Faith-Based Diplomacy: A Pathway to Marginalizing Al-Qa`ida

by

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Abstract

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The U.S. government, influenced by a secular tradition of separating church and state, is challenged by the intersections between the role of religion in foreign policy and the demand to deal with faith-based tensions and significant conflicts around the world, particularly al-Qa`ida. The U.S. policy approach to al-Qa`ida and religious extremism over the last twelve years is an approach that overwhelmingly omits faith-based diplomacy. This paper examines a faith-based policy approach to defeating al-Qa`ida: first, addressing shortfalls and limitations in past and current National Security Strategy; second, characterizing the current global nature of the al-Qa`ida organization, including its theology and ideology; and, third, recommending faith-based policy initiatives, including the advocacy for greater U.S. policy and strategy emphasis on the promotion of religious freedom worldwide.
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The reality is that religion has power. And that power can either be used creatively or destructively. . . . I do believe that religion is indeed the major cause of much conflict in the world today. And, I would say, if it is a cause, it must also be the cure.

—Andrew White, President and CEO, Foundation for Reconciliation of the Middle East

Religion and Its Challenges

Overall, 84 percent of the world’s inhabitants, estimated at 6.9 billion, identify with a religion, according to a 2012 study issued by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. The Encyclopedia of Religion states, “Religion is the organization of life around the depth dimensions of experience—varied in form, completeness, and clarity in accordance with the environing culture.” Definitions of religion are as broad and widely interpreted as the Encyclopedia of Religion. Peter Edge, author of Religion and Law, informs: “Where do we find ‘the’ English definition of religion? In fact, there is no such single definition—rather a body of related definitions which depend upon the context in which they occur.” Adding a further dimension, Edge states “There are difficulties in defining religion which are common to any consideration of the term which is not, itself, based in the discipline of an exclusive religion.” Among the complexities of doing so, Edge ultimately yields a working definition: “religion consists of statements about metaphysical reality, and beliefs and practices flowing from such statements.” Provided the broad definitions, interpretations, and individual value and expression of religion, it is not surprising religion is tied to conflict around the world: sectarian violence in the Middle East; religious nationalism in South Asia; threats of religious extremism in the West; interreligious battles in Africa; and religious suppression in East Asia. Moreover, several of these regional areas are presently influenced by al-Qa`ida, a global militant
Islamist organization and its affiliates. In the 2012 *Strategic Defense Guidance*, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, clearly indicates the U.S. priority for defeating this transnational organization. “It [the Joint Force] will preserve our ability to conduct the missions we judge most important to protecting core national interests: defeating al-Qa`ida and its affiliates and succeeding in current conflicts.”8 The U.S. government, influenced by a secular tradition of separating church and state, is challenged by the intersections between the role of religion in foreign policy and the demand to deal with faith-based tensions and significant conflicts around the world, particularly al-Qa`ida. In a 2007 interview, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright provided insight to reasons for this challenge when asked why diplomats and world leaders are “tone deaf” to the power of religion:

> It’s not a matter of not understanding or having their own personal faith. But, what had happened is that I think there was a sense that certain conflicts were so complicated, that to bring God and religion into them was an additional complicating factor, because there were so many diverse ideas. And if there’s one thing that always gets people excited, it’s their different interpretations of religion. So, the best thing people thought was, you know, this is hard enough. Let’s not bring God and religion into it.9

Secretary Albright further commented, “And, I feel especially now that the opposite needs to be true--is that in order to try to resolve conflicts we need to find the common aspects of the three great Abrahamic religions.”10 The Secretary’s response, albeit an informing perspective from the former highest-ranking U.S. diplomat, is simple and intuitive when considering the challenges of incorporating faith in a national policy approach, particularly to religious issues and conflicts. Her insight, however, uniquely highlights the underlying U.S. policy approach to complex religious issues, specifically al-Qa`ida and religious extremism over the last twelve years—an approach that overwhelmingly “leaves God and religion out of it.” This research paper advocates a
faith-based policy approach to marginalizing al-Qa`ida: first, addressing shortfalls and limitations in past and current national policy; second, characterizing the current global nature of the al-Qa`ida organization, including its theology and ideology; and, third, recommending faith-based policy initiatives to sideline al-Qa`ida. If implemented properly, a faith-based approach compliments the additional instruments of national power.

2002 and 2010 National Security Strategies

Evidence of the complexities and challenges of countering, much less defeating, al-Qa`ida is apparent through comparisons of the 2002 and, most recently published, 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) documents. As articulated in the 2002 NSS, “The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”

The 2002 strategy posture broadly characterized al-Qa`ida as simply a terrorist organization with political motivation without an associated face, religion, or ideology. In contrast, Quintan Wiktorowicz, in his 2002 book, Global Jihad, more descriptively characterizes al-Qa`ida as “the self-anointed foot soldiers of God, embroiled in a divine cosmic struggle between good and evil, the righteous and the sinful, Islamic truth and western ignorance.” Wiktorowicz assessed the Bush administration response a year following the September 11, 2001 attacks as too narrowly focused: “The U.S. response targeted radical Islamic terrorists who, as President Bush put it, were ‘traitors to their own faith, trying in effect, to hijack Islam itself.’” He further comments that President Bush, and other world leaders, dismissed al-Qaeda as part of the “lunatic fringe, outside the boundaries of Islam,” resulting in a prevailing national strategy designed to kill or
immobilize the “violent religious usurpers and so end terrorism.” Wiktorowicz presciently foresaw enduring challenges and complexities in U.S. attempts to defeat al-Qa`ida. He surmised: “If al-Qaeda is dismantled as an organized enterprise, will Islamic terrorism disappear? The administration seems to think so, and is betting its future national security on an anti-terrorism policy directed at destroying al-Qaeda’s infrastructure and eliminating its leadership.” Wiktorowicz additionally explained that an enemy like al-Qa`ida is not eradicated through military operations and law enforcement dragnets alone, since there are others to assume the place of the fallen. Wiktorowicz concludes the violent true believer is only stopped if the ideas nurturing violence and terrorism are discredited. Comparing the 2002 and 2010 NSS reveals al-Qa`ida remains resilient and not as easy to eradicate as previously assumed.

