THE FORTY-SIXTH INDIANA REGIMENT: A TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND MAJOR COMBAT ENGAGEMENTS DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History

by

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**ABSTRACT**

This thesis is an historical analysis of the amphibious operations of the 46th Indiana. The primary research question is whether the amphibious operations of the 46th Indiana were effective towards the Union’s success in the Mississippi River valley. Using Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3, Tactics, this thesis will compare the 46th Indiana’s employment of tactics to the Marine Corps’ current use of tactics according to doctrine. Tactical concepts that achieve success on the battlefield are achieving a decision, gaining an advantage, being faster, adapting, cooperating, and exploiting success. These six concepts form the foundation of the analysis of the 46th Indiana’s operations and tactics during the Civil War. Secondary research areas to determine the effectiveness of the 46th Indiana’s amphibious operations are training, command and control, casualty statistics, unit cohesion and morale.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

46th Indiana, Tactics, Marine Corps, Amphibious Operations, Mississippi River Valley, Civil War, Training, Command and Control, Casualties, Unit Cohesion, Morale.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background

When Confederate forces attacked the Federal installation at Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina on 12 April 1861, it sparked the bloodiest war in United States’ history.\(^1\) Shortly after Fort Sumter’s surrender President Abraham Lincoln, with the intent of raising more troops for law enforcement and preserving federal facilities,\(^2\) requested one regiment each from Arkansas and Delaware; two each from Tennessee and North Carolina; three from Virginia; four each from Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland; six each from Illinois and Indiana, and thirteen regiments from Ohio. Approximately 780 men formed each regiment. While some states purposely disregarded the Presidential request for troops, the Governor of Indiana, Oliver P. Morton, raised twelve regiments, to include the 46th Indiana Regiment.\(^3\) On 30 September 1861, Governor Morton authorized the Honorable R.P. DeHart, the Honorable Graham N. Fitch, Newton G. Scott, and Thomas H. Bringhurst to raise a regiment and form at Logansport, Indiana. Barracks were built and company organizations quickly gathered in Logansport.\(^4\)

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\(^3\) Ibid.

Under the command of Colonel Graham N. Fitch, a former Democratic Representative and Senator from Indiana, the 46th Indiana Regiment formed in Logansport, Indiana and officially mustered into service on 12 December 1861. The 46th Indiana Regiment served in the Western and Trans-Mississippi theaters, primarily as an amphibious force on gunboats, transports, and flatboats. During the 46th Indiana’s time in service, the regiment participated in a variety of missions, spanning conventional warfare operations, counter-guerilla operations, amphibious landing operations, and riverine operations. The 46th Indiana conducted a majority of its missions near the Mississippi River and the rivers that flow to and from the Mississippi including the Arkansas River, White River, and the Yazoo River. Major operations of the 46th Indiana included the Battle of New Madrid, Battle of Island Number Ten, an operation against Fort Pillow, Battle of Port Gibson, Battle of Champion Hill, the siege of Vicksburg, and the Battle of Sabine Cross Roads. Additionally, the regiment conducted counter-guerrilla operations. The Battle of Sabine Cross Roads, just outside of Mansfield, Louisiana, during the disastrous Red River Campaign in 1864, proved to be the largest defeat of the 46th Indiana’s history. It was at Sabine Cross Roads where the regiment lost 106 men, including eighty-six men taken prisoner. However, the regiment rebounded from this defeat, and finished the remainder of its service until mustered out of the service on 4 September 1865.

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5 Underhill, 161.
6 Bringhurst and Swigart, 11.
7 Ibid., v.
8 Ibid., 116.
All of the citizens of Indiana cherished the 46th Indiana’s service during the war. While on a long-awaited furlough, the 46th Indiana participated in its homecoming ceremony in Indianapolis in June of 1864. During the ceremony, Governor Morton praised the actions of the regiment. The governor thanked the regiment for its re-enlistment, and commended the men for staying in the field when they were long overdue to return home. The 46th Indiana met every challenge with distinction and professionalism. Its history and the men who comprised the regiment serve as references and observations in amphibious operations, leadership, and esprit de corps.

**Primary Research Question**

This thesis is an historical analysis of the amphibious operations of the 46th Indiana. The primary research question is whether the amphibious operations of the 46th Indiana were effective towards the Union’s success in the Mississippi River valley. Amphibious operations were not a new concept during the Civil War. While the Marine Corps specialized in naval expeditions conducting its first amphibious landing at New Providence, Bahamas in 1776, the Army never utilized amphibious operations to its maximum capabilities during its military campaigns. Even the creation of the Urbanna Plan, a major amphibious operation designed by Major General George B. McClellan in 1861, seemed unusual because warfare, specifically in the United States, did not rely

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9Brigthurst and Swigart, 102.

heavily on amphibious operations.\textsuperscript{11} However, Union Commanders began to realize the importance of using waterways to conduct actions aimed at defeating Confederate forces.

Amphibious operations will in all likelihood continue to be a major influence during military campaigns in the future. This makes an historical analysis of amphibious operations worthwhile in order to extract lessons for future operations. The Marine Corps specifically can benefit from studies of past amphibious operations. As a core competency, the Corps “conducts joint forcible entry operations from the sea and develops amphibious landing force capabilities and doctrine.”\textsuperscript{12} Additionally, the Corps “conducts complex expeditionary operations in the urban littorals and other challenging environments.”\textsuperscript{13} These two core competencies have significant similarities to the types of operations the 46th Indiana conducted during its campaigns. By studying the 46th Indiana’s actions, future Marine Corps leaders will gain additional knowledge of amphibious operations than can be applied for potential future operations.

This thesis will compare the 46th Indiana’s employment of tactics to the Marine Corps’ current use of tactics according to doctrine. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3, \textit{Tactics}, defines tactics as the art and science of winning engagements and battles. It includes the use of firepower and maneuver, the integration of different arms, and the immediate exploitation of success to defeat an enemy. Tactics also includes the technical application of combat power, which consists of those techniques and procedures for


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 9.
accomplishing specific tasks within a tactical action. Moreover, tactics refers to the concepts and methods used to accomplish a particular objective during combat operations. In war, tactics is the application of combat power to defeat an enemy in engagements and battles. Combat power is the total destructive force used against an enemy and is a unique product of a variety of moral, physical, and mental factors. Additionally, combat power includes the use of maneuver, supported by the application and coordination of fires to gain an advantage to defeat an enemy.\textsuperscript{14} Tactical concepts that achieve success on the battlefield are achieving a decision, gaining an advantage, being faster, adapting, cooperating, and exploiting success.\textsuperscript{15} These six concepts form the foundation of the analysis of the 46th Indiana’s operations and tactics during the Civil War.

Achieving a decision is a result of tactical actions against an enemy. Using attrition tactics or maneuver warfare tactics, the aim is to achieve a decision favorable to the desired outcome. Achieving a decision is not an easy task, but achieving a decision is important, and must lead to a result beyond itself.\textsuperscript{16} A commander achieves a decision by using military judgment. Military judgment comes from a commander understanding the situation by using a pattern of recognition. Additionally, a commander must make decisions in constantly changing environments despite the friction, uncertainty, and danger that accompanies combat. Using either an analytical process or by using an


\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 11.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 22-23.
intuitive process, a commander determines the desired end state from the situation presented to him. Acting decisively also helps achieve a decision. Once a commander has identified an enemy’s critical vulnerabilities, he then shapes the operating area to his advantage and designates a main effort to focus combat power. A commander must aggressively exploit every opportunity to destroy an enemy, committing the maximum amount of combat power, and pushing the combat force to the limits of exhaustion.

Effectively using combined arms gains an advantage. During the Civil War, infantry, artillery, and on occasion naval gunboats produced combined arms fire. Using combined arms presents an enemy with a dilemma that is difficult to overcome. Another method to gain an advantage is to use maneuver. Maneuvering forces around an enemy’s center of gravity avoids battles of attrition, while trapping an enemy in a position of disadvantage. Common maneuver involved enveloping an enemy’s exposed flank, or denying terrain from an enemy. Moreover, forces maneuvered to threaten lines of communication or forcing an enemy to withdraw from the battlefield. Additionally, maneuver aids in seizing a position that brings effective fire against an enemy while also protecting against enemy fire. Finally, maneuver also applies to time, as forces maneuver faster than an enemy does.

Other concepts to gain advantage include using the environment and using complementary forces. A force may exploit the terrain to mask a unit’s maneuver or protect indirect fire assets. A force using a tree line to conceal a defensive line, or using a ravine to hide a maneuvering unit helps gain an advantage over an enemy. Additionally, units that can operate in inclement weather or periods of reduced visibility gain a significant advantage over an adversary. Using complementary forces to fix an enemy’s
position while another force flanks the enemy’s position creates an advantage. Moreover, using the element of surprise, through deception, stealth, or ambiguity, gains an advantage over an enemy. Another method to gain an advantage is to develop an ambush mentality. For a successful ambush, a force must surprise the enemy by drawing the enemy into a trap while possessing a position that the enemy cannot see. Once the enemy draws near, the ambushing force focuses on the enemy with lethal firepower that shocks the enemy into confusion while causing numerous casualties.

Using speed through space and time is a key concept in tactics. Being faster than an enemy allows a force to gain initiative and advantage over an enemy. Factors of speed are relative speed, continuing speed, and speed and change. Relative speed applies to actions against an enemy’s movements. Continuing speed is the speed that a force can maintain over time. Speed and change refers to the transitions that occur during combat operations such as transitioning from offensive operations to defensive operations. A unit must make rapid transitions, despite the friction caused by transitions, to maintain its speed over an adversary. Additionally, a commander must not confuse moving with speed and moving with haste. Using proper reconnaissance, ensuring sufficient supporting arms, and using all manpower available are tasks that avoid moving hastily. Moreover, simple plans, decentralization, commander’s intent, experience, implicit communications, coordination, reducing friction, and physical and mental fitness are factors that increase a unit’s speed.17

Two basic ways to adapt during combat operations are to anticipate what actions an enemy may take, or improvise a new plan to counter how an enemy is operating.

17Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1-3, 72.
Additionally, combat plans should be flexible, with sufficient branches and sequels to carry combat operations past the initial objective. Moreover, a commander should decentralize decision-making, pushing authority to the lowest level possible. This allows unit leaders to adapt to the current situation without waiting for orders from higher-level commanders.

Cooperating in combat relates to control of combat forces. Cooperating results from successful integration with other units, while having the discipline to trust other units to accomplish assigned tasks. Cooperation during the Civil War occurred between artillery batteries, infantry forces, and naval gunboats. Often, due to the situation on the battlefield, cooperation occurred because of units forced to work with each other after an unexpected rout or to exploit unexpected success. Units that cooperated successfully with other units achieved desirable results.

Exploiting success is the result of achieving success, while positioning forces to accomplish subsequent objectives. Exploiting success involves the consolidation of forces and pursuing an enemy after a tactical victory on the battlefield. However, forces must also have sufficient combat power on the battlefield to exploit success. Using a reserve force is an excellent use of combat power to exploit success. A commander must be prepared to finish an enemy, following up on tactical victories presented during combat operations.

Secondary Research Questions

There are five secondary areas to research to determine the effectiveness of the 46th Indiana’s amphibious operations. The first area concerns the training the regiment conducted in preparation for amphibious operations. This thesis will examine the type of
amphibious training the regiment received, if any at all. Amphibious operations are inherently dangerous, and mitigating factors such as training can reduce casualties. This thesis will also explore common U.S. Army amphibious doctrine during this period. While written amphibious doctrine may have been lacking during this period, an exploration of common practices is required. This thesis will attempt to explore embarkation and debarkation techniques, integration with naval gunfire, and amphibious operational planning. The second area is the command and control provided by the regiment’s leaders. This thesis will address troop organization to determine if sufficient command and control existed during the regiment’s amphibious operations. The third area will be casualty statistics. Casualties will occur in battle; however, casualties can also occur during the embarkation and debarkation of units onto amphibious vessels. This thesis will analyze casualties occurring during amphibious operations, to include drowning and injuries sustained prior to and after combat operations involving direct and indirect fire. The remaining areas are intangible factors. The fourth and fifth areas are unit cohesion and morale, which are significant traits of a good unit. This thesis will examine the unit cohesion and morale of the 46th Indiana. The monotony of camp life, severe weather, illness and disease, high casualty rates, and lack of food and clothing can decrease unit morale. This thesis will explore the unit cohesion and morale of the 46th Indiana and determine if unit morale and cohesion were factors in the regiment’s success.

Operational History

The 46th Indiana Regiment’s operational history, to include its varied command and control structures at the brigade, division, and corps level as well as casualty statistics provides insight to the adversity faced by the regiment while conducting combat
operations. Command restructuring was a common occurrence during the regiment’s service in the Western theater of operations; however, the regiment benefited from having only two regimental commanders from 1861 to 1865. Moreover, casualty statistics to include dead, wounded, and illness total roughly 22 percent during the span of the war. The near permanent regimental command structure and low casualty rate facilitated much of the regiment’s success during its campaigns.18

The 46th Indiana Regiment formed in Logansport, Indiana between September and October 1861. The regiment formally mustered into service in December of the same year.19 The regiment encamped at Camp Wickliffe in Kentucky until February 1862, participating in many training events to include troop schools and drill.20 While the drill periods certainly improved the basic soldierly skills of the regiment, drill instruction rarely included live-fire tactical exercises on target ranges.21 Moreover, there is no mention of the unit having any practice in amphibious operations, to include embarkation procedures, debarking or landing exercises, or exposure to general ship life. The regiment would learn to conduct amphibious operations during the conduct of the war. The regiment experienced a steep learning curve while perfecting its amphibious operations. During the regiment’s first embarkation aboard the City of Madison and Lancaster No. 3


19Bringhurst and Swigart, 9-11.

20Ibid., 14.

in December 1861, the regiment lost a man when he fell overboard and drowned.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, during the regiment’s embarkation on the \textit{Izetta}, \textit{The City of Madison}, and the \textit{Golden State} in February 1862, the unit’s equipment was found to be “in great confusion” during the embarkation process.\textsuperscript{23}

Upon the regiment’s departure from Camp Wickliffe in February 1862, the unit relocated to Commerce, Missouri. In March 1862, the regiment participated in the siege of New Madrid, and the siege and capture of Island Number Ten along the Mississippi River in March and April 1862. Only a month out of camp, the regiment played a crucial role in securing Island Number Ten and opening a portion of the Mississippi River. After the capture of Island Number Ten, the regiment made an expedition to Fort Pillow, Tennessee in April 1862. Between April and June 1862, the regiment prepared to capture Fort Pillow only to find it evacuated the day of the attack. The regiment then moved to Memphis, Tennessee in preparation for operations up the White River in Arkansas between June and July 1862. This expedition provided the 46th Indiana Regiment with its first major combat operation, the Battle of Saint Charles, Arkansas, on 17 June 1862. After the regiment’s success at the Battle of Saint Charles, the regiment participated in limited conflict at Grand Prairie, Duvall’s Bluff, and finally at Helena, Arkansas, which lasted until April 1863.

