

TO STRIVE, TO SEEK, TO FIND, AND NOT YIELD:
HOW CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE ARMY LEAD
CHANGE

A Monograph

by

LTC Jerry A. Turner
United States Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Jerry A. Turner, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

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School of Advanced Military
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How does the Chief of Staff of the Army lead strategic change for the Army during post-war transitions? The Army is currently conducting a post-war transition after 10 years of continuous conflict and requires a methodology for leading change. What is more, the Army has conducted significant change during many post-war transitions with varying degrees of effectiveness. Failure to address the problem of how to lead change during post-war transitions will result in an Army that is too costly to the nation and less effective for the next war. Given this, there must be a model for the Chiefs of Staff to use in leading change during post-war transitions. In defining a model for the Chiefs of Staff to use during transition this research examines how to lead organizational change develops a model to guide change, and it then applies the model to previous Chiefs of Staff to assess how they led change. The model uses a combination of Stephen M. Covey's *The Speed of Trust*, Gordon R. Sullivan's "Leading Strategic Change in America's Army: The Way Forward." The research then applies the model to Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway, and Abrams as they led Army change during their post-war transitions. Finally, the research provides recommendations for future Chiefs of Staff to lead change during future post-war transitions.

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Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.

_____, Second Reader
G. Scott Gorman, PHD

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Thomas C. Graves, COL

Accepted this 23rd day of May 2013 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

TO STRIVE, TO SEEK, TO FIND, AND NOT YIELD: HOW CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE ARMY LEAD CHANGE, by LTC Jerry A. Turner, 75 pages.

How does the Chief of Staff of the Army lead strategic change for the Army during post-war transitions? The Army is currently conducting a post-war transition after 10 years of continuous conflict and requires a methodology for leading change. What is more, the Army has conducted significant change during many post-war transitions with varying degrees of effectiveness. Failure to address the problem of how to lead change during post-war transitions will result in an Army that is too costly to the nation and less effective for the next war. Given this, there must be a model for the Chiefs of Staff to use in leading change during post-war transitions.

In defining a model for the Chiefs of Staff to use during transition this research examines how to lead organizational change develops a model to guide change, and it then applies the model to previous Chiefs of Staff to assess how they led change. The model uses a combination of Stephen M. Covey's *The Speed of Trust*, Gordon R. Sullivan's "Leading Strategic Change in America's Army: The Way Forward." The research then applies the model to Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway, and Abrams as they led Army change during their post-war transitions. Finally, the research provides recommendations for future Chiefs of Staff to lead change during future post-war transitions.

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INTRODUCTION

Though much is taken, much abides; and though
We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are;
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

From the poem *Ulysses* by Alfred Lord Tennyson, 1842¹

As in *Ulysses*, Alfred Lord Tennyson's poem, today the United States Army faces a post-war transition. The Army will ask itself, much like the heroic captain Ulysses in the poem, what the nature of its future is, and what purpose it will serve. The United States Army has a varied history of answering these questions about the future of conflict and the future force during post-war transitions. Since the beginning of the post-World War II era, some Chiefs of Staff of the Army have been more successful at leading strategic change than others. The Army is required to predict the future in both the threats that the nation will face while simultaneously dealing with the challenges of post-war transition. In addition, the Army often faces a change in US strategic ends while simultaneously changing the ways and means of that strategy. As in previous post-war transition periods, for the US Army change will occur. The choice for the Army is how to manage and lead that change. For the Army, only in the nature of the change does it have a vote.

The history of the Army is replete with periods of difficult transition. The Army, like all of the US military, is a conservative organization that will resist change.² This resistance to

¹ *Brighthub Education*, (September 11, 2012) accessed at <http://www.brighthubeducation.com/homework-help-literature/121372-poetry-analysis-tennysons-ulysses/> (accessed March 18, 2013). Brighthub offers a simple characterization of the meaning of this stanza "He addresses the mariners and motivates them to seek unexplored avenues. Time is not in their favor, as they have grown old. Yet they may be capable of something noble and noteworthy. Though they are weak in bodily strength, they were strong in cerebral and intellectual ability. In addition, they were blessed with iron will."

² Jason M. Pape, "How the Army Resists Change" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, The US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), 10-29;

change is natural in large organizations and is not peculiar to the US Army. The Army has a long tradition of rapid drawdown, force restructuring, and adaptation following conflict. The United States Army is currently beginning its post-war transition after 10 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan and will continue to face these difficult decisions.

The decisions that Army Chiefs of Staff make on the future of the force occur more quickly in a post-war transition and arguably with less process than peacetime decisions. There simply is not the time to study every aspect of the threat, the organization, and the environment required to make the perfect decision. For example, the Army focused its post-World War II transition on pre-World War II plans.³ These conditions show the importance of how the Chiefs of Staff of the Army personally led change and shaped the direction the Army took as it changed from an organization at war to one prepared for the coming peace and the next war. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army focus the direction of change on many audiences that have equities in the future of the Army. The Army leadership must communicate its vision of change to both its internal and external audiences. For example, its external audiences, particularly the administration and Congress, shape the Army and its future. The Chiefs of Staff leading change shapes the force for the next conflict. Is there a model for the Chief of Staff to use that answers the questions of how to lead change beyond the simple questions posed by Ulysses to his crew?

Lessons learned from the previous conflict often shape how the Chiefs of Staff lead change during post-war transitions. The central idea within *The Army Operating Concept of 2010* demonstrates the difficulty the Chiefs of Staff face in leading change. Like Ulysses, asking what will become of him and his men, the Army concept and developments are methods the Chiefs of

Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil Military Relations from FDR to George Washington*. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 14-19.

³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, Edited by Robert H. Ferrell (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1981), 133-151.

Staff uses to ask what will become of the Army. The concept has two key components. The first is success in the future security environment requires Army forces capable of defeating its enemies. The second offers, the Army is required to establish conditions necessary to achieve national objectives. The concept challenges the Army to do so using combined arms maneuver and wide area security to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative as part of decisive action.⁴ The Army operating concept describes the tensions created from the last 10 years of war as well as the recognition that the Army mission will be different in the future. The Army has struggled with defining its mission in a similar fashion following past US conflicts. First, does the Army focus on the enemy? For example, does the Army go back to doing what it believes it does best with combined arms maneuver in the absence of a credible threat? Second, does the Army focus on other types of operations whether peace keeping/peace enforcement, counter-insurgency (COIN) or the like? This concept describes the question of what does the Army become. In addition, it displays the tensions senior leaders face in describing how to lead change for the organization.⁵ It is relatively common knowledge that the Army has had similar arguments about its role in national security following every war of the last one-hundred years.

There is also the dichotomy of capturing lessons learned of the “big war,” vice “the other

⁴ TRADOC, *Pam 525-3-1* (Fort Monroe: Training and Doctrine Command, 2010); Martin E. Dempsey, *Win, Learn, Focus, Adapt, Win Again* (Washington, D.C.: Army Magazine, 2011), 8-9. Then Chief of Staff of the Army, and Current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on the importance of concepts to the Army and explanation of the Army Operating Concept. According to the Army, the Army Operating Concept explains how the Army will comply with the Army Capstone Concept that the Army released in January 2009. This document serves as an example of leading change and how the Army provides strategic guidance. The Army released a new Army Capstone Concept on 12 December 2012 and it follows that a new Army Operating Concept is in the works.

⁵ Many continue to argue that these two missions are separate and immutable, and that the Army should focus on one or the other. Others argue the Army has the responsibility to do all missions. For examples sees Conrad C. Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002); Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002)

wars.” Of the two, does the Army focus on decisive action similar to World War II and Desert Storm? Alternatively, the Army must decide whether it focuses on lessons from the “other wars” including limited wars exemplified by Korea and Vietnam, the stability operations of the 1990s, or the COIN operations of the 2000s. There may be a false argument hidden in the choice in that many think it forces the Army to choose between the current conditions of COIN and the future condition of decisive action operations.⁶ This struggle for understanding characterizes the Army in many of the past post-war transitions and Army drawdowns. Can there be a model to assist the Army in evaluating these questions?

The Army requires a model for the Chiefs of Staff to plan, prepare, and lead change. It cannot simply restate Ulysses’ questions. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army uses this model to lead strategic change into the future. With Ulysses in mind, the thesis of this paper is that by applying a model for leading change during post-war transitions the Chief of Staff of the Army is better able to lead change during post war transitions. This monograph use a model based on a combination of General Gordon R. Sullivan’s article “Leading Strategic Change in America’s Army: The Way Forward” and Stephen M.R. Covey’s book *The Speed of Trust*.⁷ Using this model the research assesses how previous Army Chiefs of Staff led change during previous post-war transitions. This process then identifies strengths and weaknesses in their leading change. The research then applies the strengths and weakness of the Chiefs of Staff leading change to develop recommendations for future Chiefs of Staff.

This research accomplishes five tasks to test this thesis. First, it examines how multiple

⁶ Leonard L. Lira, “Transformation and the Evolution of the Professional Military Ethic: A Current Assessment” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2010), 13-16.

⁷ Stephen M.R. Covey, *The Speed of Trust* (New York: Free Press, 2006); Gordon R Sullivan, "Leading Strategic Change in America's Army: The Way Forward," *Planning Review* 23, no. 5 (1995): 16-19.

Chiefs of Staff of the Army shaped the organization during periods of post-war transition.

Second, it defines how each Chief of Staff's vision for the Army drove change. Third, it identifies how they provided the direction of change to lead their vision. Fourth, it assesses the impacts of the change the Chiefs led, on the Army. Finally, the monograph makes recommendations on how senior leaders can lead strategic change in the future.

The direction the Chiefs of Staff take to lead strategic change determines how the Army sees itself now and for the future. The process this research takes is to examine first academic and military ideas for leading change in order to develop a model to review previous post-war transitions. The research then completes a qualitative comparative study of selected Army Chiefs of Staff by examining how they led and executed strategic change in the Army during post-war transitions. The research then examines Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower (Army Chief of Staff after World War II), Matthew B. Ridgway (Army Chief of Staff following the war in Korea), and finally Creighton W. Abrams (Army Chief of Staff following the war in Vietnam). For each of the Chiefs of Staff the research answers what were the key lessons learned from their wartime experiences. Then it answers what was the effect of those lessons on leading change for the Chiefs of Staff. The research then examines the goals of change as seen by the Army Chiefs of Staff looking at the nation's vision of the future. It then applies those goals to examine the Army's vision of its role in serving the nation. Finally, the research concludes by answering how the Chiefs of Staff achieved the organizational change during post-war transition and the effects of that change in preparation for the next war.

EXPLANATION OF LEADING CHANGE

And through all this welter of change and development, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars. Everything else in your professional career is but corollary to this vital dedication. All other public purpose, all other public projects, all other public needs, great or small, will find others for their accomplishments; but you are the ones who are trained to fight.

Gen. of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Farewell Speech, May 12 1962⁸

The challenge to understanding how past Chiefs of Staff of the Army have led strategic change is the lack of a model for leading change. This model provides a common understanding of organizational change. There are sound arguments that the language of leading change is no longer adequate to understand change in large organizations. This is especially true for the Army, given the complexities of the world and the environments in which they operate. This lack of a model prevents the Army or any large organization from processing what is required for an organization to adapt and thrive.⁹ Among the many external and internal challenges, including resource constraints, manpower drawdowns, and force restructuring, the Army must think about how it changes. The challenge for the Chief of Staff is to lead change, during post-war transitions, that is in many cases fundamental strategic change. The quote from General MacArthur (above) is an example of recognizing the pitfalls of change for the Army. McArthur could not have been clearer or more precise. His description of the role of change and the Army's role for the nation are succinct and decisive. The US military has not always used this level of precision to describe leading change during post-war transitions because of a lack of a model for leading change.

The problem of leading and communicating strategic change magnifies itself in large

⁸ Douglas MacArthur, *Farewell Speech to West Point* (The National Center for Public Policy Research. May 12, 1962) accessed at <http://www.nationalcenter.org/MacArthurFarewell.html> (accessed March 18, 2013).

⁹ Robert J. Marshak, "Changing the language of change: how new contexts and concepts are challenging the ways we think," *Strategic Change 11*, no. 5 (August 2002): 279-286.

organizations. The challenge of leading strategic change is not unique to the military. Although, for the military, the effects of change and the precision required may be unique. John P. Kotter, a leading academic on organizational change, highlights there are two challenges in communicating organizational change.¹⁰ First, Kotter describes that in order for change to take place there needs to be a shared sense of a desirable future. Leaders, subordinates, and consumers of the organization need to see personal, professional, and organizational benefits to reach the shared sense of a desirable future. Secondly, he describes two pitfalls to reaching the shared sense of a desirable future, there is an under communication of the vision and secondly inconsistent messages.¹¹ How previous Chiefs of Staff have led strategic change has, at times, been imprecise. They and the Army have lacked a model to describe how the Army would change. Likewise, Chiefs of Staff have occasionally only identified the need to change rather than the desired end state of change. For the Army it is not enough to say the Army will focus on professionalism, or “go back to the basics,” or other directions of change that tends to look backwards without forward thinking. This kind of imprecise direction adds to the uncertainty about the Army’s role for the nation in the future. Precise direction for leading change is required across all complex organizations but the level of importance for the Army is in fact unique.

¹⁰ For an excellent discussion of using Kotter to understand change in the Army see Richard S. Jeffress, “Leading Change: A Model for Transformation Initiatives in Today's Army” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2003). Jeffress uses Kotter’s eight-stage process for change to evaluate Ridgway’s transformation of the Eighth Army in Korea, the development of AirLand Battle doctrine, the pentomic division reorganization, and the transformation efforts of the Army in the late 1990’s. Jeffress also mentions using Gordon R. Sullivan’s work from *Hope is not Method*.

