The Evolution of European Security: From Confrontation to Cooperation

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The people of Europe have cooperated with each other and fought each other through centuries. The majority of wars known to mankind occurred on the European continent. It took the horrors of two world wars for Europeans to finally set aside their disputes and to choose peaceful coexistence on a more permanent basis. The creation of the European Union (EU) provided an opportunity for the people of Europe to establish a common political, economic and security community. Today, there are 50 sovereign countries in the continent of Europe. This paper discusses the evolution of security in the European Union. It also describes what “security” means in terms of a “European security community.” It then explains the EU’s relation with NATO and concludes with some recommendations on the future development of security in Europe.
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The people of Europe have cooperated with each other and fought each other through centuries. The majority of wars known to mankind occurred on the European continent. It took the horrors of two world wars for Europeans to finally set aside their disputes and to choose peaceful coexistence on a more permanent basis. The creation of the European Union (EU) provided an opportunity for the people of Europe to establish a common political, economic and security community. Today, there are 50 sovereign countries in the continent of Europe. This paper discusses the evolution of security in the European Union. It also describes what “security” means in terms of a “European security community.” It then explains the EU’s relation with NATO and concludes with some recommendations on the future development of security in Europe.
The Evolution of European Security: From Confrontation to Cooperation

The people of Europe have cooperated with each other and fought each other through centuries. The majority of wars known to mankind occurred on the European continent. Brigadier General Michael H. Clemmesen, Danish Army, former commandant of the Baltic Defense College noted that “during the past the human generated earthquake events normally had their epicenter in Europe, even if the largest part of the world’s human population lives elsewhere.”¹

It took the horrors of two world wars for Europeans to finally set aside their disputes and to choose peaceful coexistence on a more permanent basis. The creation of the European Union (EU) provided an opportunity for the people of Europe to establish a common political, economic and security community.

Building a new Security Community within post World War II (WW II) Europe was the noble ambition that allowed for peaceful coexistence and further political and economic development of the EU.² Dr. Jan Hallenber refers to the concept of “security community” as a study of “…possible ways in which men some day may abolish war.”³ He noted that “there is a stable core of security in the EU, characterized by the absence of any risk of war between its members, or in other words: a pluralistic security community.”⁴

Hallenberg maintains that, “in the present European security community there is a very stable nucleus, in which war and the threat of war between members has for all practical purposes disappeared. To be precise, the states that are members of at least one of the two crucial organizations – NATO and the European Union, together form this security community.”⁵

However, while Europe has succeeded in building its own security community, it is surrounded by unstable regions and states on the periphery, which may potentially
destabilize Europe’s “core of security.” The Balkans, the Western Mediterranean, the Middle East, Ukraine and Russia, all constitute the new challenges for the present European security system.

Today, there are 50 sovereign countries in the continent of Europe. This paper discusses the evolution of security in the European Union. It also describes what “security” means in terms of a “European security community.” It then explains the EU’s relation with NATO and concludes with some recommendations on the future development of security in Europe.

How European States View Security

The end of the Cold War era in the beginning of the 1990s brought a new dilemma for the future of European security. With the collapse of the Soviet empire, the new security environment in Europe envisioned “the replacement of the old bipolar structures with new cooperative ones.” Greek author Aikaterini Hatjiadoniu argues that, “in the post Cold War framework the concept of cooperative security emerged as the appropriate tool for establishing a new Pan-European security order.” He based his argument on the observation that:

The fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989) and the subsequent evolutions in Eastern Europe, the German unification (October 1990), the demise of the Warsaw pact (April 1991) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a new era, in which the political, economic and military East-West conflict has disappeared, as the nuclear threat has, too.