In 1863, the 46th Indiana Regiment began operations from its base at Helena beginning in February. The first operation was an expedition to Yazoo Pass in Mississippi, followed by engagements at Fort Pemberton, Milliken’s Bend, and Grand

\textsuperscript{22}Bringhurst and Swigart, 12-13.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., 16.
Gulf throughout March and April. In May 1863, the regiment began operations against
the Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Beginning in May, the regiment
participated in major battles at Port Gibson and Champion Hill. After the Battle of
Champion Hill, the 46th Indiana Regiment participated in the siege of Vicksburg, making
two assaults on the city on 19 May and 22 May. The siege of Vicksburg lasted until 4
July, when the Confederates surrendered the city. The capture of Vicksburg, along with
the fall of Port Hudson, Louisiana five days later allowed the Union clear passage on the
Mississippi River. After the capture of Vicksburg, the 46th Indiana Regiment advanced
on Jackson, Mississippi, participating in the siege of Jackson from 10 July to 17 July. The
remainder of 1863 provided the regiment limited campaigning in New Orleans in August
and garrison duty at Carrollton, Brashear City, and Berwick in Louisiana until October.
From 3 October until 30 November, the regiment participated in the Western Louisiana
“Teche” Campaign. After the “Teche” Campaign, the regiment returned to New Orleans
in December.24

The regiment began 1864 with a reenlistment on 2 January. Those soldiers who
chose to reenlist could now consider themselves veterans and the unit’s official name
changed to the 46th Regiment, Indiana Veteran Volunteers. In March, the regiment
participated in the Red River Campaign in Louisiana until May. During the Red River
Campaign, the regiment participated in the Battle of Sabine Cross Roads near Mansfield,
Louisiana on 8 April. Following the tragedy that befell the regiment at Sabine Cross
Roads, the regiment conducted operations at Monett’s Ferry near the Cane River

24Frederick H. Dyer, *A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion* (Des Moines, IA:
The Press of Morningside Bookshop, 1979), 1136-1137.
Crossing on 23 April. Throughout the spring of 1864, the regiment served at Alexandria, Graham’s Plantation, Morganza, and Mansura, Louisiana. The 46th Indiana Regiment conducted an expedition to the Atchafalaya River in late May to early June. After its participation in the Atchafalaya expedition, the regiment took its long-overdue veteran furlough in June, which the regiment’s combat operations repeatedly delayed.  

After the regiment’s well-deserved furlough, the 46th Indiana embarked for another river expedition. The 46th Indiana Regiment travelled down the Ohio River towards Shawneetown, Illinois to suppress an insurrection while also battling Confederate recruiting parties in Kentucky in August 1864. Fortunately, for the regiment, it had prior service combating irregular forces during previous operations along the Mississippi River. By 1864, the regiment possessed the ability to conduct a wide range of operations from full-scale combat amphibious operations to conducting policing operations, or stability operations according to modern doctrine. After garrison duty at locations such as White Oak Springs, Gouger’s Lake, and Smith Mills, the regiment participated in the defense operations in Kentucky resisting the invasion forces led by Major General Simon Buckner of the Confederate Army. The regiment participated in Burbridge’s Expedition to Saltsville, Virginia in September through October, which was the last expedition of the regiment’s service. After Burbridge’s Expedition, the regiment returned to Lexington, Kentucky performing garrison duty until September 1865, and mustered out of service in Louisville on 4 September 1865. 

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25 Dyer, 1136-1137.

26 Ibid.
Throughout the regiment’s service, it attached to numerous higher-level headquarters. Fortunately, during the regiment’s early service in the war, Colonel Fitch commanded the brigade that included the 46th Indiana. Under these circumstances, the regiment’s second-in-command, or in current language, the Executive Officer billet, commanded the regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Bringhurst commanded the regiment while Colonel Fitch commanded the brigade. After Colonel Fitch’s resignation from the Army in August 1862, Lieutenant Colonel Bringhurst, later promoted to Colonel in August 1862, continued as the regimental commander.27

Graham N. Fitch was born in LeRoy, New York on 5 December 1809. He attended Middlebury Academy and Geneva (New York) College. Fitch studied medicine and completed his medical course at the College of Physicians and Surgeons. Upon completion of his medical training, Fitch relocated to Logansport, Indiana, and began his medical practice in 1834. He served as a member of the Indiana House of Representatives in 1836 and 1839. From 1844 to 1848, Fitch became a professor of anatomy at the Rush Medical College in Chicago, Illinois. He also worked at the Indianapolis Medical College in 1878. Fitch won election as a Democrat to the Thirty-First and Thirty-Second Congress from 4 March 1849 to 3 March 1853. After his tour in the United States House of Representatives, Fitch resumed his medical practice. In 1855, Fitch won election to fill a vacancy in the United States Senate. Fitch served in the Senate from 1855 to 1860. In

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27 Bringhurst and Swigart, 153.
1861, Fitch helped raise the 46th Regiment, Indiana Volunteer Infantry, and served as its Colonel.  

After Fitch’s resignation on 5 August 1862, Thomas H. Bringhurst assumed command of the 46th Indiana. Bringhurst was born in Philadelphia in 1819, where he received his schooling and learned cabinet making. He relocated to Logansport in 1845 where Bringhurst began to manufacture walnut veneer for eastern markets. However, the Mexican War interrupted Bringhurst’s business venture. In contrast to Fitch, who possessed a background in medicine and politics, Bringhurst received military experience prior to the Civil War. On 19 June 1846 at New Albany, Indiana, Bringhurst enlisted as a Corporal and served in the Mexican War with the First Regiment of Indiana Volunteers. After the Mexican War, Bringhurst returned to Logansport where he established the Logansport Journal in 1849 and served as its editorial writer. Bringhurst also served three terms as the city’s mayor and later became a U.S. post office inspector.

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29 Ibid.

31 Thomas B. Helm, History of Cass County, Indiana (Chicago, IL: Kingman Brothers, Publishers, 1878), 31.

The regiment benefitted from command continuity at the regimental level. Having continuity at regimental command allowed Colonel Fitch and Colonel Bringhurst to demonstrate their competency, while also building the regiment’s morale and esprit de corps.  

Although regimental commanders rarely made tactical decisions during the Civil War—brigade commanders usually made the tactical decisions—both Colonel Fitch and Colonel Bringhurst set a fine example for the men of the regiment by their aggressiveness and sound tactical decisions.

A closer review of the regiment’s command and control structure during its service reveals most of its change in command structure occurred at the Division level. At the beginning of the regiment’s operations, the 46th Indiana fell under the 19th Brigade, 4th Division, Army of Ohio until February 1862. In April 1862, the regiment fell under the First Brigade, Second Division, Army of the Mississippi. The regiment then attached to the Second Brigade, Third Division, Army of the Mississippi until July 1862. This was a critical time for the 46th Indiana, as it conducted operations against Island Number Ten, Fort Pillow, and Saint Charles during the five-month span, yet under the leadership of Colonel Fitch and Colonel Bringhurst, multiple shifts in command and control at the division level did not affect the regiment. The 46th Indiana did get a reprieve from the fluid command structure when it fell under the District of Eastern Arkansas, Department of Missouri until December 1862. However, this reprieve did not last long beginning in 1863, as the regiment began another series of division shifts between the Twelfth Division, Thirteenth Division, and Third Division under the XIII

34Griffith, 5.
35Ibid., 22.
Army Corps from February 1863 to August 1863. It was not until late summer of 1863 that the regiment fell under the overall command of the Department of the Gulf and remained there until the summer of 1864. The regiment did experience one final tactical attachment under Fourth Brigade, First Division, District of Kentucky from July 1864 until December 1864, while it conducted operations in Kentucky, before finally falling under the command of the Department of Kentucky before being mustered out of the service in September 1865.  

Civil War casualties for units were often exceedingly high, depending on the unit’s location of service. However, sickness and disease were a common cause of casualties during the war and the regiment experienced the same hardships caused by the harsh conditions experienced by soldiers. Of the 969 soldiers listed under the regiment’s original strength, plus the additional 205 men gained during the war, the regiment experienced only four officers and sixty-six enlisted men killed or wounded during combat operations. Yet sickness and illness claimed many more men to include three officers and 191 enlisted men. The regiment also lost fifty-six men who were unaccounted for during the course of the war. Yet the regiment only had twenty-two deserters, or roughly 1 percent of its total strength.  

The 46th Indiana’s actions during amphibious operations in the Western and Trans-Mississippi theaters are noteworthy and deserve further analysis. This study aims at determining the factors for the regiment's successes during combat operations, and the

36Dyer, 1136-1137.
37Ibid.
38Gowland and Gowland.
influence the regiment’s actions had on the outcome of its battles. Moreover, this study will examine external and internal factors affecting the regiment’s performance to include training; flexible command and control structures; low casualty statistics; and sound leadership provided by the regimental commanders that affected the regiment’s cohesion and morale. Further, this study may be of benefit to future leaders tasked with conducting amphibious operations along small waterways against an entrenched enemy. Finally, this study will emphasize the importance of combined naval and ground operations; an important skillset to master as the United States military moves forward in the Twenty-first Century.
Battle of New Madrid and Island Number Ten

Along the Mississippi River near the borders of Missouri, Tennessee, and Arkansas sat the town of New Madrid, Missouri, and Island Number Ten. New Madrid is located on the west bank of the river where the river curves to the south and to the east. Island Number Ten, identified as the tenth island in a string of islands in the Mississippi River, was located where the river made a sharp curve to the west and to the north. Due to the geography of the island and the river, a natural peninsula formed on the east bank of the river opposite of New Madrid. The Confederates controlled both, which allowed the rebels to prevent Union use of the Mississippi River. A Confederate force of approximately 2,000 men garrisoned New Madrid. General P.G.T. Beauregard augmented the New Madrid garrison with another 5,000 men from Brigadier General John P. McCown’s forces.\(^\text{39}\) The Confederates also possessed substantial artillery defenses for New Madrid and Island Number Ten. The Confederates placed twenty-four guns along the shores of the Mississippi River near New Madrid and Island Number Ten. The batteries included 8-inch Columbiads, 32-pounder rifles. The Confederates also placed nineteen guns on the island itself, including more 8-inch Columbiads and 32-pounders, but also 8-inch siege howitzers, 24-pounders, and 128-pounders. To complete the battery defenses of New Madrid and Island Number Ten, the Confederates employed a floating battery consisting of 8-inch Columbiads and a 32-pounder for nine guns. The

geography and Confederate batteries created a formidable defense network for New Madrid and Island Number Ten.\textsuperscript{40} Major General John Pope, commanding the Army of Mississippi, was tasked with opening the Mississippi River in order to provide access to Memphis, Tennessee.\textsuperscript{41}

With 18,000 men,\textsuperscript{42} Pope began his move towards New Madrid from Commerce, Missouri on 28 February 1862. Arriving at New Madrid on 3 March, and supported by Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote, commanding the Western Flotilla, Pope began a ten-day siege of the town, resulting in a Confederate evacuation on 13 March. Pope officially captured New Madrid a day later on 14 March.\textsuperscript{43} Pope and Foote continued their operations against Island Number Ten, eventually capturing the island on 7 April, thus completing his mission to open up the Mississippi River to allow access to Memphis.

The 46th Indiana Regiment fell under the Second Brigade, Third Division of Pope’s army. Colonel Fitch commanded the brigade while Brigadier General John M. Palmer commanded the division. The regiment was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Newton G. Scott. Scott’s command of the regiment was his first and only time as the regimental commander. Along with the 46th Indiana Regiment, the 43rd Indiana Regiment fell under the Second Brigade, while the 7th Illinois Cavalry Regiment

\textsuperscript{40}Larry J. Daniel and Lynn N. Bock, \textit{Island No. 10, Struggle for the Mississippi Valley} (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1996), 34.


\textsuperscript{42}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., xxiv.
supported the infantry. Palmer, a political general from Illinois, was not pleased with commanding brigades formed entirely of Indiana men, fearing his war reputation would not reach his constituents in Illinois. However, Palmer eventually learned to respect the Indiana men after their actions during the Battles of New Madrid and Island Number Ten.

The regiment’s first major action during the Battle of New Madrid occurred on 6 March. The regiment supported Major William Robertson’s 5th Iowa Infantry Regiment, under the command of Colonel Gordon Granger, for an attack against New Madrid. Facing Confederate skirmishers, the 46th Indiana attacked the Confederate left side of defense, driving in the skirmishers. The attack lasted more than two hours, however the attack stalled due to the heavy fire from Confederate gunboats. Additionally, the terrain did not provide adequate cover from the gunboats, leaving the regiment exposed to Confederate shells. The regiment also suffered from a lack of supporting artillery from Union batteries. Although the regiment’s attack did not yield any significant results, the attack provided the regiment with its first combat experience. Granger, in his official report, noted the regiment “behaved like veterans, and quite surprised me by their coolness and indifference to the danger which surrounded them.”

44Daniel and Bock, 151-152.
47Ibid., 103.
48Ibid.
After the regiment’s attack on 6 March, the 46th Indiana continued with more skirmishing and maneuvering until 13 March. The regiment would have participated in another attack against New Madrid, specifically Fort Bankhead located on the banks of the Mississippi. Unfortunately, General Palmer refused to cooperate in the attack with General Eleazar A. Paine, commanding Pope’s Fourth Division. Pope had no choice but to relent to Palmer’s demand and cancelled the attack against the fort. The canceled assault provided the Confederates an opportunity to evacuate New Madrid before a major engagement could take place. It is unknown how the regiment would have performed if called upon to participate in the attack to capture New Madrid. At the time, Palmer’s men were designated as a reserve force, and utilized his regiments in a “two-up, two-back” formation with the 34th Indiana and 47th Indiana forward, and the 46th Indiana and 43rd Indiana in the rear. However, based on the regiment’s previous performance during the attack with Colonel Granger, a case can be made that the regiment would have performed well under fire.

After the capture of New Madrid, Pope and Foote focused their efforts on an attack against Island Number Ten. The Union Flotilla relentlessly shelled the Confederate batteries located on the shore and Island Number Ten. However, naval bombardment of the Confederate batteries alone would not guarantee Union success; the Confederate artillery still could range the Union boats and the Confederates had a line of retreat across the river along the peninsula on the southern bank of the river. Union Flag-Officer Henry

49 Bringhurst and Swigart, 21.

50 Daniel and Bock, 62.

51 Ibid., 163.
Walke, commanding the gunboat *Carondelet*, bravely ran the gauntlet of the batteries located on the island in order to provide support to Pope. Pope wanted to land his army south of Island Number Ten, which would then cut off the retreat route for the Confederates. Additionally, a few days later, the Union gunboat *Pittsburg* successfully navigated past the batteries of the island, providing Pope with additional gunboat support for his landing. The *Carondelet* and *Pittsburg* continued to shell the Confederates’ batteries, while Pope landed his forces, led by Palmer’s Division. The Confederate situation was desperate, and the island’s garrison surrendered on 7 April. With the Confederate batteries silenced, Union forces captured the retreating Confederate troops who managed to escape Island Number Ten.53

On 14 March, the 46th Indiana marched towards Riddle’s Point, Missouri, located across the Mississippi River from Tiptonville, Tennessee. The movement was made under adverse weather conditions. Heavy rains caused roads to become muddy, with the regiment’s men encountering knee-deep pools in some spots.54 The terrain also made movement difficult, as the regiment traversed over hills and through swamps.55 However, the regiment maintained noise discipline56 and helped drag artillery pieces through the

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54U.S. War Department, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 8, 103.

55Bringhurst and Swigart, 22.