¹¹ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Harvard: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 15-16. Kotter is a leading academic on leading change. He has published over 18 books, and in 2001 *Business Week* magazine rated Kotter the #1 “Leadership Guru.” He describes eight common errors to organizational change efforts; Allowing too much complacency, failing to create a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition, underestimating the power of vision, under communicating the vision by a factor of 10, permitting obstacles to block the new vision, declaring victory too soon, and neglecting to anchor changes firmly in the corporate culture.

For the Army, another significant challenge in understanding how to lead change is the choice between bottom-up approaches vice top down-approaches to change. Ulysses asks his mariners how they should change rather than personally forcing or leading change. This question is particularly important to the Army at this current stage in post-war transition. For the Army, much of the change over the last 10 years has been a bottom-up approach. Nevertheless, many argue that the direction of change is often a top down managerial style.¹² This may define how members of the Army listen to and understand the change the Army Chief of Staff is communicating to them. One of the most significant challenges for the Chiefs of Staff is avoiding communicating in a manner that the Army perceives as belittling. Especially, after conducting itself reasonably well during 10 years of continuous conflict.¹³ Often, these managerial top-down approaches to change create a series of have and have-not constituencies.¹⁴ In other words, only the managers have the ability to affect change whereas the subordinates can only accept that change. In a modern all volunteer force where soldiers are required to make, continually, a recommitment of their service to the nation, this simply will not work.¹⁵ The direction of leading change must ensure that it does not become an “us versus them” change relationship. It requires senior leaders to take into account the achievements of the organization as well as the required

¹²Leonard Wong, *Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 1-34; Raymond T. Odierno "Building on a Foundation of Strength: the Nation's Force of Decisive Action," *ARMY* (October 2011): 23-28. The current Chief of Staff describes a bottom up approach when he writes of Implicit and Universal Trust; Trust between Soldiers, Trust between Soldiers and Leaders, Trust between Soldiers/Families and the Army, and trust between the Army and the American People.

¹³ This has been a concern for the Army in the past and not simply an opinion of the Author. The post war periods of World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam all led to the perception of soldiers and junior officers treated unfairly.

¹⁴ David Collins, "Fixing the language of change? A response," *Journal of Organizational Change Management* 15, no. 5 (2003): 584-590.

¹⁵ Beth Bailey, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Belknap Press, 2009), 1-64.

change of subordinate leaders and their organizations.

This paper uses two models, used in the military, academic, and business world, to view how Chiefs of Staff can lead strategic change. The first model will be the military centric writing of Gordon R. Sullivan's "Leading Strategic Change in America's Army: The Way Forward."¹⁶ Gen. Sullivan is a noted expert on change having led the post-Cold War drawdown of the United States Army. He currently serves as President of the Association of the United States Army and is a significant speaker on organizational and business change. General Sullivan is famous for having said, "Smaller is not better, only better is better," to provide his vision to an Army drawing down following the Cold War.¹⁷ General Sullivan's ideas on leading strategic change are succinct and one of the many reasons his work on organizational change remains important to both business and academic leaders.

Sullivan makes six points for leading strategic change in the Army. First, he says the Army must redefine the enemy. This point focuses not only on the threat that the US may face but also on the role in which the Army believes it will play in facing those threats. Second, he sees the requirement for the Army to change and grow. There is tension and inertia by some elements in any large organization that will resist change. Sullivan believes the Army can defeat this inertia by making change a part of the culture. He further believes that an organization must change its organizational climate to embrace significant change. In a top down approach, he believes that the change and growth must come from the Army Chief of Staff's vision. Third, the Army inculcates its desired change and growth by sharing that change through doctrine. In many ways, doctrine defines the Army and how the Army sees itself. Significant organizational change therefore requires a doctrinal change to codify any new ideas. After describing to the Army the change

¹⁶ Sullivan, " Leading Strategic Change in America's Army," 16-19.

¹⁷ Gordon R. Sullivan, *Hope is not a Method* (New York: Broadway Books, 1996), 147-150.

required the Chiefs of Staff must change the Army's culture to implement the change.

General Sullivan's next three steps focus on the culture of change for the Army. In the fourth step, the Army must foster innovation. In a bottom up approach, he believes that in order to change there must be a climate accepting of innovation. Leading change in a hierarchal organization could create conditions that without innovation will cause the organization to stagnate and only wait for the next change given to it. Fifth, during all of this change, there is the risk to the Army of losing its identity and culture. To prevent the risk to Army of the loss of identity and culture, the Army must emphasize values. Any organizational change creates turbulence and too many changes can lead to unplanned for consequences. It is important to control the pace of change and reinforce basic organizational values. Lastly, Sullivan argues that the Army must break the current mold. In an organization as large as the Army, any change requires a myriad of other changes. Change in the right direction, figuratively requires the Army to break a few glasses along the way.¹⁸ General Sullivan's vision for changing the Army is comparable to other major military, academic, and business thinking on leading change.¹⁹

The second model the monograph uses to assess the effects of leading change is from Stephen M. R. Covey's book *The Speed of Trust*. One of Covey's main premises is that as you increase trust in an organization you increase the opportunity to achieve change. He argues that an

¹⁸ Sullivan, "Leading Strategic Change in America's Army," 16-19.

¹⁹ General Sullivan's six points for leading change in the Army are in line with modern academic thought. To prove the validity of his model the research looked at the work of John P. Kotter. John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Harvard: Harvard Business School Press, 1996). Kotter describes an eight-step model for the process of creating major change. The steps he describes are supporting evidence to General Sullivan's six steps (linked in parentheses). The steps are: establishing a sense of urgency (redefining the enemy), creating the guiding coalition (change and growth), developing a vision and strategy (sharing the vision through doctrine), communicating the change in vision and empowering broad-based action (fostering innovation), generating short-term wins and consolidating gains in producing more change (emphasizing values), and finally anchoring new approaches in the culture (breaking the mold).¹⁹ These eight steps are remarkably similar to Gen. Sullivan's six points for changing the Army and reinforce their utility in leading change.

increase in trust has a direct correlation to the speed of change (It then follows with an increase in trust and the correlation to an increase in the speed of change allows change to occur at a decreased cost to the organization). The reverse of this is also true in that a lack of trust between the leader and the subordinates of an organization increases the cost and decreases the speed of change. This is also true on the Army's relationship with Congress and the Administration. There has been a "trust cost" following many of America's wars.²⁰

Trust inside of the Army, between the leaders and the led, is obviously a significant issue for change in post-war transitions. Likewise, trust outside the Army between it and the American people and the other institutions of the nation are significant as well. In every war, Americans have fought for their country and returned to civilian life. The difference in the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is the use of an all-volunteer force that has been committed to 10 years of conflict. After the creation of the all-volunteer Army, citizens no longer see it as their patriotic duty to serve in a time of war.²¹ Citizens that make up the Army are now professionals and require long-term commitment from the organization and its leaders. For the Army there is a significant difference in the relationship between the leader and the led in the all-volunteer force of the present vice the draft force of past. This difference will influence how the Chiefs of Staff lead change in respect to trust and influence the Army's ability to change. To examine the effects of the Chiefs of Staff in leading change the research uses part of a Covey model for the speed of trust. Covey identifies the five waves of trust as self-trust, relationship trust, organizational trust, market trust, and societal trust. To limit the scope of this paper the research uses the first wave,

²⁰ For discussions on a "trust cost" between the military and the administration, see Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil Military Relations from FDR to George Washington*, 1-49 For the "trust cost" caused by Army culture, between the Army and congress see Stephen K. Scroggs, *Army Relations with Congress: Thick Armor, Dull Sword, Slow Horse* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 53-162. For the "trust cost" between the Army and its soldiers, see the biographies of Eisenhower, Ridgway, and Abrams.

²¹ Bailey, *America's Army*, 1-33.

self-trust, and “The Four Cores of Credibility,” in order to understand the effects of trust for the Chief of Staff in leading change.²²

Covey argues that there are four cores of credibility affecting an organization’s ability to change. This research will apply these four cores to establish the effect of trust on the Chiefs of Staff’s ability to lead change. Covey writes in depth about the definition of each core but (to limit the scope of this paper) a simplified definition is required. The goal in assessing the Chiefs of Staff on integrity, intent, capability, and results is to determine the perception of whether their behavior, in leading change, achieves the desired outcomes. These desired outcomes are only possible if based on the correct assumptions of the future. For example, simplistically, has the Chief of Staff led change to protect the nation and created a force suitable for the nation’s strategy? Alternatively, has the Chief led change for what are arguably the wrong reasons for example to protect prerogatives, force structure, or the institution? There is little doubt by this author no Chief of Staff of the Army after 40 years of service would lead change he believed to not to be in the best interest of the nation. That does not always mean that their methods matched their vision and intent.

Covey identifies the first core of credibility as integrity. In his book, his definition of integrity applies to how leaders act with congruence, humility, and courage. There must be a sense of integrating intent and behavior with the humility and courage to do the right thing for the Army and the nation. The question is not to ask if any Chief of Staff of the Army has lacked personal integrity. The question is rather has the Army lived up to what the Army and the nation demanded of it. The meaning of the word integrity, for a military audience is simply too heavy with meaning

²² Covey, *The Speed of Trust*, 41-124. The research focuses on the first wave of trust as it describes the requirement for internal trust and in particular the leader of the organization. This is the best fit for research on Chiefs of Staff. The other waves of trust including relationship trust, organizational trust, market trust, and societal trust could have application for the Army in further research.

to use without additional definition. Pape, in his study of how the Army resists change, offers the word hypocrisy, without “negative connotation of deliberate contradiction,” as a replacement for incongruence between behavior and intent for change in the military.²³ For the purpose of this paper, integrity simply explains any congruence or dissonance between intent and behavior without negative judgment. This research defines dissonance as any incongruence between behavior and intent. This does not overlook the fact that there can be integrity issues that can affect the speed of trust for the Army. For example, the fact that at least five current and former Generals at the rank of one-star or higher have been reprimanded or investigated, in late 2012, for possible misconduct in recent months effects the Army’s ability to communicate with its various audiences about change.²⁴ For the Army, this type of behavior could negatively effect the speed of trust both internally and externally.

The second core of credibility is intent. Covey describes intent as motive, agenda, and behavior. In other words, according to Covey, what is the reason for the Army to change, what type of agenda does the Army use for that change and what type of behavior does the Army display to achieve its motive and agenda. Intent will be defined as how motives, agenda and behavior allow the Chief of Staff to lead change and increase trust. The Chief of Staff’s motive, agenda, and behavior must be in line with that of congress and the administration in order to effectively serve the nation. This does not mean that disagreement is disrespect. Rather did the Chiefs of Staff lead change in ways and means to match the ends of strategy provided by the administration and/or congress.

The third core of credibility is capabilities. Capability examines how the Chief of Staff’s

²³ Pape, “How the Army Resists Change,” 25.

²⁴ Lolita C. Baldor and Robert Burns, *Army Times* (November 14, 2012) accessed at www.Armymtimes.com/new/2012/11/ap-5-generals-in-trouble-rock-military-111412 (accessed March 19, 2013).

talents, attitudes, skills, knowledge, and style impacted their ability to lead change and increase trust. Much like integrity, within military circles, there can be an assumption that of course each of the Chiefs of Staff, after many decades of service and rising to the top of their profession would have the capability to lead. Rather, the question is did they have the capability to lead change when faced with the daunting political, economic, and in many cases diplomatic challenges that are simply different for the Chiefs of Staff. The talents, attitude skills, knowledge, and style become particularly important to examine the capabilities of the Army Chiefs of Staff and their impact on leading change. The capabilities required are very different for a man commanding armies in the field then one working in Washington.

The final core of credibility is results. Covey sees results as simply achieving the bottom line. Even with ample intent, integrity, and capability it is possible that results do not achieve the change that the organization has set out to do. Results matter in life and death, as well as national security. This research will examine how the changes led by the Chiefs of Staff prepared the Army for the next conflict and further into the future. Simplisticly, this model will be applied to the conflict immediately following their tenure as Chief of Staff. The model will be applied to the Eisenhower Army in Korea, the Ridgway Army in Vietnam, and the Abrams Army in Desert Storm. The research then reviews the results of each Chief of Staff's ability to lead change and increase trust for the Army during post-war transition.

There are many papers, articles, and books about leading change in large organizations with often-conflicting points of view. To review them all is outside the scope of this work. The bottom line is the Chiefs of Staff require a model to lead change for the US Army. This paper will use a combination of General Sullivan's six points for leading change in the Army and Stephen Covey's four points of credibility to increase trust to provide a model. The model then assesses Eisenhower's, Ridgway's, and Abram's ability to lead change for the Army. The Sullivan/Covey model examines the ability of the Army Chiefs of Staff to lead change during post-war

transitions.²⁵ The model also provides recommendations for future Chiefs of Staff to lead change for the Army.

The research uses these two models to examine the Chiefs of Staff in leading change during post-war transitions. The Sullivan model is used to examine the equipment for change by applying it to how the Chiefs redefine the enemy, change and grow the Army, and then to codify those changes in doctrine. Likewise, it uses the Sullivan model to examine how the Army inculcates the required change into the Army culture. It examines how the Chiefs foster innovation, emphasize values, and how the Army breaks the mold. The Covey model looks at the requirement for trust in leading change. The research then applies the model to each Chief and examines their integrity, intent, capability, and finally the results of the change they led.

Why these Generals?

