The National Guard State Partnership Program: Opportunities and Challenges

by

Colonel Rhoda K. Daniel
United States Army National Guard

United States Army War College
Class of 2013

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GAO 2012 Study of SPP, Comparisons of RAF and SPP, Field Studies with Recommendations

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Abstract

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The National Guard State Partnership Program: Opportunities and Challenges

Managing change is important. Without competent management, the transformation process can get out of control. But for most organizations, the much bigger challenge is leading change.

—John P. Kotter

In this period of potential sequestration, while the military draws down from operational missions coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army Active Component is seeking a mission set that will provide new budget, equipment, and personnel end-strength justification. The Active Component’s inclusion of the National Guard State Partnership Program into the new Regional Alignment of Forces concept should make National Guard Senior Leaders take notice. Opportunities and challenges can make for new partnerships and change old ways of doing business. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP), begun as a bottom-up effort, now requires top-down directed guidance to move it forward and become a truly valuable diplomatic tool.

This paper begins from the position that the SPP has proven its value to the United States State Department, Department of Defense, the U.S. Army and the National Guard. The question is no longer if the SPP should be sustained; the question moving forward is how best to leverage the SPP to achieve U.S. goals and expand SPP in a period of economic limitations. The larger question is how to best expand the SPP concepts of partnering and regional focus. This paper will examine the Government Accountability Office’s report on the State Partnership Program, dated May of 2012. This study, entitled “Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners,” will serve as the basis to review ways to improve the SPP from the Department of the Army and National Guard Bureau perspectives.
This paper will also utilize field interviews with NG personnel to review ongoing SPP missions and to develop recommendations for SPP improvement and evolution.

The emerging concept of Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) provides a window of opportunity for the Active Component (AC) and could lead to program changes as the NG works to expand the SPP. Working with the active components to partner in a manner that allows for the uniqueness of the NG SPP to continue may be the right change in this coming time of limited resources and shrinking budgets. The DOD needs to look to programs like the SPP that provide good use of training dollars, are joint in design, produce diplomatic outreach, and have a regional focus. The challenge is to incorporate the best of the SPP into the RAF concept, without losing the best characteristics of the SPP: the enduring long term relationships made between U.S. and SPP partner nations and well synchronized support to each Region’s Combatant Commander.

State Partnership Program History

“The National Guard’s 65-nation, 20-year-old State Partnership Program provides unique partnership capacity-building capabilities to combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors through partnerships between U.S. states, territories and the District of Columbia and foreign countries.” This official description of the SPP, as well as its strategic vision and history, is in numerous public National Guard documents and web sites. These documents describe a program that supports U.S. national interests and security cooperation goals by engaging partner nations via military, socio-political and economic conduits at the local, state and national level. The SPP evolved from a 1991 U.S. European Command decision to set up the Joint Contact Team Program in the Baltic Region with Reserve Component Soldiers and Airmen. A subsequent National
Guard Bureau (NGB) proposal paired U.S. states with three nations emerging from the Soviet Bloc and the SPP was born, becoming a key U.S. security cooperation tool, facilitating cooperation across all aspects of international civil-military affairs and encouraging people-to-people ties at the state level.7

Programmatically, “the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) is an innovative joint security cooperation program, managed by the National Guard Bureau, executed by the State Adjutant Generals in support of Combatant Commander Security Cooperation (SC) objectives under the authorities provided by the Department of Defense and Congress.”8 Interviewed as part of the research for this study and providing SPP strategic perspectives, COL Mark Boll, the Deputy J5 at the National Guard Bureau, provided insight on the management of the State Partnership Program. His areas of main concern centered on training, tracking and funding related to the SPP. According to COL Boll, funding for SPP missions is managed by National Guard appropriations or Title 32 funds, which the SPP uses in support of security cooperation activities under 14 different sections of Title 10 U.S. Code. Funding for SPP consists of Army 2060 (Pay and Allowances) and Army 2065 (Operations and Maintenance); Air Force 3850 (Pay and Allowances) and Air Force 3840 (Operations and Maintenance).9

The SPP mission, which provides the Geographical Combatant Commander (GCC) a direct theater security cooperation benefit, is a training mission for National Guard personnel using Title 32 funding. The SPP funding is based on the activities required by the GCCs and Chiefs of Mission as part of the GCC’s theater security cooperation efforts. Currently the National Guard is resourced at the 2009 Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) funding level when the SPP consisted of only 49 partnerships. Currently there are 65 partnerships.10

Demonstrating 20 years of enduring relationships, the National Guard’s SPP provides unique military-to-military activities with partner countries using National Guard (NG) expertise. Events are designed to enhance partner capabilities, advance defense reform efforts, and achieve greater military inoperability supporting U.S. security cooperation efforts. The SPP is also a training venue that provides NG personnel a mechanism to meet Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) mission sets as well as to prepare for Joint Integrated Interagency Multinational (JIIM) operations. The SPP directly supports Theater Campaign Plans and provides years of history in implementing Building Partnerships (BP), Building Partner Capacity (BPC), and conducting Security Cooperation (SC) missions.11

