
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

ALEJANDRO M. NUNEZ, MAJOR, UNITED STATES ARMY
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 2001

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2013-01

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The U.S. Personnel Recovery Architecture under Chief of Mission Responsibility: Department of State and Department of Defense Coordination

Alejandro M. Nunez, Major, United States Army

Integration of the various U.S. personnel recovery (PR) architectures leave gaps in coverage and create unnecessary delays when Americans become isolated abroad. This is especially true between the Department of the Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS). Although a few U.S. diplomatic missions abroad have mature PR architectures, each diplomatic mission is challenged with developing their own particular plan to meet the national goals in that given country. Currently, the Deparment of State continues to struggle with the challenges of leading the PR effort within each nation where the sovereignty belongs to that nation and the U.S. Government agencies within the mission do not fall under the exclusive control of the Ambassador. Therefore, the author finds it extremely important to identify the gaps where they exist and ascertain how the DoS and DoD can most effectively coordinate during a PR event within the context of a Chief of Mission (CoM) environment in order to prevent isolated persons from being tortured and/or killed. The author gives special focus to U.S. Army operations in the Western Hemisphere.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Alejandro M. Nunez

Thesis Title: The U.S. Personnel Recovery Architecture under Chief of Mission Responsibility: Department of State and Department of Defense Coordination

Approved by:

________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Prisco Hernandez, Ph.D.

________________________________________, Member
Gilbert Adams, M.A.

________________________________________, Member
Paul J. McKenney, M.A.

________________________________________, Member
Robert C. Ward, B.A.

Accepted this 22nd day of May 2013 by:

________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


Integration of the various U.S. personnel recovery (PR) architectures leave gaps in coverage and create unnecessary delays when Americans become isolated abroad. This is especially true between the Department of the Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS). Although a few U.S. diplomatic missions abroad have mature PR architectures, each diplomatic mission is challenged with developing their own particular plan to meet the national goals in that given country. Currently, the DoS continues to struggle with the challenges of leading the PR effort within each host nation where the sovereignty belongs to that nation and the U.S. Government agencies within the mission do not fall under the exclusive control of the Ambassador. Therefore, the author finds it extremely important to identify the gaps where they exist and ascertain how the DoS and DoD can most effectively coordinate during a PR event within the context of a Chief of Mission (CoM) environment in order to prevent isolated persons from being tortured and/or killed. The author gives special focus to U.S. Army operations in the Western Hemisphere.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

At many times during “the best year of my life,” I questioned my sanity in completing this task, but I was blessed with people around me who cheered me on to the finish line. I would like to thank all the wonderful folks who made themselves available and supported me.

First and foremost, I owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude to my lovely wife Angela--the one person who has always believed in me and has lovingly supported me through thick and thin. Without her patience over lost weekends and many late nights, and her countless sacrifices while holding down the fort alone, I would have never produced this thesis. Equally contributing to this project’s completion were the smiling faces, unconditional love, and infectious good humor of the world’s two best children, Bella and Bastian, who deserved far more of my time this year that I am not deployed.

I would like to thank Major General Paul J. LaCamera for all his guidance and support during his time as the Deputy Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division as I tried to reconcile the air-centric Personnel Recovery DoD doctrine with the realities on the ground for the Army in Iraq through the end of Operation New Dawn. Thanks to him, I learned that the problem with people who think outside the box is that they constrain themselves with acknowledging the box in the first place. As I wrote this thesis, I ferociously tried to ignore the “DoD box.”

Next, I would like to thank the faculty at the Western Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) particularly Robert Ward, the resident faculty member from DoS, Command and General Staff Officer School instructors and U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Gil Adams and U.S. Air Force Colonel (Retired) Gilberto Rios.
Finally, I would not have been able to accomplish the depth of research in this endeavor without the direct contributions from the great Americans at the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Scott Peters and Agent Claude Pool), Glenn Hecht at the Joint Personnel Recovery Collaboration and Planning Special Project, and Dan Baumgartner at the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .......... iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT .......................................................... iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................... v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................... vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS .......................................................... x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS .......................................................... xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES .......................................................... xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Research Question ...................................................... 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background .............................................................. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions .............................................................. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions .............................................................. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope .............................................................. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations .............................................................. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations .............................................................. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study .................................................. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................... 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layer 3: General Theme Literature ...................................... 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Question 1 ...................................................... 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>National Security Strategy (NSS)</em> .................................... 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD-1 .............................................................. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD-44, <em>Management of the Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization</em> .................................................. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Mission Authority and Overseas Staffing .................. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Command White Paper ........................................ 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 3-08, <em>Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations</em> .......... 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mission Command –Realizing Unified Action</em> .................... 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dynamics of Interagency Cooperation Process at Provincial Reconstruction Team in Operations ISAF and Enduring Freedom ................. 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layer 2: Subject Area Literature ...................................... 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Question 2 ...................................................... 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), <em>FAM-260</em> ................. 22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rationale for Selection of Research Design ................................................................. 48

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS .................................................................................................49

Analysis of a PR Architecture ..................................................................................... 49
COA Development ....................................................................................................... 52
  PR Event Triggers and Other Parameters ............................................................... 52
    Other Parameters: Risk ....................................................................................... 54
    Other Parameters: Partner Responsibilities and Relationships ....................... 61
COA Evaluation Criteria ........................................................................................... 63
COA #1 (Status Quo–no USG PR Architecture) ...................................................... 66
COA #2 (USG PR Architecture-Implemented) ........................................................ 67
COA Analysis (War-Game) ....................................................................................... 72
  Mexico Scenario .................................................................................................... 72
    War-game: COA #1 (Status Quo) .................................................................. 77
    COA #1 (Status Quo) Evaluation ................................................................... 78
    War-game: COA #2 (USG PR Architecture) ................................................ 80
    COA #2 (USG PR Architecture) Evaluation .................................................. 89
COA Comparison ..................................................................................................... 91

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................92

  Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 92
  Recommendations ............................................................................................... 94

GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................... 96

REFERENCE LIST ................................................................................................... 98
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACS</th>
<th>American Citizen Services (also USCS at some posts including Mexico)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMCIT</td>
<td>American Citizen (Acronym used by the U.S. DoS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Course of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoM</td>
<td>Chief of Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>Defense Attaché Office or Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Decision Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense support of civil authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCC</td>
<td>Diplomatic Security Command Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>Emergency Action Committee (DoS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAH</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Handbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAM</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>Foreign Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Hostage Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Institute for Defense Analyses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Isolated Person or Isolated Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPRP</td>
<td>Interagency Personnel Recovery Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPRCaP</td>
<td>Joint Personnel Recovery Collaboration and Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGATT</td>
<td>Legal Attaché (FBI agent(s) assigned to USM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOH</td>
<td>Member of Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Non-conventional Assisted Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>Northern Command, GCC responsible for Mexico, U.S., and Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD-1</td>
<td>NSPD for Organization of the National Security Council System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD-44</td>
<td>NSPD for Management of the Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OND</td>
<td>Operation New Dawn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSO</td>
<td>Regional Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>Senior Defense Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDENA</td>
<td>Mexico’s Secretariat of National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERE</td>
<td>Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>Unconventional Assisted Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USM</td>
<td>United States Mission, USG diplomatic missions abroad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Illustrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Relationships Between Levels of War</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Full Dimensional Personnel Recovery</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Survey of Literature relation layers</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Organizational Chart for Bureau of Diplomatic Security</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The PR Process Overview</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The Sub-processes of Respond</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Annex C to PRSCG</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The USG PR Process Architecture in a CoM Environment</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Risk Curve: Impact vs. Probability</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Risk Curve: Isolation risk</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Risk Matrix: Diplomatic Impact of PR Execution COAs</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Risk Matrix: Risk to Mission for PR Execution COAs</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>COA #2 USG PR Architecture Flow Chart actions 0-14</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>COA #2 USG PR Architecture Flow Chart actions 14-22</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Map of Hurricane Alix touchdown in Matamoros, Mexico</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>DoS Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Mexico Scenario Incident Sketch</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Risk Matrix: Mexico, Diplomatic Impact</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Risk Matrix: Mexico, Risk to Mission</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.</td>
<td>PR Event Triggers</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.</td>
<td>Partner Responsibilities and Relationships</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.</td>
<td>COA Evaluation Criteria</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.</td>
<td>COA #1 (Status Quo) Evaluation</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.</td>
<td>COA #2 (USG PR Architecture) Evaluation</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.</td>
<td>COA Comparison Results (by Category Weight)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Research Question

The central question of this research is how do the Departments of State (DoS) and of Defense (DoD) most effectively coordinate during a Personnel Recovery (PR) event under a Chief of Mission (CoM) environment in the Western Hemisphere during wide area security operations abroad? In order to answer the primary question with accuracy and depth, the author must answer ensuing secondary questions. These secondary questions which are also correlated to the literary review as layers of the Core in figure 3 are the following.¹

Layer 3 (General Theme Literature): (1) What mechanisms currently exist to standardize interagency operations at the national level? Layer 2 (Subject Area Literature): (2) What are the DoS and DoD PR policies and doctrine? (3) Are there gaps between the departments’ PR policies and is joint doctrine adequate? Layer 1 (PR Process Literature): (4) What are the specific mechanisms, policies, or doctrine at the national level for PR? (5) What agency is responsible for PR at the national level? and (6) Assuming that the Army is the lead DoD agency for wide area security operations abroad, how does the Army nest Army PR doctrine with Joint and DoS plans?

¹The Thesis question is depicted by the author as the primary research question related to the Core in figure 3 located in chapter 2.
Background

Integration of the different programs within the United States Government (USG) personnel recovery (PR) architecture and multinational architectures leave gaps in coverage and unnecessary delays when a person becomes isolated. This is especially true between the Department of the Defense’s PR doctrine and the DoS’ PR policies and plans. This particular gap was directly responsible for the delay and failure in launching personnel recovery forces on February 13, 2003, when the recognized terrorist group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), captured three American DoD contractors who crashed in a remote FARC-controlled area of Colombia and held them for a period of five years. A recovery force could have possibly held off adversaries and recovered the personnel before the FARC elements arrived on the scene had the USG had an official policy regarding DoD contractors and had the DoS had an interagency and multinational plan in place for conducting such recovery operations. This is because as soon as the aircraft experienced the loss of their single engine, crewmembers were able to make detailed mayday calls to the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East in Florida and their point of contact at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia. In addition to the negative strategic impact to both countries by the capture of the three contractors, the FARC also executed the American pilot and a Colombian military non-commissioned officer at the crash site (Gonsalves et al. 2009). The DoS has since addressed both deficiencies for Colombia. Yet between October 2011 and December 2011, as the responsibility for the PR architecture in Iraq transitioned from the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) to the CoM (i.e. the U.S. Ambassador) during the final months of Operation New Dawn (OND), these gaps became a critical planning consideration for the
25th Infantry Division. The 25th Infantry Division, which headed the United States Division–Center, was in charge of the entire PR architecture in Iraq, and had difficulties synchronizing efforts between the DoS and U.S. Forces due in large part to a not-to-interfere policy prevalent within the interagency (Joglekar et al. 2004). Therefore, the author finds it extremely important to identify the gaps where they exist and answer the thesis question in order to prevent similar situations from occurring with more dire consequences.

Assumptions

As unified action becomes the standard in military operations around the world, this research assumes that the GCC will employ the U.S. Army more often in its wide area security core competency. Under wide area security the Army may be required to conduct interorganizational operations as part of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), Peace Operations, Counterinsurgency, and Security Assistance (Department of the Army 2011a). According to Army doctrine, the wide area security core competency primarily employs stability mechanisms against the threat and is dominated by stability tasks while still performing offensive and defensive tasks as required (Department of the Army 2011a). The U.S. Army conducts most operations that fall under wide area security within the borders of a sovereign host nation (HN). Therefore, the second assumption is that the lead agency in these instances will be the DoS through the CoM unless the CoM and HN requests support from the GCC (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a). As of the publication date of this study, the United States diplomatic mission (USM) in the chosen country scenario may have developed and implemented an Interagency Personnel Recovery Plan (IPRP) and Annex G (draft) to
Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 may have already been published and replaced the 2005 version. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the author assumes that the USM in the country scenario does not have an IPRP implemented.

Additionally, below are the key assumptions from the United States Personnel Recovery Strategic Communication Guidance (draft) which are also a baseline for this study:

1. Adversaries initiate and exploit isolating events as part of their strategy.
2. Adversaries will continue isolating and exploiting personnel serving abroad in order to compel concessions from U.S., allies, and coalition partners.
3. In the areas of highest threat, the leadership and the local population may have anti-U.S. sentiments.
4. U.S. service members will resist capture, exploitation, and survive isolation to the best of their ability and training.
5. The USG will not make concessions to secure release.
6. USG leaders, other prominent figures, family members, and allies will make statements or take actions that will affect USG personnel recovery policies and actions.
7. The USG may not know who (state or non-state actors) is holding U.S. personnel or citizens hostage, or if those persons are alive.
8. Private organizations and/or persons, as well as many foreign governments, are inclined to pay ransom to secure the release of their personnel or citizens. (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs 2013, 7)

Definitions

USG agencies and departments often define the same terms differently. At times, even when a national policy defines a term, an agency or department definition for the same term is in conflict with the national policy definition. Therefore, the author takes great care to quote definitions and other doctrinal or policy material as appropriate. Most definitions found in this chapter are direct quotes from mostly DoD, DoS, and national policy sources; however, the author had to adapt some definitions to meet the national policy intent.
CoM Environment: The U.S. Ambassador (or other designated CoM) is responsible and has final decision authority for USG and American Citizen (AMCIT) security while respecting the sovereignty of the HN to the maximum extent possible. A third environment which is not within the scope of this study is a sovereign country with no CoM such as North Korea and Iran at the time of this publication. Examples involving DoD are security cooperation and building partnerships (Fontaine 2013c).

