Special Plans and Operations

Assessment of the Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan
**Assessment of the Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan**

**Department of Defense Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500**

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We are providing this final report for your information and use. We performed this assessment in response to a request from the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and as part of a series of assessment projects regarding accountability and control of sensitive items procured for and transferred to the security forces of Afghanistan and Iraq. We considered client comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

For purposes of this report, we request comments from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on Recommendation 1 within 30 days of the report publication date.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the assessment team from the Commander, U.S. Central Command, the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan, and their respective staffs. Their assistance and support was invaluable.

Questions should be directed to Mr. David Corn at (703) 604-9474 (DSN 664-9474) or Mr. John Taylor at (703) 604-8766 (DSN 664-8766). We will provide a formal briefing on the results, if management requests. See appendix I for the report distribution.

Kenneth P. Moorefield
Assistant Inspector General
Special Plans and Operations

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Executive Summary: Assessment of the Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)\(^1\) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan

Who Should Read This Report?
Personnel from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, United States Central Command (CENTCOM), United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A), and the Combined Security Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A) involved with procuring and providing weapons and/or ammunition to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), mentoring weapons accountability and oversight to the ANSF, and those responsible for staffing and training U.S. personnel involved in the mentoring program in Afghanistan should read this report.

Background

During the 2007 trip, the team made survey visits of approximately one week each to Afghanistan and Kuwait to gain a theater-wide perspective of the status of munitions accountability and control oversight in Southwest Asia, which is the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. The team identified issues in Afghanistan that were not fully addressed and which merited follow-up. Subsequent to the Afghanistan and Kuwait visits, the assessment team traveled to Iraq for a three week munitions assessment mission.

In April 2008, the OIG returned to Afghanistan to perform a limited assessment of the accountability and control of munitions provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan. The results were published on October 24, 2008 as part of DOD OIG Report No. SPO-2009-001, “Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces.”

In January 2009, the Commander, CENTCOM communicated his concerns to the Acting Inspector General regarding weapons accountability in Afghanistan, and requested an OIG

\(^1\) We did not include an evaluation of explosives in our assessment.
assessment comparable to that which it had previously conducted in Iraq. In response, the OIG established an assessment team which deployed to Afghanistan on March 7, 2009.

**Mission Objectives**

On February 3, 2009, the OIG announced the “Assessment of the Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan.”

The objectives of this assessment were to:

- Review the status of corrective actions initiated in response to previous IG and GAO reports on munitions accountability
- Assess the current system for accountability and control to determine if it is adequate.
- Determine whether the current security assistance program is effective in supporting munitions accountability and control.

The team assessed the munitions supply chain from port of entry, through transportation, storage, distribution and formal turnover to ANSF, to issuance to Afghan military and police personnel. Upon completing its field assessment, the team out-briefed the Commander, CSTC-A on March 30, 2009, and returned to the United States April 1, 2009. On April 13, 2009, the team briefed the Chief of Staff, CENTCOM on its preliminary observations and recommendations. Subsequently, the briefing was provided to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**CSTC-A Progress on Improving Munitions Accountability and Control**

Since June 2008, CSTC-A has made significant progress toward improving internal munitions accountability and control. The leadership of the CSTC-A Commander, supported by the impressive commitment of its training and mentoring teams, has had a significant positive impact improving the oversight system.

CSTC-A had captured the serial numbers of 152,917 donated and purchased weapons and registered them with the DOD Small Arms Registry program, and was steadily improving the scope of this initiative.

The Commander, CSTC-A issued a weapons and ammunition standard operating procedure (SOP) designating a formal point of weapons transfer from U.S. to Afghan government control. The SOP also established specific procedures for receiving, storing, and issuing weapons by serial number from Depot 1 and 22 Bunkers (the U.S.-managed national supply depots) to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units.

Furthermore, Commander, CSTC-A had developed and issued written guidance for U.S. mentors clarifying their responsibilities for assisting the ANA and ANP in establishing improved weapons and ammunition accountability and control. Specifically, Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 09-043 directed U.S. mentoring elements to conduct a monthly 10% inventory of counterpart ANSF unit weapon supplies and to ensure ANA and ANP units each conducted their own 100%
monthly weapon inventory. In addition, FRAGO 09-045 directed U.S. mentors to train the ANP on how to implement effectively the newly-approved Ministry of Interior (MOI) logistics regulations.

CSTC-A had also improved the physical security of 22 Bunkers, a national weapons and ammunition depot, by building a protective fence around it, erecting guard towers, and adding a fortified entry point. It also organized and consolidated the store of ANP weapons and ammunition.

The Combined Joint Task Force – Phoenix, a subordinate unit of CSTC-A tasked with providing and supporting the mentors and trainers for the ANA at Corps level and below, has developed a draft ANA Logistics Mentor Training Book for the Embedded Training Teams (ETT) attached to ANA units which includes guidance on weapons oversight. Moreover, the CSTC-A Consolidated Fielding Center has been providing ANA Kandak (infantry battalion) personnel and their respective mentors with training on weapons accountability and control.

**ANSF Progress on Improving Munitions Accountability and Control**

The ANSF, comprised of the ANA and the ANP, has also developed more effective systems for munitions accountability and control. This occurred in significant measure due to clear and forceful weapons oversight guidance issued by the Ministries of Defense and Interior, reinforced by the vigorous support of CSTC-A and Coalition training and mentoring personnel.

Specifically, the Minister of Defense, with support from the Chief of the Army General Staff and Corps Commanders, has provided instructions for establishing strict accountability and control over equipment, especially for weapons. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and ANA were receiving, storing and issuing weapons by serial number, accounted for in ledger books, from the Forward Supply Depots down through infantry company level. The MOD issued MOD Order #0201, which mandated monthly 100% weapons serial number inventories by all ANA units.

Moreover, weapons collected under the Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups program were being consolidated at Depot 0, established as an ANA national munitions depot, under Afghan management. Once there, ANA and U.S. military Logistics ETTs jointly inventoried the weapons by serial number.

The Minister of Interior was also exerting strong leadership to establish equipment accountability and control, especially for weapons. The Minister had sent “tiger teams” throughout Afghanistan to account for the number of weapons in police units down through the district level and to conduct serial number inventories. The Minister had also issued MOI Logistics Policy (Process for the Management of Logistics) that mandated monthly 100% ANP weapons serial number inventories.
Assessment Results

While significant progress had been achieved by CSTC-A and the ANSF with respect to munitions accountability and control, there were still additional improvements that were required.

A major obstacle to CSTC-A achieving further mentoring progress with respect to weapons accountability and control has been personnel shortages in both ETTs and Police Mentoring Teams (PMT). As a result, there were insufficient CSTC-A personnel to form the required number of PMTs, in particular, but the personnel shortfall also limited the formation of ETTs. At the time of the assessment, only 40% of the 2,375 authorized billets for the PMTs were filled. However, OSD and the Joint Staff have recently taken steps to mitigate the shortfall against the force requirements by tasking the Army to deploy a “second” Brigade Combat Team. This second BCT will almost double the U.S. mentoring personnel currently on-the-ground in support of the ANSF train and equip mission.

Additionally, the munitions oversight progress achieved must be reinforced by CSTC-A and the ANSF, and by Coalition and ISAF mentors until it becomes fully institutionalized. Establishing the necessary leadership, trained personnel, and infrastructure to create and maintain effective oversight of weapons, while creating a culture of equipment accountability, is a process that will require a sustained commitment by the ANSF and its international partners, especially on the part of U.S. forces.

Moreover, CSTC-A is responsible for generating the expansion of the ANSF, including providing the equipment, to increase the ANA from 84,000 to 134,000, with the ANP also likely to be authorized additional increases. In addition, it must now implement the new oversight requirements for sensitive U.S. defense equipment supplied to this force as specified in Section 1228 of the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act. The CSTC-A Commander had requested additional billets for CSTC-A’s Security Assistance Office to handle these increasing demands. To be effective, the new personnel assigned to these billets must be appropriately trained in security assistance programs, with standard one-year assignments.

The Afghan MOD and MOI were moving forward in establishing effective weapons oversight systems, but they did not have the visibility that a centralized, serial numbered database would provide. This limitation impeded their ability to effectively account for and control weapons inventories held by their respective ministries and the ANA and ANP. To also enable the MOD to eventually independently manage its own weapons inventory, CSTC-A was planning to install the CORE Inventory Management System software. This software was intended to provide MOD visibility over its weapons inventories at its National and Forward Supply Depots, and therefore better integrate, manage and track weapons and ammunition stored there. However, the software has been difficult for even U.S. personnel to use, and there is a strong possibility that the Afghans will not be able to independently operate and maintain this software in its current configuration. In this case, MOD will not be able to achieve the objective of enhanced weapons oversight of its depot system.
Over the past year, the MOD has provided clear guidance for establishing strict accountability and control over equipment, especially for weapons. However, MOD decrees on weapons accountability and control have not always been promulgated down the ANA chain of command. This has prevented some U.S. ETTs from building their mentoring efforts around the implementation of MODs own decrees, and hindered the development of ANA weapons accountability and control procedures and processes.

International mentoring teams (Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams and Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams) under the command of ISAF were not required to mentor the ANA and ANP using MOD and MOI weapons accountability directives, consistent with CSTC-A guidance. This could result in confusion of standards and requirements, as well as reduced accountability throughout the ANA and ANP. The recent “dual-hatting”\(^2\) of the Commander, CSTC-A as the Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, will provide him the authority to direct ISAF mentors to ensure appropriate implementation of MOD and MOI weapons accountability and control decrees and orders.

Bilateral government-to-government weapons donations by NATO/ISAF countries to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan have sometimes been distributed directly to the ANSF, by-passing the MOD, MOI and CSTC-A supply chains and therefore their internal weapons accountability and control procedures and processes. To ensure integration and consistency of oversight efforts, all weapons donations to the ANSF should conform to the oversight procedures established by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the MOD, MOI, and CSTC-A oversight systems.

Finally, pre-deployment training for U.S. military personnel assigned to Embedded Training Teams and Police Mentoring Teams did not focus sufficiently on mentoring concepts and best practices, and on ANSF weapons accountability and control policies, procedures and processes. Without this training, U.S. personnel were less prepared to mentor the development of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, and the ANA and ANP, including with respect to weapons accountability and control standards.

**Initial CSTC-A Comments**

We commend CSTC-A for taking initial corrective actions based on the teams’ out-brief to the Commander, CSTC-A and his leadership team on March 30, 2009. Their initial corrective actions are detailed at the end of each observation.

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\(^2\) Dual-hatting means one commander holding two military commands at the same time.
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Background

During the 2007 trip, the team made survey visits of approximately one week each to Afghanistan and Kuwait to gain a theater-wide perspective of the munitions accountability and control situation in Southwest Asia, which is the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. The team identified issues in Afghanistan that were not fully addressed but which merited follow-up. Subsequent to the Afghanistan and Kuwait visits, the assessment team traveled to Iraq for three weeks.

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In January 2009, the Commander, CENTCOM sent a letter to the Acting Inspector General expressing concern about weapons accountability in Afghanistan, and requested an assessment comparable to that which the OIG had previously conducted in Iraq. In response, the OIG established an assessment team which deployed to Afghanistan on March 7, 2009.

Mission Objectives
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The objectives of this assessment were to:
- Assess the current U.S. and ANSF supply chains to determine if munitions accountability and control are adequate.
- Review the status of corrective actions initiated in response to previous IG and GAO reports on munitions accountability.
- Determine whether the current security assistance program is effective in supporting munitions accountability and control.

The team assessed the munitions supply chain from port of entry, through transportation, storage, distribution and formal turnover to ANSF, to issuance to Afghan military and police personnel. Upon completing its field assessment, the team out-briefed the Commander, CSTC-A on March 30, 2009, and returned to the United States April 1, 2009. On April 13, 2009, the team briefed the Chief of Staff, CENTCOM on its preliminary observations and recommendations. The brief was subsequently sent to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Appendix A discusses the scope, methodology and chronology related to this assessment and provides a list of acronyms used in this report. Appendix B summarizes prior OIG coverage related to the assessment objectives. Appendix C provides the glossary of terms used in this report. Appendix D provides a list of the organizations contacted and visited during the assessment. Appendix E provides a summary of United States Code and DOD policies applicable to this report. Appendix F provides the details of the team’s weapons inventories in Afghanistan. Appendix G details management comments. Appendix H provides CSTC-As Corrective Actions to the GAO Report. Appendix I lists the report distribution.
CSTC-A and ANSF Progress Made

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has made significant progress toward improving internal munitions accountability and control. The leadership of the CSTC-A Commander supported by the impressive commitment of its training and mentoring teams had a significant impact.

In addition, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), comprised of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), have advanced in developing effective systems for munitions accountability and control in response to clear and forceful direction from the Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior, respectively.

Since June, 2008, CSTC-A has:

- Registered the serial numbers of 152,917 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), former Warsaw Pact & donated weapons with the DOD Small Arms Registry.
- Established procedures for receiving, storing, and issuing weapons by serial number from Depot 1 and 22 Bunkers (the U.S. national supply depots) to ANA and ANP units.
- Issued guidance establishing formal procedures for weapons transfer from U.S. to Afghan government control.
- Directed its ANA and ANP mentors to conduct a monthly 10% inventory of counterpart unit weapon supplies.
- Improved the physical security of 22 Bunkers, a key weapons supply depot, building a protective fence, erecting guard towers, and adding a fortified entry point.
- Organized and consolidated its ANP weapons and ammunition at 22 Bunkers.
- Issued weapons and ammunition standard operating procedures to mentors, which included establishing a formal point of weapons transfer from U.S. to Afghan control, updated February 26, 2009.
- Issued Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 09-043 directing all its mentoring elements to conduct a monthly 10% sampling of counterpart ANSF weapons and to ensure that the ANA and ANP conduct a 100% monthly inventory.
- Issued FRAGO 09-045 to provide guidance to train the ANP to implement the newly-approved Ministry of Interior (MOI) logistics regulations, which address weapons accountability.

Furthermore:

- Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) – Phoenix, a subordinate unit of CSTC-A tasked with providing the Corps and below mentors and trainers for the ANA, has developed a draft ANA Logistics Mentor Training Book for the Embedded Training Teams (ETT), which includes guidance on weapons oversight.
- The CSTC-A Consolidated Fielding Center provides ANA officers, Kandak personnel and their respective mentors with training on weapons accountability and control during ANA unit training.
The Minister of Defense, with support from the Chief of the General Staff and Corps Commanders, has provided guidance for establishing strict accountability and control over equipment, especially for weapons.

- Ministry of Defense (MOD) Order #0201 mandated monthly 100% weapons serial number inventories by all ANA units.
- MOD and ANA were receiving, storing and issuing weapons by serial number, in ledger books, from the Forward Supply Depots down through infantry company level.
- Weapons collected under the Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) program were being consolidated at Depot 0, a national ANA munitions depot under Afghan management. Once there, weapons were being jointly inventoried by serial number by ANA and Logistics ETTs.
- MOD was institutionalizing accountability and control policies and procedures for weapons and ammunition oversight.

The new Minister of Interior was also exerting strong leadership to establish equipment accountability and control, especially for weapons.

- The Minister has sent “tiger teams” throughout Afghanistan to account for the number of weapons down through the district level and to conduct serial number inventories.
- MOI was institutionalizing accountability and control policies and procedures for weapons and ammunition oversight.

However significant the progress that has been made by CSTC-A and the ANSF in increasing munitions accountability and control, there are still improvements that remain to be made.

The current progress must be reinforced by CSTC-A and the ANSF, and by U.S., Coalition and ISAF mentors until they become fully institutionalized.

The ANA is ahead of the ANP in establishing the necessary leadership, training of its personnel, and infrastructure required to sustain effective oversight of weapons and create a culture of accountability.

A major obstacle to CSTC-A achieving further mentoring progress with respect to weapons accountability and control has been personnel shortages in both ETTs and Police Mentoring Teams (PMT). In particular, there were insufficient CSTC-A personnel to form the required number of PMTs. At the time of the assessment, only 40% of the 2,375 authorized billets for the PMTs were filled. However, OSD and the Joint Staff have recently taken steps to mitigate the shortfall against the force requirements by tasking the Army for a “second” BCT for the ANSF train and equip mission. This second BCT almost doubles the personnel on the ground in support of the ANSF train and equip mission.
Assessment Team Inventory Overview

During the OIG assessment mission to Afghanistan from March 9 to March 30, 2009, the team visited 20 CSTC-A and ANSF locations throughout the country to observe and verify weapons and ammunition accountability and control policy, processes and procedures. Sites visited included the national weapon and ammunition depots, down through regional Forward Supply Depots, and then to individual company and police station arms rooms. The team specifically traveled to Kabul, Kandahar, Gardez, and Mazar-e-Sharif and to U.S. military, ANA and ANP locations around those areas.

The team conducted sample inventories at 17 separate locations in order to verify weapon and ammunition quantities and reconcile weapon serial numbers against stock records in order to verify compliance with U.S. and ANSF policy. The inventories totaled 1,360 weapons of 19 different weapon types, and over 50 thousand ammunition items.

