DETERMINING FACTORS FOR EU MILITARY INTERVENTION

A Monograph

by

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14. ABSTRACT
The United States has long urged greater contributions to regional security by its allies. Given the Obama administration’s shift in emphasis to Asia it is reasonable for the United States to urge the EU to play a greater role. However, arguing a greater role does not produce actual commitments. Hence an important question for US planners is when will the EU actually commit forces to regional security missions. An analysis of EU security policy and military engagement decisions can identify the core factors that persuade EU members to approve regional security missions. The three EU military engagement cases chosen for this study were: the 2006 EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR RD Congo), the EU decision not to commit forces to Lebanon in 2006, and EU decision to enforce a maritime zone off the coast of Somalia (EUNAVFOR Atalanta). The case studies were selected based upon the recent maturity of EU security policy and capability. The cases also illustrate the range of situations in which the EU might be asked to act. EU security policy has evolved to embrace regional security missions but the three cases show there are specific conditions that must apply when the EU makes a decision. There must be (1) clear EU interests, (2) an international basis for mission legitimacy, and (3) a willingness on the part of Britain, France, and Germany, to provide the operational leadership. Additionally, the EU will not intervene in open armed hostilities; that is, the intervention will enforce a settlement, it will not produce a settlement. Understanding the criteria under which the EU might consider military operations can help U.S. strategic and operational planners develop “economy of force” approaches that complement U.S. and EU interests. The analysis can also provide a common frame of reference for senior U.S. decision-makers concerning EU’s aspirations to be a credible global security player.

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<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CHOD</td>
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<td>Crisis Management Planning Directorate</td>
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<td>CPCC</td>
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<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>Council of Ministers</td>
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<td>Interim Emergency Multinational Force</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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INTRODUCTION

European countries need to make more of a contribution in terms of defense capabilities. It is not fair to keep turning to our ally in the United States to contribute military forces to problems, which involve our own security.

―Geoff Hoon, British Defense Secretary, 2004

In April 2011, President Barrack H. Obama directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct a comprehensive defense review to identify $400 billion in savings.¹ The President indicated that the search for savings should be driven by strategic considerations. The goal was to identify future spending decisions that would focus on strategy, priorities, and risks. In August 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta announced that DOD was in the process of conducting a fundamental review of the U.S. defense strategy. The intent of this strategic review was to reduce defense costs and to update the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Some key questions in the review were: “What are the essential missions our military must do to protect America? What are the risks associated with strategic choices we make? Where could partners contribute to global stability?”² During the review process, DOD identified the need to increase military capabilities devoted to the Pacific Ocean region by reducing military commitments elsewhere. The review also sought to identify capable partners that could provide forces and resources to promote security and stability in regions such as Eastern Europe and Africa.³ The European Union (EU) was discussed as a potential candidate to provide those resources.


The Department of Defense review led President Obama to announce in November 2011, a pivot or strategic rebalancing of U.S. military forces towards the Asia-Pacific region. President Obama wanted to raise the region’s priority for military resources and policy attention. U.S. security planners were concerned by China’s aggressive economic power, increased military projection capabilities, and ability to conduct anti-access operations. In January 2012, Secretary Panetta released the 2012 National Defense Strategy, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense.” The document codified the decision to adjust the U.S. military strategic posture towards both the Asian-Pacific region and Europe. As the United States shifted priorities towards the Pacific region, it sought to decrease military forces in Europe in order to save money. Shifting attention to the Pacific means the United States expects Europe to accept greater responsibility for crises in its neighborhood. This expectation is not new. The U.S. has long sought a greater participation by European countries in European security, rather than provide for European security itself. True burden sharing envisioned the Europeans leading in regional crises, allowing U.S. capacity to be directed to higher U.S. priorities. In a 2012 speech at the Bookings Institute, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton echoed Secretary Robert Gates’ charge that Europe and the EU had to play a larger role in providing broader regional stability.

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Recently, the EU has emerged as an important political, economic, and now military entity promoting a European agenda. In 2009 under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU embellished its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), indicating that the EU was serious about becoming an influential global actor. With the development of the CFSP, the EU became a possible alternative organization for military action in regions outside American direct security interest. The U.S. specifically identified Eastern Europe and Africa as regions where international organizations, such as the EU, could provide leadership and security. The CFSP declared the intention of the EU member states to safeguard common values and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, the European Security Strategy stated that the EU would take a greater role in regional conflicts in areas such as the Middle East and in the Great Lakes region of Africa. The EU sought to expand its influence even if it had to consider conducting military operations.

EU military capacity to conduct military operations has grown in stride with the maturity of EU security policy. Since 2003, there have been eight EU military operations. Most of these military operations have involved peacekeeping or military and police training. Although the operations produced mixed results, they reflect the EU’s willingness to perform complex military operations. The EU’s evolving ability to orchestrate key elements of power; i.e., diplomacy, economic, information and military, shows a willingness to commit resources to promote regional stability. Responding to a new NDS, U.S. military strategists surmise that EU engagement could

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11Hillary Clinton, “US and Europe: A revitalized Global Partnership,” Speech, A Stateman’s Forum with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Bookings Institute, Washington DC, November 29, 2012,
free U.S. forces for other priorities. Therefore, U.S. security planners would benefit from knowing under what conditions the EU will consider applying military force.

Determining under what conditions the EU is likely to commit military forces requires examining situations during which the EU decided to intervene militarily or declined to intervene and examining the evolution of EU security policy. An analysis of EU security policy and military engagement decisions can identify the core factors that dispose EU member states to approve or decline military engagements. This is true because member states take public positions and the debates in the European Council reveals national motives. The analysis of EU debates and EU member pronouncements, however, cannot reveal the impact of international security conditions or internal national factors. Hence, to gain insight into the interaction of a variety of factors that influence EU decision-making, it was also necessary to select and analyze cases of EU intervention. The three cases selected represent situations in which the EU deployed a sizable force out-of-sector to deal with various forms of instability. These forms of instability represented a risk to the EU’s strategic interests.

Investigating cases of EU military involvement revealed many of the factors the member states considered before deciding to commit forces or resources to a conflict. However, these factors alone are not sufficient to forecast a EU response to a particular event or regional security need. If the EU had made its previous decisions based solely on immediate conditions and transient national interests then each intervention did not create a reasonable expectation for future EU involvement. However, the evolution of the EU as an organization shows evidence of a policy consensus oriented toward playing a larger role in international affairs. That evolution also produced institutional changes that make intervention more possible. Hence, examining the evolution of the EU reveals both institutional and policy trends that are likely to continue and

support greater EU involvement in regional and international security. Furthermore, understanding the EU’s evolving security policy provides context and the strategy that guides EU military operations. The base security policy documents are the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Security Strategy (ESS), and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Together, these documents establish the common tenets of EU decision-making policy and frame the quintessential notion of “European common interest”.

