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14. ABSTRACT

This Strategic Research Paper (SRP) examines the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process and provides senior Army leaders with recommendations to consider for improving the process. In pursuit of this outcome, the research effort begins with a historical analysis of Army force management processes beginning in the aftermath of World War II through current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This assessment provides an examination of the TAA process, to include associated risks, and their relationship to the future strategic environment. This analysis is important in identifying and eliminating redundancies between the Army and joint interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) partners. The desired end state of this research effort is to assist Army senior leaders in improving long-term resource decision-making, using a holistic DoD capabilities assessment based approach to maximize national resources, thereby ensuring the Army meets its Title 10 responsibilities of supporting joint war fighting requirements.
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Total Army Analysis Supporting Maximization of National Resources

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The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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This Strategic Research Paper (SRP) examines the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process and provides senior Army leaders with recommendations to consider for improving the process. In pursuit of this outcome, the research effort begins with a historical analysis of Army force management processes beginning in the aftermath of World War II through current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This assessment provides an examination of the TAA process, to include associated risks, and their relationship to the future strategic environment. This analysis is important in identifying and eliminating redundancies between the Army and joint interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) partners. The desired end state of this research effort is to assist Army senior leaders in improving long-term resource decision-making, using a holistic DoD capabilities assessment based approach to maximize national resources, thereby ensuring the Army meets its Title 10 responsibilities of supporting joint war fighting requirements.
Total Army Analysis Supporting Maximization of National Resources

The United States Army is well known for being an extremely versatile and adaptive organization, and has demonstrated agility in accommodating resource constraints, force structure reductions, and congressional oversight imposed through “the power of the purse.” This demonstrated agility has allowed the Army to meet its obligations in defense of the nation for over two hundred years. Much of the Army’s ability to provide the requisite force structure and capabilities that allow the institution to fulfill its obligations within the context of national security strategy in recent history is credited to the current Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. While the process has been relatively effective, improvements are required particularly in an era of fiscal constraint, and against the backdrop of looming force structure reductions. These improvements will better enable the Army to integrate force structure and capabilities with Joint Interagency, intergovernmental, multinational partners and eliminate redundancies.

After 11 years of protracted war, and in an era where defense resources will suffer at the expense of the nation’s ever increasing national debt and need to sustain domestic entitlements, the National Security Strategy now mandates a shift from unilateral action to a greater reliance on partners and allies to achieve national interests, and ensure global security. Based on this new strategy the Army must quickly adapt to ensure it can fulfill its Title10 functions and responsibilities. No other time in the Army’s history have the stakes been so high. Hanging in the balance, is at best, an Army that continues to inefficiently maximize its resources in the form of personnel, dollars, training, and equipment, and at worst is an ill-prepared Army that lacks the strategic capability to meet global challenges as part of a multi-national force and to augment homeland defense in times of crisis.
This Strategic Research Paper examines the TAA process and provides Army senior leaders with recommendations to consider for improving the process. In pursuit of this outcome, the research effort begins with a historical analysis of Army force management processes beginning in the aftermath of World War II through current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The paper then examines current national level security strategies and guidance and assesses the effectiveness of the TAA process in developing force structure and capabilities required to enable the Army to fulfill its title ten responsibilities within the context of national strategy. This assessment includes and examination of the TAA process, to include associated risks, and their relationship to the future strategic environment. This is an important requirement for senior leaders as it applies to strategic alignment and maintaining the Army’s competitive advantage as the premier land power in the world. The paper then explores potential improvements to the process given impending reductions to current Army force structure by presenting criteria to better assess and evaluate force structure and capabilities required to meet Title 10 responsibilities within a joint interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) construct. This analysis is important in identifying and eliminating redundancies between the Army and JIIM partners.

