to meet with locals so we [CF] could instil trust and show that we were providing security in the area.” He mentioned that following the mission, the soldiers felt...
good as it was their last major mission before they went home. Leader participation may have, in part, helped persuade his subordinates of the importance of the mission, thereby ensuring their compliance.

One participant provided a couple of examples that indicated group loyalty can influence moral and ethical decision making. For example, he described an incident where a soldier had accidentally discharged his weapon. He explained the incident: “I did not report it because I knew it would cause an incident. I felt he had been counselled...nothing had been said to the chain of command about it. My [senior officer] came to me about a week later and said ‘Was there anything on the last convoy?’ I said ‘No.’ He said ‘What about a negligent discharge?’ I was caught right there so I said ‘Yes there was.’ I did explain the reason why I didn’t mention anything...I felt bad on my part that this should have been reported.” Soldiers were protecting one another, signalling group loyalty. Reporting transgressions may be perceived by group members as weakening the solidarity of the unit, and the costs associated with failing to conform may also be too high as this could lead to ostracism from the group (Shorey, 2001). In this example, however, there is a clear indication of ingroup policing practices, where transgressions are settled within the group so that it does not reach higher command. It appears that group loyalty is a potential force influencing moral and ethical decision making. As pointed out, however, the participant’s senior officer did hear about it somehow. So there are limits on the extent to which group loyalty is absolute.

A couple of participants shared experiences that reflected ingroup/outgroup differentiation. In one example, a participant reduced identification with the target by dehumanizing the outgroup. He referred to a group of “fighting aged males...[as]...sketchy looking dirt bags.” Though this did not lead to any kind of confrontation, it does suggest how ingroup/outgroup differentiation may occur in operations. Another ingroup/outgroup example came from perceived differences in nationality (International Security Assistance Force – ISAF – for Afghanistan partners) and approaches pertaining to rules of engagement (ROEs), and how this can lead to distancing.

“One of the mornings, some people from the village showed up, the [ISAF partner] kept the villagers out of there completely. There was a body, and they warned the villagers not to come in the valley and when they did the [ISAF partner] shot them. That was their way. I didn’t talk to them. I didn’t want to know them. So when we started off with this mission going up there, they [ISAF partner] started off with their orders to us that ‘If you see anything moving in the hills, shoot it.’ So our OC, when he was disseminating the orders to us, told us that ‘This is not the way it is going to be with us. We have our ROEs, and we are going to stick by them.’”

He continued to explain that the ISAF partner wanted him and his men to engage Afghans who were approaching, but he explained that the CF way was to use an interpreter and speak with the locals first. Following a minor confrontation with the other ISAF partner, he upheld the CF interpretation of ROEs. He said “It was just a different way of seeing things. That struck me as too much. We [Canadians] don’t work like that.” A strong group identity (i.e., Canadian) in contrast to an outgroup in this case influenced his moral and ethical decision making.

### 4.3 Leadership Factors

The preliminary analysis also identified a number of examples demonstrating the impact of leadership on moral and ethical decision making. A few participants underscored the need for leaders to prioritize the welfare of the troops. For example, one participant mentioned that he wanted to deploy into CF operations as an officer “to ensure that my fellow comrades would have a decent quality officer because the officers at that time [mid-90s] were not that great.” He explained that in his opinion “the reservist officers we had at the time didn’t care much about their troops and they were all about glory and the troops were suffering because of that.” He ended up leaving
the reserves and joining the regular force. Another described a situation where there were challenges in the command team, which had a potentially negative impact on the troops. He recalled,

“the command team element was not working...I felt that I was left out of the planning process. The goals and end state that we discussed was perfect. The method of getting there was a bit different...there was also a rift between the OC and battle group commander. In the end, the OCs were switched. Another OC was dropped in and we carried on from there.”

