PROSPECTS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN EASTERN AFRICA REGION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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Diploma in Strategic Studies, University of Nairobi, 2011

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**Prospects of Collective Security in the Eastern Africa Region**

This thesis examines the prospects of effective collective security in the Eastern Africa Region. The study examines the capacity of the current structures of the EASF as the regional collective security mechanism and assesses its capacity to address regional security concerns.

The overall research methodology used is the qualitative method using case studies. The study identifies key elements of collective security that favor its success. It analyzes three case studies and examines the application of the concept of collective security, and the factors contributing to success or failure. The study further examines the role of the UN as the umbrella collective security body and identifies its successes and failures.

The study finds that the success of the concept of collective security depends on the ability of the alliance to agree on the aggressor and the commitment by the players to defeat aggression. The interest of a dominant power is critical to the success of the concept.

The study concludes that the concept will only succeed when most of the players and particularly the dominant power are involved in the effort. The main recommendations are that the region needs to find a formula of obligating the regional dominant powers to the concept of collective security. Possible ways to ensure dominant regional players commit to the concept include institutionalization of the EASF and greater regional economic interdependence.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

PROSPECTS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE EASTERN AFRICA REGION, by LTC Edward Rugendo, 114 pages.

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To my family, specifically my late mother, who inculcated in me the culture of discipline and hard work and my son Mark, who missed the love of his father as I struggled to complete this work, is this research dedicated.
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<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU PSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>Eastern Africa Region</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

On June 28, 1914, a Serbian nationalist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary and his wife while they were in Sarajevo, Bosnia, which was part of Austria-Hungary. Immediately, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Russia declared war on Austria-Hungary to defend Serbia. Seeing the mobilization of Russia, Germany declared war on Russia. Subsequently, Germany attacked France through Belgium pulling Britain to the war. The world was at war. By the end of the war in 1918, over nine million people were dead and many others injured or missing in action (Parker 1995). Could the world have prevented this disaster?

Peace and security has remained a great challenge in Africa and the world. Scholars have attributed this to many factors including politics, competition for scarce resources, border disputes, nationalism and irredentism. In the last 100 years, the world has witnessed major wars resulting in deaths, displacement, massive refugee crises and disrupted economic activities. Accordingly, the security challenges have manifested themselves into the destruction of lives and property, perpetuation of human rights abuses, and generation of refugees that transcend national boundaries with terrible costs for peace, security, and development both nationally, regionally, and internationally.

Since the emergence of the state as the main actor in international relations following the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, countries have based their concept of security on the need for the state to preserve its sovereignty, values and property of its citizens against foreign enemies. However, this notion has changed with time due to other factors.
namely economics, politics and diplomacy, which have complimented the role of military power as the center in international relations. The need for a stable international and regional environment as the basis for mutual economic development and social co-existence necessitated the establishment of a credible approach to maintain order and attain world stability and security.

Consequently, the realization of the need for world security drove the founding of the United Nations (UN), as a collective security organization. The UN was formed after World War II as a collective security organization to deal with violent conflicts that were being witnessed at that time and set conditions for the avoidance of conflicts of that magnitude in the international system. As articulated in Chapter 1, Article 1 of the UN Charter, the purposes and principles of the UN are:

To maintain international peace and security; and to that end; to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means; and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. (UN 1985)

Additionally, in realization of the significant role that regional organizations can play in enhancing international peace and security, the UN Charter provided for regional organizations to address local disputes before involving the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Chapter VIII of the UN Charter specifically states: “Regional organizations shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes before referring such disputes to the United Nations Security Council” (UN 1985). This provision is the basis on which regional organizations like the European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU) and other regional organizations and their associated collective security mechanisms
emerged. These organizations have sought to develop capacities to deal with threats to security and arbitrate disputes within their regions.

Africa accounts for more border disputes that any other continent in the world. Though often dormant, the underlying causes and grievances still exist and efforts to settle them have not been fruitful. The differences of Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi peninsula, the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict over the town of Badme, the Morocco/Mauritania, and the Sahrawi People’s Democratic Republic (SPDR) disputes over the Western Sahara cases are examples of existing conflicts (Adewummi 2005). The presence of potential areas of conflict waiting for a trigger is the reason why Africa should embrace the concept of collective security more seriously. In the last 100 years, the Eastern Africa Region (EAR) has witnessed four major wars. However, little evidence shows the effectiveness of regional or continental collective security mechanism playing a role in preventing or stopping the wars. The UN intervened in the Ethiopia/Eritrea war of 1998; however, it was a case of too little too late. Equally, the AU was not able to do much seemingly because of lack of capacity while at the same time it was still transitioning from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to AU in 1999-2000, and remained an observer.

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), as established in 2002 by the Durban Protocol, outlined the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The constituents of the architecture include the Common African Defense and Security Policy; the Military Staff Committee; the African Standby Force (ASF); the Continental Early Warning System; the Panel of the Wise; and the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) (Alghali 2011). The protocol entered into force in December
2003 and subsequently the ASF was established (Cilliers 2008). The creation of the ASF reinforced the AU’s efforts towards the establishment of a collective security mechanism for the continent.

The Eastern Africa Region

The EAR is the region on the eastern part of Africa, including the territories occupied by the fourteen states that form the East African Region and the islands therein. The members include Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Republic of Tanzania, and Uganda; and as of July 9, 2011, the newly independent Republic of South-Sudan as shown on figure 1.

Figure 1. Eastern Africa Region

The map shows the countries of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi as belonging to the region. However, the researcher has modified the map and excluded them, and will not consider them as part of the region throughout this study. In addition, Sudan and South Sudan are part of the region and the researcher has adjusted the map to include them. At the same time, Somalia has not had an effective government since 1991; therefore, it is unable to transact any meaningful business both regionally and internationally.

The African Union

The AU is a union of 54 African states and islands aimed at accelerating the process of integration on the continent to enable it to address inherent social, economic and political problems while at the same time facing the world economy as one block (AU 2000). The Union is a successor of the earlier body, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which dissolved in 1999. The main objectives of the OAU were:

inter alia, to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African States; to coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States and to promote international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations. (OAU 1963)

After its birth in Addis Ababa on May 25, 1963, the OAU declared to the world its commitment to ensuring African peace and security. The Charter provided for all member states to respect the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations, mediation and arbitration. The organization went ahead and created the mediation, conciliation and arbitration commission to underline its commitment (Amoo 1992). However, no formal collective security mechanism existed. Consequently, under its watch, between its birth and dissolution, the EAR witnessed three wars. The

On July 11, 2000, the African heads of state and governments adopted the constitutive act of the African Union in Lome, Togo (AU 2000). The mission of the AU is to be: “An efficient and value-adding institution driving the African integration and development process in close collaboration with African Union member states, the regional economic communities and African citizens” (AU 2000, 2). The objectives of the AU are “to achieve unity, promote peace, security, and stability, and accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent through cooperation in all fields of humanity within the African states.” (AU 2000, 4). On realizing that security was central for peace, stability and development, and upon recommendations by the African chiefs of defense, the members created the protocol to enable them to preserve continental peace and security collectively. To operationalize the idea, the protocol created the Peace and Security Council (PSC). “The AU PSC is a legitimate mandating authority under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter” (AU 2003, 3). Subsequently, the PSC recommended the creation of the ASF as the African capability to enhance African security. Consequently, the member states adopted the policy framework for the establishment of ASF in July 2004 (Cilliers 2008).

The African Standby Force

African regional security mechanisms are inherent within the AU security arrangement. The PSC’s mandate includes spearheading the AU’s security initiatives comprising conflict prevention, management and resolution (Ochiai 2006). Consequently, the AU Assembly formally adopted a common African defense and security policy as the
basis for pursuit of continental peace and security, which gave birth to the ASF as the implementation mechanism for the PSC (Neethling 2005).

The ASF is a collection of regional multinational brigade size forces whose role is to offer the AU the necessary capacity for intervention within African countries to deal with continental conflict and security challenges as provided for in article 4 (h) of the constitutive act (AU 2000). The design of the ASF follows the five African regions with elements from other agencies. The model provides for the ASF structured in five standby brigades of 3,000 to 4,000 troops, one in each region specifically: North Africa regional standby brigade (NASBRIG); East Africa standby brigade (EASBRIG); Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMAC - Central Africa); Southern Africa standby brigade (SADCBRIG); and ECOWAS standby brigade (ECOBRIG). The idea provides for the components to remain in their original countries prepared for rapid deployment anywhere in Africa at short notice (Cilliers 2008). The ASF structure is in line with the former UN multinational standby high readiness brigade (SHIRBRIG), for UN operations with its headquarters in Copenhagen, Denmark. The formation of SHIRBRIG was a consequence of the UN’s inability to prevent the catastrophes in Rwanda and Srebrenica (Bosnia). The SHIRBRIG was composed of seven countries and deployed to the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict for six months in November 2000, but stood down in 2009. Though not a formal organ of the UN, the formation of the SHIRBRIG involved close coordination with the UN secretariat, and followed the framework of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (Koops 2008). The ASF possesses the legal mandate to intervene in cases of serious conflicts around the continent and will deploy under the patronage of the AU to intervene in border wars
(Neethling 2005). Figure 2 shows the distribution of the regional standby brigades in the continent.

Figure 2. ASF Regional Standby Brigades


The East African Standby Brigade

Established in 2004, the role of the Eastern Africa standby brigade (EASBRIG) is the maintenance of peace and security in a timely manner as per the mandate given by the
AU PSC, in accordance with the AU constitutive act. EASBRIG is still in the formative stages with the planning elements (PLANEM) in Nairobi, Kenya and the brigade headquarters in Addis Ababa Ethiopia. It draws its membership from the eleven of the fourteen countries who are members of the eastern region. The force, when fully constituted, will fall under the AU for all purposes including resourcing and deployment. The brigade subordinates itself to the AU and UN as articulated in article 4 of the protocol establishing the force (EASBRIG 2005). The article specifically states:

The Eastern Africa Standby Brigade shall be guided by the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. (IGAD 2004, 6)

This study will analyze three case studies of wars, two of which happened within the EAR in the past 50 years. These include the Ethiopia-Somalia (Ogaden) war of 1978, the Ethiopia-Eritrean war of 1998 and the 1991 Gulf War I.

Statement of the Problem

In the last 100 years, the EAR has witnessed 4 major wars and continues to face possible interstate conflicts due to a number of underlying factors. Interstate boundary disputes, competition for natural resources, nationalism and irredentism are rife and continue to create an atmosphere of mistrust and tension with a potential of explosion once triggered. The AU has tried to diffuse the tensions caused by the problems but has not been successful. Conflicts in the region have tended to be enduring and have inhibited the economic growth and development of the region. The phenomenon has affected countries in the entire region both directly and indirectly due to the failures of the collective security mechanisms both regionally, continentally and globally. The very
reasons that caused the last three wars in the region still exist and continue to get complicated as other factors like the discovery of minerals, significant refugee populations and population explosion sets in. Unless the region is able to address the underlying issues adequately, and a credible collective security mechanism put in place, then it is likely to remain embroiled in endless wars with a consequence of not being able to break the cycle of poverty.

Objectives of the Study

This study will examine the concept of collective security and its applicability to the Eastern Africa Region. The study will further scrutinize the prospects of the existing collective security mechanism in the region with a view to suggesting measures to make it more capable, responsive and credible. The specific objectives of this study are to:

1. Explore the concept and theory of collective security
2. Evaluate the effectiveness of the UN security arrangements in addressing the African security threats
3. Evaluate the effectiveness of the AU and ASF security arrangements in addressing the EAR security threats
4. Assess the prospects for collective security in the EAR
5. Recommend ways of developing a credible and responsive collective security mechanism in the EAR
**Proposed Research Question**

The study raises the following questions: What are the prospects for effective collective security in EAR? Secondary questions that when addressed will collectively answer the primary question are:

1. What regional collective security mechanism is in place in EAR?
2. What factors contribute to the success of collective security?
3. What factors contribute to the failure of collective security?
4. Has the UN adequately addressed state security problems in Africa?
5. Is the AU security arrangement adequate to address the inherent conflicts in the EAR?
6. How can the EAR develop a credible and responsive collective security mechanism?

**Assumptions**

The study has four assumptions. First, the countries within the Eastern Africa region will continue to cooperate with each other at least in the short term on security matters. Secondly, the integration of the East African Community (EAC) will go on smoothly and its success will continue to attract other regional states to join thereby expanding the integration. Thirdly, the current international boundaries will remain as they are and social and economic factors will continue to fuel disagreements on boundary disputes. Fourth, states within the region will seldom solve disputes amicably and the possibility of military confrontation will remain.
Definitions

**Act:** Act means the constitutive act of the African Union as expressed in Article 1 of the AU act signed in Lome Togo, on 11 July 2000 (AU 2000).

**Aggression:** Aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the UN, as set out in this definition (UN 1985).

**Aggressor:** An aggressor, as used in this study, means that state which is the first to declare war upon another state, invade another state’s territory, attack another countries land, naval or air forces, blockades the coast of another state or provides support or fails to deprive assistance to armed bands which have invaded another state (UN 1985).

**Assembly:** Assembly means the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Eastern Africa Region (AU 2000).

**Authority:** Authority means the Authority of Heads of States and Governments of the Eastern Africa Region (AU 2000).

**Collective Security:** Collective security, as used in this research, is the combined use of the international community’s coercive capability to combat illegal use of force in situations that threaten international peace and security (Ibrahim 2008).

**Conflict:** Conflict, in this research, refers to any situation in which two or more social entities or parties, perceiving that they possess mutually incompatible goals, resort to violence or threat to violence affecting one another (Engel 2005).

**Eastern African Region:** As used in this research, Eastern African Region means the region occupied by the fourteen states that form the Eastern Africa Region, namely
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and, as of July 9, 2011, the newly-independent Republic of South-Sudan.

**Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD):** The Intergovernmental Authority on Development is the successor organization to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), created in 1986 by six drought-stricken East African countries to coordinate development in the Horn of Africa. IGAD’s headquarters are in Djibouti. IGAD is engaged in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and humanitarian affairs; infrastructure development and food security and environment protection. IGAD seeks to foster regional security and sustain economic development in the Horn of Africa region.

**International Community:** The international community is any association of distinct political communities, which accept some common values, rules and institutions (Baylis 2008, 39).