The new post Cold War security dilemma appeared for Europe due to the fact that “in one sense, the Cold War security system in Europe was very stable during the Cold War period; it has been characterized as a Europe between the Superpowers.” According to Hallenberg:
This security system had been based on bipolarity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or more correctly, between the United States and the Soviet Union, a situation that brought stability in terms of preventing war, but that simultaneously meant that many European states were locked into an organizational framework not necessarily of their own choosing.\textsuperscript{12}

The fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union led to the creation of a new security system in Europe in which numerous organizations cooperate under different mandates or memberships.\textsuperscript{13} As noted by some observers, “in this context, emphasis was given on the development of a new cooperative security system for Europe and on the emerging of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)\textsuperscript{14} as the statutory frame in which this new security system should evolve.”\textsuperscript{15}

The framework of the European Union that was set up in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (also known as the Treaty of European Union (TEU)) consists of three pillars. The first pillar relates to the European Community (EC), the second to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the third to Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Engagements with security and military matters take place within the CFSP pillar.\textsuperscript{16}

With the Maastricht Treaty, Europeans created a legal framework for their common role in defense and security matters. Article 17 of the Treaty declared that “the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union.”\textsuperscript{17} Before that, European security and defense were identified through the framework of NATO. Signing of the Treaty demonstrated the will of the EU members to “apply a common foreign and security policy, including the future formation of a common defense policy that, in a given time, may lead to common defense.”\textsuperscript{18}

According to Dr. Gerd Föhrenbach, by signing the Treaty of Amsterdam,\textsuperscript{19} the EU made the first attempt to position itself as an entity and highlighted the need for
safeguarding its external borders. Föhrenbach refers to Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Treaty on European Union, according to which “the Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), whose objectives include: 1. To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nation Charter; and 2. To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders.” Föhrenbach concluded that, “this comes close to at least an indirect definition of the EU as a common security space.”

A great number of articles and books have been written in recent years containing different definitions of the concept of security. Merriam-Webster defines security as: the quality or state of being secure such as freedom from danger and freedom from fear and anxiety. David Baldwin defines security as: “a low probability of damage to acquired values,” and his definition best mirrors the core objectives of the CFSP of the EU. Baldwin’s definition is also “…open to other empirical referents than simply the military ones. In the present EU political system, member states regard both the traditional aspects of military security, as well as what may broadly be called economic security issues.”

Sovereign Obligations of Self-Defense

The EU constitutes an economic and political partnership of 27 member countries and is still in the process of its future enlargement. Although the European Parliament is the Union’s legislative institution and Brussels in Belgium is the de facto capital of the EU, each member country is a sovereign state with its own national
government and defense forces. Despite remarkable achievement in the field of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) Europeans are still very jealous about their sovereignty and protection of the national interests.\textsuperscript{27} Sovereignty and nationalism largely determines the agenda of domestic and international politics.\textsuperscript{28}

Europe is best characterized by diversity of cultures, values, history, society and ethnic ties.\textsuperscript{29} The jealousy with which European states protect their sovereignty has deep cultural, traditional and historical bonds. Too often the concept of sovereignty, a pure European innovation, has served as a \textit{casus belli} in Europe.

Each EU member state has its own security policy and maintains its own military forces for self defense. The reason for this is twofold. First, it goes back to the historical experiences of each individual country, and their geographic location. Second, the EU`s CSDP does not provide a framework for common defense of its members. From the beginning of its foundation, the EU as an entity did not have an ambition to become a great military power. It remains primarily a union of a civilian power to which member states commit themselves more through solidarity and common values, rather than common political and military interests.\textsuperscript{30}

Perceptions of Threat: High to Low

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe is no longer facing a common security threat. While most of the European countries share common views on the emerging security threats of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, such as terrorism, global warming, cyber and energy security, different European countries have different perceptions on how to address them. Western European countries no longer foresee a conventional state-on-state military conflict possible in the foreseeable future in Europe. Based on this assumption, these countries have launched significant transformation
efforts of their defense forces aimed to create small-size, professional and agile forces. Some of the Eastern European countries are following this example, although countries such as Poland and Baltic States still share historic fears of Russia as a potential aggressor and this fear determines their defense priorities.

Different perceptions of threats divided Europe into two blocks of Eastern and Western European countries. The first block consists of big European countries, or so called “Eurocontinentalists”. These countries support approaching Europe’s integration through the consolidated European continental “core” of Germany, France and the Benelux countries, and which seeks to minimize the U.S. influence in Europe. The second block consists of so called “Euroatlantists”, a bulk majority of the small European countries (mainly Eastern and Central European countries) which support closer relationships with the U.S. and NATO.

