NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan and the Challenges of Building Partnership Capacity

by

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Abstract

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Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches – primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces – to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention.¹

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, January, 2009

The United States and its coalition partners overthrew the Taliban Regime in 2001. Following this, the international community recognized that it would have to assist Afghanistan in rebuilding its war torn country. As part of the Bonn Agreement in December, 2001, the participants agreed that Afghan security must be left to the Afghan people. The 30 member Afghan Interim Authority requested assistance from the international community to establish and train its security forces. This set the stage for NATO and non-NATO contributions to build the security mechanism for Afghanistan.

The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are in the eleventh year of the Afghanistan War, known to most as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and carried out by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Operation Enduring Freedom began on 7 October, 2001 and was followed by NATO’s acceptance of the ISAF mission on 16 April, 2003. During this period, US led forces successfully destroyed the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan, killed Osama Bin Laden, removed the Taliban; pushing them into remote areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan. This denotes remarkable accomplishments in regards to combat operations, but the question remains, is the United States and its partners as successful in building a lasting security mechanism through the development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)?
Overseeing the development of ANSF development is the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). NTM-A was belatedly established in April, 2009 and with the United States is the lead nation in the NTM-A organization and provides more than 90 percent of the budget and training resources provided to build ANSF capacity. The Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) are the two security elements that make up the ANSF. NTM-A's mission is to support ISAF in developing a viable Afghan led security apparatus not later than 31 December, 2014.\(^2\) As this is a long term commitment, it is likely that the US and other nations will remain in Afghanistan past President Obama's stated withdrawal date of December, 2014.

The NTM-A organization provides leaders a forum to discuss and address the challenges of developing an indigenous security force in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) environment. This Strategic Research Paper (SRP) focuses on the Afghan National Police development in the larger NTM-A training responsibilities construct of the ANSF. It will examine the complexities and challenges existing in a multinational headquarters. These challenges include; achieving unity of effort, lack of sufficient trainers, cultural biases, and the prospects of securing adequate long term resourcing of the ANSF. This paper will analyze and discuss these issues and identify possible solutions for the US and NATO to achieve their desired endstate of building a viable Afghan led security force.

As the impending withdrawal of US and NATO forces approaches, ISAF has a narrow window of opportunity to set the conditions for a secure and stable Afghanistan. This can only be achieved, though, if ISAF takes a deliberate approach to address the challenges outlined in this paper. In this, moving two steps forward may require taking
one step back to maximize our capability in providing the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) a safe and secure environment where a democratic government can continue to develop. In this, NTM-A’s training and development of ANSF, from high level planning and coordination between NATO and the host country, to training Afghan Policemen all have strategic implications.

Strategic Context

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States pursued a counter terror campaign against both the terrorists and their sponsors. This strategy was known as the Bush Doctrine and included both sustained and pre-emptive attacks against known enemies to prevent further attacks on American soil. From the initial operation in Afghanistan in 2001, to the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the current fight in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), our campaign relied on the support of coalition partners to bear a greater burden of building national capacity. However, as the sole world super-power, the United States took the lead role in virtually every aspect of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the OEF theater of war, (Afghanistan), the US actively pursued al-Qa’ida and its surrogate partner, the Taliban. The 2010 National Security Strategy delineates this strategy by stating that the US will “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, we will pursue a strategy that protects our homeland, secures the world’s most dangerous weapons and material, denies al-Qa’ida safe haven, and builds positive partnership with Muslim communities around the world. Success requires a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that judiciously applies every tool of American power, both military and civilian, as well as the concerted efforts of like-minded states and multilateral institutions.” The campaign design for OEF was rooted on a multi-
faceted counter-insurgency operations approach. One component of that effort is the training and advisory line of effort currently executed by the United States and the NTM-A.

The United States is the lead nation for the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. However, NTM-A is a complex organization supported by twenty-nine NATO and Non-NATO troop contributing nations. NTM-A is compelled to apply all the elements of national power (DIME-Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic) to build partnership capacity and capabilities in the ANSF (especially focused on the ANP). In many ways, the NTM-A is America’s only clean way out of its costly conventional commitment in Afghanistan. The idea is that the US, and its partners, can exit once the ANSF is able to provide security for Afghanistan and its citizens.