**Inter-State War:** Inter-state war as used in this study means that war in which a territorial state that qualifies as a member of the interstate/international system is engaged in a war with another system member (Orend 2005, 1).

**Member States:** Member state refers to member states of the Eastern Africa Region as defined earlier.

**Security:** Security in this research refers to a condition that is devoid of and assures freedom from danger and risk.

**Self Defense:** As used in this study, self-defense refers to the right to the legitimate use of military force against another state in resistance to an act of aggression,
or action to assist a state, subjected to aggression as prescribed in article 51 of the UN charter. Such an action shall not constitute a war of aggression (UN 1985).

**Summit:** Summit refers to the meeting by the heads of states and government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member countries.

**Terrorism:** Is the use of indiscriminate violence to intimidate the general majority of people in a state, to accept the changes advocated by the terrorists. The essence of terrorism is to kill or injure opponents in ways specifically designed to cause fear and, thus, to disorganize the opposing society to a degree far out of proportion to the number of victims (Adan 2007).

**War:** War is an actual, intentional and widespread state of armed conflict between political communities, countries or different groups within a country. War is a phenomenon that occurs only between political communities, defined as those entities that either are states or intend to become states (Orend 2005, 1).

**Limitations**

Many scholars have written books and articles on the concept of collective security in general especially as it regards to the League of Nations (LoN) and the UN. However, the focus on the EAR has been minimal. Because of the political and social changes currently going on in EAR, most of the official documents in use are still in draft form. As a result, this research will rely on some documents that are still in draft form, most of which form the primary data. Further, the research will rely on interviews with people who are currently involved in the AMISOM mission in Somalia who are yet to publish their work. The other limitations are that, because of time constraints, enough
data might not be available and that the region has not extensively embraced the concept of collective security.

**Delimitation**

Based on the three case studies, the research will focus on the concept of collective security within the Eastern Africa Region. The research will only focus on interstate conflict and will also examine the international community’s response to the wars in the three case studies and determine their effectiveness. The study will not address civil wars and cold war. By definition, civil wars are a special type of war characterized by action within the confines of state boundaries. They have their own set of causes as well as overlapping with those discussed in this study. Likewise, the time available for the study is limited, therefore the researcher might not be able to make an in-depth analysis of all the relevant issues.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Chapter 1 of this thesis covered an introductory part of the general background of the collective security mechanism in the EAR. It defined the area covered by the region and traced the origin and the development of the AU, ASF and EASBRIG. It also defined the key terms used throughout this study.

This chapter will review and discuss relevant available literature related to the key research question of this study. It will focus on the key concepts of security, state security and collective security, including its origin and development. The chapter will also discuss the successes and failures of collective security in the world.

The world is in a perpetual state of conflict triggering a never-ending debate on how to prevent related catastrophes and mitigate their effects when they happen. The international community has endeavored to put in place various mechanisms to address security related challenges facing the world over a long time. Likewise, the EAR countries have made numerous efforts to create a common infrastructure to address the security challenges within the region. Consequently, this area has motivated much analysis by scholars both within and outside the region. The scholarly literature focuses on both continental and international threats to state security and the mechanisms to address the threats and the challenges such mechanisms face. This study seeks to analyze the prospects for collective security in the EAR by examining the related literature with a view to providing possible solutions to the research question. This chapter will review literature that relates to the concept of state security, the concept collective security and
its challenges. The study will present the information reviewed in three categories namely:

1. Theories of war and integration
2. Concept of security and collective security
3. Successes and challenges of collective security mechanisms

**Theories of War and Integration**

Admittedly, the nation state remains the center of interaction in world politics. For an entity to qualify for recognition as a state, it has to meet the defining characteristics that include presence of territory with recognized international boundary, sovereignty, legitimacy as drawn from the population, and a government bureaucracy (Drogus and Orvis 2012). The state is the collective will of its people from where it derives legitimacy to exercise authority within its borders. In addition, the state possesses the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within the territorial boundaries (Baylis 2008). For thorough understanding of states interactions within the international system, it is essential to examine the theories through which the system operates.

The theory of realism, as advocated by writers like Hans J. Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr among others, contend that the international environment lacks a central authority to oversee the activities of states, making it anarchic with no central authority. Equally, the system lacks morality with the rule of the jungle prevailing. Accordingly, realists argue that being the principle actor in the chaotic international arena, the state acts in a system where war is a legitimate instrument of diplomacy; where the international system cannot guarantee the security of an individual state thereby putting its existence perpetually at risk (Baylis 2005). Consequently, the core national
interest of any state, small or large, is survival and to that end, it must pursue power or protection from a more powerful nation like in the case of the US and Canada. The state therefore will survive only if it is able to guarantee its security, which is a precondition for the establishment of the civil society and will certainly strive to seek power in order to protect itself (Baylis 2008).

The said phenomenon leads states into an irreconcilable state of uncertainty about intentions and military capacities of their neighbors (who are potential enemies) leading to a security dilemma. At the core of the security dilemma is fear and mistrust among states, with a resultant effect of continued military buildup by states in pursuit of their survival, making war more likely (Baylis 2005). This theory partly helps explain some of the causes of wars that have engulfed the African continent and the world.

Whereas there is some agreement that realists have significantly explained the world phenomenon, liberalists think otherwise. Liberalists, like Keneth Kartzs, argue that states are characteristically different with some prone to war and others peaceful. Further, the international system accords states certain natural rights, like nonintervention, in their domestic affairs. Although liberalists and realists agree that war is a cyclical phenomenon, liberalists see a different reason as the cause of war. According to Waltz, the undemocratic nature of international politics, especially foreign policy, and the balance of power are the causes of war. Waltz further argues that open governance systems that are sensitive to public opinion and collective security can help prevent conflict and war (Schneider 1960).

To liberalists, humans are rational beings and believe that there is the possibility of erasing war from human experience. Morality, according to liberalists, is the core
value of human existence and abolishing war will represent a milestone in the growth of human morals. Liberalists also argue that a system where independent countries pool their resources together, and even partly surrender their sovereignty for the regional good, can best solve regional problems. Accordingly, states can interact through cooperation based on ethics, which exhibits a balance of institutionalized power. In this case, the idea of collective security would require the international community to wield most powers and responsibility to uphold world peace and security through maintaining the muscle and authority to confront an aggressor (Burchill 2001). Therefore, it is clear that liberalism only works well when the members are mature and enlightened democracies.

Consequently, when a state directs actions considered threatening against another state, the members of the international community have an obligation to act together to stop the aggressor and in the process establish security in the international system. Similarly, they consider the concept of “all for one, one for all” as an effective means to ward off potential aggressors through acting together to force restraint by the aggressor, put an immediate stop on their illegal actions and sound a warning and opposition to unlawful behavior (Mingst 2008). The study will make use of the two theories of realism and liberalism throughout the research.

**Concept of Security and Collective Security**

The concept of security is the foundation on which states and the international community in general depend for their survival. According to a paper published by Ulusoy, the concept of security is about preservation of the existence of states (Ulusoy 2012). The concepts take different forms including the balance of power, deterrence, peaceful coexistence and collective security. Different countries have sought ways to
develop policies to promote security such as disarmaments, arms limitations and the maintenance of lethal military capabilities, among others (UN 2006). This study will focus on collective security among sovereign states. Writers have also used the term collective security to define a couple of phenomena ranging from a country’s alliances to regional and international organizations. This is due to the wide range and nature of security threats that face the world. States usually face common security threats by virtue of their common geographical location, common interests or other factors. George Schwarzeberger defined collective security as machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order, or collective measures for dealing with a threat to peace (Swarzenberger 1964). A. K. Chaturvedi defined the concept of collective security as “an arrangement arrived at by some nations to protect their vital interests, safety or integrity, against a probable threat or menace over a particular period, by means of combining their powers” (Ebegbulem 2011, 23). According to Ibrahim, collective security is “the combined use of the international community’s coercive capability to combat the illegal use of force in situations that threaten international peace and security” (Ibrahim 2008, 9).

Accordingly, the concept relies on a dominant military power by an alliance or the international community to such a level that deters aggressors, and a capacity to retaliate decisively if deterrence fails. It calls for the management of the world military power by the global organization to create order, control the behavior of states, and minimize threats to security. In this organization, all states would consider a threat to the security of one state as a threat to their own security and therefore act collectively to defeat the aggressor (Ebegbulem 2011). Therefore, the founding of the LoN and later the UN was
on the basis of the concept of collective security whose principle states: “that member states would take a threat or attack on one member as an assault on all of them” (Mwagwambi 2012).

The concept of collective security is arguably as old as the international society. The Amphictyonic League, which obligated the Greek city states not to destroy any city or cut off streams belonging to the Amphictyons in both war and peace, and undertook to march against any society that would fail the obligation, points to some form of collectiveness (Ulusoy 2012). The modern international society developed over a number of centuries, with the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 being a significant event towards the establishment of the modern state in Europe, and later in the entire world. The modern international society exists based on the principles of sovereignty, nonintervention, balance of power, institutions of diplomacy and the provisions of international law, though some scholars have argued that sovereignty, as it was in the 18th century, was a philosophy of the wealthy to pursue their selfish interests (Baylis 2008). However, the effects of the French and the American revolutions partly altered the system. The notion of sovereignty became an idea conferred on the nation as opposed to the rulers. In response, the great powers created the Concert of Europe to maintain the balance of power and to protect themselves against revolutions. According to Ulusoy, the first, longest lasting, and most successful historical attempt at collective security was the Concert of Europe that states formed after the Napoleonic wars. The European great powers agreed to take collective action against threats to peace, an act that is argued to have helped prevent a great-power war from 1815 to 1854 (Ulusoy 2012). Whereas the Concert of Europe was partially successful as a forum for cooperation of the Europeans,
some of its ingredients, like the balance of power, were to blame for World War I. Under the concert, the international society in Europe represented a club of great powers that was more or less a case of joint hegemony (Baylis 2008). World War I technically sent the Concert of Europe into obliviousness. By the end of the war, other powers, namely the US and Japan, had emerged.

The cost of World War I in both human life and destruction of property was so devastating that the international community regarded war as a primary evil. Its physical consequences negatively affected civilization and created doubt on human progress. Many felt that the world needed to forbid war and in the process created an international body whose only role would be to maintain global peace and security through sorting out international disputes as and when they occurred. The creation of the LoN in 1919 is arguably the first all-inclusive attempt to construct a formal structural basis for the international society to preserve global peace and security (Baylis 2008). Unlike the Concert of Europe, the League drew its membership from the whole world and based its idea on the concept of collective security and not the balance of power. The role of the new organization was to ensure that war never occurred again. However, due to its inherent weaknesses, the League failed to prevent the outbreak of the World War II leading to its dissolution and subsequent establishment of the UN.

The role of the UN, among others, is to preserve international peace and security, through collective measures to prevent and remove threats to peace, and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches to peace. In addition, the organization endeavors to ensure the peaceful settlement of international disputes and uphold justice and international law. To that end, the organization serves as the center for the harmonization
of regional and global actions in the attainment of the common ends. The UN Charter provides for regional organizations to address local disputes before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can involve other members. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter specifically states that; “Regional organizations shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes before referring such disputes to the United Nations Security Council” (UN 1985).

Based on this provision, regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the AU, the EAC and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have undertaken to establish competencies to manage local security and settle conflicts and disputes within their regions in a collective manner. The UN is therefore the basis of the current concept of collective security in the world. The heart of the concept of collective security, as used in this study, is on a global pledge to international peace and security undertaken as a legal obligation of all states. The establishment of the UN formed the first attempt to institutionalize international law and order in furtherance of global peace and security. Acting together, the international community pledged to devote their resources to confront any act of aggression of a nation by another (UN 1986). Undoubtedly, it is clear that the structures of collective security developed over a long period, precipitated by the devastations that engulfed the world from the thirty years war through World War II.

According to Organski, collective security requires that all members move against the aggressor: “All against one.” The principles of this concept are that a skewed distribution of power, with defenders stronger than the aggressors, will support peace. However, equal distribution of power will mean war but the aggressor will be weaker
than the coalition. Further, they argue that if the aggressor were able to compromise protectors of small nations, the same would increase the chances of war. Yet, a prescription of collective security would certainly defeat the aggressor (Organski 1980). Accordingly, the desire to prevent or defeat aggression is the factor that motivates the proponents of collective security. For the successful application of concept, the principle requirements are: the ability of the members of the alliance to reach an agreement on the state culpable of aggression and the ability and willingness of the member states to contribute effectively against the aggressor. In addition, the member states must exhibit commitment in the same way to coerce and restrain the aggression regardless of its source, and the collective will of the alliance with their associated military force will be adequate to subdue the aggressor. Finally, on the face of the collective might of the alliance, the aggressor will either revise its policies or, if reluctant, face the inevitable defeat (Organski 1958).

Claude concludes that collective security relies on the premise that the deterrent effects of states with overwhelming power, whose coherence is a certainty for victory, can prevent war. The commitment to the value of world peace should be unwavering as the international society is so interdependent that a threat to peace and security anywhere threatens security of the entire society. This concept discourages individualism and obligates the states to its requirement for the ideal situation, which is devotion to the international community. Claude further argues that states must have confidence in the collective security mechanism that is essential for them to entrust their security on the mechanism. He identifies three conditions that are a prerequisite for a collective security environment. First is a world with substantial distribution of power with states controlling
equal resources and devoid of concentration of power in a few states. Secondly, the system requires a worldwide membership. Because of the complex nature of the international system and the convergence of interests, all states are potential aggressors. Therefore, exclusion of potential aggressors or states with powerful economies or militaries will make it difficult to work. This is because collective security assumes that economic sanctions will be sufficient to deter aggression and their application must be by all when need be. Thirdly, the system rationalizes a mobile hegemon (predominant power) that is capable of defending any victim of aggression anywhere. This places the preponderance of power at the helm of the international community, a condition that assures the potential victims of the certainty of protection and secures the freedom of the international community by guaranteeing global security. This means that in a situation where no state possesses comparatively sizable power to challenge that of a combination of collective states, then the situation is ripe for a collective security mechanism. On the other hand, if the opposite is true, then collective security will be a pipedream (Claude 1971).