The results of the inventories indicated that there were serial number accountability processes uniformly in place and being followed within CSTC-A and the ANSF. However, in a few instances, inventory results identified problems that were indicative of the need to further strengthen oversight processes and procedures.

The following sections detail the results of the inventories conducted by the assessment team at each of the visited locations.

Regional Command-Central / Kabul

Depot 1

The assessment team visited Depot 1, the national weapons storage depot for the Afghan National Army, on March 15, 2009.

Figure 1 – Assessment team inspects selected weapons within containers.
The team conducted an inventory sample of five shipping containers (CONEXs) used for weapon storage in the Depot 1 weapons compound. They inventoried 582 weapons of which only one weapon serial number was recorded incorrectly in the stock record.

**22 Bunkers**

The team visited the 22 Bunkers munitions storage facility to verify weapons and ammunition accountability. 22 Bunkers is surrounded on three sides by the Kabul Military Training Center and is the national storage depot for ANA ammunition and ANP weapons and ammunition.

In total, the team counted 50,611 items of ammunition/explosives and 292 weapons. Regarding the ammunition inventory, it found a small discrepancy – 2 additional 40 mm red star illumination rounds above the 50,611 ammunition items listed in the property book.

Of the 292 weapons inventoried, all were accounted for on the property book, but the team found that 5 weapons had slight serial number recording discrepancies. In at least one case, the mistake was a result of translating Arabic numbers into English numbers.

![Figure 2 – Assessment team inspects ammunition at 22 Bunkers](image)

**Afghan National Police, Region 2, District 1 Headquarters**

The team visited the ANP Region 2, District 1 Headquarters in Kabul. The team counted 10 AMD65 weapons, 50 German P1 pistols, and 2 Smith and Wesson pistols in the inventory. Although the total quantity of weapons was listed in the arms room, there was no record of the corresponding serial numbers maintained. The district police supervisors had not received the MOI guidance requiring that accountability by serial number be maintained for all weapons in the inventory of ANP units.
Afghanistan National Police, Region 2, District 2 Headquarters
The team visited ANP Region 2, District 2 Headquarters in Kabul. The HQ Commander demonstrated the security procedures used to secure the arms room. The measures included a locked door inside of the police compound as well as a video camera that monitored access. The video was on a closed circuit feed to the Commander’s office. He said that there were not enough weapons for all of the police officers, so weapons are left with the officer-in-charge at each post and then issued to the individual police officers as they come on duty.

Regional Command - South

Forward Supply Depot - South
The assessment team visited the Forward Supply Depot (FSD) – South in Kandahar. The team conducted a serial number inventory of all M4’s in the inventory. Of the 72 M4 rifles inventoried, 2 weapons had single digit serial number mistakes in recording on the issue log book and one weapon was not present. The Afghan property book officer subsequently provided documents for the missing weapon, which had been issued to the FSD commander.

205th Commando Kandak
The assessment team visited the 205th Commando Kandak in Kandahar. An inspection of the 1st Company Arms Room determined that 12 of the 15 M9s on the inventory sheet were accounted for and the serial numbers were correctly listed. For two of the three missing M9s, the Afghan Company Property Book Officer produced hand receipts with the proper serial numbers, signed by the Company Commander and the soldier to whom the weapon was issued to. The third M9 did not have issuance documentation; however, the Commander produced the weapon, which was being kept in his office, and the serial number was verified against the inventory sheet.

An inspection of the 2nd Company Arms Room for M203 Grenade Launchers indicated that all 18 were accounted for and the serial numbers on the inventory sheet were correct.

An inspection of the 3rd Company Arms Room for 18 M249 SAW machineguns indicated that all were accounted for and the serial numbers on the inventory sheet were correct. We also noticed that the M-16A2 assault rifles stored there were separately numbered with tape in the weapons rack, and were also respectively labeled, to include the name of the soldier responsible for the weapon.
The team visited the 4th Kandak, 1st Brigade, 205th Corps in Kandahar. The brigade had been issued 1827 weapons and currently had 1816 on hand (10 C7s and 1 M16 were reported as combat losses). In order to verify the property book entries, the team selected 15 M16 rifles and verified that the serial numbers taken directly from the weapons were included on the property books. Each of the serial numbers was properly recorded, without error.

ANP Regional Distribution Center
On March 18, 2009, the team visited the ANP Regional Weapons and Ammunition Distribution Center at Forward Operating Base Walton outside Kandahar. The team conducted a serial number inventory of 37 weapons – six PRG rocket launchers, six RPK machine guns, ten SW9VE 9mm pistols, ten AMD65 rifles and five GB30s. All weapons inventoried were properly recorded by serial number in the property books.

Regional Command – East
Forward Supply Depot - East,
At the Forward Supply Depot – East in Gardez, the team selected a sampling of weapons including four SW9VE pistols, 40 AMD65 rifles, two RPK machine guns, and one 82 mm mortar. It was determined that the serial number of each of these weapons was properly recorded in the property book.

1, 2, 3/1/203rd Kandaks
The assessment team visited the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Kandaks of the 1st Brigade, 203rd Corps, on March 22, 2009. It conducted a serial number inventory of 75 weapons, including 48 M16 rifles, 18 M203 grenade launchers, and nine M240B machine guns. The inventory indicated that all of
the sampled weapons were documented by serial number on the property books of these Kandaks.

**Regional Training Center**

The team visited the ANP RC-East Regional Training Center where the ANP maintains a weapons and ammunition storage facility. It conducted a serial number inventory of 23 weapons, including ten AMD65 rifles, two RPK machine guns, five SW9VE pistols, one M870 shotgun, one M590A1 pump 12-gauge shotgun, two PKM machine gun, and two RPG rocket launchers. Each of the 23 weapons was properly and accurately recorded by serial number in the property book.

**Regional Command - North**

**ANP Regional Training Center**

The assessment team visited the ANP RC-North Regional Training Center where the ANP maintains a weapons and ammunition storage facility. It conducted a serial number inventory of 24 weapons, including four SW9VE pistols, eight PKM machine guns, four RPG rocket launcher, four AMD65 rifles, and four M870MCS combat shotguns. The team found that each of the 24 weapons was properly and accurately recorded by serial number in the property book.

**ANP Balkh Province Headquarters**

We visited the ANP Balkh Provincial Headquarters to verify weapons and ammunition accountability. It conducted a serial number inventory of 13 weapons, including four SW9VE pistols, four RPG rocket launchers and five AMD65 rifles. The team found that each of the 13 weapons was properly and accurately recorded by serial number in the property book.

**2/1/209th Kandak**

The assessment team visited the 2nd Kandak of the 1st Brigade, 209th Corps to verify weapons and ammunition accountability. It conducted a serial number inventory of 67 weapons, including ten M16 rifles, 40 AK47 rifles, five PKM machine guns, five RPG rocket launchers, four Dragunov sniper rifles, and three SW9VE pistols. The inventory determined that all of the sampled weapons were properly recorded by serial number on the property book.
Figure 4 – Selected Locations Visited During Assessment.
Observation 1. CSTC-A’s Security Cooperation Program

The CSTC-A Security Assistance Office (SAO) did not have sufficient personnel to accomplish the expanding U.S. security assistance mission in Afghanistan.

This inadequacy occurred because of the increased demands imposed on the SAO by the upcoming rapid expansion of the Afghan National Army from 84,000 to 134,000, and also due to the complex implementation of sensitive equipment oversight requirements required by Section 1228 of the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act.

As a result, without an increase in SAO personnel, the ability of CSTC-A and its SAO to responsively and effectively accomplish their security assistance mission responsibilities will be impaired.

Applicable Criteria


DOD Directive 3000.05. “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

DOD 5105.38-M. “Security Assistance Management Manual,” provides guidance for the administration and implementation of security assistance and related activities in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and related statutes and directives.

Section 1228 of the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act directs the President to “implement a policy to control the export and transfer of defense articles into Iraq, including implementation of [a] registration and monitoring system”.

On January 29, 2009, the Assistant Secretary of Defense Global Security Affairs (GSA) signed a memo directing the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to “lead the effort to ensure a registration and monitoring system is developed in Afghanistan, consistent with the requirements of Section 1228 of the national Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-181 for Iraq.”


Members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective individual, collective, unit, and staff training necessary to perform to standard during operations. . . .
The DOD Components shall ensure their individuals and organizations are trained to meet the specific operational requirements of the supported Combatant Commanders, as identified in Combatant Commander-approved Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs), before deploying for operations and while deployed.

**Security Cooperation Programs Division**

CSTC-A’s Security Cooperation Programs Division is the security assistance systems integrator for the U.S. military effort to equip and sustain the Afghan National Security Forces. It manages the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program in Afghanistan, which includes current and future requirements generation and definition, fiscal planning, budgeting, procurement and coordination with CSTC-A’s CJ4 on delivery and transportation. It also manages CSTC-A’s local procurement efforts in support of the equip mission.

The SAO had 22 billets authorized with 18 personnel actually assigned. The four unfilled billets— all leadership positions designated at the O6, O5, O4 and E6 levels— were designated as one-year assignment positions and had been unfilled for the previous 12 months at the time of the assessment.

**Foreign Military Sales Process**

The FMS process in Afghanistan, from requirements identification and definition, through case development, contracting, production, transportation and concluding with delivery, can take up to 2 years. Production lead-time—the time it takes to manufacture the equipment or build the physical infrastructure—is a critical and variable component in determining how long it ultimately takes for delivery to be made. Due to these long production lead-times, the SAO uses a 2-year procurement planning projection to ensure the necessary equipment is available in Afghanistan by the required date.

**Afghan National Army Accelerated Force Generation**

In October 2008, due to the need for additional Afghan security forces, the Commander, CENTCOM made a decision to accelerate the force generation of the ANA to achieve the new authorized strength of 134,000 by December 2011. Previously, the scheduled date to complete this fielding was September 2013.

Based on the 2-year planning horizon in its procurement cycle, the SAO needs to initiate the FMS process in the Summer – Fall of 2009, for delivery to be made by the Summer – Fall of 2011.

**Section 1228 of the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act.**

In Section 1228 of the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. Congress directed the President to establish a registration and monitoring system that includes:

(1) the registration of the serial numbers of all small arms to be provided to the Government of Iraq or to other groups, organizations, citizens, or residents of Iraq;
(2) a program of end-use monitoring of all lethal defense articles provided to such entities or individuals; and
(3) a detailed record of the origin, shipping, and distribution of all defense articles transferred under the Iraq Security Forces Fund or any other security assistance program to such entities or individuals.

On January 29, 2009, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (GSA) directed the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to “lead the effort to ensure a registration and monitoring system is developed in Afghanistan, consistent with the requirements of Section 1228 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-181 for Iraq.”

**CSTC-A Letter to CENTCOM**

On March 12, 2009, the Commander, CSTC-A sent a memo to Commander, CENTCOM requesting 10 additional SAO billets in the CSTC-A Joint Manning Document. The SAO’s mission, which now includes supporting the accelerated expansion of the ANA from 84k to 134k along with the implementation of section 1228, has become even more challenging and complex. Ten additional personnel, with the appropriate security assistance training, experience and tour lengths, assuming the four vacant senior officer billets are filled, will provide the capability the Security Assistance Office requires.

The Commander, CENTCOM has agreed to the request.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and our Response**

1. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff request Military Services fill Security Assistance Office billets with trained and experienced personnel, with standard one-year assignments.

**Initial Command Corrective Actions in Response to Out-brief**

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. The CSTC-A Security Assistance Office has requested 16 additional billets to properly man the Afghan 1228 Program Office, which is under the Security Cooperation Programs directorate. The CSTC-A CG has signed off on the updated Joint Manning Document on May 28, 2009 and forwarded it to USFOR-A and CENTCOM to be validated and reviewed for fills from the appropriate Military Departments (MILDEPs). Six of these personnel will oversee contract management in the command.

**Final Client Comments**

The DOD Office of Inspector General did not receive final management comments from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on this recommendation in time for inclusion into the final report.

**Our Response**

We request the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff provide comments in response to final report.
Observation 2. Inventory Management Software Selection and Implementation

CSTC-A was planning to install the CORE Inventory Management System (CORE IMS), software designed to manage and track inventory, at the MOD’s National and Forward Supply Depots (FSD), to enable the MOD to eventually manage its own weapons inventory. However, the software is difficult to use, even for U.S. contractor personnel, and may not be a practical solution for the ANSF.

As a result, if CORE IMS were to be installed in its current configuration, the MOD personnel may not be able to develop the capacity to independently operate and maintain the software. Therefore, the objective of enhancing weapons accountability and control across the National and Forward Supply Depots by integrating them through automation may not be achieved.

Applicable Criteria

DOD Directive 3000.05. “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

Current System Background

The CORE IMS software has been in use at the CSTC-A managed Depot 1 weapons compound for the past 2 years. It has been maintained and operated by contracted personnel from Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), a defense contractor. CORE IMS is a commercial-off-the-shelf software product that has been modified for use in Afghanistan. It includes the very basic data elements necessary to maintain a proper audit trail of all weapons received, stored, and issued. It features a transaction log, security tools, and basic ad-hoc reporting and backup capabilities.

Both Dari and English translations are provided on all screen inputs and outputs. Dari is currently the official language in Afghanistan for all MOD correspondence. A comprehensive Users Manual has been developed in English, but not yet in Dari, and published.

Current System Weaknesses

On March 14, 2009, the OIG team conducted random sample weapon inventories at Depot 1. In response to the team’s request for paper printouts of the contents of individual CONEXs (large 40’ shipping containers where weapons are stored), it took over an hour to produce the ad-hoc reports. MPRI could not produce ad-hoc reports for a chosen weapons box or container. Instead, they had to produce a full report of all weapons currently on hand, export it to Microsoft Excel, and then cut and paste the portions of the report that responded to our initial inquiry. This manual manipulation of the CORE IMS data was very cumbersome and inefficient.
It also indicated that Afghan MOD personnel will not only be required to learn CORE IMS, but also Microsoft Excel.

Despite the use of laptops by the MPRI personnel to process data and produce reports, CORE IMS goes down whenever the local power generator fails. This is because the actual database resides on a separate server in another trailer. Therefore, the network connection between the laptops and the server is severed with the loss of power, which is a frequent and daily occurrence throughout Afghanistan.

The software is bi-lingual in Dari and English, but the User Manual is written in English only. Unfortunately, the vast majority of Afghans are illiterate in either Dari or English. Therefore, manual instruction and hands-on experience is vital if MOD is to ever assume daily operation of the inventory management system. At the time of the assessment, there were no Afghan MOD or ANA personnel working at Depot 1 weapons compound.

The version of CORE IMS that was being used was not available on the internet. CSTC-A and MPRI personnel stated that a newer version was being developed that would be web-enabled. They also stated that this newer version of CORE IMS would have more advanced ad-hoc capabilities. However, there was no implementation date yet established.

**Recommendation, Client Comments, and our Response**

2. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan review planning to implement Core IMS software and determine, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense, its applicability for Ministry of Defense personnel and whether alternate solutions may be easier for the Afghans to implement and sustain.

**Initial Command Corrective Actions in Response to Out-brief and Final Comments**

CSTC-A partially concurs with the DODIG recommendation. Transition to an automated system is the next step toward enabling the ANA's capability of asset inventory management within the depots. However, the MOD's Supply Decree 4.0 outlines a manual system which the ANA will continue to use as both an alternative and precursor solution to Core IMS implementation by the ANA. This manual system is fully acceptable as a method to account for property while the overall logistics skills of the ANA develop.

**Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive.
Observation 3. Ministries of Defense and Interior Weapon Inventories

The Afghan MOD and MOI do not maintain centralized data bases, by serial number, of weapons in their inventories, and in the inventories of the ANA and the ANP.

As a result, the ability of the MOD and MOI to have the necessary visibility over their respective weapon inventories, and to therefore be able to effectively manage, control and allocate this critical resource, and, finally, to be able to hold accountable those military and police leaders who have been given responsibility for these weapons, may be impaired. Furthermore, without a centralized weapon data base, the MOD and MOI are hindered in their ability to develop operational and logistical independence and self-sufficiency.

Applicable Criteria

DOD Directive 3000.05. “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The Directive also states it is DOD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.

Ministry of Defense/Ministry of Interior Decrees

Until recently, the MOD and MOI had not clearly defined their respective weapons oversight responsibilities.

However, the MOD has recently published decrees 4.0 (Supported and Supporting Unit Logistics Policy and Support Procedures) and 4.2 (Materiel Accountability Policy and Procedures) to address basic supply operations and accountability policy and procedures. These are essentially Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that direct the MOD/ANA on how to supply and account for materiel, including sensitive items such as weapons. Decrees 4.0 and 4.2 state that supply records will be “automated” and that weapons (among other items) will be accounted for by serial number.
The MOD also issued Order Number 0201, dated March 4, 2009, that mandates procedures for conducting monthly 100% weapons serial number inventories in units of the Afghan National Army and for submitting the inventory reports through the chain of command to the MOD.

The MOI has issued Logistics Policy “Process for the Management of Logistics,” dated January 6, 2009, that requires a monthly serial number inventory of all MOI / ANP weapons.