DoD Environment: The Joint Forces Commander through the Geographic Combatant Commander is responsible and has final decision authority for USG and AMCIT security as the USG agency operating unilaterally abroad with the extent of regard for HN sovereignty dictated by strategic and mission objectives. Examples of situations are major military operations, campaigns, and contingency operations (Fontaine 2013a).

Interagency coordination: Within the context of DoD involvement, interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between elements of DoD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the US military and the other instruments of national power (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011c, x).

Interorganizational coordination: Similarly, within the context of DoD involvement, interorganizational coordination is the interaction that occurs among elements of the DoD; engaged USG agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations

---

2For the purpose of this study and in an effort to increase objectivity, the author adjusted the definitions for CoM Environment and DoD Environment found in the JPRCaP Special Project sources in order to align with NSS and NSPD-12.
(IGOs); nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011c, x).

**Isolating event:** “Incident wherein personnel become separated, or isolated, from friendly support and are forced to survive, evade capture, or endure being held against their will” (Bush 2008, 2).

**Isolated Person or Isolated Personnel (IP):** “A [U.S.] citizen or national who is cut off from support and who, if not recovered or assisted is at risk of harm” (U.S. Department of State 2013). In the context of USG IP, this includes USG contract employees, government-sponsored family members, who are authorized by the USG to travel overseas (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated from friendly support (as an individual or a group) while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape (Bush 2008, 2). ³ Therefore, some of these covered individuals may not be AMCITs.⁴

**Levels of war:** Three levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical—model the relationship between national objectives and tactical actions (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a). Where the strategic level of war focuses on the national objectives and the tactical level of war focuses on the agency representative or tactical commander objectives, the operational level of war links the tactical employment of assets to national objectives.

³The PRSCG also enhances the JP 3-50 military centric definition with specific guidance to expand the coverage of IP and PR outside of U.S. military, DoD civilians, and DoD contract personnel in order to stay in line with Annex 1 to NSPD-12.

⁴Although some government agency will extend the term “U.S. national” to U.S. permanent residents, the definition found in the U.S. Code for “U.S. national” does not include U.S. permanent residents.
and military strategic objectives. Figure 1 depicts general relationships between the strategic level of war, the operational level of war, and the tactical level of war and between organizations who typically focus at these levels. The author will make use of these defined terms throughout this work although as they are applied to an environment without war and therefore will call them just the strategic level, the operational level, and the tactical level.

Mission Command: “The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a, II-2). However, for the purposes of this research, the concept of Mission Command is universal and complements the “Whole of Government Approach” as described in the NSS by establishing that the mission has priority and accomplishing the mission will require command purpose and direction to integrate the efforts of not only the agencies and assets controlled by the lead USG agency, but also of all other unified action partners.
Personnel Recovery (PR): “Diplomatic, military, and private efforts to prepare for and recover persons who become isolated from friendly support or who are held against their will” (Bush 2008, 2).

PR architecture: The structural design of process systems as applied to the fields of information technology, policy and procedures, and business management. In business, architecture is a blueprint of the enterprise that provides a common understanding of the organization and is used to align strategic objectives and tactical demands (The Business Architecture Group 2012). For the purposes of this study, PR architecture resides within the greater National Security Superstructure and is the structure of the PR process (defined below) systems composed of a PR infrastructure, which describes a process
system's component parts and their interactions, and a PR superstructure, which is the external support of the infrastructure.

**PR event**: Based on doctrine and personal operational experience, the author defines a PR event as an event that requires the PR architecture to validate the status or accountability of personnel presumed missing to determine whether they are covered by CoM authority and are in fact isolated. Therefore, a PR event will have triggers that answer whether the event does in fact involve IPs as defined in this work making it an isolating event and whether the event is under the responsibility of the CoM. Annex 1, National Security Presidential Directive-12 (NSPD-12) expanded the PR responsibilities of each agency to “prevent, plan for, and coordinate a response” to an isolating incident. The author did not find PR event as a term defined in JP 3-50, FM 3-50.1, or any other resource available to the author. However, the author can deduce from other related definitions that a PR event is a circumstance wherein the USG uses the sum of military, civil, and diplomatic efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of IPs as defined above.

**PR execution tasks**: A DoD PR Coordination Cell or DoD operations center must address these tasks during every isolating event. These tasks are report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. Further definitions for each of the tasks are located in the glossary. Although some agencies outside of the DoD have adopted the five PR execution tasks, they are not adequate to every CoM environment (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011d).

**PR Network**: “The non-technical, human system (both military and non-military) which attempts to connect-the-dots of seemingly uncorrelated information that will
eventually depict not only how the isolation event occurred, but also how to successfully resolve the event (Fontaine 2013a, 14).

**PR Process**: “a [pre-decisional] codified process that baselines and unifies sub-processes, procedures, and tasks [within USG agencies and host nations]” (Fontaine 2013d, 2).

**Unified action partners**: “are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations” (Department of the Army 2012b). These can include joint forces and components, multinational forces, and USG agencies and departments.

**Whole of Government**: “is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government (USG) to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal” (Rowell 2012, 2-3).

**Wide Area Security**: “is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative” (Department of the Army 2011b, 2-9).

**Scope**

Other works have focused on the broader theme of interagency coordination and the whole of government approach to PR, but due to the previous lack of DoS research material, these past works have examined their respective problems through a DoD lens and therefore lost some objectivity. This research will use a particular geographical area, named organizations, specific situations, the levels of war, and a more objective lens to
narrow the scope of the broader strategic question on how the United States should best use a whole of government approach to ensure a positive outcome in a PR event within the construct of the PR Process of Prepare, Prevent, and Respond. The author will give special focus to Respond in this study, as a PR event would reside within this portion of the PR Process.

Geographical area. The geographic focus will be the Western Hemisphere outside the United States.

Named organizations. The research will focus on the interaction between the DoD (Army) and the DoS (a U.S. Embassy).

Specific situation. The research will narrow the situational context by focusing on PR during wide area security operations within the GCC’s unified action plan in support of a CoM environment.

Levels of war. The research will consider activities at the operational and tactical levels of war. However, many PR situations have strategic effects and implications. Additionally, the author will for the most part leave out “of war” as the CoM environment implies that the USG is not “at war” in said environment, in contrast to a DoD environment.

Limitations

Annex 1 to NSPD-12 is a primary source important for this research as other sources reference it as the document that implements the national personnel recovery architecture. However, as the document is classified, only the confidential version is available for research. Additionally, the author cannot use existing DoS Interagency Personnel Recovery Program (IPRP) plans and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) or
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) PR Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) for this research due to classification. The lack of these documents for reference may pose gaps in any unclassified research results and analysis, but DoD PR doctrine in JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, The Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture: Final Results, NSPD-12, and Annex G (draft), Hostage Taking and Personnel Recovery, J2 FAH-1 may mitigate these gaps.

Delimitations

Due to the short span of time available for the completion of this thesis and the lack of personnel available to the author for war-gaming in accordance with JP 5-0 and ADP 5-0, the author limited the tools and detail normally used in war-gaming. However, the author will invite numerous readers to provide feedback during the war-game sections as a method for reducing subjectivity. Additionally, although the USG has been developing and refining its PR doctrine for more than four decades, for the time being the author limited the historical research of the topic between 2001 and the present, in order to better line up with the modern concepts of interagency coordination and personnel recovery as outlined in NSPD-1 and Annex 1 to NSPD-12. For example, the mechanisms available to the DoD after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, are far greater and varied due to legislation passed after the attacks and unit specialization within DoD that occurred between the Iran Hostage Crisis and 2001 (Rowell 2012).

Significance of the Study

In 2004, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) published their final report on the Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture stressing that an isolating
event can impact national policy and executive decision making because of the psychological and sociological effect it could have on the U.S. population through the media. This is the most powerful way a PR situation can have strategic effects and implications. However, Annex 1 to NSPD-12 published in 2008 and the “National Personnel Recovery Strategy Version 1 draft pre-decisional” more clearly and objectively accentuate the strategic significance of the research compared to the IDA study because the latter was completed under DoD guidance and through a DoD lens. Additionally, the Joint Personnel Recovery Collaboration and Planning Project (JPRCaP) is currently conducting an in-depth study with experiments taking place in 2013 and 2014 (Fontaine 2013b).

Figure 2. Full Dimensional Personnel Recovery

As depicted in figure 2, the study grouped the following events as PR categories: Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR), Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR), Hostage Rescue, Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR), Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC), Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC), Mass Rescue, Search and Rescue (SAR), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), and evacuations (Joglekar et al. 2004). Several academics in the DoD and DoS PR community do not agree with the study’s conglomeration of all the situations as PR categories arguing that CASEVAC-MEDEVAC, Mass Rescue, Civil SAR, and evacuations do not belong under the PR umbrella. However, according to DoS 12 FAH-1 Annex G (draft), within the context of a CoM environment, each of these situations can be the response to an isolating event as defined in Annex 1 to NSPD-12.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review will begin with works relating to the Layer 3 (General Theme Literature) topic of interagency cooperation and whole of government employment to answer secondary question 1. Then the research will move to works dealing with the Layer 2 (Subject Area Literature) policies, doctrine, and procedures within the DoS and DoD to answer secondary question 2. Finally, this research ends with works in Layer 1 (PR Process Literature) relating directly with personnel recovery to answer secondary questions 4 through 6, while labeling each work as a primary or secondary source (See figure 3).

Figure 3. Survey of Literature relation layers

Source: Created by author. As the author continued with the research into this study, he realized that Layers 1 and 2 from figure 3 mixed to make the core of the thesis; therefore, the author deliberately chose yellow and blue for Layers 2.
Research into the literature in the general subject area found that for more than four decades the United States Government has been dealing with interagency coordination and cooperation, the general theme of this research. Modern historical events have contributed to increase the way USG agencies cooperate with each other such as the Vietnam War, the Iran Hostage Crisis, the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, and the Global War on Terrorism to name a few.

Layer 3: General Theme Literature

The literature and other research placed in this section would support secondary question 1. After a survey of articles and manuals belonging to Layer 3 (General Theme Literature), it seems that there is an interagency framework established, but not often utilized. The framework exists within the subcommittees of the National Security Council (Bush 2001). Based on the research, it seems that the USG has preferred interagency coordination and cooperation instead of overarching doctrine because this approach traditionally allowed a particular lead agency to conduct its mission without interference from outside agencies. However, field research in the District of Columbia area by the author revealed that the joint interagency policy makers are earnestly trying to streamline processes in order to be more effective in the area of PR.

Secondary Question 1

What mechanisms currently exist to standardize interagency operations at the national level?
National Security Strategy (NSS)

This is a primary source and serves as an umbrella for all other sources in Layer 3 (General Theme Literature), as perhaps the most important mechanism currently available to continue to spur standardization in interagency operations at the national level. The NSS calls for the USG to “update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same,” and describes this as a “Whole of Government Approach” (The White House 2010, 14). Although this policy does not specifically name PR situations, it does intend for the USG to “prevent terrorist attacks against Americans,” which covers some of the most heinous circumstances that lead to PR: kidnapping and hostage taking (The White House 2010, 10).

This document admits that coordination across departments and agencies of the USG requires better alignment of resources with national strategy and equipping USG national security professionals with training and education to meet modern challenges and implement programs that strengthen interagency coordination. This call for the “Whole of Government Approach” and greater interagency cooperation for unified actions by the USG is precisely what the PR Process requires in both CoM and DoD environments.

NSPD-1

This is a primary source and answers secondary question 1. The document is the first in a series of National Security Presidential Directives, which replaced Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives as an instrument for stating national security policies of the United States. Here, the President of the United States
gives the National Security Council (NSC) the broad mission of overseeing and
standardizing the interagency coordination and implementing synchronized efforts by all
agencies of the USG toward common goals. The NSC uses subcommittees and working
groups to develop and implement policy at the national level for the purpose of unifying
the actions of the USG. As it is a directive, all agencies under the Executive Branch are
expected to comply; therefore, this document serves as the first mechanism at the national
level to coordinate unity of purpose and effort for the USG through interagency
cooperation, coordination, and integration.

NSPD-44, Management of the Interagency Efforts
Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization

This is a primary source and supports the “Whole of Government Approach”
described in the NSS offering a mechanism at the national level for interagency
cooperation and coordination in building partner state capabilities (The White House
2010). The purpose of NSPD-44 is to promote the security of the United States through
improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization
assistance to foreign states. This directive gives specific responsibilities to the DoS in
coordinating and leading integrated USG efforts abroad and charges all other executive
departments and agencies to “enable the Secretary of State to carry out the
responsibilities in [NSPD-44]” (Bush 2005).

Chief of Mission Authority and Overseas Staffing

This is a primary source. Other DoS documents refer to FAMs and FAHs as DoS
doctrine. This particular document explains CoM responsibilities under U.S. law and
presidential directives. CoM authority is the USG’s primary mechanism for interagency,
interorganization, and multinational cooperation abroad. Additionally, although it is common knowledge within DoD personnel that the GCC maintains authority and responsibility for the personnel under his or her command while overseas, this document explains the current state of agreements between the DoD and DoS with respect to those personnel. In 1997, the Secretaries of Defense and State co-signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) where DoS agrees to assume responsibility for the security of DoD personnel working within the purview of USMs abroad in security assistance capacities, and the DoD agrees to give DoS authority over said individuals with regard to security and ensure that all personnel operating within the purview of a USM have documentation assigning them as CoM or GCC personnel. This document also provides the names of the various DoD offices at USMs abroad that deal with security assistance.