Afghanistan and Pakistan: This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al-Qa`ida. The danger from this region will only grow if its security slides backward, the Taliban controls large swaths of Afghanistan, and al-Qa`ida is allowed to operate with impunity. Since 2002, some progress was made in weakening al-Qa`ida’s core strength, depriving the organization of training bases in Afghanistan and sequestering it in Pakistan; but the organization core and affiliates expanded operations to Iraq, the Maghreb and Arabian Peninsula. Progress does not mean the dissolution of al-Qa`ida is imminent. Vigilance and the distinctive well-balanced application of lethal power against al-Qa`ida remain prudent measures but cannot endure in marginalizing the organization. As the 2010 NSS reveals, the original Global War on Terror has evolved: “We will always seek to
delegitimize the use of terrorism and to isolate those who carry it out. Yet this is not a
global war against a tactic—terrorism or a religion—Islam. We are at war with a specific
network, al-Qa`ida, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United
States, our allies, and partners. Yet, does this strategy focus on al-Qa`ida’s center of
gravity, popular support—those small portion of supporters who aid in “legitimizing” and
“galvanizing” the violent extremists—or simply carve away the edges? After all, like the
Cold War, the conflict with al-Qa`ida is about conflicting ideologies—a war of ideas.
Ultimately, it is Muslims, however, that must persuade Muslims that liberal democratic
ideals are more aligned with Islam than al-Qa`ida radicalism. In a lingering war of
attrition through lethal means, without sincere effort to understand and explain al-
Qa`ida—its theological, ideological, and organizational elements—the United States will
inevitably continue to formulate future policy and strategy with vain attempts to
marginalize al-Qa`ida extremism as an enduring priority.

There is tremendous credence in Wiktorowicz’ aforementioned claim of fruitless
attempts to defeat a true believer with brute force. Until the ideas, motives, and
aspirations of a fanatic or fanatical movement are understood, they are extremely
difficult to marginalize. Over sixty years ago, Eric Hoffer gave the world a literary gem,
The True Believer, on understanding social thought. Hoffer’s work is a hallmark work for
any strategist attempting to understand the complexities of a fanatic or, in this case,
extremist enemy. With ambitions to reign as a burgeoning caliphate, the motivations of
al-Qa`ida members closely resonate with Hoffer’s description of a ‘true believer’: “Their
innermost craving is for a new life—a rebirth—or, failing this, a chance to acquire new
elements of pride, confidence, hope, a sense of purpose and worth by an identification
with a holy cause.” Hoffer’s insights matter because understanding this level of personal motivation or justification of ideas is what enables marginalization of an enemy insurgent—to understand individual aims, recruitment strategies, and organizational goals, growth, and sustainment. Understanding the enemy, after all, is one of the principal elements of Sun Tzu’s strategic imperative for defeating any enemy. Thomas Farr’s and Dennis Hoover’s *The Future of U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy* argues that terrorist movements thrive in part on the appeal of ideas. Their argument is further strengthened by a recurrent observation. While leaders may be captured or killed, communications disrupted or geographic regions cleared of terrorist affiliates, “the ideas which attract recruits remain operative.” Farr and Dennis further argue, “Islamist terrorism in its various guises is distinctive, and possesses a particular staying power, because of its appeal to religious obligation.” This obligation is inextricably linked to a greater vision for the al-Qa`ida organization and one persisting to evolve. Scholars continue to analyze and discuss al-Qa`ida’s past and future jihadist aims, particularly when considering the events and context surrounding Arab Spring and Osama bin Laden’s death in 2011. The following provides a brief outline of al-Qa`ida’s current organizational status, with an enduring theological foundation, an evolving ideology, and a dynamic organizational structure.

**Al-Qa`ida Today**

**Theology**

Islamic fundamentalism is a broad term referring to an individual seeking to strictly follow the two fundamental sources of Islam—the Quran and Sunna. The Quran, the literal word of God as transmitted to the prophet Mohammed in Arabic, provides rules for human activities including economics, family relations, politics, and
religious practice. Fundamentalists believe Muslims should apply the principals of the Quran to every facet of their existence. Too broad in descriptive context, the Islamist fundamentalist label spans the range from conservative Muslim, practicing democratic principals and interfaith dialogue, to the current leader of the al-Qa`ida organization, Ayman al Zawahiri. Wahabbism is one common term more accurately used to describe al-Qa`ida’s religious foundations. Wahabbism, today, most accurately reflects Saudi Arabia’s conservative version of Islam, the official religion of the state. Wahabbis, however, rarely use the term and prefer instead to call themselves “Salafis.” Salafis believe the Companions enjoyed a pure understanding of the religion where subsequent understandings are distorted by the introduction of religious innovations, local customs, or rituals. The goal of the Salafi movement, therefore, is to eradicate innovations and return to the pure form of Islam. Important to understand, al-Qa`ida only represents a small constituency of the Salafi movement; most Salafis, or Salafi reformists, condemn al Qa`ida violence, or their expression of jihad, in achieving organization objectives. Disagreements lead to internal ideological violence spurned by jihadi attacks against reformers. Also important to understand, despite this significant ideological difference, the two factions, counter-intuitively, agree on 99% of their religion. The similarities mean that individual Salafis may sway from one side to the other, important for considerations of motivation for recruitment or reasons for attrition in the organization. “A relatively unknowledgeable Salafi who is frustrated, repressed, or confused may be vulnerable to the appeals of violence,” according to Wiktorowicz. These same individuals, or true believer recruits, may also gain affinity for al-Qa`ida’s ideological interpretation for a return to pure Islam.
Ideology

