U.S. STRIKE COMMAND.

SUMMARY REPORT, COLD WAR STUDY GROUP.
**Report Documentation Page**

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SUBJECT: US Strike Command Cold War Study Summary

TO: Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Washington, D. C. 20301

1. During the period February 1964 - July 1965, a group of selected US Strike Command staff officers representing the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps conducted an extensive analysis of historical counterinsurgency operations to isolate factors common to successful campaigns, and to determine where possible factors contributing to failure.

2. Some sixty counterinsurgency campaigns were studied. From this group, twenty-three campaigns were analyzed in detail. The inclosure to this letter summarizes the results of the entire effort, and presents in concise form the numerous lessons learned from the studies. The Summary is of value to the military schools and colleges, and for use in units and organizations assigned to the US Strike Command as a source document for study and training related to counterinsurgency.

3. For the foregoing reasons, copies are being distributed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, the schools and colleges of the Armed Forces, and to major Army and Air Force units assigned to the US Strike Command, for information and use by recipients as considered appropriate.

1 Incl

PAUL D. ADAMS
General
Commander in Chief
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SUMMARY REPORT

COLD WAR STUDY GROUP

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES STRIKE COMMAND

8 JULY 1965
ABSTRACT

The Cold War Study Group, appointed in February 1964 by CINCSTRIKE was tasked with analyzing past counterinsurgency operations to isolate those factors common to successful campaigns and lacking in those instances where the insurgents were successful.

In the course of this study, a total of some sixty campaigns were analyzed. Emphasis was placed on isolating broad factors common to virtually any counterinsurgency operation rather than detailed tactics and techniques which may vary widely from one campaign to another. In short, the study concentrated on the "Why" of occurrences rather than on their mechanics.

From this study, twelve factors emerged which were common to most successful counterinsurgencies. These factors are not new, in fact, the majority stem directly from the accepted Principles of War. The important point concerning these factors is that all or most of them were present in every successful counterinsurgency, and lacking to a significant extent in every instance where the insurgents prevailed.

These factors properly constitute broad guidelines for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. They are not intended to provide detailed guidance as to tactics, techniques and procedures which stem from these factors and should be specifically tailored to the varying conditions in different insurgencies.

The report also takes note of the complex problems facing the United States when it embarks on a counterinsurgency task in a country where it does not directly control the required resources and must achieve its aims through persuasion and indirect means.
Finally, this study reaffirmed that counterinsurgency is not a new or even special form of warfare but one which has faced Western nations many times in the past. Solutions are neither quick nor easy but can be readily found in the application of sound tactics and techniques based on the Principles of War rather than in specialized forces and hardware or tricky, untried methods.
I INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to summarize the principal findings of the Cold War Study Group.

This group was formed by direction of CINCSTRIKE early last year with the task of studying past successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency campaigns in an effort to identify the factors common to successful counterinsurgency campaigns and the causes of failure in unsuccessful operations.

The Study Group was comprised of the following officers:

Lt Colonel J. F. Miller, USA Comd Gp
Lt Colonel M. M. Spark, USMC, Policy Gp
Lt Colonel D. E. Ott, USA, J5
Lt Colonel R. N. Broughton, USAF, J5
Cdr S. R. Chessman, USN, J5

Work by the group was an additional duty and was accomplished for the most part as an off duty task.

Study methodology was based on an analysis of available materiel dealing with selected counterinsurgency operations. As a first step, we developed a list of some sixty counterinsurgency campaigns. From an initial analysis of these sixty campaigns we selected 23 campaigns for more detailed study. A list of campaigns studied is at the appendix. Sources of reference material for this study were classified and unclassified records and reports available here in this headquarters, local libraries, personal libraries of group members, and material obtained from external sources including Service schools and colleges.

II PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

From this study we arrived at twelve factors which appeared to be common to campaigns which succeeded in defeating insurgency
and lacking in most instances where the insurgents were the winners. These twelve factors are as follows:

1. Unity of Effort
2. Qualitative and Numerical Superiority
3. Isolation of the Area
4. Superior Mobility
5. Effective Intelligence
6. Security
7. Constant, Relentless Pressure
8. Prompt Action
9. Clear, Hold and Consolidate
10. Denial of Sanctuaries
11. Popular Support
12. Control of Populace

It is emphasized that these factors are not intended to be detailed operating procedures or techniques which, of course, may vary widely from one campaign to another because of basic differences in the nature and cause of the insurgency, weather, terrain and cultural, economic, and political considerations. The factors that we isolated are rather broad principles or guidelines, applicable to virtually any insurgency. It is, of course, possible to win a counter-insurgency without everyone of these twelve factors being present. However, it is not considered possible to defeat an insurgency if many are missing.

