Enabling Theater Security Cooperation Through Regionally Aligned Forces

by

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Regionally Aligned Force, Regionally Aligned Brigade, Building Partner Capacity

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Abstract

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Enabling Theater Security Cooperation Through Regionally Aligned Forces

This is not a time for retrenchment. This is not a time for isolation. It is a time for renewed engagement and partnership in the world.¹

—Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta

The United States is shifting its defense priorities to meet current and future security requirements of a changing strategic environment. In 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates released the National Defense Strategy (NDS). This document emphasized the importance of building the capacities of a broad range of international partners to enhance stability and enable long-term security.² A change in administration brought a change in priorities as President Obama sought to significantly reduce U.S. forces in the Middle East.³ In January 2012, President Obama outlined his strategic approach for “creat[ing] new opportunities for burden-sharing” by “joining with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity.”⁴

Given the impetus of the President’s vision as well as the decreasing demands for forces in the Middle East, the Department of Defense (DOD) is now moving towards implementing its strategy outlined in the 2008 National Defense Strategy.⁵ The Department has fully embraced a collaborative approach to security through building alliances and partnerships to pursue mutual interests and address common challenges, to enable nascent security institutions that may likely face de-stabilizing threats, and to create a strong foundation for future collective action.⁶ The way the U.S. military will accomplish this is by “seek[ing] to be the security partner of choice…with a growing number of nations,” while at the same time “develop[ing] innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises,
rotational presence, and advisory capacity.” The Secretary of Defense is adamant that to be successful, “we must use our best skills and our assistance to build new alliances, new partnerships throughout the world by engaging in exercises, in training, in assistance and in innovative rotational deployments.” Executing a strategy based on worldwide engagement requires a change in priorities, a reallocation of resources, and a shift in focus.

The United States Army is adapting to the strategic shift. In essence, the Army is expanding its capability and capacity to better support operations and activities for all geographic combatant commands (GCC) while at the same time it reduces force structure supporting combat operations in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The Service’s most notable response to the changing defense priorities has been its implementation of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) initiative. Under this concept, the Army designates several types and sizes of conventional force units to focus on a particular combatant commander’s (CCDR) area of responsibility.

According to a December 2012 Army strategic messaging document,

Regionally Aligned Forces will provide [c]ombatant [c]ommands with mission trained and regionally focused [f]orces and Army capabilities that are responsive to all requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities. Aligned [c]orps and [d]ivisions provide Joint Task Force capability to every [g]eographic [c]ombatant [c]ommand. While those who originally created the Regionally Aligned Force concept focused specifically on operational forces conducting theater security cooperation (TSC), the Army has more recently widened both the scope and force structure included in RAF. Nevertheless, the intent of regionally aligned forces remains the same; it is designed to provide an effective means for enabling the GCCs to better execute their TSC activities.
The Army has always participated in theater engagement activities, but this initiative is different. It is as much about preventing future conflicts as it is about fighting. By using a sizeable portion of the Army to strengthen defense relationships, build military partner capacity, and set conditions for potential future contingencies, the Army gives combatant commanders a powerful tool. Regional alignment “enables the…unit to train its soldiers in language, culture and specific threat capabilities.” This initiative provides significant benefits for the Army and the combatant commands, but several significant challenges must be overcome for the RAF to become a viable force employment concept.

Analyzing the Army’s initiative begins with establishing a baseline for the lexicon concerning security cooperation. Joint doctrine defines theater security cooperation as “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.” When security cooperation is conducted within a particular combatant commander’s area of responsibility, it is generally referred to as theater security cooperation. Security force assistance (SFA) and building partner capacity (BPC) are related concepts and will be used interchangeably with theater security cooperation for this study.

Developing the Regionally Aligned Concept

Recognizing the need to adapt is important, but deciding how to adapt is critical. Even before President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) declared that the U.S. military would “continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign
counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments,” the DOD had already begun moving in that direction. In the same year it published the 2008 NDS, the Defense Department also issued the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). These documents significantly changed how combatant commands would conduct theater planning and shape their engagement activities. In 2008, the Department directed the combatant commands to develop theater campaign plans (TCP) focused less on contingency operations and more on those routine activities associated with security cooperation, ongoing operations, force posture, and deterrence. Through their TCPs, the GCCs not only demonstrated how peacetime activities were critical to achieving their endstate objectives but also what resources they needed to meet their security cooperation requirements.

An Impetus to Change

In 2009, virtually every U.S. Army brigade combat team (BCT) that was available for employment was either deployed or deploying to the CENTCOM area of responsibility (middle column Figure 1 below). Active component (AC) BCTs were spending a year with “boots on the ground” (BOG) in combat and just over a year of dwell (time not deployed) preparing for their next deployment back to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. The high demand on land forces and stress of combat was over-taxing the Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. Besides stressing the health of
the force, CENTCOM’s high demand for forces increased national security risk by restraining policymakers’ decision options by limiting available Army forces for employment elsewhere in the world. In essence there was no strategic bench of forces as the Army had no contingency expeditionary force (CEF) BCTs on hand. BCTs were in one of three categories: a CENTCOM-owned deployed expeditionary force (DEF) in the available pool, a DEF in the train/ready pool preparing for a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, or a reset pool BCT just returning from deployment and recovering from operations.\textsuperscript{18}

Despite the unfavorable predicament of Army forces at the time, CENTCOM requirements were beginning to shift as surge forces returned from Iraq and were not being backfilled. Army planners in the Pentagon and in FORSCOM considered the implications of units having longer dwell and spending less time focused solely on the
counter-insurgency (COIN) mission. Planners anticipated that by Fiscal Year 12 the Army would have more brigade combat teams available to use as a contingency expeditionary force since the number of available brigades would finally exceed CENTCOM’s demand (right column of Figure 1). These contingency expeditionary forces would be available for global missions. Nevertheless, these planners accepted the fact that it would be impossible to predict future requirements or potential operational missions in an uncertain strategic environment. FORSCOM became particularly concerned with being able to manage readiness requirements and provide the training resources for an operational force that would need to offer a broader mix of multipurpose capabilities and sufficient capacity to accomplish a wide range of missions in any environment. Therefore both the Army and FORSCOM began searching for ways to build greater versatility in the force, train units across the full spectrum of operations, and develop an adaptable operational concept.

The FORSCOM planners were fully immersed in the Global Force Management (GFM) process and well aware of the need to satisfy the growing, but mostly unmet, force requirements of the other geographic combatant commands. The FORSCOM Commander claimed that it was not until 2009 that the other combatant commanders fully embraced and adapted to the global force management process CENTCOM developed and the Joint Staff adopted in 2005. Not only had these other GCCs began to identify and refine their theater requirements in their campaign plans, but they also realized that “they had to play hardball with CENTCOM and push Joint Forces Command and the Joint Staff to validate their requirements in [the] GFM [process].” Even after the other GCCs’ requirements were validated by the Joint Staff, their
demands for land forces could not be filled by the Army as CENTCOM’s combat requirements remained a higher priority.