The three EU military engagement cases chosen for this study were: the 2006 EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR RD Congo), the EU decision not to commit forces to Lebanon in 2006, and EU decision to enforce a maritime zone off the coast of Somalia (EUNAVFOR Atalanta). The EU operation in the Congo represents a EU decision to participate as the lead international actor in an out-of-sector military engagement. EUFOR RD Congo also represents the first time the EU acted in the context of the ESS. The second case considers the process by which EU decided not to respond to the Lebanon War of 2006. The third case shows the EU as a participant in maintaining a maritime security zone off the coast of Somalia along with North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and other international partners. These cases seem to illustrate, if not exemplify, the range of situations in which the EU might be asked to act. By comparing two engagement case studies in contrast to a non-engagement decision, the analysis sought to isolate the core factors from the situational factors that might have influenced a EU decision.

The evolution of EU policy and case study analyses suggest that there is a higher likelihood of EU military intervention when four interdependent factors are present: (1) clear EU interests, (2) an international basis for mission legitimacy, (3) a willingness on the part of Britain, France and Germany, to provide the operational leadership, and (4) the cessation of open armed hostilities. These core factors are reflected in EU security policy and are found present in each of the case studies. Furthermore, the maturity of the EU security policy indicates that the EU is
prepared to act as a viable security provider. Understanding the criteria under which the EU might consider military operations can help U.S. strategic and operational planners develop “economy of force” approaches that complement U.S. and EU interests. The analysis can also provide a common frame of reference for senior U.S. decision-makers concerning EU’s aspirations to be a credible global security player. This study augments the available literature on current collective security organizations and their linkage to the 2012 NDS.

Policy

There would be no need to consider the European Union as a U.S. partner in promoting regional security and stability, had the EU remained a regional organization for economic collaboration. However, through a series of treaties in response to changes in the European and global security environment, the EU has become an organization able to undertake international security tasks independent from NATO. The transformation of the EU from a regional economic organization to an independent international organization reveals the significant events that have prompted the institutional changes and have made possible a European foreign policy independent of the policies of the member states. The three key events were the development of the CFSP, ESS, and the CSDP. Under the framework of the CFSP, ESS, and the CSDP the EU added a new instrument to its foreign policy arsenal and gave itself a security strategy to guide employment. Nonetheless, the evolving institutional character of the EU often complicates an understanding of the EU’s external policies. Revealing how EU security and defense policy evolved will show the impact policy has on decision making involving military operations.
The EU was originally conceived as a political and economic entity. In matters of military defense and security, member states fell under the protection of NATO’s muscular umbrella. However, the implosion of the Soviet Union sparked debate over Europe’s dependence on an American dominated NATO. Several member states argued for a more robust and independent foreign policy identity. Subsequently, the debate was crystalized by Europe’s inability to effectively respond to ethnic cleansing in Europe’s Balkan backyard. Despite Europe’s aspirational pronouncements, it took a reluctant U.S. to resolve a predominately European security crisis. This regional tragedy tipped the scales for many EU members and brought urgency to the development of a Europe-centric security and defense policy. While the Balkans genocide triggered consensus, the road to actually developing a EU security policy would prove long and frustrating. The incremental development of a comprehensive European security policy started with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty established the

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12The U.S. acted under the guise of NATO.
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The CFSP shaped EU international engagements and served as the foundation for all future EU security policies. 13

The Common Foreign and Security Policy

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was the EU’s first attempt to coordinate its own security and defense. The Maastricht Treaty established a comprehensive strategy to engage the international community with a common voice through a Common Foreign and Security Policy. 14 The broad aims of the CFSP were to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter. 15 Additionally, the Maastricht Treaty sought to promote cooperation, democracy, respect for human rights, internationally recognize fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. The CFSP also established new internal EU organs and duty positions needed to facilitate the EU’s security decision-making process. The CFSP reflected a strong linkage between core EU common values and those of the United Nations. Ultimately, the CFSP provided the legal architecture and re-engineered organizational structures to develop and implement EU foreign policy better.

The Maastricht Treaty established two powerful organs designed to shape EU foreign and security policy: the European Council (EC) and the Council of Ministers (CoM). 16 Both institutions represented the primary decision-making bodies of the EU. The EC is the EU’s highest political authority and is populated by the member heads of state. The EC provides the

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13 The CFSP was originally known as the European Foreign and Security Policy (EFSP); however, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty changed the policy name to CFSP. In order to avoid confusion the CFSP will be used throughout the paper.


15 The Maastricht Treaty, known as the Treaty on European Union, is the treaty that created the CFSP; its most significant contribution was the creation of a European single market and the adoption of the Euro.

16 The European Council is the heads of state of the member states.
political direction and establishes CFSP priorities.\textsuperscript{17} The CoM acts as the technician of EU foreign and security policy, and is populated by the foreign ministers of the twenty-seven member states. It is in the CoM where most discourse of CFSP decision-making takes place. The CoM typically meets once a month to discuss current and future strategic issues. To promote internal legitimacy, unanimous agreement among all member states is required to formalize a CFSP decision. Once a CFSP decision has been formally adopted, only a majority vote is required to approve subsequent implementing decisions. The decision-making process is by design a collaborative process between the EC and the CoM. The process proved deliberate and slow, frustrating many members who expected the process to mirror their domestic decision-making process.

Overall, the Maastricht Treaty provided the EU with a strong foundation upon which to build future security policy. In 1997 the EU sought to expand further and to simply its security policy by amending the CFSP. The\textit{1997 Treaty of Amsterdam} streamlined decision-making by establishing EU guidelines and common positions. The Treaty ratified three key CFSP protocols and doctrine: (1) Principles and Guidelines provide general political direction; (2) Common Positions promote unified approaches to problems or regions; and (3) Joint Actions address specific situations.\textsuperscript{18} The Treaty of Amsterdam aided timely decision-making by solidifying a common EU frame of reference and strategic doctrine. Figure 2 illustrates the CFSP building blocks for foreign and security policy.

\textsuperscript{17}Treaty on European Union, Article 22.1.

\textsuperscript{18}The Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.2-J.5.
CFSP Principles and Guidelines are approved by the EC and set the azimuth for EU policies and actions. They represent the strategic interests and goals of the EU. Examples of key strategic documents adopted by the EC in recent years include: the European Security Strategy, the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU Counterterrorism Strategy, and the EU Internal Security Strategy.\textsuperscript{19}

CFSP Common Positions are diplomatic approaches to a problem, particular region, or country. The EU has generally used CFSP Common Positions (decisions) to address problematic situations involving foreign governments or transnational entities. These situations usually arise when human rights, democratic institutions or international law are egregiously violated. Common Positions have also addressed the thorny issues of terrorism, arms control and conflict prevention/resolution. Some EU Common Positions have included political and economic sanctions. In practice, the EU relies on United Nations Security Council mandates to legitimize

any sanctions. Above all, Common Positions reflect the EU’s core value of respecting international law vice acting as a rogue unilateralist.