The desired end state of this research effort is to assist Army senior leaders in improving long-term resource decision-making, using a holistic Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities assessment based approach to maximize national resources, thereby ensuring the Army meets its Title 10 responsibilities of supporting joint war fighting requirements.
Total Army Analysis: Historical Perspective of Past Force Reductions

Historically, the Army has repeatedly faced challenges in maintaining the requisite force structure and capability required to wage the nation’s wars. This dynamic stems back to the beginning of the nation. As a young nation with limited resources and a small federal government, the ability to raise and support a standing Army was levied on the people, and the Army was exclusively employed for limited durations and for specific purposes. When hostilities ceased the Army was typically reduced to bare minimums. However, as the nation emerged as an industrial world power during the early 20th century, foreign policy began to shift from isolationism toward imperialism, and the nation’s ability to pursue national interests abroad became heavily dependent on a strong and capable military. As a result, the need to align military force structure and capabilities to meet strategic requirements became imperative, and long standing debates pertaining to the allocation of national resources in support of military requirements began to dominate the nation’s political landscape. These debates continue today, particularly in an era of fiscal constraint.

In the aftermath of World War II, these debates took on a renewed emphasis, particularly as the nation entered into the cold war struggle against the Soviet Union and sought to project democracy as a more viable approach towards governance in comparison to communism. During this period, significant transformation within the national defense structure, implemented through the 1947 national security act, further increased the intensity of these debates and would require the military to create and modify systems and processes required to ensure adequate force structure and capabilities. From a historical perspective, the period between the end of World War II and the beginning of the current “war on terror” period in Iraq and Afghanistan marks
the most significant period of change pertaining to these processes and warrants examination within the context of this research effort. Many of the current challenges associated with military processes and systems such as the Defense Acquisition System, designed to manage force structure and capabilities stem from key actions and events that took place during this period.

After World War II Army force structure was significantly reduced. At the end of the war there were in excess of 8 million Soldiers in a total of 89 divisions in the Army, and within five years, that number was significantly reduced to only 591,000 Soldiers and 10 divisions. Of the 10 Army divisions, 5 were deployed overseas, with 4 assigned to the Far Eastern Command deployed in support of occupation duty in the country of Japan, and 1 division was assigned to the European Command deployed in the country of Germany. The remaining five divisions were stationed in bases throughout the continental United States and were primarily used as a general or strategic reserve to respond to any requirement as determined by national level authorities. In determining the need for reorganization, the Army used wartime experiences as the basis for change. Despite this reorganization, most divisions were well below authorized strength and were hampered by insufficient weapons systems and equipment that was characterized as “worn-out leftovers from World War II.” Atrophied personnel and equipment readiness levels in 1950 became very apparent during the military’s dismal performance during the initial onset of hostilities in Korea.¹

Based on operational and strategic requirements associated with the Korean conflict, Army end strength increased to just over 950,000 through the middle of the 1960s, and grew to over 1,570,000 at the height of the Vietnam War in 1968.
Vietnam, the Army had an imbalanced and disproportionate amount of soldiers in its ranks that came from disadvantaged and low-socioeconomic backgrounds and many soldiers lacked any degree of formal education. Furthermore, many middle and upper class men qualified for student deferments by attending college. Many Americans believed that this practice was unfair, and this circumstance, coupled with the unpopular and protracted nature of the Vietnam War proved instrumental in the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force that has served the nation over the past four decades.

In 1970, and based on an envisioned drawdown from Vietnam, the Army initiated a reduction in force. This initiative was designed to get rid of poor performing Soldiers and reduce end strength.\textsuperscript{2} The end of conflict in Vietnam also led to significant reductions in the defense budget, and resulted in a reduction in end strength as the Army totaled 785,000 Soldiers and 13 divisions by FY1974.\textsuperscript{3}

Some Army strategic leaders thought these reductions were troubling, to include Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams, who believed that a mere 13-divisions were not sufficient enough to meet the nation’s global security requirements. Given these concerns, General Abrams gained approval from the Secretary of Defense to increase the Army’s active divisions to 16 without an increase in Active Duty end strength, which stood at 785,000. This was achieved in part by reassigning Soldiers from Army headquarters and instructional units to Army divisions, assigning reserve component “round-out” brigades to late-deploying Active Duty divisions, and realigning combat support and combat service support units to the Reserve Component. This new construct became the “Total Army Force” and was instituted into the armed forces by then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.\textsuperscript{4}
There were a number of perceived problems associated with the Total Force construct. To begin with, filling the Army’s three new Active Duty divisions from capped end strength (750K) severely taxed the Army’s already thin manpower pool. Furthermore, relationships between Active Duty and Reserve Components were considered poor at best, with many Active Duty commanders typically viewing their Reserve Component counterparts as “weekend warriors” and doubting the combat readiness of reserve forces. The Army’s intense reliance on the Reserve Component to meet combat support and service support requirements was seen by many to be problematic, because the Active Component would experience difficulties during the early portions of operations waiting for reserve forces to mobilize. However, General Abrams thought an increased reliance on the Reserve Component would prove better and would obtain and maintain the support of the American public if major conflict occurred. Furthermore, this arrangement would prevent the type of public outrage that occurred during the Vietnam era. During this period, a confluence of Issues such as, limited Army end strength versus requirements, poor recruit quality, budgetary constraints, and a lack of public support in the mid-to-late 1970s led senior Army leadership to characterize the Army as a “hollow force.”