The national power of small countries depends on the size of their territories, populations and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The small countries are well aware, that due to their limited national instruments of power, they are often subject to the manipulation of big actors in the international system. Driven by the matter of national survival small countries often have no other option but to seek membership of larger security organizations and coalitions. “The principle of equality observed in the supranational institutions gives the small states structural power which is used trying to compensate for the deficit of comparative power.”

A majority of the European countries has dual membership in both organizations, the EU and NATO. 21 of the 27 EU member countries are also members of NATO while the remaining six; Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden follow their
historically traditional policies of neutrality (the EU/NATO membership overlap is shown in Table 1). The cooperation preference with NATO is strengthened by the latest developments of economic and military relationships between Germany, France and Russia.\textsuperscript{36}

Table 1. Memberships overlap between EU and NATO member countries.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EU</th>
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While Eurocontinentalists maintain the idea of creating a European army, the lack of a common threat makes it unlikely the European states will create a European army in the foreseeable future. In this context, the next section of this paper will examine the legal framework of the EU’s security policy and application of military force for various contingencies.

Organizing for Security within the European Union

By signing the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU became responsible for its own security as an entity. The treaty allowed the EU to develop the European Security Strategy which was approved by the European Council and came into force in December 2003. Its headline reads: “A secure Europe in a better World.” The document outlines “three strategic objectives for the EU: addressing threats, building security in the EU’s neighborhood, and developing an international order based on multilateralism.” This document can be considered as a joint European security strategy that is equivalent to the National Security Strategy of any sovereign state. However, it does not replace the National Defense Strategies of its member states.
The Security Strategy does not focus purely on the security interdependence between EU member states, but affirms European interests and the EU’s role as a global player in support of a rule-based international order underpinned by the United Nations (UN). The introduction reads: “…the European Union is inevitably a global player… it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.”

By addressing emerging threats, the strategy recognizes that: “In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. …The first line of defense will be often abroad.”

The European Security Strategy acknowledges the new reality of European security interests beyond Europe’s borders. But it also requires European strategic autonomy.

The Lisbon Treaty

The Treaty of Lisbon (also known as the Lisbon Treaty) was signed by the EU member states on 13 December 2007, and entered into force on 1 December 2009. It amends the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty establishing the European Community (also known as the Treaty of Rome). The document provides the legal framework for relationships between member states and emphasizes the EU’s common values.

The Treaty recognizes various security concerns and encourages other EU member states to assist each other only in the face of crisis. However, it does not provide for the Union’s mutual defense.

Article 42 (7) of the Lisbon Treaty states:

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and
assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation.48

Article 42 (7) recognizes sovereign rights of the Union`s individual members for self-defense as well as their rights to choose the form of defense or scope of assistance and as such can hardly be recognized as a mutual defense clause.

The Treaty has potential to consolidate for a common defense of the EU under the CSDP, but until then, any military action of the member states should follow their usual constitutional procedures.49 However, the Treaty allows the EU to form ad-hoc military formations for specific operations and to deploy troops within and outside European territory.

**Common Foreign and Security Policy**

In the field of the CFSP the member states act in a strictly intergovernmental framework.50 The CFSP provides a common framework for the EU member states in which they can interact and cooperate, and serves as a coordinating and advocating mechanism. The CFSP is not a decision making body. In security and defense matters the member states are still acting based on their national interests and preferences.51 In its current form “the CFSP is not a common policy as such but resembles more of a mechanism by which the foreign policies of the key European states are discussed and reconciled with each other.”52
The Legal Authorities of European Defense Cooperation

The security and military missions of the EU are executed by two committees. First is the ambassadorial level policy making group called the Political and Security Committee (PSC). It functions as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU, which represents the governments of the EU member states and is the highest decision making body of the EU.\textsuperscript{53} Based on the international situation, the PSC defines policies and strategic direction within the CFSP and exercises political control. The PSC is also responsible for the EU’s coherent response to a crisis situation.\textsuperscript{54}