In 2009, Peter Krause and Stephen Van Evera authored an article describing al-Qa`ida’s theology as based on six elements: Salafist roots; the militarization of jihad; the elevation of jihad; the framing of vast imperial aims, and the justification for the killing of both civilians and Muslims. Aside from revisiting al-Qa`ida’s Salafist roots, this paper focuses on two of the author’s elements in outlining al-Qa`ida ideology: Jihad and Imperial Aims. While the authors characterized the elements as part of theology, this paper presents them as ideology. The distinction is subtle but important to recognize, particularly when characterizing the present-day Salafi religious movement and the principal difference, that of violence to carry out a means, between the reform oriented Salafis and al-Qa`ida.

Militarization and Elevation of Jihad: “Jihad” is the Arabic term meaning “struggle toward good” or “striving in the way of God.” Mainstream Muslims recognize two forms of Jihad: an internal struggle to be a good person, identified as the greater jihad, and external struggle to defend Islam against injury or attack, identified as the lesser jihad. Of the two, greater jihad is considered the more important. Lesser jihad requires defending Islam, by force if necessary, but includes no duty to wage an aggressive war. Al-Qa`ida inverts the Fundamentalist concepts of greater and lesser jihad by elevating the duty to defend the faith above the duty to be a good person. This position militarizes the concept of jihad and vastly expands lesser jihad to include two elements not associated with mainstream Muslims: expansionist wars of aggression, and the mass killing of non-combatants and Muslims.

Framing of Imperial Aims: Krause and Evera aver al-Qa`ida uses two methods to expand the lesser jihad to advocate and require aggressive war. First, al-Qa`ida
prescribes that any location ever ruled by Muslims, or to have significant Muslim population, is a “Muslim” land to this day. Second, al-Qa`ida prescribes that if “lands are now not governed by Muslim rulers, they are under attack and must be defended, by force if necessary.”39 The authors conclude, “The mainstream Muslim rule against waging aggressive war is thereby replaced by a defacto requirement to use force to spread Muslim rule.”40

Given this ideological approach, Leah Farrall assess al-Qa`ida’s success since 2001.

Despite nearly a decade of war, al Qaeda is stronger today than when it carried out the 9/11 attacks. Before 2001, its history was checkered with mostly failed attempts to fulfill its most enduring goal: the unification of other militant Islamist groups under its strategic leadership. However, since fleeing Afghanistan to Pakistan’s tribal areas in late 2001, al Qaeda has founded a regional branch in the Arabian Peninsula and acquired franchises in Iraq and Maghreb. Today, it has more members, greater geographic reach, and a level of ideological sophistication and influence it lacked ten years ago.41

This does not mean, however, the al-Qa`ida of 2013 experiences no challenges in achieving ideological aims. In May 2012, the Center for National Policy discussed the evolving aims of al-Qa`ida, one year after Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Special Forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan. One of three featured speakers, Will McCants, considered a leading scholar on militant Islam, discussed the influence of Abu Bakr Naji. Naji’s strategy advocates long-term guerilla warfare, targeting ungoverned spaces and eventually establishing shadow government structures supporting Islamic law. The method of al-Qa`ida is to contest government control of areas by exhausting the security forces and national will of the government through guerilla warfare and subsequent expansion of territory.42 Ironically, the Arab Spring has undermined this strategy. According to McCants, “The Arab Spring has had huge consequences for the
resonance of al Qaeda’s ideology in the region.” Recall that reformist Salafis and jihad Salafis largely agree on shared theology, advocating for a pure form of Islam. McCants contends Salafi Muslims (reformists) for years opted out of party politics and parliamentary systems, as seen as “usurping God’s role as lawmaker.” He further deduces the Arab Spring has captured Salafi involvement in parliamentary politics despite a deep theological struggle with the idea. Local sheiks and religious scholars are now advocating and influencing political involvement, claiming engagement is the lesser of two evils. This religious-leader influence appears to strike at not only reformist Salafis, but also those noncommittal jihad Salafis regarding the use of violence to achieve aims. For this reason, McCants speculates, the Arab Spring “strikes right at the ideological fellow travelers of al Qaeda . . . this audience is starting to have doubts, real doubts about staying completely out of politics or using violence to overthrow the government.” McCants further indicates nearly every al-Qa`ida statement over the previous year, May 2011 thru May 2012, discussed the consequences of the Arab Spring, warning that those governments, Muslims are forming, steal away the “fruits” of jihad “by giving it away and forming parliamentary systems of government.” McCants’ analysis is appropriately substantiated by recent al-Qa`ida leader statements.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies published an insightful summary in its Long War Journal publication highlighting key elements of summer 2012 al-Qa`ida statements by leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri’s written statements, interpreted by SITE Intelligence Group, outlined several “called-upon” goals for all Muslims. Zawahiri claims the Muslim Ummah faces the "most vicious Crusader campaign in its history." Zawahiri did not call on Muslims to strike the U.S. and instead claims "secular and
Crusader forces” are attempting to prevent Muslims from implementing sharia law. To combat this supposed anti-Muslim coalition, Zawahiri argues, Muslims should first work "to liberate the occupied Muslim lands" and reject "any treaty or agreement or international resolution that grants the disbelievers the right to take over the lands of the Muslim." Second, Zawahiri states Muslims should be ruled according to sharia, while rejecting all other bases for law. Zawahiri specifically rejects the "international order" and the United Nations. The remaining several goals outlined by Zawahiri focus on similar themes, calling on Muslims to "establish a Caliphate." Zawahiri further claims the revolutions ushered in by the Arab Spring are unfinished. He states, Muslims must be made aware "of the necessity of being ruled by Sharia and adhering to the judgments of Islam . . . continue in their revolution until they uproot the remains of the corrupt regimes, and purify their lands of external humiliation and internal corruption."