The “hollow force” characterization of the Army in the mid-1970s and early 1980s changed due in part due to arguments presented by senior DoD leaders coupled with congressional action, and the defense build-up under the Reagan Administration. In 1987, the Active Army consisted of 780,815 personnel comprising 18 divisions. In late 1989, the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union began to unravel. The demise of the Soviet Union led the United States and its allies to pursue a “peace dividend,” which resulted in
drastic reductions in defense budgets and manpower designed to decrease taxes and divert resources to other uses. In the end, a 535,000 Soldier Active Duty force—a more than 30% cut—was agreed to, constituting the smallest Army since 1939.\textsuperscript{6} During the late 1980s, and in light of a declining Soviet threat, the Army executed further force reductions and established a force structure of 15 divisions, which was referred to as the “BASE Force,” which remained intact until the onset of conflict with Iraq in the fall of 1990. After the Army's impressive performance during the “100 hours of Conflict” and the liberation of Kuwait, many senior leaders began to strongly advocate for a more technology centered approach toward warfare, and policy debates centered on reducing the size of the Army were renewed.\textsuperscript{7}

In 1993, the Clinton Administration announced it would pursue defense budget reductions of at least $88 billion from FY1994-FY1997. As part of this effort, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated a Bottom Up Review intended to modify force structure based on current and projected threats to national security. The review recommended placing added emphasis on U.S. air power and a reduction of Army end strength to 495,000 soldiers while retaining the ability to fight in two Major Theaters of War (MTWs) simultaneously. In March 1994, bottom up review recommendations were implemented, Active Army end strength was reduced to 495,000 and 2 of 12 divisions were eliminated.\textsuperscript{8}

Throughout the late 90’s and prior to 2001, based on lessons learned from the time needed for the long build-up forces into the Central Command Area of Responsibility, operations in Bosnia, and previous decisions concerning Base Realignment and Closure both at home and abroad, Army senior leadership identified
the need for a more versatile agile, and tailored force that could deploy more easily
deploy and rapidly meet the needs of the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC).

Based on manning requirements, the Army planned to undergo a complete
Transformation migrating the current force capability to a future force better organized,
trapped and equipped for JIIM operations. Army personnel end strength dropped to
approximately 480,000 before the cataclysmic events of September 11, 2001 changed
the landscape of defense spending and Army end strength for the next 11 years.

Other major initiatives after the turn of the new millennium were modularity and Grow
the Army (GTA). Modularity changed the mission and capabilities of Army headquarters
at the Brigade, Division, Corps, and Army Service Component levels while the GTA plan
expanded the force from 42 Brigade Combat Teams to 83 by the end of 2013. Congress
authorized this temporary growth in end strength in order to increase unit dwell time
between deployments to both theaters of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Total authorized
increase in end strength reached approximately 75,000 Soldiers with the intent of
returning to manning requirements prior to September 2001 when hostilities ended in
Iraq and Afghanistan.9