The second is the European Union’s Military Committee (EUMC) composed of the Chiefs of Defense (CHODS) of the member states. It is the highest military body within the Council, which provides the PSC with military advice. The EUMC is chaired by a four-star general from one of the EU states, but on a daily basis the member states are represented by their permanent military representatives located in Brussels.\textsuperscript{55}

The PSC is equivalent to NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EUMC to NATO’s Military Committee (MC). Both committees mirror their NATO counterparts as most PSC ambassadors and CHODS are double-hatted with NATO’s North Atlantic Council and Military Committee.\textsuperscript{56}

Another counterpart to NATO is the European Union’s Military Staff (EUMS), which is located a few miles away from NATO headquarters in Brussels.\textsuperscript{57} However, it does not have the same operational capacity as NATO and “collaboration between two headquarters is complicated due to the political tensions between Cyprus and Turkey.”\textsuperscript{58}

Force Sizing

While the European CSDP is a big step towards the dream for a common EU defense, it does not provide a legal basis for the creation of a European army.
According to the scholar of European politics and military policy Jolyon Howorth “in terms of overall structure, there is not, nor has there ever been a case for the constitution of a European army.” Howorth argues that “the framework, political, institutional or military for such a body currently does not exist, nor is it necessary that it should. For the foreseeable future, European armed forces will be drawn from national contingents on a voluntary case-by-case basis,” in other words, the EU remains a coalition of the willing.

The EU does not have a standing military force. It uses troops and equipment from its member nations to meet contingencies. The transformation process in most European military forces allows the Union to engage in various operations abroad through the CSDP. The EU has already deployed 27 missions from Africa to Asia. However, most of them were relatively small in numbers with few exceptions. For example, in Africa the EU engaged an anti-piracy naval flotilla that was twice the size of NATO’s to patrol the Horn of Africa. In the case of Chad and Central African Republic, the EU mobilized 10,000 soldiers from 26 countries to sustain a force of 3,700 for a period of 19 months more than 3,000 miles from Brussels.

The EU Battle Group

The agenda of the European Council Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999 drew special attention to the development of a European “rapid reaction capability”. According to some researchers “this declaration began the initial steps to create a rapid response capability that the EU could use for small crisis management situations.” The Helsinki Summit declaration led to the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF) which later was renamed the European Union Battle Group (EUBG).
The EUBG is a military force with the “minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations.” The EU has established 15 multi-national battle groups outfitted by the contributing countries in both personnel and equipment. These groups are designed for deploying on short notice and are under the direct control of the European Council of the EU. However, while most of the EU countries contribute their troops and equipment to the EUBG “the current process per the European Union Treaty states that all member states must decide on a EUBG deployment by consensus.” To date, a true EUBG has not been deployed.

Europe is making considerable efforts to increase the expeditionary capabilities of its military as only about 10 percent out of nearly 1.7 million men and women in uniform can be deployed. But besides the numbers of deployable troops, Europe has to solve the challenges to project its strategic lift, intelligence and command and control capabilities.

**Procurement and Interoperability**

In his research paper, Gary D. Stephens refers to three options for states to procure weapons and systems, namely: develop and produce domestically (autarky), purchase from abroad (foreign dependence), or cooperate in development and production (collaboration). He concluded that, “European states exhibit all three characteristics.”

The situation in the European defense market is a vivid example of the autarkic nature of its policies towards defense procurements and interoperability. As the EU remains the union of sovereign states “nearly everything about the defense market in Europe is tied back to national interests.”
The new strategic environment and a quest for strategic autonomy and shrinking budgets led to the creation of the European Defense Agency (EDA) in 2004. The main mission of the EDA is to improve the military capabilities of the member states through collaboration and cooperation in the defense sector. Europe has launched a number of successful projects. The Future Transport Helicopter (2020+), the Eurofighter and Eurocopter compete with the leading U.S. companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, just to name a few. But more robust cooperation is still limited by the member states` lack of common interests, capabilities, and defense budgets. Colin Butler noted, “spending is political in nature and often states engage in protectionism.” Driven by sovereign interests and the sense of self-defense, leading European defense industries will not be willing to share their technologies and scientific advancements. Yet, in times of economic recession, protectionism in the field of domestic labor in the defense sector is even more sensitive than ever.