Failures of Collective Security Mechanism

Collective security mechanisms have faced serious challenges from the onset. The LoN was a total failure as an instrument for collective security. According to Claude, collective security requires membership of the entire system and the exclusion of states, especially those with powerful economies and strong militaries reduces its chances of success (Claude 1971). According to Baylis, the experience of the League was a tragedy; for reasons of self-interests, powerful states remained out of the system. For instance, the decision by the US to remain outside the same system it had founded, and that of the
Soviet Union to ignore its membership spelt doom for the body from the inception
(Baylis 2010). It is of no surprise then that the League was not effective. In addition, the
combined open defiance of Japan, Italy and Germany diminished any hopes of the
League’s effectiveness as a collective security body in the international system.
Consequently, the failure to prevent the outbreak of the World War II displayed a total
failure and sealed its fate (Ebegbulem 2011).

Under the concept of collective security, the UN is the universal body that
possesses the monopoly of the authority to sanction use of force in the world. The UN
charter article 2 (4) prohibits use of force in the settlement of disputes except in three
situations. First, under article 53 where the charter authorizes use of force against an
enemy state defined by the same article as “any state which during the Second World
War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter” (UN 1985), where such
a state shows signs of renewal of aggressive policy. Second, under article 51, the charter
recognizes the inherent right of an individual state or alliance to take measures necessary
for self-defense in the event of an attack occurring against a member of the UN until the
Security Council takes measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Third, “an action by the UNSC to restore or maintain international peace and security as
provided for under chapter VII of the Charter” (UN 1985).

The first situation appears to have been superseded by events as most of those
states considered “enemy state” have since become members of the UN. The right to self-
defense only applies and is only legally acceptable when an armed attack has occurred
and requires that the state concerned to inform the Security Council immediately. The
mandate by the UN to use force under Chapter VII obligates member states to provide the
necessary military forces for that purpose. The UN, as the mother and the umbrella body of the collective security mechanisms, has faced a number of challenges in the maintenance of international peace and security. The presence of the five countries with veto powers in the Security Council, the unilateral actions by powerful states coupled with the inability of the UN to stop them, and the unwillingness of member states to entrust their security on the system have proved a big challenge to the authority of the UN. In addition, poor funding of regional mechanisms, inadequate resourcing of peacekeeping missions, interoperability difficulties and non-cooperation of countries due to individual state interests have not done the system any good.

Collective security as a concept requires states to compromise their self-interests and regard themselves as partners in an international society interested in maintaining peace and security everywhere. However, the principle of veto power conferred upon the five permanent members of the Security Council inhibits the freedom of the UNSC in its ability to function as the custodian of authority for the use of force. According to Ebegbulem, having the responsibility of the world peace that rests on the nations with the preponderance of military and economic power means that they can easily turn it into a club of few hegemons who will base their decisions to intervene or not on their interests as opposed to the collective will of the international community. For instance, critics of the UN argue that the UNSC authorized the 1950 collective action against North Korea because at the time, the Soviet Union’s delegate was boycotting the deliberations of the UNSC. Wolfers argued that the Soviet Union would have probably vetoed any military action against North Korea due to its ideological orientation and national interests. He further asserts that the desire by the US to subdue its sworn enemy motivated the
intervention in North Korea and was not a commitment to deter aggression everywhere, as is the principle of collective security (Ebegbulem 2011). Additionally, the unilateral actions by countries with veto powers against countries they perceive as threats to international peace and security, in total disregard of the UNSC, undermines the very principle that founded the UN and creates apprehension among weaker members. The fact that countries with veto powers can override decisions of the council brings its authority into sharp focus and subsequently renders it impotent.

Equally, loyalty to other powerful regional mechanisms has done a lot of harm to the credibility of the UN as the ultimate collective security body. In instances where vital interests are at stake, history has shown a tendency by members of the UN abandoning the principles of the UN in favor of regional organizations. During the 1999 NATO bombing of the Yugoslav republic, the organization disobeyed, and bypassed the UNSC. Likewise during the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq in 2003, a coalition led by the US and the UK disregarded the UNSC after failing to secure a mandate. Such unilateral actions by the veto wielding states casts doubt on the integrity and the collectiveness of the UN.

Additionally, unwillingness by the members to entrust their individual interests and survival to the collective security is a great challenge to the system. According to Mearscheimer, states live in a state of perpetual suspicions with little reason to dispel fears and totally build faith in each other, partly because any state is a potential aggressor. Accordingly, weaker states that ignore individual power and seek protection are more likely to bargain at a disadvantage in the event of aggression. The conceivable consequence of falling victim to aggression pushes states to seek power and prepare for
war as a first priority. Consequently, governments will tend to look at a conflict in terms of their individual interests and are likely to act not according to the UN, but in a manner that protects their principal interests, which are survival as well as other lesser national interests (Mearscheimer 2000).

Likewise, the system of authorizing the use of force by the UNSC is such a bureaucratic system that some states feel it is not effective to enforce global security or is not representative enough. For instance, during the crisis in Kosovo in 1998/99, the UNSC passed resolution 1160 on 31 March 1998 calling for dialogue and arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. Six months later, the UNSC voted on resolution 1199 declaring the situation in Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security, and demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities. As the UN was demanding for a cessation of hostilities, fighting continued and more people were losing their lives and refugees soaring. The January 15, 1999 massacre of Kosovar civilians in the village of Racak, though condemned, did not trigger any UN military action. The events that followed led NATO into a unilateral decision to take action against the Yugoslav Republic that later forced its leadership into a peace scheme. Ironically, around the time the air bombings were on going, some members of UNSC were condemning the action (Neuhold 2000). The UNSC first discussed the issue in March 1998; a year later fighting was still on going. The action by NATO ended the fighting within three months.

According to Allain, NATO acted because the body felt that there was the perpetuation of a humanitarian catastrophe that was a threat to peace and security, and a UNSC resolution authorizing intervention was unlikely thereby raising doubt on the effectiveness of the UN. Whereas many critics agree that the actions by NATO went
against international law, they also agree that it was morally justified. The Independent
International Commission on Kosovo concluded that the NATO actions in Kosovo were
illegal but legitimate (International Commision on Kosovo 2006). The UN’s inability to
stop states from using force without authorization creates a credibility crisis on its part.
After the experiences in Yugoslavia, Kirkpatrick in an article “The Failure of Collective
Security” concluded the following:

That collective security does not exist in Europe. That U.N. (sic) membership
cannot be regarded as a reliable guarantor of European security; that global
institutions cannot necessarily provide solutions to regional problems and that
diplomacy may not be able to discourage aggression whether or not that
diplomacy is directed from the UN. In addition, “peacekeeping” is not an
adequate response to the determined use of military force; that the “peacekeeping”
rules of engagement may make “peacekeeper” hostage without deterring the
aggressors or assisting the victims, and that force is often necessary to repel force.
(Kirkpatrick 1993)

The UN charter recognizes and encourages the establishment of regional
collective security mechanisms and seeks to utilize such regional arrangements or
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. The UN, however, put a caveat on
the regional organizations that they shall not take any enforcement action under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the UNSC. In addition,
the charter still requires that where authority has been granted, “the Security Council
shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken, or in contemplation,”
under regional arrangements or by regional mechanisms in the maintenance of
international peace and security (UN 1985).

After the end of the cold war, the African continent lost the geopolitical
importance that it had enjoyed during the cold wars’ bipolar world. Consequently,
African countries developed close cooperation in order to enhance economic
development and continental peace and security. As part of the ASF, the regional organizations developed security initiatives and structures to that end. The African states within the five regions of the continent established structures to manage their collective security and ensure regional peace and security. These structures form the basis of the ASF at the regional level and are in the process of transforming into regional standby brigades (Magosi 2007). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have made much progress in the implementation of security and conflict resolution initiatives.

The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is one of the few mechanisms that have been active. The member states established ECOWAS in 1975 as an economic integration for West African states, however, on realization that security was paramount for the realization of its objectives, created the peace and Security Council (PSC) that in turn created ECOMOG. ECOMOG has faced various legal, institutional, logistical and operational challenges, which are common to most of the regional organizations in their efforts to maintain regional security. According to Magosi, political differences, economic inequalities between member countries, individual national interests and problems of interoperability, due to colonial legacies, are a hindrance to the realization of firm regional organizations. In addition, the lack of sufficient funding, poor logistics and inadequate equipment are a challenge to its operations (Magosi 2007). One of the greatest challenges is the agreement on what constitutes a threat to security and what mandate is possible and agreeable. For instance, the ECOWAS protocol contains loopholes that could authorize the body to act outside UN authorizations. In the Liberian and Sierra Leone conflicts, ECOMOG and the UN could not agree on the mandate and
subsequently, ECOMOG unilaterally took action to enforce peace against rebel factions without UN authorization, the legitimacy of the action not withstanding (Ibrahim 2008). Additionally, the lack of critical equipment and weaponry coupled with poor logistic support for some contingents and insufficient resources to handle humanitarian crisis requirements were a hindrance to mission success. Due to a scarcity of funds, and lack of support mechanism, Nigeria contributed the biggest share but also manipulated the mission to advance its national interests (Magosi 2007).

Despite the many challenges facing the collective security paradigm, the decline in cases of interstate conflicts in the post WWII period is attributable to the exercise of the veto powers, by the great powers specifically the US and the USSR and more recently China as well as their hegemonic maintenance of a bipolar world order. Regardless of the fact that the super powers used the veto in pursuance of their own interests, they transformed the world from a place of perpetual war to a place of dialogue (Gebresilassie 2012). Equally, the concept of collective security has succeeded in enforcing the will of the international community in a number of cases. Following the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950, the UN enforcement action proved that the concept of collective security was possible. The success not only reinforced the authority of the UN as the mother of collective security but also helped demonstrate the potency of the collective will of the international community (Ebegbulem 2011). Perhaps the most recent examples of a successful case of collective security is the 1991 Gulf war that liberated Kuwait from Iraq’s invasion and the NATO action in Yugoslav Republic though not authorized by the UN.
Summary

War and conflict is a recurrent phenomenon that has endured over history. States are more likely to go to war when their interests are threatened. The security dilemma that exists within the international system continues to increase the possibility of conflicts resulting in war. The concept of collective security, as an institutionalized mechanism for the maintenance of international peace and security, developed over a long period in reaction to catastrophes that engulfed the world. The concept provides that the alliance must be all-inclusive and strong enough to deter aggression and defeat the aggressor if deterrence fails. The trend of collective security has largely been in line with the interests of the big powers who are the permanent members of the UN who hold the veto power. Various challenges have faced the UN ranging from indecisiveness to unilateral action by the super powers. However, the system has succeeded in reducing tensions among states in the international system thereby underscoring its relevance. Additionally regional security mechanisms remain important to augment the UN efforts in the maintenance of peace and security but they too face structural, legal, logistic and operational challenges.

From the above literature, some common themes that relate to security and the concept of collective security arose. The country’s economic potential and the interests of the great powers seem to influence the direction the concept of collective security take. The ability of the alliance to agree on the aggressor, the commitment of the alliance to defeat aggression and the availability of adequate military force stronger than that of the aggressor will ensure the concept succeeds. Additionally, the distribution of power within the regional or international system will greatly influence the effectiveness of the concept. The presence of hegemons in either regional or global collective security
mechanisms will certainly determine the effectiveness of collective security. The study will utilize these variables in the analysis of the concept of collective security as it relates to the three case studies with a view to recommending ways of making it more effective in preventing and managing conflict in the Eastern Africa region.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter 1 of this thesis covered an introductory part of the general background of the collective security mechanism in the EAR. The chapter further defined the Eastern Africa region and traced the origin and the development of the AU, ASF and EASBRIG. It also defined the key terms used throughout this study.

Chapter 2 reviewed and discussed relevant available literature related to the key research question of this study. The chapter introduced and defined the key concepts of security, state security and collective security. It traced the origin and the development of the concept of collective security, the UN as the highest level actor in collective security and highlighted the successes and failures of collective security in the world.

This chapter outlines the research methodology used during the conduct of this research. The research will use the qualitative methodology using case studies as a way to analyze the concept of collective security. The study focused on three case studies and analyzed the employment of the concept of collective security, its effectiveness and challenges. Using the three case studies, this research analyzed the phenomena of collective security and factors that contributed to success or failure in the effort to achieve international peace and security. The research will base its study on the content analysis of primary and secondary data. The primary sources include official documents, such as the Charter of the UN, AU constitutive act, the constitutive act of the ASF and the protocols establishing the various organs, institutions, and operational procedures for the ASF and EASBRIG. Books, data from journals and publications, magazines,
interviews, and other unpublished sources will form part of the secondary data. In addition, the study will use data obtained from the Combined Arms Research Library, the African Center for Strategic Studies, and the Internet.

Methodology

The overall methodology used for this research is the qualitative methodology using case studies. The purpose of the case studies in this research is to examine the international community’s application of collective security as a concept, with the intent of using the results to assess the prospects of collective security in the EAR. The region, which also includes the Great Lakes Region, suffers from conflicts that are complicated and multi-layered involving multiple actors with varying interests. Numerous conflict management mechanisms exist in the region, however, the potential for conflict remains. For instance, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) was set up against the milieu of the war in DR-Congo (2002-2006), with the assistance of the UN, AU and bilateral donors, to implement the peace security stability and development pact signed by the regional countries in December 2006 (Norad 2009). Others bodies include the EAC, and IGAD.

The case study methodology emphasizes abstract analysis of some degree of events and determines how they relate to each other in a particular period. “Case study, as a methodology, helps explain both the process and outcome of a phenomenon through complete observation, reconstruction and analysis of the cases under investigation” (Zainal 2007, 2). The qualitative research method involves an interpretive and systematic inquiry into meanings. It is the study of things in their natural setting in an explanatory and realistic approach in an attempt to interpret the phenomena as viewed by people, in
order to establish patterns and themes (Ospina 2004). When using a qualitative methodology comprising case studies, at times new variables not considered previously may surface. The new variables, if they arise, can aid a better understanding of the phenomena that may lead to a more conclusive analysis. The qualitative analysis method involves analysis of data such as objects, pictures, artifacts and words, in which case the researcher is the main data gathering tool.