This monograph examines three specific Army Chiefs of Staff: Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower, Matthew B. Ridgway, and Creighton W. Abrams. The three Generals all led the United States Army in post-war transitions during the modern era. They served at the highest levels of command leading the war before they became Chief of Staff. They followed their assignments as wartime commanders to serve as the Chief of Staff during the following drawdown and transition. General Eisenhower became the first Chief of Staff to lead a post-war transition for the United States Army in the modern period following World War II.²⁶ Likewise,

²⁵ Donn A. Starry, "To Change an Army," *Military Review* (1983): 20-27. General Starry provides further support for the use of these two models. General Starry, widely credited as one of the leading architects of the post-Vietnam transition, to a superb modern military, agrees with these ideas of change. He highlights that the army must identify the need for change, that leading personalities must have the educational background and ability to avoid cultural bias, there must be a spokesperson for change and that spokesperson must be able to build consensus, there must be continuity at the top, and the changes identified are subject to trials. It has proven interesting to see how nested the ideas of leading change are between military leaders such as Sullivan and Starry are with academic leaders like Kotter and Covey.

²⁶ Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of*

General Ridgway led change for the United States Army during a post-war transition after its first limited war of the modern era.²⁷ Similarly, General Abrams was Chief of Staff during the post-war transition following an unpopular war and in a transition to an all-volunteer force.²⁸ These three case studies provide examples, which are the closest in context, as the Army goes through its current post-war transition. To limit the scope of this paper, and for the previously stated unique reasons, the research focuses on these three Chiefs of Staff.²⁹

GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

I would rather try to persuade a man to go along, because once I have persuaded him, he will stick. If I scare him, he will stay just as long as he is scared, and then he is gone.

Attributed to General Dwight Eisenhower³⁰

Lessons Learned From War

General Eisenhower's service to the nation during World War II as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, focused on the building of a winning coalition and providing the resources to achieve combat success. These two subjects would be his overriding concern during the rest of Eisenhower's leadership in national security, to include his time as Chief of Staff and as

the United States of America (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1984), 471-475. 471-480.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 508-530.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 565-571

²⁹ Examining other Generals serving as Chief of Staff for their ability to lead change during post-war transitions could have included General John J. Pershing, General Maxwell D. Taylor, or General Gordon R. Sullivan. These three former Chiefs of Staff all would have met the criteria for selection in this research as they all lead their military organizations during the end of the previous conflict yet only to assume duties as Chief of Staff following the war. The research omits Generals Pershing, Taylor, and Sullivan for this research only to limit the scope of the work for this monograph.

³⁰ John J. Pitney Jr., *The Art of Political Warfare* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 43.

President. As Supreme Allied Commander in Europe he had seen the requirement for a coalition type of warfare both for legitimacy and to provide resources. He, like President Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II, eventually came to see the need for military officers to serve as diplomats as well as combat leaders.³¹ As Chief of Staff and later as President he believed to reduce the resource demand on the US other nations, in conjunction with the US, were required to fight wars. In addition, the General had also learned the economic cost of war. General Eisenhower foresaw that in the future the US required a strong security apparatus to maintain the peace. His wartime experience taught him that wars in the end were about logistics, with numbers of men, planes, tanks, etc., in direct competition with the cost of everything else needed by the nation to accomplish its strategy. A military commander simply could not have everything he wanted.³²

Eisenhower's Goals for Change

The end of World War II marked the beginning of a new era for the United States in the international arena. The nation, exhausted by war, began with a rapid de-mobilization following the end of hostilities.³³ The US rapidly learned that the threat of the Soviet Union and advent of nuclear weapons and delivery means capable of reaching across continents meant the United States could no longer expect to maintain the defense policies of the previous century and a half. Stephen Ambrose would write, "Amid the casualties of World War II lay the corpse of traditional American defense policy."³⁴ The US focused on a Europe in shambles and a new threat to the

³¹ Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency*, 23-51.

³² *Ibid.*, 23-51, 84-88.

³³ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 363-381.

³⁴ Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower: (vol 1) Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect (1893-1952)* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 433-457.

east from the Soviet Union. Because of this view, the United States would see Europe as a focal point of this east-west clash. This would force the United States to look to new policies of nuclear deterrence and collective security. Russell Weigley defined this period for the US Military as “The Atomic Revolution.”³⁵ The advent of the threat of nuclear warfare meant the focus and resources of the US military would remain on its nuclear capability. The resource decision had at its heart this capability and the high-tech means required by the Air Force and Navy to deliver it rather than a large standing Army.³⁶

General Eisenhower and the US Army took three significant lessons from World War II. First, for the United States Army was a belief that a Universal Military Training (UMT) program was required. UMT would take a constabulary force and return it to the military machine, similar to the Army of World War II, that the US believed it required to fight the next war. It would focus on rapidly generating combat power as it had during World War II. Secondly, in order to mobilize those trained through a UMT program selective service would have to continue well into the future. The manpower requirements to meet worldwide commitments were immense and some form of compulsory service would be required. Third, General Eisenhower had learned that the future security of the US intertwined collectively with Europe’s security.³⁷ Noted historian Stephen Ambrose points out these lessons were not all General Eisenhower’s but those of the Army and its World War II Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall. General Eisenhower clearly followed the path laid out by General Marshall at the end of World War II. Some have accused him of not having much original thought about the future of the Army. For General Eisenhower it was clear during the early part of his tenure that he did not see the world had

³⁵ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 363-381.

³⁶ Millet and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 471-475.

³⁷ Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 433-457.

changed following World War II. Using General Sullivan's six steps for organizational change allows for an evaluation of the effectiveness of General Eisenhower's ability to lead change in the US Army following World War II.³⁸

Eisenhower Leading Change

General Eisenhower and the US Army struggled with redefining the enemy immediately after World War II. The US Army was more concerned with keeping the force structure required for its constabulary missions, both in Europe and Japan, than looking to future conflict. The world changed rapidly in the first year after World War II with the rise of the Soviet threat. It would actually take most of his two years as Chief of Staff for General Eisenhower to come to a deeper understanding of what the Cold War would eventually look like. Nevertheless, he rapidly saw that the enemy would be ideological and the future would be a competition for nations' allegiance to an ideology and their support to one of the two opposing ideological blocks.³⁹ General Eisenhower, just as rapidly, did not see the enemy as a purely military threat. He saw the requirement for a "whole of government approach" to a threat he saw as multi-dimensional from the standpoints of military, economics, ideology, and diplomacy. Eisenhower and the Army met internal as well as external opposition in redefining the enemy according to the Sullivan model. General Eisenhower, because of this opposition, was unable to redefine the enemy that would allow him to lead change for the Army.⁴⁰ Military Commitments, political and economic factors were redefining the enemy for him. The advent of the nuclear age, rapidly advancing technology

³⁸ It has been a greater challenge to find as much in the historical record of General Eisenhower leading change as in the next two Chiefs of Staff examined. The historical record for the period of Eisenhower's tenure as Chief of Staff focuses much more on his preparation for future endeavors. This is instructive as it demonstrates that the institution changes regardless of whether the Chief of Staff leads or not.

³⁹ Millet and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 471-504.

⁴⁰ Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 440-443.

(e.g. jet engines and long-range missiles), and manpower intensive constabulary missions undermined Eisenhower's ability to look to the future. He was unable to see an enemy the US Army would have a preeminent role in defeating. Eisenhower spends far more time focused on manpower, budgets, military unification, and demobilization than in seizing any opportunity to change and grow the Army.⁴¹ Because of the struggles with redefining the enemy, the Army experiences challenges to changing and growing in the post-World War II transition.⁴²

The Army and General Eisenhower struggled with developing a way forward and therefore change and growth were extremely limited during his tenure as Chief of Staff. To partially explain the post-World War II lack of change and growth, historian Russell Weigley has written, "the historic preoccupation of the Army's thought in peacetime has been the manpower question: how, in an unmilitary nation, to muster adequate numbers of capable soldiers quickly should war occur. At the close of World War II the Army's thoughts about its role and mission returned to that historic preoccupation."⁴³ As stated previously, Eisenhower closely aligned himself with the previous Chief of Staff's programs of Universal Military Training, and demobilization plans. He had little original to say about changing the Army for the future.

Change and growth was notably limited during Eisenhower's term as Chief of Staff. General Eisenhower saw himself as a politician. After his appointment as the Chief of Staff of the Army, he would spend much of his time on increasing his understanding of things other than the future of the Army. His personal diaries spoke more about economics, politics, and diplomacy

⁴¹ Resource constraints and limitations are not necessarily prohibitive to changing and growing the Army. In the context of the post-World War II Eisenhower was following the nation's lead and its traditional historical pattern of returning its citizen soldiers to civilian life. Growth as an institution is still possible even with reduced resources. As will be discussed, both Ridgway and Abrams are actually able to increase combat power during a post-war drawdown.

⁴² Millet and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 471-504.

⁴³ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 502.

than the future of the Army.⁴⁴ It was not easy for him to transition from supreme commander of an Army, with a single goal of defeating the enemy, to a different kind of leader. He became a leader merely among equals, forcing him to compete for resources with the rest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Not only did he have to protect Army resources but was also required to protect what would be, within two years' time, an independent Air Force. Air Force structures, resources, missions, and budget were under attack from the Navy. General Eisenhower was in a constant fight for resources amongst his peers and other services in his dealings with Congress and the administration. General Eisenhower clearly did not enjoy his time as Chief of Staff of the Army. He saw little in his daily life other than paperwork and dealing with bureaucratic or resource issues.

One area where he was successful in changing and growing the military was in his ability to oversee the creation of the National War College. Obviously proposed prior to his appointment to Chief of Staff, Eisenhower was an enthusiastic supporter of the National War College. He saw it as a way to tackle problems at the strategic level.⁴⁵ This may have been the single best idea showing change and growth of General Eisenhower's tenure as Chief of Staff.

General Eisenhower also struggled to share his vision for the Army through doctrine. General Eisenhower seemed to be particularly unconcerned about how to get his message across. It is difficult, and possibly unfair, to compare how to share a vision across generations. The generational differences primarily exist in the differences in technology and media access.

⁴⁴ Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, 133-147.

⁴⁵ Report of War Department, *Military Education Board on Educational Systems for Officers of the Army. Decision Paper* (Washington, DC: War Department General Staff Organization and Training G-3, 1945), 28-29. This report, also known, as the Gerow report, provides an excellent discussion on the requirement for a National War College. The board believed that the nature of coalition warfare and the complexity of modern warfare required a different level of education and requirements. It is important to note that the Gerow board did not highlight the need for each service to have its own Senior Service College.

General Eisenhower turned down many opportunities to speak on behalf of his ideas of the future and the Army's role in the future.⁴⁶ The Chief of Staff believed the demands on his time were too great, the more he spoke the less other people would listen. He also believed many of the subjects asked of him to speak about were clearly not in the purview of the Army. He was unable to capitalize on his fame and stature to sell Congress and the American people on the requirement for a strong Army to fulfill national commitments. It is interesting to note, General Eisenhower eventually saw America was under attack by an opposing ideology bent on the defeat of the US. In spite of this, he did not use war mongering or scare tactics to articulate why he believed the US must remain strong militarily. His was a far more optimistic and focused messaging on using strength to maintain peace.

General Eisenhower struggled share his vision because he was not the only spokesperson for the Army and its way forward. Another hero of World War II, General Douglas MacArthur, remained in command in the Far East. There was an uneasy relationship for Eisenhower and General MacArthur. On more than one occasion, Congress and the American people received conflicting messages from the Army and one of its two senior generals.⁴⁷ In another subject of change, the Army informally formed two competing doctrinal and future camps. The first of the two camps had an infantry orientation led by Generals Matthew Ridgway, James Gavin, and future Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor, all of the World War II airborne community. Second, was

⁴⁶ John L Hackett, "The General and the President: A Conflict in Strategies" (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1989), 22; Ambrose, *Eisenhower: (vol 1) Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect (1893-1952)*, 435. Both authors provide evidence that General Eisenhower devoted much of his time, and more than his predecessors did, to public engagements. This included at least 46 major speeches and 13 testimonies to Congress while turning down many more. This is part of the challenge of comparing eras as later Chiefs of Staff through a variety of mediums constantly message audiences. For this argument, the point Eisenhower makes about his own dislike for speaking engagements and the lack of effectiveness is clear.

⁴⁷ Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 440-443.

the Armor camp led by General Bruce Clarke and a future Chief of Staff, then Colonel Creighton Abrams.⁴⁸ It is also interesting to note that General Eisenhower's biggest vote on Army organization was on the size of the Infantry and Armor Division. He offered his vote, but without offering opinion on the doctrine of employment, or of the enemy it would fight.⁴⁹

For General Eisenhower and the Army there would be little or no documented significant innovation following World War II. This occurs, in spite of the largest and most extensive attempt at the collection of its history and its lessons learned ever undertaken by the US Army following a war. This also included a rather significant attempt to collect and analyze the German perspective of the war. The Army, because of the competing requirements to demobilize and simultaneously execute the intensive manpower operations of constabulary service, was simply unable to prepare for the next war. This would lead to little innovation and in fact, the Army would remain focused on its tried and true methods for future conflict.⁵⁰ First of the two major innovations would be the structure of the infantry and armor division Eisenhower thought too large and inflexible. The second innovation was the unification of the services and creation of the US Air Force. The requirement to fund the Air Force, whose aircraft were immediately obsolete after the war, with the advent of jet engines and the requirement for continental protection severely constrained resources. In addition, the cost in manpower for the occupations simply prevented the Army from doing anything other than trying to survive.⁵¹ General Eisenhower and the Army were unable to lead change or innovation and this effects the preparation for the next

⁴⁸ Edward C. Meyer, R. Manning with Jane Mahaffey, *Who Will Lead? Senior Leadership in the United States Army* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995), 38-42.

⁴⁹ Robert T. Davis II, *The Challenge of Adaptation: The US Army in the Aftermath of Conflict, 1953-2000* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 3-5.

⁵⁰ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 363-381.

⁵¹ Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 433-457.

war.