Sven Biscop reinforces the concern by arguing that: “Member States fear contributing too much […] to a collective capability as compared to the extent to which they expect to have drawn on it, and invoke sovereignty to resist pooling even of existing capabilities.”

Until now, the EDA has not reached its ambition for a consolidated European defense industry. Neither has provided “…effective means to overcome the pressures of reduced defense budgets.” Europe needed additional ways to meet the challenge, which many believe can be found through the “pooling and sharing” initiative.

**Efforts to Pool and Share Resources and Capabilities**

In the absence of a common threat, the European governments undertook a reduction in defense spending focusing their fiscal priorities toward the social needs of
their populations. \textsuperscript{81} This trend has led to significant reduction of the military capabilities in the whole of Europe, including major European military powers: the UK, France, Germany and Italy.

On 9 December 2010 the Ministers of Defense of the EU member states agreed on a new cooperative scheme called the Ghent Framework for pooling and sharing of military capabilities.\textsuperscript{82} Often mistaken by many as a way to get a “bigger bang for the Euro”, the true aim of the pooling and sharing initiative is to address the absence of a coordinated approach between the member states toward cutting defense.\textsuperscript{83} The new initiative was well received by a majority of the member states and “pooling and sharing” became the new buzzword.\textsuperscript{84}

However, some states were less optimistic seeing a more integrated share of capabilities as a potential threat to their sovereignty.\textsuperscript{85} Biscop tries to mitigate this concern by arguing his point of view: “Pooling in reality increases sovereignty, empowering member states to operate at levels and in capability areas which on their own they could never hope to achieve.”\textsuperscript{86} Nevertheless, the concern is still there as countries prefer creating new forms of bi-lateral and multi-lateral defense cooperation agreements such as Franco-British and Nordic pact, the Visegrad Four, the Weimar Triangle and the South Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial Process.\textsuperscript{87}

Collaborative efforts also have potential side effects of reduced effectiveness. It makes partners interdependent and any mishaps on one side will have a negative impact on the other side.\textsuperscript{88} “\textit{Juste retour}, fair return work share agreements, can be counter-productive to realizing economic scale savings.”\textsuperscript{89}
Pooling and sharing is the form of collaboration that allows for standardization, interoperability and acquisition of capabilities. ⁹⁰ But it should not be mistaken by the paradigm of spending less on defense. Rather, it is a way to spend wisely, in a coordinated manner for the common good of the EU member states. But the inner problem with the Ghent Framework lies in the fact, that it is budget driven, rather than based on the lessons learned or comprehensive analysis of what capabilities Europe should develop and for what purposes. Yet, to achieve its aim, the Ghent Framework must win the “beauty contest” between the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing” and NATO’s similar “Smart Defense” initiative. ⁹¹

Organizing for Security within NATO

The beginning of the 1990s raised questions and concerns about the future architecture of Europe’s security and the future relationship between the EU and NATO. ⁹² Eurocontinentalists took advantage of the situation and strongly advocated for the creation of a common European defense structure within the framework of the CFSP. However, the lack of European cohesion, difference in the threat perception and negative experience of the conflict in the Balkans determined that NATO will remain the leading security organization in Europe. ⁹³

During the Balkan conflicts (Bosnia, 1992-95, and Kosovo, 1999) of the 1990s Europeans found they were incapable of responding to them without the U.S. military and NATO. Specifically, the EU states discovered that there was no security mechanism within the EU besides NATO that European countries could use to forge political consensus among them for military action. There were no European facilities to plan, organize, and manage crisis management missions besides NATO. The result of this deficit meant the EU could not respond to an even purely European crisis without
getting NATO and the United States involved. This was a wakeup call for the EU states. The realization that years after the Cold War, there was still no European institution that could undertake these campaigns in Europe`s own backyard was a frustrating and sobering reminder to the Europeans that they needed to put their security house in order.

Some European security experts have concluded that “after World War II, the resulting Western European military weakness, American military superiority, and the perceived Soviet threat meant that for most Western European states the Atlantic alliance and the American guarantee were the essential prerequisites for security.”