The order of discussion of these factors does not indicate any particular order of priority as the relative importance of each factor may vary from one situation to another. There are other factors which could be added to the list. However, these twelve are the ones...
which we found to be decisive in most instances. The report discusses each of these in turn and points out historical examples of their importance. Examples cited in the report are primarily from campaigns subsequent to World War II, although these factors appear just as frequently and were just as significant in counterinsurgency operations dating back to the beginning of recorded history.

Unity of Effort. Unity of effort must apply across the board at all levels and encompass all resources -- military, economic, political, and psychological -- so that they are effectively marshalled and coordinated in a common effort. This unified effort should not only be present at governmental level but must extend down to the field so that local commanders have control over all necessary resources to combat the insurgent. Overall unity of effort properly includes unified command of military forces in the field. Unfortunately, this unity of effort is often difficult to achieve in underdeveloped areas where divided loyalties and inept administration foster special interests and divergent efforts.

Much of the British success in retaining control of their pre-World War II colonial empire was due to their organization and procedures which provided for unity of effort. In the colonies, complete overall authority was given to the Governor General who was also the Commander in Chief and where insurgency threatened, he was almost invariably a military man. These procedures was followed with great success in Malaya where unified effort also extended down to local levels. The French employed a similar system in Algeria.

The disastrous effect of a lack of unified effort was exemplified in China where Chiang Kai-shek lacked real authority and control over the war lords who most often acted in their own self interest rather than in response to centralized direction.

Qualitative and Numerical Superiority. The size and composition of forces required to defeat insurgency are, of course, two of the basic and most important considerations in any counterinsurgency operation.

As a general rule, a marked numerical superiority has been required in most successful operations against guerrillas.
The degree of superiority required varies and usually depends on the inherent fighting quality and method of operation of the guerrilla and the amount of external support which he enjoys. In a few instances, such as in the 1964-65 pacification campaign in the Congo, a small high quality force is capable of suppressing a much larger insurgent force. However, as a general rule, numerically superior forces are required to defeat modern, Communist inspired and supported insurgency.

Listed below are counterinsurgent and insurgent strengths and the resulting force ratio in a number of counterinsurgency campaigns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Counterinsurgent</th>
<th>Insurgent</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apache Uprising</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1-2,000</td>
<td>5/2</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1871-1886)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Boer War</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1899-1902)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>7/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1899-1902)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>361,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>45/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1948-60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1.2/1</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1946-54)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indo-China</td>
<td>478,000</td>
<td>380,000</td>
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<td>(1946-54)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>9/1</td>
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<td>(1946-49)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>6.2/1</td>
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<td>(1954-62)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>5.3/1</td>
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<td>(1961-64)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>2.6/1</td>
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<td>(1953-59)</td>
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6
It is easy to draw faulty conclusions from these figures as in some instances they include home guard and auxiliary type forces. For example, in Malaya, only 36,000 of the 361,000 government forces were regulars, the remainder being home guard and police. In Algeria 80,000 of the 120,000 insurgents were auxiliaries or part time rebels.

Some writers have attempted to draw precise conclusions from such figures as to exactly what force ratio is required to defeat an insurgent in any given situation. From the viewpoint of the Study Group, the only useful conclusions which can be drawn is that substantial numerical superiority is required but that the degree of superiority required varies widely from one situation to the next. Note that in two of the areas with relatively small counterinsurgent superiority, Indo-China and Cuba, the counterinsurgency operation was defeated and the insurgents won control.

More important than mere numerical superiority is the quality and organization of the counterinsurgency forces.

Two general categories of forces are required for conduct of counterinsurgency operations. The first category comprises local police and militia type formations. These elements which should be lightly armed are properly charged with maintenance of security, law and order in the locality from which they are drawn and with defense of their area against small scale guerrilla attacks. These forces usually present a problem from the standpoint of reliability as they are normally not too well trained or disciplined and through defeat or defection may serve as a source of arms for the guerrilla. However, by providing such forces for local, static defense type missions, regular forces can be relieved of such tasks in order to conduct offensive operations against the insurgent.

The second category of forces include the regular, conventional forces representing all of the services. As mentioned earlier, unity of command over these forces must be provided for in the basic organizational structure.

The basic and fundamental force requirement for counter-insurgency operations is for light, highly mobile, well trained, infantry units which are capable of seeking out and destroying the
guerrilla. The requirement for high quality infantry cannot be over emphasized. Man-for-man, unit-for-unit, these forces must be markedly superior to the guerrilla. This superiority is not attained through heavy armament and sophisticated equipment and transport but rather by developing infantrymen who excell over the guerrilla in basic combat skills, aggressiveness, mobility and will to fight. The counterinsurgent riflemen must be self-reliant, skilled in scouting and patrolling, accustomed to hardship and must feel at home when operating in the jungle, swamps or mountains where the guerrilla is to be found. He must be able to move and fight at night and in bad weather and to use these conditions to his advantage.