Qualitative research is one of the two major approaches to research methodology in social sciences. Qualitative research involves an in-depth understanding of human behavior and the reasons that govern human behavior. Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research relies on reasons behind various aspects of behavior. Simply put, it investigates the why and how of decision-making, as compared to what, where and when of quantitative research. Hence, the need is for smaller but focused samples, rather than large random samples by which qualitative research categorizes data into patterns as the primary basis for organizing and reporting results. Unlike qualitative research, which relies exclusively on the analysis of numerical or quantifiable data, data for qualitative research comes in many media including text, sound, still and moving images. (Free Report 2012)

Some of the strengths associated with the qualitative research method include the flexibility to follow unexpected ideas during the study and explore processes successfully. The conduct of the research in the natural setting of the subject allows an undisturbed observation within the actual context. The study of multiple data streams in the literature expands the exploration of the phenomena and relevance in the processes increases the credibility of the findings. Further, the method is inductive and involves the synthesis of raw data into themes and categories (Creswell 2007). In the review of literature in this study, common variables will be determined and will form the basis for the analysis of the case studies. In addition, the researcher will conduct interviews with personalities in positions related to the collective security environment. The analysis will inform the research, the validity of the variables and possibly introduce more variables.
Some of the weaknesses associated with this type of research include the perceived lack of rigor. The inherent flexibility of the qualitative method makes researchers sometimes consider it not well defined and creates difficulties in demonstrating rigor (Anderson 2011). The results are therefore subject to scientific challenges lessening their credibility. Additionally, preconceived notions by the researcher can twist the interpretation of the data. A mixture of procedures can help mitigate these weaknesses. In this case, the study is context-specific; the researcher will analyze the data to ascertain its relevance to the research questions and the topic, while at the same time minimize his own partiality to avoid misrepresenting the results (Wiersma 1991).

Analysis

The researcher will follow the five steps for conducting a research as articulated by William Wiersma. First, identification and isolation of the problem and case studies identification. Second, reviewing of available information and determining the factors relevant to state security and the concept of collective security. Third, collection and classification of data and case studies review. Fourth, data analysis and determination of the prospects of collective security as a concept in the EAR. Lastly, the researcher will draw conclusions resulting from the study and make recommendations (Wiersma 1991).

Step 1: Identification and Isolation of the Problem

As indicated earlier in chapter 1, Africa accounts for more border disputes and potential areas of conflict than any other continent in the world. Though often dormant, the underlying causes and grievances are enduring and efforts to settle them have not
been fruitful. Consequently, peace and security have remained one of the greatest challenges to Africa’s development. The result of this condition has manifested itself in lives and property destroyed, human suffering and stunted economic development. The rise of the state system and the need for self-preservation by the states, due to converging interests and risks posed by other states and other security requirements, created the need for collectiveness in dealing with security related issues. The founding of the UN after World War II as the basis for collective security resulted from the realization of the need for global security as a prerequisite for development.

The OAU, though primarily a union based on economic prosperity of the continent, and the eradication of colonialism in Africa realized the need for a security mechanism. Its successor, the AU established the AU PSC in 2002, during the heads of state summit in Durban South Africa, and mandated it to outline the peace and security architecture for Africa. The protocol entered into force in December 2003 and subsequently established the ASF as the collective security mechanism for the continent (Cilliers 2008). Accordingly, the other four regions established regional standby brigades as regional security mechanisms. The AU mandated IGAD to spearhead the formation of the EASBRIG to handle security requirements for the Eastern Africa region. Consequently, the member states signed the draft protocol for the establishment of the EASBRIG in Jinga, Uganda in 2004 (IGAD 2004). Whereas the Eastern Africa region has witnessed four interstate wars in the last 100 years, there is no evidence of intervention by a regional collective security mechanism. The UN intervened in the Ethiopia/Eritrea war after the two sides had agreed and it came in as a peacekeeper as opposed to action against the aggressor. The research intends to examine the collective
security mechanism currently present in the Eastern Africa Region and determine how the region can strengthen it and effectively employ the concept of collective security to prevent war or at least to collectively defeat aggression. The researcher has identified three case studies to analyze in this study; the 1978 Ogaden war, the 1991 Gulf War I, and the 1998 Ethiopia/Eritrea war.

Step 2: Review of Relevant Information

Chapter 2 of this research reviewed the literature that relates to war, security and the concept of collective security. From the literature reviewed, it is clear that the security dilemma that exists in the world continues to increase the possibility of conflict and war thereby underscoring the need for an effective security mechanism at the regional, continental and global level.

In the post WWII era, the UN, as the global collective security mechanism, has both succeeded and failed in the maintenance of international peace and security. The same applies to regional security mechanisms in both Africa and the other regions of the world. The requirements of a successful collective security mechanism and the variables identified in the review of literature on the various possible reasons for success and failure of the collective security architecture will guide the research criteria of this study. The result of the analytical process will contribute to the understanding of the concept of collective security. In addition, the researcher will seek to apply the results in the Eastern Africa Region and suggest ways of strengthening its regional collective security mechanism.
The Concept of Collective Security

The study examined the concept of collective security through the key indicators identified in chapter two, as articulated by Organski, and later Claude. The research analyzed the concept of collective security in terms of its key elements namely; the ability by the alliance to agree on the aggressor, the commitment and desire by the alliance to prevent or defeat aggression, and the distribution of power.

For the concept of collective security to work well, the alliance or coalition must be able to agree on the aggressor in cases of conflict or war. An aggressor is defined as “that state which is the first to declare war upon another state, invade another state’s territory, attack another countries land, naval or air forces, blockades the coast of another state or provides support or fails to deprive assistance to armed bands which have invaded another state” (UN 1985). Sometimes it becomes a challenge for the members of an alliance to agree on who is the aggressor especially where different members of the coalition appear to favor either side, or in cases of preemptive strikes. The concept assumes that the aggressor will be identified easily, has committed a wrong and it anticipates that the international community will act against it. Accordingly, the aggressor must have committed clear offenses against another state, regional or global peace structures and the international security (Pfetsch 2004).

The second key element is the desire and commitment by the alliance to stop the aggressor. Commitment, freedom and ability by all the members of the alliance to contribute effectively against the aggressor characterize this aspect. The commitment by the members will largely depend on their interests in the conflict. Countries whose interests are at stake will more likely be willing to contribute positively in the resolution
of a conflict. At the same time, those with no interest may as well be reluctant to contribute to the cause. Alternatively, there are those spoiler states that see it in their interest to keep the pot stirred up. They are certainly likely to contribute directly or indirectly to see to it that the status quo remains. Additionally, a number of factors affect the success of this key element. Adequacy of equipment and logistics in the alliance, the interoperability of forces and the willingness of members to contribute forces to the alliance influence the effectiveness of the mechanism.

The third key element is the distribution of power. A skewed distribution of power in favor of the alliance and the presence of an adequate military force capable of defeating aggression will either vanquish the aggressor or coerce it to retract its intentions. Alternatively, power that is concentrated in one or a few states risks the concept of collective security in the event such a state becomes the aggressor (Claude 1971). The presence of a hegemon in the international system is likely to alter the balance of power. A hegemon is a country that is dominant by virtue of its military and economic power. The hegemon will either defend the victim state, or influence the collective security mechanism directly or indirectly in favor of its interests. The presence of the five permanent members of the UNSC with veto powers will most likely influence the direction the UN takes in all matters of international security (Ebegbulem 2011).

Step 3: Collection and Classification of Data

The study used two primary methods to answer both the primary and the secondary research questions. The first was to review the available literature to determine the already available information and identify knowledge gaps. The study used both
primary and secondary data to focus on the research questions. The researcher reviewed the data collected in three categories:

1. Theories of war and integration
2. Concept of security and collective security
3. Successes and challenges of collective security mechanisms

The second method of data collection was conducting online interviews with experts currently working at different levels within collective security arena. This method proved significant in gathering opinions and analysis of the concept at different levels.

Step 4: Data Analysis

The basis of the analysis of the prospect for collective security in the Eastern Africa region was the three case studies. First, the Gulf War I triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait seemingly over the control of oil resources. In this case, the concept of collective security worked almost perfectly and managed to defeat the aggressor.

Second, the Ethiopia/Somalia (Ogaden) war fought between 1977 and 1978 over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. In this case, the concept of collective security failed to prevent it but succeeded in defeating aggression though not under the UN. Third, the Ethiopia/Eritrea war fought between 1998 and 1999 over a boundary dispute that originated from the fact that at the time Eritrea became independent, the border was imprecise. In this case, collective security, as a concept, failed to prevent or stop the war until two years later when the UN managed to bring the two countries to a negotiating table and ended the war. This did not however fully settle the issue as Ethiopia still occupies the town of Badme that is still in dispute between the two countries. The three case studies represent three different scenarios; first was a case where the concept of
collective security succeeded completely, second is one that the concept succeeded outside the UN and the third where the concept failed entirely.

Additionally, the study examined the security mechanisms present in the three case studies at that time, how the international community employed or failed to employ the concept, and the reasons why the collective security concept succeeded or failed. The research then weighed the findings against the variables identified during the literature review, and the reasons for success or failure identified in chapter 2, to determine their relationship. The researcher then displayed the analysis of the three case studies in a matrix form indicating the presence or absence of various aspects as identified in step two. The study analyzed the case studies against the aspects of collective security discussed earlier, to determine their presence or absence. The researcher assessed variables using tables summarizing the factors and their sub factors with a YES representing presence of a particular key element and a NO representing absence of it (see table 1).
The researcher used both primary and secondary sources that included official government documents, reports, publications and internet sources to derive data on the three case studies. Further, the researcher conducted online interviews with three personalities currently working in UN headquarters and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The focus of all the interviews was on the operationalization of collective security at different levels and the challenges the mechanisms face. Each interview was executed online in adherence to the Army policies of informed consent in compliance with the federal laws. The researcher used the responses to help determine the effectiveness of the concept of collective security at the different levels and identify strengths and weaknesses, and possible areas of improvement. The result of the analysis of the three case studies helped the researcher to examine the current structures of the regional security mechanism and its ability to provide an effective and credible collective

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<th>Table 1. Assessment of the Aspects of Collective Security</th>
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<td>Indicators</td>
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<td>b. Outright aggression</td>
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<td>Commitment</td>
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<td>a. Willingness by alliance/coalition</td>
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<td>a. Even distribution of power</td>
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<td>b. Presence of Hegemon</td>
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<td>Concept Successful</td>
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*Source: Created by author.*
security mechanism in the Eastern Africa region. The analysis provided an insight on the current state of collective security mechanisms in the region.

Step 5: Drawing of Conclusions and Recommendations

Based on the analysis of the data in step four, the study derived conclusions regarding the concept of collective security within the Eastern Africa region; its challenges, and future prospects. The researcher has recommend structures of an Eastern Africa security mechanism and areas of focus on a possible regional collective security strategy.

Chapters Arrangement

This study is composed of five chapters, each of which covers a specific part of the analytical research conducted. Chapter 1 presented the background of the problem and the background of the Eastern Africa region security mechanism. The chapter also defined the origin and the development of the AU, the confines and countries of the Eastern Africa region and the development of the ASF and EASBRIG. It further defined some key terms frequently used in the study. Chapter 2 covered the literature review. The chapter focused on the definitions of the concept of the state, state security and collective security. The chapter also explored the origin and the development of collective security, and the role of the UN. In addition, the chapter analyzed the successes and failures of the collective security concept. Chapter 3 outlined the research methodology that the study followed and discussed the characteristics of qualitative methodology including strengths and weaknesses. Chapter 4 presented an analysis of the three case studies and related them to the concept of collective security. The chapter also analyzed the variables
identified in chapter two as they relate to the three case studies. In addition, the chapter made an in depth examination of the Africa security mechanism to determine its effectiveness. Chapter 5 will present a summary of the analysis and recommended ways of improving the collective security mechanism and developing an outline of a credible collective security strategy for the Eastern Africa region.

Summary

The study uses a descriptive qualitative methodology to analyze the variables of collective security. The study uses three case studies in the analysis of the variables that relate to collective security, with a view to examining the Eastern Africa regional collective security mechanism. The results helped the researcher evaluate the effectiveness of the current regional collective security arrangement, and subsequently recommend ways of strengthening it.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Despite war being conceivably the most studied and documented phenomenon in human history, it remains one of the most challenging phenomenon for the state, and the international community (Marshall 2002). It therefore follows that state sovereignty and military strategy, as elements of state security, are the priorities of every state as it seeks survival in the current global environment. The security dilemma resulting from such strategies continues to increase the possibilities of war between states. Responsible governments are therefore under an obligation to develop strategies that prevent such occurrences and mitigate their effects when they occur, locally, regionally and internationally. This study seeks to evaluate the prospects of collective security in the EAR with a view to suggesting ways of strengthening the already existing collective security mechanism.

Chapters 1 and 2 provided the background and the debates on the concept of security and collective security. Chapter 3 discussed the qualitative methodology that the researcher used throughout the study. This chapter analyzes the three case studies and the ASF as the continental collective security mechanism. The researcher will present this chapter in four sections as follows:

1. Section 1 will present the case study of Gulf War I and analyze it based on the variables of the application of collective security
2. Section 2 will present the case study of Ethiopia/Eritrea war and analyze it based on the variables of the application of collective security
3. Section 3 will present the case study of the Ogaden war and analyze it based on the variables the application of the collective security

4. Section 4 will examine the effectiveness of the UN and the AU in managing the conflicts within Africa

**Case Study I: Gulf War I**

On August 2, 1990 before dawn, more than 100,000 Iraqi troops backed by tanks and helicopters invaded Kuwait without provocation. Within a few hours, the lead elements of the Iraqi troops had reached Kuwait city waving Iraqi flags and taking up positions. They bombed the sheik’s palace and stormed into the city, seizing control of the central bank and the international airport. The Iraqi government barred thousands of foreigners from leaving Iraq or Kuwait for several days after the invasion. In addition, the Iraqi army took hostage all 367 passengers on board British Airways Flight 149A from London to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, that had stopped in Kuwait International Airport to refuel, to use them as human shields alongside other citizens of western countries present in Kuwait. The Iraqi government declared Kuwait the 19th province of Iraq, renamed it Kadhima and installed a puppet administration, temporarily ending the Kuwaiti government that had fled to Saudi Arabia (Tristam 1990).