56U.S. War Department, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 8, 103.
mud and over the rough terrain. The regiment finally reached Riddle’s Point three days later, occupying the trenches near the bank of the river.\footnote{Bringhurst and Swigart, 22.}

Duty at Riddle’s Point provided the regiment with an opportunity to experience severe bombardment from the Confederate gunboats. Under intense shelling, the 46th Indiana fired repeatedly at the gunboats, “spraying with musket balls” and keeping the Confederate boats from approaching the regiment’s position along the riverbank. The regiment also inflicted many casualties, killing many of the gunners on the boats.\footnote{Daniel and Bock, 98-99.} However, seeing an opportunity to cut off the Confederate retreat after the surrender of Island Number Ten, the 46th Indiana embarked on the \textit{Ohio Belle}, crossed the Mississippi River, and landed at Tiptonville. Once ashore, the regiment participated in the capture of three thousand Confederate prisoners including Confederate Brigadier General William Mackall and Colonel Edward Gantt.\footnote{Bringhurst and Swigart, 26.}

With the fall of New Madrid and Island Number Ten, the Mississippi River was now open for Union access to Memphis, Tennessee. The operation successfully combined amphibious operations of Pope’s army with naval gunfire from the Western Flotilla to bring about the surrender of the Confederate forces. In a congratulatory letter to Pope, General Grant stated Pope’s army gave “the final blow to the rebellion in Missouri.” Pope, pleased with his army’s actions, was “proud and gratified” while also “impressed with a confidence in the officers and men” of his command.\footnote{Ibid.} The men of the
46th Indiana received their baptism by fire at the Battles of New Madrid and Island Number Ten. While the regiment was not a main effort during the attacks against the Confederates, the regiment’s actions were effective in ultimately driving the Confederates from their positions on the Mississippi River. The regiment’s amphibious landing at Tiptonville aided in the capture of the retreating Confederates, while also helping to open river access to Memphis.

Fort Pillow

On 13 April, the 46th Indiana Regiment began its expedition towards Fort Pillow, Tennessee. On 16 April, Pope detached two brigades from his army to remain near Fort Pillow while the remainder of his army continued with operations towards Corinth, Mississippi for an attack against Confederate forces. Pope detached one brigade consisting of the 43rd Indiana Regiment and the 46th Indiana Regiment under the command of Colonel Fitch that remained on the Mississippi River, while the other brigade under Colonel James R. Slack remained at New Madrid.61 Although Colonel Fitch’s brigade embarked aboard two steamers, the command structure was loosely structured at best. Fitch was not officially under Flag-Officer Foote’s command, but Pope included in his orders to Fitch that he was to assist, communicate, and cooperate with Foote. Fitch reported his progress to Pope “at every opportunity.”62 Foote was the most displeased about this command structure. In a letter to Secretary of the Navy Gideon


Welles dated 17 April, Foote was extremely disappointed that Pope departed with the army away from operations conducted by Foote. However, Foote eventually relented and stated to Welles that he would cooperate with Fitch.63

The 46th Indiana’s first operation during the Fort Pillow expedition was to examine the flats and bayous in the area, with the objective to determine if the Union boats required additional passageways in the river.64 The other purpose for Fitch’s reconnaissance was to determine an area suitable for placing a battery, which could target Confederate vessels using the river below Fort Pillow while also supporting the Union assault of Fort Pillow. The reconnaissance operation was part of a shaping action by Foote in his preparation for an assault upon the fort. However, a few issues that frustrated Foote hampered the reconnaissance operation. First, Fitch was having difficulty finding a passageway for Foote’s boats, and was also having difficulty finding a place for the battery. The second item that irritated Foote was the lack of tools the regiment could use. In another letter to Welles, Foote blamed the lack of tools on the decision to pull the main portion of Pope’s army away from Fort Pillow. Lastly, a substantial Confederate force, which made Fitch’s reconnaissance a very slow operation, garrisoned Fort Pillow.65

Finally, on 1 June, reconnaissance scouts found an approach to Fort Pillow that offered good cover from the fort’s batteries. Foote now had the route he required to conduct the attack on Fort Pillow. The plan of attack called for an assault on the fort on 4

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63 U.S. War Department, OR-N, ser. 1, vol. 23, 8.

64 Ibid., 7.

65 Ibid., 10.
June, with the point of assault made at a “weak and accessible point.” The assault was a combined ground and naval attack on the fort. The 46th Indiana was to attack the rear of the Confederate positions, while the gunboats fired upon the fort from the front. In a letter to Welles, Foote stated that Fitch wanted additional men to carry out the attack against Fort Pillow. However, Fitch’s brigade of 1,500 men would have to carry the fort alone.

Before the attack could begin, the ground force required a road and a bridge in order to reach the point of attack. The task of constructing the road and bridge went to Major Thomas Bringhurst, who commanded three companies to carry out the road and bridge mission. On 3 June, Bringhurst began constructing the road and bridge near Cole Creek. However, Confederate rounds fired at a Union ramming boat compromised Bringhurst’s men, exploding near their location. Bringhurst called off the mission and the men returned the following day to complete the road and bridge under the command of Captain Bernard F. Schermerhorn. Also on 3 June, a detachment of 46th Indiana men commanded by Lieutenant Charles A. Brownlie examined a Confederate gunboat tied up near Fort Pillow. As Brownlie’s men approached, they came upon seven of the boat’s

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68 Ibid., 10.


crewmembers and captured them.\textsuperscript{71} This action negated the Confederate use of the gunboat against the Union’s attack.

The finalized plan of attack commenced on 4 June. The 46th Indiana was to conduct a mass attack from its transports, with the aim of achieving surprise as the regiment stormed Fort Pillow. The gunboats would support the attack by suppressing the Confederates while the ground force moved forward. However, as Fitch conducted his attack, a Confederate deserter notified him that Fort Pillow had been evacuated the day prior. Fitch, in a rowboat, landed with a few men from the brigade and examined the fort. Fitch found the fort evacuated and the attack against Fort Pillow never took place. There was a difference of opinion on whether the fort would have fallen quickly had the attack taken place. Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., commander of a Union ram, did not think the Fort’s defenses could have withstood the Union attack and predicted the fort “could not have lasted long.”\textsuperscript{72} However, a man with the 46th Indiana thought the fort would have been difficult to take.\textsuperscript{73}

It is unknown how the attack against Fort Pillow would have concluded. All indications point to a successful attack, had Foote and Fitch carried out their assault. Fitch’s reconnaissance identified a clear route for the ground force to attack. Additionally, the 46th Indiana’s efforts building the road and bridge ensured the terrain did not slow down the attack. Finally, the 46th Indiana’s capture of the gunboat crew

\textsuperscript{71}Bringhurst and Swigart, 28.

\textsuperscript{72}U.S. War Department, \textit{OR}, ser. 1, vol. 10, 900.

\textsuperscript{73}Jerry Voorhis, Sr., \textit{The Life and Times of Aurelius Lyman Voorhis} (New York: Vantage Press, 1976), 50.
limited the amount of resistance the Union force would have confronted during their attack. The plan was simple yet effective, as the ground force would have made an amphibious landing, and then attacked the fort with support from the Union gunboats suppressing the enemy’s defenses. This plan epitomized the concept of combined arms and amphibious operations.

Battle of Saint Charles

On 17 June, the 46th Indiana Regiment participated in its most significant battle of the war to date. Here, the regiment conducted a near picture-perfect assault against Confederate defenses, skillfully demonstrating combined arms warfare in coordination with the U.S. Navy. The Battle of Saint Charles, Arkansas occurred because of a Confederate attempt to block resupply efforts for Union General Samuel R. Curtis and the federal Army of the Southwest, who were conducting operations in North Central Arkansas. Confederate forces under the command of Major General Thomas C. Hindman controlled a bluff above the town of Saint Charles along the White River. Along the bluff was Confederate artillery that commanded the town and the river. A Union Flotilla, with the 46th Indiana embarked, was responsible for eliminating the Confederate position at Saint Charles, which would open the supply route to Curtis’ army. Unfortunately, two events overshadow the success of the 46th Indiana. A Confederate artillery round struck the Union ship *Mound City*, which pierced the ship’s boiler causing scalding steam to fill the ship, killing 105 sailors. Secondly, falling water levels prevented the Union Flotilla from reaching Curtis’ army, resulting in mission failure.74

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Tasked with resupplying Curtis’ army, Colonel Fitch and the 46th Indiana embarked aboard the *New National* and began the journey towards the White River on 14 June. The White River Expedition, as it was known, carried supplies and reinforcements for General Curtis. Along with three gunboats, the expedition entered the White River and traveled roughly fifteen miles until it encountered a concealed Confederate battery near Saint Charles. The Confederate battery posed a problem for ships traversing the river, and needed to be captured if the Union ships were to reach General Curtis.

With a force consisting of more than 1,000 men, Colonel Fitch directed a reconnaissance of the Confederate position on 16 June. A party led by Lieutenant Brownlie landed ashore and an embarked party led by Lieutenant Frank Swigart aboard a tugboat made its way up the river. The reconnaissance parties confirmed the location of Confederate troops and boats that awaited the expedition. The next day, 17 June, the 46th Indiana landed ashore about two-and-a-half miles below the Confederate battery position. A report by Colonel Fitch estimated the Confederates possessed two batteries with an unknown amount of infantry in support. There were two options for attacking the Confederate batteries. One option called for a ground attack by Colonel Fitch’s men, and the other option was for Captain Augustus H. Kilty’s Union gunboats to silence the.

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75 Bringhurst and Swigart, 34.


77 Bringhurst and Swigart, 34.

batteries using naval gunfire. Fitch yielded to Kilty’s decision to use his gunboats to destroy the Confederate batteries.\textsuperscript{79}

Regardless, Fitch deployed his skirmishers, consisting of Companies A, B, and G, with a portion of Company D in support of the three forward companies.\textsuperscript{80} The skirmishers experienced great success in forcing the Confederate pickets to retreat towards the bluff. As the 46th Indiana continued its assault against the Confederate pickets, Kilty’s boats continued to target Confederate positions. However, it was during Kilty’s assault when a Confederate shell hit the \textit{Mound City}, disabling the ship.\textsuperscript{81} With the Union gunboat assault stalled because of the damage to the \textit{Mound City}, Colonel Fitch decided to carry the confederate position with his ground forces. Fitch realized that a successful attack against the Confederate batteries required continued naval gunfire support. Immediately, Fitch called for a cease-fire from the Union gunboats. Fitch understood his cease-fire order would protect Union gunboats from another potentially crippling shot from the Confederate batteries, and allowed the gunboats to support his attack.\textsuperscript{82}

Facing an unknown number of Confederates with eight brass and iron cannons, and two 64-pound Parrots, the 46th Indiana began its assault on the bluff.\textsuperscript{83} The 46th


\textsuperscript{80}Voorhis, 54.

\textsuperscript{81}Abbott, 587.

\textsuperscript{82}Soley, 655-657.

\textsuperscript{83}U.S. War Department, \textit{OR}, ser. 1, vol. 13, 104.
Indiana conducted a simple but effective attack on the Confederate position, where one part of the regiment attacked from the front, while the other part of the regiment attacked from the flank. The left part of the line conducted the flank attack, while the right part of the line conducted the frontal attack. Company A, attacking from the river, secured the small Confederate guns, while Company B attacked from the woods and secured the 64-pounders. It was an aggressive attack conducted at the double quick through wooded and open terrain, to include wheat and corn fields. The regiment did not suffer any losses in the attack. The regiment successfully drove the Confederates from the batteries and captured the guns. Another notable event was the 46th Indiana’s capture of Captain Joseph Fry, a former Federal Navy officer, who commanded the position at Saint Charles.

The attack at Saint Charles was a brilliant display of combined arms, command and control, and joint amphibious operations. The union gunboats supported Fitch’s ground forces, enabling Fitch’s men to close on the Confederate batteries. Additionally, Fitch’s presence of mind to cease the Union gunboat’s naval fires after the crippling of the Mound City ensured Fitch still had gunboat support and spared the Union fleet of another possible disaster. Finally, the entire operation contained all of the elements of a

84 Soley, 656-657.
85 Bringhurst and Swigart, 35.
86 Voorhis, 56.
87 U.S. War Department, OR, ser. 1, vol. 13, 105.
successful attack: reconnaissance, advanced forces, and a main body attack supported by naval gunfire. It was all of these actions combined that ensured a successful attack by the 46th Indiana. While the Battle of Saint Charles was a victory for the Union, the overall objective of resupplying General Curtis’ army failed due to the falling water levels of the White River. However, the Union now had clear access up the river due to the 46th Indiana’s actions in eliminating the Confederate batteries near Saint Charles.

**Analysis**

The tactical actions of the 46th Indiana improved as the regiment gained more combat experience. The 46th Indiana’s attack during the Battle of New Madrid did not produce significant results for multiple reasons. The attack stalled because the 46th Indiana did not have a ground or naval force that prevented the Confederate gunboats from firing on the regiment. It is likely that the 46th Indiana’s attack would have been more successful if there were a cooperating force to deny the Confederate gunboats the ability to provide naval gunfire for the Confederate forces at New Madrid. Moreover, the 46th Indiana did not have supporting artillery to support its attack. Combined arms and maneuver would have suppressed the Confederate forces while the 46th Indiana maneuvered towards New Madrid. Using combined arms and maneuver would have provided the 46th Indiana with speed and momentum to maintain the initiative against the Confederate defenders. Additionally, the terrain did not provide the 46th Indiana with adequate cover from the Confederate gunboats. The 46th Indiana could have gained a significant advantage if it had used terrain effectively. Conversely, not all of the tactical errors are the fault of Colonel Fitch or Lieutenant Colonel Scott. Pope should have allocated artillery support for the 46th Indiana and assigned a force to suppress the
Confederate gunboats. The attack against New Madrid did not achieve a decision or gain an advantage for the Union, but critical lessons in speed, adapting, cooperating, and exploiting success were beginning to appear for the 46th Indiana’s leaders.

At the Battle of Island Number Ten, the 46th Indiana’s actions achieved a decision, which led to a result beyond itself. The capture of Island Number Ten allowed the Union to control a significant portion of the Mississippi River. The 46th Indiana used effective firepower to deny the Confederate gunboats from influencing its position at Riddle’s Point. Additionally, the maneuvering of the 46th Indiana to land at Tiptonville and deny a line of retreat for the Confederates exploited the success resulting from the attack on Island Number Ten. The 46th Indiana captured a significant number of Confederates, to include a Confederate General Officer.

At Fort Pillow, despite the absence of a battle, the 46th Indiana displayed sound tactical proficiency. Colonel Fitch’s request for additional forces indicates his understanding of the advantage of having more men and firepower. Additionally, the attack on Fort Pillow planned for a coordinated attack using ground and naval forces. Union ground and naval forces would have a significant advantage over the Confederate defenders in terms of combined arms. Moreover, the attack on Fort Pillow was to occur at a weak point, meant to achieve a decision. Union planners identified vulnerability in the Confederate defenses and subsequently began shaping operations to ensure their success. The 46th Indiana conducted reconnaissance, built bridges to enhance the speed of the attack, and captured crews of Confederate gunboats. Finally, the attack on Fort Pillow was to achieve surprise, which also would have benefitted the 46th Indiana. The planned
attack on Fort Pillow shows great improvement from the 46th Indiana’s previous operations.