Indigenous conventional forces should be light and austere and specifically designed to cope with the real internal and external threats to security of their country rather than organized as replicas of modern Western forces. Our study indicated a tendency to burden down counterinsurgency forces with numerous items of heavy equipment which tends to make them road bound and dependent upon a cumbersome administrative tail. While there is a limited role for armor and artillery in counterinsurgency, greater reliance should be placed on man-portable fire support means such as light mortars and recoilless rifles rather than heavier weapons. Above all, infantry units must be capable of rapid cross-country movement rather than being tied to existing roads.

Much has been said concerning the role of special forces in counterinsurgency. We believe that there is a definite need for such organizations to organize and direct the operations of irregular, antiguerrilla forces operating as guerrillas in areas generally regarded as under insurgent control. The French in Indo-China enjoyed considerable success with their Composite Airborne Commando Group which provided small cadres to organize Meo and T'ai tribesmen in the conduct of guerrilla type operations against the Viet Minh. By April 1954, the activities of native commando groups led by these cadres had succeeded in tying down some ten regular, hard-core Viet Minh battalions in rear area security missions. However, we have not found any evidence supporting the premise that the special forces are well suited or qualified to advise and instruct conventional type government forces in counterinsurgency operations.
The indigenous air forces can be highly effective against the insurgent and should be designed to provide resupply, reconnaissance and close air support for government forces and to interdict insurgent supply lines. Basically, these missions do not require sophisticated high performance aircraft unless a sophisticated enemy air threat exists.

Indigenous naval forces play a vital role in interdicting seaborne infiltration, supporting and conducting small scale amphibious operations and conducting operations on inland waterways. Small, fast patrol and landing craft appear to be the basic need for most operations. Maximum use should also be made of such locally available craft as junks and sampans.

Isolation of the Area. Since the end of World War II, the Communists and their sympathizers have exerted major efforts to initiate and support insurgencies, particularly in the underdeveloped regions of the world. The support of insurgencies by the Communists has included provision of arms, materiel, advisors, training assistance and safe havens. In virtually every insurgency of significance which has occurred during the past few years, external support to the guerrillas has been to a large degree responsible for such success as the insurgents have enjoyed.

The interdiction of external support to insurgents should be recognized as one of the most important initial tasks facing the counterinsurgent. So long as the insurgent continues to receive substantial external support the task of the counterinsurgent is enormously complicated.

The exact methods to be used to interdict this external support vary widely and, of course, should be based on an analysis of the particular situation at hand. The extreme measures taken by the French to interdict Tunisian and Moroccan support of the FLN in Algeria in the late 1950's constituted a major blow against the insurgent forces. Basically, the French built an elaborate system of fence barriers on the Tunisian and Moroccan borders which extended well out into the Sahara. These obstacles consisted of an elaborate complex of electrified fence, mine fields, and alarm systems including complete radar coverage. These barriers,
maintained by 80,000 men and patrolled day and night by ground
and air, had by mid-1958 effectively closed the Tunisian and
Moroccan border. Concurrently, naval patrols had denied access
to the Algerian coast.

In Greece, the withdrawal of Yugoslav support of Greek rebels
in 1948 and denial of Yugoslavia as a sanctuary was a decisive point
in the defeat of the Greek rebels. On the other hand, the failure
of the French in Indo-China to interdict Chinese Communist support
of the Viet Minh enabled the insurgents to constantly grow in strength
and capabilities until 1954 when the Viet Minh constituted a force of
over 300,000 men organized into irregular guerrilla units and hard
core regular organizations which included artillery and other heavy
equipment.

Superior Mobility. Superior mobility is an important requirement
if the counterinsurgent forces are to be able to seek out, locate and
destroy the guerrilla. For the counterinsurgent forces to be
successful they must possess a marked mobility differential over
the insurgents.

Unfortunately, many equate mobility with vehicular or
helicopter transport. These methods of transportation are
extremely valuable in moving forces from one area to another from
where they can undertake offensive operations against the guerrilla.
In open terrain, such as was the case in Algeria, air mobility can
provide an important advantage over the guerrilla. However, in the
final analysis, the counterinsurgent forces must rely on foot
mobility to seek out and destroy the enemy. The helicopter, the
truck and the armored personnel carrier have definite limitations
in enabling counterinsurgent forces to close with the guerrilla.
These means of transportation quickly alert the guerrilla to the
arrival of government forces and in the case of vehicular movement
tend to tie counterinsurgent forces to the roads where they are easy
targets for ambushes and where they are relatively ineffective against
insurgent forces.