General Eisenhower and the Army clearly attempted to emphasize values within its organization. There were a significant number of difficulties in inculcating the Army with professional values during his tenure. First, the demobilization of the Army was clearly going badly. So badly, it actually led to riots overseas by soldiers. The point system put into place for those who could return home soonest created difficulties for them, their families, and Congress. Morale for the Army began to hit an all-time low as demobilization, along with the inter service and budget battles, continued to wear on General Eisenhower's time and energy. Discipline had fallen so low riots took place at overseas postings as soldiers awaited discharge. This also occurred before the training of new recruits could take their place in service. In response to Congressional requirements, the Chief of Staff had to testify on the points system. The problem eventually led to General Eisenhower being personally required to respond to every request for discharge.⁵² This increased Eisenhower's time spent on paperwork and in the office to the detriment of the service. The Army was simply melting away and a new one was not available to take its place.

The pressures to maintain the force structure and meet its constabulary needs while simultaneously demobilizing from World War II meant that the US Army simply could not break the mold.⁵³ In the Leavenworth papers, No 1, describing the evolution of Tactical Doctrine from 1945 to 1976, it is clear the Army was unable to see itself beyond World War II. It is only after the General Eisenhower's tenure as Chief of Staff is complete that the Army began to look at future battlefields that may not have resembled World War II. The Army codified the doctrine of World War II in terms of air support, fire support and the use of armor and airborne forces from

⁵² Ibid., 440-443.

⁵³ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 363-381.

1945-1947 but only in the context of fighting another war in Europe.⁵⁴ The Army's preoccupation with its constabulary missions coupled with force reductions would leave the Army woefully unprepared for the next conflict. Without breaking the mold, the Army was unable to achieve the change it required during its post-war transition and the effect of the failure has significant impacts on the Army's performance during the Korean War.⁵⁵

Eisenhower's Speed of Trust

To examine the impacts General Eisenhower had on leading change for the Army following World War II the research returns to Stephen Covey's "Four Cores of Credibility." The first core of credibility assessed is integrity. Again, it is important to note in this context the research does not assess that any Chief of Staff could lack personal integrity. Rather, the research looks for congruence or dissonance between behavior and intent. In this sense, General Eisenhower clearly displayed integrity in leading the Army following World War II. Although unoriginal, his goals for the Army matched those of the nation. It is because of the rapidly changing conditions, his background, and the requirements placed on him that prevented the kind of change the Army would need in the future. General Eisenhower struggles with how to maintain the Army but his behavior and intent is congruent. Protecting the Army's interest is not at the forefront of his concern. He clearly believes, as he had learned during the preparation and execution of World War II, it was possible to reconstitute the Army in a time of crisis. Because of the nation's limited understanding of what the future would look like he was not at odds with the administration, Congress, or the nation's idea of the future. He believed he was fighting for resources to fulfill worldwide commitments rather than a protectionist policy only in the Army's

⁵⁴ Robert A. Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1979), 2-7.

⁵⁵ Davis, *The Challenge of Adaptation*, 3-6.

interest.⁵⁶

General Eisenhower meets the criteria of the second core of credibility, intent, in accordance with Covey's model. His motives during his tenure were sound. He worked to fulfill US commitments at home and abroad with little thought to the future, especially during the initial part of his term. Likewise, his agenda is also in line with the administration, Congress, the nation, and the Army. His focus on UMT, selective service, and coalition building were in line with the agendas set by the administration and Congress. As Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eisenhower focused on de-mobilization following the World War II. He was completely in line with the focus of Congress and the nation. His behavior as Chief of Staff supports his motives and agenda. He spends much of his time fulfilling Army and Congressional requirements.⁵⁷ This level of effort is all in support of the Army and the demands placed on it. His behavior, from the Covey model, towards both de-mobilization and reducing the resources the Army requires built trust both internally with soldiers and externally with Congress.

It is in the third core of credibility, capability, which General Eisenhower begins to struggle as Chief of Staff. Although he will arguably become a very able President during this era, he struggles to lead change in the Army. It is not in his talents, as described by Covey, to see that for the US and the Army, the world has changed. The changing world required that the US maintain a different type of Army, and that the US's role in the world would be decidedly different. As a military officer, he is from a different era and initially does not see that the US has entered a different security environment. He struggled to understand the world was changing rapidly. He is unable to keep pace with the level of change required as Chief of Staff. He focused on maintaining the status quo, on fulfilling worldwide commitments, and on rebuilding an Army

⁵⁶ Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 440-443.

⁵⁷ Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, 133-136.

through UMT and selective service. He would lead and field an Army that would fight like the previous war. His attitude is not conducive to seeing the requirement for change. General Eisenhower was never happy with the demands of serving as Chief of Staff and focused his time on bureaucratic efforts. He also began to spend significant time examining and preparing for his personal future after his service. The lessons he learned from a lifetime of military experience had not prepared him to understand, from a military perspective, how rapidly and significantly, the world had changed. As Robert H. Ferrell captured, in his commentary on the *Eisenhower Diaries*, General Eisenhower, “as Chief of Staff found himself in the center of a situation where he could be little more than a spectator, he could not solve the problem.”⁵⁸ His style of decentralized leadership held him in such good stead as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe failed him when he served as a spokesperson for change.⁵⁹

For General Eisenhower the final core credibility, results, is the weakest of his record as Chief of Staff. The Army that would fight the Korean War was wholly unprepared to execute its missions. General Ridgway, future Chief of Staff of the Army whom some have called the savior of the Korean War highlighted the results of preparation for the Korea War. Ridgway wrote, “We were, in short, in a state of shameful unreadiness when the Korean War broke out, and there was absolutely no excuse for it.”⁶⁰ Those results were certainly not all attributable to General Eisenhower. They were partially the result of demobilization, a failed strategy of the supremacy of nuclear weaponry, a lack of vision of the prospects for limited war, incredibly reduced resources, and an Army that was nothing more than a constabulary force. As Covey writes,

⁵⁸ Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, 133-136.

⁵⁹ Hackett, “The General and the President,” 21-22.

⁶⁰ Michael D Pearlman, *Warmaking and American Democracy* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1999), 316-320. Pearlman aptly describes the rise of General Ridgway in Korea. The quote is from Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 190-194.

“results are bottom line and the connection between results and credibility is often brutal.”⁶¹ The Army lost its inter-service competitions, its voice in the nation’s strategy, its direction for the future in doctrine, force structure and manpower, and simply did not achieve the change that was required for the nation. The results of General Eisenhower’s tenure as Chief of Staff were nearly catastrophic for the Army and the nation. It would enter the Korean War unprepared.⁶²

In conclusion, General Eisenhower was unable to lead effectively change for the US Army. The failure to properly redefine the enemy and that the world had entered a new era would lead the Army to fail to change. The failure to redefine the enemy would lead the Army to minimal change or growth during the post-war transition. Doctrine would not codify new ideas or change for the Army. Because of the pressures of US worldwide commitments, the manpower intensive constabulary mission, and the US military drawdown there was very little innovation in the post-war Army. The lack of change and growth, and innovation meant the Army culture was not at risk and there was no need to break the mold. General Eisenhower did attempt to emphasize values for the Army and the Army was able to maintain its culture. General Eisenhower was able to build and maintain trust both within the Army and externally. Returning to the Covey model, finds both integrity and intent in General Eisenhower leading change for the Army. He lacked the capability to see how rapidly the world was changing and how the Army would have to change with it. The requirement of being the Chief of Staff and leading the US Army overwhelms him. Because General Eisenhower. The results of General Eisenhower leading change are nearly disastrous for the US Army at the beginning of the Korean War.

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY

⁶¹ Covey, *The Speed of Trust*, 115.

⁶² Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 363-381.

I do however, believe that it is vitally important to remember that wars are won by achievement of domination over human beings, and the territory they inhabit, and that only land forces can achieve and maintain such domination...but in the final analysis it must be the land forces which assert and maintain control and thereby determine victory.

Matthew B. Ridgway, Speech July 30, 1954⁶³

Lessons Learned From War

General Matthew B. Ridgway learned three significant lessons during the Korean War that shaped his time as Chief of Staff. The first was the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield was unlikely unless the US and the Soviet Union were willing to engage in total war. This, at the time of the Korean War, was not in the best interest of either the United States or the Soviet Union. This understanding led him to believe the Army was required to remain capable of conventional conflict for the inevitable limited wars that would occur. Second, he saw the morale of the American soldier as the key to victory in any armed conflict. A soldier willing to fight for themselves and their unit was irreplaceable by any amount of technology or firepower. Shortly after taking command of the Eighth Army, during the Korean War, he published the "Why We Are Here" memorandum to his commanders. His subordinate commanders were required to relay, immediately, the memorandum to the entire force. General Ridgway appealed directly to the individual soldier. He proved he believed strongly that the strength of the Army was the morale of the soldier. Third, General Ridgway (and the Army) learned that even in limited wars the Army would need to play to its strengths. During the Korean War, the preeminent character of the American way of war was mobility, strength, firepower, and the technology to fight a large scale yet limited war. Ridgway would come to believe that in the nuclear era wars would not end with a clean surgical nuclear strike. The security environment would require an Army capable of defeating enemy forces and forcing the enemy's capitulation.⁶⁴ As proof of these lessons, he

⁶³ Matthew B. Ridgway, "The Statesman and the Soldier," (Vital Speeches of the Day, September 1, 1954)

⁶⁴ George C. Mitchell, *Matthew B Ridgway: Soldier Statesmen, Scholar Citizen*

wrote a series published in the Saturday Evening Post, *My Battles in War and Peace*. “To me the lessons of that conflict were clear—that hope of peace rest solidly on the strength for war. It also shattered, I hoped, forever, the dreamy-eyed delusion which possessed the minds of many then—that the threat of nuclear weapons alone could keep the peace; and of that corollary fantasy, the nebulous faith that war, even a little war could be won by air and naval power alone.”⁶⁵

Ridgway’s Goals for Change

The nation had come to recognize the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union would last longer than the temporary crises that immediately followed World War II. The US changed its understanding that conflict with the Soviet Union would be long lasting and the minor engagements in Greece, Korea, and the like would become the norm. The US would continue with nuclear deterrence remaining at the forefront the United States policy. However, it added the additional strategic objective of containment following the Korean War. The United States disillusionment with limited war following Korea shaped the Eisenhower presidency to look for new strategic policies to implement the dual strategies of containment and deterrence. “The New Look” approach of the Eisenhower presidency had its basis in the realization that America simply could not afford, economically and politically, limited proxy wars like Korea. He believed the cost of defense and security could, if not prevented, bankrupt the nation. In the more “bang for the buck,” era the administration would emphasize deterrence and its primacy in nuclear weapons. This played out in a significant reduction in both the defense budget and in

(Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2002), 48-65; Jonathan M. Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressiveness to Reaganism, 1895-1999* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998), 109-124.

⁶⁵ Matthew B Ridgway, "My Battles in War and Peace: Part One: Conflict in the Pentagon," *Saturday Evening Post* (January 21 1956): 17-18, 46-48.

military manpower.⁶⁶ The recognition of the long-term status of the rivalry between the Soviet Union was markedly different for Ridgway than Eisenhower as Chiefs of Staff. Ridgway and the Eisenhower administration were in possession of a national security strategy based on the foundation of National Security Paper 68 (NSC 68). This strategy was the articulation of the nation's vision in 1950. The strategy sought to protect "the free world" threatened by the Soviet Union over the "long pull."⁶⁷ Although the Eisenhower administration developed its own strategy, NSC 162 to take into account budgetary constraints, the basic premises of NSC 68 would remain in place.⁶⁸ This idea would force the nation to maintain a large military capability, whether nuclear or conventional. For the first time in the nation's history, the US would accept its roles overseas and maintain a large standing military to protect its vital interest.⁶⁹

General Ridgway and the Army viewed the Army's role as more than just a supporting force for nuclear deterrence. The Army viewed itself as a committed force overseas as a part of regional security structures. Likewise, the Army believed the force required mobility and strength to compete with the Soviet Union in the wars that were likely to occur around the periphery of its interest. When General Ridgway assumed duties as Chief of Staff in August of 1953, the unpopular war in Korea had ended in armistice. The Eisenhower administration, like the other

⁶⁶ Millet and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 508-511.

⁶⁷ David T. Fautua, "The 'Long Pull' Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War US Army," *The Journal of Military History* 61 (January 1997): 93-120.

⁶⁸ National Security Council, *National Security Council Report 162/2* (Washington, DC: National Security Council, 1953).

⁶⁹ Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955," *The Journal of Military History* 61, no. 2 (APR 1997): 310; Fautua, "The Long Pull' Army," 93-120. Fautua presents an excellent discussion on how NSC 68 and the Korean War served the Army's interest in developing its strategy for the Cold War. His thesis is that the NSC 68 did not shape the Army's vision for itself but helped to serve its interest and protect its force posture through regional security pacts. Bacevich also makes the point that as a part of the review of NSC 162 that they strategy was sound but that in terms of US commitments "we are overextended."

administrations following previous wars, saw an opportunity to reduce drastically the size of the US military. The reduction would affect the entire US military but the Army would endure a significant part of the reduction. Morale in the Army was, again, at a low point. The Army and General Ridgway did not believe the present force structure was sufficient for its worldwide commitments. Nor did it believe force structure was sufficient to fight wars of similar type as the Korean War. The Army remained convinced wars of this type would arise whether the US wanted them to or not. Ridgway would later testify to the US Senate about his belief that “US atomic war, contrary to the theory of “more bang for the buck,” would require more, not fewer, men.”⁷⁰ General Ridgway saw the Army as the preferred choice for the strategy of containment. He was convinced because he did not believe that neither the USSR nor the US would engage in total war. General Ridgway was certain that morally and economically the US would not be able to use nuclear war as a tool of strategy. This belief was also held to some degree by the authors of NSC 68 and later NSC 162 who were also concerned that the Soviet Union would use small wars, with “local” military action.⁷¹

Because of disagreements about the nature of conflict in the future, General Ridgway would have significant political and strategic disagreements within the Eisenhower Administration. These disagreements were to include the President himself and his Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson.⁷² Because of the deteriorating relationship following Congressional testimony opposing the “New Look” policies, the President would not reappoint General Ridgway as Chief of Staff at the end of his term. This eventually led to the publishing of General

⁷⁰ Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway*, 183.