Culminating in an attack on Saint Charles, the Battle of Saint Charles was the high point of combat operations for the 46th Indiana in 1862. The 46th Indiana achieved numerous tactical successes during the battle. Colonel Fitch used effective reconnaissance to determine Confederate defenses. Additionally, the attack against Saint Charles was a combined ground and naval attack. The 46th Indiana’s attack, conducted at the double-quick, employed great speed that pushed back the Confederate’s initial defense line of pickets. However, when a confederate shell disabled the *Mound City*, Colonel Fitch adapted his attack plans to the new situation. Colonel Fitch’s military judgment and decisive action enabled him to call for a cease-fire from the Union gunboats while he continued his speedy attack against Saint Charles. His ground attack was a simple fix and flank attack, which secured victory for the 46th Indiana. Fitch’s actions seem remarkable given his lack of military experience prior to the war. Fitch’s background in medicine and politics did not prohibit him from making sound, tactical decisions. His command and control of the attack at Saint Charles is consistent with a more experienced, professional soldier.

As the year progressed, the 46th Indiana experienced improved tactical success. The regiment was able to achieve a decision at Island Number Ten and Saint Charles. The 46th Indiana gained significant advantages at Island Number Ten, Fort Pillow, and Saint Charles. The planned attack against Fort Pillow and the assault against Saint Charles used speed to defeat the Confederate defenders. The Battle of Saint Charles, and the crippling of the *Mound City*, forced Colonel Fitch to adapt his plans yet still defeat
Confederate forces using a simple attack plan. Moreover, the planned attack against Fort Pillow and the attack against Saint Charles used ground and naval forces in cooperation with each other, ensuring maximum firepower against Confederate forces. Finally, the capture of Island Number Ten and the success of Union forces at Saint Charles opened critical waterways, which the Union could exploit for future success.
CHAPTER 3

1863

Battle of Port Gibson

On 1 May 1863, the 46th Indiana participated in the Battle of Port Gibson. The battle was the first engagement against the Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg, Mississippi. General Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the Army of Tennessee, and President Abraham Lincoln realized the significance of capturing Vicksburg. Vicksburg’s location on the Mississippi River was a vital logistics hub for the Confederate Army. The Red River flowing southeast through Louisiana, and the Arkansas and White Rivers, flowing southeast through Arkansas, emptied into the Mississippi River, forming critical Confederate supply routes. Once gathered at Vicksburg, the supplies were loaded on trains and shipped by rail to Confederate Army locations. Grant realized Vicksburg’s capture would cut the Confederate supply lines, restricting the flow of goods to the Confederate Army, and essentially starve the Confederates and splitting Arkansas, Texas, and western Louisiana from the rest of the Confederacy. Additionally, possessing Vicksburg would give the Federals greater access to the Confederacy through the Mississippi River’s tributaries.

For Grant to secure Vicksburg, he needed to fight a series of battles before reaching the city. A Union victory at Port Gibson was important because it would provide a secure bridgehead over the Mississippi River thirty miles south of Vicksburg for Grant to flow additional troops towards the latter. An initial victory also had intangible benefits

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for the Union army, specifically damaging Confederate morale after losing the first battle of the Vicksburg campaign. However, Grant realized the Confederates held the advantage by using the terrain to build strong defensive positions. Grant understood the terrain in and around Vicksburg made it easy for an inferior force, as the Confederates were to the Union, to delay if not defeat a force of superior numbers.

The town of Port Gibson, located a few miles inland from the Mississippi River, provided a good staging area for Grant to assemble his forces before moving north towards Vicksburg. Grant’s initial assault force against Port Gibson consisted of the XIII Corps under the command of Major General John A. McClernand. The 46th Indiana Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bringhurst, fell under the First Brigade commanded by Brigadier General George F. McGinnis. Major General Alvin P. Hovey commanded the Twelfth Division, containing McGinnis’s brigade.

On 30 April, Union boats of all types ferried 17,000 troops of McClernand’s Corps across the Mississippi River. At the time, the river crossing was the largest amphibious operation in American history. By early afternoon, most of McClernand’s

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Corps landed on the Mississippi River’s eastern shore.\textsuperscript{95} The landing occurred at Bruinsburg, Mississippi, providing the Union army an unopposed landing site.\textsuperscript{96} However, the Union army detained one man who might have alerted the Confederates of the Union invasion.\textsuperscript{97}

The Union army could advance along two main roads leading to Port Gibson, the Rodney Road and the Bruinsburg Road. Confederate General John S. Bowen was in charge of defending Port Gibson from the Union advance. As McClernand’s Corps moved east along the Rodney Road, Bowen received false information that McClernand’s Corps was travelling east on both the Rodney Road and Bruinsburg Road.\textsuperscript{98} Bowen deployed one brigade to form a blocking position along the Bruinsburg Road to meet the supposed Union advance, while leaving another brigade to block the Union advance along the Rodney Road. Bowen’s error provided the Union army with a considerable numerical advantage against the Confederate defenses. On the Union right, McClernand had roughly 13,000 men against a Confederate defense of only 1,000 men along the Rodney Road.\textsuperscript{99} Because of his numerical advantage, McClernand discarded any plans of maneuvering around the Confederates, and opted for a frontal assault.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{95}Ballard, \textit{The Campaign for Vicksburg}, 25.

\textsuperscript{96}Jones, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Civil War, Vol. 2, M-Z}, 1109-1110.

\textsuperscript{97}Arnold, 97.

\textsuperscript{98}Ballard, \textit{The Campaign for Vicksburg}, 26.


\textsuperscript{100}Ballard, \textit{Vicksburg, The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi}, 235.
Continuing with the eastward advance, Hovey’s division arrived near the Magnolia Church around 5:30 a.m. McClernand ordered Hovey to deploy his men along Magnolia Church Ridge. Hovey’s division occupied ridges south of Rodney Road. Although Hovey was eager to advance, McClernand ordered Hovey to halt his attack until Major General Andrew J. Smith’s division was in position. While waiting for Smith’s men to maneuver into position, Hovey sent his division to help reinforce the Union right. McGinnis deployed to Colonel William Benton’s left while Colonel James Slack’s brigade deployed on Colonel William Stone’s right. Hovey, now impatient with the lull in the Union army’s advance towards the Confederate blocking positions, sent two regiments to attack Confederate artillery positions. Badly outnumbered, the Confederates desperately fought against the Union advance consisting of Hovey’s division and Brigadier General Eugene A. Carr’s division. The Confederate crossfire, canister rounds from the artillery, and a rail fence all contributed to the Confederate repulse of Hovey’s attack. The Confederates managed to conduct a brief counterattack, but reinforcements from Major General John A. Logan’s division provided the Union army an opportunity to repel the Confederate counterattack. Hovey’s men captured the Confederate cannons, and a Union soldier had the presence of mind to turn the cannons around and fire on the retreating Confederates. Hovey’s attack resulted in the capture of

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101 Kiper, 222.
102 Ballard, *Vicksburg, The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi*, 235.
103 Ibid., 235.
three caissons with ammunition wagons and nearly 200 men taken captive.105 The Confederates fell back towards Port Gibson where they occupied positions behind newly arriving Confederate brigades.

The 46th Indiana Regiment, along with the 24th Indiana Regiment, embarked aboard the *USS Benton*.106 Cramped on the lower deck of the *Benton*, the 46th Indiana prepared itself for debarkation. With a force of 423 men,107 the regiment was the first to land on Mississippi soil. Lieutenant Thomas A. Howes and the infantrymen of Companies A, B, and C were the initial regimental assault elements to land at Bruinsburg.108 As the remainder of the Union army disembarked, the supply wagons and cavalry forces were not included. It was determined the horses should be left behind, and most officers were now moving on foot with their men.109 Additionally, the Union army’s supply system faltered and the men deployed for battle with only two days of rations, instead of the usual three. To make matters worse, the two days of rations would have to last the men for five days.110 Moreover, it was a hot summer day and the Union

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106 Voorhis, 117.


109 William L. Shea and Terrence J. Winschel, *Vicksburg is the Key; The Struggle for the Mississippi River* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 109.

110 Grant, 323.
army contended with the sun rising in the east, the direction of Grant’s attack.\footnote{Vicksburg National Military Park Commission, compiled by Henry C. Adams, Indiana at Vicksburg (Ann Arbor, MI: Library of the University of Michigan, 1910), 176.} Finally, Grant’s prediction about the terrain’s effect on an attacking force could prove correct, as the Union army traversed through ravines, over steep hills, and through heavily wooded areas.\footnote{Ballard, Vicksburg, The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi, 229.}

The 46th Indiana advanced along the Rodney Road, beginning a night march commencing around 9 p.m. on 30 April.\footnote{Voorhis, 118.} The regiment marched through the night without a stop until daylight. In the early morning hours of 1 May, the 46th Indiana arrived near the Magnolia Church, located near the Rodney Road. At approximately 7 a.m., Hovey ordered McGinnis to form his brigade in line of battle. McGinnis immediately established his first line with three regiments in front, and two regiments forming the second line in the rear. The 46th Indiana, along with the 34th Indiana and 24th Indiana comprised the first line, while the second line consisted of the 11th Indiana and 29th Wisconsin. One section of an Ohio battery supported the brigade. Confronting the Union soldiers were Confederate infantry and artillery. The 46th Indiana’s first action was to support the 18th Indiana, already heavily engaged by the Confederates. The unforgiving terrain made movement difficult. In order to reach their assigned positions, it was necessary to lift the men of Company B up a perpendicular wall of the hill.\footnote{Vicksburg National Military Park Commission, 281.}
As the attack continued against the Confederate position, McGinnis erred by sending only one regiment to assault the Confederate battery supported by a brigade of Confederate troops from the 15th Arkansas, 21st Arkansas, and 23rd Alabama.\footnote{Bringhurst and Swigart, 57.} McGinnis sent the 34th Indiana to attack, but the Confederate cannons repulsed the 34th Indiana. McGinnis corrected his mistake by reforming his battle line, now consisting of the 46th Indiana, 11th Indiana, and the remainder of the 34th Indiana. The three regiments made a daring charge on the Confederate guns, driving away the artillerymen and infantry. The 46th Indiana assaulted towards the Confederate positions, covering three quarters of a mile through the ravines, steep hills, and wooded areas. The terrain provided the Confederates a considerable defensive advantage, which Grant identified at the start of the battle. The 46th Indiana’s attack penetrated the Confederate lines, resulting in the men from Company E capturing the colors of the 15th Arkansas after shooting and wounding the 15th Arkansas’s color bearer, while men of Company H ran over the colors of the 23rd Alabama.\footnote{Ibid.} Additionally, the Union troops shot and killed the Confederate artillery’s horses, preventing the Confederates from retreating with their cannons. The Union’s fire eliminated the Confederate artillerymen’s ability to rake the Union lines with double canister shot, which the Confederates were using with great effectiveness against the Union troops.\footnote{Arnold, 108.} The Union attack resulted in the capture of two...
12-pounder howitzers, three caissons and ammunition wagons, and approximately 200
Confederate prisoners.\textsuperscript{118} Despite the successful assault by the 46th Indiana, the Confederates were
reinforced, reformed and conducted a fierce counterattack against the Union right.
Colonel Francis M. Cockrell, commanding a brigade of Confederate Missourians,
delivered a crushing blow to Colonel Slack’s brigade.\textsuperscript{119} McGinnis supported Slack’s
men, sending his brigade through more rough terrain to meet Cockrell’s counterattack.
However, McGinnis designated the 46th Indiana and 34th Indiana as his reserve force,
and did not have a significant role in the repulse of Cockrell’s counterattack.\textsuperscript{120} At 5:30
p.m., the 46th Indiana’s line withdrew and the exhausted men slept in the open fields.\textsuperscript{121}

On 1 May, 23,000 Union troops easily overwhelmed 6,000 Confederate troops at
Port Gibson. After nearly a daylong battle, McClernand’s troops pushed the Confederates
aside in sharp fighting over rough terrain.\textsuperscript{122} McClernand ordered twenty-one regiments
to attack across a frontage of 800 yards, resulting in roughly thirty-eight yards allotted to
each regiment.\textsuperscript{123} Yet, the Battle of Port Gibson demonstrated the 46th Indiana’s courage
under fire against heavy Confederate infantry and artillery fire through extremely

\textsuperscript{118}U.S. War Department, \textit{OR}, ser. 1, vol. 24, 606-609.
\textsuperscript{119}Ballard, \textit{The Campaign for Vicksburg}, 30.
\textsuperscript{120}U.S. War Department, \textit{OR}, ser. 1, vol. 24, 607.
\textsuperscript{121}Bringhurst and Swigart, 58.
\textsuperscript{123}Grabau, 158.
undesirable terrain. The regiment performed well, noting in its regimental history “In the
movement from the river, the regiment’s behavior pleased its friends and satisfied its
general officers.” The regiment took 400 men into action, with a loss of 10 men killed and
35 wounded. The regimental colors received three shots. The regiment’s capture of
the Confederate artillery and 200 prisoners reduced the Confederate threat surrounding
Vicksburg. In his official report, McGinnis stated, “I am much indebted for valuable
assistance, and the prompt and energetic manner in which they executed all orders.”
The regiment gained more confidence as it headed into its next major battle at Champion
Hill.

Battle of Champion Hill

The Battle of Champion Hill occurred on 16 May 1863. Sitting 18 miles east of
Vicksburg, the largest battle fought outside of Vicksburg was Champion Hill. Grant’s
Army of the Tennessee fought against Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton’s
Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana forces in a highly contested battle for
control of the hill. Partially wooded, Champion Hill provided the Confederates excellent
cover from Union fire. Moreover, Champion Hill’s elevation was approximately 140 feet,
making a Union charge difficult up the terrain and through the Confederate cannon
fire. On the ridge of Champion Hill, the Confederates held a defensive line roughly

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124 Bringhurst and Swigart, 58.
125 U.S. War Department, OR, ser. 1, vol. 24, 608.
126 Shea and Winschel, 133.
four miles long. Grant would appoint Generals McClernand and McPherson to attack the Confederate forces. General Hovey’s division and General Logan’s divisions would provide the main attack against the Confederates on Champion Hill. McClernand’s inactivity during the initial stages of the battle allowed the Confederates to regain the initiative several times during the day. The hill changed hands three times during the course of the battle, each side repulsing the other’s attack. The day ended with the Confederates driven off the hill and in retreat towards the Big Black River.

The 46th Indiana, along with Hovey’s division, departed Bolton, Mississippi on the morning of 16 May. Its destination was Vicksburg. Along the march towards Vicksburg, Confederate forces under Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton established a defensive line between the westward-bound Union forces and Vicksburg. General Grant was present with the Union Army of the Tennessee and personally directed Union troop movements. Although the Confederates were in the defense, General Grant was elated that he had Pemberton’s troops “in the open.” As Union troops neared the Confederates, Grant ordered gave Hovey’s division the order to advance.

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127 McPherson, 630.
129 Shea and Winschel, 133.
132 Shea and Winschel, 131.
133 Vicksburg National Military Park Commission, 282.
As Hovey’s men reached their position near the Champion House, Hovey observed the “enemy posted on the crest of the hill, with a battery of four guns in the woods near the road, and on the highest point for many miles around.” Hovey then ordered McGinnis to form his brigade in two lines, with three regiments being in front and two regiments in reserve. McGinnis obeyed Hovey’s order and deployed his brigade in two lines, with the 11th Indiana on the left flank of the first line, 29th Wisconsin in the center, and 24th Indiana on the right, while the 46th Indiana formed the left flank and 34th Indiana formed the right flank of the brigade’s second line in the reserve. McGinnis originally sent two companies of the 46th Indiana out as skirmishers, which forced a retreat of a nearby Confederate patrol, however the terrain had crowded the 46th Indiana out of position and subsequently formed in the rear of McGinnis’s brigade.