The experiences of the French in Indo-China provide numerous
tragic examples of the fallacy of relying on vehicular movement in
the presence of the enemy. On 24 June 1954, the French 100th
Group Mobile commenced a withdrawal from the town of Ankhe to Pleiku. This group consisted of three combat-experienced infantry battalions plus armor, engineers, and an artillery battalion. Most of the infantry was on foot, but because of their equipment and dependence on vehicular support essentially remained on the road. Between Ankhe and Pleiku the column was ambushed by the Viet Minh and virtually wiped out. The group, which originally numbered over 3200 men, lost more than 50% of its personnel, 85% of its vehicles including all of its armor, all of its artillery, and more than half of its automatic weapons and signal equipment. One battalion of this force which had fought with US forces in Korea lost more men in five days of this fight with the Viet Minh than it did in its two years of combat in Korea.

In the Philippines and in Malaya, small, lightly equipped infantry units carrying their own supplies, were sent into the jungle where they operated against the guerrillas for extended periods. These highly mobile light units, unencumbered by an administrative tail and able to move with stealth and speed were able to outmove the guerrilla, track him down and eventually destroy him.

These comments are not intended to convey the impression that all forms of movement other than foot should be discarded. In the Boer War, the British effectively employed cavalry as the principal offensive force against the Boer insurgents, and in Algeria helicopter borne French forces achieved major successes against the FLN. However, sophisticated forms of movement should not be adopted as substitutes for the basic foot mobility requirement to be able to close with and destroy the guerrilla in the difficult terrain from which he habitually operates. In short, the counterinsurgent must be able to move faster and farther in any terrain chosen by the guerrilla.

Effective Intelligence. Probably the single greatest problem facing any counterinsurgent is to find the enemy. Regardless of how well trained and effective the counterinsurgency forces are they will be essentially groping in the dark unless they are able to develop an effective intelligence system which provides accurate and timely information of the enemy. Unity of effort in intelligence operations against an insurgent is particularly important. All sources of information, both civil and military, must be made available to commanders at all levels to provide the basis for effective operations. Every possible
source must be exploited. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, prisoners of war, electronic intelligence, patrols, informers, and sources of information available to civil police must be exploited to the utmost and completely integrated. The most prolific source of intelligence is a native population which is sympathetic to the government cause to the extent that individuals are prepared to risk their lives in supplying information on insurgent activities. Special efforts should be made to develop and exploit this source of information.

The French in Indo-China were never really able to develop an effective intelligence system. Large scale counterinsurgency operations were more often than not complete failures because of inaccurate intelligence. As an example, French ignorance of Viet Minh artillery capabilities was to a large extent responsible for the decision to position large French Union forces at Dien Bien Phu where they were wiped out in 1954 by superior Viet Minh forces supported by massed artillery.

In Algeria, the French eventually developed an intelligence system which provided timely and accurate information and provided the basis for employment of forces which enabled them to militarily dominate Algeria towards the end of the rebellion there.

Field Marshal Sir Gerald W. Templar, Governor General in Malaya during the insurgency there, lists intelligence as one of the four most important requirements for successful counterinsurgency operations. In Malaya, the British went to great lengths to assure the highest quality of coordinated intelligence throughout the campaign. District intelligence committees were organized bringing together police and military intelligence efforts at the local level; the special investigative branch of the police was vitalized, and informers were highly rewarded and protected. As a result, towards the close of the emergency the British claimed to have complete personnel dossiers on every guerrilla leader of importance and on the great majority of their active followers.

Security. JCS Pub 1, December 1964, defines security as "Measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, observation, sabotage, annoyance, or surprise". This definition is particularly applicable to counterinsurgency as the words "espionage,
observation, sabotage, annoyance and surprise" clearly describe the tactics of the guerrilla. Security is even more important in counterinsurgency operations than in conventional type warfare. The entire strategy of the guerrilla, at least in the early phases of insurgency, is based upon striking at an unexpected point and at an unexpected time. Two of the most common words emanating from South Viet Nam today are "ambush" and "surprise". Any force which employs proper security measures cannot be ambushed nor can it be surprised. The provision of adequate security is primarily a matter of training, discipline and alertness and must be stressed in every phase of counterinsurgency planning and operations. Security should apply not only to the military forces operating in the field but to the entire structure of the counterinsurgent effort. Security measures are adequately outlined in current field manuals and other doctrinal publications, and require no detailed discussion here.

Constant Relentless Pressure. Perhaps this factor should simply be entitled adherence to the principal of the offense. We found no instance of where guerrilla forces suffered overall defeat through defensive operations on the part of the counterinsurgent forces. The key to counterinsurgency operations is to locate the guerrilla and from that point forward maintain constant relentless pressure and vigorous pursuit with the clear-cut objective of killing or capturing the entire guerrilla force. Mere dispersal of guerrilla forces accomplishes nothing as the guerrilla customarily expects to disperse following any significant action.