Mission Command White Paper

This is a secondary source written by the CJCS about the concept of Mission Command in DoD and how it achieves unified action. The CJCS expands on the JP-3-0 definition which states that Mission Command is “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders;” however, according to Richard Pedersen, the concept of Mission Command is far wider and must continue to evolve outward in order to enable military leaders to accomplish their missions within a decisive action and unified land operations construct (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a, II-2). The CJCS also expands on the responsibilities of the commander to provide clear orders and enable junior leaders through example and training to execute missions successfully. However, this document does not further the concept in the realm of the “Whole of
Government Approach” as Richard Pedersen does, which appears to be more applicable to this study (The White House 2010).

**JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations**

The author uses this document as a secondary source because it describes procedures and tools that the DoD may use when coordinating with organizations external to DoD. This edition is the most recent, and it changes the word interagency to “interorganizational” based on current realities which requires the DoD to not only coordinate with the interagency (i.e. other USG agencies), but also with International Government Organizations, Non-governmental Organizations, and the private sector (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011c).

**Mission Command – Realizing Unified Action**

This is a secondary source that describes how the Army should evolve its concept of Mission Command further beyond simply command and control in order to fully realize an institutional culture change in order to provide Army leaders with an instrument to engage, leverage, cooperate, and coordinate with unified action partners not under the control of the ground commander. According to Pedersen, the concept of Mission Command is far broader than just decentralized execution based on mission orders and must continue to advance outward in order to enable military leaders to accomplish their missions within a decisive action and unified land operations construct (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a, II-2). Again, the themes of unified effort, “Whole of Government Approach,” and integrated action are the environments upon which military
leaders must operate in a CoM environment where DoD controls very little and the Host Nation has decisive input.

The Dynamics of Interagency Cooperation Process at Provincial Reconstruction Team in Operations ISAF and Enduring Freedom

This is a secondary source. Although the author of this research is Italian, he offers a view through an outside lens of the USG’s existing interagency cooperation mechanisms and how they relate to dealing with non-USG agencies and states. Captain Zuzzi takes an in-depth look at the interagency cooperation process at the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) level in Afghanistan in order to identify deficiencies and find possible solutions to improve the effectiveness of the PRT within all three levels of war. Although the deficiencies Zuzzi identified were not exclusively in the area of interagency coordination, the interagency processes were of great concern and greater coordination would increase the effectiveness of the PRT according to Zuzzi. Similarly, the author’s research found that a possible underlining problem that hinders greater interagency coordination and cooperation is the lens through which each department and agency sees PR. For example, DoD uses a centralized Air Force-Special Operations lens for its PR doctrine and advocates the same lens to be used at the national level by DoS. In contrast, DoS used a host-nation lens on a not-to-interfere basis prior to the publication of Annex 1 to NSPD-12 and its own Annex G (draft) to 12 FAH-1, where each of the PR categories from figure 2 were separate and depended exclusively on the host-nation where the CoM authority resides. Currently, these types of deferring perspectives obstruct coordination among the interagency
Layer 2: Subject Area Literature

The Layer 2’s literature supports secondary questions 2 and 3. Based on the author’s field research at the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security in Washington, DC as part of this study, the author obtained a copy of Annex G (draft) to *12 FAH-1*, which once published, will become the DoS standard for unifying the national effort during PR events in CoM environments. Additionally, some USMs overseas operate under mission specific classified PR Plans, but the author will not use these in order not to compromise classified material. With respect to secondary question 3, the DoD services seem to have bridged the gap among each other concerning PR doctrine. The Army doctrine, for example, attempts to adapt and nest within the air-centric JP 3-50.

Secondary Question 2

What are the DoS and DoD PR policies and doctrine?

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), *1 FAM-260*

This is a primary source. As part of DoS doctrine, this document describes the various capabilities and responsibilities that reside within the DoS in the area of protection and security as DS is directly responsible for the safety of every USM employee and their families in over 285 facilities around the world (U.S. Department of State 2012b). Prior to the author’s conduct of a field research in Washington, DC, 1 FAM-260 was the only primary doctrinal source where the DoS uses the words “Personnel Recovery.” The FAM describes capabilities that support the PR Process, such as locator beacons, and calls PR one of several high-profile security programs managed by the Deputy Secretary and by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s Assistant Director.
for International Programs. Additionally, of note, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s Office of Special Programs and Coordination coordinates for PR at the department level. See figure 4 for DS organization and reporting Chain.

Annex G, Hostage Taking, *12 FAH-1*

This is a primary source and describes a portion of the policies and procedures utilized by the DoS when dealing with a specific PR situation. At the time that the author conducted this study, the 2005 edition of Annex to *12 FAH-1* was the current version and did not incorporate the holistic concept of PR as set forth in NSPD-12. As its title implies, the document dealt exclusively with the Hostage Taking aspect of PR, but did not describe it as such.
Section 230, Emergency Action Committee, 12 FAH-H

This is a primary source. Section 230 describes the purpose, conditions, and procedures for calling the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) into session. The document does not directly describe PR as one of the situations that may necessitate a session, but it does specifically mention some special situations which are a part of PR such as hostage taking and missing persons.

Section 1820: Hostage Taking and Kidnapping, 7 FAM-1800

This document is a primary source. DoS Consular Affairs sections in USMs are frequently subdivided into at minimum three subsections: Immigrant Visa, Non-immigrant Visa, Fraud Prevention, and American Citizen Services (ACS). This document is a guide for ACS personnel in case they have to deal with the Hostage Taking or Kidnapping of an AMCIT in their area of responsibility. It serves as a compilation of protocols and procedures for ACS personnel to follow in response to the aforementioned incidents; however, this document does not mention PR and does not describe Hostage Taking or Kidnapping as situations that fall under the wider PR umbrella group.

U.S. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense

This DoDD is a primary source which incorporates and cancels DoDD 2310.2 and DoD Instruction 2310.3 as a single Directive to establish policy and realign responsibilities for PR in DoD. The document also defines the responsibilities for PR regarding the preparation of forces and operational planning and ensures that DoD PR responsibilities and procedures adapt to meet emerging requirements. It also identifies the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) as the Office of the Secretary of
Defense’s Principal Staff Assistant responsible for personnel recovery strategy, policy development, and operational oversight through the USD(P) Chief of Staff (CoS) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs, while the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), as a Chairman’s controlled activity, shall be the DoD office of primary responsibility (OPR).

[DoD] PR Strategic Communications Guidance Memorandum

This is a primary source for DoD PR strategy. The then Deputy Secretary of Defense sent the PRSCG on March 4, 2008 to DoD leadership and directors. The PRSCG provides common terms of reference, addresses how the PRSCG supports the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS), Annex 1 to NSPD-12, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS). According to the document, the PRSCG uses strategic communication principles in concert with diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement elements of national power and is written to serve as an enabler to Annex 1, NSPD-12. The document also provides operational design worksheets with established lines of operation to develop Adversary Center of Gravity\(^5\) and related elements and a quick reference guide with goals, key questions, general talking points, guiding principles, USG public response guidelines, and initial tasks.

\(^5\)Something adversaries need to accomplish their objective (Department of the Army 2011a).
Joint Publication (JP) 3-50, Personnel Recovery

This is a primary source for DoD Joint doctrine. Reinforced by DoD Instructions, Directives, and service specific regulations, JP 3-50 encapsulates the DoD PR doctrine. This document provides a description of Personnel Recovery and the DoD Personnel Recovery System presenting Personnel Recovery Functions and Responsibilities, Command and Control of Personnel Recovery Operations, Operation Planning for Personnel Recovery, and the Five Personnel Recovery Execution Tasks. This document is DoD’s most up-to-date published account of PR and includes lessons learned during Operation New Dawn (OND) as the Combatant Commander, or GCC, transferred the PR architecture to the CoM in Iraq. However, although the DoD has made an attempt to include PR in CoM environments, the mechanisms within JP 3-50 are tailored for a DoD environment and offer an inadequate process for the CoM environment where the five PR execution tasks are not necessarily applicable. Additionally, within the context of the DoD environment, the approach to PR in JP 3-50 is Air Force centric and does not account sufficiently for the PR challenges faced by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps.

ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations

This U.S. Army manual is a primary source and expands on the joint theme of unified action by codifying the Army’s operational concept as unified land operations describes how the Army carries out its core competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security through Decisive Action, which is the concept of continuous, simultaneous offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). This manual is important to the author’s research in that it guides Army planners and
commanders in the wider ideas of utilizing combat power, as newly defined, with its unified action partners to achieve unity of effort through decisive action, which is precisely the scope military leaders need in order to have freedom of action to conduct or support PR operations in a CoM environment.

**Field Manual 3-50.1, Army Personnel Recovery**

This is a primary source for Army Doctrine. Prior to December 2011, the Army Personnel Recovery doctrine did not nest well with JP 3-50. This particular revision synchronizes some lexicon, which was different between Joint and Army and incorporates the joint concepts of unified action within PR. Although the previous army acronym IMDC (isolated, missing, detained, captured) is not specifically rescinded in this revision, the term is no longer included and the joint term Isolated Person is incorporated to fit the same IMDC definition (Department of the Army 2005). This manual accounts for PR situations within stability and DSCA and establishes personnel recovery capability periods as minimum, optimal, and residual on a force size versus time x-y axis. FM 3-50.1 also serves as an insightful secondary source for DoS PR policy and capabilities and provides examples of isolating criteria such as:

[The] absence of nearby friendly forces or the inability to communicate with expected organizations . . .

- No communication with their unit or higher headquarters, by any means, for the time specified in the isolated Soldier guidance.
- No contact with fellow unit members for the time specified in the isolated Soldier guidance.
- A forced or precautionary aircraft landing in hostile territory.
- A ground vehicle becoming separated from the rest of the convoy under observation in hostile territory.
- An encounter with unexpected enemy, hostile, or criminal forces. (Department of the Army 2011b, 1-9)

Although the manual is far more thorough and relevant to unified land operations compared to JP 3-50, the manual loses some application validity as it tries to work within the air-centric framework of JP 3-50, further fails to address the term “on-scene commander” adequately as it relates to PR and JP 3-50, and does not nest the JP 3-50 acronym EPA with evasion plan of action (EPA) and its appropriate definition.

Secondary Question 3

Are there gaps between the departments’ PR policies and is joint doctrine adequate?

Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture, Final Report

This is a primary source. In 2001, the House Appropriations Committee recommended that the DoD conduct an interagency needs assessment to define a national personnel recovery architecture that is fully integrated. In 2002, the DoD tasked the IDA\(^6\) to conduct a 2-year study to address the congressional recommendation. This document is the final report of this study. Additionally, per DoD request, IDA continues support to implement the recommendations of this report.

The study revealed that due in large part to the Global War on Terrorism, today's era of persistent conflict, increases the likelihood of deploying not only military, but also USG civilian and contractor personnel overseas in harm’s way. Therefore, the study

---

\(^6\)IDA is a private organization contracted by DoD to investigate PR related congressional taskings
recommends that the scope of Personnel Recovery expand to include not only DoD civilians and contractors, but all U.S. Government civilians and contractors. The study goes a step further, and includes multinational cooperation and coordination in order to stay in line with DoD’s Joint Vision for 2020. The study revealed that PR was an exceedingly broad subject area because it includes among a few Hostage Rescue, Prisoner of War (POW), and Search and Rescue in a variety of environments ranging from permissive to hostile. Therefore, after visiting the countries of Colombia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, IDA found that the most practical way to categorize PR as it relates to all USG agencies abroad is between those situations where the DoD is responsible for PR under the GCC, and those circumstances where the DoS is responsible for PR under the CoM, or Ambassador. Although the study focused on the uncertain to the hostile environments abroad, the study does address the fact that in permissive environments the Host Nation would likely be the key player. In order to set the parameters for PR, the study recommends defining PR at the national level as something that occurs only abroad. The recommended definition is:

Personnel recovery is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery of U.S. military, Government civilians, and Government contractors who become isolated from friendly control while participating in U.S.-sponsored activities abroad, and of other persons as designated by the President.

IDA also found that the DoD had a good grasp on PR and was probably the only USG agency that understood not only its application and potential strategic impact, but also implemented a well-developed PR doctrine. However, DoD also had a number of deficiencies to overcome. At the time of the IDA report publication, these deficiencies
included DoD civilian and DoD contractor coverage, differences between services in PR
doctrine, coverage of coalition partners, and the coverage of third country nationals
(TCNs). DoD has corrected most of its deficiencies, but not all. For example, TCNs
subcontracted under a DoD contractor, still pose a problem for DoD today because they
usually have no PR training, which is a common problem for USG civilians across most
other USG agencies. Similarly, other USG agencies except for the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), have similar overall PR program deficiencies.