He explained that his greatest concern was to ensure that “the troops were going to be okay overseas based on that kind of leadership style...” “You could have the best troops in the world and if they are not trained properly all you are going to do is fill body bags.” He explained that his unit was always one step behind in the work-up training for deployment, which, he stated, “reflects on the commander.” He underscored the importance of the perception of confidence,

“The bottom line was that the troops did not have confidence in the individual. The guidance I was trying to give that fell within my realm was being disregarded. I was just not part of the planning process. It came to a point when...we had to sit down and discuss it with the NCOs. It was not going to be effective overseas, and the NCOs had some very definite concerns. Whether or not there was going to be a coup there or something, it was a difficult balance.”

Again, he emphasized his own loyalty to the troops, which as a leader amounted to “ensuring that the OC [Officer Commanding] is aware of the concerns and understands the ramifications.” Post decision, he believed that he did not act soon enough in working to have the OC replaced. He stated, “I let it go a lot further then I should have.”

Another example illustrates a leader’s concern for the welfare of his troops. One participant mentioned that he had a Captain who apologized each time he had to send him “outside the gate.” He relayed that the Captain was “worried” about the risks to his troops. He commented, “it wasn’t that he [the Captain] was weak. He was just worried about what could happen.”

One participant demonstrated his ethical leadership by switching places with one of his Sergeants during a convoy operation. He explained,

“I gave orders, including orders for the lead vehicle, and at the end of orders I asked if there were any questions and one section commander said ‘No, but I would like to talk to you after orders, sir.’ He came to me and [asked] do we have a route clearance package? The answer was no. They have been gone for two months. He said he really didn’t want to be the lead vehicle. I could have said look sergeant you are going lead, but sometimes you have to lead from the front. I said ‘Tell you what Sgt, you and I will switch places, and I will take the front.’ That was apparently the wrong thing to do, and the OC let me know that later. If he loses me, he loses his LAV captain. There is a point to that, but sometimes you have to man up.”

He described the Sgt’s position and the impact this could have on decision making. “He [Sgt] said he had a bad feeling about this. He thinks things are going to be bad tomorrow. ‘I think I am going to blow up if I go first. ’ I couldn’t have that. He could make bad decisions in that case. He never said no, he just said ‘I really don’t want to.’ I said ‘No problem, I will take it.’” Again, this shows the importance of prioritizing the welfare of the troops.

Empowering subordinates and creating an inclusive environment may also be a way of demonstrating leadership concern. Explaining how he developed strong personal and working relationships with those under his command in operations, one participant mentioned the impact a fellow officer had on him in training. He recounted,
“My OC was one of the best officers I know. I would give orders to just my sergeants because the troops were sleeping, and he said ‘No, always include your troops when you can. You want them in the loop.’ So I always included my soldiers in everything and tried to empower them. On every patrol at the end of it [mission in Afghanistan], I asked them to give me their FMP [field message pad] and any information they gathered. Every soldier was a sensor.”

His earlier training experience with an officer he respected led him to recognize the potential merits of each soldier within his command, and his desire to have them speak up and offer advice in operations. He concluded, “I hope every platoon has the command climate that every driver is not afraid to talk to their platoon commander and say ‘Sir, you are about to do something stupid.’”

Participant responses, therefore, indicate the importance of demonstrating a concern for the welfare of the troops. As indicated above this was manifested in many ways ranging from an apology, but more generally by providing a climate of where subordinates are empowered to provide their input, without the fear of retribution.

### 4.4 Summary

The preliminary analysis provided evidence of social and leadership factors that influence moral and ethical decision making in CF operations. Specifically, social processes that implicated moral and ethical decision making included the false consensus effect, top-down normative social influence, the role of others in moral judgement, moral disengagement, compliance through leader participation, group loyalty and ingroup policing policies, and ingroup/outgroup differentiation. Moreover, participant responses showed strong evidence of operational ethical dilemmas and the role of several of the above factors in their moral and ethical decision making. A few participants believed that the leader’s priority is the welfare of the troops.