Current Defense Strategic Planning Guidance and Priorities

Our Nation is at a moment of transition. Thanks to the extraordinary
sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, we have responsibly ended
the war in Iraq, put al-Qaida on the path to defeat – including delivering
justice to Osama bin Laden and made significant progress in Afghanistan,
allowing us to begin the transition to Afghans responsibility. At the same
time, we must put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our
long-term economic strength. To that end, the Budget Control Act of 2011
mandates reductions in federal spending, including defense spending...As
we end today’s wars and reshape our Armed Forces, we will ensure that
our military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies.
In particular, we will continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future
success, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
counterterrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in
anti-access environments; and prevailing in all domains, including cyber. The fiscal choices we face are difficult ones, but there should be no doubt – here in the United States or around the world – we will keep our Armed Forces the best trained, best-led, best-equipped fighting force in history.\textsuperscript{10}

President Obama’s sentiments and intent underscore the current strategic shift in national security strategy and place greater emphasis on restoring the national economy. The importance of restoring the United States economy is further emphasized by former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen who characterized the national debt as the “primary threat to national security.” One of the central themes associated with this new ideological paradigm shift is the intent to reduce defense spending, while simultaneously maintaining the best led, best trained and best equipped fighting force in the world. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, titled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” reinforces the President’s intent but cautions that in “going forward, we will also remember the lessons of history and avoid repeating the mistakes of the past when our military was left ill-prepared for the future.” The document goes on to add, “As we end today’s wars and reshape our Armed Forces, we will ensure that our military is agile, flexible and ready for the full range of contingencies.”

In aligning military strategy and priorities to the President’s intent and guidance, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance communicates priorities for a 21st century defense that sustains United States global leadership. To begin with, strategic military leaders are committed to reshaping a Joint Force in the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible and technologically advanced. This force will have a global presence with greater emphasis on the Asia Pacific region, while maintaining defense commitments to Europe, and strengthening alliance and partnerships across all
regions. Equally as important, the guidance emphasizes the ability to surge and regenerate forces and capabilities to ensure the military is capable of facing, deterring and when required, defeating future threats to national security.

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance assesses defense strategy based on the changing geopolitical environment, changing fiscal circumstances in the nation, and against the backdrop of a challenging global security environment. In doing so, the guidance notes that for the foreseeable future, the nation will continue to take action to counter a range of threats alongside allies and close partners. As a result, relationships with these partners and allies are critical to global security and for the nation to achieve strategic goals and objectives. Equally as important, is the need to reduce redundancies and enable interoperability between United States military forces and our allies and partners. Given the President’s intent, coupled with the type of capabilities required by joint forces, and the complex nature of the current and future global security environment, the defense strategic guidance identified the following primary missions of the United States Armed Forces:

- Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
- Deter and Defeat Aggression
- Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges
- Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space
- Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
- Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities
- Provide a Stabilizing Presence
• Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
• Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations

The aforementioned concepts and broad range of mission sets communicated in the Defense Strategic Planning Guidance enabled senior leaders within the department of defense to prioritize defense budgets, and establish priorities pertaining to force structure and capabilities given national fiscal constraints. Following the release of this strategic planning guidance, senior military leaders provided the military services additional direction and guidance pertaining to envisioned force structure reductions. The January 2012, “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices” document was developed to inform military investment choices and conform to the 2011 federal budget control act’s requirement of reducing the future defense expenditures by approximately $487 million dollars over a five year period. This document oriented on three main areas of emphasis; more disciplined use of defense dollars; strategically driven shifts in force structure; and the all-volunteer force (sustaining the force). While all three areas of emphasis have significant consequences for the Army, arguably the strategically driven shifts in force structure emerges as most significant based on the inherent implications to Army force structure as conveyed in the following five tenants:

• Rebalance force structure and investments toward the Asia Pacific and Middle East regions while sustaining alliances and partnerships in other regions
• Plan and size forces to be able to defeat an adversary in one theater, while denying aggression elsewhere or imposing unacceptable loss
• Protect key investments in technologically advanced capabilities most needed for the future, including countering anti access threats
• No longer size forces to conduct large protracted stability operations while retaining the expertise gained from a decade of war
• To the extent possible, structure major investments in a way the best allows for their reversal or for regeneration of capabilities in the future if circumstances change\textsuperscript{11}

Based on these five tenants, senior DoD leaders further envisioned significant reductions in Army force structure. Specifically, the Army was directed to remove at least eight brigade combat teams from its force structure to include two heavy infantry divisions forward deployed in Europe. These projected force structure cuts would result in a decrease in Army end strength from 570,000 to roughly 490,000. Given these choices, the strategic implications for the Army in the future are significant, and highlight the critical need to ensure the TAA process is effective enough to enable the Army to fulfill its title ten responsibilities in support of joint war fighting requirements and meet the intent of national level strategic planning guidance.