As the Army’s global force provider, FORSCOM began discussing how it “could sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan…at a reduced level [and] provide ready global reaction forces and regionally oriented for engagement in support to combatant command theater security cooperation programs.” Yet with the heavy demand for Army forces still significantly stressing the force in 2009, only a few individuals inside the Service were willing to address the “gap in its [the Army’s] ability to meet the combatant commanders’ daily operational requirements regarding [t]heater [s]ecurity [c]ooperation, military engagement, and PCB [partner capacity building].” Senior Army leaders did not discard the importance of security cooperation or inhibit future planning, but they understood that the national priority was in resourcing the current fight. Secretary Gates made it clear that the Department “must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as those the United States is in today.” Planning continued, but the Army’s role in theater security cooperation would remain small until conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan changed.

As they looked toward the requirements and capabilities of the future force, these Army planners also drew upon the experiences and lessons learned from current operations. When the primary focus of Army units in Iraq and Afghanistan shifted from combat operations to building partner capacity in 2008, unit commanders looked for innovative ways to improve their ability to execute security force assistance. In response to a 2009 request from CENTCOM, FORSCOM teamed with the Army’s
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop and then modify an augmented
brigade structure tailored and designed to effectively execute security force assistance
in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This reinforced brigade was designated the Modular
Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance (MB-SFA). The Army also fielded the
162nd Infantry Brigade designed to train officers and non-commissioned officers
assigned to security transition teams, MB-SFAs, and transition teams that supported
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom requirements.

The integration of special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces was
another area these planners considered as they looked ahead to future global
requirements. As early as February 2008, Michael Vickers, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities,
testified to subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee that conventional
forces were making significant progress transitioning from a traditional warfare focus,
and it was important for the Department of Defense to promote the “increased
integration between SOF and GPF [general purpose forces].” Then in the summer of
2009, General George Casey published a white paper that highlighted the need for
further improvement in SOF and conventional force integration. It was clear that any
discussion of the Army supporting future security cooperation requirements would have
to consider both types of forces.

Initial Concept: The Regionally Aligned Brigade

By January of 2010, FORSCOM and Army Staff planners had developed a slide
depicting the conceptual model for a Regionally Aligned Brigade (RAB) (Figure 2)
designed specifically for theater security cooperation. The FORSCOM Commander
presented the concept to officers in U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) in Kuwait during a
professional development event in February 2010; the officers saw great utility in the idea of using a RAB to meet security cooperation requirements and for helping to reinvigorate CENTCOM’s theater exercise program. According to this original

![Regionally Aligned Brigade (RAB) Model](image)

Figure 2. Concept for Regionally Aligned Brigade.

concept, a Regionally Aligned Brigade was expected to provide a combatant command the forces necessary to conduct many of the security cooperation missions critical to building partnerships and enabling partner forces. FORSCOM planned to source, train, and allocate these conventional force brigade combat teams as part of the Army’s force generation process. The concept envisioned the GCCs’ Army service component commands (ASCC) exercising command and control over the RAB. If the sourced BCT needed specialist skills to meet its directed requirements, Army planners proposed that the theater special operations command would coordinate directly with the regionally aligned special forces group to provide the capability. The brigade was expected to
maintain a regional focus throughout the cycle of preparation and deployment. This original concept and model of employment were similar to that of a MB-SFA.

In 2010, then Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey, approved the Regionally Aligned Brigade concept for implementation. By the fall of 2011, FORSCOM planners had programmed a brigade combat team from the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York to serve as the first RAB in support of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). In December of 2011, the Army published a RAB Execute Order (EXORD) to provide specific guidance “for the resourcing, training and employment of Regionally Aligned Brigades as a means for delivering Army conventional forces for security cooperation missions in support of geographic combatant commanders’ [t]heater [c]ampaign [p]lans.” Two months later FORSCOM then followed with its own RAB order officially directing the sourcing and alignment of a brigade to support AFRICOM. Due to other requirements, FORSCOM switched the brigade sourced from the 10th Mountain Division with the 2nd BCT, 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas. This regionally aligned BCT would not deploy en masse; task organized elements of the brigade would deploy to Africa over the course of the year to support the combatant commander’s ongoing security cooperation requirements. The BCT would also serve another purpose; the Army’s “process of identifying, training and deploying a RAB … [would] test hypotheses, develop lessons learned and refine the concept for delivery of Phase 0 engagement.”

Concept Evolution: Regionally Aligned Force

By the time FORSCOM published its order the first of February 2012, the Regionally Aligned Brigade concept was already starting to morph into something larger and more comprehensive—Regionally Aligned Forces. FORSCOM and Army Staff
planners realized, as Army service component commands began to define their combatant commanders’ theater security cooperation requirements for Army forces, a brigade combat team would not suffice as a one-size-fits-all sourcing solution. Even the experienced combat commander, General Odierno, had come to accept that “we always have to be prepared to fight our nation’s wars if necessary, but in my mind, it’s becoming more and more important that we utilize the Army to be effective in Phase 0, 1 and 2.”

Many of the capacity building needs required by partner nations—such as logistics, theater intelligence, senior leader skills, and medical expertise—required specialized capabilities not part of a BCT’s assigned force structure, and the Army had to expand its concept for aligning forces.

The Army planned to provide this additional support, but it could not be fully captured under the RAB concept. A Regionally Aligned Brigade pertained only to a specific type of unit while a RAF construct conveyed the much larger support the Army was currently providing through its assigned and allocated forces to the combatant commands as well as the addition of the newly aligned units. An aligned unit, while part of the overall RAF, is a unit that “focus[es] on preparing for specific operational plans and, if required by the combatant commander, participate[s] in joint exercises or engage[s] in other theater security-cooperation events.” General Odierno recently explained to an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies what is truly new about the RAF concept when he said,

"we're going to adjust this Army force generation model in order to train and then make available to combatant commanders regionally aligned forces. And that's all sizes. It can be from platoon up to brigade; it can be combat, combat support, combat service support. And we’re developing capabilities so we get better at building partner capacity, conducting joint exercises, multinational exercises."
During the same presentation, General Odierno even talked about the Army aligning units up to corps to specific geographic combatant commands. The Army was transitioning from a discreet concept of a brigade focused mostly on security cooperation to a larger concept of geographically aligned forces; however, it is the distinct focus on using sizeable Army forces to enable TSC that makes the RAF initiative different from how the Service had previously provided quality forces.