A very common error, particularly in the early stages of insurgency has been for the government forces to attempt to defend in strength every key installation and populated area with the expectation of decisively defeating the guerrilla in open combat where he will be vulnerable to the heavier and more sophisticated fire power of the defending forces. Such tactics, of course, are purely defensive in nature, tend to dissipate and tie down forces which should be used to seek out the guerrilla and tend to overlook the fact that the insurgent seldom launches an attack unless he has every reason to believe that through surprise or superior strength he will overwhelm the defending forces.
The unwillingness of Batista's forces to leave their barracks and engage Castro's insurgents in the field and the attempted defense of Dien Bien Phu and similar fortified positions by the French are excellent examples of a failure to adhere to the principles of the offensive.

A classic example the effectiveness of relentless pressure against an insurgent was the British reaction against native troops which rebelled in the Sepoy Mutiny in India in 1857-58. The British not only broke the back of the major insurgent forces but relentlessly sought out and eliminated every small band of mutineers so that no pockets of resistance remained and the rebellion was quickly and completely eliminated.

While this relentless pressure should be primarily directed to destruction of guerrilla forces there have been many instances where special, offensive efforts to kill or capture key insurgent leaders have resulted in a prompt end to the insurgency. This has been particularly true in those insurgencies where one leader has dominated the rebel movement and has widespread popularity to the extent that neither individual possesses the stature to assume effective control of the movement. For example, when Bella Krim fell into French hands during the Riff War and when Aquinaldo was captured by United States forces in the Philippines these insurrections collapsed. However, we found that elimination of rebel leadership in Communist supported insurgencies is generally less decisive. In such cases personalities of leaders are usually played down and the Communist apparatus can most often quickly provide leaders to replace those who have become casualties. Nevertheless, elimination of key insurgent leaders can often prove decisive.

Prompt Action. Most of the insurgencies which we studied grew to significance only because of the failure to initiate prompt effective action against the beginnings of the insurgency. In many instances, prompt action with relatively small forces can reverse a deteriorating situation at a very early point. Examples of the effectiveness of prompt action by small, well trained forces include the four air mobile operations conducted by the British 45th Marine Commando in less than 55 hours against mutinous Tanganyikan Army units at four widely separated places in 1964. In addition, similar small British forces quickly and easily quelled Army mutinies in Kenya and Uganda.
The rapid commitment of Marine and Army forces recently in the Dominican Republic is another example of how prompt action may well have averted a long drawn out disorder conducive to a Communist takeover. Equally illustrative of the importance of prompt action was the rapidity with which Iranian Army units quelled the very serious Teheran disorder in June 1963.

**Clear, Hold and Consolidate.** In discussion of the clear hold and consolidate factor, the principle point to be made is that counter-insurgency operations must provide for clearing operations which will eliminate all significant insurgencies in a selected area and then must provide the means of holding the area which has been cleared. To simply move through the area eliminating overt insurgent resistance serves no long range useful purpose as the insurgents will tend to move back into the area once the counterinsurgent forces have departed. A fundamental objective of counterinsurgency operations must include the provision of firm, secure base areas which are clear of insurgent activity and can be used as bases for administrative operations and from which offensive counterinsurgency operations can be launched.

The "consolidate" part of this factor not only applies to military consolidation of objectives but also to the restoration of government and essential services and functions so as to return the populace to a productive status in a rapid, efficient manner. Plans should be made well in advance to implement such measures as rapidly as possible once an area is pacified.

The French successfully applied this principle in Algeria where they developed the so-called "oil spot" technique. This simply meant clearing holding and consolidating selected areas and then expanding the size of the cleared area outward until they linked up with adjacent areas thus eventually resulting in the complete pacification of large areas of the country.

**Denial of Sanctuaries.** Denial of sanctuaries has been touched upon in the discussion of interdiction of external support and the requirement for constant, relentless pressure and tends to merge with these principles. As previously mentioned, measures must be taken which deny the insurgent the opportunity to take refuge in neighboring countries.
Just as important is the necessity of not permitting the insurgent to exercise long term domination of any particular area in the country in which the insurgency is taking place.

So long as the guerrilla has the opportunity to retrain, rest and regroup his forces with relative immunity, the counterinsurgent effort is faced with a long uphill struggle. Castro's use of the Sierra Maestra and Greek rebel sanctuaries in the Grammos and Vitsi areas afforded more or less secure bases for these forces.

The requirement to deny sanctuaries to the guerrilla was recognized in Malaya where British forces habitually went deep into the jungle seeking out insurgent bases and camps and attempting to keep him constantly on the move. Another example was Operation RAT KILLER which was conducted in the winter of 1951-52 in Korea. This operation succeeded in eliminating a guerrilla sanctuary in the Southwestern part of the country, and resulted in the killing of more than 10,000 guerrillas and the capture of a like number, and through elimination of the sanctuary resulted in the pacification of an area long subject to guerrilla attacks.