The US National Security Strategy calls for America to strengthen the security of other countries at risk by “undertaking a long-term, sustained effort to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law.” In carrying out this policy, there are inherent challenges in the practical application of this approach when operating multilaterally. Moreover, funding a strategy to build a nation’s security element from the ground up is extremely expensive and a long term endeavor. In Afghanistan, this funding plan must be sustainable even in an era of declining national budgets.

Historical Context - Advisors and Trainers

Training foreign security forces is not new for the United States. In 1962, the US established a training command to assist the South Vietnamese government to develop a credible security force. Called the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MAC-V),
this organization conducted military training that created a viable security mechanism for the South Vietnamese Government. Equally impressive was that the United States conducted this foreign internal defense mission and trained an indigenous force while engaged in combat with the North Vietnamese and its Viet Cong ally.

American Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams assumed command of the South Vietnamese Army training mission in 1956. The South Vietnamese Army at that time was ineffective and its senior leadership known as dysfunctional. Through MAC-V’s effort in the re-organization of field unit command and control structure, as well as its emphasis on training centers, the South Vietnamese Army showed signs of progress in the late 1950s. However, familiar themes such as language barriers, rapid rotation of U.S. advisors and corruption by Vietnamese officials were difficult hurdles to overcome. The challenges that were encountered in Vietnam are some of the same challenges facing NTM-A advisors today in Afghanistan. At the core of the challenge facing the US in Afghanistan is its ability to build an efficient and professional police force.

Why is it important to dedicate resources in time, manpower and equipment to train a foreign police force? A nation’s police by its very nature and design come in contact with the indigenous population on a daily basis. Their main objective is to enforce the rule of law, provide security and to protect the citizens. In performing these tasks, the police develop a relationship with the people whom they protect. They also develop situational awareness and understanding of their surrounding and serve as a human intelligence source to detect, investigate and disrupt insurgent networks at their base of operations. This is why the United States’ National Military Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review placed emphasis on building the security capacity of
partner states. The National Military Strategy specifically states that “we will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security. This will deny violent terrorist safe-havens from which to operate.”

History of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan

Following three weeks of aerial precision strikes and carpet bombing type operations, the Afghan Northern Alliance supported by U.S. Special Operations Forces, captured the Afghan capital of Kabul with relative ease. The concept of dismantling the Taliban regime now became reality with Taliban and Al Qa’iada leaders fleeing Kabul to safe havens in the mountains of Tora Bora and Western Pakistan. As the Taliban ran for the hills, Afghans ran into the streets of Kabul playing western music to include Pink Floyd and Elton John. They were freed from the tyrannical reigns of the Taliban. “People wore jeans again. People danced. People laughed. Some people cried.” This momentum would continue as military operations pushed south into Kandahar and Helmand provinces. Operation Enduring Freedom proved swift and highly successful in its initial stages. But, yet, the difficult task lay ahead; that of constructing a new and viable national infrastructure from the ground up.

The Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001, known as the Agreement on Provisional Arrangement in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, urged the United Nations to assist in the development of an Afghan security force for Kabul and the surrounding areas. This initiated an effort to build a fledgling Afghan security apparatus, with the first priority of work focused on the Afghan National Army. The Afghan Interim Government and members of the United Nations agreed that security should first be established to enable the development of a permanent Afghan government. As the Afghan Interim Authority and Government took
shape, the United States and Great Britain launched an initiative to secure international support in building Afghan security institutions capable of performing police and counter narcotics operations. In April 2002, this initiative was known as the “lead nation” donor support framework in which the following countries volunteered to assist: Germany-ANP, Italy-Judicial Reform, Japan-disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, Great Britain-counter-narcotics, and the United States-ANA. As the focus this paper’s discourse is on the development of the ANP, it is important to note that the initial strategy and effort by the Germans was methodical but extremely slow in its implementation. Under the German plan, the proposal was that 1,500 Afghan police officer candidates attend the police academy in Kabul for a five year period. At this rate of production, it would have taken decades to realize the formation of a credible Afghan Police force.