**Impetus for Concept Implementation**

The strategic framework and intellectual momentum for increasing security cooperation activities was in place well before General Odierno told Congress in February 2012 of the Army’s intention to “using a low-cost, small footprint approach by utilizing rotational, regionally aligned forces.” While the basic purpose of the Army’s RAF concept has changed little from what its originators intended, a great deal has changed in the Army’s willingness to support, promote, and implement it. The United States and its military are at a strategic inflection point. America continues to drawdown forces in the Middle East and is shifting focus toward East Asia where a rising China has begun to assert its growing influence. The United States and many of its international partners face a financial crisis that is affecting national, regional, and international security and affecting military capability. “Unlike past drawdowns when threats have receded,” Secretary Panetta explained to Congress during his February 2012 testimony, “the United States still faces a very complex array of security challenges across the globe.”

Based on comments General Martin Dempsey made to CBS News correspondent Bob Schieffer on January 8, 2012, it is clear that United States military
leaders fully grasp the momentous shift in world affairs and understand this opportunity to define the Army’s roles, missions, and force structure to ensure it continues to play a significant role in national security. General Dempsey stated that both he and General Raymond Odierno realize

this is the point. We’re at a strategic inflection point, where we find a different geopolitical challenge, different economic challenges, shifting of economic and military power. And what we’re trying to do is to challenge ourselves to respond to that shift and to react to that strategic inflection point and adapt ourselves.

Army leaders and combatant commanders are determining how the Joint Force will meet its numerous and diverse requirements of the President’s national security strategy in an environment of greater fiscal constraints while simultaneously building the foundation for the future force. “For over six decades the U.S. has underwritten …global security for the great trading nations of the world,” asserted the Joint Forces Command Commander (JFCOM) in 2010, “yet global and domestic pressures… [are] dramatically impact[ing] the defense budget in the face of rising debt and trade imbalances.”

One senior Army commander aptly described the conundrum when he said that, “the Army writ large, as well as the other forces, are [sic] struggling with the strategies for our new world.” Expected fiscal trends and unanticipated global events require the military to think differently mitigate risk to the national security a cheaper cost. The RAF initiative is one way the Army is trying to meet the changing strategic demands while also providing a clear vision of change to quell what General Odierno referred to as a growing “angst” due to uncertainty.
Qualities of Regionally Aligned Army Forces

While the Regionally Aligned Force construct is an Army initiative, the geographic combatant commanders are the end-users of these soldiers and stand to benefit greatly in numerous ways. Secretary Panetta has “directed all of the geographic combatant commanders to think and plan strategically when it comes to security cooperation, including all their regional activities – from joint exercises, exchanges, and operations to more traditional forms of security assistance.” The Army believes that “[s]oldiers are particularly important in this effort, since all nations have land security elements, even if lacking credible air and naval forces.” Moreover, “[h]umans live on the land and affect almost every aspect of land operations. Soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them. They accomplish missions face-to-face with people.”

The Army considers the Regionally Aligned Force well suited for executing TSC requirements on behalf of the GCCs as the RAF is built upon a unique system—a human being. As the combatant commanders move forward with implementing initiatives “to improve regional stability and promote peace through security cooperation,” they should expect that their regionally aligned Army forces will bring three particular qualities to their TSC programs—capability, capacity, and continuity.

**Capability**

While the quantity of available Army units is important, the quality of those forces is arguably even more critical when engaging in theater security cooperation. It is not an overstatement to say the Army currently has the best trained and most combat experienced force in its history. “Ten years of war,” said General Odierno, “have produced an exceptional cadre of commissioned and noncommissioned leaders able to shift among different missions and different physical, political, and cultural
American soldiers have been educated in a multicultural, multinational, and ill-structured environment imposed by fighting a counterinsurgency. Secretary Panetta wants “to see the military retain the hard-won capability to train and advise foreign security forces in support of stability operations like in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Both leaders and soldiers have a greater understanding of the importance of interagency and multinational cooperation in successfully executing security force assistance and can carry this hard-earned capability with them as they engage new partners around the globe.

Of course some of our partners will look for the United States Army to provide expertise beyond that generally associated with irregular warfare. For that reason, Regionally Aligned Forces “will train for the full range of military operations during the first part of the training and readiness phase of the [f]orce [g]eneration model.” Once it completes this training, the unit will then focus on theater specific operational plans, exercises, or security-cooperation activities. A Regionally Aligned Force is designed to be a flexible force capable of not only executing directed theater operations but will also be capable of providing security force assistance across a broad array of mission sets. By using the combat skills and capacity building experience inherent in Army units as well as the expertise acquired during pre-mission training, the GCCs will be able to more effectively build relations with partner countries.

Capacity

In terms of capacity, the sheer size, types, and numbers of forces the Army plans to regionally align will provide combatant commanders a significant means for carrying out their theater security cooperation objectives. Besides the one brigade being aligned to AFRICOM in 2013, the Army plans to align four BCTs to GCCs in 2014 and two more
in 2015. Additionally, the Army has already aligned a corps to U.S Pacific Command (PACOM) and expects to align another to CENTCOM. Since the Army does not have enough corps headquarters to align with each combatant command, it plans to align a division headquarters to the others. Units from the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve will also be aligned to a specific area of responsibility and may potentially be able to bring some of their civilian skills to the partnership. In fact, the National Guard has been executing its own regional alignment program, the State Partnership Program, for almost two decades. This program has mostly focused on former Soviet bloc countries and developing nations by partnering states in the U.S. with another country. The RAF initiative hopes to mirror many of the successes of the State Partnership Program and significantly expand it to include more combat and security focused efforts. The comments of one ASCC commander sum up the importance of greater capacity provided by the RAF initiative when he said, “It just provides us so much more opportunity to engage with more countries, to continue our Phase Zero operations, [and] to continue our understanding of each other’s tactics, techniques and procedures.”

Continuity

The concept of regional alignment is a dramatic shift in how the Army prepares and provides its units, and it is also probably the biggest benefit to the end-user of those Army forces. In many respects, regional alignment is expected to provide to the GCCs the same benefits that the Campaign Continuity program provided to the International Security Assistance Force Commander in Afghanistan—units that develop a richer understanding of a specific region and, over time, are able to build on previous relationships. According to the Service’s own 2012 Strategic Planning Guidance, regional alignment “allows the integration of planning and training for Combatant
Command contingencies, focuses language and cultural training, and provides predictable and dependable capabilities to GCC and [ASCC] commanders.\textsuperscript{71} The greater regional familiarization and understanding of a combatant command’s planning procedures and routines will not make these soldiers language or cultural experts; however, it will make these Army units more valuable as a GCC asset and as a reliable military partner. It is up to the combatant commanders to use these forces to greatest benefit in their respective AORs.