*CFSP Joint Actions* have evolved from Europe-centric to out-of-sector civilian and military engagements. This evolution included the practice of appointing EU Special Representatives (EUSRs). The EUSR’s role has become that of special envoy; serving as the eyes, ears, and voice of the EC in designated situations. Joint Actions, and the appointment of EUSRs, increasingly signal the EU’s willingness to play a role in regional crisis intervention. However, initial Joint Actions were tepid and lacked a clear connection to the EU’s emerging foreign policy and security objectives. The EU was missing a coherent EU security strategy.

**European Security Strategy**

In 2003, the High Representative for Common and Security Policy proposed, and the EC approved, the European Security Strategy (ESS). The purpose of the ESS was to outline a security strategy for Europe based on the member-states’ common political objectives. Similar to the U.S. National Security Strategy and France’s White Paper on Defense and National Security, the ESS aligned EU security objectives with its foreign policy. It was the first time that member states forged a common security strategy. Nonetheless, the ESS did not resolve internal debate over the appropriate relationship with an American dominated NATO. Some member states steadfastly sought the continued protection of America’s super power capabilities. Other members argued for neutrality or a break from dependency on NATO. The ESS acknowledged these differing points of view by walking a consensual fine line. The ESS framed three broad strategic objectives for EU policymakers.21


21Ibid.
1. The EU should take appropriate action to address identified threats such as: regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, failed states, organized crime, disease, and “destabilization poverty.”

2. The EU should focus on building regional security in its neighborhood: the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean region, and the Middle East.

3. The EU should seek the construction of a rules-based multilateral world order in which international law, peace, and security are ensured by strong regional and global institutions.

The ESS is a product of EU core values and share beliefs with the international community of nations. It maintained that security and stability could only be achieved by collaboration and a mixture of economic, political, and military engagement. The ESS placed prevention at the forefront of the EU’s security strategy. The EU would focus on the root causes of instability by strengthening the rule of law, promoting human rights, and assisting in economic development via trade and foreign assistance. The ESS laid an intellectual threshold for EU engagement and recognized the real-world need for proportional EU capabilities to address political/economic and military threats.

**The Common Security and Defense Policy**

The development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) linked resources to the capabilities of a viable ESS. The approved CSDP represented a profound step in the EU’s maturity. The member states had not only agreed upon a common security strategy, but also committed to resourcing a military capability. However, the resourcing would only be as robust as the member states’ political will and collective resources permitted. Building on the EU’s

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initial civilian focus, early CSDP engagements involved police and judicial training. Subsequent CSDP engagements have incrementally expanded to niche missions such as: peacekeeping, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict stabilization, and humanitarian assistance.\(^{23}\)

CSDP decision-making relies on many of the established EU principals and the creation of additional specialized supporting staffs. The EC and the CoM provide strategic guidance and direction. The EU Military Committee (EUMC), composed of the member state’s Chiefs of Defense (CHOD), provides military operational input to the EC and the CoM. The most influential specialized supporting staffs include: the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), charged with integrating civilian and military strategic planning; the Civilian Planning Conduct Capability Office (CPCC), charged with planning civilian missions; the Joint Situation Center (SitCen), which acts as a fusion center for intelligence analysis and threat assessment; and a professional EU Military Staff (EUMS) which is tasked by the EUMC to provide military advice to key EU officials. At its core, the CSDP expanded the EU’s response capabilities to regional crisis and to scenarios on the low end of the spectrum of violence.

Reflecting the nature of the EU itself, the CSDP evolves. Initially, the CSDP outlined a series of goals designed to grow the EU’s collective capabilities. In June 2004, the EC raised the capability bar by establishing fixed capabilities as proffered in the EU’s Headline Goal 2010 strategy. The EU has since set the aspirational goal of being able to regionally respond swiftly and decisively to a full spectrum of operations.

The EU’s aspirational capabilities tend to rest on a EU Battle Group strategic concept. EU planners have sought to build several prototype Battle Groups designed to influence the

emerging crises. The EU’s vision is to defuse emerging crises by deploying a tailored battalion-sized rapid response force.\textsuperscript{24} Currently EU Battle Groups are on standby for six-month periods and ready to deploy within ten days of alert. In January 2007, the EU was able to demonstrate an increased military capability by maintaining two rapid response Battle Groups.\textsuperscript{25} EU Battle Groups have provided the military means for enhance security within the EC’s traditional niche missions.

The fruition of the CFSP, ESS, and the CDSP, gives the EU increased political and military credibility. However, the usefulness of the EU is best judged by factoring both its will to act and its capabilities to influence. The next three case studies reveal the factors that contributed to or inhibited a EU decision concerning military engagement. The cases selected represent out-of-sector military operations in which the EU deployed a military force to deal with various forms of instability. The first case study is the 2006 EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR RD Congo). In the case of the Congo the EU led the international effort from conception to execution. The Congo also represents the first time the EU deployed forces outside of the continent of Europe.

Case Study: EUFOR RD Congo

Since the 1960s the Great Lakes region of Africa has been an area of violent conflict and instability. The region fell into disarray after decades of famine, disease, and constant ethnic fighting. The DRC seemed particularly susceptible to instability. Since 2000, the UN has maintained a peacekeeping force in the DRC to monitor a peace agreement between warring factions. In 2005, the UN recognized the EU’s maturing military capacity and requested EU

\textsuperscript{24} There are also EU Maritime and Air Rapid Response Concepts.

assistance in safeguarding the upcoming 2006 DRC presidential election. The UN request was a major step for EU prestige. Previously the EU was never considered a viable regional security provider because it lacked capacity in policy and function. The EUFOR RD Congo case study represents EU decision-making in an out-of-sector military mission under the construct of the new ESS. Ultimately, the EU decided to intervene in the DCR, thereby ensuring in a peaceful presidential election. The intervention provided the EU with much-needed experience and confidence, and created a blueprint for future EU interventions.

The 2006 EU intervention was a subset of a much larger and complex UN peacekeeping effort called the United Nation’s Organizational Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). On March 22, 2006, the European Parliament debated a request by the UN to send a peacekeeping contingent to support the 2006 DRC presidential election. The key considerations influencing EU decision-making were: protection of EU strategic interests, perceived mission legitimacy by the international community, and the physical capacity to command and control the mission. A brief historical description of the UN intervention in the Congo sets the broader context in which the EU decided to deploy troops to reinforce MONUC.