As McGinnis neared the bottom of Champion Hill along the Jackson Road, the Confederate battery appeared 800 yards to his front. Hovey ordered McGinnis to advance with the intent to “feel the enemy”. McGinnis’s brigade approached the Confederate

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134 Gabel and the Staff Ride Team, 145.


137 Ballard, Vicksburg, The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi, 296.

138 Smith, 194.

139 Ballard, Vicksburg, The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi, 298.
position and came under grape and canister shot from the Confederate cannons.\textsuperscript{140} Due to the Confederates’ deadly cannon fire, McGinnis ordered his brigade to lie down on the ground, avoiding the grape and canister shot. After the Confederate artillerymen fired their cannon shots, the Union troops stood up and charged up Champion Hill. The Federals repeated this tactic each time the Confederates fired towards the advancing Union troops.\textsuperscript{141}

During the battle, Confederate troops heavily engaged the 11th Indiana Regiment. McGinnis ordered the 46th Indiana to support the 11th Indiana, which Bringhurst did immediately. The 46th Indiana moved into position along the 11th Indiana’s left flank, occupying a hollow to the right of the road.\textsuperscript{142} Confederates nearly flanked the 11th Indiana on both sides when the 46th Indiana arrived and joined the 11th Indiana in repulsing the Confederate attack.\textsuperscript{143} The 46th Indiana charged out of the woods towards a section of an Alabama battery. The 46th Indiana’s attack against the battery resulted in the capture of two 12-pounder Napoleon cannons.\textsuperscript{144} The 46th Indiana’s capture of the Confederate cannons relieved the pressure asserted on the 11th Indiana. McGinnis noted in his official report that the 46th Indiana moved in “gallant style” to the support of the 11th Indiana, at the double-quick, and drove the rebels from a three-gun battery located

\textsuperscript{140}Fullenkamp, Bowman, and Luvaas, 239-241.

\textsuperscript{141}Ballard, \textit{Vicksburg, The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi}, 298.

\textsuperscript{142}Voorhis, 125.

\textsuperscript{143}Bringhurst and Swigart, 61.

\textsuperscript{144}Williamson, 133.
directly in front of the attacking 46th Indiana.\textsuperscript{145} Although the official report from
General Alvin P. Hovey noted the capture of two Confederate cannon, Hovey’s report
echoes McGinnis’s observations of the 46th Indiana. Hovey stated the 46th Indiana
“gallantly” drove the enemy from their guns on the right of the road leading up
Champion Hill.\textsuperscript{146} The 46th Indiana’s capture of the Confederate cannon was a shared
effort between 11th Indiana and 29th Wisconsin. However, the 46th Indiana’s
reinforcement of the 11th Indiana undoubtedly helped the Union to silence the
Confederate cannons that slowed the Federal advance up Champion Hill.\textsuperscript{147}

The Union and Confederates made repeated charge and countercharge throughout
the battle. In three hours of hard fighting on Champion Hill, the hill changed hands three
times. Finally, during the afternoon McGinnis’s brigade began an orderly withdraw,
contesting every inch of ground. Reinforcements under Colonel George B. Boomer
arrived just as McGinnis’s men fell back towards their starting attack point.\textsuperscript{148} Although
the 46th Regiment fell back towards the bottom of Champion Hill, their successful attack
against the Confederates was remarkable considering the advantage the Confederates
held with regard to terrain and defensive works. General Grant noted, “Champion’s Hill,
where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or
design, was well selected.” Champion Hill was one of the highest points in the area, with
a commanding view of the surrounding ground. Ravines, thickly wooded areas, and

\textsuperscript{145}Fullenkamp, Bowman, and Luvaas, 240.

\textsuperscript{146}Ibid., 237.

\textsuperscript{147}Smith, 204.

\textsuperscript{148}Fullenkamp, Bowman, and Luvaas, 240.
undergrowth aided in the strong defense of Champion Hill. Grant also noted the hill would be “difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended.”

The Battle of Champion Hill pushed the Union troops to their limits. In addition to facing deadly grape and canister shot from the Confederate cannons, the Union troops contended with difficult terrain. The fighting was fierce, with men relying on their bayonets and rifle butts to subdue the enemy. Despite the difficult circumstances, the 46th Indiana moved as “one man” and made the deadly, but necessary charge on the Confederate battery. Notwithstanding, the day after the battle six companies of the 46th Indiana took the opportunity to trade in their hated Austrian rifles for Springfield rifles left on the battlefield. General Grant said of the battle, “The Battle of Champion’s Hill lasted about four hours’ hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to the dignity of battle.”

The attack left the 46th Indiana exhausted and bloody and with a casualty rate of 24 percent. The 46th Indiana took 350 men into action on Champion Hill, and lost twenty killed, sixty-one wounded, and three missing in action. Casualty statistics from


150 Fullenkamp, Bowman, and Luvaas, 241.


152 Vicksburg National Military Park Commission, 282.

153 Smith, 250.

154 Arnold, 196.

155 Bringhurst and Swigart, 63.
McGinnis’s brigade show the Confederates made a strong stand on Champion Hill. The 11th Indiana suffered 36 percent casualties; the 24th Indiana suffered 40 percent casualties; the 34th Indiana suffered 11 percent casualties; and the 29th Wisconsin suffered 23 percent casualties.\textsuperscript{156} Hovey’s entire division suffered a casualty rate of nearly 29 percent.\textsuperscript{157}

The Battle of Champion Hill resulted in a Union victory, and provided General Grant a clear route towards Vicksburg. If the Union had been defeated at Champion Hill, the Confederates could threaten Grant’s supply lines and might have led Grant to abandon his plan to capture Vicksburg.\textsuperscript{158} The 46th Indiana’s actions during the battle relieved a nearly surrounded regiment, and resulted in the capture of a section of Confederate battery. Although the regiment was not part of the final assault that ultimately took the hill, the regiment fought hard and paid a heavy price in casualties. The regiment earned praise from McGinnis and Hovey, and could stake a claim to the Union victory as part of the advance brigade making the assault on Champion Hill.\textsuperscript{159}

\textbf{Battle of Bayou Bourbeau}

On 3 November 1863, Confederate forces commanded by Major General Richard Taylor nearly routed Union forces under the command of Major General William

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\textsuperscript{156}Arnold, 196.  
\textsuperscript{157}Vicksburg National Military Park Commission, 282.  
\textsuperscript{159}Gowland.}

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Franklin at the Battle of Bayou Bourbeau, near modern-day Grand Coteau, Louisiana.\textsuperscript{160} However, the battle was the culmination of poor Union generalship and a rare numerical advantage gained by the Confederates. In October 1863, after Major General Nathanial P. Banks’ repulse at Sabine Pass, Texas, Banks sent Franklin with two Corps up Bayou Teche to Opelousas, Louisiana on the Texas Overland Expedition. Bernard Schermerhorn, an officer with the 46th Indiana claimed, “This expedition like that of General Franklin’s against Sabine City in August 1863 has culminated into a most magnificent failure and every day shows more clearly the inefficiency of our Commanding Generals.”\textsuperscript{161} Additionally, Union morale must have been low. In a letter to his wife, Schermerhorn stated, “I now regret very much that the XIII Army Corps has transferred to this Department.”\textsuperscript{162}

Opposing Franklin’s movement was Taylor’s small Confederate army. Franklin reached Opelousas without difficulty; however, poor roads, difficult terrain, and supply shortages prohibited Franklin from moving further. In late October, Franklin returned to the Teche with Taylor in close pursuit. On 3 November, Taylor commenced a surprise attack against Union Brigadier General Stephen G. Burbridge’s division near Grand Coteau along Bayou Bourbeau. Confederate forces led by Brigadier General Thomas Green clashed with Union forces on Burbridge’s front and flanks.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{160}This battle is also known as the Battle of Grand Coteau or the Battle of Carrion Crow Bayou.

\textsuperscript{161}Bernard F. Schermerhorn, letter to wife, 9 November 1863, \textit{Bernard Schermerhorn Papers, 1862-1864}, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, IN.

\textsuperscript{162}Ibid.

During the early morning hours, Green attacked Burbridge’s isolated position with Confederate cavalry, which drove in Burbridge’s outposts on the Bellevue Road.\textsuperscript{164} Burbridge had received a report earlier that morning that a heavy column of Confederate cavalry was forming in line of battle to his left\textsuperscript{165} however; he dismissed the report because he did not believe there could be substantial Confederate forces in the area.\textsuperscript{166} Due to Burbridge’s erroneous estimate of the enemy situation, he had little time to prepare to receive the Confederate assault and was under attack before he could react.\textsuperscript{167} Burbridge repulsed the early morning Confederate attack after he formed his men in line of battle, pushing the Confederates back with his own cavalry. The Confederates made another attack on Burbridge’s lines just after daybreak, which Burbridge again repulsed.\textsuperscript{168} A few hours later between 11 a.m. and noon, Green returned with increased cavalry and three regiments of infantry consisting of the 11th Texas, 15th Texas, and 18th Texas regiments commanded by Colonel Oran M. Roberts.\textsuperscript{169} The Confederates reinforced the night before and now numbered approximately 10,000 men against Burbridge’s force of approximately 1,050 men. The Union men contested the Confederate attack for a brief moment however; Burbridge’s lines began to break under

\textsuperscript{164}Williamson, 201.

\textsuperscript{165}Stephen A. Dupree, \textit{Planting the Union Flag in Texas: The Campaigns of Major General Nathaniel P. Banks in the West} (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 67.

\textsuperscript{166}Williamson, 201.

\textsuperscript{167}Dupree, 67.

\textsuperscript{168}Schermerhorn.

\textsuperscript{169}Williamson, 201.
the pressing Confederate attack. \textsuperscript{170} Burbridge, completely overwhelmed by the
Confederates, witnessed regiment after regiment break lines and disperse. \textsuperscript{171} Burbridge’s
men fell back in great confusion. Confederate forces surrounded and captured the 67th
Indiana Regiment located on Burbridge’s left flank. Burbridge ordered a retreat, just as
reinforcements were coming to support the Union rout. After a defensive stand by the
46th Indiana, the lone supporting regiment on the field, the Confederates withdrew. The
Union lost 716 men, mostly prisoners captured by the Confederates. \textsuperscript{172}

During the initial stages of the Battle of Bayou Bourbeau, the 46th Indiana was
encamped in line of battle with the 24th Indiana. The 24th Indiana was on the right and
the 46th Indiana on the left. Also encamped with the 46th Regiment was the remainder of
Burbridge’s Division and a portion of the XIX Army Corps. The camp was located at
Carrion Crow Bayou, three miles to the rear of Burbridge’s headquarters. On 2
November, the day prior to the battle, the 46th Indiana heard heavy skirmishing between
Burbridge’s troops and Confederates, but Burbridge ably repulsed the Confederates on 2
November and during the morning hours of 3 November. However, Colonel Bringhurst
could hear the battle increasing in scale and ordered his men to stack arms, finish their
morning meals, and stay close to their weapons in preparation for a possible fight with
the Confederates. Around 9 a.m. and 10 a.m., orders were issued to the regiment to

\textsuperscript{170}Dupree, 67.

\textsuperscript{171}Schermerhorn.

prepare for a fight as word had filtered into the camp that Burbridge had been attacked and would require assistance.¹⁷³

By noon, the firing was now constant and heavy. Without prompting, Bringhurst formed his regiment and began moving forward towards the sound of battle.¹⁷⁴ Bringhurst quickly had his regiment in line, and started the move without waiting for the remainder of the brigade.¹⁷⁵ Within a few minutes, the regiment was marching in column up the road with an approximately 15 minute head start from the remainder of the brigade.¹⁷⁶ According to Bringhurst, the regiment “marched on rapidly for two miles, when men, wagon trains, and artillery were seen dashing out of the woods. Rebel cavalry were seen striking the teamsters and artillerymen with their sabers.”¹⁷⁷ The Confederates killed many of the men they pursued.¹⁷₈

As retreating Union troops poured out of the woods, the scene was chaotic. Schermerhorn, in a letter to his wife, noted he had never seen such confusion in his life. The 46th Indiana was now about a mile from the woods, and could see the Confederate cavalry and infantry to their front and right flank. The terrain was an open prairie and the 46th Indiana men could see with great clarity the Union rout in front of them. Yet, the 46th Indiana never faltered and pressed forward at a fast pace. Additionally, the

¹⁷³Voorhis, 166.
¹⁷⁴Dupree, 67.
¹⁷⁵Voorhis, 166.
¹⁷⁶Schermerhorn.
¹⁷⁷Dupree, 67.
¹⁷⁸Bringhurst and Swigart, 78.
regiment’s men could see three pieces of artillery coming out of the woods, pursued by Confederate cavalry.\textsuperscript{179}

Bringhurst now had an accurate picture of the Confederate attack advancing towards his position at Buzzard Prairie. Undeterred from the massive Confederate force pursuing the frantic Union troops, Bringhurst continued to march his column at a near double-quick in order to get in firing position.\textsuperscript{180} From a column, Bringhurst formed his men in line of battle, ordered his men to lie down, and load their weapons. He also ordered his men to hold their fire until ordered to fire.\textsuperscript{181} Bringhurst realized firing too soon would put the retreating Union troops in jeopardy from their own men shooting them. Bringhurst signaled to the Union troops running towards his line to move off the left, which the men complied. Despite the heavy Confederate fire directed towards the 46th Indiana, the men displayed great fire discipline by not returning fire until ordered. As soon as the front was clear, Bringhurst ordered his men to fire and the 46th Indiana fired a lethal volley which hit at least three Confederate cavalrymen.\textsuperscript{182} As the Confederates continued their approach towards the 46th Indiana, the regiment’s fire had good effect causing the Confederate cavalrymen to withdraw to the woods from which they came.\textsuperscript{183}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{179}Schermerhorn.
  \item \textsuperscript{180}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{181}Voorhis, 166.
  \item \textsuperscript{182}Schermerhorn.
  \item \textsuperscript{183}Voorhis, 166.
\end{itemize}
The regiment’s fire checked Green’s troops as the Confederate men charged into Buzzard Prairie in close pursuit of the Federals. The regiment’s fire also allowed a section of the 2nd Massachusetts Battery, led by Lieutenant William Marland, to unlimber on the right of the 46th Indiana’s line. Marland turned his 6-pounder rifles on the charging cavalry and poured a massive fire at the Confederates.\textsuperscript{184} Bringhurst told Marland that the 46th Indiana would support the battery, which allowed Marland to take his battery back through the woods in pursuit of the retreating Confederates, driving them back in disorder.\textsuperscript{185} The 46th Indiana and Marland’s battery combined to form a deadly fire that repulsed the Confederate attack. Further Union pursuit of the Confederates was halted because of an order to wait for Colonel Slack’s brigade to arrive on the field for reinforcement.\textsuperscript{186}

The Confederates withstood the fire from the 46th Indiana and 2nd Massachusetts for a short time, but could not hold the field. The Confederates captured one cannon from the 17th Ohio Battery but the 46th Indiana upon the Confederate exit from the field regained it. Companies A and B of the regiment were sent forwards as skirmishers towards the woods, however the skirmishers did not experience any Confederate opposition. The 46th Indiana’s actions stopped the Union rout, saving a Union battery and wagon trains.\textsuperscript{187} The 46th Indiana was the only regiment of the brigade on the field

\textsuperscript{184}Williamson, 202.