Tangible Benefits for Combatant Commanders

\textbf{Enabling Others}

One of the most obvious benefits of having a larger and effective regionally focused engagement capability is in its preventative value. Violent extremism remains the foremost challenge to United States national security as well as to international stability; however, the security institutions of many states do not have the physical, intellectual, or experiential wherewithal to defeat this global threat.\textsuperscript{72} U.S forces have learned in fighting terrorism over the last decade that “without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads.”\textsuperscript{73} An investment in building closer ties with partners and allies and improving their military capacity should “lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention.”\textsuperscript{74} As U.S. land forces have shown in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, a concerted effort to build military capacity in areas where terrorism has flourished or even natural disasters may strike is enabling these partner countries’ security forces to protect their populations, defend against internal as well as transnational threats to stability. Regionally Aligned Forces will provide the
GCCs a significant resource in helping fragile state security forces develop a capacity
“and the will to counter… violent extremism.”

Today’s soldiers—experienced in the intellectual and practical foundations of counterinsurgency—understand the connection between the population’s support for its
government and the government’s ability to care for the basic needs of its population.
This is a skill that Army units have used to good effect in several countries through
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) exercises with foreign security
forces as well as through actual HA/DR operations. Army National Guard (ARNG)
units—now included in the Army’s RAF concept—are especially adept at HA/DR as they
regularly prepare for and conduct these types of operations in support of their state
governors. HA/DR capacity building is hugely important to combatant commanders in
regions prone to disasters, and it is also a way for the U.S. military to put security
cooperation efforts in a more positive light.

Yet there are other less apparent examples of how building partner capacity of
military and law enforcement forces have improved not only internal but also external
security. Secretary Panetta recently told an audience at the U.S. Institute of Peace that

The benefits of this emphasis on a partnered approach to security were
apparent to me during a trip that I took to Colombia in April. There, the
United States has spent years training and equipping the military to take
on the FARC [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia], a narco-
trafficking terrorist organization. Not only has Colombia made significant
gains over the past few years against the FARC, it is stepping up to help
combat illicit trafficking in Central America. Colombia is now one of
fourteen countries working cooperatively to disrupt narco-traffickers in
Central America. I also visited Brazil and Chile, and saw impressive
demonstrations of their growing military capabilities – capabilities that are
enabling them to contribute to security in Central America, Africa and
across the globe.
The U.S. Army’s persistent engagement in Latin America is showing significant results beyond the Colombian Army’s internal security operations against the FARC; Colombia now has a very capable military that serves as a regional check against external threats, especially Venezuela.79

With respect to Africa, U.S. activities are already showing significant results. The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is making significant progress in setting the conditions for improving governance in that country, and ground forces working for AFRICOM have been directly involved in helping train many of the African Union forces involved in AMISOM security operations, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian operations across the continent.80 In a failed country like Somalia, where violent extremism can develop and propagate, but where American public opinion may prohibit direct military intervention, the U.S. can use security cooperation activities to train and empower regional armies and police and enable them to serve as a stabilizing force.

An expansion of the Army’s security cooperation capability can, over the long term, provide an even greater payoff—to include both national security and fiscal security. With the reality of shrinking defense budgets, U.S. senior decision makers have openly stated that we will look to our partners to meet common security challenges and share in the costs and responsibilities.81 In the Pacific, for example, the U.S. Army has helped equip and train partner missile defense forces who now directly share in the overall theater ballistic missile defense effort.82 The U.S. receives the highest return on its security investments when allies and partners are not just able to provide for their own security but also contribute to the security of others. As highlighted above, Secretary Panetta described how our efforts to build partner capacity are helping to
transform some of our more capable military partners into contributors for global security. This transformation is most evident in Europe, where the U.S. has invested in robust and long-term TSC programs. Many of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries are sharing in the security costs of operations in Afghanistan and playing a significant role in helping to improve the capacity of countries around the world. NATO serves as the best and most obvious model of how nations are able to transform from a security consumer into a security exporter through dedicated and persistent engagement.

Arguably, the most important TSC activity that has contributed to the rapid growth and sustainment in capability of European militaries has been U.S. sponsored and led combined exercises. In fact, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) exercise program has been so successful that other partner nations are now leading their own. U.S. land forces have participated in a Polish-led exercise, and Bulgaria recently hosted a regional energy security exercise for other nations of the Balkans using simulation systems that the United States helped Bulgaria develop. Yet these regional programs are still in the early stages and must continue to be nurtured. Two authors from the Atlantic Council who are seeing a similar security partnership developing in Northern Europe cautioned United States leadership from “viewing regional cooperation as justification for US disengagement from the region… [as it] would undermine the motivation among the nations to pursue regional cooperation.”

While there has been substantial progress in the development of multinational exercises, there is still room for improvement. Ongoing operational requirements for U.S. Army forces in the Middle East have significantly limited U.S. participation in
combined exercises in Europe and in other AORs over the past decade.\textsuperscript{66} In fiscal year 2003, for example, the Department of Defense re-scheduled or cancelled 49 of 182 exercises.\textsuperscript{87} For several years U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) regularly had to simulate Army headquarters for their exercises due to requirements of combat operations.\textsuperscript{88} Yet an increase in land forces available to the GCCs should provide a needed shot in the arm to their bilateral and multilateral exercise programs. Revitalizing joint and combined exercises was, in fact, one of the original reasons for developing the RAB concept.\textsuperscript{89} “We’ve been very, very busy. … for over 11 years,” the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) commander recently stated, but the PACOM “commander now has [the] Army back and is now capable of utilizing it…here in this theater of operations.”\textsuperscript{90} The Army’s proposed rotational force capability will be even more critical to maintaining vibrant exercise programs and TSC activities in the CENTCOM and EUCOM areas of responsibility as DOD is reducing permanent force structure in those regions.

Enhancing Commander’s Understanding of the Environment

An expanded security cooperation capability provided by Regionally Aligned Forces can also significantly enhance a combatant commander’s knowledge and understanding of his AOR. Commanders and staff in any combatant command must continually scan their environment, assess observations, and determine how best to influence regional actors.\textsuperscript{91} It is impossible for a combatant commander or his staff to be aware of many of the developing threats or security trends in the AOR without having forces regularly engaged with the military forces of other states. The Director of Homeland Security noted that “the 9/11 attackers conceived of their plans in the Philippines, planned in Malaysia and Germany, recruited from Yemen and Saudi Arabia, trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and carried them out in the United States.”\textsuperscript{92} Prior
to September 11, 2001, the U.S. had little-to-no ongoing TSC activities with several of these countries, and by Secretary Rumsfeld’s own testimony to the 9/11 Commission, “he thought that the Defense Department, before 9/11, was not organized adequately or prepared to deal with new threats like terrorism.”