Aligning the Total Army Analysis Process to Meet Future Requirements

As we look to the future, the uncertainty and complexity of the global security environment demands vigilance. In these challenging economic times, America’s Army will join Department of Defense efforts to maximize efficiency by identifying and eliminating redundant, obsolete or unnecessary programs, responsibly reducing end-strength and by evolving our global posture to meet future security challenges.\textsuperscript{12}

The TAA process determines organizational authorizations and provides the proper mix of organizations that comprise a balanced and affordable force structure for the Army. Force structuring is an integral part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Joint Strategic Planning System. It develops force structure in support of joint, strategic, and operational planning and Army planning, programming and budgeting. The development of a force is based on an understanding of strategic objectives, threats, and the dynamics of externally and internally imposed constraints (i.e., dollars, end strength, roles, and missions).¹³

Given this definition, the output of the TAA process should provide a capability broad enough to meet joint war fighting requirements as communicated by GCC. Nevertheless, as indicated earlier in this document, force structure typically does not congruently meet requirements. One of the most important portions of the TAA process is determining the proper mix of force capabilities to meet GCC demands and requirements.

Determining maneuver force requirements historically proves as the easier problem set to solve when supporting geographic combatant commanders. As we evaluate the proper combat force mix for the future force, Army senior leaders must take a hard look at the affordability and agility of heavy, light, special purposed divisions/brigades, and special operating forces (SOF) as part of a larger force and capabilities within the Department of Defense. These types of capabilities will prove important given the envisioned nature of threats and operational requirements associated with the future operating environment and global landscape.

Equally as important in the future are Maneuver Enhancement and Force Sustainment organizations. These types of units are unique to the Army and distinguish it from other services, as they are the enablers that provide the Joint force the capability
for improved mission success and extended survivability during protracted conflicts within a theater of war. As with maneuver forces, the important questions are how much is enough, what is redundant within other services, what is the time extent of major combat operations, and most importantly how will the Army change its force structure to meet strategic requirements? In addressing these important questions, particularly in light of the aforementioned strategic guidance and choices communicated by senior DoD leaders, the Army must assume greater risk in many different areas. This allows the Army to achieve significant savings in manpower, training, and equipment if it, in coordination with DoD, adopts a holistic capabilities assessment approach as opposed to continuing the status quo of maintaining specific functional capabilities that can be accomplished by other JIIM partners.

TAA Process Improvements and Recommendations

The detailed guidance, direction and choices provided in the strategic documents examined in this research effort provide the framework for the impending TAA process. This guidance also influences the development of an affordable Army force structure that will meet strategic demands, thereby ensuring the Army maintains its reputation as the premier land force in the world. Changes in the TAA process can improve affordability through capabilities analysis by eliminating redundancies with DoD. This can be accomplished by shifting from an Army centric analysis process to a joint capabilities analysis by using specific force structure requirements outlined in the Global Force Management (GEF) and Joint Strategic Capabilities documents (JSCAP) as a forcing function. While the approach of requiring each service to determine specific capabilities mix in a standalone manner in the past may have served us well, it has out lived its usefulness and a more DoD/Joint approach to determining requirement
capabilities is required to truly maximize the use of government resources. This research effort recommends the following changes in the process and general force requirements to better implement the wise application of limited resources and enable the Army to meet global requirements and ensure the security of the United States.