\textsuperscript{185}U.S. War Department, \textit{OR}, ser. 1, vol. 26, 371.

\textsuperscript{186}Williamson, 202.

\textsuperscript{187}Voorhis, 166.
who fired a shot, repulsing the Confederates by themselves with support from a few cannons.

The Confederates executed a well-planned attack, and thought they could “gobble” up the Burbridge’s forces before reinforcements came.\textsuperscript{188} Yet, the Confederates met a devastating defensive stand by 46th Indiana. The regiment did not have a man killed during the battle, and suffered only had three men wounded.\textsuperscript{189} Conversely, the regiment inflicted heavy casualties against the Confederates. In the woods directly in front of the 46th Indiana’s position, lay twenty Confederate dead and twelve wounded. The regiment saved the destruction of many Union troops, and lauded by many of its commanders. Major General Cadwallader C. Washburn, Commanding General of the 1st Division of the XIII Army Corps, and Brigadier General Robert A. Cameron rode up to the regiment thanking the men for their prompt and timely service, and complimenting them on their general efficiency. Burbridge also personally thanked the regiment the day after the battle. A statement from Doctor T. J. Wouds of the 96th Ohio summarized the effects the regiment had on the battle:

\begin{quote}
To our delight and surprise it is the Forty-Sixth Indiana, whose colonel [Bringhurst], hearing the roar of battle, instantly formed his command, and waiting for no orders, with the instincts of a true soldier, had marched at the double-quick, and halting for a moment to take a breath, found the opportunity to save us from utter annihilation. We join these brave comrades and charge upon them the line of gray and steel, with a cheer. A short, sharp struggle with the bayonet, they flee through our camp so swiftly that they find no time to disturb anything.\textsuperscript{190}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{188}Schmerhorn.

\textsuperscript{189}Bringhurst and Swigart, 78.

\textsuperscript{190}Williamson, 203.
The 46th Indiana’s defensive stand at Bayou Bourbeau prevented the Confederates from penetrating towards the Union reinforcements coming to support the retreating Union forces. If the Confederates pursued past the 46th Indiana’s defensive position, the rebels could have inflicted greater Union casualties. Bringhurst’s initiative proved to be a major factor in the success of the 46th Indiana at the Battle of Bayou Bourbeau. Additionally, Bringhurst’s massing of his regiment’s firepower caused substantial Confederate casualties, which stopped the Confederate attack.

Analysis

In 1863, the 46th Indiana participated in two major engagements that required the regiment to charge directly into Confederate cannon fire while Confederate infantry held the advantage by holding the high ground. In the third major engagement, the 46th Indiana, with support from a section of artillery, repulsed a major Confederate attack without the support from other Union forces. However, by 1863, the 46th Indiana possessed enough skill, courage, and leadership to experience tactical success at every engagement. Moreover, Colonel Bringhurst’s tactical command and control of the 46th Indiana, combined with his bold initiative to use speed at every opportunity, placed the 46th Indiana in positions where the regiment could achieve a decision, gain an advantage, and exploit success.

At Bruinsburg, the 46th Indiana’s unopposed amphibious landing did not influence any future outcomes of the battles fought at Port Gibson and Champion Hill. The landing at Bruinsburg was merely a position to inject more troops and supplies for the assault on Vicksburg. However, once ashore, the 46th Indiana overcame significant disadvantages during its attacks at Port Gibson. The first disadvantage at Port Gibson was
the weather and sun. The weather was hot and the 46th Indiana attacked towards the east, in the direction of the rising sun. This prohibited good visibility for the Union men. The second disadvantage at Port Gibson was the terrain, which favored the Confederates. Steep hills, deep ravines, and heavily wooded areas provided protection to Confederates occupying defensive positions. The third disadvantage was the Confederate cannons that the 46th Indiana frontally assaulted. Finally, the fourth disadvantage was the fatigue experienced by the 46th Indiana’s men after marching through the night. The 46th Indiana did not start with an advantage at Port Gibson. This placed a heavy burden on Colonel Bringhurst to put the regiment in an advantageous position.

As the attack against Port Gibson commenced, the 46th Indiana occupied a position in the front line of McGinnis’s brigade. The 46th Indiana made two major maneuvers during the battle. The first maneuver supported the 18th Indiana, which Confederate forces heavily engaged. The 46th Indiana and the 18th Indiana, using the tactical principle of cooperation, succeeded in relieving the Confederate pressure against the 18th Indiana. The second maneuver required the 46th Indiana to join the 11th Indiana and 34th Indiana in an attack against Confederate artillery. Once in position, the 46th Indiana conducted a bold assault against the Confederate cannons. This assault resulted in the capture of artillery pieces, ammunition, and 200 Confederate prisoners. The assault also relieved pressure on other Union forces by eliminating the fire from the Confederate artillery. Moreover, the targeting of the Confederate horses eliminated the Confederates’ ability to retreat with their artillery pieces. The Confederates regrouped and counterattacked, however the 46th Indiana’s participation in the counterattack’s repulse was not significant because of McGinnis’s designation of the 46th Indiana as a reserve
McGinnis does not mention why he held the 46th Indiana in reserve during the Confederate counterattack, but it can be assumed the 46th Indiana was held in reserve because it had the least amount of men available.  

The 46th Indiana’s actions at the Battle of Port Gibson were decisive because its actions led to a Union victory. The victory attained at Port Gibson led directly to a larger success in the war as a whole. Moreover, Union control of Port Gibson provided the secure bridgehead for Grant to flow additional troops. Additionally, a case can be made that the Union victory damaged Confederate morale as designed by Grant.

While the 46th Indiana did not possess an advantage during the battle, its actions aided McGinnis’s brigade, and Hovey’s division, to gain the advantage over the Confederates. By eliminating the Confederate artillery, the artillery fire could not influence the movement of Union forces. Additionally, McGinnis’s maneuvering of the 46th Indiana, first to aid the 18th Indiana and then to attack the Confederate artillery with the 11th Indiana and 34th Indiana, gained the advantage for the Union. Using complementary forces, McGinnis defeated the Confederates to his front.

The 46th Indiana exploited success by capturing the Confederate artillery, ammunition, and prisoners, but also by targeting the Confederate horses. This prevented the Confederates from using the horses to move the ammunition caissons and deprived the Confederates the future use of the horses. At the brigade level, McGinnis exploited his success by consolidating his forces to meet the Confederate counterattack, while also

191 According to McGinnis’s official report, his brigade consisted of the following regiments and number of men at the Battle of Port Gibson: the 11th Indiana Regiment - 519 men; the 24th Indiana–546 men; 34th Indiana–607 men; 46th Indiana–423 men; 29th Wisconsin 533 men.
designating a reserve force to follow-up the success his brigade experienced against the Confederates. The 46th Indiana performed well at the Battle of Port Gibson, and its actions helped obtain the objectives Grant set out to accomplish during the opening stages of the assault towards Vicksburg.

The Battle of Champion Hill had similar characteristics as the Battle of Port Gibson. The 46th Indiana made another charge against Confederate artillery, but at Champion Hill, the 46th Indiana made better use of the terrain to gain an advantage. Additionally, the 46th Indiana’s ability to move with speed and in mass facilitated much of the regiment’s success. Despite leaving the Champion Hill in a contested withdraw, the 46th Indiana caused significant damage to the Confederate forces that Grant was able to take Champion Hill and defeat Pemberton’s army.

The 46th Indiana began the attack on Champion Hill in the reserve of McGinnis’s brigade. McGinnis sent two companies of the 46th Indiana forwards as skirmishers, which made contact with a Confederate patrol and forced the patrol’s retreat. Once consolidated, McGinnis tasked the 46th Indiana to support the 11th Indiana. The 46th Indiana and 11th Indiana cooperated in attacking a Confederate position. The 46th Indiana made good use of the terrain to its advantage, using hollows to conceal its maneuver against the Confederate infantry and artillery. The 46th Indiana charged from the woods, using mass to its advantage, and captured the Alabama battery’s cannons. Capturing the Confederate cannons relieved pressure on the 11th Indiana, allowing the 11th Indiana to continue its attack.

Colonel Bringhurst moved the regiment with speed and cohesiveness. This allowed the 46th Indiana to gain advantage over the Confederates, moving faster than the
Confederate artillerymen could react. Additionally, the 46th Indiana’s cooperation with the 11th Indiana and 29th Wisconsin allowed the three units to make a successful attack against the Confederate artillery. However, the momentum of the Battle of Champion Hill would change three times throughout the day. Despite the 46th Indiana’s initial success, the regiment would withdraw from the field after two Confederate counterattacks. The 46th Indiana could not exploit its success; however, the larger Union army would eventually take the hill. The 46th Indiana achieved a decision within the context of its own attack against the Confederate artillery; however, the regiment did not participate in the final attack to secure Champion Hill. Despite having to leave the field in withdraw, the 46th Indiana did achieve initial tactical success by using speed, cooperating with adjacent units, and gained an advantage by using the terrain to conceal its movements.

The Battle of Bayou Bourbeau, the location of the 46th Indiana’s successful defensive stand against Major General Taylor’s Confederate forces, was more of a result of actions taken prior to the battle. Colonel Bringhurst’s initiative and military judgment allowed the 46th Indiana to arrive quickly to the battlefield before the Confederates completed the Union rout. Bringhurst, absent of orders to move to the front, put the 46th Indiana on the road to Bayou Bourbeau on his own accord. Moreover, Bringhurst used speed to gain as much advantage as possible, moving the regiment at near double-quick into their firing positions. Once on the field, Bringhurst displayed excellent command and control of his forces. Bringhurst controlled his men’s fire, realizing that premature fires would hit the retreating Union men. Additionally, Bringhurst gained significant control of
the retreating Union men, signaling the men to move out of the way of the 46th Indiana’s field of fire.

Once Bringhurst had clear fields of fire, he massed the 46th Indiana’s fires to repulse the pursuing Confederate cavalry. Additionally, he gained control of a section of Lieutenant Marland’s 2nd Massachusetts Battery. Cooperating with Marland’s artillerymen, Bringhurst brought more fire to bear on the Confederates. Once the field was cleared of Confederate opposition, Bringhurst sent Companies A and B forward to clear the fields to the front. The Confederates broke off the pursuit, leaving Bringhurst in control of the field.

From a tactical perspective, Bringhurst achieved a victory. However, since the 46th Indiana moved towards the field by itself, the regiment did not have the capability to exploit success. An argument can be made that if the Confederates counterattacked after the initial repulse, the unsupported 46th Indiana would be at a significant disadvantage. However, the 46th Indiana’s defensive stand achieved its goal by stopping the Confederate pursuit and relieving the pressure on the retreating Union men.

The 46th Indiana’s actions at the Battle of Bayou Bourbeau did not lead to a larger Union success, but did stop a significant Confederate pursuit. Bringhurst gained an advantage over the Confederates by using speed to establish his defensive position, which also provided a clear field of fire. Bringhurst also cooperated with a small artillery section, which brought more fire to bear on the Confederates. Unfortunately, the 46th Indiana was not in a position to exploit success after the battle; however, the regiment’s defensive stand was an aggressive maneuver that helped repulse further Confederate aggression.
The Battle of Sabine Cross Roads, also known as the Battle of Mansfield in Louisiana, on 8 April 1864, resulted in a devastating Union defeat during the Red River Campaign. The Red River Campaign, conducted from 12 March 1864 to 20 May 1864, was a failed Union attempt to capture Shreveport, Louisiana and occupy parts of northeastern Texas. At the time, President Lincoln wanted to establish a Union presence in Texas to counter the French-supported regime of Mexican Emperor Maximilian I.  

The Red River Campaign drew 45,000 Union men to participate in the expedition, combining General Grant’s forces with dozens of gunboats, a fleet of transports, and supply vessels under the command of Admiral David Porter. The campaign failed to appeal to Grant, who wished to use his forces for an assault against Mobile, Alabama. Due to Lincoln’s desire to establish control over Texas, Grant dutifully ordered 20,000 men commanded by Major General Nathaniel P. Banks; 10,000 men commanded by Brigadier General A.J. Smith of General William T. Sherman’s army; and 15,000 men commanded by Major General Frederick Steele operating in Arkansas to participate in the expedition. Banks commanded the Union ground forces, supported by Porter’s gunboats. Lincoln’s insistence that Banks move toward Texas by way of the Red River meant Banks received

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194 Ibid.
The Red River Campaign forced Grant to cancel his assault on Mobile.\textsuperscript{195} Grant voiced his concerns about diverting valuable assets from other, more critical operations; however, General Henry Halleck, Union General-in-Chief, notified Grant that the expedition was more about state policy than military policy.\textsuperscript{196} Grant had no choice but to accept the President’s decision to invade Texas. The intent of Banks’ expedition was to move up the Red River and capture Shreveport, Louisiana. Shreveport was the site of Confederate General Edmund Kirby Smith’s Trans-Mississippi Department and Louisiana’s state capital. After capturing Shreveport, the Union could then invade Texas.\textsuperscript{197} Despite pressure from Lincoln to conduct the campaign, Grant imposed restrictions on Banks that still allowed Grant to conduct his attack against Mobile in the future. Grant ordered Banks to return Smith’s men to Sherman in time for Sherman’s campaign against Atlanta.\textsuperscript{198} The return of Smith’s men was to occur even if Banks had not yet captured Shreveport. Moreover, Grant directed Banks to return to New Orleans by April for operations against Mobile.\textsuperscript{199} Banks was on a strict timeline, and needed to conduct his operations quickly and efficiently.

\textsuperscript{195}Caton, 112.


\textsuperscript{197}Jones, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Civil War, Vol. 2, M-Z}, 1155.

\textsuperscript{198}Catton, 173.

Banks established his Order of Battle. He commanded the Union Army of the Gulf, consisting of the XIII Army Corps commanded by Brigadier General E. G. Ransom. The XIII Army Corps consisted of two divisions; the Third Division commanded by Brigadier General Robert A. Cameron and the Forth Division commanded by Colonel William J. Landrum. Cameron’s division consisted of two brigades. Lieutenant Colonel Aaron M. Flory, of the 46th Indiana Regiment, commanded the First Brigade and Colonel William H. Raynor commanded the Second Brigade.\(^{200}\) The First Brigade consisted of the 46th Indiana, 29th Wisconsin, a battery from the First Missouri Light artillery and Second Battery of the Ohio Light artillery. The Second Brigade consisted of the 24th Iowa, 28th Iowa, and 56th Ohio. Landrum’s division consisted of the First Brigade commanded by Colonel Frank Emerson and the Second Brigade commanded by Colonel Joseph W. Vance. Banks also commanded part of Major General William B. Franklin’s XIX Army Corps. Franklin’s Corps consisted of the First Division commanded by Brigadier General William H. Emory; the Second Division commanded by Brigadier General Cuvier Grover; and a Cavalry Division commanded by Brigadier General Albert L. Lee.\(^{201}\)

Despite the large Union force, Banks’s army suffered serious setbacks during the campaign. Falling water levels prevented Porter from providing sustained gunboat support to the Union ground forces. Additionally, Banks set his army on a route that took

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\(^{200}\) Voorhis’s diary entry of 4 December 1863, notes Colonel Brinthurst returned to Indiana for a recruiting trip from 4 December 1863 to 26 April 1864. Lieutenant Colonel Flory commanded the brigade in Brinthurst’s absence.

it out of range of Union naval gunfire. Banks’s misfortune with the falling water levels and his choice to lead his army out of range of the Union gunboats resulted in significant failure at the Battle of Sabine Cross Roads on 8 April, where Union forces suffered great loss in personnel and materiel. At the end of the day’s fighting, the Union lost 20 cannons, 200 wagons, and Confederate forces captured hundreds of Union men.202

**Actions of 46th Indiana Regiment**

On 8 April, the day began with the 46th Indiana conducting a fifteen-mile march from Pleasant Hill, Louisiana to Sabine Cross Roads, near the town of Mansfield, Louisiana.203 The march started at 6 a.m., with the men enjoying a beautiful bright, cloudless day. Landrum’s Fourth Division led the column, moving forward to support Lee’s Cavalry Division that pursued Confederate forces the previous day. Bringing up the rear of the column were forces of the XIX Army Corps commanded by Franklin.204 At 3 p.m., the unit went into camp about ten miles from Pleasant Hill. During the march, the regiment’s men could hear the sound of battle to their front.205 Ironically, the Confederates spent the day fasting and praying with the intent of summoning God’s support for their cause. However, the Confederates were to be ready to march at a moment’s notice and the operational pause did not last long.206 What the Indianans heard

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203Bringhurst and Swigart, 86.