**Current Ministry of Defense Weapons Tracking**

Depot 1, the national weapons storage depot for the ANA located outside Kabul, is controlled and managed by the CSTC-A embedded training team (ETT) stationed there. The ETT uses inventory management software called CORE IMS to maintain the inventory of weapons stored there and has contracted with MPRI, a defense contractor, to manage the software.

The MOD does not have an independent inventory system to track their weapons stored at Depot 1.

**Current Ministry of Interior Weapons Tracking**

22 Bunkers, the national weapons storage depot for the Afghan National Police located outside Kabul, is controlled and managed by the resident U.S. ETT. The ETT uses Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheets to maintain an inventory of the weapons stored at that facility.

The MOI does not have an independent inventory system to track their weapons at 22 Bunkers.

**MOD/ANA and MOI/ANP Sustainability**

The MOD and MOI do not have automated visibility over their weapon inventories held throughout the supply chain. Consequently, their ability to manage and coordinate their weapon inventories is limited and dependant upon the on-site U.S. ETTs and the resourcefulness of the local ANSF personnel.

As weapon serial numbers are collected through implementation of the new decrees and policies, the MOD and MOI will need data systems that capture and manage this critical information. The development of effective inventory management systems will be a critical stepping-stone to Afghan operational independence and self-sufficiency.

**Recommendation, Client Comments, and our Response**

3. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to develop and install databases to track Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police weapons by serial number and unit locations.
Client Comments
CSTC-A concurs with the DODIG recommendation. CSTC-A CORE-IMS is the automated system used by the ANA to receipt, store and issue weapons by serial number and location from the national level depots. The ANP is using an Excel spreadsheet product, which is maintained by US Mentors to track weapons since there is not an Afghan system in place. CSTC-A will mentor the ANA and ANP logistics leaders to assess their automation needs in order to either modify existing systems, or come up with new system that meets their weapons accountability needs. The mentoring effort must begin at the ANSF Ministerial levels.

Our Response
Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive.
Observation 4. Condition of M16s Designated for the Afghanistan National Security Forces

During a sample inventory of weapons stored at Depot 1, the assessment team noted that some M16A2s that were purchased by the U.S. military for distribution to the ANA appeared to be in unsatisfactory condition. These particular “refurbished” weapons were dirty, had paint that came off on your hands when handled, broken hand guards and ejection port covers, and even had leftover “Go Army” stickers on them. These weapons would have eventually been distributed to the ANA, which would have undermined its confidence in the NATO weapons fielding program.

This occurred because of a lack of oversight to ensure M16s provided met the standard required in the procurement contract.

As a result, CSTC-A will be forced to withhold some M16s from distribution to the ANA until these problems are corrected.

Applicable Criteria

DOD Directive 3000.05. “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

DOD Instruction 5000.64. “Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006, provides policy and procedures for DOD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C., section 524.

NATO Weapon Fielding Program

CSTC-A has made a strategic decision to upgrade the ANA from former Warsaw Pact weapons to rifles that are used by NATO forces. The 201st Corps, the 203rd Corps and the 205th Corps, which are serving in the most contested areas of the country, are scheduled to receive the NATO weapons first, with the 207th Corps and the 209th Corps retaining their former Warsaw Pact weapons for now.

One of CSTC-A’s sources for NATO weapons are refurbished M16s sourced from the U.S. military. The M16s the team inspected were supplied by a U.S. contractor that purchased used U.S. military M16s and refurbished them for distribution to the ANA.

Depot 1 Weapons Assessment

While conducting serial number inventories of weapons at Depot 1, the assessment team opened a crate that contained M16A2s. The M16s were procured as refurbished weapons. The contractor had packaged the refurbished weapons in individual plastic bags and placed them in a crate with approximately 100 other rifles.
The following M16 problems were identified:

- A majority of the weapons did not appear to have been cleaned prior to delivery. They were dirty, had rust on them, and some of the barrels were clogged with cloth.
- Many of the weapons had broken hand guards and ejection port covers.
- The weapons had not been “Blued” prior to their shipping. They had been painted and the paint rubbed off as the team checked the serial numbers on the weapons.
- The weapon parts appeared to be worn and the weapons may not fire properly, although the assessment team did not test fire any of them.
- There were old stickers still attached to the rifle butts.

Figure 5 – Refurbished weapons purchased by the U.S. for distribution to ANA with old stickers still attached.

The M16s were, therefore, not in acceptable condition for distribution to the ANA. These weapons needed to be serviced, range-tested and brought up to an acceptable condition for issuance.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and our Response**

4. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:
   a. Review the contract for these weapons and amend it accordingly, if required, to ensure that future weapons meet an acceptable standard for Afghan National Army use.
   b. Determine whether the weapons supplied under this contract represent a breach of contract and if so take appropriate actions.
   c. Screen weapons currently at Depot 1, service and/or repair them to an acceptable standard
Initial Command Corrective Actions in Response to Out-brief

Recommendation 4.a. Review the contract for these weapons and amend it accordingly to ensure that future weapons meet an acceptable standard for ANA use.

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. CSTC-A has reviewed the current contracts. All inbound weapons are required to be fully mission capable, but not required to be completely overhauled. Only parts that fail standard gauging and functions checks will be fixed or replaced. Additionally, CSTC-A held a teleconference on 28 May 09 with Military Departments and Life Cycle Management Commands to ensure all future weapons meet acceptable standards for ANA operational use. There is a follow-up meeting schedule for the week of 8 June 2009.

Recommendation 4.b. Determine whether the weapons supplied under this contract represent a breach of contract and if so take appropriate actions.

The M-16A2s in question, with minor exceptions, are in compliance with contractual obligations. No-go weapons are being reported to CSTC-A and will be repaired by the in-country weapons maintenance contractor. Discrepancies are reported via standard Supply Discrepancy Reports to the U.S. Navy International Programs Office and the USMC, as they were the providers of the weapons.

Recommendation 4.c. CSTC-A screen weapons currently in Depot 1 and remove and appropriately dispose those that are unusable.

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. CSTC-A is consolidating a list of non-mission capable weapons provided under the contract. Data received to date has been presented to the U.S. Navy International Programs Office & the USMC and discussions have begun on steps to rectify the discrepancies. Upon completion of non-mission capable checks for weapons supplied to the ANA, the USMC has indicated a willingness to replace no-go parts on delivered weapons. This process will be ongoing, as weapons have already been distributed to ANA units and the weapons maintenance contractor is conducting inspections at each site.

Recommendation 4.d. Identify weapons already distributed that do not meet standards, and service and or repair them.

NO RESPONSE: NEW RECOMMENDATION

Recommendation 4.e. Screen future weapons under this contract before shipment.

NO RESPONSE: NEW RECOMMENDATION
Client Final Comments

**Recommendation 4.a:** CSTC-A concurs with the DODIG recommendation. CSTC-A has reviewed the current contracts and require all inbound weapons to be fully mission capable. Only parts that fail standard gauging and functions checks will be fixed or replaced. Additionally, CSTC-A held a teleconference on 28 May 2009 with Military Departments and Life Cycle Management Commands to ensure all future weapons meet acceptable standards for ANA operational use.

**Recommendation 4.b:** CSTC-A concurs with DODIG recommendation. The M-16A2s with minor exceptions are in compliance with contractual obligations. The weapons identified as unserviceable are being reported to CSTC-A and will be repaired by the in-country weapons maintenance contractor. Discrepancies are reported via Shipping Discrepancy Reports to the U.S. Navy International Programs Office and the USMC.

**Recommendation 4.c:** CSTC-A concurs with the DODIG recommendation. CSTC-A screens weapons procured with Afghan Security Force Funding as part of a 1228 End Use Monitoring Team. CSTC-A reports non-mission capable weapons provided under the contract on the Shipping Discrepancy Reports. Data received to date has been presented to the: U.S. Navy International Programs Office and the USMC and we are trying rectifying discrepancies.

**Recommendation 4.d:** CSTC-A CJ4 has reviewed the requirements in current and future FMS contract cases. All inbound weapons are required to be fully mission-capable, but refurbished weapons are not required to be completely overhauled. Only parts that fail standard gauging and functions check will be fixed, replaced, or overhauled. In order to get weapons to the field quickly, the decision was made to accept weapons that meet serviceability requirements without complete overhaul and refurbishment. CSTC-A CJ4 sent a letter to the US Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) to address the unserviceable weapons provided under the contract, in addition to filing required Shipping Discrepancy Reports (SDRs).

**Recommendation 4.e:** Does not apply to CSTC-A.

**Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive.

In regards to recommendation 4.e, CSTC-A mentioned in previous comments that it has taken steps with the “Military Departments and Life Cycle Management Commands to ensure all future weapons meet acceptable standards for ANA operational use.” This meets the intent of the recommendation.
Observation 5. Mobile Arms Room Containers

The Mobile Arms Room Containers (MARC) program for the transport and storage of weapons down to the Kandak and company levels has significantly improved ANA unit-level weapons security and control; however, the MARCs themselves suffered from design flaws:

- Doors, locks and windows were not strong enough for proper security.
- Weapons racks did not properly secure the weapons during in-transit moves, causing damage to the weapons.
- The environmental control unit was mounted on the side of the MARC, increasing the likelihood of it being damaged while in-transit, and thus becoming unserviceable.
- The MARCs were too large and immobile for use at lower echelon units (Kandak and below)

As a result, design deficiencies in the MARCs have hindered the ability of the lower echelon units to properly store and secure their weapons. Additionally, the size of the containers has made it difficult for use at the Kandak (battalion) and lower echelons.

Applicable Criteria

DOD Directive 3000.05. “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

DODI 5100.76. “Safeguarding Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) and the AA&E Physical Security Review Board,” October 8, 2005, outlines the authorities, responsibilities, and functions relative to worldwide uniform policy, standards, and guidance for the physical security of conventional AA&E in the possession or custody of the DOD Components.

DOD 5200.08-R. “Physical Security Program,” April 9, 2007, implements DOD policies and minimum standards for the physical protection of DOD personnel, installations, operations, and related resources, to include the security of weapons systems and platforms.

MARC usage at the National, Regional, and Kandak level

In order to expedite the fielding of NATO weapons, as well as to ensure they have a secure storage facility at the unit level, CSTC-A contracted with a local Kabul manufacturer to develop and build the MARCs. The MARC is a modified 20’ or 40’ CONEX\(^3\) modified to include built-

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\(^3\) CONEX stands for container express. In the case of the MARCs, they are International Organization for Standardization (ISO) containers that come in 20’ and 40’ lengths. The 20 foot long by 81/2 foot high by 8-foot wide ISO container is the primary size container for unit equipment shipments. Units may use larger containers in contingency or mobilization operations. However, user capability to handle and transport these containers is the overriding consideration; for example, what is the availability or capacity of container–handling equipment? The ISO container is already a standardized part of the world’s commercialized shipping and transportation system.
in weapons racks, an environmental control unit (air conditioner) and, on the front of the MARC, an issue window and securable front door.

The vendor delivers the MARCs to Depot 1 where CSTC-A personnel stage them in preparation for unit fielding of NATO weapons. To prepare a weapon shipment for delivery, the U.S. ETT at Depot 1 pulls the appropriate weapons out of their storage containers and then loads them into a MARC for transit to a Corps, Brigade, or Kandak. The MOD then uses either one of their own trucks to move the MARC or it contracts with a commercial trucking company.

**Moving the MARC**

Lifting the MARC off the ground to set it on a truck requires the use of a crane, RTCH\(^4\), or equivalent material handling equipment. Depot 1 and the Forward Supply Depots have the ability to pick-up and move either the 20’ or 40’ MARC. However, at the Kandak and company level, the ability to use the 40’ MARC as a mobile asset is limited due to its large size and the lack of appropriate material handling equipment assets.

**Security Features on the Access Window and Front Door**

The front door, access window and locks on the MARCs are not strong enough to properly secure the weapons stored inside. Once the Afghan units receive the MARCs, they are forced to make on-the-spot modifications to upgrade the security of the front door, access window and locks. At the 1\(^{st}\) Brigade of the 203\(^{rd}\) Corps in Gardez, the Afghans and U.S. mentors were backing a vehicle up against the MARCs access window and front door at night to block them and provide additional security until modifications could be made.

![Figure 6 – Front and side views of the Mobile Arms Room Containers](image)

Other CONEXs are QUADCONS (four of them are equivalent to one 20-foot ISO container) and TRICONs (three are equivalent).

\(^4\) RTCH stands for Rough Terrain Cargo Handler that comes in 20’, 25’, and 40’ capable variants.
**Environment Control Unit**

The Environment Control Unit (ECU), or air conditioner, currently sits on the long side of the MARC, which increases the likelihood of damage during transport. Relocating the ECU to inside the container or to one of the MARC’s short ends would reduce the potential for damage. During a visit to Forward Operating Base Lightning in Gardez, we observed damaged ECUs on some of the MARC units, which occurred during transit.

**Built-in Weapons Storage Racks**

The MARCs had four rows of built-in racks, which held either NATO or former Warsaw Pact weapons. When the MARC was stationary, the racks were well-suited for storing weapons. However, while the MARC was being transported from Depot 1 to a receiving Corps, Brigade, or Kandak, weapons fell out of the racks, ended up in a pile on the floor and suffered damage. The racks would need to be modified to install some type of tie-down to securely hold weapons while in-transit.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and our Response**

5. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:
   a. Review contract, determine if containers met requirements, and adjust if necessary to address security problems.
   b. Coordinate with contractor to modify doors, locks and windows to upgrade security features, install tie-downs on racks to securely hold weapons while in-transit, and redesign location of external climate control unit.
   c. Coordinate with the Ministry of Defense and/or Afghan National Army to determine the best size of the Mobile Arms Room Containers for effective use down to the Kandak level.

**Initial Command Corrective Actions in Response to Out-brief and Final Comments**

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. We have coordinated with the contractor, and all recommendations are incorporated into the newest MARC design. Additional security has been added to the doors and windows. Additional brackets have been installed on the exteriors, for air-conditioners, and additional bars have been added to secure weapons during transit.

**Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive.
Observation 6. CSTC-A Policy Regarding Serial Number Accountability for Weapons

During the assessment team’s sample physical inventories, it determined that some weapons stored at Depot 1 and at other ANA/ANP supply points had not been removed from their packing material to allow for verification of the serial number off the weapon itself. This was inconsistent with Commander, CSTC-A’s guidance and failed to ensure adequate verification of the serial numbers actually on the weapons.

This occurred because depot staff did not follow CSTC-A guidance correctly.

The lack of physical verification could lead to incorrect recording of weapons, or acceptance of containers without all the weapons inside. This practice did not conform to appropriate weapon accountability.

Applicable Criteria

Commander, CSTC-A Guidance. Frago 09-052 (DTG 260503ZMAR09) requires CSTC-A mentors to conduct a 100% visual verification of all M4 Rifle and M240B machine gun serial numbers issued to the ANA.

DOD Directive 3000.05. “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

DOD Instruction 5000.64. “Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006, provides policy and procedures for DOD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C., section 524.

DOD Instruction 5010.40. “Managers’ Internal Control Program Procedures,” January 4, 2006, states that management internal control procedures are basic to U.S. Government accountability and are specified in this instruction.

DODI 5100.76. Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives, “Safeguarding Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) and the AA&E Physical Security Review Board,” October 8, 2005, outlines the authorities, responsibilities, and functions relative to worldwide uniform policy, standards, and guidance for the physical security of conventional AA&E in the possession or custody of the DOD Components.

DOD 5200.08-R. “Physical Security Program,” April 9, 2007, implements DOD policies and minimum standards for the physical protection of DOD personnel, installations, operations, and related resources, to include the security of weapons systems and platforms.
Introduction
Manufacturers normally ship new and refurbished weapons in some type of a sealed container in which the weapons are wrapped in paper or sealed in plastic. The primary purpose of this method of shipment is to ensure protection of the weapon from any damage. In normal procedures, the receiving unit would open the container and plastic wrapping to physically verify the condition and serial number for record purposes. This breaking of the seal would not occur at the national or a regional supply point, but at the battalion or receiving unit level.

During previous CSTC-A inventories, personnel took weapon serial numbers off the shipping manifest, or from the outside markings on the containers in which the weapons were shipped, versus physically opening the package and directly verifying each serial number on the weapon itself.

However, given the need to strengthen weapons oversight in Afghanistan, reflected in the guidance issued by the Commander, CSTC-A, all weapons need to be opened and physically inspected to verify their condition and serial number at the national depot levels.

Discrepancies Noted At All Echelons of the MOD and MOI Storage and Issue Sites
While visiting different supply points and unit armories, the team noted various types of weapons still in their original packing and shipping containers. At Depot 1, this was the case with M24 sniper systems, M4s, and AKMS rifles. At the Forward Supply Depot in Kandahar, there were M4s and M16s in their original packaging. At Balkh provincial Police HQ, there were AMD-65s still wrapped in paper packing material and sealed in a plastic outer protective bag. There were no errors in the serial numbers recorded once the weapons were individually inspected. But, at each of the sites, it was determined that the previous prevailing practice was followed, i.e., that weapon serial numbers were not verified by physically inspecting each weapon.