Process Improvements

- Service Chiefs should conduct a comprehensive review of capabilities required to support the GEF and JSCAP based on global requirements for next 5-10 years, and determine and designate a lead service in providing that capability
- Service chiefs should determine which capabilities within DoD are inherently governmental and contract other services as required
- Service chiefs should eliminate or significantly modify service capabilities analysis like TAA in favor of a joint capabilities analysis, thereby requiring the services to make hard decisions pertaining to which service takes the lead in determining where redundant capabilities reside in each service (migrate Title 10 responsibilities to the Office of Secretary of Defense – OSD)

Force Structure Recommendations

- Increase Manning in senior officer and non-commissioned officer duty positions to enhance skill sets in Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) to support Phase 0 (Shape) and Phase IV (Stability) operations
- Increase/integrate Special Operation Forces (SOF) into traditional forces
- Decrease Force Sustainment organizations relying on reach back for supportability and capabilities of sister services
• Grow cyberspace capability integrated into a DoD capability across each of the Services
• Integrate Composition (COMPO) 1 and 2 units when applicable
• Continue Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) Concept

The Impact that these TAA process improvements and force structure recommendations will have on the force while significant, may take many years to change the culture within DoD and each Service. Transformational change must occur at the every level to achieve the objective of combining similar joint capabilities especially in the Force Sustainment and Medical areas. In addition, continued emphasis is needed to ensure compatible command and control (C2) and information support systems. Without seamless communication systems across the services, an efficient joint environment supporting GCC will remain problematic. Lastly, as efficiencies are gained by implementing these recommendations, training executed in a joint environment must become more common if we are to maximize the true capabilities of a Force that will provide ready capabilities to the GCC.

Conclusion

The United States Army currently enjoys a reputation as the world’s premiere land power, assisting the United States government with projecting power across the globe to secure allies, partners, and the international economic system. In order to project flexible and adaptable capabilities required to meet these demanding global requirements, institutional processes must support the overall Army mission.

During each inter-war period, national leaders made important decisions as to the correct force mix and size to balance domestic and national security interests. While
the United States Army quickly adapted after each of these major drawdowns, harsh lessons from these force reductions must not be repeated as we enter into another post inter war period.

The TAA process or variations thereof have played a critical role in determining the required force to meet future challenges, and while measure of performance and effectiveness were evaluated in terms of victory, as we move into the new era of global uncertainty, fiscal constraints and the national debt require the Army to implement different measures of effectiveness by evaluating the structure based on cost and affordability. If the Army’s past is an indication of its ability to adapt to the emerging and future challenges of a Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous environment, the nation can rest assured that it will be up to the task, but not without implementing basic fundamental changes to the TAA process that served us well in the past. My fundamental recommendation to improve the process by moving it toward developing a joint force process at OSD level will potentially eliminate many force and capability redundancies within each of the services, thereby saving taxpayers billions of dollars in manpower, training, equipment, and services throughout the Department of Defense. In addition to these process improvements, changes within the Army culture as it pertains to evaluating decisions based on cost (cost culture), changes to personnel system, as well as a different approaches to select career fields such as strategic planners and foreign area officers that support the requirements of in Phase 0 and Phase IV, if that capability is best supported by the Army.

From the DoD and Army level the challenge to reducing overhead at headquarters throughout organizational structure has always been a major challenge
during periods of force reductions. Furthermore, a routine conservative approach to garner the necessary savings may not be best solution. Looking for savings within personnel accounts (health care/unemployment), excess infrastructure, and acquisition programs, tend to become extremely problematic, as the process involves changing existing laws/regulation and concurrence from 536 elected stakeholders within the government. With this in mind, leadership within the DoD led by the Army should study a possible expansion of Gold Water Nichols Act to determine the feasibility and affordability of Title 10 responsibilities migrating to OSD.

Regardless of the extent of risk or change senior Army leaders decide to accept, the ability to adapt and change may prove to be the single most important organizational challenge. Change in institutional processes such as TAA underpinned by a fundamental acceptance of evaluating enterprise decisions based on maximizing resources through adaption of a cost culture will go a long way in ensuring systems, processes, and programs are viewed holistically from a joint perspective and not predominantly from a Service perspective. As the nation’s largest military service, senior Army leaders must lead change to ensure resources are maximized and provide the necessary land force to ensure the nation’s security from both international and domestic perspectives.

The risks and consequences of missing the mark on the designing the future capabilities to provide Combatant Commanders with the capabilities and capacity to prosecute the next war is too high and important not to mitigate and get right. Implementing changes to the TAA process and shifting more Title 10 responsibilities to OSD could deliver the necessary savings from redundant capabilities throughout the
total joint force, thereby maximizing our precious national resources during time of increase budget constraints.

Endnotes


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.


11 Ibid.