In 2003, the United States supplemented the German program by establishing additional police training programs. This initiative was started in response to observing a need to rapidly increase the number of policemen available for GIROA. The U.S. State Department served as the lead agency in training the ANP until 2005 when that responsibility transferred to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). DoD decided to implement a training strategy similar to the one executed in Iraq as part of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. As noted by the United States Institute for Peace, the implementation of the transfer of responsibility for ANP from the State Department was assigned to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which also trained the ANA simultaneously.
Development of the ANP attracted numerous nations, who contributed both monetary and manpower resources. These contributions emerged in the form of bilateral agreements with the Afghan government starting in 2001. Yet, this action was plagued by lack of unity of effort since there were bi-lateral agreements with no synchronization of effort between the international actors. This lack of integration produced layers of duplication of effort and gaps in providing the specific types of capabilities that the Afghan police force needed to develop. For example, police training academies sprung up across Kabul and were led by police trainers from Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey and the U.S. all with different levels of resources operating with different standards.

There were also numerous police training organizations in Kabul that had different ideas on what the ANP should look like. These included the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) and the German Police Project Office. To de-conflict training standards, coordinate and synchronize training efforts, and pool available resources, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) Headquarters was activated in November 2009, eight years after the beginning of OEF.

The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan serves as the entity to coordinate resources from contributing nations in building a viable ANSF. To that end, NTM-A synchronizes activities with both U.S. and international agencies that includes the US State Department as well as the European Police and the European Gendarmerie Force. In the resourcing and training of the Afghan Police force, NTM-A’s focuses its efforts on initial recruits, equipping the force and building long term institutional capacity for the Afghan security forces. Specifically with the Afghan Police force, NTM-A
provides oversight in coordination with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior for the following police institutions: Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Border Police (ABP) and the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP). Upon completion of new recruit initial police training, NTM-A provides assistance to the Afghan MoI in the assignment process. NTM-A is responsible for recruiting, training and assigning police forces, while the International Security and Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC) is responsible for advising, assisting and partnering with fielded police units. This seems simple enough, but proved problematic as we will discuss later in this paper.

NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan Structure

The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan is a multinational military organization comprised of twenty-three NATO contributing nations and six non-NATO contributing countries. The NTM-A Headquarters is robust in staff and functional area representation. From the combined joint staff, special staff, personal staff to multiple deputy commanders (army, air, special operations police and support operations), the organization appears similar to a theater equivalent type command. However, upon closer inspection, the US occupies most of the senior staff officer and general officers positions in the headquarters. One will find only limited representation of senior leaders from the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Poland and France.
Figure 1.

As previously stated, NTM-A’s mission is to provide unity of effort for the training and establishment of Afghan led security. If one combines this mission statement to the organization chart depicted in diagram 1, one would surmise that it can accomplish this task with few limitations and distractions. Yet, this is far from the truth. An in depth investigation reveals that the NTM-A Headquarters is a joint and combined organization with numerous and varied officers of different nations mixed throughout the headquarters. This would not matter, except the many agencies and nations operating in this HQ have divergent standards, goals and agendas. Moreover, with further scrutiny one finds that the NTM-A trainers operating in the Afghan training sites are multinational in composition. In certain instances there may be multiple national trainers occupying the same training facility with different training missions. Simultaneously, there are different actors that also operate in Afghanistan with an interest in training the
police forces. These include the U.S. State Department, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), as well as various countries with established bi-lateral agreements, none of which function with the unity of effort one would expect.

Training a foreign security force is not new for the United States. We’ve been on this road before in places such as Korea, Vietnam and Iraq. However, only recently has the U.S. provided training to an indigenous force in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and multinational environment. While some lessons observed from our past experiences can be useful in developing new strategies, others will not apply to the current multinational situation and environment. In the near future, the United States and NATO must collectively focus its efforts on challenges in unity of command and unity of effort, resourcing and sustaining the Afghan National Police force. This does not discount the actions of NTM-A from its inception to the present, but is meant to focus selectively at areas in which the U.S. and NATO can contribute to create a long lasting and permanent security apparatus for the GIRoA and its people. Upon the activation of the NTM-A organization, the headquarters focused its attention on building the combined staff and identifying the resources necessary to implement a revised strategy that would reverse the negative trend of ANSF development dating back to 2003.