CSTC-A Command Guidance
Commander, CSTC-A had issued guidance previously ordering a physical inventory verification of all weapon serial numbers at Depot 1. Tiger teams dispatched to the depot were directed to verify all serial numbers by physical inspection of weapons in the inventory, but there were some weapon types that they had not inspected as directed. An on-the-spot correction with the Logistics (LOG) ETT Officer-in-Charge corrected the issue at Depot 1 of all current weapons on-hand. Since this is the logistical throughput point for all NATO weapons, opening them there will correct any deficiencies before distribution to the lower echelons.

Consistent with the Commander’s guidance, CSTC-A needs to ensure that U.S. personnel working at the Depot 1 and 22 Bunkers weapons compounds physically verify the serial numbers by inspecting each weapon (not just by checking serial numbers on the outside of a shipping package or container). Additionally, since weapons were identified at lower echelon ANA and ANP units still in sealed shipping containers, it was apparent that these personnel were also not observing correct serial number verification practices. CSTC-A mentors up and down the supply
chain will need to ensure all ANA and ANP personnel physically verify the serial numbers of all weapons directly from the weapons themselves.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and our Response**

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<tr>
<th>6. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:</th>
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<tr>
<td>a. Reinforce guidance to mentors to ensure their ANA and ANP counterparts physically verify the serial number on each weapon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Ensure that all personnel at Depot 1 and 22 Bunker weapon compounds physically verify serial numbers of weapons in new shipments by directly inspecting the weapon itself.</td>
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**Initial Command Corrective Actions in Response to Out-brief**

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. CSTC-A published a Weapons and Ammunition SOP on 26 February 2009, that established procedures to account for and verify weapons by serial numbers. Additionally, multiple FRAGOs were issued in support of weapons and ammunition accountability programs, including CSTC-A FRAGOs 08-090 (Accountability of NATO Weapons, dated 09 Aug 2008), 09-039 (Depot SOP for Weapons and Ammunition, dated 26 Feb 2009), 09-038 (Tiger Team for Weapons Inventory at ANA Depot 1, dated 27 Feb 2009), 09-043 Mod I (Verification of Compliance with 100% Weapons Serial Number Inventory, dated 17 Mar 2009), 09-052 (Verification of Serial Numbers for M4 Rifles & M240B Machine Guns, dated 26 Mar 2009), and DRAFT 09-XXX (Afghan 1228 Program Implementation). The Afghan 1228 Program has begun conducting end use monitoring visits to ANSF units, providing first-hand sample verification of serial numbers and cross-referencing of the observed data with the DOD Small Arms Registry and CSTC-A records. Physical verification of serial numbers on weapons is the standard procedure at Depot 1.

**Final Client Comments**

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. CSTC-A published a Weapons and Ammunition SOP on 26 February 2009, that established procedures to account for and verify weapons by serial numbers. Additionally, multiple FRAGOs were issued in support of weapons and ammunition accountability programs, including CSTC-A FRAGOs 08-090 (Accountability of NATO Weapons, dated 09 Aug 2008), 09-039 (Depot SOP for Weapons and Ammunition, dated 26 Feb 2009), 09-038 (Tiger Team for Weapons Inventory at ANA Depot 1, dated 27 Feb 2009), 09-043 Mod I (Verification of Compliance with 100% Weapons Serial Number Inventory, dated 17 Mar 2009), 09-052 (Verification of Serial Numbers for M4 Rifles & M240B Machine Guns, dated 26 Mar 2009), 09-107 Lost, Damaged or Destroyed Weapons Serial Number Reporting, dated 22 June 2009. The Afghan 1228 Program has begun conducting end use monitoring visits to ANSF units, providing first-hand sample verification of serial numbers and cross-referencing of the observed data with the DOD Small Arms Registry and CSTC-A records. Physical verification of serial numbers on weapons is the standard procedure at Depot 1. The 1228 Team conducted an inspection of Depot 1 on 8 August 2009 and discovered no discrepancies. Depot 1 is in compliance with all SOPs.
Our Response

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive.
Observation 7. Promulgation of Ministry of Defense Policy on Weapons Accountability to Field Level Operational Units

Ministry of Defense decrees on weapons accountability and control have not always been promulgated to ANA operational units by the ministry and the ANA General Staff.

This occurred due to lack of effective follow-through to achieve this objective by the MOD and ANA chains of command.

As a result, this prevents the U.S. ETTs from building their mentoring efforts around the implementation of MOD’s own decrees, and hinders the development of ANA weapons accountability and control procedures and processes.

Applicable Criteria

**DOD Directive 3000.05.** “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The Directive also states it is DOD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.

**MOD Order #0201.** Dated March 4, 2009, outlines “procedures for conducting a monthly 100% weapons serial number inventory in units of the Afghan National Army and submitting of the inventory report through the chain of command” to the MOD.

**MOD Munitions Policy**

The MOD has made significant progress in the development and implementation of policies for the accountability and safeguarding of weapons and ammunition. Among other initiatives, it issued MOD Order #0201, which mandated a monthly 100 percent weapons serial number inventory by all ANA units and the reporting of those results to the MOD.

However, despite this progress, the policies have not always being effectively implemented because they were not promulgated to lower level operational units.
**205th Corps in Kandahar**

During a visit to the regional Forward Supply Depot (FSD) in RC-South at Kandahar, the U.S. LOG ETT assigned to mentor the on-site MOD personnel reported that the policy on weapons accountability and control had not been received by the ANA personnel operating the FSD. The LOG ETT provided the ANA personnel a copy of the policy, but the Afghans would not act on it because it had not come down through their ANA chain of command.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and our Response**

7. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:
   a. Coordinate with the Ministry of Defense for it to promulgate the decrees down the chain of command to all Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army echelons.
   b. Ensure embedded training team personnel confirm that Ministry of Defense decrees have been received with counterpart units.

**Initial Command Corrective Actions in Response to Out-brief and Final Client Comments**

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. CSTC-A continues to advise and train MOD and MOI on weapons accountability. CSTC-A trainers are mentoring compliance and reporting monthly to CSTC-A. The MOD developed an ANA weapons accountability decree that was both ratified & promulgated on 4 Mar 09, we continue to mentor execution.

**Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive.

There were no MoD or ANA personnel assigned to and working at the Depot 1 weapons compound and were, therefore, unable to develop the warehouse and inventory management skills that the MOD and ANA require to build logistical self-sufficiency.

This occurred because the U.S. ETT managing Depot 1’s operations did not believe the Afghan personnel working there were productive so they were reassigned.

As a result, the U.S. is losing a valuable opportunity to train a cadre of Afghan workers on how to manage a well-run weapons depot and to build this capability into the MoD and ANA logistics sustainment base.

Applicable Criteria

DOD Directive 3000.05. “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The Directive also states it is DOD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.

Depot 1 Operations

The weapons compound at Depot 1 is the national weapons depot for the ANA. It stores approximately 45,000 NATO-type and 15,000 former Warsaw Pact weapons. The facility is managed by 11 U.S. logistical Embedded Training Team mentors (LOG ETT) personnel. In addition MPRI has 2 personnel working on-site supporting the CORE Inventory Management System software. No Afghan MOD or ANA personnel were currently assigned to or working at the weapons compound within Depot 1 as part of the operational staff.

The weapons compound is part of the much larger main facility called Depot 1, to which 120 Afghan personnel are employed. The weapon compound’s guards are Afghans contracted for by CSTC-A.
In April 2008, when the OIG team visited Depot 1 as part of a previous assessment, it observed Afghan soldiers working on weapons refurbishment within Depot 1.

In early 2009, the LOG ETT decided the Afghan personnel weren’t sufficiently effective performing their then assigned function, so they were reassigned by the MOD. While this may have increased short-term productivity, Depot 1 then became a strictly U.S. operation run by CSTC-A (overall management and the running of the depot) and MPRI (management of the CORE Inventory management System).

To build ANSF logistical self-sufficiency, the MOD and ANA will need a cadre of trained and mentored staff who have experience in working in a well-run weapons supply depot operation and the capacity to manage such facilities.

**Recommendation, Client Comments, and our Response**

8. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, coordinate with Ministry of Defense counterparts to assign Ministry of Defense and/or Afghan National Army personnel to Depot 1 and ensure they receive appropriate training and mentoring in depot management and supporting services in the area of weapons accountability and control.

**Initial Command Corrective Actions in Response to Out-brief**

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. Our current direction is for MOD/ANA personnel to manage the daily operations for sustainment at Depot 0, which will reinforce Afghan actions and generate self-sufficiency. LOG-ETT mentors MOD / ANA at Depot 0 focus on mentoring supply processes, procedures, and property accountability.

**Final Client Comments**

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. Our current direction is for MOD/ANA personnel to manage the daily operations for sustainment at Depot 0, which will reinforce Afghan actions and generate self-sufficiency. LOG ETT mentoring MOD/ANA personnel at Depot 0 focus on mentoring supply processes, procedures, and property accountability. Depot 0 operational implementation is on track. The transfer of uniforms from Depot 1 to Depot 0 began 23 July 2009. Vendors will begin direct delivery of these types of items to Depot 0 in late August. Winterization efforts will be centralized at Depot 0 this fall/winter. The first Afghan requisition for winter gear was received at Depot 0 on 26 July 2009.

**Our Response**

Although Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, the client comments were only partially responsive. The comments detailed the training and mentoring of Afghan personnel in supply management at Depot 0, but did not address the opportunity to train Afghan personnel in “depot management and supporting services in the area of weapons accountability and control” at Depot 1. We request CSTC-A review the recommendation again and provide comments in response to final report.

International mentor forces in ISAF Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (POMLTs) had not been directed to mentor the ANSF regarding implementing MOD and MOI weapons accountability directives or, if they have taken the initiative to mentor the ANA and ANP on munitions oversight, the mentoring standards may not have been consistent with that of CSTC-A guidance to U.S. ETTs and Police Mentoring Teams (PMT). OMLTs and POMLTs have not operated under a unified command with their U.S. ETT and PMT counterparts. This has contributed to a lack of coherence and consistency in the overall mentoring effort.

For example, on March 8, 2009, the Commander, CSTC-A issued FRAGO 09-043 which directed all mentors to ensure that the ANA and ANP conduct their recently ordered 100% monthly inventories of ANA and ANP weapons. However, due to current command relationships, this FRAGO only covered U.S. ETTs and PMTs but not ISAF OMLTs and POMLTs.

The lack of coordination between guidance provided to ISAF mentoring teams and guidance provided to CSTC-A mentoring teams may result in some ANA and ANP units not receiving any mentoring in the proper accountability and control of weapons. Or, the standards that ISAF mentors have applied may not be the same as those implemented by CSTC-A mentors, or be consistent with MOD and MOI directives.

This could result in ANA and ANP confusion concerning the appropriate weapons oversight standards and requirements, and therefore reduce accountability throughout the ANA and ANP.

Applicable Criteria

DOD Directive 3000.05. “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

Fragmentary Order 09-043. “Verification of Monthly Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Compliance with 100 Percent Weapons Serial Number Inventory,” March 8, 2009, requires all elements of CSTC-A to ensure that the ANSF conduct monthly 100% serial number inventory of all weapons and also to assist the ANSF in their efforts to account for, control, and physically secure weapons. The order also requires mentors to conduct their own 10% monthly inventory of the M-16, AK-47 and other weapons systems.


Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Logistics Policy, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” January 6, 2009. This decree incorporates and/or replaces all previously approved logistics management policy and systems. This policy contains specific requirements related to: property accountability, the logistics structure and organization, roles and responsibilities, property book establishment and maintenance, specific instructions for each class of materiel, roles and responsibilities, as well as general responsibilities for anyone using government materiel. The policy requires serial number accounting for weapons. The policy requires that weapons be inventoried by serial number monthly.

Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Order #0201, dated March 4, 2009, mandated procedures for conducting monthly 100% weapons serial number inventories in units of the Afghan National Army and for submitting the inventory reports through the chain of command to the MOD.

Afghanistan Chain and Command Structure
In October 6, 2008, the activation of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan was announced with its Commander dual-hatted as the Commander, ISAF. This new command and control structure should provide for improved unity of effort between U.S. and Coalition forces. Today, all mentoring elements in Afghanistan, whether U.S. ETTs and PMTs and Coalition OMLTs and POMLTs, fall under the command of this dual-hatted commander allowing for the integration and coordination of the mentoring assistance provided to the ANA and ANP.

MOD and MOI Guidance
The Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior have provided clear and forceful direction to the ANA and ANP on establishing effective systems of weapons accountability. Consequently, a number of decrees and orders have been signed and issued that advance the development of effective systems for weapons accountability and control.

The MOD has issued Order Number 0201, dated March 4, 2009, mandating a monthly 100% weapons serial number inventory in units of the ANA and that requires the inventory results to be submitted through the chain of command to the MOD.

Likewise, the MOI has issued MOI policy “Process for the management of Logistics”(???)}, dated January 6, 2009, mandating monthly 100% weapons serial number inventory in units of the ANP.
CSTC-A Guidance

Due to previous U.S. government audit and evaluation reports from the Government Accountability Office and OIG, the Commander, CSTC-A has issued guidance to improve its mentoring assistance regarding ANSF weapons accountability and control.

One of the key building blocks for improving oversight was FRAGO 09-043 directing ETTs and PMTs to conduct monthly 10% sample inventories of ANA and ANP weapons and to ensure that the ANA and ANP conduct the 100% monthly inventories of weapons as mandated by the MOD and MOI, respectively.

CSTC-A also issued FRAGO 09-045 directing their mentors to train the ANP to implement the newly-approved MOI logistics regulations, which addressed weapons accountability policy and procedures.

In addition, CJTF Phoenix has developed a draft ANA Logistics Mentor Training Book for the ETTs, which includes guidance on mentoring ANA weapons oversight.

Lack of Consistent, Uniform Mentoring Standards

CSTC-A, the organization tasked with the training and equipping of the ANSF did not have operational command over the OMLTs and POMLTs that were tasked with helping to carry out that mission. Since the OMLTs and POMLTs were staffed and commanded by different nations, with varying guidance on how their missions were to be conducted, mentoring related to developing ANSF weapons oversight has not been consistent necessarily with CSTC-A mentoring standards.

Thus, since the OMLTs and POMLTs have been under the ISAF chain of command, but not that of CSTC-A, they have not been bound by FRAGO 09-043, among other oversight mentoring guidance, which directed U.S. mentors to ensure that the ANA and ANP conduct 100% monthly inventories.

To avoid confusion and ensure consistent standards regarding ANSF weapons accountability, both U.S. CSTC-A mentoring teams and non-U.S. ISAF mentoring teams would have to provide their ANA and ANP counterpart units the same mentoring assistance.

Recommendation, Client Comments, and our Response

9. Commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan, dual-hatted as the Commander, International Security Assistance Force, direct the international mentors (OMLTs and POMLTs) to mentor the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior decrees and orders, consistent with Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan mentor guidance, on Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police weapons accountability and control.
Initial Command Corrective Actions in Response to Out-brief

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. CSTC-A provided a draft FRAGO to ISAF to review for approval and publication. The FRAGO, once approved and distributed by ISAF, will direct Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLT) and Police Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (POMLT), the ISAF equivalent of CSTC-A Embedded Training Teams (ETT) and Police Mentor Teams (PMT), respectively, to enforce the MOI and MOD weapons accountability programs. Both MOI and MOD have issued decrees establishing weapons accountability procedures to include monthly serial numbered inventories. OMLTs will enforce the conduct of the inventories through mentorship as well as active participation and supervision of inventories. CSTC-A anticipates that ISAF will publish this FRAGO in the coming days.

ISAF published FRAGO 291-2009 on 19 June 2009 that directs ISAF OMLTs and POMLTs to ensure their ANSF mentored units conduct monthly one hundred percent serial number inventories of all weapons and assist them in their efforts to account for, control, and physically secure weapons.

Final Client Comments

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) published FRAGO 291-2009 on 19 June 2009 that directs ISAF OMLTs and POMLTs to ensure their ANSF mentored units conduct monthly one hundred percent serial number inventories of all weapons and assist them in their efforts to account for, control, and physically secure weapons.

Our Response

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive.
Observation 10. Weapon Donations to the Afghanistan National Security Forces

Weapons donated by some NATO/ISAF countries have been distributed directly to Afghan National Army units, by-passing the MOD, MOI and CSTC-A supply chains.

This occurred because the MOD, MOI and CSTC-A did not have sufficient visibility of and control over bilateral government-to-government weapons donations by NATO/ISAF countries.

As a result, procedures instituted by the MOD, MOI and CSTC-A for munitions accountability and control may have been by-passed, reducing Afghan visibility over their own weapon inventories, and hindering achieving weapons accountability and control.

Applicable Criteria


CSTC-A FRAGO 09-043 requires mentors to “ensure that ANSF completes monthly 100 percent by weapons serial number inventories and reports results to the next ANSF higher level of command” and “mentors will conduct monthly 10 percent sampling of AK-47s and M16s…[and] additional weapons systems and report serial numbers to CSTC-A.”