The UN’s initial involvement in the Great Lakes region was in response to the 1994 Rwanda tribal genocide and subsequent violence that spilled over the Zaire border. The first phase of that conflict ended when rebel forces, supported by Uganda and Rwanda, seized the Zairian capital and ousted President Joseph Mobutu. Rebel leader Laurent Kabila then assumed the presidency and changed the name of the country from Zaire back to the DRC. Like many

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27 The war that ensued from the 1994 Rwanda genocide is commonly known as the First Congo War. The conflict officially lasted from 1996-1997.

contested transitions in Africa, leaders changed, but little else. The economy remained in disorder, corruption continued to flourish and the central government lacked control over various parts of the country. In particular, ethnic and tribal tensions in eastern DRC went unaddressed. In a bold move, President Kabila decided to expel all allied troops that helped bring him to power. President Kabila expelled the allied troops to counter his domestic image of a foreign puppet. The allied troop departure left extremist elements in eastern DRC free to launch attacks back into Rwanda without fear of retribution. Rwanda viewed the DRC’s lack of action against extremist safe havens as a sign of negligence. Rwanda concluded that preemptive military action inside the DRC was the only way to prevent broader regional instability. 29

In August 1998, Rwanda and Uganda conspired to spawn a new rebel movement to punish President Kabila and the ill-prepared DRC forces. The resulting conflict became known as the Second Congo War or as the “Great War of Africa.” Eventually, a total of eight African countries, as well as 25-armed groups, participated in the continental fight. By the year 2000, despite horrific destruction and massive civilian casualties, the conflict devolved into a military stalemate. 30 It was not until the assassination of President Kabila that the combatants saw an opportunity to break the stalemate. 31 UN efforts gave rise to a ceasefire agreement that mandated foreign powers leave the DRC. The resulting Sun City agreements sought national reconciliation by facilitating the formation of a new government that included representatives from rebel movements. The UN mission in the DRC was charged to monitor the implementing peace agreement. 32

31 His son Joseph Kabila succeeded President Kabila.
The DRC peace agreement required the unification of national territory, the reformation of the armed forces, and the establishment of the rule of law. A key component of the peace agreement was democratic elections in the summer of 2006. In December 2005, the United Nation’s Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guerhenno asked the EU to deploy a military force to assist MONUC in safeguarding the country’s democratic elections.\(^3^3\) The EU immediately initiated a debate within the European Council, to discuss different options for supporting the UN effort in DRC.

Central to the debate over military engagement was the protection of EU strategic interests. President of the CoM, Hans Winkler, stated the CFSP and the ESS provided the EU clear guidance concerning economic and military support to strengthen DRC democracy.\(^3^4\) President Winkler reminded Parliament members that the Great Lakes region of Africa was a key component of the ESS and represented a direct strategic interest to the EU. The EU had already invested 700 million euros into the DRC, and had provided valuable humanitarian and security assistance.\(^3^5\) In 2003, the EU led Operation ARTEMIS, the rapid reinforcement of UN MONUC stability forces. The operation helped stabilize the deteriorating peace process in DRC. Moreover, in 2005, the EU undertook a UN tasking to help build an integrated civilian police unit called EUPOL Kinshasa. EUPOL Kinshasa’s purpose was to train over a thousand Congolese policemen to defend governmental institutions. Also, in 2005, the EU launched the EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for DRC Security Reform (EUSEC-RD Congo). EUSEC-RD provided

\(^{33}\) Helmut Fritsch, EUFOR RD Congo: A Misunderstood Operation? (Kingston, Ont: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 2008), 9.

\(^{34}\) Hand Winkler served as the Secretary of State of Austria and as the rotating President of the CoM.

advice and assistance to Congolese leaders on security policy. The numerous humanitarian and security missions supporting DRC represented a significant investment by the EU to protect their strategic interest as outlined in the ESS. Another key EU concern was the perception of mission legitimacy within the international community. Many members were concerned about being drawn into an intervention, which lacked popular support within Europe and the international community.

Mission legitimacy was an important consideration within the EU CoM. The CoM along with the European Parliament was reluctant to authorize any military option without the solid participation of various member states and explicit consent by the DRC and the UN Security Council. Many members such as, France, Germany, and Portugal, wanted a UN Security Council Resolution specifically authorizing the EU to act as peacekeepers. On April 26, 2006 the UN passed Security Council Resolution 1671 authorizing the EU to employ independent forces in the DRC in support of the DRC electoral phase. This endorsement formed the legal basis for EU Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, the authorization for operation EUFOR RD Congo. EU Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP also provided the operational objectives for the EU peacekeeping force.

The central objectives for the peacekeeping mission were (1) to provide support to the United Nations in the DRC to stabilize the situation if MONUC faced serious difficulties, (2) contribute to the protection of civilians in imminent danger of physical violence in the area of its deployment, (3) contribute to the airport protection in Kinshasa, (4) ensure the security and


freedom of movement of its personnel and the protection of the EUFOR RD Congo installations, and (5) execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger. While the EU received legal authorization to act from the DRC and the UN Security Council, this alone did not build a consensus for EU intervention. Germany and the U.K. were reluctant to commit troops to an area where peacekeeping operations could quickly escalate into open hostilities. Both countries wanted assurances that secession of open hostility was completed before supporting any military operation. Furthermore, the CoM was not certain the EU had the capability to command and control a peacekeeping operation more than 4,000 miles away. The EU lacked an operational headquarters.

The EU realizing they lacked the capacity to provide an operational headquarters decided to designate a framework nation. Only France, U.K., and Germany had the capacity to provide such an operational headquarters. Furthermore, no member state was eager to adopt the mission framework responsibilities. Although U.K. and Germany supported the notion of a EU military operation, they were both reluctant to deploy troops. Eventually, U.K. ruled out participation in the mission due to their heavy military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The EU ultimately persuaded Germany to participate on the condition that only 100 of its troops would deploy to Kinshasa; the rest would remain as part of the reserve force in neighboring Gabon. The EU designated Germany as the framework nation and the operational headquarters was located in Potsdam, Germany. The council appointed German Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck the EU operational commander and French Major General Christian Damay the EU tactical


commander. Needless-to-say, most EU member states were lukewarm about the EU force engagement.

![Figure 3. EUFOR DRC Map](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eufor-rd-congo (accessed January 15, 2013).

Operation EUFOR RD Congo was finally launched on June 12, 2006 and included 2,400 troops contributed by 21 EU members. The biggest contributors were France (1,090), Germany (780), Poland and Spain (130 each), Belgium (60), and Sweden (55). The mission also included the deployment of an advance element to Kinshasa of 400-450 military personnel and a battalion size “on call” force located outside the country. That force was to be on stand-by and prepared to

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quickly deploy upon the approval of EU decision-makers. The cobbling together and projection of this multinational force was a significant EU achievement. EU forces safeguarded the election and the EU quickly deemed EUFOR RD Congo a political and military success. The EU helped increase stability for central Africa and performed a laudatory humanitarian role. Laurent Kabila won the election and his rival agreed to challenge the newly elected president only through peaceful means. EU forces redeployed in accordance with their mandate and the DRC generally viewed the EU force as impartial and professional.