In this light, Libyans in particular remain engaged in a long-standing public debate about the proper role of Islam in public life. This specific debate culminated in violence between the Qadhafi government and armed Islamist opponents leading to the eventual overthrow of the government. Presently, the debate is taking on new urgency providing opportunity to define a new constitution. At the forefront is a sharp debate regarding strict interpretations and enforcement of sharia as a primary component of Libya’s new constitution. Salafist groups with direct ties to al-Qa`ida, particularly Ansar al Sharia and Hizb al Tahir, support this position and are increasingly more organized and publically active. The call to implement sharia immediately has become a common rallying cry for al-Qa`ida, as well as jihadists who are either ideologically or operationally linked to the terror group. It provides a point of contrast to the Islamist governments
that have risen to power since early 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, has advocated a more gradual approach to implementing sharia.\

According to the *Long War* article, “Al Qaeda has attempted to rebrand itself in the wake of the Arab Spring as the true defender of Islamic law.” In Yemen, al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula adopted the name Ansar al Sharia as a new brand for winning converts. Similarly, al-Qa`ida-linked organizations have risen under the Ansar al Sharia banner elsewhere.

In summary the article states, “Zawahiri's call for Muslims to implement sharia is no accident. Al-Qa`ida's brand has been damaged after years of indiscriminate violence inside the Muslim world and the group is attempting to remake its image as the true protector of Islamic law.” What is yet determined is whether or not al Qa`ida or affiliated organizations will temper violence in pursuing its new ambition.

## Organization

In 2013, U.S. foreign policy goals remain inextricably linked to managing and minimizing the growing threats of religious intolerance and sectarian violence, both contributing factors to al-Qa`ida organizational growth and sustenance. During the May 2012 Center for National Policy roundtable, several perceived misunderstandings related to al-Qa`ida’s organizational structure were also addressed, revealing analysis contrary to the 2010 NSS al-Qa`ida assessment. These contrary findings raise questions regarding the validity or effectiveness of the US strategy approach in defeating al-Qa`ida. Mary Habeck, from John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, surmised, "when we talk about al Qaeda core and al Qaeda affiliates as two separate things, this is actually a false dichotomy. And the two have [to] be seen as a part of a single organization, not a movement, not a network but an organization that
had in place bylaws and all sorts of rules for dealing with succession in a way that a
network or movement would not have had.”\textsuperscript{60} Drawing on documents available from al-
Qa`ida in Iran from 2005 and 2006, and recently recovered documents from the bin
Laden raid in Abbottabad, Will McCants also elaborates on al-Qa`ida’s organizational
structure; one affording a-Qa`ida affiliates the flexibility to operate independently in a
particular region, but still receiving hierarchical-level guidance from al-Qa`ida senior
leaders like Zawahiri.

My sense of from those documents is that when al Qaeda central wants
something done, it is couched in terms of advice, advice to their affiliates.
And you’ll notice the way in which Zawahiri, for example approaches
Zarqawi who had been misbehaving, and he says, brother, we notice from
afar X, Y, and Z is happening. Based on our experience in Egypt and
around the world, we are uncomfortable with what is going on, but you, of
course, are on the ground. We don’t want to push, but can we suggest
these things? And they leave it to Zarqawi’s discretion whether to
implement them or not.\textsuperscript{61}

McCants’ analysis suggests that core al-Qa`ida plays a significant role in establishing a
grand strategy for executing objectives, given a particular geographic region of
operations. Leah Farrall substantiates this theory: “Al Qaeda is not a traditional
hierarchical organization, with a pyramid-style organizational structure, and it does not
exercise full command and control over its branch and franchises. But, nor is its role
limited to broad ideological influence.”\textsuperscript{62} Mary Habeck adds, al-Qa`ida has demonstrated
a great deal of resiliency in the same manner of insurgencies around the world. Al
Qa`ida responds to attrition “which is the main strategy that the United States has been
following in order to combat this.”\textsuperscript{63} All this, Habeck concludes, is accomplished to
demonstrate to supporters and financiers “that they are more resilient than people take
them for, but they are in fact to fulfill their original objectives of creating, at some point,
an Islamic state.”\textsuperscript{64} On the topic of organizational resiliency and attrition, Naji’s
Management of Savagery—a candid description of the need to create and manage nationalist and religious resentment and violence in order to create long-term propaganda opportunities for jihadist groups—also notably discusses the value of provoking military responses by superpowers in order to recruit and train guerilla fighters and create martyrs. Naji suggests that a long lasting strategy of attrition will reveal fundamental weaknesses in the abilities of superpowers to defeat committed jihadists.\(^6^5\) Well-known insurgency theorist, David Kincullen, builds on Naji’s suggestion:

AQ moves into remote areas, creates alliances with local traditional communities, exports violence that prompts a Western intervention and then exploits the backlash against that intervention in order to generate support for its Takfiri agenda. Al Qa’ida’s ideology tends to lack intrinsic appeal for traditional societies, and so draws the majority of its strength from this backlash, rather than from general popular support.\(^6^6\)