Letter from Afghan Minister of Defense Wardak to the Commander, CSTC-A, requesting all donated equipment be vetted through the CSTC-A’s Office of International Security Cooperation, dated December 2007.

Discussion

During the OIG assessment in Afghanistan, CSTC-A’s Office of International Security Cooperation (ISC) reported that there have been bilateral government-to-government weapons donations from NATO/ISAF countries to the GIRoA made outside of CSTC-A’s visibility and control. These incidents also by-passed the MOD, MOI and CSTC-A supply chains, and were inconsistent with MOD and MOI recently established accountability and control procedures and processes.

For example, the Government of Canada recently transported 2,500 donated C7s (the Canadian version of the M16A2) to Helmand province in southern Afghanistan for distribution by Canadian Forces directly to the 1st Brigade of the 205th Corps. Under the ISAF command and control structure, Canada has responsibility for security in Helmand province and is partnered
with the local ANA unit, the 1st Brigade of the 205th Corps. Fortunately, the Canadians subsequently notified CSTC-A about their donation.

**Office of International Security Cooperation**

Established in January, 2007, CSTC-A’s Office of International Security Cooperation (ISC) works to coordinate weapon donations from the international community in support of the efforts to develop the ANSF. The ISC coordinates with CSTC-A’s CJ7 (Operational Plans) to determine the equipment requirements, and with the CJ4 (Logistics), which compares those requirements to equipment inventory in stock. The ISC then approaches the international community to ask for specific equipment donations that meet equipment requirements and which are in-line with the ANSF fielding plan. The ISC does not get involved with or have visibility over bilateral government-to-government equipment donations.

In a December 2007 letter to the Commander, CSTC-A, the Minister of Defense requested all equipment donations to the ANA be vetted through the ISC to ensure that each type of equipment fits an actual ANA requirement and will be logistically sustainable. A similar CSTC-A vetting process is in place for equipment donated for the ANP.

**CSTC-A Fielding Plan**

A strategic decision was made by the U.S. and its allies to upgrade the ANA from former Warsaw Pact weapons to rifles that are used by NATO forces. The 201st Corps, the 203rd Corps and the 205th Corps were scheduled to receive the NATO weapons first, with the 207th Corps and the 209th Corps retaining their former Warsaw Pact weapons for now.

Without coordination with the ISC there can be no assurance that international donated weapons delivered directly to Afghan units meet a valid ANSF equipment requirement and are included in the approved fielding plan. Equipment requirements have been carefully planned and consider issues such as maintenance, training and life-cycle support. Donated weapons that are not on the fielding plan may require unique parts, special training for maintenance personnel, and possibly even different ammunition. In the absence of allied equipment cooperation and coordination, there is also a potential for increased costs and equipment down-time, which could potentially diminish operational effectiveness of the ANSF.

**U.S. Recording and Reporting of the Serial Numbers of Donated Weapons**

When donated weapons shipments are not coordinated through the ISC, CSTC-A does not have the opportunity to collect and register the weapon serial numbers for reporting to the DOD Small Arms and Light Weapons Registry. This prevents the achievement of one of the objectives of the DOD Serialization Program, i.e., “provid[ing] special emphasis on, and visibility of, small arms by tracking, reporting, validating, and registering the status of each small arm by serial number and physical custodian.”

Donated weapons shipments not coordinated through the ISC also could cause serious gaps in the accountability of weapons. CSTC-A mentors, if unaware of weapons received at the Afghan
unit level, would be hindered in conducting their own serial number inventories as required in FRAGO 09-043, and MOD and MOI personnel could not maintain weapon visibility and, therefore, accountability and control.

**MOD/ANA and MOI/ANP Supply Chain**

Building Afghanistan’s capacity to provide for its own security is a major U.S., Coalition and NATO priority. In order for the ANSF to become a self-sustaining force, the training and mentoring effort must emphasize the development of a sustainable ANSF logistics capacity. These logistics functions include the proper transportation, receipt, storage, issuance, maintenance, accountability and control of weapons, along with other equipment. In order to develop this ANSF logistic capability, standardized and transparent supply chain processes must be practiced. This applies specifically to weapons shipments which, if not coordinated through the ISC, may not be received, stored and issued appropriately, thus preventing the development of ANSF logistics capabilities.

**Recommendation, Client Comments, and our Response**


**Initial Command Corrective Actions in Response to Out-brief**

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. In February, CSTC-A implemented procedures which required that serial numbers for weapons donations be provided before the arrival of the donation. On 31 May 09, a letter was sent to DATES reiterating this policy and requesting that CSTC-A be notified of any donations involving weapons by a NATO member country. Typically all NATO donations go through CSTC-A, but there have been occasions when items were donated on a bilateral basis and they did not come through CSTC-A. This letter asks that, CSTC-A be informed of all weapons donations and be provided with a serial number listing.

**Final Client Comments**

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. In February, CSTC-A implemented procedures which required that serial numbers for weapons donations be provided before the arrival of the donation. On 31 May 09, a letter was sent to Directorate for ANA Training & Equipment Support (DATES), reiterating this policy and requesting that CSTC-A be notified of any donations involving weapons by a NATO member country. Typically all NATO donations go through CSTC-A, but there have been occasions when items were donated on a bilateral basis and they did not come through CSTC-A. This letter asks that, CSTC-A be informed of all weapons donations and be provided with a serial number listing.
Our Response
Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive.
Observation 11. Pre-deployment Training for U.S. Personnel on Logistics or Weapons Accountability

United States military personnel assigned to mentor the ANSF do not receive specific training on logistics and the role of weapons accountability and control in the ANA and ANP.

Combined Joint Task Force – Phoenix (CJTF-Phoenix) personnel reported that this occurred because the pre-deployment training at Fort Riley (moving to Fort Polk) for U.S. military personnel assigned to ETTs and PMTs does not focus sufficiently on mentoring concepts and best practices, and specifically, on the specifics of what ETTs and PMTs need to know about ANA and ANP logistics and related weapons accountability and control.

Without this training, U.S. ETT and PMT personnel will be less effective mentoring the MoD and MoI to maintain weapons oversight standards in the Afghan Army and Police.

Applicable Criteria


Provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The Directive also states it is DOD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.
**Introduction**

Based on comments received from mentors throughout Afghanistan, it appears that personnel designated to be ETT or PMT mentors are not receiving sufficient training while at Fort Riley and other Continental United States (CONUS) based training sites before deploying. This would appear to be the case specifically with respect to logistics, and the visibility now being given to the important role of accountability and control in maintaining necessary oversight of weapons provided to the ANSF by the U.S., Coalition and NATO.

**CSTC-A and CJTF Phoenix Efforts**

The Commander, CSTC-A is working internally to better train his mentors in logistics and weapons accountability, and to standardize their mentoring efforts across Afghanistan. To this end, CJTF Phoenix CJ4 has drafted an ANA Logistics Mentor Training Book and is currently working to send it out to all the Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands (ARSICs) to implement evenly across Afghanistan.

For the ETTs and PMTs already deployed to Afghanistan, CJTF Phoenix may need to impose a “training day” stand-down for them to be instructed in the key points raised in this new handbook.

**Future Pre-Deployment Mentor Training**

It is critical that incoming and future mentors be effective immediately upon deployment to Afghanistan. That means that they know the standards that they will be expected to mentor to before arriving in-country. To enable this to happen, the new Mentor Training Book should be sent to Ft. Riley (Fort Polk) for inclusion in the ETT and PMT training curriculum.

**CJTF Phoenix Training and Policy Directorate**

CJTF Phoenix CJ4 is setting up a training and policy branch which the Mentor Training Book would be updated and maintained. In an effort to make logistics and weapons accountability information available to all mentors, the CJTF Phoenix CJ4 has placed these standards on their website. Most mentor ETTs have access to the web, and those who do not get CDs sent to them.

To facilitate keeping the Mentor Training Book current and up-to-date, CJTF Phoenix can incorporate lessons learned from after action reviews from the at the end of tours of ETT and PMT personnel.

**Conclusion**

CSTC-A personnel have identified problems with the logistical training mentors are receiving prior to being deployed. As a result, its staff has taken a proactive approach to correcting the weaknesses once mentors arrive. TF Phoenix has developed an ANA logistics guide, for example, which provides a standardized approach to logistics training and mentoring. A new logistics training program for current and future ETTs and PMTs could be based on this guide. In addition, this training could be integrated into pre-deployment training courses and provided to U.S. military personnel preparing to be mentors in Afghanistan. Enhanced preparation of
mentor personnel will increase the effectiveness and results of the support they provide to the ANSF, including with respect to weapons accountability and control.

**Recommendation, Client Comments, and our Response**

11. Commander, CENTCOM, coordinate with Commander, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)/Forces Command (FORSCOM), to provide standardized logistics training to U.S. mentors, including for weapons accountability and control, prior to deployment.

**Initial Command Corrective Actions in Response to Out-brief**

CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. CSTC-A provided the TF Phoenix ANA Logistics Mentor Training Books, training guidance, including weapons accountability, to USFOR-A CJ3 as well as 1/1-ID and 1st ARMY LNOs, on 31 May 09. USFOR-A will forward this to CENTCOM, to be included in the CONUS ETT training curriculum.

**Final Client Comments**

CENTCOM concurs.

**Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive.
Appendix A. Scope, Methodology, Chronology and Acronyms


During the 2007 trip, we made survey visits of approximately one week each to Afghanistan and Kuwait to gain a theater-wide perspective of the AA&E accountability and control situation in Southwest Asia, which is the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility. We identified issues in Afghanistan that we did not fully address during this effort but which merited follow-up. Subsequent to the Afghanistan and Kuwait visits, the assessment team traveled to Iraq for the remainder of the trip.

In April 2008, the DOD Office of Inspector General returned to Afghanistan to perform a limited assessment of the accountability and control of AA&E provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan. The results were published on October 24, 2008 as part of DOD OIG Report No. SPO-2009-001, “Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces.”


Methodology. We conducted this assessment from January, 2009 through August, 2009 in accordance with the standards established by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency published in the Quality Standards for Inspections, January 2005. We conducted fieldwork in Afghanistan from 10 to 31 March, 2009. We planned and performed the assessment to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions, based on our assessment objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions based on those assessment objectives.

We examined both quantitative and qualitative data in this project. The qualitative data consisted of individual interviews, direct observation, and written documents. Quantitative data consisted of inventory records and physical inventories of weapons and ammunition.

We contacted, visited, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from organizations of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of State, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

5 We did not include an evaluation of explosives in our assessment.
Organization, the International Security Assistance Organization and MPRI. Appendix D provides a complete list of those organizations.

We reviewed public laws, DOD policies (directives, instructions, regulations, manuals, and strategic plans), Army regulations, and CSTC-A operations and fragmentary orders that were relevant to area we assessed. Appendix E provides a complete list of those documents.

Within organizations supporting the train and equip mission in Afghanistan, we examined or sought out policies and procedures concerning:

- Accountability, control, and physical security of U.S.-supplied AA&E and captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons and the appropriate reporting of these weapons’ serial numbers.
- Data input controls and quality assurance reviews regarding the processes used to manage AA&E inventories.
- Plans for the development of ANSF logistics.
- Guidance and plans on missions, roles, responsibilities applicable to U.S. training teams and mentors that were training and mentoring the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and ANSF organizations.
- Guidance on the training, development of the skill sets, and personnel practices related to U.S. training team and mentor personnel.

Our success in finding existing policies and procedures and the validity of the contents, if determined, are discussed in the observations of this report.

We assessed the management and results of programs for the accountability of AA&E. We believe that the documents reviewed, personnel interviewed, and other evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our conclusions, based on our assessment objectives.

**Chronology.** The ANSF Team chronology:

- **January 16, 2009** Acting IG received letter from Commander, CENTCOM
- **January – February 2009** Research and Fieldwork in CONUS
- **February 2009** Fieldwork in Europe (NATO, Britain)
- **March 10, 2009 to March 30, 2009** Fieldwork in Afghanistan
- **March 31, 2009** Out-briefed Commander, CSTC-A
- **April 13, 2009** Briefed Chief of Staff, CENTCOM
- **April – June 2009** Analysis and Report Writing
- **July 2009** Draft Assessment Report Issued for Management Comments
- **August 2009** Management Comments Received and Evaluated
- **August 2009** Final Report Issued

**Use of Computer-Processed Data**

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this assessment.
Use of Technical Assistance
We did not use Technical Assistance to perform this assessment.

Acronyms Used in this Report
The following is a list of the acronyms used in this report.

- AA&E: Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives
- AECA: Army Export Control Act
- ANA: Afghan National Army
- ANCOP: Afghan National Civil Order Police
- ANP: Afghan National Police
- ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces
- ARSIC: Afghan Regional Security Integration Command
- CONEX: Container Express
- CONUS: Continental United States
- CORE IMS: CORE Inventory Management System
- CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan
- DIAG: Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups
- DODD: DOD Directive
- DODI: DOD Instruction
- DOD IG: Department of Defense Inspector General
- DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- ETT: Embedded Training Team
- EUCOM: U.S. European Command
- FMS: Foreign Military Sales
- FOB: Forward Operating Base
- FORSCOM: Forces Command
- FRAGO: Fragmentary Order - a change to an Operations Order
- FSD: Forward Supply Depot
- GAO: Government Accountability Office
- GIRoA: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
- GSA: Global Security Affairs
- HQ: Headquarters
- ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
- ISC: International Security Cooperation
- ITAR: International Traffic in Arms Regulations
- JMD: Joint Manning Document
- JMETL: Joint Mission Essential Training List
- LNO: Liaison Officers
- MARC: Mobile Arms Room Container
- MILDEP: Military Departments
- MoD: Ministry of Defense (Afghanistan)
- MoI: Ministry of Interior (Afghanistan)
- MPRI: Military Professional Resources Inc.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMT</td>
<td>Police Mentor Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>POMLT</td>
<td>Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA/LW</td>
<td>Small Arms/Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>Security Assistance Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>United States Forces – Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USML</td>
<td>United States Munitions List</td>
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Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

During the last 3 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) have issued 5 reports discussing the accountability and control over munitions provided to the Afghan National Army and Police.

Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov. Unrestricted SIGAR reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.sigar.mil. Unrestricted DOD IG reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.DODig.mil/PUBS/index.html.

Prior coverage we used in preparing this report has included:

**GAO**


GAO-08-661, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, June 18, 2008


**SIGAR**

Nothing issued during this time period regarding weapons and/or munitions accountability

**DOD IG**

D-2009-075 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Phase III-Accountability for Weapons Distributed to the Afghanistan National Army, May 21, 2009 (Project No. D2007-D000LQ-0161.005)

SPO-2009-001 - Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces, October 24, 2008

**Summary of GAO Report No. GAO-08-883T.** The report stated that:

- The ANP continues to encounter difficulties with equipment shortages and quality.
- Defense officials expressed concerns about the quality and usability of thousands (20% are of good quality) of weapons donated to the police.
Summary of GAO Report No. GAO-08-661. The report stated that:

- New equipment plans for the ANA have been implemented and the ANA has received more equipment items. Defense planned to equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of this equipment proved to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment.
- ANA combat units report significant shortages in about 40 percent of equipment items Defense defines as critical, including weapons.

Summary of GAO Report No. GAO-09-267. The report stated that:

- Defense did not provide clear guidance to U.S. personnel as to what accountability procedures applied when handling, transporting, and storing weapons obtained for the ANSF, resulting in significant lapses in accountability for these weapons.
- Although Defense has accountability procedures for its own weapons, including tracking by serial number and conducting routine physical inventories, it did not clearly establish to what extent these procedures would apply to weapons obtained for ANSF.
- USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete inventory records for an estimated 87,000 weapons—or about 36 percent—of the 242,000 weapons that the United States procured and shipped to Afghanistan from December 2004 through June 2008.
- For about 46,000 of these weapons USASAC and CSTC-A could not provide serial numbers, and for an estimated 41,000 weapons with recorded serial numbers, CSTC-A did not maintain any records of their location or disposition.
- CSTC-A did not maintain reliable records, including serial numbers, for any of the weapons it obtained from international donors from June 2002 through June 2008, which, according to CSTC-A, totaled about 135,000 weapons.
- Lapses in accountability occurred throughout the supply chain. After receiving weapons in Kabul, CSTC-A did not record their serial numbers or routinely conduct physical inventories at the central depots where the weapons were stored.
- Although the weapons were in CSTC-A control and custody until they were issued to ANSF units, U.S. Central Command and CSTC-A officials did not have a common understanding of when the weapons were considered formally transferred to ANSF and thus no longer subject to Defense accountability procedures.
- Despite CSTC-A training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard and account for weapons. As a result, weapons CSTC-A has provided to ANSF are at serious risk of theft or loss.
- CSTC-A’s policy is not to issue equipment to ANSF without verifying that appropriate supply and accountability procedures are in place. Recognizing the need for weapons accountability at ANSF units, CSTC-A and State have deployed hundreds of U.S. military trainers and contract mentors to help the Afghan army and police establish equipment accountability practices.
According to DSCA officials, U.S.-procured weapons and sensitive equipment provided to ANSF are subject to end use monitoring, which is meant to provide reasonable assurances that ANSF is using equipment for its intended purposes. DSCA has published end use monitoring guidance that calls for, among other things, intensive controls over sensitive defense items, such as night vision devices, which are considered dangerous to the public and U.S. forces in the wrong hands. In May 2008, CSTC-A developed an end use monitoring plan and began implementing it in July 2008, but has not had sufficient staff to conduct the monitoring envisioned.