While EUFOR RD Congo provided important support to the DRC/MONUC in Kinshasa, it avoided much of the violence experienced in other parts of the country. When the EU launched EUFOR RD Congo, the security situation in many parts of the country was dire. The International Rescue Committee estimated that 1,200 people died daily because of the conflict. \(^4^3\) The security situation in the eastern part of the country was especially unstable. In July, 17,000 people fled from renewed fighting in Ituri. Despite the increased bloodletting and a dire need for further security reinforcement in the east, EUFOR RD Congo did not deploy to the region. EU troops remained limited to their area of operations in and around the capital city. Although EURFOR RD Congo did cooperate with MONUC in the handling of minor disturbances in and around the capital, it did not join the fight to manage the violence raging throughout the DRC.

EUFOR RD Congo case study suggests some specific indicators revealing when the EU would consider military engagement. These indicators include; a strategic interest to the EU, mission legitimacy, and the offer by one of three-major EU states to be the framework nation. Initially EU consensus was problematic. However, France overcame the political inertia and stepped forward with supporting resources. Providing requisite leadership, France successfully argued that the humanitarian need was great, reassured fellow member states that the mission was

possible, and that the engagement was ultimately in the EU’s strategic interest. The UN in concert with the DRC provided the legal authority in the form of a Security Council Resolution. Even though the EU’s political will eventually solidified behind EUFOR RD Congo, many individual nations ultimately lacked the fortitude to risk their troops in the more dangerous areas. Germany, in particular, was reticent to allow its forces in areas where the forces were likely to meet armed confrontation. Some member states had already expended their domestic political capital in supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). OIF and OEF left participating European members sensitive to military operations that might result in casualties. The resulting political and operational caveats placed on EU participating countries caused significant friction within the EUFOR RD Congo command and control structure.

Although the military operation was relatively brief, it still required one of the three major EU states to be the framework nation. Institutionally, the EU lacked the required command and control apparatus with which to manage operations over such a distance. Therefore, EUFOR RD Congo depended on a member state that already possessed that standing military capability. Ultimately the EUFOR DR Congo provided the EU with much-needed experience and confidence, resulting in a blueprint for future EU interventions.

Case Study: Lebanon

Conflict in the Middle East is not new to Europeans. The French and the British have a long and storied experience fighting and peacekeeping in the Middle East. Since the creation of Israel in 1948 there has been continuous conflict between Israel and her neighbors. A major front in this conflict has taken place along the contentious Israel-Lebanon border. The UN has been deeply involved providing peacekeepers and monitors along the border to prevent an escalation of violence. At the conclusion of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, the UN asked the EU to provide peacekeepers to monitor the UN backed ceasefire agreement. After careful debate, the EU
decided not to send peacekeepers. This case reveals the considerations that influenced the EU to
decline a military intervention in Lebanon.

The 2006 United Nations peacekeeping operation in Lebanon was arguably an obvious
engagement for the EU because it exhibited many of the same factors as the previous approved
EUFOR RD Congo mission. The ESS emphasized regional conflict management as one of the
three EU strategic objectives; specifically citing regional conflict in the Middle East as a vital
security threat.\textsuperscript{44} There was also an explicit request for third party intervention from both Israel
and Lebanon. The UN Security Council passed an official resolution legitimizing and
encouraging an EU engagement. In Lebanon, a ceasefire was in place temporarily keeping both
parties separated from each other. Even the U.S. took a low-key but supportive posture towards
possible EU engagement. Despite the similarities between the Lebanon situation and that of the
DRC, the EU deliberately refused to engage in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon.
Understanding the differences between both cases help determine what influences played larger
roles in EU decision-making.

The proposed Lebanon operation was a subset of a much larger UN peacekeeping
operation called United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). On August 23, 2006, the
EU held an emergency meeting to discuss a request by the UN to deploy a EU military force to
augment UNIFIL.\textsuperscript{45} Potential factors that influenced the decision to intervene were: the EU’s
intent to raise its international profile, secession of open hostility, and EU member commitments
to military operations elsewhere. The historical background of the Israel-Lebanon conflict
provides context in which the EU declined to deploy troops to support the UNIFIL.

\textsuperscript{44}Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy,” http://ue.eu.int/

\textsuperscript{45}Kajsa Ji Noe Oest, “The EU as a Rectant Conflict Manager: The Case of Lebanon 2006,”
Lebanon had suffered 24 years of bloody civil war that systematically destroyed most of its infrastructure and national cohesion. External intervention contributed significantly to the escalation of violence. In 1982, Israel launched an offensive into Southern Lebanon to suppress hostile elements that launched cross-boarder attacks.\(^46\) In 1985, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres ordered a large Israeli troop withdrawal from Lebanon, and left only a modest contingent of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the allied Lebanese militia to guard a narrow 15-kilometer security zone paralleling the Israeli boarder. In May 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak made good on a campaign promise and complied with UN Security Council Resolution 425, withdrawing all Israeli forces to the internationally recognized border. The UN then created the UNIFIL to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. \((\text{see figure 5})\).\(^47\)

\(^{46}\)On 6 June 1982, the failed assassination attempt of Israel’s Ambassador to the U.K. by Muslim extremists triggered an Israeli invasion into Southern Lebanon. The purpose of the invasion was to expel the PLO, Syrian forces, and Muslim Lebanese forces.

Following the civil war, Syria intervened heavily in Lebanon’s internal affairs, chiefly through economic, military and intelligence intrusions. In April 2005, after more than 29 years, the UN and Syria agreed to a Syrian troop withdrawal from Lebanon. In July 2006, Hezbollah ambushed an Israeli patrol, killing three IDF soldiers and capturing two others. Subsequently, an additional five Israeli soldiers were killed while attempting to rescue the two captured soldiers. In response, Israel launched massive air and artillery strikes on Lebanon. On 13 July, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) executed Operation SPECIFIC GRAVITY, a pre-planned 34-minute strike against more than 50 of Hezbollah’s long-range rocket launchers.\(^4^8\) The massive aerial plummeting had

only mixed success, forcing the Israeli’s to conduct a major ground invasion into southern Lebanon. The Israeli ground invasion met heavy resistance and after a few months both Israel and Lebanon were ready for a ceasefire.

On August 11 2006, Israel and Lebanon agreed on a ceasefire laid out in UN Resolution 1701. The UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan, envisioned that 9,000 of the additional 15,000 UNIFIL peacekeepers would come from the European states. This expectation had evolved from an exploratory dialog with EU representatives. Since the EU had announced the creation of a new Battle Group, the UN was hopeful that the EU could expeditiously deploy forces with few impediments. EU peacekeepers where considered vital for immediate stability and a sustained ceasefire. UN planning unrealistically called for a portion of the UNIFIL augmentation to land in South Lebanon as early as 16 August. However, a full month after the ceasefire agreement only a fraction of the additional UNIFIL peacekeepers were in place. The situation on the ground became more desperate and the UN brokered ceasefire was at risk of unraveling.