Once al-Qa`ida has established local authority, it seeks to exploit the backlash to shift the orientation of jihad from the local to the global. In a 2010 article, titled “Al Qaeda’s M&A Strategy,” Daniel Byman, a foreign policy Senior Fellow at the Saban Center of Middle East Policy, discusses the origins of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which began as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). GSPC, rebranded AQIM, joined the ranks as an al-Qa`ida affiliate in 2006.\(^6^7\) “AQIM is not alone in going from a local to a global focus,” Byman claims. He further elaborates al-Qa`ida has systematically attempted to attract regional jihadist start-ups both reputable and newly created, convincing them their struggle is a component of al-Qa`ida’s overarching International agenda—and vice versa.\(^6^8\)

When groups embrace al Qaeda’s “far enemy” logic, they are also embracing strategic absurdity. Terrorist groups that succeed politically, like Hezbollah and Hamas, are firmly anchored in local realities and politics and their success comes in part because their ambitions are limited. Not so with al Qaeda. Al Qaeda may preach that the regimes in Riyadh, Cairo, and Algiers are held in place by U.S. troops and influence,
but the reality is that these governments have their own ruthless security
services and means of buying off rivals that help them ensure their grip on
power even if Washington abandons them.69

Washington by no means abandoned the Algerian government in January 2013
when a Mali-based al-Qa`ida affiliate identified as Masked Brigade, specifically targeting
westerners, attacked, and held hostage, workers from a British Petroleum-operated
natural gas complex in Algeria. However, per Byman’s 2010 prediction, today’s Algerian
Army and Special Forces had no inclination to request international support or negotiate
with the militants, promptly killing the militants along with numerous hostages in the
rescue attempt. What unfolded in Algeria helps frame Byman’s additional argument that
because of the operational “risks,” as experienced in Algeria, “the decision to join al-
Qaeda often angers more sensible group members who retain local ambitions.”70
Byman helps summarize just how dynamic and precarious relationships are between al-
Qa`ida and its affiliate organizations and potential recruits. He also underlines the
importance of a balanced and carefully crafted U.S. policy in response to dealing with
al-Qa`ida’s principal organization, its affiliates, and local populations with varying
allegiances and motivations, sliding somewhere in between.

The most vexing dilemma for U.S. counterterrorism policy, however, concerns groups that may be moving toward al Qaeda but have not yet made the leap. Many al Qaeda affiliates always hated the United States and its allies, but their focus was local for many years. Because the groups had some ties to al Qaeda, George W. Bush’s and Barrack Obama’s administration began to target them and encourage others to do so. As a result, the groups became more anti-American, creating a vicious circle.71

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress approved the open-ended
use of military force against al-Qa`ida and it’s allies. In addition to activity in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, the Bush and Obama Administrations have used the authority to launch
military action, predominately drone strikes, against far-flung al-Qa`ida affiliates, including networks in Yemen and Somalia. Depending on individual perspective of current U.S. counterterrorism (CT) policy, including drone use, the effects are debatable. In January 2013, NBC World News Online reported Yemen tribal sources, and the Ministry of Defense, reported more than 10 suspected al-Qa`ida operatives were killed in a house explosion along with three others in a drone strike. The operatives, Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), are considered by Western governments as one of the most active and dangerous affiliates of the al-Qa`ida organization.72 Physically reducing the numbers of AQAP members, therefore, is a positive end result of an attrition-based U.S. CT policy. On the other-hand, the news article further informs, “Earlier this month, dozens of armed tribesman took to the streets in southern Yemen to protest drone strikes they said killed innocent civilians and fed anger against United States.”73 In his article, Byman discusses Somalia in similar context to what is unfolding in Yemen: highlighting how U.S. involvement in the invasion and targeting of al-Qa`ida-linked individuals in Somalia intensified anger in Al-Shabab. He concludes, “In short, U.S. administrations are often damned either way. Ignoring the groups allows potential threats to grow worse and risks an attack from out of the blue. But taking them on may mean driving some deeper into al Qaeda’s fold—and making the terrorist threat all the more dangerous.”74 Byman surrenders to the fact there is “no one-size-fits-all strategy” for marginalization of al-Qaida and its regional affiliates around the world; however he does argue for the implementation of a principal element of any good counterinsurgency strategy: “In all these cases, however, the United States should strive to separate the locals from the al Qaeda core.”75 It is the locals in these regions, in
many instances Salafis, as previously discussed, who teeter on the edge of joining jihad organizations and subsequently decide to remain “local” or join al-Qa’ida and pursue “global” jihad objectives. Byman concludes his article summarizing that the organization’s current merger strategy is a double-edged sword: al-Qa’ida gains from its acquisitions, but can also be hurt by them. Leveraging this juxtaposition, an aggressive faith-based policy provides an alternative or, minimally, a compliment to the current attrition-based U.S. policy, presently yielding short-term success but long-term adverse consequences.

Faith-Based Initiatives and Recommendations

Framing the Problem—Solution

In a 2009 monograph providing recommendations for the Obama Administration on religious freedom policy, authors Thomas Farr and Dennis Hoover begin a chapter on counterterrorism policy stating,

Today’s most important security threat involving religion is, of course, the global terrorist/insurgent network led by Al Qaeda and its ilk. The U.S. response has been to pursue (1) hard-power approaches (military, law enforcement, and intelligence measures focusing on preventing a particular action—terrorist violence), and (2) broader efforts in conflict prevention, counterinsurgency, and democratic nation building. Unfortunately, in practice the U.S. has overemphasized the former and underemphasized the latter.

The authors further suggest a “more balanced and effective approach” would employ military means as one component of a combination of all elements of national and international power. This combination, Farr and Dennis explain, must include “smart” diplomacy and solutions to the critical problems of religious and secular authority.