⁷¹ Fautua, "The 'Long Pull' Army," 93-120.

⁷² Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism," 303-333. This may be the best discussion on the Ridgway relationship with the Administration. Herspring also does justice to the relationship between the Eisenhower Administration and the rest of the Pentagon and Congress.

Ridgway's controversial final report on national security in opposition to the administration.⁷³

Using General Sullivan's six steps for Organizational Change allows the evaluation of the effectiveness of General Ridgway's post-war transition.

Ridgway's Leading Change

General Ridgway and the Army clearly identified and redefined the Soviet Union as the enemy of US. However, they saw the type of conflict as most likely to be a conventional war rather than a nuclear one. As General Ridgway had written in a paper on national security, "We are confronted with a secret murderous conspiracy, centralized in the USSR, and bent on our ultimate destruction."⁷⁴ This simple idea became the overriding focus for maintaining a strong military deterrence to prevent general war. General Ridgway saw a Soviet Union increasing both conventional and nuclear, military capability. As part of the 'New Look,' he saw the West decreasing its conventional forces and only increasing its nuclear capability. Total war was not in the best interest of the Soviet Union or the United States. He believed the Soviet Union's desired outcome of the US ultimate destruction, clearly implying that the USSR would use any means to defeat the United States. General Ridgway argued for a balanced US military structure and approach. He wanted an Army capable of defeating any of the threats to US national security and protecting US national interest worldwide.⁷⁵ The challenge for General Ridgway and the Army was although they are able to articulate who the enemy was they struggled to articulate to the administration the required resources and a strategy to combat it.

In spite of the struggles with the Eisenhower administration General Ridgway was able to

⁷³ Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway*, 175-200.

⁷⁴ Mitchell, *Matthew B Ridgway*, 151.

⁷⁵ Bart Howard, "Army Transformation 1953-1961: Lessons of the "New Look" Army" (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 2-6.

change and grow the Army. In hindsight, the change may not have had much long-term value. First, he believed all technological developments and advances in war fighting would eventually lead to a counter development that would negate their advantage. He wrote “There is still one absolute weapon—the employment of which dominates every consideration of national security—the only weapon capable of operating with complete effectiveness—of dominating every inch of terrain where human beings live and fight, and of doing it under all conditions of light and darkness, heat and cold, desert and forest, mountain and plain. That weapon is man himself.”⁷⁶ He saw the soldier as the best all-round tool for the Army. He also saw the Army with a preeminent role in the defense of the nation. The Army, despite significant decreases in manpower, was actually able to achieve an increase in active divisions. It also increased readiness for those divisions through modernization and streamlining. In many ways, General Ridgway and the Army embraced technology as its savior rather than the soldier, opposing the lessons Ridgway learned in Korea. The Army was able to achieve change in its structure, thought and capability on the nuclear battlefield. It also achieved significant improvements in technology including guided missiles, air defense, and tactical nuclear weapons. Likewise, the Army put new doctrine and tactics in place, in keeping with improvements in technology, to face the modern nuclear threat.⁷⁷ This change may have been change just for changes sake. The Army was in many ways fighting for its very survival. Others were forcing it to demonstrate change. Andrew Bacevich would write, “The Army in the 1950s was like an aging corporation challenged to modernize or face extinction.”⁷⁸ The Army was not changing to face the enemy it had redefined; it was changing for the sake of its own internal interest.

⁷⁶ Mitchell, *Matthew B Ridgway*, 156-163.

⁷⁷ Howard, “Army Transformation 1953-1961,” 7-10.

⁷⁸ Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), 94.

General Ridgway ability to communicate clearly manifested itself in his attempts to share his vision through doctrine. He publicly and privately battled with the Secretary of Defense over the morale and care of soldiers and fought to protect their benefits in an era of cost cutting. This was one of his key lessons learned from the Korean War.⁷⁹ He authored a number of reports directly to the President starting as soon as he became Chief of Staff. He continued to do so all the way through his tenure. General Ridgway consistently offered his views on national security and the role of the Armed Forces. He built an internal team, to include fellow paratrooper Major General James Gavin, who would lead a series of reviews of the “New Look” policies. The internal review would eventually make its way into public debate. While leading the resistance to the President’s policies, General Ridgway went public to air his concerns to both the Congress and the media. A.J. Bacevich, prominent scholar on military policy, argues that Ridgway used Army doctrine as a political tool in its fight with the administration and Congress. FM 100-5 published in 1954 clearly espoused General Ridgway’s views through doctrine on the linkage of national strategy and military purpose. It also included his views on the use of nuclear weapons, that the goal of war was the destruction of the enemy, and that nuclear weapons had a supporting role for the US military and not the supported role. The Army clearly wanted to avoid the policies of the “New Look” and remain focused on its traditional role in US strategy. In a similar method to his release of the “Why We are Here?” memorandum during the Korean War, General Ridgway and the Army also published the Pamphlet 21-70, *The Role of the Army*. This pamphlet discussed the relevance of the Army and therefore its soldiers, and again General Ridgway had it distributed to every member of the service.⁸⁰ His largest failure in the communication of his vision through doctrine rests in the previous paragraph. The Army changed and grew. However,

⁷⁹ Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway*, 185.

⁸⁰ Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism," 317-332.

the change may not have been in the direction that General Ridgway sought. The doctrine and vision re-enforced the role of the Army. However, the acquisition of technology, its employment, and the doctrine that reinforced nuclear supremacy in tactics and strategy was not the outcome General Ridgway wanted to lead. One can argue for or against the merits of General Ridgway's ideas; he was unable to share his vision across the US Army, with the President, and Congress.

General Ridgway and the Army attempted to foster innovation in the period following the Korean War. The Army would move forward on the technology and doctrine it believed would make it relevant in the atomic era. General Ridgway, during a foreign policy speech to the American Assembly in 1954, would write, "The method by which this end is achieved has remained fundamentally the same throughout history. That method is the defeat of the enemy's armed forces."⁸¹ As the public and private debates of the "New Look" went on, the Army continued to view its role as it had in the past. In fact, the previous statement does not take into account the unfamiliar outcomes of limited war. If the General's statement were the case, then he and the Army clearly "lost" the Korean War. There is little room in his statement for the use of the Army, as it would happen during Vietnam, the Balkans, or the COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the Leavenworth Paper No1 Dougherty highlights, with the exception of including the effects of mass destruction weapons, there is little change in Army doctrine at the time. Senior Leaders such as the future Chief of Staff of the Army General Taylor, Lieutenant General Bruce Clark, and Major General Gavin all ran tests showing that the World War II style formations, with exception of the Armored Division, could not adapt itself to the atomic battlefield. Two notable exceptions to the lack of innovation include the re-activation of the 101st Airborne and the creation of four armored divisions for the Army. The Army because of the nuclear threat also begins to look at the battlefield in a non-linear fashion. This examination

⁸¹ Ridgway, "The Statesman and the Soldier," 1954.

would eventually lead to the creation of the Pentomic Division.⁸² In the end, the attempt at innovation failed for the Army because the Army was unable to define itself satisfactorily (both internally and externally). The changes it would make were mostly for a future war that General Ridgway believed the US was the least likely to fight.

General Ridgway emphasized values during his tenure as Chief of Staff. From his first speech upon being sworn in as Chief of Staff, General Ridgway would talk about the “integrity of the military profession.” To his officers he spoke of, “an officer corps of such character and competence as will provide the highest profession and spiritual leadership to our citizen armies.” General Ridgway also pointed out that a non-commissioned officer corps was “indoctrinated and inspired by the officer corps.” He saw these two groups as the standard-bearers of Army values. Without the values he described in the possession of these two groups, he believed that you could not have an Army.⁸³ The value he placed on integrity manifested itself in his orders that forbid the taping of telephonic conversations without the prior consent of the other party. He also ordered the reinstatement of the hand salute after its suspension in 1946. It was clear he believed this sign of respect empowered the officer and non-commissioned officer corps to enforce standards that he believed was the foundation of the Army.⁸⁴ General Ridgway was proud of the way he emphasized values for the Army. After his retirement he would write, “I left feeling in my heart only the deepest admiration and respect for that magnificent officer corps I left behind—men who loyally and faithfully, with whatever means are granted them, are building the Army for

⁸² Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976*, 15-17. The Pentomic division was the Army’s solution to surviving on nuclear battlefields by not massing forces. It was a preparation for a war that Ridgway believed least likely the Army was going to fight.

⁸³ Ridgway, Matthew B. *Soldier: Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 269.

⁸⁴ Mitchell, George C. *Matthew B Ridgway: Soldier Statesmen, Scholar Citizen* (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2002), 135.

tomorrow.”⁸⁵

The Army struggled to break the mold, according to Sullivan’s model, during General Ridgway’s tenure as Chief of Staff. The Army attempted to break the mold of traditional thought, first through technology. The use of German scientists and strengthened ties to US industry rapidly produced significant technological change for the Army (guided and long-range missile, air defense, and tactical nuclear weapon technology). As Howard points out by 1955, the Army would have nine different missile systems either in use or in development.⁸⁶ The Army then attempted to break the mold through trials and tests of the new equipment and doctrine. Senior leaders of the Army undertook a series of trials and tests for the Army to operate in the nuclear battlefield. Studies such as the Atomic Field Army -1 1956, and the APPLE 2 test were conducted. The APPLE 2 was a test where an Armored Task Force maneuvered minutes after an atomic blast to an objective, attempting to prove that Army technology had utility on the atomic battlefield. The problem with these tests was that they lacked realism. In many cases, the technology required to execute doctrine was not available to the Army as it was testing the doctrine. This led to the predictable outcome that an institution fighting for relevancy was predefining the results of tests. Doughty points out, “the concept of employment for the Pentomic Division was based on a wide variety of equipment which did not appear until the late 1950s.”⁸⁷ Although General Sullivan argues that in breaking the mold, change does not have to be linear. In fact, he points out that change should occur simultaneously but it simply does not work for the Army following the Korean War.⁸⁸ The simultaneity of change in technology and doctrine was

⁸⁵ Ridgway, *Soldier*, 320.

⁸⁶ Howard, “Army Transformation 1953-1961,” 7-8.

⁸⁷ Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976*, 18.

⁸⁸ Sullivan, "Leading Strategic Change in America's Army," 16-19.

unsynchronized and proved ineffective. The Army was unable to break the mold in technology or doctrine and erroneously focused on remaining relevant to the “New Look” while adhering to old notions. Within 10 years, most of what they achieved would be gone.

Ridgway’s Speed of Trust

To examine the impacts of Ridgway’s leading change, the paper returns to Covey’s first core of credibility, integrity. General Ridgway, although often at odds with the administration, and the secretary of defense, did not falter in his credibility of integrity personally or organizationally. Ridgway used many means (both formal and informal) to share his vision of the Army and to focus on his lessons learned. General Ridgway strongly believed that his advice on Army requirements should be the most honest and objective possible. Furthermore, as Chief of Staff of the Army, he believed that it was his obligation and duty to provide advice to his civilian leaders. He later wrote, “The advice should be based on my honest, fearless, objective estimate of what the Army needed to serve the national interest, and it should have no reference to the impact my recommendations might have on the national economy, on domestic politics, nor on admiration policy at any particular time.”⁸⁹ It was his honest conviction that the national security policies, the resources the Army was receiving, over-emphasis on nuclear capacity, and the means to deliver it were to the detriment of the nation and the Army. General Ridgway would write in his memoirs demonstrating his passion for clearly providing advice on Army requirements. He wrote, “The position I took consistently through my two years as Chief of Staff was based on the simple conviction that when a man is given a job to do, he is entitled to receive the means in which to do it—at least the minimum means with which he can reasonably be expected to accomplish his mission.”⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Ridgway, "My Battles in War and Peace," 17-18, 46-48.

⁹⁰ Ridgway, *The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, 311.

General Ridgway led change for the Army that he strongly believed was in the nation's best interest. As Bacevich would write, "In fact, the differences between the President and his Army Chief of Staff were beyond reconciliation. His resistance to administration policy impelled by a deep sense of professional responsibility, Ridgway simply could not compromise. To conform would be to become party to the destruction of that profession, something that he could not conceive of doing."⁹¹ There are elements of incongruence and a subversive nature of the engagements between the Army and the administration. These become clear when examining intent in the next paragraph. This subversive nature borders on serving the Army's own interest and could call into question the integrity of General Ridgway's leading change.

General Ridgway and the Army failed the test of intent when it came to leading change following the Korean War. As Andrew Bacevich later declared, "Between the autumn of 1953 and the summer of 1955 the United States Army took it upon itself to mount an explicit challenge to civilian control."⁹² Although based on General Ridgway's beliefs and personal integrity, at some point in the process, the motives of General Ridgway and the Army violated the test of intent. The change General Ridgway would lead became less about serving the nation, and more about keeping the Army's preeminence in leading the defense of the nation. Finally, Ridgway knowingly allowed General Gavin to create a group to subvert the administration's policies. The group was instrumental in writing doctrine as a political statement. That enabled the Chief of Staff to disagree publically with the administration in the press and to Congress. Because of these points, the Army and General Ridgway failed the behavior test of intent.⁹³ By following a

⁹¹ Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism," 330.

⁹² Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism," 330.

⁹³ Hackett, "The General and the President," 34-40. Ridgway offers a counterpoint in most his personal writings. Hackett attributes this as a fundamental disagreement between Eisenhower and General Ridgway over the role of senior military officials and the advice they give. Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism," 330. Bacevich argues that this is a direct

subversive agenda, like speaking publicly about the dissonance between him and the administration and the Gavin, the Ridgway failed in the intent core of credibility. The impact of the failure of motive, agenda, and behavior would have far-reaching effects for the Army and the nation. For a leader that proffered so much respect for civilian control of the military, General Ridgway attempted to lead change outside of the strategy of the administration. He had wanted to give only military advice in the absence of politics, economics, or administration policies. Unfortunately, General Ridgway would soon be involved in doing more than offering only the best military advice in his dealing with administration, Congress, and the press.