The SPP reflects an evolving international affairs mission for the National Guard. It promotes regional stability and civil-military relationships in support of U.S. policy objectives. State partners actively participate in numerous and varied engagement activities including bilateral familiarization and training events, exercises, leader mentorships, and support to other security cooperation activities. All activities are coordinated through the theater combatant commanders and the U.S. ambassadors’ country teams, and other agencies as appropriate to ensure that National Guard support meets both U.S. and partner country objectives. Military-to-military engagement is the primary focus of the SPP, promoting defense and security cooperation in emergency management, disaster response, border and port security, leadership and non-commissioned officer development, medical capacity, and developing
peacekeeping operations capability. The SPP supports combatant commanders’ theater campaign plans and ambassadors’ mission strategic resource plans.\textsuperscript{12}

In practice, the National Guard conducts high impact, low cost security engagements with partner countries by establishing long-term security cooperation relationships with U.S. friends and allies around the world. Currently 65 countries are linked to 49 states, 2 territories (Puerto Rico and Guam), and Washington D.C. Within the EUCOM area of operations, 22 states help increase the capacity and capabilities of 21 partner countries. Within SOUTHCOM, 19 states assist 23 partner countries. AFRICOM has 8 partnerships; CENTCOM and PACOM have 7 partnerships each. NORTHCOM has one partnership. The newest GCC, AFRICOM, has the following partnerships: South Africa and New York, Morocco and Utah, Ghana and North Dakota, Tunisia and Wyoming, Nigeria and California, Botswana and North Carolina, Senegal and Vermont, Liberia and Michigan.\textsuperscript{13}

Input from military officers currently working with the State Partnership Program is important to this study. One of the oldest SPPs is between Latvia and the state of Michigan. The current Bilateral Affairs Officer (BAO) in Latvia, LtCol J. Andrew Roberts, was interviewed for this study. Using the example of SPP partner nations in EUCOM, strategic and international shaping efforts that support U.S. National Strategic Objectives are highlighted by the involvement of the SPP partner nations as part of co-deployments with their states in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). As LtCol Roberts said, “When you discuss metrics, having the first SPP partners deploying to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) together in the Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT)” is a key example
of SPP…we have a number of partner nations that are with us in Afghanistan that wouldn’t be there without the SPP program.”

U.S. National Strategy highlights the importance of shaping activities with nations and cultivating partnerships around the globe. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is effective in establishing and strengthening U.S. relationships with nations around the world. This bottom-up approach builds partnerships with other nations. After twenty years, the SPP has proven its worth as an effective diplomatic tool. Linking the SPP to shaping and security missions, LtCol Roberts stated: “Conducting TSC together across GCCs boundaries is a great measurement of what we have done.”

As outlined in Table 1, sixty-five State Partnerships Programs and two Bi-Lateral Relationships have been established as of 2012. Among these partnerships 15 of the 21 EUCOM SPP Nations have engaged in an ISAF co-deployment with their state SPP Partner, demonstrating the strategic importance of the NG SPP.

Strategic Guidance

Beginning with the National Security Strategy (NSS), the mission of SPP follows strategic guidance issued by the President of the United States: “Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.” The NSS states four enduring U.S. national interests: Security, Prosperity, Values, and International Order.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS), The National Military Strategy (NMS), and The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), of the United States of America give
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further strategic guidance related to the concepts of partnership. The NSS and QDR guide the establishment and the NMS provides the four National Military Objectives: Counter Violent Extremism, Deter and Defeat Aggression, Strengthen International and Regional Security, and Shape the Future Force. 23 The mission of SPP is of strategic importance, as it is subordinate to all four of the National Military Objectives.

In searching for strategic, joint and service specific level directives related to SPP; information gaps become apparent. At the highest strategic level there are many references to the mission and the ideals that are reflected in SPP; however, at the service level, where the Army has the opportunity to specifically mention the SPP as part of the contribution the NG makes to the overall DOD mission set, there is no reference. The essence of SPP found in strategic level documents is absent in the service specific documents that drive mission and budgets. For example, in the 2012 Army Posture, The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action, reference to the National Guard occurs in only two locations. 24 First, in Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), the National Guard is given credit for its historical and traditional role related to home land security and response to natural disasters. 25 The second reference to the National Guard occurs later under the subcategory of “Smaller but Reversible” under the larger subject of Implications for America’s Army. 26 This reference to the National Guard on the concepts of Reversibility 27 and Expansibility 28 speaks to the needed size, structure and capabilities of the National Guard needed to provide a ready and accessible force. 29

The SPP gap occurs when the second role of the Army, “shape” is defined. This is where the Army Posture Statement could have tied Active Forces, National Guard, and Combatant Commanders together by using the SPP as an example of how the U.S.
shapes the international environment.\textsuperscript{30} Instead, the “shape” role of the Army uses the same terminology and strategic language that defines SPP, but does not give credit to the National Guard for their 20 years of effort in these missions. If the 2012 Army Posture Statement can write at length and list in detail the two main DSCA missions in 2011, then it should list or refer to the SPP and the 65 partnerships that the NG’s SPP represent, promoting international partnerships around the world. This is a strategic, international, and highly visible mission that is absent from Army strategic-level documents.

Addendum A to the 2012 Army Posture Statement contains an online information paper related to the mission of SPP. The addendum includes, \textit{National Guard State Partnership Program: Global Engagements}.\textsuperscript{31} This National Guard specific information paper provides the broad-based historical and contextual concepts that define the SPP. However, with no mention of the mission terms of SPP in the main document, this reference leaves the reader with the impression that the NG SPP is only a NG specific matter and has no bearing on the Active Component. The one other SPP paper entitled, \textit{State Partnership Program for Excess non-standard equipment (NSE) in Iraq}\textsuperscript{32} is also an online information paper listed in Addendum A. This leads to the perceived point of view that the SPP is specific only to the NG, and not worth defining.