Before launching into areas that require additional NTM-A attention, let’s point out a few positive actions of the coalition headquarters to date. One obvious area is the re-assessment and revision of the Recruit, Assign and Train model (RAT). Prior to
2009, CSTC-A implemented a Recruit, Assign and Train model to build the requisite number of Afghan Police Officers in a short period of time.

The thought process was simple enough; find Afghans who wanted to become policemen and put them on watch immediately with minimum training, then follow up with additional police training when the conditions allowed. Although this was effective in rapidly providing the security forces needed, the newly minted police officers did not have the requisite skills to enforce the basic rule of law concept. These untrained, ill performing policemen quickly reverted to corrupt practices that undermined the efforts to rebuild Afghanistan. The police development was so inadequate in early 2009 that U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke described the ANP as “inadequate, riddled with corruption and the weak link in the security chain.” NTM-A changed the ANP growth and development model from the earlier described Recruit, Assign and Train to a Recruit, Train and Assign concept in order to emphasize importance on the training aspect of the police development program. As a result, new recruits must now attend and graduate from the basic training program which is eight weeks in length prior to their assignment as a police officer. This paradigm shift resulted in policemen that are at a minimum, knowledgeable in his basic police functions, duties and missions prior to field assignment. Additional NTM-A accomplishments since its founding include the following:

- Growth of 25,546 police officers from 94,985 to 120,504 since November 2009 (27% increase)
- Approved growth of 134,000 police officer by the end 2011
- Instituted a literacy program making NTM-A the largest adult educator in Afghanistan
Unity of Command and Unity of Effort

Unity of Command is one of the nine recognized principles of war in the United States Army doctrine. Its central theme is the application of available forces under a single commander in a manner that masses combat power toward a common objective. The objective in a unity of command approach is to create unity of effort in harmonizing action across multiple organizations towards one end-state. Unity of command implies that all forces fall under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan applies an integrated command structure in its Multi-National Headquarters in an attempt to achieve unity of command and unity of effort in the execution of its mission. The NTM-A mission may be a misnomer due to the fact that the NATO Alliance countries are not the only countries that operate under this training headquarters. Non-NATO countries such as Australia, Finland, Jordan, Korea, Mongolia, and Singapore are also NTM-A contributing nations.

The role and mission of NTM-A is extensive and complex. As the lead organization for Afghan security training, NTM-A is directed to synchronize the efforts of NATO and non-NATO contributing nations, as well as other international governmental organizations. There are many challenges to creating a unity of command in the NTM-A with a contingent of twenty-nine different nations. There are areas of contention in NTM-A which should be addressed to maximize its training and development efforts in the remaining years prior to 2014.

One of these areas of contention is the NATO command and control structure. The IJC and NTM-A are three star commands who report directly to the ISAF Commander. IJC is ISAF’s operational arm of action, while NTM-A is ISAF’s training
and development arm of action. At times, these headquarters and their subordinate commands differ in thought and action on the training and deployment of ANP forces. This is evident in the case of the Afghan National Civil Order Police. NTM-A conducts initial training of all ANP forces to include the ANCOP. At the completion of the training, ANCOP officers are assigned to one of four brigades located throughout Afghanistan. IJC employs ANCOP forces in the role of clear and hold in the COIN operational model as a complementary effort to ANA actions. This is not as seamless as the statement implies.

IJC has the responsibility to partner with ANCOP deployable units; however, there are not enough IJC units to complete the task. ANCOP is an Afghan regional based force which also serves as a national deployable force for the MoI. Although ANCOP works for the MoI, their actions were influenced by the IJC. In 2011, ANCOP forces were paired with U.S. Special Operations units to clear and hold key terrain in the Helmand and Kandahar regions of Afghanistan. In rare cases where partnering did occur with special operations forces, it occurred days prior to the ANCOP deployment cycle. This was not helpful. To bridge the IJC gap in partnering to the ANCOP deployment process, NTM-A assigned mentors to ANCOP Headquarters Command and Staff. While this was a noble gesture, it did not resolve the core problem. NTM-A mentors did not have access to IJC plans, while the IJC staff did not fully appreciate the limitations of the ANCOP organization.