General Ridgway certainly had the core of capability to lead change for the Army. He was widely regarded as the best officer, and the Army's choice to be Chief of Staff. Obviously talented, Soffer wrote, "Since World War II, Ridgway had been groomed to be Army Chief of Staff, partly through the effort of General Omar N. Bradley, with a blend of political, military, operational, and staff assignments perhaps unequaled by any other Army officer."⁹⁴ His talent was immense, demonstrated by his tactical exploits during World War II to his operational successes as the commander in Korea. It was his attitude that worked against his capability to lead changes in the Army. His attitude toward the civilian leaders of the military was clearly detrimental to the Army. He simply could not get beyond his differences with the Secretary of Defense. It is clear from General Ridgway's memoirs that his tenure as Chief of Staff was not in any way fulfilling to him. At every turn, General Ridgway felt disenchanted by the attitudes of the administration and his civilian leaders. He wrote, "The pressure brought on me to make my

confrontation to civilian control over the military³³²⁻³³³. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency*, 116-117. Herspring argues this fundamentally weakened the executives control over the Joint Chiefs. In addition, the manner in which Ridgway and the Army engaged the media and Congress was detrimental. The assertion made here has its basis in the Covey model of motive, agenda, and behavior engendering trust and in this case, it did not happen.

⁹⁴ Soffer, *General Matthew B. Ridgway*, 175.

military judgment conform to the views of higher authority was sometime subtly, sometime crudely applied.”⁹⁵ The knowledge General Ridgway had developed during his service prepared him for leading change in the Army. However, it was in his style (a component of intent) that he may have failed to lead change the most. Bacevich, in a discussion of style argued that Ridgway’s performance as Army Chief of Staff displayed an old time traditional military professionalism. To make this point he uses a description of Ridgway’s successor as “the new model soldier, the polished, “intellectual,” and politically astute Maxwell D. Taylor.”⁹⁶ General Ridgway’s style was oblivious to the changing realities of the modern world. He rejected the requirement to serve as a part of a government, at the wishes of the administration, and in accordance with its demands. He failed to understand the administration’s goals and to work as a part of that team. His integrity and his desire to offer the best military advice would consistently put him personally at odds with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the rest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the spirit of Eisenhower’s dislike of talking generals, the effect of Ridgway was that the more he spoke, the less other people listened.

It is also a conflicting set of outcomes for General Ridgway and the Army in the results core of credibility. General James Gavin, who would later retire in protest over administration policies, heaped great credit on General Ridgway for saving the Army. He wrote, “Much has been written about General Matthew B. Ridgway, and more will be written when the full record is available for public scrutiny. Suffice it to say the country owes him a debt that it will never be able to repay. Somehow, despite Secretary Wilson and the Chairman of the JCS, he managed to hold together our Army and to continue to ready it for the nuclear-missile-space age, despite a

⁹⁵ Ridgway, "My Battles in War and Peace," 17-18, 46-48.

⁹⁶ Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism," 332.

constantly shrinking budget...He was a stalwart adherer to the truth.”⁹⁷ In the end, the Army spent much money, time, and creativity on a futile endeavor. It wasted those resources on technologies and doctrine that, in many cases, was absent from the Army in its next war. In addition, Herspring in general and Bacevich specifically argue that the lasting effect was significant damage to civilian and military relations. The damage to these relations would bear significant repercussions for the country.⁹⁸ In the end, General Ridgway left the nation with an Army that would change in technology and doctrine to fight a war he believed was the least likely to occur.

In conclusion, General Ridgway was unable to lead change for the US Army after the Korean War effectively. Unlike General Eisenhower, General Ridgway was able to redefine the enemy. His ability to change and grow the Army, because of its focus on technology and change for change’s sake would be of dubious value at the outbreak of the Vietnam War. The Army was able to codify this change and growth in doctrine but this too was a failure because of its political nature and its lack of lasting impact on the Army. Likewise, in spite of attempts to innovate, the Army would prepare itself for a war that Ridgway believed it was the least likely to fight. General Ridgway and the Army clearly emphasized values in matters small and large alike. The Army, again because of its erroneous focus on technology to remain relevant, was unable to break the mode or to change Army culture. Returning to the Covey model, it is that in the intent core, the incongruence between General Ridgway’s motive and behavior leads to failure in changing the Army in a way that was acceptable to him and the administration. Although clearly a capable officer, in many ways his attitude and style led to irreconcilable differences with the administration and severely limited his ability to lead change for the US Army. In the results core,

⁹⁷ Mitchell, *Matthew B Ridgway*, 139.

⁹⁸ Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism," 332; Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency*, 115-117.

Ridgway failed to lead change that was effective in preparing the Army to fight the Vietnam War or beyond.

GENERAL CREIGHTON ABRAMS

Soldiers are not in the Army....They are the Army
General Creighton Abrams⁹⁹

Lessons Learned From War

General Creighton Abrams and the Army learned three important lessons that would drive change following the war in Southeast Asia. The first lesson was never again did the Army desire to conduct large-scale combat operations without mobilizing the nation. Later, the Weinberger/Powell doctrine would be the final evolution of this argument.¹⁰⁰ The nation and therefore the Army would not enter into a war without meeting the conditions of this doctrine. The conditions included the requirement for popular and Congressional support. Conflict would have the dual requirements of involving vital national interest and there would be sufficient force available to accomplish the mission. General Abrams felt the decision of President Johnson and the subsequent failure to mobilize the reserves led to significantly greater cost in terms of military operations. Additionally, it had significant impacts on Army effectiveness and long-term health of the Army force. Abrams would later provide significant proof to his belief on the effect of the decision. During a briefing to senior civilian officials he said, "Mr. Secretary, the only Americans who have the honor to die for their country in Vietnam are the dumb, the poor, and black."¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Lewis Sorely, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (San Diego, New York, London: A Harvest Book, 1999), 360.

¹⁰⁰ Suzanne C. Nielsen, "Rules of the Game? The Weinberger Doctrine and the American Use of Force." In *The Future of the Army Profession*, by Donald M. Snider, edited by Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw Hill, (2005, 2002): 627-649.

¹⁰¹ John E. Leatherman, "General Creighton Abrams" (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 9.

The second major lesson learned by the General Abrams and the Army was the importance of well-led soldiers that trusted their leadership. In Lewis Sorley's, Pulitzer Prize nominated author, Vietnam work, he describes General Abrams sense of constant concern for the value of the individual soldier. Abrams came to believe many of the difficult issues of drugs, race, and violence were attributable to leadership issues within the Army. He continued to believe soldiers performed well with good leadership and trust even in the worse situations. He also saw a breakdown in trust between junior and senior officers based primarily on "micromanagement."¹⁰² The third lesson of war is that the Army should focus on Europe and its defense, and the demise of the Soviet Union. Preparedness for a future conflict with a modern professional force would become the overriding concern of the Army. General Abrams first visit as Chief of Staff of the Army was to Europe.¹⁰³

Abram's Goals for Change

The end of the Vietnam War brought significant change in the nation's vision for the future. First was the idea of "no more Vietnams." The massive disillusionment with that war would drive American strategy for at least two decades. Again, America's distaste for limited war manifested itself. Partly as a byproduct of the civil rights and social movements of the 1960s, US would reject the draft and demand an equal opportunity all-volunteer force. The movements that induced the change included the anti-war movement and a conservative ideal of the responsibility of citizenship.¹⁰⁴ The nation saw its military as an equal opportunity all volunteer force focused on defending the United States core interests. The distaste for limited war and the size of the anti-

¹⁰² Sorley, *A Better War*, 287-304.

¹⁰³ Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of his Times* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 199), 350-372.

¹⁰⁴ Beth Bailey, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Belknap Press, 2009), 1-33.

war movement would lead to limited military engagements following the end of the war in Southeast Asia. The Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973 foreshadowed the type of war the US expected to fight in Europe. There was realization at the end of the Vietnam conflict that this type of war was one the US was not prepared to fight.¹⁰⁵ The United States would focus its strategy in European containment of the Soviet threat, without the idea of proxy war. This was a very different perspective from General Ridgway. In addition, the United States Congress would assert significant influence and attempt to limit the executive power of the presidency. The US, disillusioned over the Vietnam War, internal political crisis, and in a general malaise of the 1970s was against overseas entanglements.¹⁰⁶ It was in the environment of disillusionment, the questioning of US roles overseas, and the idea of limited involvement that General Abrams and the Army looked to the future.

General Abrams and the Army followed the nation's lead in the idea of "no more Vietnams." Some have argued the idea of "never again" followed the defeat of the US Army in Southeast Asia. The Army worked diligently to prevent a repeat of the Vietnam experience in three significant ways. First, the US Army would force the US government to mobilize the nation prior to any future conflict through force structure moves. The moves included both the shift to an all-volunteer force and the assignment of forces required for combat, to the reserves. Many have argued, the conditions constrained politicians and helped to prevent them from conducting unpopular wars. The Army could not deploy without a mobilization of the reserves. General Abrams declared, "If we go to war again, we're taking the reserves with us."¹⁰⁷ Secondly, the US Army shifted its focus from counter-insurgency operations in Southeast Asia to a focus on facing

¹⁰⁵ Robert K. Griffith, *The U.S. Army's Transformation to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974* (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1997), 54.

¹⁰⁶ Millet and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 542-573.

¹⁰⁷ Sorely, *Thunderbolt*, 364.

the Soviet threat in Europe. The Army would fix the broken state of US forces in Europe and orient the organization on equipping for a fight in the central European plains. Finally, the Army would make doctrinal changes that would require a very different Army from the one that served in Vietnam. It would focus the Army on the eventual AirLand Battle doctrine and would require new methods of training and equipping the force.¹⁰⁸ Using General Sullivan's six steps for leading change allows for the evaluation of the effectiveness of General Abrams leading change.

Abrams' Leading Change

General Abrams redefined the enemy away from insurgents and out of Asia, toward the Soviet threat, and back to Europe. The Army clearly wanted to protect against a repeat of the defeat in Vietnam. It wanted to avoid any of the messy kind of limited war that was Vietnam. By focusing the organization on the central plains of Europe, the Army could prepare itself for a future conflict. The future conflict would be in the clear national interest and of a scope and scale that would require the mobilization of the entire nation. This change in enemy allowed the Army to focus on professionalism, doctrine, and equipping the force. That allowed the Army to preserve the force as a profession while meeting a very clear threat. The redefinition of the enemy clearly influenced how the Army would change and grow. It allowed the Army to change its doctrine, foster innovation, emphasize values, and break the mold in a very different way than Ridgway and Eisenhower.

For General Abrams and the Army, the change and growth phase of the Sullivan model clearly "began in disaster."¹⁰⁹ The Army was in a state of disrepair from Vietnam, facing momentous change by transitioning to an all-volunteer force. It was unprepared for the intensity of modern combat with a peer competitor. The change and growth phase for the Army would

¹⁰⁸ Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam*, 2-6.

¹⁰⁹ Millet and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 369.

focus on the three lessons it learned from the war in Southeast Asia. First, the Army focused on adapting the profession of the Army, its size and mix of force structure, and a doctrine that would allow it to fight the war it wanted.¹¹⁰ Abrams was able to work through Congress to increase the Army from 13 to 16 divisions. He would accomplish the increase by reducing headquarters and the “tooth to tail” of the Army. In Congressional response to his changes in force structure General Abrams proclaimed, “In the three wars that I have been in, it was never very crowded at the front.”¹¹¹ Secondly, the Army had to adapt to the all-volunteer force while simultaneously focusing on the professionalism of the Army. As War College author Frank Weaver wrote, “He enhanced the role of women by their integration into all skills, branches, and units other than the combat arms. Furthermore, he directed the increased representation of minorities in the Army that diametrically opposed American society’s racist views of minorities.”¹¹² Third, the Army focused its efforts on the readiness to fight in central Europe. The speed of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the shift in Army focus to Europe would force the Army to realize it needed the readiness level to fight tomorrow. It created a version of Army thinking that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld later embodied in his infamous quote during the Iraq War. In response to a soldier’s questions about equipment shortages Secretary Rumsfeld spoke the words, “As you know, you go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”¹¹³ Largely ridiculed and vilified for this statement it is actually a fair representation of Army thought. To

¹¹⁰ Starry, "To Change an Army," 20-27.

¹¹¹ Edwin M. Flanagan Jr., "A Man of 'Infinite Variety' Abe: His Wit and Wisdom," *Army* (February 1977): 41.

¹¹² Frank B. Weaver, “General Creighton Abrams: Ethical Leadership at the Strategic Level,” (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1999), 19. For an opposing opinion, see Bailey, *America's Army*, 158. Bailey believes Congress ultimately forced the issue of woman in the military.

¹¹³ Donald Rumsfeld, *PBS Newshour* (December 9, 2004) accessed at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec04/armor_12-9.html (accessed March 18, 2013).

highlight the change, the Army wrote in its FM 105 revision, “Today the US Army must above all else, *prepare to win the first battle of the next war.*”¹¹⁴ General Abrams and the Army clearly embraced change and growth in adapting the profession, force structure, and doctrine to fight in the future and meet the nation’s needs.