204Ibid., 87.

205Voorhis, 195.

Confederate Lieutenant General Richard Taylor spent the previous weeks avoiding a major engagement with Banks’s force, as directed by his superior officer General Edmund Kirby Smith. This delaying action angered Taylor, who wanted to fight Banks and possessed the terrain that gave Taylor an advantage. Additionally, Taylor understood that he held a position that blocked Banks’s access to Sabine Cross Roads. By blocking the access to the Cross Roads, Taylor denied Banks’s use of a road leading to Shreveport and the two roads that skirted the Red River, making it impossible for Porter’s fleet to support Banks’s movement with naval gunfire. Subsequently, Taylor established his blocking position on a large field with 8,800 men at Sabine Cross Roads, three miles southeast of Mansfield. The field was located on Moss’s Plantation, measuring 800 yards wide and 1,200 yards long, and covered with weeds, stumps, and fallen timber. A fence followed an old road through the field and separated it from an encroaching pine forest. The current road from Pleasant Hill ran through the center of the field, entering it from the southeast over a prominence called Honeycutt Hill. The road then angled down the side of a ravine, crossed a small stream, and then headed up another

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207 Voorhis, 196.

208 Brooksher, 87.

hill to the woods where Taylor established his blocking position. Before the battle, Taylor remarked, “I am going to fight Banks here, if he has a million men.”

At 7 a.m., Lee’s Cavalry Division made contact with Taylor’s force. Lee, leading the vanguard of Banks’s forces, requested infantry support from Franklin. Franklin initially approved the request, but ultimately denied the request as Franklin was under the impression that Confederate forces would not bring on a major engagement on 8 April. Franklin assumed Lee could defeat Taylor’s Confederates with his cavalry division. Banks, however, overruled Franklin’s decision and ordered him to support Lee with infantry. Instead of falling back to a better defensive position, Banks called up Landrum’s Division to assist Lee in driving back Taylor’s force. Landrum’s Fourth Division hurried to the front, where Lee’s cavalrymen and Landrum’s forces temporarily repulsed Taylor’s men. Taylor pulled back to a well-selected defensive position that spanned both sides of the road and covered both flanks of Banks’s advanced line. Lee’s men seized Honeycutt Hill at noon, which provided Lee a view of the new Confederate defenses. Banks held a council of war that discussed postponing the

\[\text{210 Brooksher, 87.} \]
\[\text{211 Ibid., 88.} \]
\[\text{212 Bringhurst and Swigart, 87.} \]
\[\text{213 Brooksher, 85.} \]
\[\text{214 Williamson, 218.} \]
\[\text{215 Bringhurst and Swigart, 87.} \]
\[\text{216 Pierre Comtois, “Red River Campaign: Collision at Sabine Crossroads,”} \]
\[\text{Military History 14, no. 4 (1997): 54-60.} \]
fighting for another day to allow the XVI Army Corps and XIX Army Corps to reach the battlefield, providing the Union with numerical superiority. However, Banks overruled the postponement and ordered Lee to pursue the Confederates. Banks believed Taylor’s force was nothing more than a harassing force that pestered the Union forces the previous two days. Banks had full confidence he could defeat Taylor’s men with his cavalry division and infantry.\textsuperscript{217}

At 4 p.m., Taylor’s men counter-attacked with a heavy fire, forcing the Union to fall back to a defensive position behind the rail fence.\textsuperscript{218} Taylor’s counter-attack also took advantage of two errors made by Banks. Banks’s army formed in column but its column strung out for nearly twenty miles. Banks’s subordinate units were not in a position to support one another. Secondly, Banks’s decision to choose a route far from the Red River negated Porter’s ability to support Banks with naval gunfire. Taylor took full advantage of Banks’s costly mistakes.\textsuperscript{219}

Banks’s men on the battleground numbered 5,700 men. Landrum’s Fourth Division of Ransom’s XIII Army Corps was on the field. Landrum’s Fourth Division consisted of two brigades. Lee’s cavalry division was also on the field. Because Banks’s Army was in column, and spread over twenty miles, the remainder of his army could not reach the field in time for Taylor’s counter-attack. Additionally, the Army’s supply wagons blocked the narrow road leading to the battlefield, making it difficult for Banks’s

\textsuperscript{217}Bringhurst and Swigart, 87.

\textsuperscript{218}Jones, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Civil War, Vol. 2, M-Z}, 910.

\textsuperscript{219}Brooksher, 88.
reinforcements to reach the field.\footnote{Jones, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Civil War, Vol. 2, M-Z}, 910.} Banks was in a precarious position, having put his cavalry and infantry forces too far forward, and blocking the only travel route for reinforcements with his supply train.\footnote{Williamson, 218.}

Taylor’s forces charged at the Union line before the Union men could finish their defensive preparations.\footnote{Jones, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Civil War, Vol. 2, M-Z}, 910.} Taylor ordered Brigadier General J.J. Alfred Mouton’s division to attack the Union left, followed by Major General John G. Walker’s division attacking the Union right. Additionally, Confederate Brigadier General Thomas Green’s cavalry attacked the Union flanks. Quickly, the Confederates overran Ransom’s position.\footnote{Ibid.} Nearly surrounding the Union forces, Taylor’s men cut off the Union’s line of retreat. Additionally, Banks’s men were running out of ammunition. Banks faced surrender or annihilation.\footnote{Bringhurst and Swigart, 88.}

The fierce clash was more than Banks expected from Taylor’s men. Banks instantly ordered Franklin to bring up Cameron’s division.\footnote{Brooksher, 90.} Fortunately, for Banks, Cameron’s division was already on the move to the battlefield, as the battle grew fiercer. Cameron, a former newspaper editor, pushed his division to the front as fast as possible along the crowded, narrow road in order to support Landrum’s division.\footnote{Ibid., 93.} The road was
full of teams and stragglers on foot and on horseback making it nearly impossible to
move any farther. Cameron continued to move his division at the double-quick, per
Banks’s orders.

When Cameron’s division made its way around the supply wagons blocking the
road, Cameron established a Division blocking position between a Union artillery battery
and a copse of trees in front of Sabine Cross Roads. Cameron arrived on the field with
1,300 men. He formed his line of battle with the 46th Indiana and five companies from
the 29th Wisconsin of the First Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Aaron M. Flory on the
right of the road. Colonel William H. Raynor’s Second Brigade consisting of the 24th
Iowa, 28th Iowa, and the 56th Ohio formed on the left of the road. As Cameron’s men
solidified their line, they encountered a wave of retreating Union men badly defeated
during the first phase of the battle.

Within thirty minutes of fighting, the Confederates had crushed Banks’s
vanguard. The Confederates wounded Ransom and wounded or captured both of
Landrum’s brigade commanders. By the time Cameron’s division reached the field,

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227 U.S. War Department, OR, ser. 1, vol. 34, 273.
228 Ibid.
229 Dupree, 124.
230 Ibid., 126.
232 Ibid., 100.
they found Landrum’s division nearly decimated. Cameron cleared the wagons and men congesting the road, and formed a line of battle in the woods a mile south of Moss Plantation.

Once Cameron’s division reached the edge of the woods, Cameron ordered a halt and waited to open fire on the Confederate masses moving towards their position. The Confederates, pursuing Banks’s retreating vanguard, traveled through a clearing on the battlefield in successive lines and in closely massed columns. Cameron waited for the Confederates to approach his defensive lines within close rifle range before unleashing a deadly volley into the Confederates.

Flory’s Brigade drove the Confederates entirely from the field, forcing the Confederates to abandon some of their artillery pieces. Additionally, remnants of Landrum’s division joined Cameron’s division to repulse the Confederate attack. Cameron used the terrain to his advantage, concealing his forces behind logs and the fence running through the woods. Moreover, just beyond the edge of the woods, there was an open field three quarters of a mile across with nothing significant to obstruct the

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233 Voorhis, 196.
234 Forsyth, 75.
235 U.S. War Department, OR, ser. 1, vol. 34, 273.
236 Dupree, 126.
237 U.S. War Department, OR, ser. 1, vol. 34, 282.
238 Dupree, 126.
239 Ibid., 127.
The open space was more than three times the length of the front of Cameron’s division.\textsuperscript{241} This open view gave the Union men an excellent field of fire. The Union fire repulsed the Confederate advance, however the Confederates reformed and charged again. Cameron held his line for an hour, but eventually his line faltered under the Confederate attack.\textsuperscript{242}

The Confederates charged in masses, driving Cameron’s Second Brigade back, while simultaneously sending a heavy column on Cameron’s right.\textsuperscript{243} The Confederates outflanked and nearly surrounded the 46th Indiana, numbering only 250 men, while the brigade had only 500 men.\textsuperscript{244} The Confederates massed on the Union left flank, which prompted Cameron to send his reserve force, the 24th Iowa, to check the Confederate attack on the left. The Confederates pressed the Union right at the same time. Flory ordered the 46th Indiana, being on the extreme right, to change front and meet the Confederate charge.\textsuperscript{245} The Second Brigade’s line faltered on the left side of the road, leaving the First Brigade’s left flank exposed to Confederate fire. Flory repositioned the 46th Indiana 100 yards to the rear, to meet the Confederate charge, but was overwhelmed forcing the regiment to abandon its position.\textsuperscript{246}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{240} Bringhurst and Swigart, 88.
    \item \textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 89.
    \item \textsuperscript{242} Dupree, 127.
    \item \textsuperscript{243} Voorhis, 196.
    \item \textsuperscript{244} Ibid.
    \item \textsuperscript{245} U.S. War Department, \textit{OR}, ser. 1, vol. 34, 272.
    \item \textsuperscript{246} Ibid., 282.
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Hancock, leading the 29th Wisconsin, moved through thick underbrush and fallen timber to form a blocking position on the left of the 46th Indiana Regiment.\textsuperscript{247} However, the Confederates maintained a high rate of fire, while Union ammunition levels continued to fall. The 46th Indiana formed another line in a road nearly parallel with the first line of battle, attempting to repulse the Confederate attack.\textsuperscript{248} Out of ammunition and under considerable pressure by the Confederates, the 46th Indiana’s line finally faltered under overwhelming Confederate numbers and gave way.\textsuperscript{249} Flory eventually ordered the brigade to leave the field.\textsuperscript{250} The Confederates wounded and captured Flory before the battle’s end.\textsuperscript{251} Walker’s Confederates ensured the Union collapse by rolling up Banks’s isolated right flank. In response to the heavy Confederate attack, one Union Soldier noted, “I shall never forget climbing that hill, every minute seeing someone fall or writhing in the agonies of death. . . . We had a splendid chance for a little while as they came over the ground we just had . . . in fair view and we could take deadly aim [. . . but] with all of our endeavors, we could not stem the current.”\textsuperscript{252}

The Confederates pursued the retreating Union troops, but remnants of Franklin’s Corps repulsed the pursuing Confederates three miles in the rear of the battle line.

\textsuperscript{247} Brooksher, 100.

\textsuperscript{248} U.S. War Department, \textit{OR}, ser. 1, vol. 34, 282-283.

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., 273.

\textsuperscript{250} In his diary, Voorhis does not say “retreat.” Voorhis writes, “He would die before he would surrender.”

\textsuperscript{251} U.S. War Department, \textit{OR}, ser. 1, vol. 34, 282.

\textsuperscript{252} Brooksher, 101.
Fortunately, for the Union troops, darkness ended the battle that provided Banks’s men an opportunity to break contact with the Confederates, while establishing a defensive position near Pleasant Hill. The Union rout was complete, with the Confederates capturing hundreds of Union prisoners. During the battle, a Northern news reporter remarked, “We found ourselves swallowed up, as it were, in a hissing, seething, bubbling whirlpool of agitated men.” In a desperate attempt to organize his fleeing men, Banks shouted, “Form a line here. I know you will not desert me.” However, Banks’s men ignored his pleas, and continued their retreat towards Pleasant Hill. The soldiers shed guns, knapsacks, and anything else that slowed them down.

The next day, 9 April, Banks’s army successfully repulsed another Confederate attack at Pleasant Hill. This provided Banks the opportunity to break contact with the Confederates and begin the army’s retreat to the Red River to meet Porter’s gunboats. Luckily, for Banks, Taylor did not pursue Banks’s force because of Smith’s orders for Taylor to send nearly all of his infantry to Arkansas to stop Steele’s Camden Expedition. The Red River Campaign closed on 20 May 1864. Banks failed to capture Shreveport; he did not return Smith’s men in time to participate in Sherman’s move against Atlanta, and suffered a staggering defeat at Sabine Cross Roads. The campaign was a major failure for the Union.

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253 Williamson, 218.
254 Joiner, 102.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
During the Battle of Sabine Cross Roads, the 46th Indiana lost seven men killed; thirteen wounded, and eighty-six missing.\textsuperscript{258} The missing men became Confederate prisoners and transferred to a Rebel prison in Texas. Among the notable prisoners were Lieutenant Colonel Flory, the brigade commander; the regiment’s Chaplain, Hamilton Robb; and Captain William Dehart, the Company D commander.\textsuperscript{259} The regiment fought hard, but overwhelming confederate numbers proved too much to repulse. The 46th Indiana’s regimental history called the Red River Campaign “one of the greatest blunders of the war.”\textsuperscript{260} Additionally, the regimental history’s authors claimed the Union “was defeated and destroyed with the loss of material inestimable, and a sacrifice of life terrible to contemplate, through a plan of battle which threw in the fight detachments of troops only as fast as they could be destroyed.”\textsuperscript{261} The battle resulted in Union defeat, but the 46th Indiana was not at fault for the loss. Banks’s tactical and operational errors prevented his army from having any chance of success. However, the 46th Indiana’s actions provide excellent examples of tactical proficiency that repulsed the Confederates for some time before given the order to retreat.

Analysis

The 46th Indiana’s performance during the Battle of Sabine Cross Roads, despite the final result and numerical inferiority, displayed good use of maneuver and effective

\textsuperscript{258}Bringhurst and Swigart, 89.

\textsuperscript{259}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{260}Williamson, 218.