Additionally, this document provided the author an explanation of the President’s
personal letter to each CoM upon assignment which was of utmost importance to this
study. According to IDA, this letter usually begins with the text:

As Chief of Mission, you have full responsibility for the direction, coordination,
and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in
country/at international organization, regardless of their employment categories or
location, except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on
the staff of an international organization. Except for the activities of the personnel
excepted above, you are in charge of all executive branch activities and operations
in your mission/international organization … take full responsibility for the
security of your Mission and all the personnel for whom you are responsible,
whether inside or outside the chancery gate. Unless an interagency agreement
provides otherwise, the Secretary of State and you CoM must protect all USG
personnel on official duty abroad other than those under the protection of a U.S.
area military commander. (Joglekar et al. 2004)

The DoS and DoD do have an interagency agreement for CoM environments as
mentioned earlier in this chapter where the DoD agrees to inform the CoM of any
personnel in country and DoS agrees to take responsibility for their security.
Out of Captivity: Surviving 1,967 days in the Colombian Jungle

This is a primary source that details the 2003 kidnapping and 2008 rescue of the three American DoD contractors described in chapter 1, from their perspective. The book demonstrates in vivid detail the repercussions of not having PR Architecture in a CoM Environment. The incident and captivity described in this book can probably be credited with being the single event that prompted the USG to reexamine its PR capabilities and policies. Prior to this event, DoD contractors were not covered for personnel recovery support and the NSPD-12 charge to all USG agencies of preventing and supporting all USG personnel and AMCITs was not yet instituted. In the last 10 years the USG has made many strides towards building unity of effort against the threats posed by isolating events, and a similar incident would most likely not occur in Colombia any time soon thanks to the USM-Colombia’s robust IPRP; however, since all USMs are not required to have an IPRP, a similar situation could still occur somewhere else in the globe even after all the USG policy changes and increased focus. In fact, prior to the isolating event that led to the September 11, 2012, killing of Ambassador Chris Stevens and four other USG employees in Benghazi, Libya, a DoS report described the risk of USM personnel and other AMCITs becoming isolated as a result of militia or political violence as “HIGH” (Schachtman and Beckhusen 2012). Only seven months later, there are very likely many other USMs with high isolating event risk.

Whole of Government Approach to Personnel Recovery

This is a secondary source that identifies gaps between the different PR policies across the USG. While a student at the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Air Force
Lieutenant Colonel Rowell provides a broad examination of President Bush’s 2008-Annex 1, NSPD-12 and recommends further work in the implementation by developing and instituting a national PR strategy. Lieutenant Colonel Rowell’s research project focuses at the strategic level of war for PR.

Personnel Recovery in a Non-Major Theater of War: A Paradigm Shift

This article is a secondary source which analyzes the PR capabilities and requirements in a sovereign nation abroad and compares the PR capabilities and structures present in the 2006 environments in Iraq and Afghanistan to the environments found in the Western Hemisphere. Scott Peters wrote this article prior to the publication of Annex 1, NSPD-12 and avidly brings to light the fact that the Central Command GCC was not the only GCC conducting military operations, but that in fact every GCC was conducting operations ranging from theater security cooperation to stability operations. The article concisely and adequately describes the evolution of the DoD PR doctrine from CSAR to PR, as the recovery of isolated aviation and special operations personnel by specialized and dedicated units from the same communities to the more inclusive “personnel recovery” of friendly isolated personnel on the battlefield by the nearest capable recovery force. Peters also makes the assertion that as the environments in the Southern Command’s area were sovereign nations, the DoD (and USG for that matter) must not violate that sovereignty without the appropriate presidential authority (Peters 2006, 86). Peters then quotes the former Director of the Rescue Coordination Center in Colombia, Wade Chapple, as asserting that when USG personnel are isolated in Colombia, they must first acquire permission from the Colombian Government and
approval from the CoM in Colombia, before USG assets can respond (Peters 2006, 87).

As a conclusion, Peters argues for a PR model in CoM environments where the security-assistance offices (SAOs) coordinate support with the interagency partners and the HN while SAOs also build the HN capabilities. In this manner, the “ambassadors would be able to safeguard the lives of U.S. citizens isolated in any country” (Peters 2006, 89).

*Personnel Recovery Capabilities Mission Area Analysis (MAA): Matrix and Assessment Tool*

This document is a secondary source that aimed to provide interagency partners with a roadmap to conduct a self-assessment of organic PR capabilities through the DoD lens. The assessment uses the DoD PR doctrinal model as the end state. The author found during this research that although some USG agencies found this approach fitting for their particular mission, most use these sources as tools to learn how to conduct their PR in a DoD environment and not to develop their overall PR programs.

*Joint Personnel Recovery Collaboration and Planning White Paper*

This document is a secondary source. It is a one-pager that provides the purpose, problem statement, and brief description of the JPRCaP Special Project. The problem statement JPRCaP aims to solve is: “The senior defense official lacks standardized planning and information sharing procedures with the [PR] network, thereby limiting the effectiveness of PR activities in a [CoM] environment” (Fontaine 2013c).
Personnel Recovery: Using Game Theory to Model Strategic Decision Making in the Contemporary Operating Environment

This is a secondary source that examines PR in a DoD environment. In this research, Major Ecklund finds that joint doctrine is adequate and the military is in fact using the most rational decision-making model to offset the predictable nature of PR dedicated assets when the report of the physical location of an isolated person is known. Utilizing game theory as a logical way to compare strategy combinations, Ecklund found that in six out of seven cases the strategic costs of not recovering an evader outweighed the tactical costs that dedicated assets brought in terms of predictability. Major Ecklund’s findings are relevant to the present thesis in that he offers a strategic impact analysis of not conducting PR or rather of allowing an isolating event to terminate in capture. However, this work diverges from current PR doctrine by separating Hostage Rescue as a type of operation outside of the PR scope. Hostage Rescue is in fact a subset of PR.

Layer 1: PR Process Literature

Literature in this group is directly related to the thesis question and will support secondary questions 4, 5, and 6. All evidence points to Annex 1 to NSPD-12 as the current doctrine or policy for the national level. There does not seem to be any one agency responsible; however, NSPD-1 gives the interagency policy development to the NSC. Additionally, Congress asked DoD for a comprehensive study of PR in 2003, and NSPD-12 seems to give particular PR tasks to DoD, DoS, and Department of Justice (DoJ). The author expects to find additional answers to secondary question 6 in the PR architectures the author will develop for the scenario analysis.
Secondary Question 4

What are the specific mechanisms, policies, and doctrine at the U.S. level for PR?


This is a classified confidential primary source and is the overarching national PR policy and mechanism. This document began to surface in draft form after the IDA concluded its study in 2004, and standardizes a PR and IP definition for all USG agencies and departments as well as creates an initial roadmap toward a USG PR program. However, most PR academics believe the document allowed too much leeway for each agency and department to continue operating in a not-to-interfere basis, which is inherently not synchronized. All Documents such as the DoS Annex G (draft) to FAH-1 and DoD Implementation of Personnel Recovery Strategic Communications Guidance directly reference and quote Annex 1 to NSPD-12. The author gained access to this document through the DS PR section in Washington, DC.

**DoD Actions and Assessment of Annex 1, Appendix A, Shared Tasks to NSPD-12 (draft version 2)**

This document is a secondary source that assesses DoD requirements under Annex 1, NSPD-12. The document is a thorough analysis of where DoD stands, and the direction DoD must continue to comply with NSPD-12. However, once the JPRCaP Special Project submits its final findings, it would be beneficial for DoD and the USG as a whole to conduct this assessment anew taking into account the JPRCaP findings.
National Personnel Recovery Strategy Version 1
draft Pre-decisional (NPRSV1 draft)

This document is a primary source that provides a strategic framework to minimize risk associated with the isolation of USG personnel. The document attempts to support the overall USG approach to PR defined in Annex 1, NSPD-12 and to complement existing interagency PR policies. The document aligns well with Annex 1, NSPD-12 in the following points:

- Prevent future acts of captive-taking by changing how our adversaries and their supporters think and feel about the very act;
- Quickly and unambiguously recognize, report, and declare a possible isolating event;
- Quickly and accurately locate isolated personnel;
- Conduct collaborative planning, case management, and response within the comprehensive personnel recovery network;
- Safely and rapidly secure and recover isolated persons;
- Effectively reintegrate personnel and collect pertinent information;
- Adapt or modernize the personnel recovery network to address capability shortfalls. (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs 2012)

However, the document maintains a DoD-centric approach to PR throughout. For example, this policy would assume that PR is exclusive to USG personnel within the context of military operations and that CoM environments are the exception and not the rule. The facts discovered in this study point to CoM environments as being the most common as they overshadow DoD environments in number.

United States Personnel Recovery Strategic Communication Guidance (draft)

This document is a primary source which “supports national [PR] policy by providing a foundation for coordinating [USG] efforts before, during, and after [USG or AMCIT] personnel are illegally detained, held hostage, or otherwise isolated from
friendly control” (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs 2013). Although this document along with the “NPRSV1 (draft)” marked strides in the right direction, both documents are still too DoD-centric. There are many examples in the document, but a singularly clear example lies in the fact that the document uses the DoD PR doctrinal words “friendly control” in the quoted sentence above instead of the Annex 1, NSPD-12 more inclusive words of “friendly support” (Bush 2008, 2). However, this kind of enabling document is essential in order for the USG to truly use a whole of government approach to PR (The White House 2010). The document was particularly useful to this study as the author made use of its Key Assumptions in chapter 1, which are suppositions of the current situation assumed to be true in the absence of facts. For example, with regard to Key Assumption 5, although the USG has made concessions in the past in order to secure the release of hostages as was the case with Iran between 1978 and 1980, the official USG policy is that it will not (Follett 1984).

Personnel Recovery and Resilience: Preparing for the Worst, Working with the Best (draft)

This is a primary source describing USG PR mechanisms in a CoM environment. Lindsay Henderson is a Foreign Service Officer who currently works at the U.S. Consulate in Frankfurt, Germany and participated as a lead officer receiving USG personnel evacuated from Benghazi, Libya in 2012, as they arrived in Germany for reintegration. In her previous assignment abroad, Henderson had also experienced having to deal with a PR event at a USM without having any PR training. Therefore, during her first opportunity, she decided to take the DoS PR course in Washington, DC en route to
Germany. None of her colleagues thought she would find practical application to her training while assigned to Germany, yet when the September 11, 2012, attack on the Benghazi diplomatic mission occurred, Germany was the closest safe haven with the right architecture and resources to serve as a reintegration point. This article highlights the importance of providing PR training to individuals who may have to deal with managing or supporting a PR event even in relatively low risk USMs. In the CoM environment, ACS has the primary responsibility for dealing with certain types of PR events such as missing persons and detentions, although the DoS does not consider detentions to be a subset of the PR process.

Secondary Question 5

What agency is responsible for PR at the national level?

Annex G, Hostage Taking and Personnel Recovery (draft)

*Foreign Affairs Handbook, Volume 12, Handbook 1*

Annex 1, NSPD-12 is the only document that addresses an answer to this question directly by making the National Security Council responsible for the USG PR policy; however, for practical purposes the National Security Council will not engage at the Operational or Tactical levels of war. The author therefore uses a more pragmatic approach to answer who is responsible for the USG PR and finds that the January 2013, revision to Annex G, *FAH-1* directly answers this question in its purpose statement:

This Annex’s objective is to prepare for, prevent, and respond to missing persons, isolated persons and/or hostage taking incidents. This annex provides guidance for missing or isolated persons and kidnapping or hostage taking of any U.S. citizen, whether they are U.S. Government employees, their family members, members of household (MOH), or private U.S. citizens. In limited circumstances, the U.S. Government can designate non-U.S. citizens to receive Personnel Recovery support. (U.S. Department of State 2013, 1.1)
This document finds its support base within four documents already discussed in this chapter: the NSS, NSPD-12, NSPD-44, and *U.S. Code Title 22*, where the DoS is specifically charged with leading and synchronizing the integrated USG efforts in CoM environments particularly with regards to the security and safety of USG and AMCIT personnel. Therefore, Annex G (draft) to *12 FAH-1* when published, will not only be the de facto mechanism for USG PR abroad in CoM environments, but also implies that the DoS is the USG department responsible for USG PR. The author obtained a copy of this document from the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security during the study’s field research in Washington, DC. The author considers this document a breakthrough not only for the DoS, which had a reputation of inadequate PR policies and procedures within the interagency PR circles, but also for the USG as whole because it bridges a gap that existed in implementing the national policy set forth by Annex 1 to NSPD-12 at the operational and tactical levels. It was important for the author to examine this document in the context of the CoM environment and through a USG lens instead of a DoD or DoS lens. Anyone who examines this document through a DoD lens will find it hollow and inadequate; however, based on an understanding of CoM authority, the CoM environment, and the USG’s imperative to respect the sovereignty of host nations, it is evident that the policy serves as an adequate mechanism for instating a PR architecture that fits each of the different USMs around the world within an existing regional PR Network. However, the document leaves a gap in covered persons by not also using “USG Person(s)” in its purpose and definitions. Although the last sentence of its purpose indicates that non-AMCITs can receive PR support, it does not account for the many non-AMCITs who are USG employees, military service members, or contractors. This is a
very real risk because it implies that precious time will be lost in the response to a PR event in order to obtain a designation for a non-AMCIT. It is important to also note that DoS does account for family members and members of household who are not AMCITs, but by not accounting for all other USG employees and family members outside DoS, Annex G (draft) fails to meet that aspect of NSPD-12.

Introduction to Joint Personnel Recovery Collaboration and Planning (JPRCaP) Special Project

This document is a secondary source that describes how the JPRCaP Special Project is studying and answering the gaps that currently exist for DoD PR in the CoM environment. The author found that the definitions found in this source for CoM Environment and DoD Environment do not take into account perhaps the most important aspect of any USG action abroad: HN sovereignty.