Effective counterinsurgency operations require a “continuous process in which commanders direct intelligence priorities to drive operations, and the intelligence that these operations produce causes commanders to refine operations based on an improved understanding of the situation.” Current Army doctrine defines this ever-developing situational awareness process as “co-creation of context.” Understanding the human terrain of another culture is very much a bottoms up process where face-to-face interaction provides the context. In many respects, every soldier in Iraq and Afghanistan was considered a sensor and analyst as much as a shooter. The same idea holds true for soldiers participating in security cooperation activities.

Besides building stronger relationships, U.S. forces can garner a great deal of incidental intelligence during combined operations exercises, exchanges, and seminars. According to Joint doctrine, “knowledge and understanding occur better through interaction, whether in person or virtual, than through reading and assimilating various products.” Much of the environmental information required for preparing the combatant commander’s strategic estimate is gained by interaction with interlocutors from outside DOD and through intelligence analysis. While soliciting input from outside the military is important, these personnel are generally not focused on military related activities and may not be attuned to cues of growing security threats. Through personal interaction with partner militaries, U.S. forces can glean specific kinds of intelligence or information
and develop shared assessments of common threats.\textsuperscript{98} Therefore, it is clear that security cooperation activities—and especially a robust TSC capability based on persistent engagement—play an essential role in helping a CCDR better understand the human and physical environment of his AOR.

**Improving Theater Posture and Readiness to Respond**

Although theater security cooperation activities are not a guarantee for preventing conflict, they can help the combatant commanders more effectively posture for that eventuality. A well-resourced TSC program plays an important part in hedging against the requirements of future conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has slowly pulled back or cut a sizeable portion of its forward stationed forces. Any U.S. military intervention will require access to sea ports, airports, logistics facilities, and transportation nodes. Because “the challenge of operational access is determined largely by conditions existing prior to the onset of combat operations[,]…success in combat will often depend on efforts to shape favorable access… in advance.”\textsuperscript{99} This is why assuring greater operational access and global freedom of action is an important focus area for all GCC’s Phase 0 activities.\textsuperscript{100}

The Army plays a central role in operational access in support of the geographic combatant commands because it is normally responsible for setting the theater. The Army works “with partner nations… [for] ensuring the theater is prepared to execute contingency plans”\textsuperscript{101} and in posturing for “future operations by expanding the sustainment base, increasing industrial capacity, and integrating and synchronizing sustainment, distribution, communications and civil engineering functions.”\textsuperscript{102} While the ASCC is the element charged with setting the theater on behalf of the GCC, it often uses operational and logistical assets from throughout the Army to help accomplish this
mission. Regional alignment will allow the GCC and ASCC staffs to plan and exercise setting the theater tasks with actual aligned units and headquarters vice simulated staffs or units that are only apportioned for planning. Furthermore, many of these newly aligned Army units may be able to share their setting the theater best practices from experiences during operations in the Middle East with both GCC personnel as well as partner nations.

Having a more persistent, consistent, and capable Regionally Aligned Force available for combatant commands will establish important relationships and trust with partners before a crisis begins. Admiral Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress how our partner engagements “foster connections with other governments that reinforce our diplomatic channels and have proven critical during times of crisis.”\textsuperscript{103} One Federal Emergency Management official described it best when she wrote, “It’s almost a cliché in emergency management circles that it’s too late to exchange business cards once catastrophe has already struck.”\textsuperscript{104} The same holds true for building relationships within military circles and when interacting with those outside the military community. One of the critical reasons the U.S. was able to deploy Special Forces into Afghanistan fairly quickly after 9/11 was because of earlier contact with the Government of Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{105} Yet even today, after twelve years of war, the United States’ tenuous military and civilian relationships with governments in that region make setting the theater an extremely difficult task. Building stronger relationships to better posture the theater takes time and significant resources.

For theater posture, one of the most important benefits of having larger, more capable, and regionally focused Army forces is that combatant commands will have a
stronger “foundation upon which to build effective, collective action in times of…
crisis.” Being able to integrate with other international military forces and function
effectively alongside one another in a combat environment requires persistent
engagement. For both EUCOM and PACOM the model of multi-national, rotational
engagement exercises is not necessarily new, but exercises like these occur less
frequently and on a much smaller scale than prior to 9/11. This, however, is changing.
In November 2012, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) recently sponsored a joint and
interagency exercise involving forces from eighteen nations designed to test new
doctrinal concepts and interoperability. It involved more than 3,600 U.S. troops and
1,700 partner forces and was the largest such event USAREUR has conducted in the
last twenty years. I Corps, as part of its realignment to PACOM, is scheduled to
participate in multinational exercises with Japan, Australia, and South Korea this year.
While still in its infancy, the RAF concept is already helping GCCs to develop an ability
to conduct combined operations, advance the benefits of collective defense, and
posture for combat.

Reinvigorating U.S. Legitimacy in the Land Domain

Geographic combatant commands need a capability to re-establish legitimacy in
the land domain and convey a message of U.S. commitment to the wider community of
international partners. The American armed forces are held in high regard around the
world, and as Admiral Mullen pointed out, “many militaries around the world clamor to
train with us.” Political scientist Joseph Nye described this attraction to U.S. military
power and its tie to military assistance as the harder side of “soft power.” This
attraction provides the U.S. a form of credibility and legitimacy it cannot get from other
aspects of national power. Yet because of the significant and prolonged U.S.
operational commitment of ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, other GCCs have been forced to do without sizeable Army forces for over a decade. Consequently, their land-focused TSC programs and their military soft power have suffered.

Humans live on the land and because of this fact, land based military and paramilitary forces generally play a central role in politics and society. Even in PACOM’s ocean-dominated AOR most Asian states’ armies are the nations’ senior service and enjoy the lion’s share of military resources. This is why the TSC programs for all GCCs require a strong Army component. One Army publication described the point this way:

Soldiers are particularly important in this effort, since all nations have land security elements, even if lacking credible air and naval forces. To the degree that other nations see us as the best army in the world, they gravitate to us to help them achieve the same high standards of military performance, or tie their security to the world’s most capable army.

In fact, in many Latin America countries, the senior military leaders are almost wholly from their respective nation’s armies, and these officers “have a certain cultural bias” as they generally “prefer to interact with other U.S. Army general officers during military-to-military engagements.” GCCs can leverage this to their advantage and use their own regionally aligned Army forces to achieve greater influence.