\textsuperscript{261}Ibid.
firepower to repulse the Confederate’s attack. Flory’s use of maneuver, re-positioning the 46th Indiana to meet the point of Confederate attack, was the primary reason the 46th Indiana held its position for the length of time it did. Flory positioned the 46th Indiana towards the enemy to repel the Confederate attack. However, as the Confederates flanked the 46th Indiana position, Flory maneuvered the regiment from facing the front to facing towards the flank. This maneuver ensured the 46th Indiana faced the Confederate frontal assault, which denied the Confederates a flanking attack against Flory’s men. As the new position became untenable, Flory re-positioned the 46th Indiana a third time, one-hundred yards to the rear of its second position. The 46th Indiana’s third position provided space for the regiment to continue its defense against the Confederate attack. However, the Confederates possessed a significant numerical advantage and drove the 46th Indiana from the field. While Flory’s maneuvering was of considerable skill, the 46th Indiana’s positions were continuously in jeopardy. On the 46th Indiana’s left flank, the Confederates overwhelmed the Second Brigade, and drove the Second Brigade from its initial defensive position. With the Second Brigade driven towards the rear, the Confederates fired upon the First Brigade, to include the 46th Indiana, from the left flank. The Confederates trapped the 46th Indiana in a pincer movement. The Indianans, facing overwhelming combat power from both flanks, fled the field.

Despite retreating from the battlefield, Flory and the 46th Indiana continuously attempted to gain the advantage over the Confederates. The 46th Indiana used the terrain to its advantage. The men of the 46th Indiana used the logs and fences to conceal their defensive positions. Additionally, the regiment’s defensive position, at the edge of the woods, provided the 46th Indiana’s men with an excellent view of the pursuing
Confederates. In front of the 46th Indiana was an open field, which provided good fields of fire for the Union infantrymen. As the pursuing Confederates approached, the 46th Indiana unleashed lethal fire and cut down many of the Confederates. The 46th Indiana’s use of terrain and its clear field of fire of the Confederate attackers helped in the defense of the field. However, depleted ammunition supplies also limited the 46th Indiana’s ability to repel the Confederate attack.

The Battle of Sabine Cross Roads did not provide the 46th Indiana the necessary time and space to achieve victory. Confederate forces denied Flory, and the men of the 46th Indiana, the opportunity to achieve tactical success. Flory was not in a position to achieve a decision because of the perilous situation confronting the 46th Indiana. At the Battle of Sabine Cross Roads, the 46th Indiana was a blocking force, used to stop the attacking Confederates. However, by the time the 46th Indiana arrived on the battlefield, Banks squandered any opportunity for his subordinate commanders to achieve a tactical victory.

Additionally, Flory could not gain a significant advantage over the Confederate attackers. Flory’s use of maneuver, firepower, and terrain was noteworthy, but did not produce enough advantage for Flory to turn the tide of the battle. However, the Union defeat was not Flory’s fault. Banks’s tactical errors and the Confederate advantage in men and equipment denied the Union division commanders and brigade commanders from using their forces in complementary ways. Banks failed to conduct a coordinated attack, which left the Union men vulnerable to the Confederate attack.

Moreover, the Confederates made better use of speed than the Union forces. When the Confederates drove back Union forces, the Confederates immediately re-
positioned to take advantage of their new success. For example, when the Confederates drove back the Second Brigade on the 46th Indiana’s left flank, the Confederates transitioned quickly to a new position that brought more firepower on the 46th Indiana’s exposed left flank. Flory’s use of speed was irrelevant during the battle, because the Confederates negated any chance of using speed to the 46th Indiana’s advantage. The Confederate attack progressed too fast for the 46th Indiana to have an opportunity to stop the Confederate advance.

Finally, Flory and the 46th Indiana could not exploit success because of the Confederate victory. It is doubtful that the 46th Indiana could have solely turned the tide of the battle by itself. The Confederates destroyed Landrum’s division; wagons and baggage trains blocked Cameron’s division from providing timely support to Landrum’s division; and Union gunboats could not support Banks’s army. The Confederates possessed too much of an advantage for the 46th Indiana to overcome thanks to Banks’s failures to prepare his force for a fight. While the Indianans fought bravely, and Flory succeeded in maneuvering the regiment to meet three Confederate attacks while using the terrain to his advantage, superior Confederate forces defeated Union forces. Moreover, the Confederate army achieved tactical success by superior firepower, maneuvering around Union defensives, and exploiting its success. Conversely, Banks’s decision to piece meal his army into battle proved to be a fatal error for the Union army. The Union men retreated to Pleasant Hill after Confederate forces soundly defeated Banks’s army.
The 46th Indiana Regiment’s amphibious operations proved successful within the concepts of current Marine Corps tactical doctrine. The 46th Indiana’s use of speed, its ability to cooperate with naval gunships and supporting artillery, and its ability to adapt to the tactical actions by the Confederates, were significant factors in its ability to gain an advantage and achieve a decision. Moreover, the 46th Indiana exploited its success when possible. Furthermore, when the 46th Indiana’s actions were part of a larger tactical action, its success facilitated Union division and corps commanders to press on with their operations against the Confederates. When the regiment gained an advantage over the enemy, it experienced success.

Beginning with the attack on New Madrid in March 1862, the 46th Indiana did not experience significant, favorable results because of its exposure to Confederate gunboat fire. Additionally, the terrain occupied by the 46th Indiana did not provide adequate cover from the Confederate gunboat shells. Moreover, the 46th Indiana did not have support from Union artillery batteries during the attack on New Madrid. The 46th Indiana’s attack stalled due to the regiment’s lack of terrain and lack of Union artillery support. However, the 46th Indiana experienced success against Confederate skirmishers, driving the skirmishers from their positions while gaining valuable combat experience in its first engagement. The 46th Indiana improved its ability to gain advantage as the war progressed, incorporating terrain and supporting indirect fire in its subsequent engagements.
During the attack on Island Number Ten, the 46th Indiana made better use of the terrain, occupying trenches to protect them from Confederate gunboat fire. Additionally, the 46th Indiana focused its firepower to repel the Confederate gunboats from approaching its position along the shore of the Mississippi River at Riddle’s Point. The 46th Indiana’s firepower inflicted many Confederate casualties while denying the Confederates an opportunity to destroy the regiment’s defensive position. Moreover, the 46th Indiana embarked aboard the Ohio Belle, crossed the Mississippi River, and landed at Tiptonville, Tennessee and cut off the line of retreat for the Confederates abandoning Island Number Ten. The 46th Indiana’s amphibious landing captured three thousand Confederate prisoners. The use of defensive terrain, massed firepower, and maneuvering to an amphibious landing gained an advantage over the Confederates, and achieved the final decision of capturing Island Number Ten. The 46th Indiana’s actions at Island Number Ten helped open the Mississippi River, and allowed General Pope to exploit the success of having Union access to Memphis, Tennessee.

The 46th Indiana’s actions at Fort Pillow demonstrated a complete understanding of the use of speed and combined arms employment. While the 46th Indiana did not engage in battle due to the evacuation of the Confederates from Fort Pillow, the well-planned attack aimed at achieving surprise at the objective. The 46th Indiana began by reconnoitering the terrain, and ensured an unobstructed route existed between the origin of attack and Fort Pillow. An unobstructed route facilitated speed and provided cover from Fort Pillow’s batteries. The plan called for a combined ground and naval attack on the fort. The 46th Indiana’s attack plan included an assault at the rear of the fort while naval gunfire suppressed the fort’s defenses from the front. The 46th Indiana prepared to
assault from transports, using surprise to gain an advantage over Fort Pillow’s defenders. However, the Confederates abandoned Fort Pillow and the attack cancelled. Despite the evacuation of Fort Pillow, the 46th Indiana possessed enough of an advantage over the Confederate defenders by having a speedy route which to assault the rear of the fort. Additionally, the 46th Indiana had the support of naval gunfire to suppress the Confederate defenses. The speed and cooperation involved in the attack put the 46th Indiana at a significant advantage. The attack plan at Fort Pillow epitomized the concept of combined arms and amphibious operations.

The 46th Indiana’s last significant engagement of 1862 occurred at Saint Charles, Arkansas. The Battle of Saint Charles was a brilliant display of combined arms, command and control, and joint amphibious operations. Moreover, Colonel Fitch’s adaptability after the disabling of the Mound City enabled the 46th Indiana’s attack to continue immediately. The attack on Saint Charles used a simple fix and flank maneuver that secured victory for the Union. The decision achieved at Saint Charles was the result of reconnaissance, speed, coordination with naval gunboats, and maneuver. These factors enabled the 46th Indiana to gain an advantage and defeat the Confederates. While the 46th Indiana achieved tactical success at Saint Charles, falling water levels negated its operational mission to resupply General Curtis’s army. Yet, the White River was now open for Union access.

The 46th Indiana’s major battles of 1863 were primarily ground operations, starting with unopposed landing at Bruinsburg, Mississippi to begin General Grant’s campaign against Vicksburg. The first fight, the Battle of Port Gibson, was a tactical success for the 46th Indiana. The 46th Indiana overcame two significant Confederate
advantages in terrain and artillery. Maneuvering to capture Confederate artillery and two hundred prisoners, the 46th Indiana gained an advantage over the Confederates. Moreover, the 46th Indiana’s cooperation with units on its flanks ensured the capture of the Confederate cannons. The decision achieved at Port Gibson allowed the Union to attain its strategic and operational goals. The victory at Port Gibson allowed Grant to exploit success, and gave him a secure bridgehead to flow additional troops into the area and provided the Confederates the initial defeat that demoralized Confederate troops.

The Battle of Champion Hill was a Union victory, and the 46th Indiana’s actions at the battle aided in the victory. However, the 46th Indiana did not factor in the ultimate victory, having to withdraw from the field after bitter fighting which saw Champion Hill change hands three times. Despite having to withdraw from the field, the 46th Indiana employed many of the tactical concepts that provided success during early battles. The 46th Indiana made better use of the terrain to conceal its movements and provide cover against Confederate artillery. Additionally, the 46th Indiana conducted its attack with speed and in mass, moving faster than the Confederates could react. Moreover, the 46th Indiana cooperated with the other regiments in its brigade to capture Confederate cannons. The 46th Indiana’s capture of the Confederate artillery relieved pressure on other Union units maneuvering on Champion Hill. Further, the Union victory at Champion Hill provided Grant a clear path to Vicksburg.

The Battle of Bayou Bourbeau was a magnificent stand by the 46th Indiana that stopped a Union rout and repulsed a Confederate pursuit. The success at Bayou Bourbeau resulted from Colonel Bringhurst’s initiative, speed, and command and control of the regiment. Bringhurst moved the 46th Indiana towards the sound of battle on his own
Moving at the double-quick, the 46th Indiana arrived on the field and immediately occupied a defensive line. Bringhurst ordered his men to withhold their fire until the retreating Union men coming towards the 46th Indiana’s position were out of the way. With a clear field of fire, Bringhurst ordered his men to unleash a deadly volley that halted the Confederate advance. Additionally, Bringhurst coordinated with a section of artillery that was retreating from the field. The artillery section halted, turned around, and fired on the pursuing Confederates. Two drawbacks of Bringhurst’s decision to move unsupported towards the battle is the vulnerability of his command and the inability to exploit success. Had the Confederates chosen to counterattack, Bringhurst’s men would have been isolated on the battlefield until reinforcements arrived. Secondly, because the 46th Indiana was unsupported, it could not pursue the Confederates. However, the 46th Indiana’s defensive stand achieved its goal by stopping the Confederate pursuit and relieved pressure on the retreating Union men.

The last significant battle that the 46th Indiana participated, the Battle of Sabine Cross Roads, was a devastating loss for the Union. As part of the failed Red River Campaign, the Battle of Sabine Cross Roads was a result of poor generalship from Major General Banks. Tactical errors plagued the Union men, and placed the Union army in a position of disadvantage against the Confederates. While the 46th Indiana made a determined stand at Sabine Cross Roads, the regiment had eighty-six men captured by the Confederates. Moreover, the Confederates possessed a numerical advantage, and overwhelmed Banks’s force. Lieutenant Colonel Flory, commanding the regiment in Bringhurst’s absence, maneuvered the 46th Indiana as best he could to meet the Confederate attack, but the Confederate force proved too much for the 46th Indiana. The
46th Indiana withdrew from the field without ever gaining an advantage over the Confederates. The 46th Indiana attempted to gain an advantage, using terrain and massed firepower, but nothing repulsed the Confederate attack. Despite Flory’s attempts to achieve a decision, Banks’s errors negated any opportunity for Union success.

Documentation concerning the 46th Indiana’s training for amphibious operations is lacking. While the 46th Indiana integrated well with naval gunfire as in the case of Fort Pillow and Saint Charles, and the regiment planned for amphibious operations during its campaigns, the literature found does not provide much in the way of training for embarkation and debarkation. It can be concluded that overcrowded ships and haphazard loading of ships resulted in an absence of amphibious training. It can also be argued that the success experienced by the 46th Indiana during its amphibious operations was a result of the regiment’s ability to learn on the fly.

The 46th Indiana benefited from having a stable command structure within the regiment. Colonels Fitch and Brinthurst commanded the regiment throughout, except for two instances where Lieutenant Colonels Scott and Flory commanded the regiment on one occasion, respectively. Sources, such as Aurelius Voorhis’s diary, reveal that the 46th Indiana men held their regimental commanders in high regard. There does not appear to be any issue with the 46th Indiana’s relationship with its brigade and division commanders. However, prior to the Battle of Bayou Bourbeau and Sabine Cross Roads, there is a trace of consternation with the 46th Indiana’s commanders at the Army level such as Generals Franklin and Banks. Bernard Schermerhorn mentions the lack of faith in the Army’s leadership in a letter to his wife, and again mentioned in the regimental history.
Casualty statistics fluctuated with the intensity of the battle, and the 46th Indiana experienced a large number of casualties, specifically at Champion Hill and Sabine Cross Roads. However, the defensive stand at Bayou Bourbeau resulted in few casualties. It can be argued that the 46th Indiana experienced a standard amount of casualties during their battles, as evidenced during the attack on Champion Hill. Illness and battle wounds were the largest contributor to casualties, a usual occurrence during the Civil War.

Finally, unit cohesion and morale appeared to be a factor in the unit’s success. This starts with the unit’s loyalty and admiration for the regimental commanders. Voorhis mentioned in his diary that the men referred to Colonel Bringhurst as “Pap”, and the men had great faith in their leaders. The unit made determined attacks against strong Confederate artillery positions, and against pursuing Confederates with great success. Despite withdrawing from the field at Champion Hill and Sabine Cross Roads, the regiment conducted an orderly withdraw at Champion Hill and the regiment held as long as it could before finally being overrun by the Confederates at Sabine Cross Roads. This is an indication of the unit’s pride and fighting spirit.

The 46th Indiana’s actions proved to be successful at the tactical level, and often led to further Union success at the operational and strategic level. Adhering to basic tactical principals such as achieving a decision, gaining an advantage, being faster, adapting, cooperating, and exploiting success, the 46th Indiana contributed to the overall operational aims of the Union army. Moreover, Marine Corps’ current tactical doctrine applied to the 46th Indiana’s tactics more than 150 years ago. This proves that achieving a decision, gaining an advantage, being faster than the enemy, adapting to changing situations, cooperating with adjacent units, and exploiting success are timeless factors
towards tactical success. With the future of the size and capabilities of the United States armed forces uncertain, lessons from smaller amphibious units can be beneficial for future study. The 46th Indiana provides military students with an excellent background for tactical amphibious operations along smaller waterways.
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