Summary of DOD IG Report No. D-2009-075. The report stated that:

- Material internal control weaknesses in accounting for weapons provided to the ANA were identified. CSTC-A did not have a formal process in place to transfer weapons to the ANA. In addition, CSTC-A was unable to account for weapons, including weapons purchased with the ASF Fund. CSTC-A records did not list all weapons by serial number, and accountability systems used at ANA Depot 1 had significant data integrity problems.

- Additionally, material internal control weaknesses in the safeguarding of ANA weapons were identified. Security at ammunition supply points built with ASF funds in Gardez, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif were not in compliance with DOD guidance.

Summary of DOD IG Report No. SPO-2009-001. The report stated that:

- However, the assessment team found that CSTC-A had not issued implementing instructions or procedures governing the accountability, control, and physical security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives the U.S. is supplying to ANSF.

- CSTC-A had not clearly defined the missions, roles, and responsibilities of U.S. training teams and senior mentors involved in advising ANSF and the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior on the accountability, control, and physical security of U.S.-supplied Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives.

- CSTC-A had not accurately recorded the serial numbers of weapons that were to be issued to ANSF and did not report these serial numbers to the DOD Small Arms Serialization Program.

- CSTC-A needs to issue command policy guidance and implementing instructions or procedures for the accountability, control, and physical security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives.

- It is critical that the CSTC-A develop a formal mentoring strategy with detailed implementing guidance for mentoring ANSF and the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior on the accountability, control, and physical security of U.S.-supplied Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives.

- Additionally, CSTC-A needs to ensure that serial numbers and associated information in its data systems used to track the weapons are accurate, and report the serial number information to the DOD Small Arms Serialization Program.
Appendix C. Glossary

**Accountability** - DOD Instruction 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006, states that accountability is the obligation imposed by law, lawful order, or regulation, accepted by an organization or person for keeping accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents, or funds, with or without physical possession. The obligation, in this context, refers to the fiduciary duties, responsibilities, and obligations necessary for protecting the public interest. However, it does not necessarily impose personal liability upon an organization or person.

**Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives** – The “Department of Defense Strategic Plan for the Distribution of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” (AA&E Strategic Plan) May 2004, states: Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) is a broad categorical concept, which can have multiple interpretations and definitions. Each of the DOD military services and agencies, plus the federal government (through the Code of Federal Regulations), have various definitions which can apply to material that may be considered AA&E, yet there is no standard definition.

For the AA&E Strategic Plan, AA&E is a term used to inclusively mean weapons, components requiring special controls, ammunition or munitions for those weapons, and other conventional items or materials with explosive, chemical, or electro-explosive properties designed for and/or capable of inflicting property damage, and death or injury to humans and animals. Items should be considered for inclusion in the AA&E category if they meet any of the following tests:

- Possession of, or access to the item is controlled due to potential risk associated with loss of the item, or its use for unintended purposes by unauthorized persons.
- The handling, transporting, storage, or use of the item presents a potential safety risk for the general population, and the risk must be controlled through visibility and specific procedures.
- The handling, transporting, storage, or use of the item presents a potential or known security risk. Exceptional care must be taken to maintain accountability over the item and information about it, to preclude disclosure of classified or sensitive information, or to prevent unauthorized persons from accessing or acquiring the item intentionally or unintentionally.

**DOD Small Arms/Light Weapons Registry** - DOD 4000.25-M, “Defense Logistics Management System,” Volume 2, Chapter 18 (“Small Arms and Light Weapons Serial Number Registration and Reporting”), Change 5, March 25, 2008, states that the DOD Small Arms/Light Weapons Registry is the DOD central repository for small arms and light weapons serial numbers. The registry serves as the single point of access for inquiries relating to the last known record of small arms and light weapons serial numbers. Serial numbers are provided by the Component Registries on a scheduled and as required basis.
**Joint Manning Document** – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1301.01C, “Individual Augmentation Procedures,” January 1, 2004 (current as May 1, 2006) states that a manning document of unfunded temporary duty positions constructed for or by a supported combatant commander that identifies the specific individual augmentation positions to support an organization during contingency operations. Joint manning documents (JMDs) for permanent activities with a joint table of distribution or joint table of mobilization distribution should only identify individual augmentation positions for temporary military or DOD personnel. JMDs for activities without a joint table of distribution or joint table of mobilization distribution (e.g., some joint task forces) should identify all positions required for that activity to support the mission. Positions should be identified as unit fill, coalition fill, civilian/contractor fill, or individual augmentation fills on the JMD.

**Logistics** - Joint Publication 1-02 states that logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with:

- design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel
- movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel
- acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities
- acquisition or furnishing of services.


**Munitions** – Joint Publication 1-02 states that munitions, in common usage, can be military weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

**Security** - Joint Publication 1-02 defines security as a condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from unintentional or directly hostile acts or influences. For the purpose of the AA&E Strategic Plan, security entails visibility over and physically keeping AA&E in the custody of only those with specific authorization, and the ability to quickly identify and respond to situations or incidents of actual or potential compromise of AA&E while in the logistics chain.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons Serial Number** - DOD 4000.25-M states that the serial number is the total series of characters appearing on the firing component part of a small arm or light weapon.

**Stability Operations** – DOD Directive 3000.05 defines stability operations as military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.
Depot 0 - Afghan run Depot that contains captured enemy weapons

Depot 1 - Depot that contains the storage of all incoming weapons and ammunition for the ANA

22 Bunkers - Bunker complex that stores ammunition for both the ANA and ANP
Appendix D. Organizations Contacted and Visited

We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following NATO, U.S., and Afghan organizations:

Europe

*North Atlantic Treaty Organization*
Officials assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Afghanistan

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan
- U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and key staff members
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, International Security Assistance Force
- European Union Police key staff members

United States

*Department of State*

- Officials assigned to the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau

*Department of Defense*

- The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

*Joint Staff*

- Officials assigned to the J5 Afghan desk, Europe/NATO desk, and current Operations
- Officials assigned to the J4 Health Services Support Division and Future Plans Division.

*U.S. Central Command*

- Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, and key senior staff members
- Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
- Assistant Division Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 101
- Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and key staff members
  -- Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix and key staff members
  -- Commander, Afghan Regional Security Integration Command-Central, South, East,
and North, their subordinate elements, and key personnel
-- Regional Training Centers at Gardez and Mazar-e-Sharif
-- Counter-Insurgency Academy
-- Consolidated Fielding Center
-- Office of International Security Cooperation
-- Depot 1
-- 22 Bunkers

- Commander, Afghanistan Engineer District and key staff members
- Deputy J7-Regional Command-South

Defense Agencies
- Officials assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency
- Officials assigned to the Defense Contract Management Agency

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Ministry of Defense
- Minister of Defense
- Ministry of Defense Inspector General
- Ministry of Defense General Staff Inspector General
- Ministry of Defense National Military Command Center
- Afghan National Detention Center
- Kabul Military Training Center
- Depot 0
- Forward Support Depots in Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif
- 201st Corps
  -- Chief of Staff
  -- Combat Service Support Kandak and Embedded Training Team
- 203rd Corps
  -- Corps Commander
  -- 1st Brigade and Embedded Training Team
  -- Commando Kandak and
  -- 3d Brigade Embedded Training Team
- 205th Corps
  -- Corps Commander
  -- 1st Brigade Commander, G3, and Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
  -- Corps Deputy Inspector General
-- Forward Supply Depot

- 209th Corps
  -- Corps Commander
  -- 1st Brigade and Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
  -- Forward Supply Depot

**Ministry of Interior**

- Minister of Interior
- Minister of Interior Inspector General
- Ministry of Interior Commander of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
- Ministry of Interior National Military Command Center
- Regional Police Headquarters—Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif
- Regional Logistics Center-South
- Joint Regional Afghan National Police Center (Kandahar)
- Kabul Afghan Police Districts 1 and 2
Appendix E. United States Code and DOD Policies

The following is a summary of the laws, instructions, orders and procedures applicable to arms and ammunition accountability and reporting. We evaluated the arms and ammunition program for the Afghanistan National Security Forces against these criteria to determine whether the program was in compliance.


- Sec 40A(2)(A) “shall provide for the end-use monitoring of defense articles and defense services in accordance with the standards that apply for identifying high-risk exports for regular end-use verification.”
- Sec 40A(2)(B) “shall be designed to provide reasonable assurance that the recipient is complying with the requirements imposed by the USG with respect to use, transfers, and security of defense articles and defense services; and such articles and services are being used for the purposes for which they are provided.”

Title 40, United States Code, Section 524, January 3, 2007

Title 40, United States Code, Section 524 makes a general requirement that “Each executive agency shall maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under its control.”

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended (22 U.S.C. 2151)

The Congress finds that fundamental political, economic, and technological changes have resulted in the interdependence of nations. The Congress declares that the individual liberties, economic prosperity, and security of the people of the United States are best sustained and enhanced in a community of nations which respect individual civil and economic rights and freedoms and which work together to use wisely the world’s limited resources in an open and equitable international economic system. Furthermore, the Congress reaffirms the traditional humanitarian ideals of the American people and renews its commitment to assist people in developing countries to eliminate hunger, poverty, illness, and ignorance.

Therefore, the Congress declares that a principal objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to development and to build the economic, political, and social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives.

United States development cooperation policy should emphasize five principal goals: (1) the alleviation of the worst physical manifestations of poverty among the world’s poor majority;
(2) the promotion of conditions enabling developing countries to achieve self-sustaining economic growth with equitable distribution of benefits;
(3) the encouragement of development processes in which individual civil and economic rights are respected and enhanced;
(4) the integration of the developing countries into an open and equitable international economic system; and
(5) the promotion of good governance through combating corruption and improving transparency and accountability.

The Congress declares that pursuit of these goals requires that development concerns be fully reflected in United States foreign policy and that United States development resources be effectively and efficiently utilized.

The Foreign Assistance Act also reorganized U.S. foreign assistance programs and separated military and non-military aid. For example:

Sec 505. Provides conditions of eligibility for technology transfers and sensitive item procurement. Permits observation of use of articles, services, and training. (22 U.S.C. 2314)

Sec 515. Requires overseas management of assistance and sales programs. (22 U.S.C. 2321i)

**International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).** Implementing regulations for Arms Export Control Act, specifies the United States Munitions List (USML). The USML is a list of articles, services, and related technology designated as defense-related by the United States federal government. This designation is pursuant to sections 38 and 47(7) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 and 2794(7)). The list specifically includes both firearms and ammunition as “Significant Military Equipment”.


Provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The Directive also states it is DOD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.
Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.


The objective of this manual is to establish continuous visibility over all SA/LW by serial number from the contractor to depot; in storage; in-transit to requisitioners, in post, camp, and station custody; in the hands of users; during turn-ins; in renovation; and during disposal/demilitarization.

Chapter 18 “Small Arms and Light Weapons Serial Number Registration and Reporting” provides procedures for reporting small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) serial numbers for weapons under the control of the DOD components, the manual requires this report for all SA/LW including foreign and commercial weapons, museum pieces with serial numbers, and captured, confiscated or abandoned enemy SA/LW in the possession of the DOD.

The manual also includes requirements for activities shipping weapons to send a listing of the weapon serial numbers contained in each shipment with the shipment documentation accompanying SA/LW shipments between the DOD Components. When shipments consist of multiple containers, the listing shall identify which serial numbers are within each of the containers.

Finally, the manual specifies directions for weapons shipped outside of the control of the DOD, including FMS cases. “When SA/LW are selected for shipment to FMS/Grant Aid and other Agencies outside the control of the Department of Defense, or when a DOD agency assumes title and accountability for U.S. weapons purchased or produced under a DOD contract then shipped directly to Security Assistance or other customers outside DOD, the SA/LW Control Reporting Transactions for the weapons shall be provided to the shipping Component Registry giving notification of shipment. The shipping Component Registry codes each weapon in the shipment using SA/LW Transaction Code N (Shipment to Other Agencies) or code F (Shipment to FMS/Grant Aid) depending on type of shipment. The shipping Component Registry then enters the SA/LW shipment data into the inactive file. Weapons returned to the DOD supply system from previous shipments to FMS/Grant Aid and other agencies outside the control of the Department of Defense shall be registered by the receiving activity on its Component Registry.”

Chapter 12 “Small Arms Serial Number Registration and Reporting” provides procedures for reporting small arms serial number data between DOD Components and the DOD Registry. Small arms, as defined in Definitions and Terms, including those mounted on aircraft, vehicles, and vessels, that are accounted for in unclassified property records, will be reported (included will be foreign and commercial weapons, and museum pieces with serial numbers).

The manual also states that the shipping activity will provide a listing of the weapon serial numbers contained in each shipment with the shipment documentation accompanying small arms shipments between DOD Components. When shipments consist of multiple containers, the listing will identify which serial numbers are within each of the containers.

The manual also includes information for small arms without a national stock number or with missing, obliterated, mutilated, or illegible serial numbers. The manual states that those small arms should be assigned a local control number or management control number and then reported to the DOD Registry by the DOD Component Registry for review and assignment of an management control number, national stock number, and/or serial number.


States that sensitive items are materiel that requires a high degree of protection and control due to statutory requirements or regulations. It defines sensitive items as items of high value, highly technical or of a hazardous nature, small arms, ammunition, explosives, and demolition material.

DOD Regulation 4140.1 “DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation,” May 23, 2003

The regulation specifies that the DOD Small Arms Serialization Program shall provide special emphasis on, and visibility of, small arms by tracking, reporting, validating, and registering the status of each small arm by serial number and physical custodian.

In addition, the regulation requires that small arms be reported to the DOD Registry, according to the procedures in Chapter 12 of DOD 4000.25-2-M, "Military Standard Transaction Reporting and Accounting Procedures (MILSTRAP)," September 19, 2001 and Chapter 19 of DOD 4000.25-M, "Defense Logistics Management System (DLMS)," February 1996.

The regulation also requires the DOD Components to establish, control, and fund the automated registration of all small arms in their inventories, including all small arms transferred outside their inventories, such as those released to the GSA and those released under foreign military sales arrangements. In this regard, the application of automated item identification may improve the timeliness, accuracy, and efficiency of inventory control by enabling the use of machine-readable materiel identification and supporting serialized item tracking.

The directive states: “DOD materiel management shall be structured to be responsive to customer requirements during peacetime and war” and that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall “Monitor the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the DOD logistics system, and continually develop improvements.”

**DOD Instruction 5000.64 “Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006**

This instruction provides policy and procedures for DOD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C. 524. It also requires that accountability property records shall be established for all property purchased, or otherwise obtained, that are sensitive as defined in DOD 4100.39-M, “Federal Logistics Information System,” Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007.

**DOD Instruction 5010.40. “Managers’ Internal Control Program Procedures,” January 4, 2006, states that management internal control procedures are basic to U.S. Government accountability and are specified in this instruction.**

**DOD Instruction 5100.76 “Safeguarding Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) and the AA&E Physical Security Review Board,” October 8, 2005**

This instruction provides conceptual guidance on 3 specific areas of AA&E accountability and references implementing detailed guidance. The following are the 3 general areas of guidance:

First the instruction states that, “the security of conventional AA&E is a DOD high-interest item and is important because of the potential for this material to jeopardize the safety and security of personnel and installations worldwide especially if these materials were to be obtained illegally by subversives, terrorists, or other criminal elements. It requires continual oversight and monitoring by senior-level DOD representatives. These representatives will form the AA&E Physical Security Review Board.”

Next the instruction requires that “Conventional AA&E shall be properly safeguarded against theft, loss, damage, or unauthorized use in accordance with the minimum standards outlined in [DOD 5100.76-M, “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives, August 12, 2000] reference (e) and DOD 5200.8-R (reference (g)).”

Finally the instruction states that “All DOD Components will implement the processes and procedures to assess and evaluate appropriate additional security measures based on continual threat assessments, Force Protection Condition changes, and vulnerability assessments. They will also use reliable risk management principles for mitigating, reducing, or eliminating risks.”

This manual prescribes minimum standards and criteria for the physical security of DOD sensitive conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) in the custody of any DOD Component or DOD contractor.

Specifically:

- Chapter 3 provides detailed physical protective measures to be taken at facilities;
- Chapter 5, Section 1 includes requirements for 100% physical inventories should be taken monthly at the unit level and annually at the depot level;
- Chapter 5, Section 3 requires that each DOD Component with custody of AA&E items shall establish and maintain serial number registration and reporting;
- Chapter 6 provides detailed transportation security policy, standards, and procedures for sensitive, conventional AA&E;
- Chapter 6, Section 8 deals with Overseas In-theater movements and requires that AA&E in transit shall be provided the same or greater protection as that required for CONUS movements; and
- Finally, Chapter 6, Section 10 provides detailed guidance on the requirements for shipments made for the foreign military sales program.