**Popular Support.** The generation of popular support amongst the natives of the country in which the operation is being conducted is usually a difficult and complex problem. In general, the Communists have been quite successful in identifying their insurgency with the basic desires of the common people. To counter this requires positive government programs which strike at the fundamental causes of civil dissatisfaction. To be effective, the government must demonstrate to the people that such programs actually exist and the government is sincerely concerned with the welfare of the individual. Corruption, inept administration, and indiscriminate brutality against the civil population are often direct causes of popular support of the insurgents and must be avoided. An effective psychological warfare campaign should be conducted to sell the counterinsurgent case.

Pacification must take priority over reform. Essentially, the initiation of social, economic, and political reforms cannot take place in the midst of chaos and disorder. Before effective programs of this type can be undertaken a reasonable semblance of law and order must be established.
Another facet of this problem is the need to be able to afford a degree of protection to the populace against Communist terrorist methods to which they often resort to intimidate the people. In many areas we found that the average native was quite apathetic towards the real issues of the civil war and would give his support to the side which appeared to be most capable of affording him protection.

An example of the importance of popular support was in the Philippines, when Magsaysay's program to win support was probably the decisive factor in defeating the Hukis. In his efforts, he literally stole the issues from the insurgents by effecting the reforms that the Hukis were using as propaganda. He eliminated the causes of popular discontent and through civic action programs and disciplined behavior reestablished trust in the Filipino Armed Forces and the government. As a result, the overwhelming majority of the Filipinos came to support the government cause and the Huk rebellion collapsed.

Another example of where popular support was a major factor was in China. Mao Tse Tung considered support of the populace as essential to his cause and took strong, effective measures to prevent unnecessary loss of peasant property and lives. On the other hand, the Nationalists displayed such indifference to the feelings and welfare of the common people as to lose virtually all popular support.

Mention should be made at this point that popular support requires a strong, determined will to prevail and win on the part of the counterinsurgent. This will to win must exist not only in the hearts and minds of the military forces but also in the government and in the people from which the government draws its strength and support. Unless this will to win exists and unless the counterinsurgent forces, the government and the people have the determination to endure the frustrations and attritions of an extended campaign, the guerrilla may be able to win by default even though he is being defeated militarily. An excellent example of such an occurrence was in Algeria where the FLN was clearly defeated in the field but still able to achieve its objectives because of the lack of determination and will to win on the part of the metropolitan French populace and the government in Paris.
Control of Populace. The classic source of insurgent strength lies in the people of the country. While gaining of popular support can prove decisive in defeating the insurgent, measures must also be taken which will provide for the control of the population so that the insurgent can be identified and separated from the population. Measures to control the populace can include such extreme steps as relocation of large segments of the population and concentration of these peoples in secure, guarded towns and villages such as occurred in the Boer War and in Malaya. Basic requirements of an effective control system include a pass and identification system and methods of keeping track of the activities and movements of each individual.

In Algeria, the French implemented a pass system that included a chain of individual responsibilities beginning with the head of each family and extending up through to the senior official of a village or major section of a city. Every individual was issued a photograph-fingerprint type pass that he was required to have in his possession at all times. The head of each family was held strictly responsible at all times for the whereabouts and activities of each member of the family.

Checks were frequent and unannounced and harsh measures were imposed against violators. Application of the system to Algiers in 1957 was so effective that even the Casbah was never again able to afford hiding for more than a few terrorists.

III The Greek Civil War, a Classic Example

Having discussed each of the twelve factors developed by the Cold War Study Group it is appropriate to examine one specific insurgency to illustrate the importance and validity of these factors.

In many respects the Greek Civil War is a classic case for a study in counterinsurgency. In the early stages of this conflict, the pacification effort lacked most of the factors which have been discussed and virtually no progress was being made against the Communist supported rebels. The means by which the counterinsurgent effort was reshaped and made effective provide numerous examples attesting to the validity of the factors discussed above.
In the early stages of the war, in 1946-47, there was clearly no unity of effort. The British had advisors in Greece and were supplying aid. U.S. efforts were not closely coordinated with the British, and the Greek military and civil authorities were essentially pursuing separate, uncoordinated courses of action. Even within the U.S. assistance effort there was no unity in spite of the fact that there was a single individual initially responsible for the entire U.S. assistance program. As an example of the fragmentation in the early period, the U.S. was responsible for training Greeks in the use of newly arrived U.S. equipment, but the British were responsible for "tactical training". The shift to a more unified effort was protracted and difficult. It was 1949 -- 2 1/2 years after the outbreak of fighting -- before the Greeks appointed a commander in chief with full authority over the military establishment. This appointment of General Papagos, from retirement, as Commander in Chief, was accompanied by a cessation of political meddling in military affairs and a general governmental support of counterinsurgency operations. U.S. and Greek efforts were coordinated and unified by the close relationship between General Van Fleet and General Papagos. Unity of U.S. aid, assistance and advice was finally achieved by subordinating all U.S. efforts under one man accredited to the Government of Greece - the Ambassador.