In the 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance the SPP gap continued along the same venue. “Shaping is described as an enduring, daily requirement and is emerging as a core competency of the Army.”\textsuperscript{33} In the 2012 ASPG, shaping activities were listed in detail and included word for word the terminology that defines the SPP without mentioning the program. Terms like building partner capacity, military-to-military, and
security assistance teams are just a few of the specific concepts used to define the doctrinal concept of shaping without ever acknowledging a program that has been defined with the same terms for 20 years: the SPP.

This review from the strategic level highlights gaps in guidance related to SPP. Missed concepts become lost in translation down to the Service level, resulting in a lack of synergy between Active Component Services and NGB. This gap is what leaders out in the field express when they take issue with not having clear guidance, training and sufficient resources.

At the National Guard Bureau level, the list of documents used by the NGB-J53 to develop SPP programs include CJCS Manual 3130.10 Campaign Planning, OSD Security Cooperation Planner's Handbook, DODI 5111.20 and related draft CNGBI, SPP Implementing Guidance, CCMD Theater Campaign Plans and Country Plans, Integrated Country Strategies (DOS/DOD), DODD 1322.18 Military Training, CJCS Annual Training Guidance, Annual Appropriations, Strategic Capabilities Plan, and the Joint Capabilities Areas and Joint Mission Essential Task List items. Guidance is transmitted to the states and to the GCCs via Joint, NGB, Country, and TCP guidance and lessons learned.

This brief review of strategic level documents results in the initial recommendation to improve the State Partnership Program. First and foremost, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should formally advocate that the mission set of SPP become the third mission of the National Guard. The National Guard's first mission provides the traditional DSCA mission at the state and federal levels. The second mission set of the NG is to the Nation’s Defense in times of conflict and war. The
importance of making SPP a formal mission of the National Guard becomes even more apparent after reviewing the pathway for SPP approval.

The Process to Establish an SPP

The SPP process begins with a formal and written request from an individual nation to the U.S. ambassador in the requesting country. If the U.S. Embassy elects to approve the request, the Ambassador endorses the partnership concept and forwards it to the appropriate Combatant Commander. Once the Combatant Commander determines that the partnership meets the strategic objectives and functional and regional priorities, the request is sent to the NGB for review.

The Chief of the NGB then reviews the SPP request and if the Chief of the NGB accepts the SPP request, the CCDR is informed of this acceptance and National Guard Adjutant Generals from each state are informed and proposals back to the Chief of the NGB from each state TAGs are solicited. Each state then reviews and determines if they would like to submit a proposal to be considered a nominee.

At the state National Guard level, this proposal would include a statement of intent, background on their state and capabilities, proposed areas to partner with the requesting country and discussion on the historical and cultural and other factors to consider in selecting the best fit between the requesting country and the state. The state-drafted proposals go through three levels of review, with the Department of Defense (DOD) and once these measures are met, the Chief of the NGB forwards a recommended state National Guard Nominee to the CCDR and the requesting country’s U.S. embassy for final approval.35 The process to establish an SPP, although complex, works as evident in the 65 successful SPP relationships.
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to Congressional Committees, dated May 2012, “State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners” GAO-12-548 (GAO CODE 351649) makes specific recommendations to the Department of Defense to correct identified SPP deficiencies. GAO-12-548 Study serves as the basis for analytical assessment. The GAO conclusion is simple, “Despite twenty years of history the SPP is not without areas of concern.”

Recommended GAO findings can be summarized with increasing oversight (clear goals, objectives, and metrics); better data collection (agreed-upon definitions and rules); clear funding guidance (clarifies how to use funds for civilian participation); and updated training (funding guidance for civilian participation and policy updates).

The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act directed the GAO to study the State Partnership Program. As stated by GAO-12-548, “The GAO determined (1) the extent to which SPP activities are meeting program goals and objectives; (2) the types and frequency of activities and funding levels of the program; and (3) any challenges DOD faces in the program’s implementation.” The GAO collected written responses to questions from State Partnership Program Coordinators at the state level, Bilateral Affairs Officers at the U.S. embassies in the partner nations, and officials at the combatant commands, reviewed documents, and interviewed DOD officials.

What the GAO Found

The GAO found that many SPP stakeholders, including State Partnership Program Coordinators, Bilateral Affairs Officers, and combatant command officials, cited benefits to the program; however, the program lacks a comprehensive oversight
framework that includes clear program goals, objectives, and metrics to measure progress against those goals, which limits the DOD’s and Congress’ ability to assess whether the program is an effective and efficient use of resources.\textsuperscript{40}

The GAO further cited that the SPP activity data was incomplete as well as inconsistent and funding data was incomplete for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. Therefore, the GAO could not provide complete information on the types and frequency of activities or total funding amounts for those years. The GAO found that the multiple data systems used to track program activities and funding are not interoperable and users apply varying methods and definitions to guide data inputs.