While indicating U.S. counterterrorism and democracy promotion strategies have only had “some” and “limited” success respectively, neither of these strategies integrated an...
appropriate focus of religion and religious freedom. Three years later, in 2012, Farr contributed to an additional monograph, authored by Timothy Shah, titled, *Religious Freedom*. In the monograph’s executive summary, the reader quickly understands that Farr and Dennis’ 2009 recommendation for a “more balanced and effective approach” in combing elements of national power to address issues of religious authority has lingered or largely gone ignored:

Religious freedom is under sustained pressure today around the world. In some places it is fair to say that religious freedom is under siege. Although scant attention is paid by governments . . . the implication of the crisis—and we contend that it is a crisis—are quite serious. A worldwide erosion of religious freedom is causing large-scale human suffering, grave injustice, and significant threats to international peace and security.

Moreover, the authors contend it is essential to recognize that a crucial contributor to the religious radicalism giving rise to al-Qa`ida is the political repression and manipulation of Islam endemic in many Muslim-majority societies. The argument, therefore, is if religious repression radicalizes and destabilizes, religious freedom counter-radicalizes and stabilizes. Logically then, religious freedom should be considered an essential component in any effective long-term strategy for weakening radical religious movements.

Contributing to the paper’s early definition and discussion of religion and law, the discussion of religious freedom is explained, by Shah, as the "freedom to speak and act—both individually and in community with others—in ways that express whatever truths one may possess about transcendent order.” Furthermore, religious freedom is explained as the right to form political parties, or to espouse public arguments, on the basis of religious teaching. The unfortunate and ugly irony to this is al-Qa`ida’s theological and ideological determined insistence that western influences and actions—
including occupation of Muslim lands, promotion of Democracy, and drone strikes killing militant Islamists—are all contributing factors to restricting the religious freedom’s of jihad Salafis in accordance with their understanding and practice of pure Islam and Sharia. According to Shah, the United States is in effect hindering or removing “freedom to engage all the aspects of one’s physical being to practice and manifest the truth about the unseen order of reality, and to join with others of like mind and spirit.”

Given al-Qa`ida’s indestructible vow to theology and ideology, to the degree of martyrdom, it is understandable U.S. proponents of lethal approaches, such as drone strikes or other direct action kills on al-Qa`ida key leaders and members, are the only reasonably argued methods to effectively reducing or eliminating the threat. But, such hard-power approaches, as previously highlighted by Farr and Dennis, have only achieved “some success” due largely to the organization’s ability to recruit and continually to grow. Even soft-power approaches, like democracy promotion, have had “limited success.”

A U.S. policy for successful defeat of al-Qa`ida derives from the approach of Muslims helping Muslims, and furthermore, in narrower circumstances, reformist Salafis engaging within their own communities to “rescue” those who are “frustrated, repressed, or confused” from turning to the violent means and expression of jihad. Howard Clark, former Senior Intelligence Analyst for Homeland Security’s Counter Radicalization Branch, proposes “charismatic leaders, groups of friends, families, neighborhoods, mosque leaders, or inspired lone wolves, armed with emotive anti-al-Qa`ida messages may help to inspire inoculation or even active revolt against al-Qa`ida.”

Faith-based diplomacy enables this approach and level of success and follows a key principle of counterinsurgency
operations outlined by Byman—consistent work to separate the locals from the core of al-Qaida.

Faith-based diplomacy, according to author Douglas Johnston, incorporates religious considerations into the practice of international politics. At the operational level, faith-based diplomacy makes religion part of the solution to “intractable, identity-based conflicts,” escaping the reach of traditional diplomacy.\textsuperscript{89} Johnston posits,

A distinguishing characteristic of faith-based diplomacy is the fact that it is more about reconciliation than the absence of conflict. It is about restoring respectful relationships between the parties through a broader array of roles from those normally associated with traditional diplomacy—from impartial observer to message carrier, emphatic advocate, or activist. Common to all forms of its practice is the commitment to capitalize on the positive role that religious leaders and institutions can play in building trust and overcoming differences. They can serve as instruments of change by exercising their moral authority, their commitment to nonviolence, and their ability to inspire communities.\textsuperscript{90}

Johnston separates those most capable and best credentialed to execute the groundwork, literally and figuratively, of a faith-based approach: “faith-based diplomacy is not well suited for government practitioners. In the West, constraints relating to separation of church and state get in the way; and elsewhere a government’s political agenda inevitably compromises the kind of balanced neutrality that is normally required to succeed.”\textsuperscript{91} Thus, Johnston explains, religious leaders themselves or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), equipped for the responsibility, must take on the task. It is the government’s responsibility to then reinforce the process or build upon as circumstances permit.\textsuperscript{92} Part of reinforcing the process begins with the President setting the tone and broaching policy guidance to government organizations responsible for developing and executing faith-based diplomacy.
National Security Strategy

First, and most importantly, the President must revise the current NSS portrayal of al-Qa`ida into a thorough, albeit succinct, and accurate representation of the organization’s theology, ideology, and structure, including the dynamics and interrelationships of affiliate organizations. As the ultimate document for national security policy, the NSS provides guidance for subordinate agencies to develop supporting strategies. Accurately broadening the portrayal of al-Qa`ida—through root-cause determination and understanding of true believer and organization motivations and aims—into national-level policy and strategy documents, inherently expands the aperture of opportunities to disrupt or marginalize the organization through a faith-based diplomatic approach.