Meanwhile, ANCOP leaders felt that their units did not receive the attention from IJC partnering units, and felt that their police force was merely fodder for the ANA. As noted by David Bayley and Robert Perito, “small isolated units of the Afghan National
Police have been called upon to face insurgent attacks without appropriate weapons and military support. As a result, they have suffered more casualties than the ANA.\textsuperscript{19}

These repeated deployments in support of clearing and holding operations out of sector led to high casualty and attrition rates in the ANCOP. Additionally, the MoI also tasked the ANCOP to perform un-announced security missions not recognized by IJC or NTM-A. This exacerbated the attrition. During this author’s time as an advisor to the ANCOP National headquarters, it appeared that the mission set and priorities for this paramilitary police force was not synchronized appropriately between the Afghan MoI, the IJC or the NTM-A.

Establishing unity of command in this scenario is impossible due to the types of organizations involved. However, establishing unity of effort is a must. To do this, an NTM-A fusion cell should be established in the MoI. The fusion cell must have permanent representation from advisors and liaison officers from all involved parties. There are advisors from NTM-A currently assigned to the MoI, but there is no fusion cell where collaborative efforts take place. The MoI is the focal point of all actions and decisions as it applies to ANP utilization and deployment. IJC and NTM-A advisors working out of the MoI on a daily basis would maximize unity of effort necessary to synchronize the operational and developmental needs of ANCOP and the ANP. Additionally, the advisors’ synergistic action combined with the MoI would harmonize U.S., NATO and host nation interests. Although IJC and NTM-A are separate commands with different commanding generals, this arrangement of an integrated IJC, NTM-A and MoI cell would set the conditions for current and future planning as we
transition to Afghan centric and Afghan led operations. This fusion cell would also enable the coordination of IO and NGO entities that have vested interests in the ANP.

This approach applies to the establishment of fusion cells in the IJC and NTM-A subordinate command headquarters. IJC established six Regional Commands (RCs) across Afghanistan; RC East, RC South, RC Southwest, RC West, RC North and RC Capital. In response, NTM-A created six Regional Support Commands (RSCs) mirroring the IJC footprint. The RSCs are responsible for ANSF training centers and support of ANSF developmental projects. 50% of the RSCs are currently operating within the RC Headquarters footprint which leads to increased flow of information and unity of effort. IJC and NTM-A must work to provide the same capability to the remaining RCs and RSCs, as well as integrating our Afghan counterparts. This will be instrumental as U.S., NATO and non-NATO nations begin the sustainment phase of support to GIRoA.

Cultural Competence

By design, NTM-A is a culturally diverse organization. The diversity in experience, knowledge and views offers benefits to assist in the development of Afghanistan’s security force. However, this diversity also brings many challenges that U.S. leaders, without multinational experience must overcome. The U.S. and its NATO partners must continue to stress the criticality of cultural understanding, acceptance and integration of multinational forces. In a multinational environment, some leaders find it easier to discount partner countries and work unilaterally than invest the time required to analyze their thoughts and opinions. NTM-A was not immune to this behavior. It was not a surprise to observe some U.S. leaders with dismissive attitudes towards leaders from partner nations. On occasion, U.S. leaders excluded partner nation
representatives from meetings and discussions. The affect of these actions contributed to eroding esprit de corps within the headquarters. On a recurring basis, one would hear remarks from U.S. military members that denigrate our NATO partners. Remarks such as the abbreviation for NATO means “Nothing After Two O’clock”, or “Need Americans to Operate” fosters resentment from our allies. It also tears at the fabric of trust, decreases the level of commitment, and adversely affects our unity of command and effort. More importantly, it inhibits the international community’s efforts to build a credible and sustainable Afghan National Security Force.