The Personnel Recovery Process

This document is a secondary source. As depicted in figure 5, the PR Process as defined by the JPRCaP is made up of three separate but equally important processes: preparation, prevention, and response. In order for the PR Process to achieve its JPRCaP objective of unifying sub-processes, procedures, and tasks within the PR Network in order to enable the Senior Defense Official (SDO) to increase the effectiveness of PR activities in a CoM environment, the JPRCaP Special Project had to look beyond the five PR execution tasks found in DoD doctrine. The PR Process does this by defining the activities of each process and then analyzing further the Respond process. Within the Prepare process are activities or actions that are accomplished prior to a PR event occurring, and it postures at-risk personnel, recovery elements, and decision-makers to
support a successful PR response. The Prevent process includes activities or actions where individuals actively avoid becoming an IP and where organizations protect personnel from becoming isolated. The Respond process is further divided into seven sub-processes but is generally related to activities or actions accomplished when a PR event occurs and results in successfully reintegrating personnel.

![PR Process Overview](image)

**Figure 5. The PR Process Overview**


The seven sub-processes for Respond are notification, collect data, analyze data and develop COAs, present COAs to CoM, develop supporting concepts of operation, and execute the PR response. The selection of these seven sub-processes allows for more deliberate and thoughtful planning when compared against the five PR execution tasks DoD uses currently. In fact, the gaps that exist in DoD’s tasks are clearly visible in figure 6 where there are four sub-processes between PR execution tasks.
Another very important concept addressed in this presentation is the logical and simplified overarching COAs that will always exist in CoM environments: HN, bilateral, or USG. Within the USG option, the CoM can decide to execute overt, clandestine, or covert operations. The author used these last concepts for COAs to formulate a political risk matrix and a risk to mission matrix adding a fourth private option and allowing that each option can also execute overt, clandestine, or covert operations.
Secondary Question 6

Assuming that the U.S. Army is the lead DoD agency for wide area security operations abroad, how does the Army nest Army PR doctrine with Joint and DoS plans?

Building Partner Nation PR Capacity

This document is a secondary source and attempts to address the problem statement: “Current U.S. approach to, and understanding of, PR in a Partner Nation (PN) [environment] is [DoD-centric]; this approach also fails to recognize the requirements of [interorganizational] proactive coordination and therefore is not responsive to the requirements of PR in a PN [environment]” (Peters n.d., 2). Peters spouses the development of a codified interorganizational approach to PR that accounts for PN sovereignty and CoM authority to mitigate the opportunity for USG adversaries to exploit USG or AMCIT isolated personnel. Based on Peters’ analysis the CoM, as the entity responsible for all USG activities within a PN, is responsible for developing and approving a PR country plan. More specifically, he argues, pursuant “U.S. statute (title 22, Chap 58, sec 4802)” the local RSO within the DS should be the focal point for the development of said plan (Peters n.d., 2).

Memoranda of Agreement or Understanding between DoD and other USG agencies and departments

The following list of Memoranda are not exhaustive, but provide a sample of current formalized coordination that the DoD has made in pursuit of greater interoperability and unity of effort related to PR. For the purpose of this research, the author categorizes these documents as primary sources and interprets them as tools the
U.S. Army can utilize in order to nest its own PR doctrine with other members of the interagency.


CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Means and Criteria for Research

The research methodology used in this work is to locate the sources in the Layer 1 (PR Process Literature) of the circle depicted in figure 2 of chapter 2. The closer the research gets to Layer 1, the more comparable the literature is to what the author intends this document to be, or rather the closer it gets to the Core which is this thesis. The research methodology incorporates a survey and analysis of pertinent literature, articles and works on websites, personal experiences of the author, and lessons learned. However, the plethora of the research will be within Layer 1 (PR Process Literature) and Layer 2 (Subject Area Literature), where material is available. For example, up until the author conducted a field research in Washington, DC, he had difficulty in obtaining Layer 1 material for DoS mostly due to its restrictive classification. The other documents written on the broad subjects of interagency cooperation, whole of government employment, and force protection, serve as support to the author’s analysis and interpretation where gaps in information exist. The author will continue with this research methodology in parallel with analysis and results interpretation through the completion of this thesis. As the research phase progresses, the author will look to incorporate interviews, existing survey data, and existing operations research studies when applicable to the scope of this work.

Means and Criteria for Analysis and Results Interpretation

The author focuses the analysis in terms of the scope described in chapter 1 to enhance its overall significance and effectiveness. The starting points to evaluate the
current USG PR architecture as it relates to coordination between DoD and DoS in CoM environments are the DoD, DoS, and interagency policy and doctrine available to the author. The author will not utilize operating procedures and IPRPs applicable to the Western Hemisphere because they are classified and their use in this research could potentially place classified material in an unclassified venue. The PR Process (Prepare, Prevent, and Respond), doctrine, and policies are the ideal focal points and become the criteria from which to measure and evaluate the gap between different PR architectures applied during an isolating event. The author bases the analysis on USG lessons learned, historical accounts, and the author’s experience.

As the author framed the problem, he found that the operational design concepts of ends, ways, and means fit well for the research question. The end state for this thesis is a thorough and meaningful analysis of the CoM environment that answers the research question and thereby offers a recommendation on how the DoS and DoD can most effectively coordinate to manage a PR event. The ways are through the application of the PR Process as framed by JPRCaP, Annex 1 to NSPD-12, and DoD doctrine to a series of constants and variables applied to a PR scenario within the scope of this work and the analysis of this application. Lastly, the means are the scenario, Annex G (draft) to 12 FAH-1, relevant doctrine, Annex C to the DoD PRSCG (figure 7), the National PR Strategy (draft), the U.S. PR Strategic Guidance (draft) and other aids developed by the author.
The scenario will meet all parameters listed in the Scope section of chapter 1, but will further focus on the CoM environment within Mexico. The scenario’s IPs will include a group composed of U.S. military, USG civilians, and USG sponsored personnel. The elements of each scenario to remain constant will be the USG activity and group of IP. The variables will the PR architecture in place, or lack thereof. Ideally, the author intends to compare the management of a PR event: (1) within no established interorganizational or interagency architecture and (2) within the context of the Annex G (draft) to 12 FAH-I as a viable PR architecture.
Rationale for Selection of Research Design

The aim of this section is to discuss the author’s rationale for selecting the scenario research design. The particular research design in this work more closely resembles a war-game as used in the Course of Action (COA) analysis step of the Army Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) or Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), although the author does not subscribe fully to the war-gaming requirements in either. Its weaknesses include its heavy reliance on tactical judgment and experience, in addition to the lack of a full staff to offer diverging points of view. However, its strength lies in that it also relies heavily on policy and doctrinal foundations, which are the primary criteria the author will utilize to measure and identify gaps between PR architectures (COAs). In order to compensate for tactical judgment and experience from a single source, the author will find other points of view in lessons learned and oral histories from subject matter experts and the Thesis Committee readers. The author expects to arrive at the intended end state with a recommendation on how DoD and DoS will most effectively manage a PR event within the scope of this thesis.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Analysis of a PR Architecture

The intent in this section of the study is to analyze the data available to construct a blueprint of what the USG PR Process Architecture in a CoM environment would be. As previously defined in chapter 1, PR architecture is the structural design of the PR process systems as applied the CoM environment to provide a common understanding of the mechanisms internally and externally and is used to align strategic objectives and tactical requirements (The Business Architecture Group 2012). The PR architecture resides within the greater National Security Superstructure and is the structure of the PR process systems composed of a PR infrastructure, which describes a process system's component parts and their interactions, and a PR superstructure, which is the external support of the infrastructure.
The Superstructure as depicted in figure 8 is composed of policies and organizations that enable the PR Process. It is mostly made up of strategic-level decision and policy makers and begins with the NSS since the purpose of the PR Process at the national level is to prevent adversary actions to degrade the security of the United States through nefarious actions such as hostage takings, kidnappings, and illegal detentions. The policies and entities which exist in the Superstructure do not have the areas of PR as their focus. The President of the United States (POTUS), the NSC, Host Nation governments, and International Governmental Organizations (IGO) are actors that in conjunction with enabling policies such as NSPD-1; NSPD-44; Titles 6, 22, and 28 of US
Code; and International Agreements lie within this circle at the strategic level. The PR Architecture then lies upon this established architecture of systems and is divided into the superstructure and the infrastructure at the very core.

The superstructure includes but is not limited to the following policies, doctrines, or procedures: the NPRSV1 (draft); NSPD-12; the USPRSCG (draft); USG PR programs; Host Nation PR Programs; IGO PR programs; Memoranda of Agreement or Understanding; and the 2013 Annex G (draft) to \textit{12 FAH-I}. The stakeholders in this part of the PR Architecture are the CoM, the GCC, and the Host Nation Security Forces because they will deal directly with PR Process at the strategic and operational levels. At the core of the PR Architecture lies the infrastructure which is essentially the IPRP developed and tailored by the stakeholders within the architecture for each USM. The stakeholders within the infrastructure are the RSO, ACS, the medical officer, and all the members of the EAC (SDO, LEGATT, USAID, etc.). These stakeholders are the ones to operate at the tactical level to manage and execute the response to a PR event. The similarities between figure 3 and figure 8 are intentional because during the effort to analyze and define a PR Architecture, the author found that the methodology used for chapter 2 readily applied to this analysis as far as the applicability of the policies found at each Layer. Similarly, the color scheme also fit nicely because as the yellow Layer 2 (Subject Area Literature) and the blue Layer 1 (PR Process Literature) combine to make the green Core, the Superstructure (blue) and Infrastructure (yellow) combine to make the PR Architecture (green).
COA Development

The end state of the Analysis of this study is to compare two COAs to answer the research question of how do the DoS and DoD most effectively coordinate during a Personnel Recovery (PR) event under a CoM environment in the Western Hemisphere during wide area security operations abroad? As described in chapter 3, the COAs will be the variable for each country scenario. In reality, each COA would be different when applied to a specific country scenario. That is, a COA where no established interorganizational PR architecture exists will still be different for each country due to external factors such as HN capabilities, bilateral agreements, DoD presence, and locally established procedures. However, for the purpose of this research, the author grouped the status quo (COAs where there is no established PR architecture) into COA #1 (Status Quo). Similarly, the author grouped the COAs where the DoS Annex G (draft) to 12 FAH-1 is applied as the PR architecture to vitalize the PR Process as COA #2 (USG PR Architecture). The author intentionally overlooked the details of the country scenario in part or in whole in order to avoid falling in the trap of developing USM specific IPRPs instead of a USG PR architecture within which an IPRP can nest.

PR Event Triggers and Other Parameters

The 2005 version of FM 3-50.1, Army Personnel Recovery, listed a few examples of IPs such as:

- Individuals who are unaccounted for as a result of a break in contact (e.g. while on patrol or during a convoy operation) or during a routine 100% personnel and accountability check.

- Hostages.

- Prisoners of War (POW).
• Individuals illegally detained by foreign governments.

• Crew of an aircraft experiencing a mishap or shoot down.⁷ (Department of the Army 2005, 1-2)

Taking this information into account as well as the information provided in the 2011 version of FM 3-50.1, and in Annex G (draft) to 12 FAH-1 described in chapter 2, the author developed a list of six possible PR event triggers that tactical level stakeholders could use as part of the PR process. These PR event triggers are depicted in Table 1. The PR event triggers and other parameters in this section take into account the fact that the CoM environment has over 285 variations and by definition is not considered USG combat zone although it may be a combat zone for other countries including the HN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trigger (includes but is not limited to :)</th>
<th>Condition Present? (Y/N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) An organization or individual is claiming to be holding USG or AMCIT person(s)</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Report of high jacking or carjacking</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) In-transit aviation accident or unplanned landing</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Unaccountability of USG person or AMCIT particularly as a result of: - Ground transit accident - Natural disaster - Terrorist act - Anti-U.S. demonstration</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Vehicle becomes separated from rest of convoy</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Communication check-in not conducted within specified time (threat dependent)</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

⁷The concept of “illegal detention” may not necessarily be “illegal” in the context of the sovereign state’s laws, but it could be perceived as illegal by the USG or other organizations.
The six PR event triggers conform to situations that a DoS employee may find while working in the ACS or RSO sections of a USM. However, the author also attempts to bridge the gap remaining in the January 2013, Annex G (draft) to 12 FAH-1, by including the phrase “USG or AMCIT person(s)” in the wording of the triggers.

The intent of the triggers is to provide the individual or individuals with responsibilities within the PR Process a set of conditions whereby a person may become an IP. For example, although trigger 1 in table 1 is obviously an isolating event if proved to be true, an in-transit aviation unplanned landing (trigger 3) or a ground transit accident (trigger 4) would not necessarily prompt a person receiving or listening to the report to confirm the accountability of all USG and AMCIT persons or if there exists any threat in their present location. Furthermore, the threat in a CoM environment that can create or exacerbate an isolating event can include instantaneous demonstrations, terrain accessibility, or weather in addition to the traditional PR threats of criminal, terrorist, and enemy military activity. For these reasons, the preparation and prevention processes of the PR Process are instrumental in preparing USG personnel to see the signs required to respond in a timely manner and save lives, but to prepare USG personnel to take certain actions when isolated to help those trying to affect the response.

Other Parameters: Risk

Per DoD doctrine, the GCC establishes risk of isolation for DoD personnel based on location, mission, and other criteria (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011d). Additionally, in the U.S. Army commanders down to the battalion level may designate subordinates a higher risk of isolation category as compared to that already designated by higher commands.
This is one DoD effort to mitigate and prevent isolating events in the DoD environment and the designation goes hand-in-hand with additional training in PR, SERE, or both.