The invasion precipitated Gulf War I, which pitted the Iraqi forces against a U.S. led coalition that lasted only six weeks. By the time President Bush declared a ceasefire on February 27, 1991, the coalition forces had ejected Iraqi forces out and restored Kuwait. The war cost over a hundred thousand lives, infrastructure destruction and billions of dollars to all the parties involved.
Background

The conflict between Iraq and Kuwait is as old as the two countries themselves. Throughout the 19th century, what is present day Kuwait existed as a village on the Arabian Gulf as part of Basra province of the modern day Iraq, administratively ruled by the Ottoman Empire. Following the end of World War I, the victors in the war, namely Britain, France and the US, dismantled the Ottoman Empire and took control of the Arab nation. Britain drew an arbitrary border creating the state of Kuwait and declaring it its colony by 1922 (Klein 2003). Succeeding Iraqi administrations never accepted what they referred to as the secession of Kuwait. By 1938, the Iraqi government had made three unsuccessful attempts to restore Kuwait as part of Iraq, and condemned the British policy of encouraging the disintegration of the Arab nation. (El-Najjar 2001).

The declaration of independence of Kuwait on June 19, 1961 precipitated renewed intentions of Iraqi’s annexation of Kuwait, with the Iraqi leader declaring that Iraq considered Kuwait part of Iraq. Despite losing the colony, Britain was readily available to protect Kuwait’s independence. The UN admitted Kuwait in 1963, the same year the Baath party in Iraq staged a coup and overthrew Iraq’s leader, General Qassim, and assassinated him. Following the Baath party’s rise to power, Iraq, through non-formal agreements, was able to access its former islands in the Gulf, though they never demarcated the border between the two states. In 1979, Saddam Hussein became president and within a year waged war against Iran. The war with Iran left the country with a much larger army, estimated to be a million strong, but also with huge debts and a collapsing economy (Klein 2003). Figure 3 shows the map of Iraq Kuwait border.
Prelude to Invasion

During the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait provided extensive support to Iraq, in the form of loans, and allowed Iraq to use its territory as depth, with fighters and bombers launching from Al-Ahmadi Air Base. In addition, Kuwait authorized the building of a pipeline through Kuwait to carry Iraqi oil to the Red Sea port of Yanbu in Saudi Arabia.


Kuwait’s attempt to negotiate a demarcation of the border with the Iraqi authorities following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war failed. At the same time, Kuwait was pressing Iraq to repay the loans that it had extended during the war. However, Iraq maintained that the war with Iran was to protect all the Gulf States against the Ayatollahs and expected them to write off the loans. Further, Iraq accused Kuwait of destabilizing the oil prices by producing oil beyond the OPEC agreed quotas, and stealing its oil from
the Rumaila oil field at the border. On July 20, 1990, Iraq started amassing troops at the border with Kuwait. By the end of the month, Iraq had assembled more than 100,000 troops at the border, a move interpreted by the neighbors as an act to coerce Kuwait to adhere to the quotas. At a summit in Amman in 1990, Saddam Hussein presented four demands for Kuwait: “abiding by OPEC quotas, ceding the southern part of the border including Rumaila oilfield, writing off of the war debt and compensation for oil market losses as a result of the oil price decline to the tune of 30 billion dollars” (El-Najjar 2001). In spite of efforts by the Arab states to diffuse the tension between the two states, they never reached an agreement. The military buildup continued and on August 2, 1990, it happened. The Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and quickly gained control of the entire country with minimum resistance from the Kuwaiti security forces.

Response by the Regional Organizations

Two intergovernmental bodies that could have intervened in the crisis existed at the time of the invasion, of which both countries were members; the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the League of Arab States.

OPEC is an intergovernmental organization established in September 1960, with membership spread across North and West Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Its main role is the harmonization of oil policies by member countries to safeguard stable revenue for oil producing nations and price stability in the world oil market (OPEC 2003). Consequently, the body possessed no mandate to intervene in the crisis except mediation. OPEC members tried to mediate the Iraqi-Kuwait dispute before the Invasion, but to no avail. The July 27, 1990 OPEC meeting deliberated on the issue and urged Kuwait to abide by OPEC quotas, an issue that was one of the demands by Iraq. In
addition, OPEC members prevailed upon the two sides to hold face-to-face talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The talks failed to resolve the dispute (El-Najjar 2001).

The League of the Arab states is an intergovernmental organization of the independent Arab states formed in 1945. Its role revolves around coordination of policies of the member states in order to strengthen their relations and safeguard their independence and sovereignty. The League prohibits the use of force in the settlement of disputes between member states and, pursuant to Article VI of the Charter of the League of Arab States, empowers the Council of the League of Arab States to determine the measures necessary to defeat aggression if it occurs (League of Arab States 1945). By virtue of being the regional body, the League of Arab States had an obligation to take immediate action against Iraq’s aggression in line with Article VI of the charter.

Surprisingly, the league failed even to convene an emergency meeting in order to deliberate on the situation. Some states issued statements individually condemning the invasion and calling on Iraq to reverse the case. The emergency meeting did not happen until August 9, 1990 in Cairo Egypt. However, divisions and insults characterized it. At the end of the day, twelve states voted in favor of resolutions condemning the invasion and demanding Iraqi withdrawal, others either opposed, abstained or expressed reservations (Barnett 1998). Accordingly, with the divisions and disorder, the ability of the league to resolve the crisis was in doubt.

Response by the International Community

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait violated Article 2 of the Charter of the UN. The UNSC carries the mandate to ensure protection of its members against threats to peace and security. As such, it is responsible and obliged to take all necessary measures to
ensure peace and security prevails in the international system (UN 1985). On the day of the invasion, Kuwait’s representative to the UN wrote a letter to the UNSC requesting an immediate meeting of the council to deliberate on the situation. At the end of the deliberations, the council adopted draft resolution 660 condemning the invasion and demanding an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait (UN 1991). A series of UN resolutions followed demanding withdrawal, imposing sanctions and eventually authorizing use of force to restore Kuwait.

Building the Coalition

In the life of a nation, we are called upon to define who we are and what we believe. Sometimes these choices are not easy. But today as President, I ask for your support in a decision I've made to stand up for what's right and condemn what's wrong, all in the cause of peace. (Bush 1990)

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait precipitated a response by both the UN and the US. The US president called for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces in Kuwait and rebuffed attempts by Iraq to negotiate a withdrawal. On August 7, 1990, five days after the invasion, President George H.W. Bush directed the deployment of US troops into Saudi Arabia to protect its oilfields against what America believed were preparations by Iraq to invade Saudi Arabia. The military buildup of Operation Desert Shield continued and by the time of launch of Operation Desert Storm, the US had massed over 500,000 troops in Saudi Arabia. On August 20, 1990, President Bush signed National Security Directive 45 that contained the US policy in response to the events in the Gulf, outlining US objectives. Among the objectives were; “immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait,” and the “restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government” (Richelson 2001).
On November 29, 1990, the UNSC set the date of January 15, 1991 as the deadline for Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait, and failing to do so, the international community would use force to restore Kuwait to the pre-conflict status. The US led a coalition of more than 30 countries drawn from all over the world who contributed troops and logistics in the operation to restore Kuwait. The coalition deployed over a million troops with the US alone contributing over 70 percent of both troops and equipment. The coalition forces began with a massive air campaign on January 18, 1991, to destroy Iraq's forces, military and civil infrastructure in both Iraq and Kuwait in order to break their will to resist. In a desperate attempt to draw Israel into the war and possibly arouse the Arab nationalism, Iraq launched scud missiles against civilian targets in Israel and called for terrorist attacks against the coalition forces. It also launched scud missiles at Saudi Arabia in an attempt to break the coalition. The ground offensive began on February 24, 1991, lasting only 100 hours, evicting the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and restoring the pre-conflict status quo. President George H. W. Bush declared a ceasefire on February 28, 1991 ending the war (Estes 2006). Gulf War I was an example of a situation where the international community was able to stand up against aggression and, as such, a good case study of collective security succeeding.

Analysis of the Application of Collective Security

At the time of invasion, Iraq had the largest army in the region, against the small and ill-equipped armed forces of Kuwait. The invasion turned into a dash and within a day, Iraq had annexed Kuwait. Were it not for the intervention of the international community, the sovereignty of Kuwait would have been lost. This study seeks to analyze the international community’s application of the collective security concept in this case
study, based on the key elements identified in chapter two namely; agreed aggressor, commitment by the members, and distribution of power including presence and adequacy of the military force.

**Agreed Aggressor**

The actions of Iraq of invading Kuwait and installing a puppet regime and later declaring it the 19th province triggered Gulf War I. The UN definition of an aggressor is “that state which is the first to declare war upon another state, invade another state’s territory, attack another country’s land, naval or air forces, blockades the coast of another state or provides support or fails to deprive assistance to armed bands which have invaded another state (UN 1985). On August 2 1990, Kuwait was a sovereign state, recognized by the international community, and was a member of the UN. Kuwait at the time did not have troops in Iraq and therefore the actions of Iraqi forces of crossing the border first and taking control of Kuwait amounted to aggression. Equally, the free dictionary defines preemption as a surprise attack launched by a state against its enemy (another state) in order to prevent the enemy from attacking it (Free Dictionary 2012). At the time of the invasion, there was no evidence of Kuwait harboring any intentions of invading Iraq. Therefore, the case of preemption could not arise. Consequently, the case of Iraq’s actions against Kuwait was outright aggression, as was declared by the international community, including the League of Arab States. Finally, based on the definitions and the statements by individual states and the deliberations at the UN, there was an agreement that Iraq was the aggressor. Accordingly, the evaluation for this variable is yes (see table 2).
Commitment by the Coalition Members

The commitment and willingness of the members of an alliance largely depend on their interests in the conflict. For the Arab League, the conflict was a catastrophe. However, whereas allowing Iraq to invade Kuwait was courting disaster, the issue of Arab nationalism appeared in play. Some countries opposed the intervention by western militaries for fear of a charge of collaborating with western governments against a fellow Arab-Muslim state. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) opposed the intervention on the basis that its issue with Israel is put on the agenda, a case that Saddam used as a condition for withdrawal. Eventually, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria formed the bulk of the Arab troop’s contribution to the effort, probably because they viewed Iraq as a regional threat and therefore taming it was in their interests. The League of Arab States failed entirely in its role as the regional collective security mechanism. Moreover, the league could not even agree on the way forward, seemingly due to countries’ stakes, as articulated by President Mubarak: “At the summit, we trade accusations and curses without reaching any results” (Barnett 1998, 4). At the UNSC, a majority of the members agreed on the need to use force against Iraqi aggression. The draft UNSC resolution 678, that authorized the coalition to use force to restore Kuwait sailed through the vote with 12 votes in favor, 2 against (Yemen and Cuba) with China abstaining (UN 1991). In addition, more than 30 countries pledged to contribute to the war, out of which 29 made troop contributions initially. Equally, the retaining of the homogeneity of the forces from different countries that formed the coalition, and giving specific tasks for units as a whole as opposed to breaking them and integrating them into other countries mitigated the interoperability challenges. Similarly, the coalition managed to assemble sufficient
logistics to support the operation. The campaign succeeded courtesy of the level of cooperation witnessed at the UNSC, the willingness and actual troop contributions by the coalition members and the ability of the troops to operate together. The success of the entire campaign is a testimony of the commitment by the members of the coalition. This case study is a good example of a case where the regional collective security mechanism failed miserably. The case equally demonstrates an instance where the collective security concept by the international community succeeded. The assessment of the presence of the variable of commitment is therefore yes.

Distribution of Power

The distribution of economic and military power is a key determinant of how things shape a conflict. The presence of a country with the preponderance of economic and military power (hegemon) is likely to influence the outcome of any conflict. In this case, the Iraqi armed forces were no match for the coalition forces in terms of professionalism, equipment, logistics and training. Additionally, the US possessed the preponderance of both economic and military might, and leveraged its hegemonic tendencies to influence other members to join the coalition. Out of the forces contributed by the coalition members, the US alone accounted for approximately 70 percent. This tilted the distribution of power in favor of the coalition. Gulf War I exhibited a war between an aggressor and a coalition whose military might it could not match. The coalition assembled a force that was adequate to defeat the aggressor. Certainly, the involvement of the US is what made success possible. Considering that it contributed 70 percent of the troops and resources, it is correct to argue that, the coalition would not have had sufficient military force had the US not contributed its share. Accordingly, this
is a case where the distribution of power was uneven favoring the coalition, there was presence of a hegemon in the name of the US and together the coalition assembled adequate military force against the aggressor.

Summary

The actions of Iraq invading Kuwait, a sovereign state on August 2, 1990 triggered Gulf War I. The cause of the conflict dates back to the era of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent actions of the colonial masters. The events succeeding the independence, nationalism and the leadership character are also evident as contributors to the war. Accordingly, the study finds the case study as a successful example of collective security under the international community. This was made possible by the coalition’s ability to agree on the aggressor, commitment, presence of adequate military force and the willingness by the coalition members to stop the aggressor. Moreover, the presence of a hegemon was the dominating factor in the success of the coalition.

A new element that came out is the national interests of the dominant power in the success or failure of collective security. The US spared no energy to ensure that the conflict was resolved on favorable terms. One reason that appeared to be at play is that US vital interests were at stake. At the time of the invasion, the US was relying on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for nearly half of its imported oil and was staring at a situation that threatened its economy (Bush 1990). This explains why the US president ordered the deployment of forces into Saudi Arabia way before the UNSC authorized the use of force. In addition, it helps explain the reasons behind committing such enormous resources in a war to restore Kuwait.
Case Study II: Ethiopia-Eritrea War

On May 6, 1998, members of the Tigray, an Ethiopian militia operating near the de facto border with Eritrea, fired at Eritrean troops patrolling near the border killing four Eritrean soldiers. In response, an Eritrean mechanized brigade, supported by heavy artillery, crossed the border and occupied the town of Badme. The Ethiopian government demanded an immediate withdrawal of the Eritrean troops before continuing with any negotiations. A week later, the Eritrean troops expanded their occupation to the areas surrounding the villages of Badme triggering one of the bloodiest wars of the post-World War II era (Abbink 1998). The two states traded artillery fire and engaged in air attacks on both military and civilian targets that left hundreds of thousands of people dead and infrastructure destroyed. Additionally both sides deported civilians with their origins in the opposing sides. The two countries engaged in a war characterized by direct assault against heavily fortified positions reminiscent of the World War I trench warfare that resulted in a stalemate. By the cessation of hostilities, Ethiopian troops had pushed Eritrean troops out, retaken Badme and occupied the surrounding areas. At the same time, leaders from both sides insisted that they did not want war and blamed the other side for escalating (Global Security 2012). To the surprise of many, the international community, especially the developed world, appears to have ignored this ruthless war, at least at the beginning. The events at the Balkans at the time of this war overshadowed it (Human Rights Watch 2003).