The expanded UNFIL peacekeeping mission in Lebanon was problematic from Israel’s point of view. Israel commonly viewed UN peacekeepers as sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Prior to the 2006 ceasefire, there was a call from Israeli to replace the perceived inept UNIFIL forces already on the ground. Israeli officials accused UNIFIL of incompetence and open collaboration with Hezbollah. Led by a French General, the initial UNIFIL force contingent included 2,000 soldiers from France, China, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, and Poland. The first UNIFIL mandate specified three tasks: verify Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist Lebanese government efforts to restore its authority in the area.49 Despite this demanding charge, the UN gave UNIFIL a very narrow operational scope and restrictive rules of engagement. Ultimately, a frustrated Israel publically stated that the “UN

record on the border had undermined Israeli confidence in the ability of an international force to maintain the peace.”

It was clear that the Israelis wanted a predominately European or NATO force that could maintain the peace and disarm Hezbollah.

Against the Lebanese backdrop, the EU aspired to raise its profile in the Middle East. The EU was already the main provider of humanitarian aid in the region and now wanted to prove its credibility as a global security partner. When UN Secretary Kofi Annan asked Europe to assume a leading role, the EU seriously considered military engagement in Lebanon as UNIFIL peacekeepers. While the political debate commenced in the European Council, the EUMS simultaneously started to conduct contingency planning. However, the first planning requirement was to designate a lead nation. The EU lacked an independent command and control structure able to manage a robust peacekeeping force. The EU still required one of its three largest members, France, Germany, and U.K., to provide the facilities and platforms to command and control a peacekeeping force.

Although initially interested in raising the EU’s global profile as a credible security partner, EU political momentum quickly waned. The three most influential EU members and the most likely force providers were reluctant to accept the mantle of lead nation. The U.K. rejected the role because it was decisively engaged in both Iraq and Afghanistan. There was simply no internal domestic political or military support for a third engagement. Germany was very hesitant from the beginning, often delaying key EU decisions in order to allow further debate. German Chancellor Angela Merkel ruled out ground troops citing fears for their safety. Germany was already committed in Afghanistan and the Merkel government lacked the political capital needed

50Mark Regev, spokesmen for the Israeli Foreign Ministry

51Katarina Engberg, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene? the EU and the Military Option in the Lebanon War Of,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11, no. 4 (December 2010): 408.

to support another ground force deployment outside Europe. The specter of post-World War II isolationism had been re-ignited within segments of the German population. Additionally, there was the unique Holocaust cultural sensitivity that risked German soldiers possibly operating against Israeli/Jewish soldiers. This political issue was absent in the Afghan situation and other EU engagements. Grudgingly, Germany acquiesced to providing a small naval contingent if absolutely necessary. The only possible remaining EU lead nation was France.

Initially, France welcomed the call to lead the EU military engagement in Lebanon. After all, it had already garnered expertise from its previous UNIFIL participation. After momentarily basking in the leadership limelight, France realized that there was little support from other EU members. France quickly shifted its position from supporting an EU engagement to supporting a UN flagged peacekeeping force. It became obvious that EU members felt overcommitted, especially, because the new EU Battle Group was already dedicated as the strategic reserve for the EUFOR DRC mission. Ultimately, the UN could not depend on the EU to provide a robust peacekeeping force or an operational headquarters.

The inability to rapidly establish an operational headquarters consistently undermined EU engagement efforts. In 2006, the EU did not have an independent operational headquarters and relied on two options to fill headquarters shortfalls. The first was to rely on one of the five designated EU headquarters belonging to individual member states. The five designated EU headquarters belonged to France, U.K., Germany, Italy, and Greece. The second option was to use a NATO facility under the Berlin Plus arrangement. The idea of using the Berlin Plus

53 Judy Dempsey, “Germany Reluctant to Send troops as Backing is Sought for Mideast Resolution,” New York Times, August 6, 2006

arrangement was quickly dismissed owing to the EU’s excruciating experience in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{55} Furthermore, it was doubtful, according to Gen Jean-Paul Perruche, Director of the EU Military Staff, that a Berlin Plus arrangement would have been a workable solution since NATO support was not acceptable to all parties.\textsuperscript{56} Lebanese elements considered NATO as dominated by the U.S and too biased in favor of Israel. The option to rely on a framework nation withered when the “big three” declined to lead the intervention. Because the EU did not physically have the capability to operationally control peacekeepers and France, the U.K., and Germany limited their participation the EU decided to decline the UN request to lead the peacekeeping effort in Lebanon.

An important factor in the decision not to intervene was the potential for hostility to erupt between Hezbollah and Israel. A key component of UN Resolution 1701 was the disarmament of Hezbollah by the Lebanese government. The EU and Israel recognized that the Lebanese were incapable of disarming Hezbollah, noting that the Lebanese army had no units in Southern Lebanon with which to accomplish this task. Irish Defense Minister Willie O’Dea stated that “if Hezbollah does not disarm and the Israelis regroup, EU troops could be in mortal danger.”\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie compared Lebanon with French experiences in the Balkans where peacekeepers had been powerless to prevent civilian massacres while they were routinely susceptible to attacks by both parties.\textsuperscript{58} Italy also voiced concern about the possibility of violence escalating between Israel and Hezbollah with EU peacekeepers caught

\textsuperscript{55}EU used the Berlin Plus agreement when they took over responsibilities from NATO. However, the EU quickly found out that using NATO infrastructure meant NATO had to be consulted in most decisions, creating a very slow and painful decision-making process.

\textsuperscript{56}Katarina Engberg, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene? the EU and the Military Option in the Lebanon War Of,” \textit{Perspectives on European Politics and Society} 11, no. 4 (December 2010): 415.


between both warring factions. In the summer of 2006, Italy started to withdraw its forces from Iraq and was hesitant to get involved in another foreign military mission where the likelihood for casualties was high. The potential of escalating hostiles between Israel and Hezbollah was a decisive factor in deciding not to intervene in Lebanon.

The Lebanon case study suggests two determining factors that led to EU’s decision to decline a military operation in Lebanon. The first was the unwillingness of France, U.K., or Germany to act as lead nation. Since the EU did not physically have the capability to operationally control peacekeepers, the lack of support by France, U.K., and Germany was a determining factor in the EU’s decision to pass on leading the peacekeeping effort in Lebanon. The second determining factor was the potential for the mission to escalate into open hostility. In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, EU peacekeepers were kept away from the most volatile areas. The Lebanon mission called for the deployment of EU peacekeepers to the most violent areas. No EU member had the political capital to support such a high-risk military operation. Ultimately, the EU clearly missed an opportunity to enhance its credibility as a security provider by passing on the peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. Consequently, the EU’s image as a dependable peacekeeper entity suffered great damage. The UN, allies, and the warring parties all felt they had been let down by the EU.