Prior to deployment in Afghanistan, U.S. military personnel are provided cultural training on a repetitive basis, however, there is little to no cultural training to enhance a U.S. soldier’s understanding of his multinational partner. As echoed in Joint Publication 3-16, “much time and effort is expended in learning about the enemy; a similar effort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religious customs, history, and values of each partner.”21 While it is vital to develop an acute understanding of the host nation’s culture and history, it is just as important to devote the energy required to understand and appreciate the similarity and differences of our NATO Allies and other multinational forces.

In the remaining years left to assist GIRoA in building an effective security force capable of defending Afghanistan, the U.S. must look for talented and culturally savvy leaders who are comfortable with working and integrating the whole of government and partner nations. This implies working in close coordination with Department of State (DoS) representatives as we continue to move forward. DoS and DynCorps, its primary contractor support, were the sole entities in charge of ANP recruit training until 2010
when DoS turned its ANP training responsibility to the Department of Defense. Actions during the transition of responsibility were contentious and lacked clarity of purpose. This was due to differing views of priorities and opinions. Regardless, the lack of cultural understanding between DoD and DoS representatives led to friction that stymied the transition process. We need leaders who understand the complexities of working within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multi-National (JIMM) environment, and getting the best possible contributions out of our partners.

As the U.S. and NATO begin its drawdown, non-DoD organizations and a small DOD contingent will remain to support and continue the development of GIRoA. During this critical time as DoD completes it training mission, NTM-A leaders must rely on their cultural expertise and experience to set the conditions for a seamless transfer of authority back to DoS and GIRoA. It is critical that we develop leaders that are culturally astute and are comfortable with working in a multinational environment. The United States will seldom, if at all, operate unilaterally in future military operations.

One Size Does Not Fit All

The training surge of U.S. forces in 2010 attempted to fill the lack of sufficient Afghan National Army and Police trainers. At that time, NTM-A identified 15 ANSF institutions that required specialized trainers. ANP training sites and institutions were the top five on that same list.22 This shortfall in trainers started from the creation of the ANSF and remains an impediment to the development of the Afghan security apparatus. To mitigate the deficiency of specialized police trainers, NTM-A’s relies on pledges from NATO as well as non-NATO countries. In response, the international community answered the request with additional pledges, however, confirmed pledges seldom equate to an actual trainer in Afghanistan.
As a quick fix to the trainer shortfall, NTM-A generated an RFF (Request for Forces) through the United States’ DoD in early 2010. In the spring of 2010, FORSCOM deployed an infantry battalion of the Global Response Force from Fort Bragg, N.C. to serve as trainers for a 90 day period. They were the bridging effort prior to the deployment of main effort U.S. trainers. In the summer of 2010, three combat arms battalions (infantry, air defense and field artillery) deployed as ANSF trainers for a period of 12 months. These trainers were employed across Afghanistan and trained both ANA and ANP forces. The ANP military trainers responded and adapted remarkably to provide police recruits with basic police training and survivability skills training necessary in a combat environment. However, the training lacked focus on rule of law, population engagement, and combating corruption. These specialized police skills were not in the repertoire of the U.S. Army trainers. This surge operation rapidly filled the void of trainers, but did not address the specialized training necessary to develop the ANP holistically. As observed in the 2010 CSIS report of the ANSF, “The U.S. RFF and TDY personnel are essentially filler, and may not have a relevant background or have received much pre-deployment training for the mission.”

The United States as a global leader must do more to influence our NATO partners to contribute to resourcing trainers with the right skill set and specialty to meet the objective of building the ANP both in quantity as well as quality. The use of RFFs for military police in conjunction with increased pressure on NATO Allies to fulfill their promises will alleviate the shortfall of qualified trainer. NTM-A should continue to use military trainers, both U.S. and coalition to provide focused survivability and combat training. Since the ANCOP is a paramilitary unit, this approach would work well.
Military trainers and advisors can also contribute to sustainment training to the ANP since their logistics system mirrors that of the United States Army. As we begin to see our deployment operation tempo decrease, military police units will inevitably play a larger role in ANP development.