Background

Like in many parts of Africa, the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict owes its roots to the legacy of colonialism, following the scramble and partitioning of the continent by the
Europeans in search of natural resources. The current day Ethiopia is, however, one of the parts of Africa that escaped the craziness of colonialism, although Italy partially occupied it from 1936-1941. The history of Eritrea is different. Towards the end of the 19th century, Italy began to assert its presence in the region and wrested control from the Ottoman and Egyptian authorities that were present at that time. By 1885, Italy was controlling the Red sea ports of Assab and Massawa. However, Ethiopia successfully thwarted the Italian expansion inwards. The 1889 Uccialli treaty was the first attempt to define the border between Ethiopia and the Italian areas that became an Italian colony and later Eritrea. Further Italian attempts to expand inwards were unsuccessful leading to the battle of Adwa in 1896. Later Italy and Ethiopia established a temporary boundary arrangement, and later followed three border treaties in 1900, 1902, and 1908 thereby addressing the entire common border. The boundary agreement did not take into account the tribes, neither was any of the three agreed borders fully delimited nor demarcated. In 1935, Italy invaded, annexed the whole of Ethiopia and occupied it until 1941, when it ceded control to the United Kingdom (UK) following the defeat of axis powers in WWII. Emperor Haile Selassie resumed control of Ethiopia in 1942 following an agreement with the UK, while Eritrea remained a British colony until 1952 when, with the support of the UN and USA, Eritrea became a federated region of Ethiopia (UN 2006).

At that time, Ethiopia had a long history of enslaving and abusing the Eritrean populace. Consequently, the absorption of Eritrea into Ethiopia did not go down well with Eritreans. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia safeguarded his tight control over the new federation and put in place measures to weaken the federation. He appointed his relatives to govern Eritrea, banned political parties in Eritrea, outlawed indigenous
languages and introduced Amharic language of Ethiopia as the teaching language. In 1962, the Ethiopian government undeterred by protests, invalidated the autonomy of Eritrea and subsequently declared it the 14th province of Ethiopia. (Stephenson 2006).

Shortly after annexation, the people of Eritrea formed several armed groups to liberate themselves against what they termed as the Ethiopian colonization. The secessionist Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) proved effective in waging a guerrilla war against the Ethiopian government. Its successes in 1974 against the EPLF in Asmara severely undermined the morale of the Ethiopian army and directly challenged the authority of the Emperor in Eritrea. In the same year, Colonel Haile Mariam Mengistu led a junta that deposed Emperor Haile Selassie. The overthrow of the Mengistu regime by the Ethiopia People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1991, and the subsequent granting to Eritrea the rights to its own government, marked the tipping point. Afterwards, on 29 May 1991, the then legislative body, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), formed the Provisional Government in Eritrea (PGE). The Eritreans overwhelmingly voted for self determination in an internationally monitored referendum, and created an independent state on May 24, 1993 (Global Security 2012).

Subsequently, the two countries did not manage the official secession of Eritrea properly. The desperation of the TPLF that had accommodated the EPLF during the struggle, and the excitement that followed the success made the two states fail to address the potential differences that came to haunt them later. The two sides failed to address the border disputes that existed, the issue of overlapping population and the status of other’s nationals living on either side (Zondi 2007). Figure 4 shows the border between the two countries including the disputed areas (marked in red).
Breakout of the War

The Ethiopia-Eritrea War occurred against two brotherly states that had cooperated in fighting and eventually overthrowing the regime of their common enemy, the Mengistu regime. After the 30 years of war and the Eritrean independence, no one would have expected that the two states would again get involved in a full blown out war against each other. The unexpected Eritrean forceful occupation of Badme triggered the war that left many dead, injured and displaced. Between 1993 and 1997, relations focused mainly on trade, citizenship issues and regional security policy. The differences that existed were mainly over border, trade, currency, and other policy issues that the two sides were capable of solving through negotiation. However, the border dispute, though considered minor, is what started a major war.
Despite the border conflict appearing as the major cause of the conflict, some deep-seated issues deserve the attention of the international community. Ethiopia’s access to the sea is one of the major issues that ignited tension. The development of the ports of Massawa and Assab occurred when Eritrea was under the control of Ethiopia. The independence of Eritrea technically rendered Ethiopia landlocked and imposed heavy taxes on goods from or destined to Ethiopia at the port of Assab. This coupled with the conflict, left Ethiopia with Djibouti as the only outlet port to the sea. Equally, the autocracy and hatred between the leadership of Ethiopia and Eritrea made resolution of the conflict difficult (Lata 2006).

**Intervention by OAU**

Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, the OAU council of ministers held a meeting in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in June 1998, where the 34th Heads of State and Government Summit had convened the at the same venue and time. The meetings, though ordinary, took advantage of the convergence to commence initiatives to end the hostilities and convince the parties to accept the proposals earlier recommended by a US/Rwanda negotiation team. A number of initiatives followed but for one reason or the other both parties failed to sign any agreement despite agreeing in principle and declaring an intention for the peaceful settlement of their dispute. Whereas Eritrea was willing to sign the OAU sponsored framework agreement, whose modalities the 35th summit endorsed in Algiers on July 12, 1999, Ethiopia insisted on the finalization of the implementation details before appending a signature. The later document that called for the redeployment of forces to the pre-conflict levels, deployment of military observers to monitor the redeployment and demilitarization and delimitation of the entire common border was also
rejected (Aboagye 2001). As the negotiations were proving futile, the fighting continued even with the condemnation by the OAU, and imposition of an arms embargo.

Following a series of high-level meetings and intercessions, and subsequent talks in Algiers, Algeria, the two parties finally signed an agreement on June 18, 2000 for the cessation of hostilities. Among the issues agreed upon included: “redeployment of forces to pre-conflict levels, the deployment of a peacekeeping force to monitor the implementation of the agreement, creation of a 25 km temporary security zone, and establishment of a military coordination commission to coordinate the implementation of the agreement” (Aboagye 2001). On the basis the agreement, the OAU summit authorized establishment of the OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE) (Gidey 2012).

Intervention by the UN

A few days after the start of hostilities, the UN Secretary-General communicated with the leaders of both Ethiopia and Eritrea, urging restraint and offering help to resolve the conflict peacefully. On May 16, 1998, the US sent Susan Rice, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, later joined by the Rwandan vice-president, Paul Kagame, to launch a mediation effort. In two weeks, the US-Rwandan facilitators proposed an action plan that involved, among other things, “the withdrawal of forces from the disputed territory, the deployment of a neutral observer force, the return of civilian administration to disputed areas, and an investigation into the origins of the conflict” (Aboagye 2001). The two countries failed to agree to the proposals, leading to a new round of fighting. Ethiopia specifically appeared unwilling to sign any ceasefire until it had forcefully retaken the lost ground.
It was not until June 2000, that the two sides, assisted by mediators from the UN, US, EU and the OAU, that they signed the Algiers agreement, that required them to solve their differences based on the international border conflict resolution law. The agreement provided for, among others, the establishment of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) to delineate the 1000 kms common border, and a 25kms wide Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) inside Eritrea observed by the UN peacekeepers until approval by both parties of the International Boundary Commission marked border. Both countries committed themselves to respect the outcome of the commission, whose decision they considered final, and without recourse to appeal. Subsequently, the UN created the United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to monitor the implementation of the agreement. The boundary commission delivered its ruling on April 13, 2002, which Eritrea accepted but Ethiopia rejected. In its delineation, the commission marked the town of Badme to be in Eritrea, but Ethiopia contested the decision and continued with its occupation, and remains a contested area. Numerous initiatives to arbitrate have proved fruitless, and a situation of no-war-no-peace exists (Zondi 2007).

Analysis of the Application of Collective Security

At the time of the breakout of hostilities, neither of the countries had declared war or had shown any intentions of invading the other. While there existed unresolved differences, the post 1991 relations between the two countries were friendly. The cooperation that existed between the EPLF and the TPLF during the struggle appeared to conform to the Leninist tactics, meant to broaden the movement for success against a common enemy, in this case the Mengistu regime, with individual interests playing out thereafter. The international community failed to prevent the war and took two years to
stop it, after a stalemate on the war front. This study seeks to analyze the international community’s application of the collective security concept in this case study, based on the key elements identified in chapter 2 namely; agreed aggressor, commitment by the members and distribution of power.

**Agreed Aggressor**

The trigger of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War was the incident at the border area of Badme involving soldiers from both countries. At the time, both countries were sovereign and recognized by the international community. However, there was no clear border demarcation between them, which was one of the causes of the war. Whereas the actions by Eritrea of occupying Badme may remotely fit the UN definition of an aggressor, the lack of a clear border demarcation in itself casted doubt as to who was the aggressor. Additionally, members of the international community, including the OAU and the UN had no basis of branding any of the countries as the aggressor. Based on the circumstances prevailing at that time, and the way the international community handled the conflict, it is not clear who was guilty of aggression. Therefore, this was neither a case of outright aggression nor preemption. The assessment of the variable of the agreed aggressor is therefore not present.

**Commitment by the Coalition Members**

At the time of the escalation of the conflict, there was no regional collective security mechanism. The OAU charter provided for peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration. However, there existed no military structures to resolve or prevent conflict from escalating into war, and the only thing that
existed was the commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration, as a separate protocol to the charter (OAU 1963). The OAU therefore did not consider military intervention at any point, and relied on mediation and arbitration to resolve the conflict. The only time the military got involved was after the Algiers agreement that formed OLMEE whose role was to monitor the implementation of the agreement.

Equally, the UN never considered military intervention to stop the war. For the two years that the countries were at war, its efforts were concentrated mainly on negotiations and other initiatives. The UN-sponsored military force UNMEE, came as a peacekeeping force to occupy the demilitarized zone, monitor, and assist in the implementation of the peace agreement.

Consequently, with the absence of a regional collective security mechanism and the lack of a call for use of military intervention by the international community, the willingness of the regional and the international community to solve the problem was uncertain. Equally, there were no forces assembled to manage the conflict and therefore, there were no logistics considered, neither was there any requirement for interoperability of forces. Whether or not the countries that contributed to UNMEE would have been willing to commit troops to stop the war is debatable. This case demonstrates an instance where both the regional and the international community were unwilling to apply the concept of collective security to stop a war. The study therefore considers the variable on commitment with its sub-variables as being absent.

**Distribution of Power**

The distribution of economic and military power in this case study appeared skewed in favor of Ethiopia. By 1998, both the Ethiopian and Eritrean militaries were not
prepared for war. Despite Ethiopia having a comparatively stronger military than Eritrea, economic difficulties compounded by famine and other internal uprisings, like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), stretched its military strength. After the war began, Ethiopia went on a massive mobilization and built its army significantly technically outnumbering Eritrea. Likewise, the armed forces of most of the neighboring countries were comparatively smaller than that of Ethiopia; the reluctance by the regional countries to call for a military solution is attributable to this fact. Equally, Ethiopia hosted the OAU headquarters and appeared to leverage that to influence decisions by OAU. For that reason, Eritrea protested and charged that the OAU favored Ethiopia and doubted its neutrality on this matter. The lack of military intervention by the international community left the region at the mercy of the principle of “might is right”. It is not clear whether the regional militaries would have raised adequate military forces to counter Ethiopia had they adopted that course. The involvement of the regional power as a party to the conflict complicated its resolution. This case demonstrates the difficulty posed to the collective security mechanism when a regional hegemon becomes party to a conflict or an aggressor. The study therefore considers that the even distribution of power was absent, there existed a regional hegemony in the name of Ethiopia and there lacked adequate military force to manage the conflict.

Summary

The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, and subsequent escalation into war, was because of factors that the two countries ignored during the official separation. At that time, a regional collective security mechanism never existed and the continental body was more of a forum for integration that relied heavily on the goodwill of its members. The
overreliance on passive methods of resolving the conflict prolonged the war for 2 years. Likewise, the UN chose to use the same passive initiatives leading to the same problem. The lack of a clear aggressor is seemingly the reason why both the regional and the international community never explored the use of coercive force to stop the war.

Unlike other areas where the international community has been involved militarily to address conflicts, this conflict zone possessed no known mineral resources or any other terrain considered of value to any country other than the two. Arguably, it is safe to view the failure by the international community to use coercive power to stop the war in the light of absence of resources desired by them. Similarly, the little interest exhibited by the international community is perhaps due to its occupation with the conflict at the Balkans that may have overshadowed the events at the horn of Africa.

Consequently, the Ethiopia-Eritrea war is an example of a case of failure of collective security concept. The most notable is the lack of a regional collective security mechanism that could have dealt with the issue, and the low-key response by the international community. All the key elements that favor collective security namely; agreed aggressor, commitment by members and adequate military force were conspicuously absent.

**Case Study III: The Ogaden War**

On July 13, 1977, two weeks after Ethiopia and Somalia governments had severed diplomatic ties, the Somali National Army (SNA) invaded Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and Bale province. Simultaneously, the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), a rebel group that had been fighting the Ethiopian government for autonomy of the Ogaden region and subsequent unification with Somalia, mounted an attack into the Ogaden from
the north oriented towards the towns of Harar, Dire Dawa and Jijiwa. The invasion caught the Ethiopian military unaware and by early September, the area was under control of the WSLF and the SNA forces (Nkaissery 1997).

The initial Somali push was successful and by November 1977, the SNA forces and the WSLF had captured much of the Ogaden region, which resulted in the subsequent capture of the town of Jijiwa. Despite the initial gains, the Ethiopian resistance stiffened around Harar and Dire Dawa and the attack culminated by November for lack of vital supplies (Weiss 1980). The OAU condemned the invasion and supported military assistance to Ethiopia. The initial Ethiopian reaction was diplomatic. Ethiopians believed that the international community would compel the Somalia government to withdraw its forces. However, by December 1977, it was clear that the Somali troops were not about to withdraw. Subsequently, Ethiopia assisted by Cuba, the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc allies, mounted a counter offensive that destroyed 4 Somali brigades and routed its national forces out of Ogaden by 10th March 1978 (Nkaissery 1997).