In the area of superiority of forces, Greece initially possessed an army just reconstituted following the World War II German occupation. The armed forces were poorly equipped and trained and not psychologically motivated for guerrilla warfare. The Greeks then created special units of an elite nature which were intended to have special capabilities against the guerrillas. However, the organization of these elite units only served to lower the morale and effectiveness of the bulk of the army whose feeling was to let these specialists in counterguerrilla operations do the fighting. The overall effectiveness of the Greek forces was gradually improved due to General Van Fleet's efforts which made significant changes in the training and organization of these forces. As the result of the changes effected by Generals Van Fleet and Papagos the Greek Army became a creditable force, superior in every significant respect to the guerrillas.
Much of the initial rebel success was due to the fact that the northern border of Greece was open and guerrillas moved freely between Greece and its Communist neighbors. The factor of isolation of the area was achieved later -- but more by luck than by design. The ideological disagreement between Marshal Tito and the Soviet Communists led to estrangement of Yugoslavia from the Communist fold and a gradual closing of the Yugoslav - Greek border. This was a major factor in the defeat of the insurgents.

Constant pressure on the insurgents simply did not exist at first. Well over half the army was committed on some form of static security duty. Employment of the army on offensive tasks increased after General Van Fleet arrived. Van Fleet made frequent visits to front line units, exhorted senior Greek officers to do the same and persuaded the Greeks to undertake offensive operations against the guerrillas. Intensified pressure against the rebels followed the appointment of General Papagos as Commander in Chief.

Prompt action was not taken to meet the insurgent threat by Greece, the U.K. or the U.S. This was undoubtedly a factor in prolonging the conflict.

Sanctuaries were allowed to exist in the northern mountains -- particularly the Grammos area near Albania and the Vitsi area adjacent to Yugoslavia. Only late in the conflict were sanctuaries attacked and pressure maintained to prevent creation of new bases and safe havens.

Popular support was also slow in coming in some areas where the communists played on dissident attitudes of the peoples of areas such as Macedonia. In other areas they used ruthless terror tactics to instill fear of supporting the government in rural areas. However, the extreme cruelty and mistreatment of civilians eventually backfired and the population gradually came to support the government. The growing strength and capability of the army to provide protection to lives and property added to the ability to obtain popular support.

One last point can be made in reviewing the Greek insurgency. The United States made a major effort to rehabilitate the Greek economy during the conflict. Much of this effort was fruitless since it was taking place in areas not under firm government control. In
January 1948, Mr. Loy Henderson of the State Department commented to Secretary of State Marshall that economic recovery would be impossible unless the communist insurgents were destroyed. This comment serves to illustrate the significance of priority to pacification in a country in turmoil.

IV Problems of an Outside Power

One of the most difficult aspects of the insurgency problem for the United States is that we usually must operate as an outside power in a country or area where we have no authoritative control over the counterinsurgency operation. While actions required to quell the insurgency may be readily apparent to us, the problem of bringing the indigenous government to undertake these actions is complex and frustrating.

Lacking authoritative control, the outside power usually has to rely on persuasion or threats to induce the indigenous government to take the necessary steps to defeat the insurgent. Operating in strange environments and cultures and confronted with native suspicion of Western motives, ignorance, political instability, inept and corrupt administration and an often false sense of national pride, the outside power may well decide to withdraw its support and let the victory go to the insurgent through default.

The fundamental factor of unity of effort is extremely difficult to achieve in such circumstances. An outside power can urge the troubled government to unify its efforts and can provide assistance under the overall direction of the local government, but this cannot assure that unity of effort will be achieved. This point must not be confused with intervention in areas where the outside power is able to wield complete control over all elements of the local government. Thus, the British in Malaya and the French in Algeria were in quite a different position from that occupied by the United States in Greece or Viet Nam.

The intervening power faces other problems than the attainment of unity of effort. Aid and assistance can be given to government forces, but military superiority can be difficult to
attain if the insurgents are receiving substantial external support. Isolation of the area to prevent external assistance may be difficult to achieve without direct antagonism of a neighboring country, whereas the local government would be less subject to world criticism for its actions towards neighbors.

The problem of establishing an effective intelligence network is difficult under the best of circumstances. With wide ethnic and cultural backgrounds between the local population and the outside power, it is extremely difficult to establish the rapport essential to effective intelligence.

Perhaps, transcending the problems mentioned is the possibility of another difficulty; that of motivating the local government where apathy, native listlessness or internal corruption have taken the edge off the desire to quell insurgency. If this situation exists, such factors as constant pressure, popular support and control of the populace may be extremely difficult to achieve. A will to win and a willingness to exert energy must somehow be induced into the local government.

The outside power may thus have full realization of the military and political actions that should be taken to bring about a high probability of success, but the very role of being an outsider may preclude doing the tasks that have been identified. Financial assistance, military advice, training assistance and political support all contribute toward helping a local government combat insurgency, but frustrations may well lie in the path of the outsider's efforts to help a local government achieve victory.