In addition, the terminology used to identify activity types is inconsistent across the combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau. The GAO went on to find that funding data from NGB and combatant commands were incomplete, and although NGB provided its total spending on the program since 2007, it could not provide information on the cost of individual activities. The GAO stated that although the NGB has initiated efforts to improve the accuracy of its own State Partnership Program data, without common agreement with combatant commands on what types of data need to be tracked and how to define activities, data cannot be easily reconciled across databases.\textsuperscript{41}

The most prominent challenge the GAO identified was how to fund activities that include U.S. and foreign partner civilian participants. The GAO cited specifically the example of activities involving use of civilians such as subject matter for expert exchanges on military support to civil authorities and maritime border security. Although the GAO cites that DOD guidance does not prohibit civilian involvement in activities, it
found that many stakeholders have the impression that U.S. military is not permitted to engage civilians in State Partnership Program activities and some states may have chosen not to conduct any events with civilians due to the perception that it may violate DOD guidance.

The GAO noted that DOD and National Guard Bureau are working on developing additional guidance and training in this area. However, the GAO stated that until these efforts are completed, confusion may continue to exist and hinder the program’s full potential to fulfill National Guard and combatant command missions. The GAO Report made four specific recommendations to improve the SPP.

**GAO Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1**

The Secretary of Defense directs the Chief of NGB, in coordination with the combatant commands and the embassy country teams, to complete and implement its comprehensive oversight framework by using the goals, objectives, and metrics currently being developed as its basis. In its response, DOD concurred with the recommendation. The NGB acknowledged the need for updated program goals and objectives to more accurately reflect the current operating environment. It also acknowledged the need for development of metrics to measure and assess program progress. These efforts are underway and will be incorporated into updates to NGB’s policy and strategy documents for SPP.

**Recommendation 2**

The Secretary of Defense directs the Under Secretary of Defense, Policy, and Joint Staff, in coordination with Chief of the NGB, the combatant commands, and the embassy country teams, to develop guidance for all stakeholders that includes agreed-
upon definitions for data fields and rules for maintaining data until the global data system is fully implemented. The Department of Defense concurred and is currently writing a Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) which will replace the current Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 11-011, "Use of Appropriated Funds for Conducting State Partnership Program (SPP) Activities." This DODI will provide additional guidance to all stakeholders that will include the issues identified in GAO report.44

Recommendation 3

The Secretary of Defense directs the Under Secretary of Defense, Policy, to develop guidance that clarifies how to use funds for civilian participation in the SPP. The Department of Defense concurred and is currently writing a Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) which will replace the current Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 11-011, "Use of Appropriated Funds for Conducting State Partnership Program (SPP) Activities". This DODI will provide additional guidance to all stakeholders that will include the issues identified in GAO report.45

Recommendation 4

The Secretary of Defense directs the Chief of the NGB to develop additional training for SPP Coordinators and Bilateral Affairs Officers on the appropriate use of funds for supporting the State Partnership Program, especially in regards to including civilians in program events. The DOD concurred. NGB currently uses various forums for the training of SPP stakeholders to include dedicated courses at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), Combatant Command Regional Workshops, and NGB Workshops. NGB recognized the need for emphasis on training to ensure adherence to program policies and procedures. To that end, the NGB has developed additional DISAM curricula relevant to SPP Coordinators and Bilateral Affairs
Officers, and will use existing workshops and State Coordinators’ monthly VTCs to increase training opportunities.  

In summary, the GAO recommended that DOD complete its comprehensive oversight framework for the State Partnership Program, develop better guidance to achieve reliable data on the program, and issue this guidance and conduct additional training on the appropriate use of funding for program activities, including those involving civilians. This paper assesses that the GAO-12-548 Study is a comprehensive and accurate reflection of the current issues and changes that face the State Partnership Program. The critical next SPP question is what have the stake-holders done to address these challenges?  

Actions since GAO-12-548 from NGB  

In an interview, the NGB Deputy J5, COL Mark Boll, pointed out that even before the GAO report, NGB had previously identified many of the challenges listed in the GAO Study and was currently in the process of developing or refining many of the documents and actions recommended by the GAO. The real value the GAO recommendations produced were, as COL Boll stated, “getting the required DOD level guidance formalized and out to the field.” These same SPP goals and objectives are now updated and expanded into a NGB Strategic Plan and a draft Strategic Plan released to States as the interim guidance until completion of DODI 5111.20 in late 2012.  

NGB has also improved professional development opportunities and metrics for SPP, and COL Boll points out, “It is important to note that these two issues are prevalent across DOD, not only NGB.” Data management and reporting of SPP activities is set to get standardized utilizing the Army Global Outlook System (ARGOS). In addition to the required ARGOS, each Combatant Command uses its own reporting
system and includes SPP activities. DOD is currently working to implement a global management system (Global-Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS)) that will standardize security cooperation reporting across all Combatant Commands (CCMDs).

A new DOD instruction has been issued, COL Boll pointed out: “DODI 5111.20 was released 14 Dec 12 after nearly two years of drafting and staffing, and was also begun before the GAO study.” DODI 5111.20 establishes policy, assigns responsibility, and provides instruction for use of DOD funds to pay for cost of authorized SPP activities.50

This DODI instruction also incorporates National Defense Authorization Act 2012 and policy guidance for U.S. and foreign civilian involvement in SPP activities. A Chief of the National Guard Bureau Instruction (CNGBI) is currently in development; it will follow the DODI by establishing NGB policy, assigning responsibilities for planning, coordinating and conducting activities of the NG SPP.51

NGB utilizes monthly video tele-conferences to put this policy out to the field. DODI 5111.20 and NDAA 12 are published and the CNGBI will soon be issued. The need for constant education for the military leadership working on SPP activities continues to be of concern for NGB because of how training is funded.52 From the NGB perspective, unfinished work includes the standardization of all definitions associated with SPP and security cooperation activities.