The NSS must also emphasize the importance of promoting religious freedom worldwide. Timothy Shah argues religious freedom is an essential element in “any effective long-term strategy for weakening radical religious movements.”93 Shah further underlines the importance of this fact, indicating that many religious traditions have produced violent extremists, but twenty-first century Islamist extremism and terrorism pose one of the greatest threats to peace, security, and freedom.94 This is a straightforward, albeit powerful, claim that easily lends credence to the advocacy and increased importance of stressing religious freedom. The influence of reformist Salafis, jihad Salafis in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Sudan, and Yemen are all locations where, according to Shah, “religious individuals and communities ardently seek public voice and social space and yet are systematically thwarted, are precisely those societies that have tended to incubate the Islamist terrorist networks threatening global stability and American security.”95
Faith-Based Approach: AQAP in Yemen

AQAP in Yemen, operating as Ansar al-Sharia, has emerged as a vanguard for global jihad with committed local interests as well.\textsuperscript{96} Christopher Swift, fellow at the University of Virginia’s Center for National Security Law, recently returned from fieldwork in Yemen to examine the insurgency from a local perspective. His aims were to evaluate AQAP attempts to recruit, indoctrinate, and control the population with hopes to identify instances where tribal and religious leaders effectively resisted al-Qa`ida’s advance.\textsuperscript{97} AQAP uses incentives for recruitment, engaging local tribal leaders to help target “disaffected individuals” in exchange for wells and food in drought stricken areas. AQAP further establishes territorial control by bolstering weak sheikhs, also with incentives like manpower, money, and weapons to help the sheikhs reassert tribal authority. According to Swift, AQAP also governs occupied areas using armed militias and sharia courts to establish a “brutal yet orderly society.”\textsuperscript{98} Swift summarizes AQAP efforts in Yemen: “The group is the first Al-Qaeda franchise to successfully blend the ideological dictates of global jihad with the practical requirements of local insurgency.”\textsuperscript{99} To counter AQAP efforts, Swift recommends an overall strategy with elements mirroring the conciliatory nature of a faith-based approach. First, he recommends the United States finance Yemini efforts to mediate trial disputes using local religious organizations and NGOs in order to limit al-Qa`ida’s ability “to exploit local grievances while reducing the prospect of inter-tribal conflict.” This initiative also encourages sheikhs to “deny customary protection for tribesman who join AQAP, allowing other tribes to attack and expel them without fear of retaliation.”\textsuperscript{100} A further objective, as previously discussed, is mitigating the ability of AQAP to recruit jihads with a focused local agenda. Daniel Byman emphasized the importance of a balanced and carefully crafted U.S. policy in
response to dealing with al-Qa`ida’s principal organization, its affiliates, and local populations with varying allegiances and motivations. Lethal approaches may decapitate hard-core AQAP leadership, but this approach must be balanced with diplomatic conciliatory measures, with the proportion of effort weighted to the latter. In this context, recall David Kincullen’s statement regarding the effects on local population in response to lethal approaches; core al-Qa`ida affiliates exploit the backlash against western intervention in order to generate support for its larger agenda. For these reasons, Swift advocates a "light footprint" in Yemen, arguing for the empowerment of local allies, allowing Yeminis to take credit for U.S.-backed initiatives. Swift explains, "If Washington can approach these challenges with nuance and local insight, Yemen’s struggle against terrorism may offer a unique opportunity to defeat Al-Qaeda while laying a stronger foundation for national reconciliation."  

Implementation

Per Johnston’s’ recommendation, it is religious leaders and well-established NGOs who are best suited for implementing a U.S. faith-based diplomatic approach, empowering local religious and tribal leaders. There is no better government agency equipped for this undertaking than the International Religious Freedom (IRF) Office within the Department of State. Established in 1998, through the IRF Act, the organization’s principal aim was to strengthen U.S. advocacy on behalf of individuals persecuted in response to violations of religious freedom in foreign countries. The Act also established an IRF office within the State Department and ambassador-at-large position. While the history of the IRF is beyond the scope of this paper, it does advocate for the recent IRF-based recommendations proposed by Timothy Shah and the Witherspoon Institute. A few specific recommendations, required to effect results and
emphasize the magnitude and importance of a faith-based approach to prevail over al-Qa`ida, include:

- Give the religious freedom function an appropriately robust status within the foreign policy community by situating the IRF ambassador-at-large within the office of the Secretary of State, reporting directly to the Secretary.\(^{104}\)
- Give religious freedom policymakers sufficient resources.\(^{105}\)
- Mandate, the president’s letter of instruction to U.S. ambassadors, the allocation of embassy resources to engage religious actors, ideas, and communities and to advance religious freedom broadly understood.
- Support via foreign aid and democracy funding, religious and secular non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around the world that seek to advance religious freedom as part of democratic development.\(^{106}\)
- Encourage the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom to continue to expand its efforts to study the effects of religious freedom on religious extremism.\(^{107}\)

As previously discussed the Arab Spring has served as a springboard for democratic development and reform in many Muslim nations and has subsequently unleashed the Salafis as a new political force. Generally, the Salafis maintain they are promoting the purest alternative to the dictatorships long dominating the regions.\(^{108}\) Many Muslims see it differently, however, labeling ultra-conservative Salafis as bullies who threaten others unwilling to share their rigid beliefs.\(^{109}\) A faith-based diplomatic approach requires relationship building and support for individuals like Nader Bakkar, a young spokesman for Egypt’s most successful Salafi party. Despite the conflicting
views, Bakkar insists his religion is not backward looking and is best exemplified in Saudi Arabia’s Salafi-run state. Importantly, however, Bakkar understands the importance of religious freedom in forwarding his party’s interests, “We cannot impose our religious point of view, our doctrine . . . people must choose it.”

NGOs are also an integral part of not only advocating and implementing programs promoting religious freedom, but also specifically providing assistance to reform and democracy-oriented organizations able to affect or remove the influences of al-Qaeda on a local population. A funded NGO’s work, however, regardless of whether a faith-based organization or not, must not include proselytizing in Muslim countries, ultimately contributing to the narrative of a Christian or western crusade against Muslims. Lee Marsden writes: “if assistance as a component of US foreign policy is to be delivered by faith-based and neighborhood partnerships, there needs to be strict enforcement of the separation of Church and state, whereby US organizations that proselytize when delivering assistance are disqualified from receiving US government funding.” Failure to do so, Marsden claims, only weakens the President’s objective of building “new relationships with the Muslim-majority world,” reinforcing suspicions about U.S. intent and involvement in these regions.