Despite the evidence outlined in the preliminary analysis, it is suggested that a more tailored methodology specifically examining the influence of social processes (e.g., conformity, compliance, etc.) and leadership factors (e.g., leader subordinate dynamics) on moral behaviour in a military context may be required to reveal more completely their subtlety. Thus, additional research investigating the social and leadership factors that influence moral and ethical decision making in a military context could be conducted with CF personnel, using a semi-structured discussion protocol. Such an approach will encourage participants to speak of moral conduct with a sustained focus on the social processes and leadership factors that shape it.
This page intentionally left blank.
References


Distribution list

Document No.: DRDC Toronto CR 2011-098

LIST PART 1: Internal Distribution by Centre:
2 DRDC Toronto Library

TOTAL LIST PART 1

LIST PART 2: External Distribution by DRDKIM

DLPCP:
1 LCdr Chris Lyon  Lyon.CDF@forces.gc.ca
1 LCol Martineau  Martineau.JCY@forces.gc.ca
1 LCol Larouche  Larouche.JMS@forces.gc.ca
PG2 Command Thrust Exec:
1 Maj Mike Rostek  ROSTEK.MA@forces.gc.ca
1 Micheline Belanger  Micheline.Belanger@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
1 Shawn Hoag  Shawn.Hoag@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

DMPORA:
1 Maj Dave Scultz  SCHULTZ.DC@forces.gc.ca

CORA:
1 Dean Haslip  HASLIP.D@forces.gc.ca
1 Brian McKee  McKee.B@forces.gc.ca
1 Roger Roy  Roy.RL@forces.gc.ca

RMC:
1 Head Military Psychology and Leadership Department - Peter Bradley  bradley-p@rmc.ca

CFLI:
1 LCol Jeff Stouffer  STOUFFER.JM@forces.gc.ca

TOTAL LIST PART 2
14 TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED
This page intentionally left blank.
**UNCLASSIFIED**

### DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. ORIGINATOR</th>
<th>2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The name and address of the organization preparing the document, Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Centre sponsoring a contractor's document, or tasking agency. are entered in section 8.)</td>
<td>Overall security classification of the document including special warning terms if applicable.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishing: DRDC Toronto</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing: Humansystems® Incorporated; 111 Farquhar St. Guelph, ON N1H 3N4</td>
<td>(NON-CONTROLLED GOODS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring:</td>
<td>DMC A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting:</td>
<td>REVIEW: GCEC JUNE 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TITLE

Social and Leadership Factors Influencing Moral Decision Making in Canadian Military Operations: An Annotated Bibliography (U)

Facteurs sociaux et facteurs de leadership exerçant une incidence sur la prise de décisions morales dans le contexte des opérations militaires canadiennes: bibliographie commentée (U)

### AUTHORS

Michael H. Thomson ; Courtney D. Hall

### DATE OF PUBLICATION

June 2011

### NO. OF PAGES

6a Total containing information, including Annexes, Appendices, etc.: 83

### NO. OF REFS

6b Total cited in document: 58

### DESCRIPTIVE NOTES

Contract Report

### SPONSORING ACTIVITY

Sponsoring: Tasking:

### PROJECT OR GRANT NO.

9a If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant:

14ci06

### CONTRACT NO.

9b If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written:

W7711–09–8158/001/TOR

### ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER

10a The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document:

DRDC Toronto CR 2011–098

### OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s).

10b Any other numbers under which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor:

### DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY

11 Any limitations on the dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification:

Unlimited distribution

### DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

12 Any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document Availability (11). However, when further distribution (beyond the audience specified in (11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected):