Ideas of how to plan and budget for SPP activities from the NGB J53 perspective revolve around a new design concept that the planning budgets and funding should be based on SPP activities and events per partner nations in support of the prioritized
needs of Combatant Commands. Funding should no longer be based on a state-by-
state equal dollars model, since travel and other needs differ greatly across the states. 
Priorities of the Combatant Commands must drive planning and thus dollars. For 
example, an SPP event in SOUTHCOM will have a lower cost than an SPP event in 
AFRICOM. Recognizing that there are a minimum number of SPP events needed, the 
recommended NGB J53 concept would be to plan for five SPP activities per year for 
each partnership, then take the priorities of the Combatant Commands to determine 
funding of critical requirements.53

The bottom line from the NGB perspective, COL Boll said, is that, “much still 
needs to be done to improve the SPP. The key point here is that many of the needed 
items to be worked are from a whole of government approach.” The work remaining is 
for the SPP terms that the DODI 5111.20 defined to make it into doctrine across DOD, 
Joint, and Services. Another important point to COL Boll was that “Training dollars that 
are managed by the services with their Title 10 authority need to fund SPP professional 
development training.”54 These tasks are above NGB level and will take a whole of 
military approach and proactive work by NGB to socialize the need. Documents related 
to SPP must establish clear and consistent SPP language. From NGB J53 perspective, 
“hard work remains in areas of funding, updates to doctrine across the entire services 
and training methods.”55

Perspectives from the Field on SPP

In researching this paper, the lack of training for SPP personnel was apparent 
from the beginning. For a field perspective on what is actually happening related to the 
SPP, LtCol J. Andrew Roberts, Bilateral Affairs Officer (BAO) for the SPP between 
Latvia and the Michigan National Guard, was interviewed. When asked to speak about
the professional development for the SPP, he stated: “There is no professional
development for SPP personnel… I received orders on 09 SEP 2011 to report to Latvia
09 SEP 2011.” The strongest message that LtCol Roberts made on the SPP program
is the lack of preparatory education and training:

This is my biggest feedback to NGB every time I get a chance. Active
duty Foreign Area Officers receive a masters, one year of language and
one year of OJT in their region before working at the desk next to mine.
NGB needs to normalize the funding stream so that a BAO can receive at
least a few months of language, visit the CCMD they will be working under
to understand current Country Cooperation Plans (CCP) and any
CONPLANs their partner nation may be part of.

Most of the answers from LtCol Roberts centered on improvements related to
training. This perspective on the need for training goes to the fourth recommendation by
the GAO Study: currently all the training being done for SPP has taken place without the
support from the Services. The Services normally fund and direct training requirements.
Some improvements have been made in this area; DISAMS is an example of efforts to
improve SPP training.

LtCol Roberts made three main recommendations during his interview to improve
the SPP. In his perspective, while the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) has
been touting the SPP program for years—and LtCol Roberts completely agreed from a
results perspective that the SPP is probably the best engagement program the National
Guard has, but “Having a few dozen personnel on ADOS orders around the world
doesn’t make for a Program.” With its recent program-of-record status, the GAO study
and congressional attention, the SPP is ready to program training and funding to ensure
long term viability.

LtCol Roberts’ first recommendation is to first require NGB to track personnel
working in SPP positions, managing SPP personnel as a professional and skilled
population much like the tracking of FAOs. Secondly, a three month training period would suffice (six would be better), a few months of language training, a month on the ground in country, two weeks at CCMD to overlap with the one week orientation course they teach every month for new members stationed at the CCMD, and some time at NGB to understand that part of the operation, would double the capability of a BAO in their first year. Third, validate the joint experience of BAO positions (get them on Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) vice having to put in an experience request). This will enhance the desire of NG personnel to apply for these jobs.60

When asked to speak on metrics used to track the missions/exercises/activities related to the SPP, LtCol Roberts reiterated the need to clarify terms, metrics and data fields used to track SPP data.61 Funding improvements, the third recommendation of the GAO Study, was highlighted by LtCol Roberts, who noted the complexity of the programs and funding streams that challenge the BAO working with a partner nation. When LtCol Roberts spoke of the need for training, he used the complexity of the funding to run the SPP as one of the main drivers to improve the level of training those SPP personnel received prior to arriving in their SPP country.62

LtCol Roberts was queried about the developing concept called Regional Alignment of Forces. LtCol Roberts’ response although positive, was countered by a concern for the RAF concept. The good news of incorporating the Active Component to support SPP partner nation’s security engagements is seen as a positive, since EUCOM has a difficult time getting AC support to these activities. The concern is in the turn-over and rotational style of the AC. The AC is not able to offer what the NG can
give partner nations: the long term and often decades in length relationships that are developed between the partner nation and the National Guard. The National Guard State Partnership Program (NG SPP) has demonstrated the value of enduring long term professional relationships that are formed over years of working together. This enduring partner ability that currently resides in the National Guard State Partnership Program.