Conclusion

Broadly, the Qur’an views religion, as proclaimed by God’s messengers, as a human good. For the Qur’an, belief in one God, the Creator and Sustainer, is the basis for religion and morality, and maintains people should protect this belief assiduously. This shared perspective is not that dissimilar for many of the other world religions,
believing in the commitment to and omnipotence of one God. Religious freedom advocates for every person to use reason in seeking truth regarding whatever unseen order of reality there may be.\textsuperscript{114} Ironically, this freedom, in instances perceived as divinely authorized or bestowed, gives justification, albeit severely misapplied, to religious organizations like al-Qa`ida to reason the use of violent extremes to promote a return to pure Islam. Moreover, al-Qa`ida has attempted to rebrand itself in the wake of the Arab Spring as the true defender of Islamic law. Since 2001, The National Security Strategies have inadequately or miss-portrayed al-Qa`ida through narrow discussion of its theological, ideological, and organizational elements. As a result, the U.S. has engaged in a lingering war of attrition through lethal means, ultimately creating a local population backlash al-Qa`ida strategy depends upon for recruitment and overall support of its ideological strategic aims. The President should revise the NSS to include a shift in policy from an existing focus of effort exploiting lethal methods to a diplomatic faith-based approach. A faith-based approach must include a significant focus on the promotion of religious freedom and the use of local religious organizations, leaders and NGOs to aid in marginalizing al-Qa`ida’s ability to influence or coerce local populations.

Endnotes


\textsuperscript{3} Lindsay Jones, ed., \textit{Encyclopedia of Religion}, Vol. 11. 2nd ed. (Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference, 2005).


\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., 29.
6 Ibid., 32.


10 Ibid.


13 Ibid., 4.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 5.


19 Ibid.


23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.
The second source of Islam is the Sunna, or the path of the prophet Mohammed, a compilation of stories about the sayings and actions of the prophet. Wiktorowicz, *Global Jihad*, 6.

The term refers to the ideology of Abdul Wahab, an 18th century theologian who helped found the original state of Saudi Arabia. Abdul Wahab was a strict and literal adherent to the Quran and Sunna. Ibid., 7.

This term derives from the Arabic Salaf, referring to the Companions of the Prophet Mohammed, generally including the first three generations of Muslims who learned about Islam from the Prophet or those who knew him. Ibid.


As previously discussed, the difference between theology and ideology, in the context of religious legitimacy, is largely determined by an organization’s self-actualized perception of its own beliefs. Webster defines theology as the study of religious faith, practice, and experience; especially the study of God and of God’s relation to the world.” Furthermore, Webster defines ideology as “manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture” and additionally as “the integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program.” Given the two definitions, this paper consigns the meaning of theology to describing the ninety-nine percent stable similarities between the Salafi reformists and al-Qa’ida and consigns the meaning of ideology to al-Qa’ida’s minority interpretation and acceptance of the use of violence to further its objectives.
Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

SITE is an Intelligence Group focusing on research and analysis of terrorist networks, including monitoring jihadist propaganda, studying trends within the online jihadist community, and understanding how jihadist groups utilize the Internet.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Additionally, Mohammed al Zawahiri, Ayman’s younger brother, is one of several al-Qaeda-linked jihadists who called upon the Brotherhood to set aside all forms of law other than sharia, which is often poorly defined. During a recent interview with Cairo’s Al Masry al Youm, the younger Zawahiri was asked what he wants Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi to do. “I demand [that Morsi] and all Muslims to hold on to Allah’s creed, to be pious, to know that they are accountable, to strive to avoid the forbidden and to apply Islamic Sharia,” Mohammed al Zawahiri responded. Sharia “has the solution to all our problems.” Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Habeck, “A Year Beyond Bin Laden.”
61 Ibid.
63 Habeck, “A Year Beyond Bin Laden.”
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Byman, “Al Qaeda’s M&A Strategy.”
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 38.
81 Ibid., 65.
82 Ibid., 56
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 17.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
88 Clark, Revolt Against Al-Qa`ida, 45.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., 57.
92 Ibid.
93 Shah, Religious Freedom, 56.
94 Ibid., 55.
95 Ibid., 63.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Byman, “Al Qaeda’s M&A Strategy.”
102 Swift, “Next step to defeating Al-Qaeda.”
103 Johnston, Religion, Terror, and Error, 57.
104 According to Shah, “No American administration has given the IRF ambassador-at-large the authority, status or resources necessary to accomplish the mission. The ambassador should be situated in the office of the Secretary of State, and should report to the Secretary. . . .
Elevating the status of the IRF ambassador will communicate to foreign officials and American officials alike that the United States gives a high priority to the advancement of international religious freedom.” Shah, Religious Freedom, 72.

105 According to Shah, “The United States Congress has not provided independent appropriations for the ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom or for the ambassador’s office. This has severely restricted the ability of the ambassador to develop strategies that can be successful.” Shah, Religious Freedom, 73.

106 In a separate email interview, Thomas Farr also indicated “the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should hold a major oversight hearing on the operation of the 1998 IRFA.” He stated no such hearing has ever occurred and in doing so would communicate to the State Department and the administration that Congress is serious about IRF policy. Thomas Farr, email interview by author, March 1, 2013.

107 Ibid., 74.


109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.


112 Ibid.

113 Shah, Religious Freedom, 41.