Provides guidance for the administration and implementation of security assistance and related activities in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and related statutes and directives. The manual states that:

Security assistance is a group of programs, authorized by law, which allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign governments. Security assistance transfers may be carried out via sales, grants, leases, or loans and are authorized under the premise that if these transfers are essential to the security and economic well-being of allied governments and international organizations, they are equally vital to the security and economic well-being of the U.S.

Security assistance programs support U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. These programs increase the ability of our friends and allies to deter and defend against possible aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens, and help foster regional stability.

Title to FMS materiel normally transfers from the USG to the purchaser immediately upon its release from a DOD supply activity (point of origin). However, USG security responsibility does not cease until the recipient Government’s or international organization’s Designated Government Representative (DRG) assumes final control of the consignment.
DOD Regulation 5200.08-R “Physical Security Program,” April 9, 2007
Implements policies and minimum standards for the physical protection of DOD personnel, installations, operations, and related resources, to include the security of weapons systems and platforms.

In this memorandum the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence memorandum issues clarification on the physical security of AA&E while under U.S. control until formal transfer to a foreign nation.

Army Regulation 710-3 “Inventory Management Asset and Transaction Reporting System,” February 25, 2008
This regulation implements applicable provisions of DOD 4140.1–R and DOD 4000.25–2–M. It establishes policy, responsibilities, and procedures for Department of the Army asset and transaction reporting systems, and focuses on reporting requirements at all levels. The reporting systems described herein were developed solely to provide high visibility on selected, difficult to manage items; and to provide the opportunity to intensively manage those items.

The Army Regulation includes the following specific guidance: When reporting foreign weapon serial numbers that contain unidentifiable characters (non-English alpha numeric) that can be translated into an alphanumeric equivalent, the translated serial number will be permanently inscribed on the weapons and reported to the UIT Central Registry. When the foreign weapon serial number cannot be translated into alphanumeric equivalents, the UIT Central Registry will assign a serial number that will be permanently inscribed on the weapon and reported to the UIT Central Registry.

Report shipments directed under grant aid or FMS agreements to the UIT Central Registry. When small arms are selected for shipment by the shipment activity, or when DOD assumes title and accountability for weapons purchased or produced under a DOD contract, and then ships directly to Security Assistance, follow the shipment procedures in a above, using transaction code “F” instead of transaction code “S”. Listings are not required to accompany weapon shipment.

Fragmentary Order 08-130 “Conduct a Monthly 10% Inventory of a Designated Weapons Type by Serial Number to Ensure Accountability and Report Results on TRAT and PTRAT,” October 12, 2008
FRAGO 08-130 requires a 10% monthly inventory of CSTC-A weapons to ensure accountability and safeguarding. The mentors to the ANSF are responsible for ensuring their ANSF organizations are practicing proper accountability procedures.
**Fragmentary Order 09-043 “Verification of Monthly Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Compliance with 100 Percent Weapons Serial Number Inventory,” March 8, 2009**

This order requires all elements of CSTC-A to ensure that the ANSF conduct monthly 100% serial number inventory of all weapons and also to assist the ANSF in their efforts to account for, control, and physically secure weapons. The order also requires mentors to conduct their own 10% monthly inventory of the M-16, AK-47 and other weapons systems.

**CSTC-A Weapons and Ammunition Standard Operating Procedures, February 26, 2009**

The CSTC-A Weapons and Ammunition Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) applies to all mentors who support the Afghanistan National Security Force (ANSF) and national depots that receive, store, and issue Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E). The SOP is the primary command policy guidance and implementing instruction for the accountability, control, and physical security of AA&E supplied by the United States and or the international community to the ANSF.

The SOP provides specific guidance on the following areas:

- Receipt of weapons at Kabul International Airport
- 22 Bunkers Weapons and Ammunition Procedures for ANSF
- ANA Depot 0 Weapons Procedures
- ANA Depot 1 Weapons Procedures
- Retrograde of ANSF Weapons
- Small Arms Serial Number Registration and Reporting
- Captured Weapons

The SOP specifies serial number inventory procedures for new, retrograded, and captured weapons.

**Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Decree 4.0 “Supported and Supporting Unit Logistics Policy and Support Procedures,” January 11, 2009**

This decree requires property book maintenance by serial number for ammunition and explosives in the Afghanistan National Army.

**Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Decree 4.2 “Ammunition and Explosives Operation Policy and Support Procedures,”**

This decree issued by the MOD requires serial number accounting for weapons in the Afghanistan National Army.

This decree incorporates and/or replaces all previously approved logistics management policy and systems. This policy contains specific requirements related to: property accountability, the logistics structure and organization, roles and responsibilities, property book establishment and maintenance, specific instructions for each class or materiel, roles and responsibilities, as well as general responsibilities for anyone using government materiel. The policy requires serial number accounting for weapons. The policy requires that weapons be inventoried by serial number monthly.

Ministry of Defense Order Number 0201, dated March 4, 2009, mandates procedures for conducting monthly 100% weapons serial number inventories in units of the Afghan National Army and for submitting the inventory reports through the chain of command to the MOD.

Letter from Afghan Minister of Defense Wardak to the Commander, CSTC-A, requesting all donated equipment be vetted through the CSTC-A’s Office of International Security Cooperation, December 2007.
Appendix F. Assessment Team Inventories

During the MAT mission to Afghanistan from March 10, 2009 to March 31, 2009, the team visited various locations throughout the country to observe and verify weapons and ammunition accountability and control. The team conducted sample inventories in order to verify quantities and to perform serial number reconciliations against stock records in order to verify compliance with U.S. and ANSF mission oversight policy.

Overall, the results of the inventories indicated that there is a serial number accountability process in place within CSTC-A and the ANSF. However, in a few instances these inventories identified problems that were indicative of the need to strengthen the system for accountability and control in certain respects.

The team inspected 20 ANSF storage and supply points and conducted sample serial number inventories at 17 of those sites. The inventories totaled 1,360 weapons covering 19 different types of weapons and over 50 thousand ammunition items. The team traveled to Kabul, Kandahar, Gardez, and Mazar-e-Sharif and other locations around those areas.

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**Weapons types**

**NATO standard**

1. M4 automatic rifle
2. M16 automatic rifle
3. M203 grenade launcher
4. M24 Sniper rifle
5. M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW)
6. M240B medium machine gun
7. SW9VE 9mm pistol
8. German P1 9mm pistol
9. Remington 870 pump shotgun 12 gauge
10. Remington 870 modular combat shotgun (MCS) 12 gauge
11. Mossberg M590A1 pump 12 gauge

Former Warsaw Pact Weapons (FWP)
1. AK47 rifle and variants (AK47, AK74, AMD65, VZ58, AKMS)
2. RPK light machine gun
3. PKM medium machine gun
4. DShK heavy machine gun
5. GP25 & GP30 grenade launcher
6. Dragunov SVD Sniper Rifle
7. RPG rocket launcher
8. 82 mm mortar

The following details the results of the inventory conducted by the munitions assessment team at the each of the visited locations.

National Depot Inventories

**Depot 1**
The MAT first visited Depot 1, the national weapons storage depot for the Afghan National Army on March 15, 2009. The weapons compound in Depot 1 is a separate and secure area within the overall Depot 1 compound and is controlled and managed by the CSTC-A U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT) stationed there.

The team conducted a judgmental sample of five shipping containers (CONEXs) used as storage areas in the Depot 1 weapons compound. The containers were marked as numbers E90, E95, E108, E112, and D83. Once we selected the five containers we observed the quantity and type of weapons and determined whether we should take a full inventory of the container or select a sample of the weapons in that container.

The sample included 582 weapons at the Depot 1 location. Of those 582 only one weapon’s serial number was recorded incorrectly in the stock record (3716 versus 6716).

In container E90, we selected box 15 and box 233 for a full inventory. Box 15 included 112 M16 assault rifles. Box 233 included 100 M16 assault rifles. Each of the 212 weapons sampled in container E90 were included in the list of weapons in the container. Each of the serial numbers recorded from the weapons matched the property records.
In container E95, we selected box 71 and box 21 for a full inventory. Box 71 included 100 M16 assault rifles. Container E95, Box 21 included 100 M16 assault rifles. Each of the 200 of the weapons was included in the inventory list accurately by serial number.

Container E108, Box 13 had 40 loose M16 assault rifles. Our inventory of the serial numbers matched the on-hand inventory sheets and the Core IMS sheets. There are usually 50 M16s per box when shipped as new weapons. The ten missing weapons were previously identified internally by a CSTC-A Tiger Team. For information on the results of the CSTC-A Tiger Team results see “Tiger Team Results” section beginning on page 6 of this appendix. Container E108, Box 8 included 50 brand new M16A2 assault rifles still in their individual boxes. All weapons were correctly annotated by serial number on the inventory lists. CSTC-A had not conducted a physical observation of the serial numbers on the weapons themselves; instead the ETT operating the weapons compound had just recorded the serial numbers off the boxes from the manufacturer.

Container E112, Boxes 19 and 20 included 20 M24 Sniper Rifles still in their individual factory sealed boxes. All weapons were correctly annotated on the inventory lists. However it was noted that these weapons had not been removed from their boxes. CSTC-A had not conducted a physical observation of the serial numbers on the weapons themselves; instead the ETT operating the weapons compound had just recorded the serial numbers off the boxes from the manufacturer.

Container D83, Boxes 225, 226, 227, 237, 241, 246, 247, and 253 were inventoried. These boxes included 110 AK47FS assault rifles, including some in their opaque sealed plastic wrapping. The assessment team had to cut the plastic wrapping to do the serial number inventory based on the numbers engraved on the weapons themselves. One weapon’s serial number was recorded incorrectly in the stock record (3716 vice 6716). CSTC-A had not conducted a physical observation of the serial numbers on the weapons themselves; instead the ETT operating the weapons compound had just recorded the serial numbers off the boxes from the manufacturer.

22 Bunkers

The team visited the 22 Bunkers weapons and ammunition storage facility on March 14, 2009 in order to receive briefings on the operations and conduct judgmental samples to verify weapons and ammunition accountability. 22 Bunkers is surrounded on three sides by the Kabul Military Training Center and stores the ANA ammunition and the ANP weapons and ammunitions.

In total, we counted 50,611 items of ammunition/explosives and 292 weapons at the 22 Bunkers facility. The MAT found that of the only ammunition discrepancy was that the bunker had 2 additional 40 mm red star illumination rounds beyond what was listed in the property books. Of the 292 weapons inventoried the team found that 5 weapons had slight serial number discrepancies. In at least one case the mistake was a result of translating Arabic numbers into English numbers.
The following is a summary of our judgmental sample inventory and any issues found at 22 Bunkers. (items without a sub-bullet were accurately included in the property records, by serial number when applicable)

- Grenades (hand/40mm): 42,017 counted
  - 2 extra red star 40mm not on inventory sheet
- Signal Illuminations: 1,874 counted
- Detonation Cord: 4,000 counted
- Blasting Caps: 2,720 counted
- M249: 12 counted
- RPK: 27 counted
  - Serial No. MA474 recorded as MA471
  - Serial No. 1981 recorded as 191 (numbers in Arabic)
- PKM: 13 counted
- AMD65: 30 counted
  - Serial No. EC1910 recorded as EL 4910
- AK47: 30 counted
  - Serial No. IA0499 recorded as IA0489
- VZ58: 90 counted
  - 2 weapons were in the wrong boxes (switched)
- Shotguns: 50 counted
  - Serial No. LM008287 recorded as LM008297
- GP30: 40 counted
**Tiger Team Result Results**

On March 21, 2009 the Logistics Embedded Training Team (LOGETT) group from CSTC-A provided the results of a weapons inventory conducted at Depot 1 to the MAT team. The evaluation was described as an internal “Tiger Team” that conducted physical verification of all serial numbers and quantities and matches those serial numbers against the CORE IMS data as of March 16, 2009.

The Tiger Team verified serial numbers of 47,612 weapons. The Tiger Team reported that 216 weapons that were listed on the property records were not found during their inventory. This included 14 M16s, 160 M4s, 4 M240Bs, and 38 M203s. The Tiger Team found that all of the M24, M2, Shotgun, M249, 60mm and 81mm weapons numbers were accounted for.

The following are the results of that Tiger Team (TT) inventory:

- **M16A2**: The CORE IMS data contained 38,468 weapons. The TT counted 38,454 which is 14 less than the system data. On 18 March the TT reported that the 14 fewer weapons may be attributed to being received in 5 different containers that were received by lot and quantity with no date.
- **M4**: The CORE IMS data contained 1,169 weapons. The TT counted 1,009 which is 160 less than the system data. On 18 March the TT reported that the 160 fewer weapons may be attributed to being received between February 2007 and May 2008.
- **M240B**: The CORE IMS data contained 225 weapons. The TT counted 221 which is 4 less than the system data. On 18 March the TT reported that the 4 fewer weapons may be attributed to being received by quantity in early 2008.
- **M203**: The CORE IMS data contained 38 weapons. The TT could not find any which is 38 less than the system data. These items were received by serial number between May 2007 and June 2008.
- **M24, M2, Shotgun, M249, 60mm mortar tubes, and 81mm mortar tubes**: The TT found that the numbers in CORE IMS matched the physical count.

**Regional/Provincial Inventories**

**Regional Command - South Regional Distribution Center**

The team visited the RC-South Afghanistan National Police Regional Distribution Center weapons and ammunition storage facility, on March 18, 2009 in order to conduct judgmental samples to verify weapons and ammunition accountability.

The munitions accountability team conducted a judgmental sample of the weapons stored for issue at the Regional Distribution Center. The MAT conducted a serial number inventory of 37 weapons including: GB30 (5), RPK (6), RPG (6), SW9VE (10), and AMD65 (10).

During the inventory, we noted that although physical control of weapons was being maintained at the Regional Distribution Center, some of the weapons were currently accounted for by serial number at the Kandahar Provincial Headquarters. This situation occurred because the weapons...
were slated to be issued to Kandahar Provincial ANP personnel upon the unit’s successful completion of the Focused District Development (FDD) training program. ANP personnel determined that the weapons serial numbers would be retained on the provincial HQ property book even though the weapons were at the Regional Distribution Center.

The ANP Non-Commissioned Officer responsible for running the Regional Distribution Center, knew which weapons were intended for the FDD program graduates. He stated during the serial number inventory that the weapons were therefore not on his property book yet. The NCO was correct; the weapons were not on the Distribution Center property book during the review.

All other weapons inventoried were properly included in the property books by serial number.

**RC– East, Gardez Regional Training Center**

We visited the Regional Command East Afghanistan National Police Regional Training Center weapons and ammunition storage facility, on March 22, 2009, in order to conduct judgmental samples to verify weapons accountability. The munitions assessment team conducted a serial number inventory of 23 weapons, including AMD65 (10), RPK (2), SW9VE (5), M870 (1), M590A1 (1), PKM (2), and RPG (2).

The team directly observed the serial number on each weapon and then reviewed the property books on site to ensure that they were accurately recorded by serial number in the property book. The team found that each of the 23 weapons was properly and accurately reported. In addition, a further review of the property books showed that the regional training center maintained appropriate property records accounting for weapons that had already been issued out. The documentation included signatures by supervisors as well as thumb prints of the police officer receiving each of the issued weapons.

**RC-North, Mazar-e Sharif Regional Training Center**

The team visited the Regional Command North Afghanistan National Police Regional Training Center weapons and ammunition storage facility, on March 26, 2009, in order to conduct judgmental samples to verify weapons and ammunition accountability. The munitions assessment team conducted a serial number inventory of 24 weapons, including SW9VE (4), PKM (8), RPG (4), AMD65 (4), and M870MCS (4).

The team directly observed the serial number on each weapon and then reviewed the property books on site to ensure that they were accurately recorded by serial number in the property book. The team found that each of the 24 weapons was properly and accurately reported.

**Balkh Provincial Police HQ**

We visited the Afghanistan National Police Balkh Provincial Headquarters on March 26, 2009, in order to conduct judgmental samples to verify weapons and ammunition accountability. The munitions assessment team conducted a serial number inventory of 13 weapons, including SW9VE (4), RPG (4), and AMD65 (5).
The team directly observed the serial number on each weapon and then reviewed the property books on site to ensure that they were accurately recorded by serial number in the property book. The team found that each of the weapons was properly and accurately reported.

**RC-East/Gardez Forward Supply Depot**

We visited the Gardez Forward Supply Depot on March 23rd, 2009 in order to conduct judgmental samples to verify weapons accountability by conducting a serial number reconciliation between the weapons and the property books.

We selected a variety of weapons including 4 SW9VE pistols, 40 AMD65 rifles, 2 RPK rifles, and finally 1 82 mm mortar. We found that each of these weapons were properly included in the property books. During the site visit the ANA made progress by organizing the weapons holding area with racks that were numbered to better account for the weapons.