Headlines from the January 2013 AUSA News read: “Guard and Reserve must continue to build strong partnerships.” This article highlights comments that GEN David Rodriguez, Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, made at the Association of the United States Army’s Annual Meeting and Exposition on October 22, 2012. In his remarks, General Rodriguez told the audience that he wanted to build on the strong partnerships that have been built over last twenty years, highlighting SPP missions and speaking that the biggest change for the future is the move to align units regionally with combatant commands. Speaking on “maximizing training resources” and more jointly
training exercises, General Rodriguez linked RAF to SPP in a time of limited resources, working jointly to achieve strong partnerships with international partners.66

During the AUSA Annual Meeting, a panel of six General Officers met on October 23, 2012 for a session titled “Aligning Forces Regionally in Support of the Combatant Commanders.” One member of this forum expressed perspectives in an article that the AUSA printed in its January 2013 newspaper called “Realigning Regional Forces aimed at preventing Future Wars.” Much of this article resembles the NGB official mission statement for SPP.

LTG John F. Campbell, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7, offered that “Regional alignment is all about providing the combatant commander with the right force at the right time to better shape, maybe preventing something like an Iraq or Afghanistan.” The AUSA article stated that the intent of regional alignment is to build strong relationships with other nations, assisting security forces, joint and combined exercises and training, humanitarian missions, natural disaster relief and medical capabilities and assisting with peacekeeping, border security, counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism efforts. Comments from LTG Campbell tied Regional alignment to giving Soldiers better social and cultural networks and providing combatant commanders with the resources they need to be “more responsive and globally engaged,” adding that prepositioned equipment and regional knowledge related to communications, tactics would facilitate a more rapid response if needed.67

This article further tied the fact that regional alignment has been in place in the form of the State Partnership Program for over two decades with the National Guard taking the lead in forming partnerships between states and specific countries. The
article continued to give background and history of the SPP and then wrote that the
Army is now adopting the National Guard’s strategy en masse. This alignment of
forces in some cases will be a brigade, but could also include smaller or bigger
elements. This article gave recognition of the requirements to bring in political and
military leaders of partner countries, highlighted and defined by current SPP policy
connecting the U.S. State Department and the partner country ambassadors. The final
portion of this article explained how the Army plans to use its Force Generation Model
to provide ready and responsive aligned forces by utilizing the existing and proven
ARFORGEN concept and that the Army wants to include special operation forces with
regional alignment.

Another senior level brief on Regional Alignment of Forces was given with slides
and questions that clearly tie SPP to RAF. Bullets on the current initiatives of alignment
state that RAF incorporates those capabilities already aligned (SPP, CA, etc.). This
brief, at the Army G-3/5/7 level, used Africa FY 13 as an example, and listed RAF
executing TSC in Africa with a table providing numbers of partner nation activities, all in
a manner that leads the audience to the false conclusion that the listed missions are a
part of the AC’s RAF. This slide stated the numbers are covered by all RAF elements,
which could imply that the NG SPP is now just an RAF element. The final slide listed
challenges for the way ahead related to RAF and the question of “How far do we take
habitual alignment across the Army Total Force? The desire is to habitually align at
EAB, some sustainment commands, and niche capability enablers. Is this restricted to
AC only or could RC be considered the solution?” In the last six months, the concept
of RAF has grown and the AC is socializing a vision that SPP is just an element of RAF.
Timely recommendations and improvements are essential to strengthen the NG’s SPP, but also to send the message to the AC that the NG SPP is not just an element of RAF.

Recommendations

Recommendations for improvements to the SPP must begin at the strategic level first, by formally defining the SPP mission within the overall mission for NG. The National Guard’s mission set would be, first, the traditional DSCA (Title 32 mission) under state control, second, the traditional National Defense in times of conflict and war (Title 10), and third, the newest mission set of Global Partnerships through SPP, where traditional NG in Title 32 status work with partner nations. This doctrinal change is the strategic foundation to improve the SPP.

The second recommendation is directed toward doctrine and funding and the metrics used for tracking the SPP management. This recommendation continues progress made as a result of the GAO Study. Standardization of definitions associated with SPP and security cooperation activities defined in DODI 5111.20 must become updated in across DOD, Joint and Services doctrine. Training dollars managed by the Services through their Title 10 authority need to fund the SPP professional development training, much like the FAO program. DOD funding approval must match current SPP levels and the metrics across the board must be uniform to allow for better allocations. These tasks are above NGB-level to execute and will take a whole-of-military approach and proactive work by the NGB to socialize the needs. Documents related to SPP must establish clear and consistent SPP language, doctrine, funding codes and metrics.

The third recommendation is for training and professional development of SPP personnel. The NGB must track personnel working in SPP positions and manage SPP personnel as a professional and skilled population. SPP personnel training would
include a three month training period prior to assignment and should include language training, in country cultural training, two weeks at the CCMD to overlap with the outgoing SPP Officer and to attend the one week orientation course at the CCMD and training at NGB. SPP personnel training requirements and qualifications would validate the joint experience of BAO positions and should be documented on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). The overall concept would treat the SPP personnel development like FAO professional development in terms of tracking, education and accreditation.

The fourth and final recommendation of this paper is for the NGB to aggressively study the current Army RAF Concepts and make recommendations from the National Guard point of view. The NG should provide recommendations on how the NG SPP can work with the new developing RAF concept.