General Abrams was able to share his vision and lead change through doctrine. He influenced Army doctrine most significantly by allowing his subordinates to develop the doctrine of the future force. Some have argued it was a personal failing of General Abrams and he did not think to the future. Rather, it truly was a manifestation of the power of the architect of Army doctrine, General William E. DePuy’s leadership, style, and ability.¹¹⁵ General DePuy, the first commander of the Training and Doctrine Command, saw the training of professional soldiers required significantly different training strategies from the training of former draftees and volunteers. The combination of the creation of an all-volunteer force, advancing technology, and the threat to the US in Central Europe from the Warsaw Pact required a fundamental change in how the Army trains.¹¹⁶ The combination eventually led to the doctrine of AirLand battle, and was instrumental in the Army that emerged at the end of a turbulent time. The combination would lead to the Army success during Operation Desert Storm. The doctrine was a combination of armored and maneuver warfare that favored speed and shock. Conrad C. Crane of the US Army War College provides a counterpoint. He argues that there were serious negatives to the change. He challenges that such a narrow focus on a very specific doctrine and type of conflict, to the exclusion of other kinds of war and military commitments, was detrimental to the Army in the

¹¹⁴ Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976*, 41.

¹¹⁵ Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 22-23.

¹¹⁶ Roger J. Spiller, "In the shadow of the dragon: Doctrine and the US army after Vietnam." *The RUSI Journal* 142, no. 6 (1997): 41-54.

future. The doctrinal changes are manifestations of the US Army's lessons learned from Vietnam. The changes incorporated the idea of "never again" that pervaded the Army and most of the US government at the time. Few tactical and operational lessons from Vietnam made it into US Army doctrine of the 1970s and 1980s. The doctrinal changes purposefully avoided the history of that messy conflict. The US Army's decisions on doctrine would lead to significant challenges for the United States Army in the peace-keeping/peace-enforcement operations of the 1990s and the Counter-Insurgency missions of the 2000s.¹¹⁷

The period following the Vietnam War was truly a renaissance for the Army and it fostered innovation at every turn. General Abrams writing in October of 1973 captures the clearest guidance to the Army for how he expected innovation. He wrote, "To be fully ready, the Army must maintain a chain of command which provides freedom for junior leaders—commissioned and noncommissioned—to make decisions...They must be granted a chance to operate without a senior looking over their shoulders, making decisions for them or second-guessing them."¹¹⁸ That type of freedom to operate and fostered innovation is clearly in the spirit of General Sullivan's leading strategic change. He wrote about the Army's post-Cold War, "So we cut across organizational boundaries to integrate efforts...to legitimize change at every level."¹¹⁹ Abrams consistently demonstrated to his subordinates that they were empowered to change the Army. General DePuy would lead a revolution in training and doctrine that was

¹¹⁷ Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam*, 4-8. Crane makes the point, among others, that the Army's rejection of everything but conventional war would lead to problems in operations other than war. In addition, there are arguments that the mantra of never again would strain civilian and military relations in the future. Nielsen, "Rules of the Game? The Weinberger Doctrine and the American Use of Force," 627-649. Nielsen provides an excellent discussion on the topic as well. David Halberstam, *War in the Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals*. (New York, London: Simon & Schuster, 2001) See Halberstam for civilian military relations impacts on operations of the 1990s,

¹¹⁸ Weaver, "General Creighton Abrams: Ethical Leadership at the Strategic Level," 21.

¹¹⁹ Sullivan, "Leading Strategic Change in America's Army," 16-19.

innovative and empowering to subordinates. In spite of initial difficulty, the Army emerged from that period better than many had thought it would. The Army would implement the all-volunteer forces and reinforce success through innovation, and by emphasizing values.

General Abrams and the Army emphasized values throughout the transition of the Army of the Vietnam War and to an all-volunteer force. The total Army, obviously weakened by over 10 years of war, was showing cracks to include discipline and standards. A leadership study after the Vietnam War indicated the lack of standards and discipline. One of the conclusions of the study was, “The lack of uniform standards through the Army... standards of appearance and standards of performance...this sort of thing. Problems that every commander is faced with today...the haircut; on every single post and on each post, within units there is a different standard for haircuts.”¹²⁰ A simple thing as grooming standards was evidence to Army leadership of significant problems. Abrams set about fixing these problems by focusing the Army on its purpose and its responsibilities. General Abrams said, “There must be, within our Army, a sense of purpose and a dedication to that purpose. There must be a willingness to march a little farther, to carry a heavier load, to step out into the dark and the unknown for the safety and well-being of others.”¹²¹ He re-installed the basic responsibility of the individual in a professional organization. When asked after a series of discipline issues to include accusations of recruiting irregularities he would point out the individual responsibility to do the right thing. He stated, “We’ve got men in all kinds of places in the Army who are under temptations and under pressure...nobody on the face of the earth can take honest away from anybody; he’s got to give it up himself.”¹²² General Abrams never made excuses for the Army. Nor did he make excuses for himself. He never placed

¹²⁰ U.S. Army War College, *Study on the Military Professionalism* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1970), B-1-9.

¹²¹ Sorely, *Thunderbolt*, 360.

¹²² Harris W. Hollis, "The Heart and Mind of Creighton Abrams," *Military Review* (April 1985): 60.

blame for the problems of discipline and standards. Instead, he led change by reinforcing values of the institution and the individual.

General Abrams and the Army were able to break the mold following the Vietnam War. A combination of the effects of the war, a renaissance in the thinking on doctrine, leadership, and professionalism allowed the Army to transform. The Army eventually proved able to transform itself into a modern capable institution. General Abrams would maintain his focus on the future force, rather than simply becoming overwhelmed by force reductions. He would go on to say, "We've got to stop preaching that we're saving dollars. We're saving the Army—the country needs one."¹²³ The experience of Vietnam may have been so catastrophic that it allowed the Army to break the mold. It provided the freedom to try something completely new but breaking the mold was certainly in General Abrams' vision.¹²⁴ Lewis Sorely captures a quote from General John Vessey, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about General Abrams leading change. He said, "When Americans watched the stunning success of our armed forces in Desert Storm, they were watching Abrams' vision in action...the use of the reserve components and, most important of all, the advanced training which taught our people how stay alive on the battlefield were all seeds planted by Abe."¹²⁵ It is clear throughout the historical record the future senior leaders of the United States Army in the 1980s and 1990s attributed much of the organizations success to General Abrams' vision.

Abrams' Speed of Trust

The research returns to integrity in the Covey model, to assess the effectiveness of General Abrams in leading change. There is no question that General Abrams and the Army

¹²³ Flanagan, "A Man of 'Infinite Variety' Abe: His Wit and Wisdom," 43.

¹²⁴ Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam*, 2-8.

¹²⁵ Sorely, *A Better War*, 369.

displayed immense integrity during the post-war transition. General Abrams worked diligently with the administration, Congress, and the rest of government to rebuild the Army. His behavior and intent were congruent. He was certainly unafraid to voice his mind. Like any good organization, there were tensions in the Department of Defense. Unlike General Ridgway, he was able to move beyond them. General Abrams was able to build a superb relationship with both the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense. It was because of those relationships he earned more latitude than his predecessors did. The latitude included leeway in force restructuring, doctrine, and resources.¹²⁶ Due to his blunt and witty style of language, General Abrams was able to communicate extremely well to both internal and external audiences and build trust. On humility, a requirement for integrity, General Abrams described, "We ought to be a little humble when we seek to manage the careers of others. There is out there a human chemistry at work that we are not fully aware of."¹²⁷ General Abrams was a superb ethical leader that did much to reinstall professional qualities of the Army following Vietnam.¹²⁸ In all three areas of integrity, the areas of congruence, humility, and courage, General Creighton Abrams succeeded in the first core of credibility.

In the second core of credibility, intent, General Abrams displays the motive, agenda, and behavior required to lead change for the US Army. His motive was clear, to rebuild the Army, and to achieve an all-volunteer force. In addition, he would focus the Army on a core mission of facing the Soviet threat in Europe and developing an institution that could do those things for the country. General Abrams' agenda was simple, to make the Army more professional and to put the

¹²⁶ Sorely, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of his Times*, 360-366.

¹²⁷ Hollis, "The Heart and Mind of Creighton Abrams," 61.

¹²⁸ Weaver, "General Creighton Abrams," 22-23.

failures of Vietnam behind it.¹²⁹ His agenda matched the nation's and the administration's vision of the future. He had initially gained respect as a superb combat leader and he clearly was able to transition to strategic leadership. General Abrams was able to lead change through a simple agenda that matched his motive.

In the third core of credibility, capability, General Abrams and the Army proved successful as well. At the dedication of Abrams Loop located on Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, General Donn Starry proclaimed, "All of us remember him as the determined and dedicated man who undertook to put the Army back on its feet amid morale, discipline and so many other difficulties besetting our country and our Army as we disengaged from the war in Vietnam."¹³⁰ His talents to serve as Chief of Staff were superb. As Lewis Sorely pointed out, no Chief of Staff was ever more prepared to assume those duties. General Abrams' attitude as Chief of Staff was to do what was best for the Army, while accomplishing the missions assigned to it by the Army's civilian leadership.

In the fourth core of credibility, results, the Army achieved the results it set out to accomplish following Vietnam. General Martin E. Dempsey, then current Army Chief of Staff and the current Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff wrote about the results of the leading doctrinal change. He had written, "After the Vietnam War ended, General William E. DePuy, General Donn A. Starry, and then MG Paul F. Gorman led a "doctrinal revolution" that shifted the Army's training to develop the capability to centralize, mass and synchronize forces quickly."¹³¹ The results of General Abrams leading change were clearly manifest in Operation Desert Storm and the subsequent second invasion of Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The

¹²⁹ Leatherman, "General Creighton Abrams," 18-22.

¹³⁰ Donn A. Starry, "Dedication of Abrams' Loop at USACGSC," *Military Review* (September 1979): 37.

¹³¹ Dempsey, *Win, Learn, Focus, Adapt, Win Again*, 10-11.

supremacy of the United States Army was essentially to go unchallenged for two decades. Only when the Army subsequently faces a significant COIN mission in both Iraq and Afghanistan is the change led by General Abrams' found wanting. There is the argument they had learned their lessons too well. The enemy that adapted to US strengths was no longer willing to fight the US Army in its preferred way of fighting.

In conclusion, General Abrams is able to lead effective change for the US Army. General Abrams clearly redefines the enemy, from insurgent to the Soviet threat in central Europe, which allows the Army to focus on change. This focus allows the Army to change and grow, from a draftee to an all-volunteer force, focusing on professionalism and readiness. Through the efforts of Abrams trusted subordinates, the Army codifies change and growth in doctrine. General Abrams fostered innovation that would lead to a generation of officers that would value it. It is partially, because of his emphasis on values, that the Army survives a difficult post-war transition and the transformation to an all-volunteer force. The focus on readiness, professionalism, and doctrine allowed the Army to break the mold and inculcate these significant changes throughout the force. Abrams was able to increase his speed of trust inside and outside of the Army. General Abrams integrity and intent allow him to work inside and outside the Army to increase the speed of trust and is instrumental in his ability to lead change. In the capability core, unlike Ridgway, Abrams is able to lead the Army and to work with the administration and Congress toward effective change. In the results core, Abrams creates an Army that is arguably the best in the world and is prepared to fight during Desert Storm and to survive the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

The previous reviews of three Army Chiefs of Staff have made clear the impact of the Army Chiefs of Staff have on leading change. Likewise, it has become clear that the combination of Gordon R. Sullivan's and Stephen M.R. Covey's models could be used to guide and evaluate

change. General Sullivan's precepts of redefining the enemy, change, and growth, codifying change in doctrine, fostering innovation, emphasizing values, and breaking the mold have utility in guiding change in the Army. Covey's cores of credibility integrity, intent, capability, and results are useful to evaluate trust both internally and externally. This conclusion draws the key lessons learned from each of the previous Chiefs of Staff.

Redefining the enemy is the Chiefs of Staff key catalyst for leading change in the Army. General Eisenhower's failure to identify the changing nature of the enemy and conflict prevented the Army from anticipating the change it required. Likewise, Ridgway was unable to lead effective change because he was unable to convince the administration of the nature of the enemy. In addition, the Army would change for a war it believed it was the least likely to fight. Likewise, Ridgway's failure to redefine the enemy correctly led to his failure in leading change. Multiple focuses can create the false idea of flexibility rather than a focus on the type of war the nation needs it to fight. Abrams discredits this idea, "I have used the word flexibility for the last time. It seems that is a large general purpose tent under which chaos, confusion, and incompetency are kept well hidden from the public."¹³² Although the Army would never fight the enemy, it had prepared for, by picking an enemy that enabled change, it was successful. In hindsight, after the peacekeeping operations of the 1990's and the counter-insurgencies of the 2000s, Abrams may have predicted the wrong the wrong enemy. Much of this failure of prediction was attributable to the insistence of 'no more Vietnams.' However, Abrams focus on the high end of combat and its singular insistence to confront the Soviet Union on the central European plains arguably led to the Army of Desert Storm. This Army would also be professional and adaptable enough to serve the nations needs during the next two decades. Abrams was able to

¹³² Hollis, "The Heart and Mind of Creighton Abrams," 62.

focus the Army on an enemy that allowed it to develop the culture, professionalism, doctrine, and technology that would prepare it for future conflict of any type.

The Chiefs of Staff ability to redefine the enemy is the precursor to changing and growing the Army. Without one, there cannot be the other. Eisenhower was simply unable to change and grow the Army because of his inability to redefine the enemy. Ridgway was clearly able to change and grow the Army. However, his inability to redefine the enemy correctly and in conjunction with the administration, led to change that was ineffective. Abrams was able to change and grow the Army. His singular focus on an enemy enabled the Army to change. The conclusion is that redefining an enemy enables change and growth. In many ways, redefining the enemy as the precursor for change and growth is far more important than predicting the correct or actual enemy the Army may face in the future. The selection of the enemy must not attempt only to preserve the force and see threats everywhere. The selection enemy must create or enable opportunities to lead change. The size of the Army is not as important as what the Army can do for the nation and its preparation to adapt during the next conflict. Most important for the Army in its preparation for the next war, is that redefining the enemy creates the conditions that allows the Army to be adaptable in the face of unforeseen enemies.