The Background

Before the colonization of Africa, the people in the Ogaden region, who were mostly ethnic Somali herders, lived in relative peace and the conflict that originated from the slave trade and the control of the ports along the coast rarely affected them. The arrival of the British in the sea port of Berbera marked the beginning of what would become the social dichotomy of the region. The port of Berbera offered the British an advantage in the control of the mouth into the Red sea, and the Middle East. The British considered control of this region vital to their interests; they established protectorates and as usual signed treaties with the coastal Somali clans.
Similarly, France and Italy developed interest in the horn of Africa as they endeavored to expand their influence. The French established a port on the northern western tip of Somalia in present day Djibouti. The Italians came a little later and established a port further into the Red sea at Assab, in present day Eritrea. As interests diverged, a confrontation ensued between Italy and Britain over the control of the region. In 1888, the two powers agreed to demarcate the border between their areas of influence along the coast. Italy acquired control of the eastern part of the British holding and established a protectorate over the land ruled by the Sultan of Zanzibar. In 1889, Menelik II became Emperor of Ethiopia and signed the treaty of Uccialli with Italy concerning the fate of Eritrea (Berkeley 1902).

Consequently, as the scramble of Africa continued, the powers divided the region into five major regions: “the Ogaden, Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland Protectorate, the British Northern Frontier Districts (in present day Kenya) and French Somaliland” (Rediker 2004, 206). Following the defeat of the axis powers in World War II, Italy, ceded control of Italian Somaliland to Britain including the Ogaden region that it had conquered. Later, the independence of the region separated the Somali people into four countries. British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland unified into the Republic of Somalia, the northern frontier district became the North Eastern province of Kenya; the Ogaden region was carved off into Ethiopia; French Somaliland became the independent state of Djibouti. This effectively separated the once homogenous society into four. The ceding of the Ogaden region to Ethiopia did not go well with the Somali people, who believed in uniting all the Somali people into one autonomous Somali nation. Their flag at independence had a five-pointed star with each point representing a region of the
greater Somalia. The threat of unification of Somalia did not go down well with Ethiopia. In his speech directed to the people of Ogaden, the Ethiopian Emperor said: “We remind you that all of you are by race, color, blood, and custom, members of the great Ethiopian family” (Rediker 2004, 209). Afterward, Ethiopia terminated the grazing rights of Somalia citizens in the Ogaden in 1960, a move that greatly affected their livelihood because they relied heavily on livestock. This sparked brief but bitter skirmishes that marked the Ogaden War of 1964 between Somali and Ethiopian troops along the border. Ethiopia however retained formal control of the Ogaden region (Rediker 2004).

During this time, the superpowers were busy entrenching their influence in the region. The US supported the Ethiopian government while the Soviet Union supported the Somalia government. The Ethiopian government at the time faced numerous internal problems due to secessionist groups like the EPLF, TPLF and WSLF. The new Ethiopia regime of COL Mengitsu violently engaged these groups. This did not go well with the US who reduced aid to the government for human rights abuse. Consequently, the Ethiopian government expelled the US military and diplomatic personnel in 1977 and started courting the Soviets. On the other hand, the Somalis severed links with the Soviets and courted the Americans, effectively switching the superpowers (Nkaissery 1997).

Prelude to the War

Despite the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1954 that granted the Ogaden region to Ethiopia, and the failure of Somalia to recapture the region in 1964, Somalia held, and still does, that the Ogaden region is, by all right, part of it. The fact that the Somali nation shares history, language, culture and religion amplifies this claim. Therefore, the border
between the two states remains provisional, and the Ogaden region is in a state of contestation. Figure 5 shows the Ogaden region (shaded green).

The 1976 effort by Somalia’s President Siad Barre to negotiate for the autonomy of the Ogaden region failed. He immediately increased support to the WSLF who had stepped up military activities within the Ogaden. The decreasing US support to the Ethiopian government and the internal problems facing Ethiopia presented Siad Barre with the best opportunity to reclaim the Ogaden. The Somali leader envisioned a quick decisive battle against what he considered a weak and unprepared Ethiopian military. At the start of the hostilities, Somalia possessed a well-trained and equipped military, courtesy of fifteen years of Soviet assistance (Nkaissery 1997).

Figure 5. The Ogaden Region

The war began with the support of the WSLF by the Somalia troops in early 1977, with an intention of using them as a proxy force. Military officers from Somalia led the WSLF fighters who initially concentrated on interdicting Ethiopian forces’ logistics and critical infrastructure. The entry of the SNA in July 1977 found the Ethiopian forces rather vulnerable and successfully isolated within the central sector with the WSLF controlling a substantial portion of the Ogaden territory. The initial onslaught by the SNA was very successful capturing all vital centers within the Ogaden, with the exception of Harar and Dire Dawa, which the Ethiopian troops successfully defended. The OAU diplomatic intervention did not succeed in stopping the war and the Soviets and the Cubans joined the war on the Ethiopian side. On the contrary, the US did not support Somalia thus tilting the balance in favor of Ethiopia and its allies. The Somali offensive started to slacken. Overextended lines of communication, shortage of supplies and interdictions by the Ethiopian Air Force forced a culmination by the end of October 1977 (Weiss 1980).

Intervention by the OAU

When the hostilities broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia, the OAU was the continental body with the mandate of resolving international disputes within the continent. In addition, Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, hosted the OAU headquarters. The conflict between the two countries drew the attention of the OAU as early as 1964 during the initial hostilities. In line with its roles, the OAU appointed a committee to convene in Libreville, Gabon, to mediate the conflict. Somalia claimed that Ethiopia was part of the powers that drew the boundaries and therefore had deliberately annexed the Ogaden region. However, it was unable to convince the committee on its justification.
over its claim of the Ogaden. Unable to agree, both parties withdrew from the mediation committee. Consequently, the mediation committee passed a resolution reinforcing the validity of article 3 of the OAU charter, which obligates all member states to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of others (OAU 1963). The committee further reiterated that it was not possible to redraw the existing borders and condemned any use of force to that end. At the same time, the OAU was facing numerous challenges among them, members were skeptical of Ethiopia’s neutrality as the host of OAU headquarters on the face of a major external conflict and inability to resolve internal conflicts. The intervention by the continental body was therefore a failure and did nothing to deescalate the conflict.

TheExternalInvolvement

The interests of the US and the Soviet Union in the horn of Africa were, as usual, to gain control of the region, in order to control the strategic gateway to the Red Sea and the Middle East. The Soviets intended to unite the Horn of Africa under a common socialist ideology. Thus, it tried diplomatic advances between Ethiopia and Somalia to decide the fate of the Ogaden region, but failed. Somalia’s President Siad Barre saw little prospects for an agreement and insisted that self-determination by the people of the Ogaden was compulsory. The Soviets angered, by Siad Barre’s stand, shifted their support to Ethiopia. As expected, Siad Barre severed ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba and nullified the earlier treaty of friendship, and offered the base at the port of Berbera to the US. Despite providing aid to Somalia, the US did not support the greater Somalia ambitions, and was not willing to engage in another war after the events in Vietnam. The
Siad Barre regime failed to realize that fact and overestimated the support they expected to receive from the US during the war (Rediker 2003).

The entry of the Soviet forces and its Eastern bloc allies sealed the fate of Somalia’s irredentism. The Soviet Union supplied Ethiopia with military hardware approximated to cost over $1 billion by the end of 1977, including 400 tanks and 50 jets. In addition, the allies injected their troops into the war. Among the new entrants into the war included 2,000 Soviets, 1,000 East Germans, 2,000 Yemenis and 12,000 Cubans. The counter offensive had begun. The Ethiopians planned the operations under the guidance of Soviet officers. They relied on massive airlift of troops and heavy firepower, deception, and took advantage of the insufficiently supplied SNA. However bravely the SNA soldiers fought, they were seriously defeated leading to the Somali government’s announcement of the intention to withdraw. Ethiopia and its allies completely routed the SNA and recaptured the Ogaden region by 10 March 1978 (Nkaissery 1997).

Analysis of the Application of the Collective Security Concept

During the hostilities, the OAU tried to mediate the differences that existed between the two countries over the control of the Ogaden region. However, the irredentist factor on the side of Somalia and the sovereignty claim by the Ethiopians made the prospects of an agreement impossible. Further, the Soviet Union and Cuba engaged both sides in an effort to avert the war; nonetheless, Somalia had decided to resurrect its irredentism ideology. The study will analyze the application of collective security as a concept in this case study, using its key elements and determine their presence or absence.
Agreed Aggressor

The Ogaden war started following the invasion of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by the SNA in an effort to assist their relatives to achieve their dream of self-determination. At the time of invasion, both countries were independent and recognized by the OAU and the UN. Whereas Somalia did not recognize the Ogaden region as part of Ethiopia, the OAU charter and the charter of the UN obligated it to pursue peaceful means in seeking for the resolution of the disagreement. At the same time, Ethiopia had not shown any signs of invading Somalia to warrant preemption. Consequently, its action of supporting the WSLF inside Ethiopia and subsequent invasion by its national military was a case of outright aggression, and perfectly fitted the UN definition of aggression. Additionally, the international community, including both the US and the Soviet Union, did not support Somalia’s forceful seizure of the Ogaden region. The study therefore considers the variable of agreed aggressor as present.

Commitment by Coalition Members

The Ogaden war is a good example of a case where the concept of collective security succeeded without the involvement of the UN. The OAU condemned Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia; however, the continental body lacked the capacity to build a coalition to defeat the aggression. Moreover, the charter of the OAU only provided for the resolution of disputes through mediation and as such did not provide for a military intervention. In this case, the Soviet Union built the coalition, with its allies, mainly Cuba and East Germany, providing the bulk of the troops and resources. The degree of the involvement of the members was a clear demonstration of their willingness and commitment. Similarly, prior to commencement of the counter offensive, the Soviet
Union supplied military hardware to the Ethiopian military and organized for training on the same, and supervised the planning of the operation. At the same time, the allies who formed the coalition followed the Soviet doctrine and therefore, all the forces within the coalition were interoperable. Equally, before the counter offensive, the Soviet Union and Cuba provided the bulk of the logistics that proved sufficient during the operation. The study considers this variable present including the sub variables of willingness, interoperability and presence of sufficient logistics.

**Distribution of Power**

Economic and military power are the ultimate determinants of the outcome of a war. At the onset of hostilities, the militaries and the economies of both countries were largely at par in strength. The Ethiopian forces had more men in arms while the SNA had an upper hand in equipment, especially the air force. The fact that Ethiopia was having internal problems afforded Somalia some considerable advantage but that did not last for long. The presence of a dominant power, namely the Soviet Union, as a proxy hegemon, on the list of interested parties tipped the scale in favor of the coalition. The Soviet Union leveraged its influence to get its allies to join the coalition. By February 1978, Ethiopia and its allies had assembled a force three times that of Somalia. Consequently, Somalia faced a coalition of military power that it could not match, and was subsequently defeated. Therefore, in this case study, it is arguable that a skewed distribution of power in favor of the coalition existed. Additionally, the presence of a dominant power and other allies ensured the presence of adequate military force. The study therefore finds that the distribution of power was uneven, a hegemon existed and there was adequate military force to defeat aggression.
Summary

The aspirations of unifying the entire Somali nation in a single state were central to the Ogaden war. The actions of Somalia to offer support to the WSLF, a rebel group operating in a neighboring country, and its invasion of Ethiopia triggered the Ogaden war. The colonial legacy of arbitrarily drawing boundaries without regard to social factors is the root cause of the conflict. However, the international community has laid down procedures that govern resolution of such disputes and therefore resorting to war amounted to aggression. Accordingly, the study finds the case study as a successful case of collective security, though not under the UN. The coalition’s ability to agree on the aggressor, their willingness and the adequacy of military forces contributed immensely to success. Additionally, the Soviet Union had sought throughout to secure a strong presence in the Horn of Africa in order to widen its influence. Consequently, the need to solidify control of the region appeared to have been the key motivating factor in supporting Ethiopia and not necessarily to defeat of aggression. This case study reaffirms the length to which hegemons can go in order to further their interests.

In conclusion, the concept of collective security requires that all members move against the aggressor, with the single motivation being to prevent aggression and defeat it if it occurs. The study has explored the application of the concept in the three case studies based on the key elements identified in chapter 2, and has outlined the findings of the presence or absence in table 2.

Based on the analysis, the three case studies have helped reinforce the key elements of collective security as discussed earlier. The study generally agrees with the argument by Organsky on the key elements of collective security. In a conflict situation,
the ability to agree on the aggressor is key to building a strong coalition. However, the agreement of the aggressor depends on the interests of the members and the neutrality of the collective security mechanism. Seemingly, the motivation for involvement in a coalition is not always the need to defeat aggression. Interests of different parties play a big role in determining countries involvement. For instance, in the Gulf War I, the most crucial reason for the success of the coalition appears to have been the need to avoid destabilization of the global oil supply by the US. Equally, the urge to develop a strong partner in order to control the region by the Soviet Union was the major driving factor in the success in the Ogaden war.

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<td>b. Presence of Hegemon</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Adequate military force</td>
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<td>Concept Successful</td>
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*Source*: Created by author.

Equally, the collective will of a coalition, with their associated military might that is adequate to subdue the aggressor, does not necessarily force the aggressor to revise its policies as exhibited in case studies 1 and 3. To the contrary, aggressors in the two case
studies held their policies until they were defeated. The amassing of the military force in Saudi Arabia in 1990/91 failed to persuade Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait even after the coalition appeared ready to launch. It is the actual fighting that routed Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. Arguably, therefore the mere demonstration of military might or the willingness to use force may not necessarily cause the aggressor to review its intentions.

Similarly, the presence of a dominant power whose interests are at stake plays a pivotal role in the success or failure of collective security. The presence of a dominant power in both Gulf War I and the Ogaden war greatly influenced the success of collective security. On the other hand, lack of interest by the dominant powers where the local collective security mechanism is weak or nonexistent spells doom to its success. Likewise, when a dominant power appears on the scene as either the aggressor or a protector of the aggressor, it nullifies the effectiveness of the collective security. Other key elements of collective security largely depend on the above two.

Undoubtedly, most regional collective security mechanisms lack the capacity and sometimes the will to address regional threats to security. The inability by the League of Arab States to address the 1990 Gulf crisis before the involvement of the international community attests to this. The fact that the hegemon will only appear where and when its interests are at stake makes the success of collective security mechanism based on hegemonic influence unpredictable. This reinforces the need for a strong and responsive regional collective security mechanism capable of handling the inherent regional security threats without overreliance on the international community.
The United Nations

As discussed earlier, the role of the UN is to preserve international peace and security, through collective measures to prevent and remove threats to peace, and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches to peace. In addition, the organization endeavors to ensure the peaceful settlement of international disputes and uphold justice and international law. To that end, the organization serves as the center for the harmonization of regional and global actions in the attainment of the common ends (UN 1985). The UN has both succeeded and failed in its obligation to maintain the international peace and security. The inability of the UN to secure international security has played out largely in Africa, which accounts for more conflicts than any other continent in the world. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the crisis in Darfur, Ethiopia-Eritrea war, the current chaos in the DRC and many other conflicts in West Africa are a good example of where the UN appears unable to stop a crisis until after considerable suffering.