As the U.S. Army is the agency representing the DoD as it coordinates with DoS to manage a PR event in the context of this thesis, the author used several pieces of information, reports, and graphics to further analyze the PR Architecture and develop a viable COA for the USG PR Architecture. Three of these research and analysis aids follow.

![Figure 9. Risk Curve: Impact vs. Probability](image)

As plotted in figure 9, personnel with the highest probability of isolation will commonly have the lowest impact to on-going missions, and inversely personnel with the lowest probability of isolation will tend to have the highest impact. This is not a hard rule and does not imply that isolation with low impact should go unnoticed or that a person with a high probability of isolation such as a Special Forces soldier or an Army aviator will necessarily have low impact. However, the DoD environment ideas portrayed in figure 9 and figure 10 do serve to illustrate that the persons with the highest probability of isolation in the CoM environment are also those persons traveling the roadways and that the risk can be reduced by increasing the size of the element to which the persons traveling belong. Nonetheless, both risk curves describe probabilities and risk associated with the Prepare and Prevent elements of the PR Process as the Respond element and its sub-processes could very well have different measures of survivability, escape, and recovery.
Additionally, the risk curves discussed here do not apply only to USG personnel, but also to private AMCITs abroad who also run a commensurate risk of isolation and whose isolation pose similar perceived threats to the security of the United States in the realm of information operations. Today, private AMCITs who are abroad on business fall under a sometimes robust private PR architecture as experienced firsthand by the author in Iraq and for which exists historical records such as the successful recovery of private citizens employed by Electronic Data Systems (EDS) by a private recovery force.
employed by EDS owner Ross Perot (Follett 1984). For this reason, the author further expanded on the sub-processes and viable COAs as put forth by the JPRCaP by adding a fourth option for recovery assets: the private option. In fact, EDS is not the only entity to use private means to extract personnel from abroad. In the aftermath of the kidnapping and murder of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent (SA) Enrique Camarena in Mexico, the DEA hired local Mexican nationals to apprehend and transport to the U.S. some of the perpetrators of SA Camarena’s kidnapping and murder (Zaid 1997). Although this was viewed as a kidnapping in Mexico and by many critics within the U.S., the same mechanism could be utilized by USG agencies to execute PR operations. Moreover, where the JPRCaP provides overt, clandestine, and covert mediums for the USG option, the author also includes these as methods for the other three options. That is, a HN may decide to employ HN assets or hire private assets to conduct a recovery but maintain the option for plausible deniability for political considerations and therefore opt for a covert medium (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012). Although the unique situation in any given CoM environment will require a particular analysis of the diplomatic impact risk and the risk to mission, the author compared the use of the four different options for PR assets against the mediums with which to employ them to provide a general risk outcome for diplomatic impact (figure 11) and for risk to mission (figure 12).

---

8See glossary for individual definitions of clandestine, covert, and overt.
In general, overt operations will have a lower risk as far as diplomatic impact is concerned because such an option implies that both the HN and the USG have made the appropriate political implication analysis more importantly the sovereign country (i.e. the HN) approves of the action. Inversely, there is a higher risk to mission with overt operations because the possibility exist that the adversary knows when and how the PR assets will be employed (figure 12). However, this is another instance where the particular type of isolation may be conducted openly such as a search and rescue abroad.
On the other end of the risk spectrum for diplomatic impact lies covert operations because whether these are conducted by or with the HN or not, the political consequences of a failure would be severe. On the other hand, there is lower risk to mission when the operation is conducted in secrecy, yet with all the support it requires; therefore, clandestine action would have the least risk to mission. Since covert action offers the government entity plausible deniability, it also usually carries less logistical and enabler support. Again, these comparisons can very possibly change from one CoM environment to another.

![Figure 12. Risk Matrix: Risk to Mission for PR Execution COAs](source: Created by author.)
In developing the COAs, the author will determine if the risk matrices must be adjusted to meet particularities of the CoM environments studied here.

**Other Parameters: Partner Responsibilities and Relationships**

Table 2 is derived direction from FM 3-50.1, *Army Personnel Recovery* (2011), and is a thoughtful and deliberate approach to analyzing the responsibilities and relationships in the PR Network as it applies to partner nations, organizations, and individuals. The importance of this table is that it allows the author to build on research and analysis already conducted to anticipate what actions can be expected from the actors discussed in the table, namely the HN and the USM. This information will be especially relevant to COA #1 (Status Quo), as this COA is the absence of PR Architecture.
Another important factor that comes to light is that the concept of Mission Command as described by Richard Pedersen in *Mission Command – Realizing Unified Action*. In a 2012 White Paper, the CJCS expanded on mission command as “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders;” however, according to Pedersen, the concept of Mission Command is more comprehensive and must continue to develop outward in order to enable military leaders to accomplish their missions within a decisive action and unified land operations construct (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a, II-2). With respect to the PR Process, important aspect of Mission Command is perhaps not the fact it its “commander centric” as the
CJCS describes, but that it is more concerned with unity of effort and synchronizing every part of the PR Network to accomplish the mission instead of controlling subordinates under a particular military command (Dempsey 2012, 4). Every USM, and to some extent the Secretary of State, deals with this paradigm each day all around the world: the CoM has legally stated authority and responsibility for the safety and welfare of USG and AM CIT persons within his or her USM, but he or she controls very little of what happens there. That is, each agency reports to their respective heads and executes the policy that is important to their department while maintaining a coordination with the CoM that allows them to remain in-country and able to execute their department policies. The CoM can always do is require that a USG person depart his or her USM, so remaining in-country requires that other agencies not under the control of the CoM operate within the guidance of the CoM. In short, the idea of Mission Command and how it relates to Unified Land Operations for the Army will be a key component for either PR Architecture COA.

COA Evaluation Criteria

In order the fulfill the aim of this research, the author will use three criteria necessary in a COA to adequately provide the best means for the DoD and the DoS to most effectively coordinate during a PR event within a CoM environment in the Western Hemisphere. With that in mind, and based on preliminary results gathered in the execution of this study, the DoS needs a USG PR Architecture within which to exercise more effectively its CoM authority, meet the requirements of NSPD-12, allow for each USM to exercise policies tailored to their particular diplomatic realities, and respect the concept of interagency cooperation on a not-to-interfere basis that is valid currently. On
the other hand, the DoD requires a more rigid architecture that will provide clear unity of effort across the USG agencies, respond quickly and decisively during a PR event, and allow for the routine rehearsal and validation of individual USM’s PR Plans that are part of the greater PR Network in order to safeguard its personnel abroad operating in high risk of isolation CoM environments. Using this analysis, the author brought together the following COA Evaluation Criteria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unified Action</td>
<td>Increase effectiveness of CoM Authority and Unity of Effort of USG. Establishes a Mission Command structure for the interagency under the CoM.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Are USG agencies in CoM environment obligated to support CoM in managing PR event? Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meets NSPD-12 requirements</td>
<td>Tasks as depicted in Appendix A, Annex 1, NSPD-12.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes independent &amp; decentralized operations of each USM</td>
<td>Each USM tailors the development and implementation of USG policies in the CoM environment. DoS Ops Center and DSCC do not exert command or authority within a CoM environment.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Does decision making regarding USG actions within the context of PR and security belong to the CoM? Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respects the not-to-interfere concepts with other USG agencies.</td>
<td>Actions of one USG Agency do not infringe on the mission accomplishment of another USG agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Does the CoM have the authority to interfere with a USG agency’s mission or retask a mission when dealing with a PR event? Yes = 0; No = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick &amp; Decisive Response</td>
<td>Provides timely and comprehensive PR Support to all USG persons and their families operating within a CoM environment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2  Does CoM or Deputy Chief of Mission (DSM) convene EAC based on a decision point (DP)? Yes = 1; No = 0 Based only and exclusively on a recommendation? Yes = 0; No = 1 Are non-AMCIT USG and USG contractor personnel automatically supported? Yes = 1; No = 0 Are non-AMCIT family members of all USG and USG contractor personnel supported? Yes = 1; No =0 Add total.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integral part of the PR Network</td>
<td>Existing PR mechanisms of the PR Network are integrated into the Architecture to facilitate rehearsals, validations, the application of the judicial process, and leveraging partner nation capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2  Does the COA interconnect USMs with other existing DoS and DoD resources? Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proficiency maintenance</td>
<td>Provides a construct for routine centralized rehearsals and validations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1  Can a single agency or department validate response and coordinate for response rehearsals through COA? Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*
COA #1 (Status Quo–no USG PR Architecture)

COA #1 does not require much development as it is based on the current state of affairs relating to the problem statement of this work. However, a thorough analysis of the situation with a lack of a synchronized USG PR architecture is imperative. For example, most agencies working abroad in CoM environments require some degree of PR training for their personnel sent abroad and varying forms of PR contingency plans. As is evident with the numerous memoranda found in the Layer 1 (PR Process Literature) resources section of chapter 2, USG agencies have strived to comply with NSPD-12 in a vacuum created by a lack of a synchronized USG PR architecture. For the most part, USG agencies work in CoM environments with HN counterparts under provisions of Title 6 (Domestic Security), Title 10 (Armed Forces), Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse), and Title 28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure).9 Because all of the aforementioned Titles (except Title 10) process some sort of civilian law enforcement capacity, most USG law enforcement agencies will conduct a PR operation without an explicit sanction from the CoM, as they determine that international law enforcement treaties and integration with local law enforcement entities provides them the legal means to recover their IPs and NSPD-12 requires them to do so. As for the DoD, if its personnel become isolated in a CoM environment, the DoD must assess what USG law enforcement agencies are on the ground, what HN security forces may assist, what memoranda mechanism to leverage, and try to integrate all players possibly without on-the-ground

9US Code Titles mentioned are only a selection of Titles under which some USG agencies fall in a CoM environment and is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all Titles in use in CoM environments.
participation. In short, COA #1 (Status Quo) requires each USG agency to conduct the PR Process with or without the integration of DoS and the CoM.

COA #2 (USG PR Architecture-Implemented)

As already described in this chapter, COA #2 (USG PR Architecture) differs from COA #1 (Status Quo) in that here a USG PR Architecture is developed and implemented for use in CoM environments. The USG PR Architecture to be described here is essentially the implementation of the January 2013, Annex G (draft) to 12 FAH-1 around a customized USM IPRP. However, the USG PR Architecture must provide a minimum functionality in the event of no established USM IPRP. Additionally, the Prepare and Prevent portions of the PR Process must be the supporting base for the Response. Annex G (draft) to 12 FAH-1 integrates other DoS policies and procedures that fall in any of PR Processes, but focuses more on the Response. As this study focuses on the management of a PR event, the author will not discuss the Prepare and Prevent processes at length except to reiterate that a quick and lifesaving response will have far higher chances of success when it is overlaid on deliberate, planned, tested, and documented preparation and prevention mechanisms.

The author will present the Response PR Process of the January 2013, Annex G (draft) to 12 FAH-1 on a flowchart (figure 13 and figure 14), and describe it line by line within the context of the analysis of the PR Architecture previously described. Cross-reference the following numbered lines with the step numbers depicted in figure 13.

0. Report of AMCIT or USG person in distress.
**Response: Notification**

1. Receive Report or Notification.

2. Follow actions in G 3.1-1, *12 FAH-1*.

3. Notify incident commander.

**Response: Collect Data**

4. DP1: Is there a PR Event trigger?

**Response: Analyze Data and Develop COAs**

5. No. Allow proper authorities to engage and continue to monitor. Return to step 3 and monitor for PR Event triggers.

5. Yes. Report situation to RSO.

6. DP2: Does AMCIT meet IP criteria?

7. No. Evidence shows AMCIT CANNOT be IP. Inform RSO and share information with appropriate organizations.

7. Yes. Data collected indicates probability of Isolating Event.

8. Attempt to make contact with IP and contact ACS if IP is AMCIT.

9. Convene the EAC and discuss any actions taken thus far.

10. Determine the appropriate recovery assets and protocols for their deployment. Begin COA development.

Parallel steps: Alert sections or agencies that may have role in PR Event (Medical Section for reintegration). Complete Missing Persons Information Card thru family or MOH and others close to IP.

11. Using the Risk Matrices for PR COAs, brief on political risk, risk to missing, and available assets for recovery and reintegration (Medical Section).
Figure 13. COA #2 USG PR Architecture Flow Chart actions 0-14

Source: Created by author.
Parallel steps for step 11: Inform DoS Operations Center (OPS CENTER).
Inform DS Command Center (DSCC). Suspend access of USG IPs to all Department facilities and systems. Conduct analysis of possible compromised information.
Coordinate with office of DoS Spokesperson to develop public affairs strategy.

12. Notify and involve the GCC thru the SDO and request status of PR assets available in region. SDO and GCC staff fill out Annex C to PRSCG and provide to EAC.
Preparation: Notify other posts in region that may play a role in the event to include reintegration (e.g. safe haven, U.S. Military base, medical personnel, etc.). Determine if involvement of local security services is appropriate (if not already involved).

13. Data: Is IP location obtained?

14. No. Continue to collect and analyze data in order to locate IP. Return to action 9.

14. Yes. (14) Off-page connector. Receive input for GCC and present COAs to CoM for decision. Use figure 11 and figure 12 to evaluate risk in COAs.

15. DP3: Host Nation option for recovery assets?
If yes, go to action 16.
If no, Bi-lateral option?
If yes, go to action 16.
If no, USG (unilateral) option?
If yes, Overt, Clandestine, or Covert? Then go to action 16.
(Continuation from step 15) If no, Private option?

If yes, Overt, Clandestine, or Covert? Then go to action 16.

If no, Refine COAs based on CoM guidance and go back to action 14.