For the Army the key to change and growth is to codify the changes it desires in doctrine. It is clear that based on the lack of growth following World War II that General Eisenhower had little change to codify into doctrine. General Ridgway did codify many of the changes he sought in doctrine. Though again, it was a change that would not last. His use of doctrine as a political tool also calls into question the doctrine's durability over time. Abrams, through trusted subordinates, was able to achieve a doctrinal revolution. The Army's use of doctrine to codify change and growth in the profession, leadership, technology led the Army through the Vietnam post-war transition. The creation of this doctrine would drive all forms of change for the Army

from professionalism to technology. Importantly, this doctrine would also build the foundation for innovation.

Leading change in the Army requires more than change and growth codified in doctrine. At every level in the organization, it must foster innovation. For the organization to react to change there must be the freedom to innovate at every level. Because of the resource constraints placed on Eisenhower and Ridgway's incorrect direction of change, the Army was unable to foster innovation following World War II and Korea. Abrams on the other hand was able to foster innovation throughout the Army. He said, "The object of teaching is to enable the young man or young woman to get along without their leaders...to provide them with independence of mind and soul without arrogance of spirit or self-deceptive sophistication."¹³³ This same sense of fostering innovation (despite what was arguably a failing of Abrams to lead personally the change in doctrine) led to subordinates codifying those changes in doctrine. Fostering innovation allowed the Army to overcome unseen secondary and tertiary effects of change.

In order to survive what is often violent change, with a conflict in equities between different groups, the Army must emphasize values. The emphasis on values does not have to devalue or not recognize the efforts and successes of the previous generation. Clearly, all three Chiefs of Staff emphasized values. Eisenhower focused on the care of the draftee soldier and their nation's perception of the Army. Ridgway clearly cared for the individual soldier and empowered the Army's junior leaders, its non-commissioned and commissioned officers. Mitchell describes how Ridgway was able to empower company grade officers. Mitchell quotes a senior officer reporting to Ridgway, "you are one of the few in of our senior officers has had any success in restoring somewhat the prestige of the Army."¹³⁴ Likewise, Abrams and the Army following

¹³³ Hollis, "The Heart and Mind of Creighton Abrams," 62.

¹³⁴ Mitchell, *Matthew B Ridgway*, 151.

Vietnam emphasized values. In a discussion of junior leaders, Sorely quoted in Thunderbolt, “Chief what you have got to understand is that the company grade officers are idealistic.” Abram’s reply “Yes Bob, and our job is to keep them that way.”¹³⁵

The final task, according to Sullivan, is for the Army to break the mold. It simply cannot maintain the status quo during post-war transition and in leading change. Change must effect the entire organization and the change the Army must eventually accept them as fact. The Army must take the various branches, units, and organizations equities into account in order to build consensus. However, during the change not all equities require protection and some must be broken. Eisenhower was unable to break the mold due to worldwide commitments and manpower constraints. Ridgway remained too focused on the last war and his lessons learned to lead effective change. Abrams breaks the mold for the Army. The all-volunteer force led to a greater focus on professionalism and the institution. Abrams ability to lead change was contagious and the effect was an Army that began to embrace a variety of significant change.

In returning to Covey’s model to analyze the Chiefs of Staff speed of trust, it becomes clear that internal and external trust is vital to leading change. In the core of integrity, all three of the Chiefs passed the test of integrity. Eisenhower was in line with the goals of administration and the nation and therefore was able to engender trust. Ridgway struggled with intent, but his personal integrity was not found wanting. Ridgway’s relationship with administration and its nearly subversive nature only barely pass the test of integrity. In the final assessment, Ridgway passes the test of integrity because he demonstrated congruence between his intent and his behavior. Although he opposed the administration, he did not act one way while saying or thinking another. He stood by his positions, fought for his beliefs, and was ultimately relieved for them. Likewise, Abrams is in congruent in his intent throughout his leadership time.

¹³⁵ Sorely, *Thunderbolt*, 351.

Intent is a key for the Chief of Staff to increase the speed of trust, internally and externally, for the Army. Both Eisenhower and Abrams increased the speed of trust following World War II and Vietnam. It is cautionary, in examining the tenure of Ridgway, the effects of failure in the core of intent. Ridgway proved to be subversive to the goals of the administration. Ridgway cannot achieve the change he desires because of the breakdown in the relationship with him and the administration. This would lead to the Army struggling for a voice and for resources. In addition, future Chiefs of Staff would feel the impact of his failure in intent. The failure of intent begins to breakdown in the trust relationship between the Presidency and the Army. Ridgway failed to build trust and failed to lead change because of it. Unlike Ridgway, Abrams achieved the change he desired because his intent was sound. He and the Army worked to meet the nation's needs and to provide the administration and the nation an Army they wanted.

The core of capability proves to be a key to understanding the Chiefs of Staff ability to increase the speed of trust. All three Generals were obviously masters of their crafts. They had been successful at tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. This simply did not translate to success as Chief of Staff. Eisenhower, although arguably a superb politician and later President, could not anticipate fast enough the changes in US security. Therefore, he could not anticipate what that would mean for the Army. Likewise, Ridgway was unable, because of the components of capability, his style, and attitude, to affect an increase in the speed of trust within the administration and with congress. He was unable to transition his personality to the give and take politics at the highest levels of government. In addition, he was unable to adapt his relationships with members of the administration that he felt were less capable. His capability was not suitable to succeed as the Chief of Staff. On the other hand, Abrams showed how powerful the core of capability is in increasing the speed of trust. He was simply adaptable and better prepared to serve as Chief of Staff than either Eisenhower or Ridgway.

The final core of results is the core that is most important to the Army. It is also the most difficult to evaluate due to the lag between the Chiefs of Staff's tenure and the next conflict. Many other factors influence a nation's preparation for war. It is clear that the Eisenhower tenure did little to prepare the Army for the Korean War. The Army had maintained neither its technological nor training superiority and was unprepared to fight a large scale, although limited war. Likewise, the Army of General Ridgway was unprepared for the Vietnam War. The Army had wasted 10 years in pursuit of the doctrine and technologies to survive on a nuclear battlefield that it was unlikely to fight. General Abrams was able to achieve an Army that was able to build and then hold a material and qualitative advantage over its enemy, 20 years later, during the first Iraq war. In addition, this Army, although arguably unprepared for COIN operations, was professional and adaptable enough to learn. In the results core it is clear that Abrams was able to achieve the results he desired.

In conclusion, all three Chiefs of Staff were successful to some degree. It appears that redefining the enemy is the single largest catalyst for leading change. The redefinition of the enemy drives the change and growth the Chiefs desire. Without significant change and growth, for the Army there is little or no innovation or in breaking the mold. All three Chiefs of Staff emphasized values but they also emphasized empowering subordinates and in particular non-commissioned and junior officers. Speed of trust also proved important. Integrity is present in all three Chiefs of Staff leading change. It was in the intent core that made the primary difference in the speed of trust. In spite of life long preparation, the job of Chief of Staff is simply different in its scope and duties than any other post these generals had served. The capabilities they had prior to serving as Chief of Staff may not translate to the highest post. Finally results matter and prove that the cumulative effects of leading change and the speed of trust achieve an Army that is either ready or not for the next war.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEADING STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE ARMY FOR THE FUTURE

The research indicates the Army that fights the last war may be unprepared to wage the next. Much of this problem has its basis in the lessons the Army and its leaders learned during their careers and certainly during their last war. As the debate on the Army's future rages in 2013, there is little doubt that the Army is going to be much smaller due to fiscal constraints. In addition, the historical pattern is clear that Army will reduce its size, resources, but still has the requirements to maintain large-scale commitments and be prepared to defend the nation. Likewise, there is little possibility that the Army or the nation will be able to afford everything it wants or even everything that it believes it needs to execute those missions. As General Ridgway found out, the Army will not be able to be all things to all people. In addition, the Army needs to anticipate what the nation's vision of the future will be. For example, the likelihood of large-scale counter-insurgency mission is possible but the nation may not be willing to bear the cost in the near future. The Army should serve the nation's strategic vision. Nevertheless, the Army must be as prepared as it can be for all contingencies in the future. Knowing these conditions to be true, the research proposes some recommendations for future Chiefs of Staff of the Army.

In order to lead change it is imperative the Chief of Staff redefines the enemy for the Army and in some cases the nation. The Chief of Staff should redefine the enemy by first considering the threats as most likely and most dangerous. The threat cannot be everything; the Army must accept the risk that the nation chooses for it. For the Army, the most dangerous enemy should become the priority for manning, training, resourcing, and procurement. Abrams provides the best example of this by focusing the Army on the Soviet threat and in Europe. This drove the technology, doctrine, and organization that could fight the most dangerous threat while remaining able to adapt to the most likely threat. Abrams' focus on central Europe was the key to developing AirLand battle, and subsequently the training and the technology that supported its execution. Without an enemy that allows to Army to focus its change, development, and

acquisition it can become easily constrained by its resources after conflict. The Chief of Staff redefining the enemy enables the change and growth that the Army seeks.

The Chief of Staff must change and grow the Army even with dwindling resources. Change and growth must first occur intellectually. Resource constraints are not an excuse to change and grow. In addition, the Army with both Ridgway and Abrams was able actually to grow combat power in spite of overall reductions. They both did this by ruthlessly cutting headquarters and staff and increasing the number and readiness of its divisions. Abrams describing how to generate resources would say, “Ruthlessly get rid of stuff.”¹³⁶ The Army must embrace the coming reductions and ruthlessly cut organizations that have less priority. This provides the ability to change and grow the Army. The Army must execute reductions in staffs and the bureaucracy to maintain the combat power in combat units required to fight the next war. Change and growth, intellectually, is much cheaper than acquisition, and with reductions in other areas can be affordable. Obviously, this is easier to say and harder to do, but it is a requirement to change and grow the Army.

The Chief of Staff must share his vision and then codify that vision through doctrine. He must be the spokesperson for change. In the modern age, with its instant communications and various organizations that have only gotten larger producing vast amounts of intellectual material there is risk that the Chief of Staff’s message could be lost. The Chief must focus his vision of change for the entire force. Without this focus, there is simply too much change to consume for the vast majority of the force to understand and internalize. The messages must remain simple, focused, and easy to understand in order to allow the force to innovate as required. The changes should focus on very specific messages in order for the Army to understand them. Again, Abrams’ examples of focusing on Europe and the Soviet threat, readiness, the all-volunteer force

¹³⁶ Sorely, *Thunderbolt*, 365.

all provided detailed specific guidance that led to effective change. Only changes required should be the focus of doctrine.

The Chief of Staff must foster innovation throughout the force in order to change the Army culture and allow it to embrace change. The best way to do this is to underwrite risk for the formation. The Chief cannot simply talk about discipline and values, but must underwrite mistakes. In addition, there may be too many organizations championing innovation that in actuality may prevent innovation throughout the Army. The Army must focus its innovation on relatively junior leaders. Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway, Abrams was soldier-and-junior-leader focused. This empowered subordinates to innovate to advance the changes they may have advocated. The Army as an institution must remain focused positively on the success of the junior leaders of the force. Certainly, the most important aspect of fostering innovation is to support and develop the Army's non-commissioned and relatively junior officers in the rank of Major and below. The ability to innovate for the current generation of officers has already begun. To foster their development requires a culture of learning, developing, growing. The Army should focus much of its organizational energy on quality education.

The Chief of Staff must emphasize values. The Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage must continue to be encouraged and enforced. However, the Chief of Staff should carefully foster communication so that the messaging to the Army is not one where the emphasis is on past failings but rather as an ingredient to allow positive change. As the 1970 War College study concluded,

“The most frequently recurring specific themes describing the variance between ideal and actual standards of behavior in the Officer Corps include: selfish, promotion-oriented behavior; inadequate communication between junior and senior; distorted or dishonest reporting of status, statistics, or officer efficiency; technical or managerial incompetence; disregard for principles but total respect for accomplishing even the trivial

mission with zero defects; disloyalty to subordinates; senior officers setting poor standards of ethical/professional behavior.”¹³⁷

The Army of today and presumably the future is now simply better than this. Any hint of a return to this behavior and/or like actions require a swift institutional response. This emphasis on values allows the Army to continue to improve through coming episodes of difficult change.

The Army must break the mold in order to achieve the change it desires. Breaking the mold means tough decisions are required, and some equities in various organizations are at risk. No organization or equity should remain safe from proving its value to the organization. The Army may not need 10 divisions to defeat a current threat in the near future. Working through congress and the administration, to break the mold requires the Army to announce boldly its requirements to defend the nation and then ruthlessly cut the rest. Likewise, the Army should reduce or merge branches of the Army that are no longer required to defeat an anticipated threat. In addition, there should be reductions in organizations and bureaucracies that do not add enough value. As the Army gets smaller, the support structure required is exponentially smaller and requires a corresponding reduction.

The speed of trust remains the accelerant that allows the Army to change rapidly and cost-effectively. The conclusion focuses on the first two cores of credibility, integrity, and intent. In order to achieve the previous recommendations with congress and within the Army it must focus on increasing the speed of trust. The Chiefs of Staff must display the highest sense of integrity. They cannot protect the Army for its position, prominence or its own interest, but must protect the Army for the nation. This includes identifying risks and mitigating associated with policy but then violently executing that policy. To do any less will engender a lack of trust with the administration and within its own ranks. Likewise, intent means that the Army must shed

¹³⁷ U.S. Army War College, *Study on the Military Professionalism* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1970), 30-32.

lower priority capabilities at its expense in order to enable the policies set forth by the Administration, Congress, and the American people. The Chief of Staff serves the administration at the pleasure of the President and must act in accordance with its strategy, policy, and priorities after offering his best military advice. To do anything less will slow or prevent change and is not in the best interest of the nation.

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