Unlimited announcement

**UNCLASSIFIED**
(U) Military missions for the Canadian Forces (CF), including asymmetrical warfare and counter insurgency operations, have become increasingly complex and, as such, there is a greater probability that soldiers of all ranks will confront moral and ethical decisions. As moral and ethical decision making is both challenging in a military operational context (Thomson, Adams, & Sartori, 2006) and argued to be a social activity (Haidt, 2001), military personnel will undoubtedly look to others, including leaders and peers, for guidance or support to make the right choices. To this end, an annotated bibliography was conducted to highlight probably social and leadership factors that will influence moral and ethical behaviour. A number of social factors were identified, including moral disengagement mechanisms (such as displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, and dehumanization); ingroup/outgroup differentiation; group identity; group cohesion and loyalty; compliance and conformity; false consensus effect; and normative social influence (or social contagion). Leadership factors included the impact of different kinds of leadership (e.g., transactional, transformative, ethical, etc.), ethical role modelling, and leader–member interaction. This report also included a preliminary data analysis of CF subject matter experts (SMEs) first-hand accounts of moral and ethical decisions made in operations to highlight any social and leadership factors that had an influence on this process. It provided some initial insights into some of the social and leadership factors influencing moral decision making, including the false consensus effect, top-down normative social influence, the role of others in moral judgement, moral disengagement, compliance through leader participation, group loyalty and ingroup policing policies, and ingroup/outgroup differentiation. Moreover, participant responses showed strong evidence of ethical leadership and how this impacted decisions. A few participants implied that one leader priority is showing care for the welfare of the troops, which may shape moral and ethical decisions in operations (e.g., favouring ingroup over outgroup).

(U) Compte tenu de la complexité croissante des missions militaires des Forces canadiennes (FC), y compris les opérations de guerre asymétrique et de contre insurrection, il y a plus de chances que les soldats de tous grades feront face à des décisions morales et éthiques. La prise de décisions Morales et éthiques étant à la fois difficile dans le contexte d’opérations militaires (Thomson, Adams et Sartori, 2006) et, semble t il, une activité sociale (Haidt, 2001), le personnel militaire orientera sans aucun doute sa conduite en fonction de celle d’autrui, entres autres des leaders et des pairs, et comptera sur leur aide pour faire les bons choix. À cette fin, une bibliographie commentée a été dressée pour mettre en lumière les facteurs sociaux et les facteurs de leadership qui auront vraisemblablement une incidence sur le comportement moral et éthique. Un certain nombre de facteurs sociaux ont été cernés, dont les mécanismes de désengagement moral (par exemple, le déplacement de la responsabilité, la diffusion de la responsabilité et la déshumanisation); l’établissement d’une distinction entre l’endogroupe et l’exogroupe; l’identité de groupe; la cohésion de groupe et la loyauté envers ce dernier; le respect et la conformité; le faux effet de consensus et l’influence sociale normative (ou la contagion sociale). Parmi les facteurs de leadership, mentionnons l’impact des divers styles de leadership (p. ex. transactionnel, transformationnel, éthique, etc.), les modèles de comportement éthique et l’interaction leader membre. Le présent rapport comprend également une analyse provisoire des comptes rendus de première main des experts en la matière (EM) des FC faisant état de la prise de décisions morales et éthiques dans le cours des opérations en vue de mettre en lumière tout facteur social ou lié au leadership.
ayant eu une incidence sur le processus décisionnel. Cette analyse donne un aperçu initial d’un certain nombre de facteurs sociaux et des facteurs de leadership exerçant une influence sur la prise de décisions morales, entre autres le faux effet de consensus, l’influence sociale normative venue d’en haut, le rôle des autres dans le jugement moral, le désengagement moral, la conformité à travers la participation des leaders, la loyauté envers le groupe et la ligne de conduite de ce dernier relativement au maintien de l’ordre et l’établissement d’une distinction entre l’endogroupe et l’exogroupe. De surcroît, les réponses des participants indiquent fortement l’existence d’un leadership éthique et l’incidence de ce dernier sur les décisions prises. Quelques participants ont laissé entendre que le souci du bien-être des troupes était la priorité d’un leader, d’où la possibilité que ce facteur façonne les décisions morales et éthiques prises dans le contexte des opérations (p. ex. accorder la préférence à l’endogroupe plutôt qu’à l’exogroupe).

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

(U) Leadership; social factors; Moral Decision Making; Canadian Military Operations

UNCLASSIFIED