Case Study: EUNAVFOR Atalanta

Since the creation of the Eurozone, the EU has surpassed China and the U.S. as the largest importer and exporter of goods throughout the world. The EU economy generates a GDP of over $16.5 trillion making it the largest economy in the world.59 The protection of the EU economy represents a strategic interest to member states. The EU antipiracy mission off the coast

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of Somalia; i.e., EUNAVFOR Atalanta, is a compelling case study because it was the first time the EU used new decision-making authority granted under the CSDP, to directly protect EU markets and interests. Member states generally agreed that the mission was in their common interest. The mission was also mandated by a UN Security Council Resolution. The U.K. performed the lead nation responsibilities to include the employment of aircraft, ships, and personnel from France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. EUNAVFOR Atalanta was able to project a measured response to a known threat. As an enduring accomplishment, EUNAVFOR Atlanta established a new standard for the successful modern day capture and prosecution of pirates based on international maritime law.

In November 2008, the EU became alarmed over the impact of increased piracy and armed robbery at sea, specifically off the coast of Somalia. The ESS highlighted piracy as a new dimension of organized crime, often a result of state failure. The EU had designated piracy as one of several transnational criminal activities that posed a direct threat to its member states. While pirates had been active off the waters of Somalia for decades, 2008 witnessed four major developments associated with Somalia’s protracted civil war. First, the number of attacks increased dramatically over a very short period of time. Second, pirates began to take hostages and ask for ransoms rather than just seize cargo. Third, the types of ships targeted evolved from small cargo vessels to large super carriers, previously thought to be safe from attack. Finally, the operational range of the pirates increased beyond 500 nautical miles. The pirates showed increased sophistication and audacity by positioning mother ships to launch daring and successful...
raids. In short order, this ingenuity combined with the breath of attacks made Somalia the new piracy capital of the world; a title previously held by Indonesia.62

Figure 4. Expansion of Pirate Operations

Source: EUNAVFOR/IMB

Somali pirate attacks had crossed the threshold from annoyance to become a major commercial and security threat for EU member states. During the first nine months of 2008, the International Maritime Bureau reported 63 cases of piracy and robbery off the coast of Somalia. These armed attacks by Somali pirates resulted in the capture of more than 200 people and 13 vessels.63 In addition to major cargo losses, maritime insurance companies had to pay millions of dollars in ransom for the return of insured personnel and property. The propensity for maritime insurance companies to pay such high ransoms only encouraged increased piracy. Beyond the

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mounting insurance costs, piracy represented a threat to EU member states on several levels. Foremost, piracy constituted a direct security threat to EU member state citizens. Routinely, pirates targeted Europeans for kidnapping because they perceived EU nations were likely to pay a ransom. In addition to the personal safety of their sea-going citizens, EU member states were obligated to protect ships sailing under their respective national flags. With 20% of global trade passing through the Gulf of Aden, the escalating piracy posed a significant threat to both the world and European economies.

The escalating piracy resulted in costly delays to the flow of European maritime commerce and negatively influenced EU market competitiveness. In addition to major shipping lane diversions, some shipping companies opted to totally reroute the flow of commerce away from the horn of Africa—all at a significant expense in time and money. Adding to increase maritime insurance costs, many shipping companies paid their crews a premium for transiting known pirate waters. In one year alone, insurance for cargo passing through the Gulf of Aden soared from $900 to $9,000; a huge economic drain considering that over 16,000 ships transited the area yearly. The accumulating piracy costs included; ransom payments (estimated at 20-30 million dollars in 2008), millions of dollars in extra fuel costs to avoid attacks, skyrocketing insurance premiums, and the expense of hiring private security escorts (estimated at up to 100,000 dollars per transit). These compounding expenses, totaling hundreds of millions of dollars, added to the economic drag on a struggling Europe facing recession. By November 2008, the Secretary-General of the European Community Ship-owners Association (ECSA), which represented 41% of the global merchant fleet, was specifically calling on EU member states to

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64 Most EU citizens targeted were either recreational yachters or fisherman.
65 Many shipping companies opted to use the longer Cape of Good Hope shipping route, however, increasing fuel costs eventually nullified this option.
take forceful action against piracy off the Somali coast. 67 The ECSA wanted not only security
escorts, but also military reprisals against the pirates.

Based on the location of pirate activity and support bases, security analysts voiced
concern that the pirates would develop symbiotic links with regional terrorist groups. Somali
pirates had already forged links to warlords and militias in Somalia and Yemen, including a
developing relationship with the Al-Shabaab group in Somalia. 68 As long as pirate attacks proved
increasingly profitable, the attraction of easy money, access to cargo and international notoriety
offered strong incentives for potential terrorist partners. Although direct links remained unproven,
the potential was sobering. This concern was heightened in September 2008, when pirates
captured a Ukrainian freighter, the MV Faina. The ship was loaded with military hardware
including grenade launchers, anti-aircraft weapons, 33 Russian-made T-72 tanks, and a huge
amount of ammunition. Quick actions by the US Fifth Fleet prevented the MV Faina from sailing
to the Somali coast and offloading the military cargo. Eventually the pirates received a ransom in
exchange for the ship. However, it was not lost on EU members and the U.S. that pirates held the
potential means to act as arms merchants supplying and collaborating with terrorist organizations.

A secondary EU concern was the potential marine environment risk posed by piracy.
Indeed, the targeting of oil and chemical super tankers brought this risk to a completely new
level. The ESS identified the security implication of natural or man-made environmental
disasters. 69 Somali pirate’s indiscriminate use of heavy machine gun fire and rocket-propelled
grenades had the ability to crack tanker hulls. The resulting huge release of petro chemicals posed

67 Miles Costello, “Shipping Insurance Cost Soars With Piracy Surge Off Somalia,” The Times
January 8, 2013).

68 Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International

an unthinkable threat to the marine environment. The mere threat to discharge these petrochemicals into coastal waters could prove a viable mean with which to extort ransoms. Given the horrific effects of historical tanker accidents (e.g., the *Exxon Valdez* in 1989 or the *Erika* in 1999), world leaders feared that the increasingly audacious pirate attacks would eventually result in a marine disaster. This fear escalated when security planners realized that terrorist organizations could partner with pirates and hijack tankers to create targeted massive coastal pollution.

Following the dramatic surge in the number of pirate attacks; the UN Security Council passed several resolutions intended to manage the problem. Resolution 1816 authorized states to use “within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery”.\(^70\) Following the UN Security Council resolution, France initiated draft military options for EU consideration. France argued that a naval operation would be a measured response to a mounting security and economic threat. Additionally, EU engagement would expand the Union’s scope of action and help reinforce EU values. Most members of the European Council publicly supported the mission. It offered an unfettered and UN sanctioned opportunity for the EU to finally defend its economic and security interests outside the European continent.