Conclusion

In a time of limited funds it is essential that the National Guard lead changes required at the strategic level to ensure the growth of the State Partnership Program. Ensuring the enduring character of the NG SPP is even more important today, in light of the emerging RAF concept. The NG needs to sustain its efforts to develop new SPP partnerships and make the required funding and training changes to improve the State Partnership Program. The NG must work with the Active Component to help develop the RAF concept and ensure that the best possible support is provided to Combatant Commanders. If the National Guard does not help lead RAF concept development, there is great potential for reversal of the last 20 years of SPP success. Army leadership should not allow this to occur. Partnerships with other nations will only become more
important in the future and the SPP is a critical tool for building and maintain these partnerships.

Endnotes


2 U.S. Department of Defense, State Partnership Program, DODI 5111.20 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, December 14, 2012). Defines State Partnership Program (SPP): A DOD security cooperation program under which a military-to-military relationship is established between the National Guard of a U.S. State and a partner nation’s military forces for the complementary purposes of promoting mutual understanding; interoperability; furtherance of the Combatant Commander’s theater security cooperation program objectives by building enduring relationships with, and, to the extent authorized by law, the capacity of, partner nation military forces; and promoting the readiness of U.S. National Guard forces. pg 13.


4 MG Jeffrey Snow, “Regional Alignment of Forces,” briefing slides, U.S. Army War College Senior Leader Seminar, Shepherdstown, WV 16 January 2013. “RAF” is defined as: Regionally Aligned Forces or RAF provides the Combatant Commander with up to Joint Task Force capable headquarters with scalable, tailor able capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. Includes Army Total Force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others. RAF Approved by CSA as of 25 OCT 2012.

5 U.S. Department of Defense, State Partnership Program, DODI 5111.20 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, December 14, 2012). Defines SPP partner nation: A foreign nation with which DOD, at the request of a State’s National Guard, and with the approval of the relevant geographic Combatant Commander and COM concerned, has established (or is in a formal process of establishing) a SPP, pg 13.


7 Ibid.

8 National Guard Bureau web page, SPP Information Policy Paper tab, NGB Posture Statement January 2012 www.arnq.army.mil, 703-607-5752 or NGB-J5

9 Boll, Mark, COL, Deputy J5 at National Guard Bureau. Telephone and email Interview by author DEC 2012, JAN 2013 and FEB 2013. Field Study Experiences at the NGB level.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.


14Roberts, J. Andrew, LtCol, Bilateral Affairs Officer at the Us Embassy, Latvia. Telephone and email Interview February 2013. Field Study Experiences as the BAO to Latvia, working with the Michigan Army National Guard and NGB.

15 Ibid.


18 Ibid., pg. 17.


20 Michael G. Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America’s Military Leadership (Washington DC: 2011), pg. 6. “We will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security. This will help reduce potential safe-havens before violent extremism can take root. We will nest our efforts to build partner capacity with broader national security priorities, consolidate our institutional processes, and improve coordination across agencies. Military-to-military relationships must be reliable to be effective, and persevere through political upheavals or even disruption.”


22 Ibid.

Over the past year, the Army has continued to provide instrumental support to civil authorities. The Army’s reserve component proved to be one of our great strengths for these missions, giving the force depth and flexibility. The National Guard provides a distinctive capability for the Nation. When floods, wildfires and tornados struck from the Midwest to the South over the span of a few days in spring 2011, more than 900 National Guard Soldiers supplied a coordinated response to address citizens’ needs across the affected region. Similarly, when Hurricane Irene knocked out power and flooded towns across the Northeast in the summer of 2011, nearly 10,000 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen across 13 States delivered critical services to sustain the region through the crisis.

Third, it will require ready and accessible Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces. The Army’s reserve component has proven essential in contingency operations around the world. From Kosovo, the Sinai and Horn of Africa to Afghanistan and Iraq, homeland defense along America’s southwest border, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at homeland abroad, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have evolved into indispensable parts of our operational force, and will continue to rely on them to provide depth and versatility to meet the complex demand of the future.

Structuring and pacing reductions in the Nation’s ground forces in a way that preserves the ability to make a course change to surge, regenerate and mobilize the capabilities needed for any contingency.

Managing the force in ways that protect the Army’s ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital, rank structure and other assets that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force. This involves reexamining the mix of elements in the active and reserve components, maintaining a strong National Guard and Army Reserve, retaining a healthy cadre of experienced noncommissioned and midgrade officers, and preserving the health and viability of the Nation’s defense industrial base.

Second, our Army must help shape the international environment to enable our Combatant Commanders to assure our friend and contain our enemies. We do that by engaging with our partners; fostering mutual understanding through military-to-military contacts and helping them build the capacity to defend themselves. These actions are an investment in the future that the Nation cannot afford to forego. We must cultivate positive relationships before they are needed and be a reliable, consistent and respectful partner to others.


34 Boll, Mark, COL, Deputy J5 at National Guard Bureau. Telephone and email Interview by author DEC 2012, JAN 2013 and FEB 2013. Field Study Experiences at the NGB level.


37 Ibid., highlights

38 Ibid., highlights, pg. 3.

39 Ibid., highlights, pg. 8.

40 Ibid., highlights, pg. 8.

41 Ibid., highlights, pg. 11, 15, 16.

42 Ibid., highlights, pg. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.


44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Boll, Mark, COL, Deputy J5 at National Guard Bureau. Telephone and email Interview by author DEC 2012, JAN 2013 and FEB 2013. Field Study Experiences at the NGB level.