**Afghanistan National Army and Police Unit Level Inventories**

**Afghanistan National Police Region 2, District 1 Headquarters**

We visited the Afghanistan National Police Region 2, District 1 Headquarters, on March 26, 2009, in order to observe weapons and ammunition accountability.

The Commander of Region 2, District 1 Headquarters stated that some U.S. personnel from the Police Mentoring Team had recently (within 2 weeks) come to complete an inventory of their weapons. However he was not given any documentation related to the inventory results. While touring the arms room, the team noted 10 AMD65 weapons, 50 German P1 pistols, and 2 Smith and Wesson pistols in the inventory. We did not have sufficient time to conduct a full serial number inventory. Although the quantity of weapons was listed in the arms room, there was no record of the serial numbers maintained. In addition the ammunition was stored in mass in an open container.

**Afghanistan National Police Region 2, District 2 Headquarters**

The team visited the Afghanistan National Police Region 2, District 2 Headquarters, on March 26, 2009, in order to observe weapons and ammunition accountability.

The Commander of Region 2, District 2 Headquarters showed us security procedures used to secure the arms room. The measures included a locked door inside of the police compound as well as a video camera that monitored access to the room. The video is on a closed circuit feed to the commander’s office. The Commander stated that although he has had trouble with AWOL police officers they have had no instances of missing weapons because the officers are not allowed to carry weapons home; even on duty they cannot leave the District 2 area with weapons. The Commander said that there are not enough weapons for all of the officers so weapons are left with the officer in charge at each post and then issued to the police at the start of the duty. We were unable to visit any of the posts to confirm what type of accountability is maintained. The arms room had only 10 AK style rifles that looked to be in unusable condition. There was a sheet tracking quantity, but no serial number inventory.
4/1/205th Kandak

The team visited the 1st Brigade, 205th Corps Commander and G3 (Operations) on March 18, 2009, in order to conduct inventory reconciliations to verify weapons accountability.

The brigade has been issued 1827 weapons (950 C7s, 412 M16s, 162 M203s, 210 M249s, and 93 M240s). They currently have 1816 on hand (10 C7s and 1 M16 were combat losses). They have paperwork that shows the issuance of these weapons to the brigade. In order to verify the property book entries the MAT judgmentally selected 15 M16 rifles and verified the serial numbers taken directly from the weapons were properly included on the property books. Each of the serial numbers was properly recorded without error.

Commando Kandak (205th Corps AO)

The munitions assessment team visited the Commando Kandak, on March 18, 2009, in order to conduct judgmental samples to verify weapons and ammunition accountability. The munitions assessment team conducted a serial number inventory of 123 weapons, including M4 (72), M203 (18), M249(18), and M9 (15). During the inventory the assessment team noted some issues.

Of the 72 M4 rifles inventoried, 2 weapons had single digit serial number mistakes in recording on the issue log book. One of the 72 weapons was not in the box. The property book officer provided documents for the weapon; it was issued to the commander.

The inventory of the M9 9mm pistols showed that 3 were not in the arms room. The property book officer provided documents showing that the 3 pistols were checked to 3 officers. Two pistols of the issuances had proper documentation including hand receipts. The third pistol did not have documentation; however, the commander produced the weapon from his office and the serial number was verified against the registration.

In general, the records were complete and the weapons matched serial number documentation. All problems identified were corrected while the assessment team was at the site.

1, 2, 3/1/203rd Kandaks

The munitions assessment team visited the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Kandaks of the 1st Brigade, 203rd Corps, on March 22, 2009, in order to conduct judgmental samples to verify weapons and ammunition accountability. The munitions assessment team conducted a serial number inventory of 75 weapons, including M16 (48), M203 (18), and M240B(9). The inventory indicated that all of the sampled weapons were documented on the property books by serial number.

The team conducted the sample by judgmentally selecting weapons from each container at the location. The 1st Brigade, 203rd Corps used the Mobile Arms Room Containers for storage and had placed the containers on a separate section of the base with concertina wire around the perimeter. This section also housed new HMMWVs. The 75 weapons selected by the munitions assessment team were all documented by serial number on the property books at the Kandak level. The property book officers were knowledgeable about the weapons on hand and had
developed additional security measures in addition to the standard MARC. They had welded chains to the door and the main MARC structure so that a padlock could be used. They had also sealed the locks with paper and a signature so that tampering attempts would be evident.

2/1/209th Kandak

The munitions assessment team visited the 2nd Kandak of the 1st Brigade, 209th Corps, on March 26, 2009, in order to conduct judgmental samples to verify weapons and ammunition accountability. The munitions assessment team conducted a serial number inventory of 67 weapons, including M16 (10), AK47 (40), PKM (5), RPG (5), Dragunov (4), and SW9VE (3). The inventory determined that all of the sampled weapons were documented on the property books by serial number.
Appendix G. Management Comments

US Central Command Comments

FOR: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Draft DODIG Report: "Assessment of the Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan" (DODIG Project D2009-D00SPO-0148.000)

1. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the recommendations presented in the DoDIG draft report.

2. Attached are the USCENTCOM response (TAB A) and USFOR-A and CSTC-A (TAB B) responses to the recommendations for the respective commands.

3. The Point of Contact is Colonel Mario V. Garcia, Jr., USCENTCOM Inspector General, (813)827-6660.

JAY W. HOOD
Major General, U.S. Army

Attachments:
TAB A: CENTCOM Response
TAB B: USFOR-A Response/
CSTC-A Response
RECOMMENDATION 11. (page 43, DODIG Draft Report). DODIG recommends that Commander, CENTCOM, coordinate with Commander, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)/ Forces Command (FORSCOM), to provide standardized logistics training to U.S. mentors, including for weapons accountability and control, prior to deployment.

CENTCOM RESPONSE: CENTCOM concurs.
MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General (Assistant Inspector General for Special Plans and Operations), 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4424


1. Headquarters United States Forces-Afghanistan acknowledges that recommendation No. I is for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and No. 11 is for Commander, United States Central Command.

2. I endorse and fully concur with the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan-DCG response to recommendations No. 2 thru No. 10. In addition, USFOR-A concurs that recommendation 4.e. does not apply to CSTC-A since the subject weapons supply contract is administered by the US Navy International Programs Office (NIPO). CSTC-A has sent correspondence to NIPO addressing weapons serviceability concerns.

2. Point of contact for this action is USFOR-A IG, Col Lawrence Brundidge, DSN: 318-237-1678.

Encl
CSTC-A-DCG Response Memorandum

JOHN A. MACDONALD
Major General, USA
Deputy Commander, Support
United States Forces-Afghanistan
MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General (Assistant Inspector General for Special Plans and Operations), 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4704

SUBJECT: CSTC-A Response to Draft Report on Assessment of the Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan (DOD IG SPO Project No D2009-DOOSPO-0148.000)


2. This memorandum formally responds to recommendations within the draft report. CSTC-A has continued to improve AA&E accountability and control procedures since the Special Plans and Operations (SPO) out-brief that occurred on 30 MAR 09. Since then, CSTC-A acknowledged the findings and implemented many of the recommendations, while collaborating with Afghan Leadership to improve management oversight and program execution.

3. CSTC-A’s comments to Recommendations 2 through 10 of the draft report are provided within the attached enclosure.

4. Point of Contact for this action is Mr. Jessie Charlie Ridley, Senior Auditor. Office of the Inspector General, DSN (318) 237-1166 or email jessie.c.ridley@afghan.cwu.army.mil.

Encl

ANTHONY R. IERARDI
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commanding General
Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
Response to DOD OIG Audit Report
Assessment of the Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan (Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0148.000)

Recommendation No. 2:
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan review planning to implement Core IMS software and determine, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense, its applicability for Ministry of Defense personnel and whether alternate solutions may be easier for the Afghans to implement and sustain.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: CSTC-A partially concurs with the DODIG recommendation. Transition to an automated system is the next step toward enabling the ANA’s capability of asset inventory management within the depots. However, the MOD’s Supply Decree 4.0 outlines a manual system which the ANA will continue to use as both an alternative and precursor solution to Core IMS implementation by the ANA. This manual system is fully acceptable as a method to account for property while the overall logistics skills of the ANA develop.

Recommendation No. 3:
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to develop and install databases to track Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police weapons by serial number and unit locations.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: CSTC-A concurs with the DODIG recommendation. CSTC-A CORE-IMS is the automated system used by the ANA to receipt, store and issue weapons by serial number and location from the national level depots. The ANP is using an Excel spreadsheet product, which is maintained by US Mentors to track weapons since there is not an Afghan system in place. CSTC-A will mentor the ANA and ANP logistics leaders to assess their automation needs in order to either modify existing systems, or come up with new system that meets their weapons accountability needs. The mentoring effort must begin at the ANSF Ministerial levels.

Recommendation No. 4:
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Review the contract for these weapons and amend it accordingly, if required, to ensure that future weapons meet an acceptable standard for Afghan National Army use.
b. Determine whether the weapons supplied under this contract represent a breach of contract and if so take appropriate actions.

c. Screen weapons currently at Depot 1, service and/or repair them to an acceptable standard for distribution if required, and appropriately dispose of any that are unusable.

d. Identify weapons already distributed that do not meet standards, and service and or repair them.

e. Screen future weapons under this contract before shipment.

Recommendation 4.a.: Review the contract for these weapons and amend it accordingly to ensure that future weapons meet an acceptable standard for ANA use.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. CSTC-A has reviewed the current contracts and require all inbound weapons to be fully mission capable. Only parts that fail standard gauging and functions checks will be fixed or replaced. Additionally, CSTC-A held a teleconference on 28 May 2009 with Military Departments and Life Cycle Management Commands to ensure all future weapons meet acceptable standards for ANA operational use.

Recommendation 4.b.: Determine whether the weapons supplied under this contract represent a breach of contract and if so take appropriate actions.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: CSTC-A concurs with DOD IG recommendation. The M-16A2s with minor exceptions are in compliance with contractual obligations. The weapons identified as unserviceable are being reported to CSTC-A and will be repaired by the in-country weapons maintenance contractor. Discrepancies are reported via Shipping Discrepancy Reports to the U.S. Navy International Programs Office and the USMC.

Recommendation 4.c.: CSTC-A screen weapons currently in Depot 1 and remove and appropriately dispose of those that are unusable.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. CSTC-A screens weapons procured with Afghan Security Force Funding as a part of a 1228 End Use Monitoring Team. CSTC-A reports non-mission capable weapons provided under the contract on the Shipping Discrepancy Reports. Data received to date has been presented to the U.S. Navy International Programs Office and the USMC and we are rectifying discrepancies.
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Recommendation 4.d.: Identify weapons already distributed that do not meet standards, and service and or repair them.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: CSTC-A CJ4 has reviewed the requirements in current and future FMS contract cases. All inbound weapons are required to be fully mission-capable, but refurbished weapons are not required to be completely overhauled. Only parts that fail standard gauging and functions check will be fixed, replaced, or overhauled. In order to get weapons to the field quickly, the decision was made to accept weapons that meet serviceability requirements without complete overhaul and refurbishment. CSTC-A CJ4 sent a letter to the US Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) to address the unserviceable weapons provided under the contract, in addition to filing required Shipping Discrepancy Reports (SDRs).

Recommendation 4.e.: Screen future weapons under this contract before shipment.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: Does not apply to CSTC-A.

Recommendation No 5:
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Review contract, determine if containers met requirements, and adjust if necessary to address security problems.

b. Coordinate with contractor to modify doors, locks and windows to upgrade security features, install tie-downs on racks to securely hold weapons while in-transit, and redesign location of external climate control unit.

c. Coordinate with the Ministry of Defense and/or Afghan National Army to determine the best size of the Mobile Arms Room Containers for effective use down to the Kandak level.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. We have coordinated with the contractor, and all recommendations are incorporated into the newest MARC design. Additional security has been added to the doors and windows. Additional brackets have been installed on the exteriors, for air-conditioners, and additional bars have been added to secure weapons during transit.

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Recommendation No. 6:
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Reinforce guidance to mentors to ensure their ANA and ANP counterparts physically verify the serial number on each weapon.

b. Ensure that all personnel at Depot 1 and 22 Bunker weapon compounds physically verify serial numbers of weapons in new shipments by directly inspecting the weapon itself.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: CSTC-A concurs with the DOD OIG recommendation. CSTC-A published a Weapons and Ammunition SOP on 26 February 2009, that established procedures to account for and verify weapons by serial numbers. Additionally, multiple FRAGOs were issued in support of weapons and ammunition accountability programs, including CSTCA FRAGOs 08-090 (Accountability of NATO Weapons, dated 09 August 2008), 09-039 (Depot SOP for Weapons and Ammunition, dated 26 February 2009), 09-038 (Tiger Team for Weapons Inventory at ANA Depot 1, dated 27 February 2009), 09-043 Mod 1 (Verification of Compliance with 100% Weapons Serial Number Inventory, dated 17 March 2009), 09-052 (Verification of Serial Numbers for M4 Rifles & M240B Machine Guns, dated 26 March 2009), 09-107 Lost, Damaged or Destroyed Weapons Serial Number Reporting, dated 22 June 2009. The Afghan 1228 Program has begun conducting end use monitoring visits to ANSF units, providing first-hand sample verification of serial numbers and cross-referencing of the observed data with the DOD Small Arms Registry and CSTC-A records. Physical verification of serial numbers on weapons is the standard procedure at Depot 1. The 1228 Team conducted an inspection of Depot 1 on 8 August 2009 and discovered no discrepancies. Depot 1 is in compliance with all SOPs.

Recommendation No. 7:
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Coordinate with the Ministry of Defense for it to promulgate the decrees down the chain of command to all Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army echelons.

b. Ensure embedded training team personnel confirm that Ministry of Defense decrees have been received with counterpart units.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: CSTC-A concurs with the DOD OIG recommendation. CSTC-A continues to advise and train MOD and MOI on weapons accountability.
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CSTC-A trainers are observing, monitoring compliance, and reporting monthly to CSTC-A. The MOD developed an ANA weapons accountability decree that was both ratified & promulgated on 4 March 2009, we continue to mentor execution.

Recommendation No. 8:

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, coordinate with Ministry of Defense counterparts to assign Ministry of Defense and/or Afghan National Army personnel to Depot 1 and ensure they receive appropriate training and mentoring in depot management and supporting services in the area of weapons accountability and control.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. Our current direction is for MOD/ANA personnel to manage the daily operations for sustainment at Depot 0, which will reinforce Afghan actions and generate self-sufficiency. LOGEIT mentors MOD/ANA at Depot 0 focus on mentoring supply processes, procedures, and property accountability. Depot 0 operational implementation is on track. The transfer of uniform Depot 1 to Depot 0 began 23 July 2009. Vendors will begin direct delivery of these types of items to Depot 0 in late August. Winterization efforts will be centralized at Depot 0 this fall/winter. The first Afghan requisition for winter gear was received at Depot 0 on 26 July 2009.

Recommendation No. 9:

Commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan, dual-hatted as the Commander, International Security Assistance Force, direct the international mentors (OMLTs and POMLTs) to mentor the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior decrees and orders, consistent with Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan mentor guidance, on Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police weapons accountability and control.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: ISAF published FRAGO 291-2009 on 19 June 2009 that directs ISAF OMLTs and POMLTs to ensure their ANSF mentored units conduct monthly one hundred percent serial number inventories of all weapons and assist them in their efforts to account for, control, and physically secure weapons.
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Recommendation No. 10:

Commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan, dual-hatted as the Commander, International
Security Assistance Force, ensure weapons donations by NATO/ISAF member
countries to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan follow Ministry of
Defense, Ministry of Interior and Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
accountability policies and procedures.

CSTC-A RESPONSE: CSTC-A concurs with the DOD IG recommendation. In
February, CSTC-A implemented procedures which required that serial numbers for
weapons donations be provided before the arrival of the donation. On 31 May 2009, a
letter was sent to the Directorate for ANA Training & Equipment Support (DATES),
reiterating this policy and requesting that CSTC-A be notified of any donations
involving weapons by a NATO member country. Typically all NATO donations go
through CSTC-A, but there have been occasions when items were donated on a
bilateral basis and they did not come through CSTC-A. This letter asks that, CSTC-
A be informed of all weapons donations and be provided with a serial number listing.
Appendix H: Final Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
Director, Joint Staff
  Director, Operations (J-3)
  Director, Logistics (J-4)
  Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)

Department of the Army
Secretary of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command
  Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
U.S. Army Forces Command
Auditor General, Department of the Army
Inspector General of the Army

Department of the Navy
Naval Inspector General
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (International Programs)

Department of the Air Force
Commander, Air Force Security Assistance Center
Inspector General of the Air Force

Combatant Commands
Commander, U.S. Central Command*
  Commander, United States Forces – Afghanistan*
  Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan*
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command

*Recipient of the draft report
Other Defense Organizations
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Other Non-Defense Federal Organizations

Department of State
  U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
  Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs
  Inspector General, Department of State

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member
Senate Committee on Appropriations
  Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
  House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement
  House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
House Committee on International Relations
Safety and Occupational Health Accountability In DoD Individual Performance Evaluation Reports