17. DP4: HN and/or CoM authorizes execution of DP3 option.

Source: Created by author.
18. Conduct Recovery. Parallel Preparation: Arrange transportation to reintegration. Passports, visas, and other required documents are ready for recovered personnel.


20. Transport recovered persons to safe haven for reintegration.


**COA Analysis (War-Game)**

The author will use the sequence of key events A through E as depicted in figure 17 of the Mexico Scenario to chronologically organize and conduct the war-game of COA #1 (Status Quo) and COA #2 (USG PR Architecture). Additionally, the products the author developed for COA #2 (USG PR Architecture) will be utilized in the war-game such as the Flowchart depicted in figure 13 and figure 14.

**Mexico Scenario**

Situation: At 0200 UTC on August 16, 2013 Hurricane Alix made landfall at peak strength, with maximum sustained winds of 115 mph, gusts of 135 mph and an unusually low central pressure of 947 millibars in the municipality of Heroico Matamoros in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas (see figure 15). After the storm, Mexico's Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) deployed 800 troops from the 8th Military Zone to Tamaulipas under Plan DN-III-E to help aid operations (López Acosta 2012). Prior to landfall, the troops enforced mandatory evacuations of residents of the affected areas. In
Tamaulipas, 263,000 people were affected by Hurricane Alix, and 2,260 homes were flooded. Additionally, 80,000 were affected by Alix's remnants, leaving 30% of the municipalities of the state without communication.

The Secretaría de Gobernación declared a state of emergency in 15 of Tamaulipas' 43 municipalities, freeing federal disaster funds for use in aid operations. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto requested adding resources to the federal disaster fund. In Texas, Governor Rick Perry activated the state's search and rescue capabilities, the 36 Infantry Division’ Headquarters, a battalion of the 136th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB), a Texas Guard Civil Affairs Battalion, and a Texas Guard Medical Company as a response to effects in Brownsville and the Rio Grande Valley. However, the President of the United States soon federalized the Texas National Guard units under

Figure 15. Map of Hurricane Alix touchdown in Matamoros, Mexico

title 10 as Joint Task Force (JTF) Panther, but the damage and casualties sustained in Brownsville were minimal (López Acosta 2012).

After its dissipation, Alix continued causing deaths throughout Mexico, particularly due to flooding. Two deaths were reported in Matamoros; another six were reported to have died in other parts of Tamaulipas as a result of Alix. As part of the Communication Exercises conducted in 2012 between Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and SEDENA, both organizations agreed to work through the appropriate and sovereign civil authorities to provide military support on both sides of the border in order to save lives. Therefore, Civil Affairs and Army Corps of Engineers elements frequently travel into Mexico with USG and HN personnel to conduct Humanitarian Assistance (HA) tasks.

Prior to the hurricane, Matamoros, Mexico had a high activity level of narcoterrorist organizations. Their activities picked up quickly after the disaster, and the USM in Mexico issued the following warning:
American citizens who find themselves confronted by armed assailants who demand property should know that it is usually best to comply with those demands. Additionally, U.S. Government official personnel assigned to the U.S. Consulate General in Matamoros have been advised to:

- Travel in pairs whenever possible
- Watch what is happening in mirrors – trouble can come from behind as fast as from the front
- Pre-program emergency phone numbers in your phone and have your cell phone charged and with you at all times
- Keep emergency medical supplies in the car
- Be familiar with the areas in which one is driving and know as many different routes as possible
- Know one’s vehicle and its capabilities; ensure it is in good working order and de-program any auto-unlocking features
- Trust one’s instincts; most crime victims perceived something was wrong before they actually experienced it
- Have a plan before leaving; know where safe havens (e.g., police stations or Mexican military outposts) are along intended routes

Figure 16. DoS Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens


Incident Report submitted to the USCS (ACS) at the U.S. Consulate General in Matamoros, Mexico by a local national at 1:00 P.M. on September 24, 2013.

Who? A large group of armed masked men from two Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) held a smaller group at gun point.

What? Seemed to be detained or kidnapped in their own vehicles (a Mexican official vehicle and a Ford Expedition, white, with diplomatic plates). Witness could not tell if masked men were criminals or undercover police. Witness heard people in diplomatic vehicle speaking English.

When? Approximately 9:30 A.M. September 24, 2013

Where? Calle Cantinflas and Colegio las Culturas, near Technical High School 81, Miguel Barragán.
Why? Unknown. Witness reports that he did not know why, but he did not call the local police because he thought the armed men might have been police themselves. The caller only identified himself as “Luis Alvaro.”

**Key Sequence of Events**

A. Approximately 9:28 AM, an SUV with official Mexican Federal tags (lead) and an SUV with diplomatic tags (trail) are transiting south on Colegio de las Culturas towards Calle Avenida Cantinflas, with approximately 2 individuals in lead vehicle and 4 individuals in trail.

B. Approximately 9:30 AM, heavily armed and masked individuals cut off two vehicles in front and back.

C. Gun men from assailant vehicles got out and began screaming at apparent victims to open their doors.

D. Approximately 9:33 AM, all four vehicles departed scene south on Colegio de las Culturas.

E. 1:04 PM, witness calls the U.S. Consulate General Matamoros to report incident.

*Source: Created by author*
War-game: COA #1 (Status Quo)

COA synopsis. COA #1 assumes that Mexico does not have an IPRP, and PR programs are managed and implemented at the Agency or Department level.

Key Event A. As each USM operates under tailored security plans and each agency operating in the HN is individually responsible for the accountability of its employees, the U.S. Consulate would not necessarily track the movement of all USG personnel unless they are DoS employees on official business.

Key Event B. USG personnel in this situation would follow their individual agency’s procedure for emergency and accountability and would not necessarily communicate directly with the Consulate. US Army personnel would have theoretically obtained a country clearance from the Defense Cooperation Office at the US Embassy in Mexico through US Army North and Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Also, all USG persons conducting business in Mexico should have received an RSO security brief. Each USG agency represented in isolated group could have different reporting requirements in frequency and mode; therefore, it is possible that the agency representative in Mexico would not know until the next scheduled event that day.

Key Event E. ACS section has telephone number announced in website for the reporting of emergencies. ACS will operate under Consular Section Manuals and Handbooks for specific incidents, in this case 7 FAM-1820, protocols for Hostage Taking and Kidnapping, but because the report does not immediately indicate that AMCITs are the victims, ACS would contact RSO and local police. RSO would follow appropriate FAM and FAH protocols to conduct accountability of USM personnel. Very likely in this situation, the local police would be the first to respond after Consulate personnel notifies
them. Also, unless the RSO requests full accounting for all persons from all agencies, the RSO may not be able to verify that USG personnel are missing until many hours later. If the isolated persons were DoS Consulate or Embassy employees, the RSO would have a much better capability to respond and verify through section management and the motor pool. Eventually, when the appropriate agency realizes that their personnel are missing or when a demand is made by the kidnappers, the RSO would call the EAC and follow the protocols as depicted in Annex G, 12 FAH-1 (2005) and 12 FAH-H. In Mexico, the RSO would coordinate directly with HN security forces to respond, but some USG agencies may take it upon themselves to self-recover with organic assets and agency HN partners. This has happened in the past successfully in Mexico, but such unsynchronized actions create a troublesome consequence management situation for the CoM even when the action may have been technically bilateral.

COA #1 (Status Quo) Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Weighed Score</th>
<th>Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unified Action</td>
<td>Increase effectiveness of CoM Authority and Unity of Effort of USG. Establishes a Mission Command structure for the interagency under the CoM.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Are USG agencies in CoM environment obligated to support CoM in managing PR event? Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meets NSPD-12 requirements</td>
<td>Tasks as depicted in Appendix A, Annex 1, NSPD-12.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes independent &amp; decentralized operations of each USM</td>
<td>Each USM tailors the development and implementation of USG policies in the CoM environment. DoS Ops Center and DSCC do not exert command or authority within a CoM environment.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Does decision making regarding USG actions within the context of PR and security belong to the CoM? Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respects the not-to-interfere concepts with other USG agencies.</td>
<td>Actions from one USG agency do not infringe on the mission accomplishment of another USG agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Does the CoM have the authority to interfere with a USG agency’s mission or retask a mission when dealing with a PR event? Yes = 0; No = 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Quick & Decisive Response | Provides timely and comprehensive PR Support to all USG persons and their families operating within a CoM environment. | 2 | 0 | Does CoM or Deputy Chief of Mission (DSM) convene EAC based on a decision point (DP)? Yes = 1; No = 0

Based only exclusively on a recommendation? Yes = 0; No = 1

Are non-AMCIT USG and USG contractor personnel automatically supported? Yes = 1; No = 0

Are non-AMCIT family members of all USG and USG contractor personnel supported? Yes = 1; No = 0

Add total. = 0 |
| Integral part of the PR Network | Existing PR mechanisms of the PR Network are integrated into the Architecture to facilitate rehearsals, validations, the application of the judicial process, and leveraging partner nation capabilities | 2 | 0 | Does the COA interconnect USMs with other existing DoS and DoD resources? Yes = 1; No = 0 |
| Proficiency maintenance | Provides a construct for routine centralized rehearsals and validations | 1 | 0 | Can a single agency or department validate response and coordinate for response rehearsals through COA? Yes = 1; No = 0 |
| **TOTAL** | **3** |
Panther would have stood up a PR Coordination Cell (PRCC) as part of the DoD PR Network prior to deploying any personnel across the border into Mexico. In order to meet the requirements set forth in Annex G (draft, 12 FAM-1 at the tactical and operational levels, the PR Officer (PRO) under the SDO would maintain open communications with the PRCC at JTF Panther to create an accurate and current situational awareness picture of all JTF elements operating in Mexico and be prepared to provide the RSO information as required. Other agencies and departments operating in Mexico would be expected to do similarly.

At the strategic level, NORTHCOM would ensure that DoD elements operating abroad in North America provide the respective CoM situational awareness and support during PR events as required in NSPD-12, “NPRSV1 (draft),” and “USPRSCG (draft).” Other USG departments and agencies would also integrate their PR programs to support the CoM in an integrated manner.

Key Event A. Office of Defense Coordination (ODC) at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico received movement plan from JTF Panther in support of a survey of infrastructure damage at the Instituto Tecnológico de Matamoros by a group composed of one Army Corps of Engineers civilian, one Army Engineer officer from the 136th MEB, and two local national USG employees. The local nationals were drivers employed by the ODC. The survey group would be escorted by personnel from the Mexican federal government and SEDENA. Departure from the U.S. Consulate General Matamoros was planned for 8:00 A.M. and return to the consulate by 2:30 P.M.

Key Event B. Some USG vehicles abroad are outfitted with locator beacons that can be activated in case of emergencies and GCCs sometimes require that DoD personnel
carry Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs) in some locations around the world. However, the author has experienced that although these devices offer the PR Network early warning of PR triggers, they are only as good as the operators. Additionally, when DoD personnel operate abroad, they are usually required to carry emergency contact cards with key phone numbers such as the Marine Security Detachment, the RSO, and other pertinent phone numbers. For the purpose of this scenario, the IPs do not activate any beacons nor make any cell phone calls.

Key Event C. Neither the RSO nor the ODC receives distress calls.

Key Event D. Neither the RSO nor the ODC receives distress calls.

Key Event E. Figure 13 step 0, at 1:04 P.M. an ACS Foreign Service National (FSN) at the U.S. Consulate General Matamoros receives a report from a local national stating that they saw what appeared like Americans being held up by a large group of heavily armed masked men at an intersection near the Instituto Tecnológico de Matamoros and then escorted south on Calle Colegio las Culturas about three and a half hours earlier.

Figure 13 step 1. ACS FSN uses the missing persons card located in Annex G (draft) to record report and passes the card to an ACS Consular Officer informing her of an incident near Las Culturas neighborhood. Since the witness’ statement suggest that the victims were Americans in a vehicle with diplomatic tags, the Consular Officer immediately consults Annex G (draft), the local EAC Annex, and informs notifies the Incident Commander (figure 13 steps 2 and 3). In the meantime, the Consular Officer tasks an FSN to call their POC with Matamoros law enforcement to see if they have detained or received any reports of AMCITs or consular employees in the last five hours.
Figure 13 step 4. The Incident Commander and the Consular Officer discuss the situation and decide that the decision criteria for DP 1 (PR event trigger) is present in the situation and report it to the RSO (figure 13 step 5).

Figure 13 step 5. The RSO office begins working the case by contacting members of the PR Network including the SDO, the LEGATT, and USAID. The RSO also investigates the day’s listing of reported official movements and contacts the consulate motor pool and all section chiefs to check consulate personnel accountability, including family members, and verify status of any known official movements in the vicinity of Las Culturas neighborhood. The ODC contacts the RSO directly after receiving word from the SDO to inform him of the survey planned for that morning in the Las Culturas neighborhood. ODC is waiting on the JTF Panther to contact the survey team to verify accountability.

Figure 13 step 6. DP 2: Does AMCIT meet IP definition? JTF Panther PRCC is in direct coordination with NORTHCOM Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), RSO, ODC, and SDO. JTF Panther PRCC is unable to establish communications with survey team. DP 2 answer is yes.

Figure 13 step 7. JTF Panther declares a PR Event to NORTHCOM JPRC through a Search and Rescue Incident Report (SARIR) and provides RSO a copy of SARIR which includes the Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) for each DoD individual except for FSNs. NORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC) coordinates with SEDENA for

---

10USG employees assigned to the USM in Mexico are permitted to use diplomatic tags on their personal vehicles, which in turn may be driven by family members and MOHs.
information and intelligence and approves PR Event. JPRC assigns a DoD PR Event number.