We offer no solution of these problems which of course differ widely from one situation to the next. However, an outside power contemplating assistance to a country facing insurgency should first assure itself that the government to be supported is sufficiently effective and responsive to external advice as to offer a high probability of success. It is probably better to allow a country or area to go by default rather than to lose a fight under impossible conditions and be forced to make a humiliating withdrawal.
V CONCLUSION

In concluding this summary report, the Study Group feels it appropriate to comment on the multiplicity of programs and the great emphasis which has been given to counterinsurgency in all of the United States Armed Forces.

There is little question that the increased emphasis on counterinsurgency has made the Armed Forces more aware of and better prepared to face the problem. However, it is believed that a tendency has developed to devote rather sizeable efforts to develop cheap, quick and easy solutions. Most of these panaceas seem to rely on new, specialized gimmicks and hardware. The number of R&D projects devoted to counterinsurgency weapons and equipment is staggering and in many cases they indicate a fundamental lack of understanding as to the realities of combat.

As an example, the Study Group recently reviewed a study which proposed development of a complex, vehicular mounted device which through detection of CO₂ in the atmosphere could warn a column of an enemy ambush. In the opinion of the Study Group, a pair of trained, dismounted scouts could do this job far better.

There was no instance in the 60 campaigns studied where decisive results were attained against an insurgent through introduction of specialized weapons or equipment. In fact, equipment appears to be a relatively unimportant factor compared to tactics, techniques, training and the will to fight.

In conclusion, this study showed that insurgency is not a new, mysterious, or different problem; but one which has occurred repeatedly throughout history and one which can be defeated today just as it has been in the past.

The factors which were isolated are not new but are basically restatements of the Principles of War which are every bit as valid in defeating insurgency as they are in any other type of warfare. The Study Group fully recognizes that the attainment of these factors is not easy and that it requires imagination, ingenuity and hard work on the part of the counterinsurgent.
Counterinsurgency is nothing more or less than another form of warfare and as in any other type of war, solutions are neither quick, easy or cheap.
APPENDIX to Cold War Study Group Summary Report.

List of Insurgencies Studied

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The Mexican Revolution against MAXIMILLIAN 1862-65
* The Apache Campaign, SW United States
The Cuban Insurgency against Spain 1892-97
* The Marine Corps Campaigns in Haiti
* The Marine Corps Campaign in Nicaragua 1915-31
The Columbian Insurgency 1927-32
* The Rise of Fidel Castro in Cuba 1956-64
The Jagan Disturbances in British Guinea 1957-59
The Anti U.S. Panamanian Riots 1960-64
1964

MIDDLE EAST

* The Campaigns of T. E. Lawrence 1916-18
The Nile Valley Uprisings 1919
The British Campaigns in Northern Iraq 1920-32
The Anti Zionist Palestine Insurgency 1936-39
The Rashid Ali Revolt in Iraq 1941
* The Kurdish Revolt in Iran 1946
* The Zionist Resistance to the Palestine Mandate 1945-48
The Communal Disturbances in Lebanon 1958
* The Teheran Riots 1963
* The Fars Uprising in Iran 1963
The Yemen Civil War In Progress

AFRICA, MEDITERRANEAN, BALKANS

The Corsican Revolution
The French Pacification of Algeria Late 18th Century
The Disturbances on Cyprus 19th Century
* The Boer War 1931
The Riff War in Morocco 1888-1902
The Yugoslav Partisans 1920's
* The Greek Civil War 1941-45
1945-49
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<th>Region</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPE</strong></td>
<td>The Wars of Netherlands Liberation</td>
<td>16th &amp; 17th Centuries</td>
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<td>The Irish Rebellions</td>
<td>1600-1919</td>
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<td>The Spanish Guerrillas</td>
<td>1807-14</td>
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<td>The Greek Revolution against the Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>1821-27</td>
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<td>The Hungarian Rebellion of Louise Kossuth</td>
<td>19th Century</td>
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<td>The Paris Commune</td>
<td>1871</td>
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<td>The Hungarian Regime of Bela Kuhn</td>
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<td>The Finnish Red-White Civil War</td>
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<td>The Kapp Putsch and 'other German disturbances</td>
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<td>The de Valera Campaign against Michael Collins</td>
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<td>The Soviet Partisans</td>
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<td>The French Maquis</td>
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<td>The Hungarian Rebellion</td>
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<td>The Mallakand Campaign and Northwest Frontier Disturbances</td>
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<td>Chindit Operations in Burma</td>
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<td>The Chinese Communist Revolution and its Consolidation</td>
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<td>The Malayan Civil War</td>
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<td>The HUK Uprisings in the Phillipines</td>
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* Selected for detailed study.