The UN Charter provides for regional organizations to address local disputes before the UNSC can involve other members. To this end, the UN has mostly relied on local mechanisms to play a leading role in resolution of local disputes. The UN bureaucracy and the apparent influence by the five permanent members of the Security Council have severely affected the ability of the UNSC to respond to incidences where threat of peace exists, especially in Africa. The 5 permanent members of the UNSC have abused their veto powers to protect their national interests and those of their allies. The end of the cold war saw a paradigm shift in ideological camps and led to the minimizing of polarization that existed among countries. The permanent members have exercised the
veto power with caution; however, they have adopted a strategy of canvassing outside the
UNSC seating to garner support from other members without necessarily announcing
veto power on resolutions. Some of them draw draft resolutions to a stalemate by
pronouncing their intention to veto before taking the resolution to a vote (Kiugu 2013).

Arguably, the global major powers have turned the UN into a forum for rubber-stamping
their decisions and is no longer a guarantor of security for all as earlier
intended. Further, the UN faces difficulties in funding and forces availability on the face
of the global financial crisis, because the major contributors are facing financial
difficulties. The UN therefore can only assist local collective security mechanisms who
have the inherent capacity to operate independently. The partnering with regional
mechanisms is primarily for mandate and financial and logistical support, especially
when the situation has been stabilized. Relying solely on the UN to deter or defeat
aggression has not been very successful. Therefore, it might not be in a position to
guarantee security for the African continent.

The ASF

The objectives of the AU, as provided for in article 3 of the constitutive act,
includes the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states and
promotion of peace, security and integrity of the continent. The act further prohibits the
use or threat of force among member states and reserves the right to intervene in a
member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances,
namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (AU 2000). Consequently, the
AU member states adopted the common African defense and security policy framework
for the establishment of ASF in July 2004 (Cilliers 2008). Accordingly, the AU Peace
and Security Council (PSC) relies on three bodies to facilitate the implementation of the common African defense and security policy; the panel of the wise, the continental early warning system and the ASF. The panel of the wise is composed of a team of highly respected and experienced African statesmen with extensive experience in dealing with peace and security issues in Africa. Their role is to advise the AU PSC on areas related to continental peace and security. The early warning system is a mechanism whose role is to collect, process and act on information in order to provide the AU PSC with early warning regarding threats to continental peace and security (Magosi 2007). The ASF is a multidisciplinary force whose role is to offer the AU the necessary capacity for intervention within or between African countries to deal with continental conflict and security challenges as provided for in article 4 (h) of the constitutive Act (AU 2000). The ASF is the umbrella body of the regional security mechanisms of brigade size multinational forces prepared to respond to threats of peace and security within the continent. The ASF possesses the legal mandate to intervene in cases of serious conflicts around the continent, and will deploy under the patronage of the AU PSC to intervene in border wars (Neethling 2005).

The AU is currently engaged in an operation in Somalia fighting the Al Shaabab militants that have engaged the Somalia government for more than a decade. It is also engaged in a hybrid peacekeeping operation with the UN in South Sudan and Darfur, and has stood up a force, The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to deal with the current crisis in Mali. Though not an interstate conflict, the Somalia case presents an example of situations where the ASF is likely to find itself obligated to take
action collectively. The actions by the militant group affect the security of the entire region and the world, due to its terrorist activities and links to Al Qaeda.

Challenges of the ASF

As the umbrella body of the regional security mechanisms, success of the ASF largely depends on the success of the regional mechanisms that collectively form the ASF. The political will and cooperation of the member states is crucial to the success of the ASF. The challenges that AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is currently experiencing is a good example of what the ASF is likely to go through in future. The unwillingness of member states to contribute troops when required is one of the potential challenges that face the ASF. When the AU sanctioned the use of force to protect the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, and asked member states to contribute troops, only two countries initially did so. This prolonged the mission to a point where it was almost crumbling until the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) launched operation Linda Nchi in October 2011.

Equally, logistical inadequacies, due to limitations in funding, a factor that is negatively affecting operations in AMISOM. The funding comes from diverse sources, depending on interests, and is therefore unpredictable. The lack of mission essential equipment, like communications, vehicles and air and sealift capability, is big challenge. Additionally, the mixture of equipment from different countries and different military doctrines in the African armies pose problems in developing a common ASF doctrine and thus undermines interoperability.

Similarly, tensions and mistrust between member states continue to undermine the capacity of the AU/ASF to resolve conflicts before they can escalate into war. For
instance during the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict in 1998, Eritrea felt that Ethiopia had an undue influence on the AU since it hosted its headquarters. The belief that Eritrea was not likely to get a fair hearing by the AU due to Ethiopia’s influence brings the impartiality of the union into sharp focus, and negatively affects its authority (Karanja 2013).

The ASF as currently constituted is therefore unable to adequately deal with the continental threats to peace and security as provided for in the AU constitutive act. The reliance on the loosely organized regional mechanisms and the lack of adequate funding renders the ASF impotent. Equally, the presence of regional dominant powers namely; South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia and earlier on Libya and Egypt undermines the impartiality of the ASF.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The end of the cold war shifted the type of world conflicts from mainly interstate to intrastate. However, it did not eliminate the possibility of interstate conflicts degenerating into full-scale war. Various factors that cause interstate conflict remain and continue to get complicated with population explosions and competition for scarce resources. The colonial legacy of arbitrary and imprecise state boundaries, especially in Africa, continues to precipitate situations that have the potential to cause wars.

The concept of collective security involves the joint use of both regional and the international community’s coercive capability to challenge aggression and resolve situations that undermine international peace and security. Central to the concept is the need for collective use of force to deter/defeat aggression, management of military power by global or regional organizations, the control of behavior of states and creation of a global order and minimization of threats to peace and security. History has proved that success or failure of collective security is dependent on some factors that either favor or discourage its success. The ability to agree on the aggressor in cases of interstate conflicts, whether it’s a case of preemption or outright aggression, and the commitment by the members of an alliance to defeat aggression exhibited by the willingness of the states to commit their forces, provide sufficient logistics are key elements that affect the success of collective security. Additionally, the distribution of power within the international or regional arena is a key determinant of the ability of the alliance to assemble sufficient military force adequate to defeat aggression.
Admittedly, a major factor that plays a vital role in building a coalition and commitment by states is the interests of the major actors. Major powers with the preponderance of economic and military power possesses a commanding influence in coalition building. Dominant powers will stop at almost nothing to resolve a situation that threatens their interests. Equally, other actors will more likely be willing to participate in an alliance to defeat aggression in situations that are likely to threaten their security or other interests. The success of the coalition during the Gulf War I was attributable largely to the presence of a hegemon (US) whose interests were at stake. The other players joined the coalition to be part of a winning team and in the process also protect their interests. Likewise, the success in the Ogaden war can be attributed to the efforts of the Soviet Union who succeeded in assembling a coalition to defeat Somalia inorder to stamp their authority and expand their influence in the region. However, in the case of the Ethiopia/Eritrea war, lack of interest by the major powers and the fact that one of the regional powers was party to the conflict spelt doom for the concept of collective security. The failure by other regional states to intervene in the conflict supports the argument that the inclusion of major players is paramount in any effort to build a coalition. Arguably, the major motivating factor for unwavering participation in a collective security coalition or alliance by states is national and collective interests as opposed to the need to defeat aggression. Collective security will only succeed if the dominant power is committed to it and will fail if it is not. The success of collective security therefore lies on the ability of the community to bind the major powers in the effort.
The UN, being the umbrella global collective security mechanism, has not been greatly successful. The UN has both succeeded and failed in causing the use of the international community’s collective will to defeat aggression or intervene in various situations that threaten international peace and security. Some of the failures include the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the Ethiopia-Eritrea war.

Equally, the economic crisis that faced the western countries, most of whom are the main financiers of the world body, and a surge in the requirements for the UN to intervene, especially in Africa, is arguably to blame for the UN’s inability to address all the cases adequately. Likewise, the influence by the five permanent members of the UNSC and the inability by the council to control the major powers have undermined its authority to maintain international peace and security. Accordingly, different regions have sought to organize themselves in order to manage their regional security concerns without solely relying on the UNSC, an arrangement that is in line with chapter VIII of the UN charter that encourages creation of regional mechanisms to address regional security issues before referring them to the UNSC.

Consequently, the AU, in realization of the role of security in development, adopted the common African defense and security policy framework for the establishment of the ASF, as the collective security mechanism to manage and resolve threats to continental peace and security. The ASF with its three bodies has the roles of managing, coordinating and mandating the employment of force in conflict resolution within the continent as directed by the AU PSC. However, it relies on the multinational regional standby brigades that together form the ASF. The ASF faces challenges ranging from the lack of political will by the member states, states tensions and mistrust,
interoperability and legal and logistical inadequacies. In addition, the fact that ASF relies on the regional standby brigades makes it toothless, and its success depends on the willingness and the ability of the regional standby forces. Accordingly, the certainty of the ability of the ASF to address adequately the EAR security challenges is in serious doubt.

The mission of the EASF is to contribute to regional and continental peace through a regional conflict prevention, management and resolution capability able to respond effectively to crisis within Eastern Africa and across the African continent. However, a critical scrutiny of the EASF exposes some serious challenges that cast doubt on its ability to mature into a credible and effective collective security mechanism. The deployment scenarios created by the protocol that established the EASF gravitate more towards peacekeeping as opposed to defeating aggression. The mind-set created therein appears to be more of a humanitarian force with the possibility of collective action against an aggressor missing. Under the current mandate, it is not clear how the force will respond in the event of an interstate conflict. Similarly, the loosely binding MOU and policy framework do not guarantee commitment by member states, a fact that is clear in the challenges the AMISOM force is facing. Lastly, the region lacks a common central factor strong enough to bind all the member states together. The tensions and mistrusts that exist among member states are a potential factor that compromises regional cohesion necessary for the operationalization of the force.

Recommendations

Undoubtedly, the threat of both interstate and intrastate conflicts remains in Eastern Africa despite transformations in regional environment. The very causes of
conflict are still present and continue to get complicated by the day because of the changing social political factors. History has proved that the UN takes time to respond to security situations and works better when supporting local mechanisms. The strengthening of the EASF should therefore be a top priority. Accordingly, the study has identified that with the current structures, the EASF is not in a position to provide the region with the security necessary for social economic development. The following recommendations suggests ways of building a more effective and credible collective security mechanism in East Africa.

First, the commitment of all regional actors especially the dominant powers is a must if the concept is to succeed. As stated earlier, the exclusion of dominant powers will spell doom to collective security in situations of conflict. The region must therefore involve the major powers in the development of the mechanism. One way of binding the member states, including the major actors, is through economic interdependence. As earlier mentioned, interests are central to the decision by states to contribute effectively to a collective security endeavour. Economic interdependence is a common denominator around which member states can rally together in the region. For instance, Uganda uses the port of Mombasa in Kenya for over 90 percent of its imports and exports, at the same time Uganda is one of the largest importers of Kenyan goods. The interdependence would therefore make it imprudent for the two countries to go to war. The East African Community should open its membership to accommodate most if not all the EASF members, and encourage common economic infrastructure like financial and information communication and technology services, ports, pipelines and railroad systems serving most of the member countries. This will create a situation whereby a problem in one
country will affect all the other members and compel them to act against any destabilizing factor in the region. Additionally, it will make it very expensive for any member state to become hostile against another. Certainly economic interdependence is a major factor to the success of a regional collective security mechanism.

Secondly, the region needs to develop a strong credible and responsive mechanism with a strong structural capacity to deal with the regional threats to peace and security. A strong regional collective security body will act as a confidence building measure and also as a deterrence to the potential trouble makers. Equally, it will provide the basis of coalition building in the event of a conflict situation that requires involvement of international players or larger forces. Accordingly, institutionalization is one of the sure ways of ensuring structural fidelity of an body. The EASF must operate on a legal basis that binds all member states to the ideals of the force, and obligates all member state to share the obligations, threats and the resultant benefits of the regional collective security body. The system should forbid members from conducting themselves or joining other regional or international arrangements that might run contrary to the ideals of the EASF, and place a high premium on states whose conduct run against the principles of the body and those that fail in their obligations.

Equally, the force must secure adequate and predictable funding to be able to remain relevant and able to respond to security requirements. In addition to the contributions by members and other well-wishers, the body should consider developing partnerships with other successful bodies like NATO and the EU, like in the case of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) (UNESCO 2013). Successful
cooperation will not only assist to fund the force but also in developing a common doctrine, capacity building and logistics infrastructural development.

Similarly, the mandate of the force must be clear. The member states must inculcate an offensive mind set into the entire force structure. The EASF must present a posture with a force capable of stopping an agreed upon aggressor and intervene including in states in the event of genocide and other humanitarian crises. Equally, the mandate should be clear on the threshold of intervention, and able to respond in different scenarios. These include intrastate conflicts, interstate conflicts involving member states, and conflicts involving a member state and a state belonging to a different region. Likewise, to minimize the tensions and mistrust among members states, the members should encourage political openness, good governance, rule of law and democratic ideals. Collective security succeeds better in mature democracies and therefore the region should encourage the same.

**Recommendations for Future Study**

The Eastern Africa Region like all other regions in Africa is embroiled in endless conflicts that continue to get complicated by changing social factors like globalization and global warming. Moreover, the interest of world powers is re-emerging with discoveries of more reserves of natural resources, especially oil. The recent discovery of massive oil reserves in Kenya and Uganda, and the prospects of the same in Tanzania, are cases in point. Additionally, most of these discoveries have occurred near the international borders. These factors are likely to re-ignite the dormant but deep-seated grievances especially that relate to border conflicts. Managing these conflicts early enough will forestall the possibility of them escalating into full-scale war. Consequently,
there is need for further study on the underlying factors likely to cause war in the region. Similarly, there is need to conduct further study on how the member states can mitigate these differences before they intensify.
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