Security cooperation is most effective when it is a joint endeavor; however, TSC conducted by Army forces connotes a specific message to friend and foe alike. Just as with war, when the United States commits Army forces to an endeavor, it is usually demonstrating a long-term commitment. While air and sea forces represent significant military might and are powerful expressions of U.S. armed potential, they operate “in the air, on the sea, and in space,” domains where “humans are interlopers...temporary
While “Send in the Marines,’ connotes both a demand for action and a presumption of success,” the less prevalent phrase, “commit the Army” connotes something much more lasting. A substantial Army supported security cooperation program communicates an “unmistakable American intent to partner and adversary alike,” that “if necessary, combat-ready Army units can deploy to threatened areas, reinforce host-nation forces, [and] complement American air and sea power” to defend our interests and those of our allies. The Army can only perform this security function on behalf of the GCCs if it can provide a persistent force viewed as capable, of sufficient size and capacity, and specifically focused on security in that region.

Challenges and Recommendations

While the Army’s RAF concept will clearly provide a significant and needed capability to the CDRs in shaping their AORs, its implementation is not without challenges. First and foremost, the Army still shoulders a vast majority of the requirements for waging the war in Afghanistan. Winning the current war is its first priority and therefore demands a significant portion of its intellectual and physical resources. Nevertheless, the Army is answering the President’s call to “see the horizon beyond.” Regionally Aligned Forces are a substantial part of the Army’s vision of what lies ahead. Implementing that vision will not be easy.

Ability to Maintain a Regional Focus

While the RAF concept posits that Army forces will be able to maintain a more regional focus and provide greater continuity and persistence to the GCCs, events in the world may deem it otherwise. Prior to 9/11, the Army touted itself as being an expeditionary force capable of conducting conventional operations world-wide, and it
“relegated unconventional war to the margins of training, doctrine, and budget priorities.”¹¹⁹ Since the invasion of Afghanistan, the Army has narrowed its aperture again, but this time in the other direction. It is extremely difficult for military or civilian leaders to see and plan for a future they cannot predict. Although national leadership may not anticipate the U.S. military engaging in large scale counterinsurgency operations or even a sizeable conventional war, the possibility of both missions still exists. In the 2000 Presidential debate, candidate George Bush said that he did not “think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation building,” but his preferences for what the U.S. military “ought to be used for” changed significantly over the course of the next eight years.¹²⁰

To hedge against the uncertainty of the global security environment, the Army must maintain and the geographic combatant commands must demand a land force capable of operating along the full spectrum of operations and in numerous environments. There is an inherent danger in the Army trying to build a force of generalists – one where soldiers practice a broad range of missions but effectively do not master those specifically critical to ground combat; however, there is an equal danger in training an army of specialists or cultural experts that can only fight one particular type of warfare or in one particular region. The Army is shrinking in size and does not have the manpower to create one-dimensional units specializing in a limited number of warfighting skills, whether peace enforcement, disaster relief, counterinsurgency, or high end conventional warfare. As more Army units are aligned to the GCCs and spend more time operating in a particular region, the Army will have to fight the tendency of its units “going native” and losing their versatility as a global land
force. The Army can avoid this problem by continually rotating brigade-sized and smaller units through the ARFORGEN process and aligning these units to support different GCCs. The units will still gain familiarity with their aligned GCC and the AOR during their train up and preparation period prior to mission assumption. While this may negate some of the continuity benefits associated with regional alignment, it will keep units adept at conducting missions across the range of military operations and allow soldiers and leaders to share TSC best practices from one GCC to another.

**Military Dominance of Foreign Policy Execution**

With the largest budget in Washington, a manpower pool that dwarfs the Department of State, and now a clear strategic charge to expand engagement with our partners, the DOD influence is poised to shape U.S. foreign policy even more than it does today. The importance and imperative of global partnering comes through loud and clear in both the written and spoken words of America’s civilian and military leaders. Their words do not fall on deaf ears. Military officers are experienced at taking guidance from higher authorities and accomplishing the directed mission. “The lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and development have become more blurred,” Secretary of Gates said in 2008, “and… the various elements and stakeholders working in the international arena have learned to stretch outside their comfort zone to… achieve results.”

Given the scope of the Army’s RAF initiative and the additional engagement capability and capacity it will give the GCCs, there is a very real possibility of the U.S. military wielding even more influence in more regions around the world.

To truly check the growing and significant military influence in foreign policy would require managing the expectations of national leaders and changing how they approach challenging strategic issues. Strategic patience is not an American virtue.
Our national leadership has come to expect instant results during a crisis, and because of its global reach and resources, the DOD, not the Department of State (DOS), is a ready means to demonstrate to the American public and the world that the U.S. is taking decisive action. While the security threats of the Cold War significantly increased this trend, the attacks of 9/11 only intensified the pace.\textsuperscript{122} Now, politicians and public alike have become somewhat desensitized to the size and influence of U.S. military diplomacy; it has become part of the United States’ institutional decision-making process.\textsuperscript{123} As one writer put it, “the truth is the U.S. has consciously devalued the role of diplomacy and development, belied by no clearer indicator than staffing and funding.”\textsuperscript{124} While Secretary of State Clinton’s push for “Civilian Power” is a step in the right direction, it is only a first step in a long journey.

As the GCCs expand their TSC programs and the Services enlarge their capacity building capabilities, there will inevitably be a temptation by the combatant commands to do more partnering activities and do them quickly to demonstrate immediate results. This methodology may prove counterproductive to a more carefully measured and properly coordinated approach that would support the objectives of the host nation as well as other key stakeholders. Also, any U.S. security cooperation initiatives should not overwhelm the requirements of the host nation or its capacity to absorb U.S. assistance. Finally, the combatant commands must ensure that all TSC activities are coordinated with and support theater objectives, and most importantly, the respective State Department-led Country Team. This will help synchronize DOD actions with DOS priorities, reinforce diplomatic efforts, and avoid duplication.\textsuperscript{125}
Combatant commanders should consider following the example set by a former AFRICOM commander who continually emphasized the military’s role in Africa as a part of a ‘“three-pronged’ government approach, with DOD taking the lead on security issues, but ‘playing a supporting role to the Department of State, which conducts diplomacy, and USAID, which implements development programs.’” AFRICOM is putting words into action; it is now funding four additional DOS Foreign Service Officers for the headquarters. GCCs, the ASCC commanders, and their staffs must diligently guard against getting out front of the diplomats but instead seek ways to build closer ties with their State counterparts.

The Regionally Aligned Force unit commanders and leaders also have a role in helping to limit military dominance of foreign policy. Most of the officers and senior NCOs in the Army today have served one or more tours in the Middle East, and their experience with military-to-military engagement has been in a combat zone where the DOD has been the lead federal agency. The rules and authorities they operated under in Iraq or Afghanistan are significantly different from those that govern soldiers’ actions during Phase 0 activities in a sovereign nation. Leaders will need to educate and train their soldiers on the differences between TSC and combat-focused security force assistance. As guests of a sovereign nation and partnering as equals, unit leaders and soldiers will require greater diplomatic and negotiating skills as well as an understanding of roles and responsibilities of U.S. and foreign civilian agencies, nongovernmental organizations, international media, and foreign armed forces. They will have to learn to lead from behind by listening, empathizing, coaching, and enabling. This is difficult. In fact, one 2008 study concluded that the [U.S.] Army in particular, lacks a motivation and
savvy for understanding other points of view and perspectives.”