However, this is not enough. The U.S. must encourage the participation of international police organizations to assist in the effort. The European Police, European Union Rule of Law organization, and police institutions from the GCC are all viable candidates to assist in the development of ANSF. With an increase of professional police advisors to the ANP, NTM-A will create the opportunity to select qualified Afghan police officers to serve as trainers for the Afghan Police force. This train the trainer methodology would go a long way to setting the conditions for a complete and successful transfer of authority to the MoI and GI RoA.

Resourcing the Afghan National Security Force requires a long term commitment by the United States and the international community. Presently, the Afghan government and the international community use the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) as a forum to discuss the development strategy of ANSF. In 2010, the JCMB supported GI RoA’s request to increase the ANSF end strength (ANA-171,600; ANP-134,000). It is tough to make a case against the increase of security forces if one takes a near term approach; however, we must engage in an intellectual discourse on how to sustain the ANSF growth in future years. The sustainment of a large security force will be a monumental undertaking for the GI RoA. Afghanistan remains a poor country in comparison to the rest of the world with a 111 ranking out of 196. Its Gross Domestic Product is roughly 29 billion with an annual 1.5 billion in revenues and 3.3
billion in expenditures. Will Afghanistan have the capability to sustain the security forces that the international community created? By itself, the answer is overwhelming no.

GIROA committed over a third of its total revenue to the development of the ANSF in 2010-2011. This equated to $455 million dollars in total Afghan contribution. The United States and the international community contributions bridged the gap for the required budget necessary to grow and sustain the ANSF. The United States alone donated 9.3 billion in 2010 and 11.6 billion in 2011 to the Afghan Security Forces Fund. In addition, the international community donated $625 million in LOTF-A (Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan) dollars to ANP development. For the foreseeable future, the United States will bear the burden of this security apparatus in Afghanistan. According to the April 2010 report to Congress, “The United States will continue to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage its Allies and partners to help pay for ANSF sustainment, but likely will continue to shoulder the major portion of these costs for the near future.” In light of this, the United States and NTM-A must scrutinize how it is shaping the ANP force structure and capabilities that they are leaving for GIROA.

The United States and its partners must take a pragmatic approach to how we resource the ANSF, particularly the ANP. The U.S. should always ask itself, what does right look like for the Afghans? It should orient its logic on what is good enough and not on what is the standards as applied in a western hemisphere frame of thought. When we look at mobility for the ANP, the U.S. currently field our Afghan partners with new Ford Ranger pick-up trucks by the thousands, is this the right answer? Maybe they
would be just as well served with a less costly solution. At a future point, the international community will decrease or discontinue it financial support to GIRoA. Have we created a security force that is unsustainable for the Afghan government? If the Afghan government lays off a portion of its security force, where will these trained and armed security personnel go to find work? We can only hope that they do not venture to seek employment with volatile extremist organizations.

The security apparatus in Afghanistan has grown and improved considerably since the establishment of NTM-A in 2009. However, there are areas where the U.S. and its international partners must focus their efforts in the remaining years. We must re-assess our manning, training and equipping strategy which is fundamentally linked to the budget dedicated to ANP development. Our strategy must focus on building a security force that is a “good enough” force instead of a “gold” standard, especially in the domain of equipping. This good enough force must reflect the capability of the Afghan government to sustain that force with minimal assistance from external nations. The U.S. and NATO would achieve greater gains by providing an adequate amount of experienced police trainers vice providing a plethora of new Ford pick-up trucks to the ANP. Additionally, to optimize the execution of multinational operations, the U.S. must allocate the required time and effort in developing culturally astute leaders that understand the complexity and challenges of working with our NATO and Non-NATO contributing partners. This is in addition to developing and understanding the various cultures of our host nation. Our time is quickly passing in Afghanistan, the question remains, will our efforts to produce a viable Afghan security force pass the test of time.
Endnotes


4Ibid., page 27.


9Ibid.

10It is important to note that this author used the word construct, not re-construct. Reconstruction connotes that a base or infrastructure of some sort was in place to build upon. In the case of Afghanistan, there was no base for re-construction efforts in numerous governmental and security areas. This included the Afghan Ministry of the Interior which controls the country’s police force.


23 Ibid., 22.