Boll, Mark, COL, Deputy J5 at National Guard Bureau. Telephone and email Interview by author DEC 2012, JAN 2013 and FEB 2013. Field Study Experiences at the NGB level.

Roberts, J. Andrew, LtCol, Bilateral Affairs Officer at the Us Embassy, Latvia. Telephone and email Interview February 2013. Field Study Experiences as the BAO to Latvia, working with the Michigan Army National Guard and NGB.

Ibid., Interview LtCol Roberts to explain DISAM: DISAM is the DOD, Defense Inst of Security Assistance and Management, taught at the same schools as LDESP Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace course conducted by Center for Civil-Military Relations.

Ibid., Interview LtCol Roberts on question of metrics and terms: “SPP Director Tracks with ARGOS, BAO uses TSCMIS (what EUCOM uses). Hearing G-TSCMIS is coming for some time. We went to TSCMIS about a year ago at EUCOM, still learning and changing the system quite a bit. It will be better than the old CFR system, but has its limitations. As an example, an exercise can generate 8 AARs that are over a hundred pages with a dozen PAO and local media stories. You can upload those, but the system only queries the text boxes that are the header for event AAR. Difficult to sum up a 1700 person exercise where all three Baltic partner states take part with Strykers, A-10s and JTACs in 5 paragraphs. EUCOM has been proactive in changing the system this year. I have requested that the uploaded material at least show up as a reference, if someone does a data base query, to allow them to know more data is available. As far as metrics, that is a tricky issue. SPP/TIC funds can pay for “familiarization” and not training, so it is difficult to “measure” the success of those events. With SPP another difficulty is measuring the actual relationship that is built over time.”
62 Ibid., Interview LtCol Roberts on question of syncing: “From my experience the long term relationship allows the SPP partner to have an institutional memory that understands what the goals of the Ambassador and Combatant Command are working toward. As an example we are conducting the Main Planning Conference (MPC) for the third CJCS directed Baltic exercise Saber Strike this week. I have been to every planning conference and exercise for the past three years (this goes to before my time as the BAO, but as a partner state I was involved with the previous two). This continuity allows for a good understanding of long term goals that a brand new exercise planner form USAREUR may have no idea of. As to syncing, I am a part of the country team meeting every Monday with the Ambassador and we have a separate POL/MIL meeting for specific military activities every other week. I get input and a chop on the Ambassador’s Mission Resource Request (MRR) which is his multi-year plan. We are fully briefed by the Latvian side as to their 5 year Defense Development Plan. Attend the European Strategic Initiative Conference (ESIC) in the fall were we update specific country engagement plan, meet with all components and OPRs for EUCOM Lines of Activity (LOA) to ensure we are utilizing all resources to meet specific EUCOM goals. Attend EUCOM Strategy Conference (ESC) in the spring for a bigger, all-Europe picture of where US strategic thought is going. Conduct an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) planning session where we have reps from our partner state that aligns FMS, FMF, 1206, CRSP, IMET, mil to mil, SPP events, exercises, etc… into a five year plan that aligns with the Latvian five year plan and build capabilities that have been vetted through the EUCOM engagement process.”

63 Ibid., Interview LtCol Roberts on question of RAF is the new SPP: “All for having set AC deployments to the AOR for security engagements. The Marines’ Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF) is a great example. We have a very difficult time getting EUCOM components to support activities because they are in a training status. As an example, USAREUR units are at a certain point in their ARFORGEN cycle and any commander tapped to send four guys to Bulgaria to conduct MDMP training is way more worried about the 19 year old that just showed up at his unit and getting them trained to deploy than TSC. Having an AC unit go through their training cycle and deploy to the AOR ready to conduct TSC is a much better approach. That being said a unit cannot have a SPP relationship. As AC member rotate through their tours, it may the 5th deployment of the 32nd Fighter Squadron to Poland, but no one on that trip has met a Pole in their life. When the SPP partner sends some members from Grayling Air to Ground Range to the JTAC regional planning meeting hosted by USAFE this spring – every Michigan member will have been to Latvia at least 5 times and every Latvian in the room has been to Michigan at least 3 times and had dinner at two of the Michigan Guardsmen’s’ houses. When General Francisco (MI ATAG) comes out this summer and is talking to the Chief of Defense (CHOD) about attending a Red Wings game as 1Lts 18 years ago, you get the goodness of SPP that a rotational AC unit can’t match.”

64MG Jeffrey Snow, “Regional Alignment of Forces,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, U.S. War College Senior Leader Seminar, Shepherdstown, WV 16 January 2013. Slide defining RAF: Regionally Aligned Forces or RAF provides the Combatant Commander with up to Joint Task Force capable headquarters with scalable, tailor able capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. Includes Army Total Force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography,
languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others. RAF Approved by CSA as of 25 OCT 2012.

65“Guard and Reserve must continue to build strong partnerships,” AUSA News (January 2013): Association of the United States Army, Society of National Association Publications-Award Winning Newspaper Vol 36 Number 3 or at www.ausa.org

66 Ibid.

67 “Realigning regional forces aimed at preventing future wars,” AUSA News (January 2013): Association of the United States Army, Society of National Association Publications-Award Winning Newspaper Vol 36 Number 3 or at www.ausa.org

68 Ibid., pg 17.

69 Ibid., pg 17.


71 Ibid.