In a TSC environment, respectful deference will be as valuable as military competence.

**Operating Within a Cumbersome System**

One of the greatest challenges with the DOD initiative of “Building Partnerships in the 21st Century” is trying to execute and now expand bi-lateral and multi-lateral military-to-military programs using a security cooperation system that Admiral Mullen told Congress was “designed for another era.” He went on to testify that the requisite “authorities are inflexible and our processes are too cumbersome to effectively address today’s security challenges in a timely manner.” The strategic environment has changed drastically since 9/11, but our Cold War-based TSC programs have advanced far more slowly. Prior to the shift to a COIN strategy in Iraq, U.S. security cooperation focused specifically on engagement; now it clearly has a focus to build partners’ capacity so that they are better able to address threats and de-stabilizing influences. Secretary Panetta has echoed the call to update the system; he also has told the Department to find ways to streamline their own internal processes related to security cooperation. Right now, the DOD’s deployment approval process requires the Secretary of Defense to personally approve each one of the separate “operational” deployments of a Regionally Aligned Force in support of a GCC.

There are other non-U.S. aspects of the security cooperation process that make it more difficult to be effective. The willingness or capacity of our international partners to accept our assistance, or in some cases, to take on more partnering events may be a limiting factor. Mexico, one of our most able military partners, provides a good example. While the U.S. Army and the Mexican Army have significantly increased their partnering activities in the last three years, the military is limited from doing more for several
reasons. First, there is still significant political and cultural animosity toward the United States—based on a long history—that inhibits the U.S. military from doing more to enable Mexican forces. The other limiting factor is how much capacity building assistance Mexican forces can absorb. Mexican forces are fully engaged in a war with the drug cartels and still responsible for national defense and disaster response.\textsuperscript{135} The U.S. must remember that for a partnership to be effective there has to be two or more willing and able parties. As Admiral James Stavridis said, “[t]heater commanders … work with time horizons that are much farther out and impact a much broader set of factors. They and their staffs are working to affect events, people, and situations across a time continuum that may stretch for a decade.”\textsuperscript{136} Trying to build capable partner forces that willingly embrace democratic principles takes time and patience. If the U.S. tries push too hard or to do too much too fast, it could actually undermine relationships.\textsuperscript{137}

Yet the most cumbersome and contentious aspect of the TSC program, like most government programs, is the funding process. The U.S. Government’s “security cooperation programs still rely on a patchwork of different authorities, different funding, [and] different rules.”\textsuperscript{138} While Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta think the new “dual-key” pooled resources of the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) is a move in the right direction, it is clearly not enough.\textsuperscript{139} The challenge, as described by Admiral Mullen is the lack of “a better coordinated, pooled-resource approach that make[s] resources more fungible across departments and programs and better integrates our defense, diplomacy, development, and intelligence efforts.”\textsuperscript{140} Additionally, when it comes to funding for U.S. Regionally Aligned Forces operating in a GCC’s AOR, there
is very little operational money available to a combatant commander unless he has to execute a contingency plan.\textsuperscript{141}

In times of growing fiscal austerity and greater Congressional scrutiny over spending, the Administration, DOD, and DOS will need to speak with a common voice as they urge Congress and other interagency stakeholders to improve the United States’ security cooperation capabilities. DOD, in particular, will have to answer increasingly harder questions from Congress; the Department will have to justify its need to ramp up its TSC spending, vice paring it down, and be able to show measurable progress.\textsuperscript{142} As one planning manual points out,

This will take CCMD-level analysis and cooperation with other C/S/As [Commands/Services/Agencies] to capture DOD-wide resourcing by country and region, and how that funding supports achievement of CCMD objectives. The foregoing puts a premium on efficiently using the resources available with maximum positive effect and it also means that clear-eyed assessments are critical in the planning and execution.\textsuperscript{143}

Limited funding will require tough strategic choices as well. DOD will have to work with DOS regarding prioritization of specific countries to engage as well as the size and frequency of these military-to-military events.\textsuperscript{144} Whether dealing with international partners, interagency bureaucrats, or Congressional members, the Department is going to have to demonstrate the same strategic patience it will require of its partnering soldiers.

Conclusion

The Regionally Aligned Force initiative is the Army’s attempt to achieve two of the three imperatives in its “prevent, shape, win” strategic framework as well as the particular ways it will meet national strategic ends while supporting the theater objectives of the GCCs’ theater campaign plans.\textsuperscript{145} It is part of the “US strategy to
employ indirect approaches… to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention.”

The United States is withdrawing from Middle East conflicts, but will remain a global power with global commitments. However, meeting these commitments will pose many challenges. While some in Washington and across the Nation may seek retrenchment, the Administration is proposing an active and wider engagement with our international partners. The Army’s RAF concept is an important part of DOD’s contribution to helping this strategy succeed.

Endnotes


5 The 2008 National Defense Strategy could not be implemented at the time. President Bush’s determination to defeat the insurgency in Iraq and prioritize forces for on-going operations in Central Command’s area of responsibility only allowed the services—and especially the Army—to minimally support the increasing security cooperation requirements of other geographic combatant commands. General Charles C. Campbell, “ARFORGEN: Maturing the Model, Refining the Process,” Army 59, no. 6 (June 2009), 49-54, http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2009/6/Pages/default.aspx (accessed December 2, 2012) and Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Force Generation, Army Regulation 525-29 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 March 2011), 1. A change in administration
brought a change in priorities as President Obama sought to significantly reduce U.S. forces in the Middle East. Bob Woodward, *Obama’s Wars* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 290-1, 304.


8 Panetta, “Dean Acheson Lecture.”


10 Michael Knippel, Planner, Strategic Initiatives Division, U.S. Army Forces Command, telephone interview by author, November 9, 2012.


13 Security force assistance (SFA), while defined more specifically as helping to build capacity and capability of a nation’s security institutions and often used in the context of counter-insurgency, is virtually identical in focus and purpose as TSC. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, defines security force assistance as “Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.” DOD considers SFA a subset of overall TSC initiatives. Joint Publication 3-0 describes military engagement as the routine interaction between elements of the U.S. Armed Forces and those of another state’s military or civilian agencies “to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence” and is a component of security cooperation. Lastly, the term capacity building or building partner capacity (BPC), while regularly used in the joint community, is not defined in joint doctrine; however, Army doctrine describes BPC as “the process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening of managerial systems.” Capacity building is much broader than SFA or TSC as it includes improving activities, institutions, and systems in a community or state beyond those necessarily related to security. It may apply to activities conducted by individuals or groups in both private and public organizations. Ibid.; Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, *Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, Security Force Assistance (SFA)*, October 27, 2010, 1.