Figure 13 step 8. Key Event E + 02:00. JTF PRCC, ODC, and RSO continue attempt to make contact with IPs through cell phones without success. JTF J2 works with the interagency to analyze all available data in order to locate IPs. Respective responsible organizations and military units contact family members of IPs in the U.S. and in Mexico. Only the FSNs have family in Mexico. Family members had not spoken to anyone in group since prior to 9:30 A.M. of that day.

Figure 13 step 9. RSO informs DSM that next step required is to convene the EAC. DSM informs CoM, and CoM authorizes EAC. EAC convenes and includes SDO and a representative from ODC and JTF Panther. RSO updates EAC members of the most current situation. In the meantime, the PR Network continues to gather data and to prepare intelligence to be shared with HN.

Figure 13 step 10. Per RSO advice, CoM requests all agencies and departments represented in EAC to provide a listing of their recovery capable assets in country and their availability status. Simultaneously, the CoM requests that the RSO and the SDO look first at the feasibility of leveraging the Mexican government to provide the necessary capabilities through their law enforcement organizations or military. The EAC begin COA development. ACS continues completes Missing Person Information Card for involved in case and coordinates with JTF Panther to arrange transportation and treatment of IPs at nearest medical facility in Texas for initial triage and follow-on reintegration.

Figure 13 step 11. RSO informs the DoS OPS Center and DSCC. JTF Panther, U.S. Customs, and U.S. Coast Guard have helicopters operating on both sides of the
border which can be made available with 2 hours notice. DEA and Air Force North (AFNORTH) can each provide a team in Matamoros within 60 minutes as they have already received preemptive readiness warnings. The Mexican Federal Police has a Special Tactics Team ready to respond now and SEDENA has authorized Mexican Army helicopters to support the Mexican Federal Police. The Mexican government has advised the CoM that it intends to meet its security responsibilities and has explicitly asked that no USG agencies operate outside of the currently approved humanitarian assistance role in support of the relief to Hurricane Alix victims. A private security company based in Texas has also offered its services as a recovery force to the CoM. The RSO briefs the DSM on available COAs using figure 18 and figure 19. The lowest diplomatic risk will be to abide by the HN request, which is to allow them to conduct any rescue unilaterally and overtly. This will allow the Mexican government to save face and show their population and the world that they respect international law and deal with criminal organizations swiftly.
On the other hand, lowest risk to the mission would be using a bilateral rescue force, which the Mexican government has expressed to the CoM it does not want.
Figure 13 step 12. ACS has established direct communications with Texas Guard medical company located in Brownsville, Texas for initial triage and with the Brooke Army Medical Center (BAMC) in Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas for follow-on reintegration of IPs. RSO and LEGATT continue coordinating with local law enforcement.

Figure 13 step 13. Is IP location obtained? Using USG intelligence assets, the location of the IPs is obtained with a 90% certainty. The details are only shared initially with CoM, RSO, and JPRC.

*Source:* Created by author.
Figure 14 step 14. RSO presents COAs to CoM.

Figure 14 step 15. DP 3: HN option? The CoM approves the HN options but will coordinate with Mexican government to allow USG PR experts to participate in planning. Also, based on recommendations by LEGATT, the CoM does not authorize the release of how the location was obtained to Mexican authorities.

Figure 14 step 16. Bilateral team develops a CONOP.

Figure 14 step 17. CoM and HN approves CONOP.

Figure 14 step 18. While a JTF composed of SEDENA and the Mexican Federal Police conducts the recovery, NORTHCOM arranges the safe passage of the Mexican aircraft across the border to Brownsville and a MEDEVAC C-130 aircraft ready to transport personnel from Brownsville to San Antonio, Texas.

Figure 14 step 19. Mexican JTF successfully recovers all USG personnel and transports them directly to Brownsville, Texas.

Figure 14 steps 20 to 22. Upon transfer of DoD personnel to DoD in Brownsville, Texas, DoD assumes responsibility for Reintegration. DoS is complete with PR event.
Table 5. COA #2 (USG PR Architecture) Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Weighed Score</th>
<th>Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unified Action</td>
<td>Increase effectiveness of CoM Authority and Unity of Effort of USG. Establishes a Mission Command structure for the interagency under the CoM.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Are USG agencies in CoM environment obligated to support CoM in managing PR event?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Yes = 1; No = 0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meets NSPD-12 requirements</td>
<td>Tasks as depicted in Appendix A, Annex 1, NSPD-12.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes independent &amp; decentralized operations of each USM</td>
<td>Each USM tailors the development and implementation of USG policies in the CoM environment. DoS Ops Center and DSCC do not exert command or authority within a CoM environment.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Does decision making regarding USG actions within the context of PR and security belong to the CoM?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Yes = 1; No = 0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respects the not-to-interfere concepts with other USG agencies.</td>
<td>Actions from one USG agency do not infringe on the mission accomplishment of another USG agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Does the CoM have the authority to interfere with a USG agency’s mission or retask a mission when dealing with a PR event?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Yes = 0; No = 1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick &amp; Decisive Response</td>
<td>Provides timely and comprehensive PR Support to all USG persons and their families operating within a CoM environment.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Does CoM or Deputy Chief of Mission (DSM) convene EAC based on a decision point (DP)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Yes = 1; No = 0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Value1</td>
<td>Value2</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based only exclusively on a recommendation?</td>
<td>Yes = 0; No = 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are non-AMCIT USG and USG contractor personnel automatically supported?</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are non-AMCIT family members of all USG and USG contractor personnel supported?</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integral part of the PR Network</td>
<td>Existing PR mechanisms of the PR Network are integrated into the Architecture to facilitate rehearsals, validations, the application of the judicial process, and leveraging partner nation capabilities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Does the COA interconnect USMs with other existing DoS and DoD resources? Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proficiency maintenance</td>
<td>Provides a construct for routine centralized rehearsals and validations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Can a single agency or department validate response and coordinate for response rehearsals through COA? Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.
## COA Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Baseline Weight</th>
<th>COA #1 (Status Quo) Weighed Score</th>
<th>COA #2 (USG PR Architecture) Weighed Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unified Action</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meets NSPD-12 requirements</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes independent &amp; decentralized operations of each USM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respects the not-to-interfere concepts with other USG agencies.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick &amp; Decisive Response</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integral part of the PR Network</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proficiency maintenance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The DoS and DoD can most effectively coordinate during a PR event under a CoM environment in the Western Hemisphere during wide area security operations abroad within the construct of a USG PR Architecture that enables the respective USM CoM to lead, coordinate, and synchronize the USG effort in support of the HN or to conduct ensuing operations to effect the return of IPs to friendly support. The comparison of the COA evaluation criteria for the COAs war-gamed in chapter 4 demonstrates that COA #2 (USG PR Architecture) met the criteria better with a superior score of 13 to the status quo (COA #1) score of 3. Although the status quo did not score higher than COA #2 (USG PR Architecture) in any criteria, it did tie in the following areas:

1. Meets NSPD-12 requirements.
2. Includes independent and decentralized operations of each USM.
3. Respects the not-to-interfere concept with other USG agencies.

It is also worth noting that neither the status quo nor COA #2 (USG PR Architecture) met all NSPD-12 requirements.

The author was able to answer most of the secondary questions in this research and with those answers develop a USG PR Process Architecture (figure 8) construct defined by one external and two internal sections. Externally, the architecture’s Superstructure is composed of national policies that serve as mechanisms which currently exist to standardize interagency operations at the national level such as the NSS, NSPD-1, NSDP-12, and NSPD-44 to name a few. The architecture then is composed of the
superstructure which are the DoS, DoD, and other government agencies PR policies and doctrine which function as separate processes or systems with interdepartmental gaps that are bridged by a National PR Strategy, a National PR Strategic Communication Guidance, and a revised Hostage Taking and Personnel Recovery annex to \textit{12 FAH-1}. The infrastructure then is the local IPRP customized to the political, diplomatic, and environmental realities of the USM and leverages the superstructure for support from external PR Networks. Since the DoS is the lead agency for PR within CoM environments, the Army can best respond to a PR event when it nests its regional and unit PR plans with the local CoM IPRP while in the conduct of wide area security operations in a CoM environment.

The DoD and DoS have the most to gain out of all the USG agencies with the implementation of a USG PR architecture. As DoD does not have a legal instrument to act alone in CoM environments, the absence of a USG PR architecture also does not provide DoD a clear agency to depend on for PR in that environment, which wastes time, effort, and lives during a response. On the other hand, without a USG PR architecture, DoS cannot maintain a unified effort in its foreign relations mission and will have to continue to deal with the consequence management of other agencies’ unilateral (or bilateral) actions in the aftermath of a PR operation. The results of this study expose serious gaps in the way the USG responds to PR events in CoM environments and validate three draft policy documents as viable mechanisms within the PR Process Architecture.
Recommendations

A rigid USG PR architecture as proposed often in DoD literature would by all accounts function in an expeditious and coordinated manner as it tends to function in DoD environments. However, this system does not adequately take into account two very important variables: the national sovereignty of other countries and the law enforcement functions that USG agencies perform abroad under a myriad of US Code Titles. Although there may be situations where the USG must take unilateral action in a CoM environment, as a nation that espouses the ideals of rule of law, the USG should always default to the HN and support the HN as much as possible. There are two countries around the globe without a CoM (which connotes that these countries are not HNs, the USG has no diplomatic relations there, and it is therefore not a CoM environment): North Korea and Iran. However, those countries are the exception and would probably more neatly fall in the realm of the DoD environment.

On the contrary, a USG PR Architecture should be made up loosely of many other architectures in order to afford adaptability to the environment, respect for HN sovereignty, and independence of each executive branch agency and department to operate. Naturally, the independence afforded today to each USG agency degrades the application of the whole of government approach to resolving PR events as it slows response and sometimes creates a culture of “each agency rescues their own,” which was not the intent of NSPD-12. In order to accomplish the noble mission of returning isolated persons to friendly support, the author recommends that the NSC revise and publish the “NPRSV1 (draft)” and the “USPRSCG (draft)” so that they are less DoD-centric and more Whole-of-Government-centric by incorporating more inclusive terminology such as
“friendly support” versus “friendly control.” Also, the author recommends that DoS revises the current Annex G (draft), 12 FAH-1 so that it directly integrates external PR architectures, delineates a body that inspects and validates USM programs (prepare, prevent, and response), and requires an IPRP for every USM. DoS would also benefit greatly from ensuring that every shift at the DoS OPS CENTER and the DSCC has a PR trained individual who can provide reach back capability to USM personnel abroad in PR doctrine and procedures.

Lastly, DoD is again leading the Joint Interagency with the JPRCaP Special Project; however, until a similar project is conducted under the direct supervision of an NSC sub-committee, the results will be guided, albeit inadvertently, by the DoD paradigm that the DoD way of conducting PR is proven worldwide, and it is the only way to return isolated persons to friendly support.
GLOSSARY

Civil SAR. Civil SAR is “military assistance to civil (i.e., civilian) search and rescue authorities in non-hostile, non-denied environments” (Joglekar et al. 2004).

Clandestine Operation. (DoD) An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2007).

Combat Power. “The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time” (Department of the Army 2012b, Glossary-2).

Covert Operation. (DoD) An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible deniability by the sponsor (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011b).

CSAR. “A specific task performed by rescue forces to affect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war” (Joglekar et al. 2004).

Hostage Rescue (HR). HR “is typically employed after diplomacy or negotiations have failed or been deemed unwarranted. It typically involves very specially trained forces who only attempt a rescue after detailed planning has been completed. Rescue attempts often require coordination between the governments of the hostages and of the nation in which the incident occurs” (Joglekar et al. 2004).

JCSAR. “A combat search and rescue operation in support of a component’s military operations that has exceeded the combat search and rescue capabilities of that component and requires the efforts of two or more components of the joint force. Normally, the operation is conducted by the joint force commander or a component commander that has been designated by joint force commander tasking” (Joglekar et al. 2004).

Mass Rescue. “A mass rescue operation (MRO) is one that involves the need for immediate assistance to large numbers of persons in distress such that capabilities normally available to search and rescue (SAR) authorities are inadequate” (Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue (COMSAR) 2003).

NAR. Non-conventional Assisted Recovery is a “term for methods used by US Government Agencies to set up, maintain, and operate what used to be called Escape & Evasion networks. Also called NAR” (Joglekar et al. 2004).
NEO. There are several phases to a Chief of Mission led evacuation of U.S. personnel from a host nation. Initially, as a situation appears to become more threatening, U.S. personnel (particularly dependents) are assisted (cautioned but not directed) to leave. As the situation further deteriorates, U.S. personnel are directed to leave to include a drawdown of the Embassy staff. If the situation prevents evacuation through civilian means the Chief of Mission may request that DoD conduct a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (Joglekar et al. 2004).

Overt Operation. (DoD) An operation conducted openly, without concealment (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012).

SAR. Search and Rescue is “[the] use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea” (Joglekar et al. 2004).

UAR. Unconventional Assisted Recovery is the “[PR] conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or [UAR] mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return [IPs] to friendly control” (Joglekar et al. 2004).

Unified Action Partners. “Military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations” (Department of the Army 2012b, Glossary-8).


Henderson, Lindsay. 2013. Personnel recovery and resilience: Preparing for the worst, working with the best (draft). Article by a Foreign Service Officer, Unpublished.


Zuzzi, Mattia. 2010. The Dynamics of interagency cooperation process at Provincial Reconstruction Team in Operations ISAF and Enduring Freedom. Master’s Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.