Initially, the U.K. and Germany were reticent to contribute naval forces under the EU banner. The U.K. preferred a NATO led mission because the U.K. viewed the alliance as a more proven and competent partner. Furthermore, NATO had extensive experience in securing and policing the sea-lanes. However, NATO was already fully engaged in Afghanistan and did not want to become overcommitted. Thus, the U.K., itself a significant naval power, grudgingly

supported the mission, recognizing that it had to act even if it was under EU authority. The U.K.’s enthusiasm for the mission warmed only when the EU agreed that a British rear admiral would command Atalanta and that the EU’s operational headquarters would be located at Northwood in the United Kingdom. Since the mission began in December 2008, Atalanta forces have successfully conducted over 100 escorts of foreign vessels through the pirate-contested waters. Further, these efforts have enabled the delivery of over 492,000 tons of food aid to the World Food Program saving countless lives. Moreover, the ESCA reported that piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia have dropped by more than 50 percent largely due to the naval forces of Atalanta.

EUNAVFOR Atalanta case suggests that the protection of vital strategic interests and the operational leadership and capabilities of the EU’s “big three” were determining factors in the decision by the EU to intervene off the coast of Somalia. The costly impact of piracy to the EU economy and the potential collaboration of Somali pirates with terrorists provided a direct threat to EU strategic interests. A reoccurring theme in the case studies is the EU’s limited ability to operationally manage military engagements from a purely EU facility. Even by 2009, the EU depended on the operational leadership and capabilities of one of the EU’s “big three” member-states. Ultimately, EUNAVFOR Atalanta was able to project a measured response to a known threat to European trade and once again prove that it could be a viable security provider.

EU Decision Criteria

The three case studies suggest that there are many interdependent factors that contribute to EU security decision-making. The EU when debating whether to conduct a military operation

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72 Ibid.
considered duration, location, and the scope of the operation all. However EU approval for military intervention rested on four core factors. The four determining factors are: (1) clear EU strategic interests, (2) an international basis for mission legitimacy, (3) a willingness on the part of U.K., France and Germany, to provide the operational leadership, and (4) the cessation of open armed hostilities. All four of these factors were present in both the EUFOR RD Congo and EUNAVFOR Somalia missions. Unfortunately, in the case of Lebanon, some of the factors were absent, resulting in the decision by the EU not to intervene.

The first determining factor is whether the mission is a strategic interest to the EU. The EU parliament has sought to set forth strategic interests in EU policy and to reflect them in the CFSP, ESS, and CSDP. EU strategic interests are not limited to a fixed, narrowly defined premise. Rather, they also involve lofty notions such as the rule of law, protection against genocide, support for democracy, humanitarian assistance, military force, and peaceful conflict resolution. Although ultimately the decision to intervene comes down to a consensus among member states; these policy documents guide decision-makers in their approach to complex security issues.

The second determining factor is the perception of mission legitimacy by the international community. Establishing mission legitimacy gives the EU the moral authority to act in a military operation. If an operation lacks moral authority, it can affect a country’s decision to contribute troops. The EU influences other legitimate international organizations to confer third party legitimacy on their military engagements. The EU members have indicated through their actions and policies that the EU would prefer to provide military forces in response to a UN Security Council mandate. The EU recognizes the UN as the standard for international authority and the preferred institution for underwriting stability and security through multilateralism. All
three case studies had a binding UN Security Resolution authorizing action by the EU. To date, all EU military operations operated under a UN Security Council Resolution.73

The third determining factor is a willingness on the part of U.K., France and Germany to provide operational leadership. The EU’s ability to exercise military power remains, in large part, dependent on the military resources, planning capabilities and operational reach of France, U.K., and Germany. Perhaps as the EU grows in confidence and capability, other member-states; e.g., Italy, Greece and Poland, can grow into the framework nation role. However, it is unlikely that the EU will achieve an independent operational command and control architecture in the near future. The absence of this independent capability not only makes the “big three” senior partners in any engagement decision, but also limits the scope of any proposed mission. In the case of Lebanon, the unwillingness of France, U.K., and Germany to provide operational leadership was a decisive factor in the EU’s decision not to participate in the UNIFIL mission.

The fourth determining factor is the cessation of open armed hostilities. Member states do not want their military forces stuck in endless engagements that risk escalating casualties. Currently, the EU lacks the requisite consensus, supporting policy and military capabilities to launch and sustain prolonged high-intensity combat operations. Considering current economic realities, most European leaders defer to NATO for their collective security. However, the U.S. strategic rebalancing of its resources at the expense of Europe is viewed as but a harbinger of things to come. Countries such as France and Germany may welcome the U.S. shift towards the Pacific, assuming a diminished U.S. presence in Europe will encourage a more robust EU. Other EU countries, such as the U.K. and Italy, are more reluctant to totally depend on a Union that often has been criticized for indecisiveness and lacks the security arsenal that comes with a U.S.

partner. Although properly viewed as a subset of the four core criteria, mission duration and “war
weariness” play an important role in EU military engagement decisions. Due to potential
domestic political backlash and economic considerations, EU decision-makers look more
favorably on relatively short missions. Experience has shown when member states are committed
to military operations outside the EU framework their attitudes dampen towards participating in
EU military engagements.

Conclusion

The maturing of EU security policy has led to an expansion of EU military capability.
This policy evolution indicates a willingness to commit resources to promote regional security.
EU military operations generally involve significant threats to the EU’s common political,
economic, and security interests. The three case studies indicate that EU approval rests on four
core criteria. The four determining criteria are: (1) clear EU strategic interests, (2) an international
basis for mission legitimacy, (3) a willingness on the part of U.K., France and Germany, to
provide the operational leadership, and (4) the cessation of open armed hostilities. In addition to
these four EU decision-making criteria, the mission duration and war weariness also play a
secondary role in the decision to engage.

As the U.S. strategic focus incrementally pivots to the Pacific, American resources will
shift away from Europe. Europeans will face several options: accept much higher risks to their
security and values, slowly retreat into a form of regional isolationism, rely on the grace of
international organizations for world order, or contribute more to their own security well being.
The latter path will likely involve increased independent engagements beyond the European
continent. The four EU military engagement criteria distilled from the case studies offer some
promising insights. Based on historical examples, the criteria suggest under what circumstances
the EU is open to military engagement. The criteria equally delineate the much vaster array of
circumstances in which the EU would not entertain engagement. Certainly the EU would not act
without a UN resolution or have the ability to act in a large-scale high intensity armed conflict.

Unless the EU significantly strengthens its structure, cohesion, and capabilities, it cannot
hope to fill the partial power vacuum left by a refocused U.S. Tracking this unfolding
disequilibrium is important for U.S. security planners because it will help in determining where
the U.S. can assume strategic risk. Understanding the criteria under which the EU might consider
military operations will help U.S. strategic and operational planners develop “economy of force”
approaches that complement each other’s interest. As NATO’s relevancy diminishes and finite
U.S. resources focus on the Pacific, it would be wise for the U.S. to look towards the EU as a
strategic partner.


U.S. Library of Congress. “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s Rebalancing
Toward Asia.” CRS Report R42448, Washington, DC: Office of Congressional

3, 2012).