16 Within the ARFORGEN model, the BOG:Dwell planning ratio is used to project available forces to meet demand; within the ARFORGEN process, these ratios are used to measure operational demand on the force overtime. For the active component force, it is the ratio of deployed periods, or boots on the ground (BOG) time, to non-deployed periods, or dwell. For a reserve component force deploying to combat, the ratio is measured as periods of time mobilized to periods of time not mobilized.

17 General Charles “Hondo” C. Campbell, Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, “Office Call with DA G3,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Washington, DC, December 9, 2009; “The ARFORGEN process is the structured progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of the combatant commander and other Army requirements. The ARFORGEN process is the Army’s core process for force generation, executed with supporting-to-supported relationships, that cycles units through three force pools: Reset, Train/Ready, and Available. Each of the three force pools contains a balanced force capability to provide a sustained flow of forces for current commitments and to hedge against unexpected contingencies. ARFORGEN establishes the basis to plan and execute Army wide unit resourcing.” ARFORGEN definition is from *Army Force Generation*, Army Regulation 525-29, 1.

18 There were three additional active component BCTs not available to CENTCOM in 2009—one in South Korea assigned to Pacific Command; one at Fort Bragg, North Carolina ready for world-wide rapid deployment as a global response force; and another committed to Army testing and evaluation at Fort Bliss, Texas.


21 Honorable Pete Geren and General George W. Casey, Jr., *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2009 to the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 1st Session, 11th Congress* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, May 2009), 6-7; General Charles “Hondo” C. Campbell, Commander,


Doyle, telephone interview by author, November 7, 2012.


Doyle, telephone interview by author, November 7, 2012.


General Charles “Hondo” C. Campbell, Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, “The Readiness Core Enterprise and ARCENT,” February 25, 2010, slide 17. Author attended the presentation and served as the note-taker for the FORSCOM Commander.


Knippel, telephone interview by author, November 9, 2012.

Knippel, e-mail message to author, December 11, 2012.


Knippel, e-mail message to author, December 11, 2012.


Paul McLeary, “U.S. Unit’s Africa Deployment Will Test New Regional Concept,” Defense News, September 26, 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120926/DEFREG04/309260003/U-S-Unit-8217-s-Africa-Deployment-Will-Test-New-Regional-Concept (accessed 26 Oct 12). Phase 0 (Shape) refers to the “normal and routine military activities—and various interagency activities…performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies.” Phase 1 (Deter) “includes activities to prepare forces and set conditions for deployment and employment of forces in the event that deterrence is not successful.” Phase 2 (Seize Initiative) “involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the adversary to offensive culmination, and setting the conditions for decisive operations.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011), III-42 – III-43.


47 Ibid.


49 A strategic inflection point is “when the balance of forces shifts from the old structure, from the old ways of doing business and the old ways of competing, to the new.” Andrew S. Grove, Only the Paranoid Survive: How to Exploit the Crisis Points That Challenge Every Company and Career (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 33.


51 General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “‘Face the Nation’ Transcript: January 8, 2012,” http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57354647/face-the-nation-transcript-january-8-2012/ (accessed November 22, 2012). Dempsey’s comments are similar to what Andy Grove describes in his book. “Taking an organization through a strategic inflection point is a march through unknown territory. The rules of business are unfamiliar or have not yet been formed. Consequently, you and your associates lack a mental map of the new environment, and even the shape of your desired goals is not completely clear…infighting ensues, arguments as to what direction to take bubble up and proliferate.” Only the Paranoid Survive, 139.


56 Panetta, “Dean Acheson Lecture.”

59 Ibid., 1-1.

60 Ibid., 1-5.


63 Panetta, “Dean Acheson Lecture.”

64 Rodriguez, “Preparing the Force for Unified Land Operations,” 78.

65 Ibid.


69 Ibid.

70 Philip Grey, “101st Airborne Division becoming Afghan experts,” *The Leaf Chronicle*, June 15, 2011, http://www.theleafchronicle.com/article/20110626/NEWS08/106260302/101st-Airborne-Division-becoming-Afghan-experts (accessed December 15, 2012). According to a presentation by the FORSCOM Commander, Campaign Continuity was a “SECDEF approved” program designed to “rotate Divisions, BCTs, and EAB [Echelon Above Brigade] BCTs into the same areas in which they had previous experience in order to enhance campaign continuity, reduce pre-deployment training challenges, and enhance leaders’ partnership building capability by building on previous relationships with security forces and with local and government leaders.” Campbell, “Remarks to the Infantry Warfighting Conference,” slide 20.


78 Leon E. Panetta, “Dean Acheson Lecture.”


88 Tan, “Pacific Commitment.”

89 Campbell, “The Readiness Core Enterprise and ARCENT,” slide 17.

90 Tan, “Pacific Commitment.”


Ibid.

Ibid.


U.S. Department of the Army, 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 8.


Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Posture Statement of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the 112th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington DC: Department of Defense, February 2011), 19, http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs/testMullen02162011.pdf (accessed 1 December 2012). This same theme has been reiterated by virtually every senior military leader who has spoken to the Class of 2013 at the U.S. Army War College.


Tan, “Pacific Commitment.”

Mullen, Posture Statement of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the 111th Congress Senate Committee on Armed Services, 21.


Obama, National Security Strategy, i.


Messai Sehili Assia, The Militarization of American Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era, Dissertation (Constantine, Algeria: Mentouri University, March 2007).


130 Panetta, “Dean Acheson Lecture.”

131 Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Posture Statement of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the 112th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 20.

132 Ibid.

133 Panetta, “Dean Acheson Lecture.”

134 Knippel, email message to author, December 11, 2012.

135 Hobbs, telephone interview by author, October 9, 2012.


138 Panetta, “Dean Acheson Lecture.”

139 This fund is pooled jointly between State and Defense, and Secretary of State must consult with the Secretary of Defense before using these funds. The fund is managed by an interagency body at Foggy Bottom and enables the U.S. to provide training resources and support to enable partner security forces to conduct security operations and participate in coalition operations. Ibid.; Shapiro, Remarks as delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Nina M. Serafino, *Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF): Summary and Issue Overview* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2012), ii.

140 Mullen, Posture Statement of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the 112th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 20.
141 Zielinski, “Conducting Successful Phase 0 Operations,” 2012, slide 11.


143 Ibid.