The three pillars on which the post-war European settlement was based have been eroding for a generation. That is most obviously true of the second pillar: Common Foreign and Security Policy. Steven Philip Kramer reinforces this conclusion by arguing that:

Only now is Europe experiencing the full consequences of the dissolution of the threat once posed by the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, close security ties with the United States were an existential concern to Europe. After the Cold War, many old NATO members still prized the alliance as a kind of catastrophic health insurance policy against a resurgent Russia; new members, which had just escaped Russian clutches, saw in NATO`s Article 5 – that an armed attack against one or more NATO members is considered an attack on them all – a guarantee of their own survival.

The Legal Authorities of NATO Defense Cooperation

In contrast to the EU, NATO is a political and military alliance whose primary goals are the collective defense of its members. NATO exercises its leadership through integrated military and civilian command structure and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is its political decision-making body which is located in Brussels, Belgium. The Alliances` military aspects are implemented through NATO`s Military Committee.
Member countries are represented in NATO headquarters through permanent representations headed by ambassadors.  

Like the EU, NATO is “an intergovernmental organization in which each member country retains its sovereignty.” NATO’s decision making process is based on consensus, which means that there is no qualified majority voting and all votes of members countries are equal. NATO member countries appoint senior politicians as a Secretary General on rotational term of approximately four years. The Secretary General is the spokesperson for the Alliance and his main role is to help build consensus among members.

NATO is both, an Alliance that holds together member nations with common values and interests, and an organization that provides the structure which enables its members to implement the goals of the Alliance.

The NATO Treaty

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded on 4th April 1949 with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Washington Treaty) in the Departmental Auditorium in Washington D.C. “The Treaty derives its authority from Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which reaffirms the inherent right of independent states to individual or collective defense.” Member countries are committed to mutual defense through Article 5 of the Treaty which provides the legal basis for members to protect each other. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party of Parties so attached by taking forthwith, individual and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.\textsuperscript{106}

Just like Article 42 (7) of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 5 of the Washington treaty recognizes sovereign rights of individual members for self-defense as well as their rights to choose the form of defense or scope of assistance. But its main difference is the articulated legitimacy of the application of military force compared to the Article 42 (7).

**Force Sizing**

NATO does not have a standing military force, but, like the EU, uses troops and equipment from its member nations on an ad-hoc basis as contingencies arises. Often, when deployed in NATO operations multinational forces are referred to as “NATO forces”. However, these operations are sustained by the national assets of NATO member countries\textsuperscript{107} which often have to be shared between NATO and EU led operations. This is achieved through a so called “force generation” process that ensures required manpower and material for operations.\textsuperscript{108}

The end of the Cold War eliminated the threat to the Alliance the Soviet Union posed. The new environment raised concerns about NATO`s *raison d’être*.\textsuperscript{109} NATO took the challenge by initiating a transformation process which did not impact its core as a defense organization but added new value as security provider outside NATO`s boundaries.\textsuperscript{110}

During the May 2002 meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, NATO foreign ministers decided that: “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”\textsuperscript{111} In the words of General James Jones, then NATO`s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, “…NATO will no longer have
the large, massed units that were necessary for the Cold War, but will have agile and capable forces at Graduated Readiness levels that will better prepare the Alliance to meet any threat that it is likely to face in this 21st century.”

At the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002, the Alliance took on a counter-terrorism mission and began to assemble a NATO Response Force (NRF) in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the threat from transnational terrorism. This force was declared operational at the Riga Summit in November 2006. Subsequently, however, NATO member states have displayed different views on how best to address terrorism, with the result that the NRF has seen little use. It has come to be viewed as too large for most sorts of rapid deployment missions yet too small for a major intervention. The size of the NRF has been scaled down from 20,000 troops to 13,000. It has only been employed for limited humanitarian operations, such as the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir and has been discussed as a possible facilitator for African Union – led action.¹¹³

Procurement and Interoperability

NATO mirrors the EU’s autarkic nature of defense procurements and interoperability. In the absence of a single set of procurement rules, NATO’s procurement “depends on the founding source, the host nation involved, the type of goods or services required, and degree of urgency involved.”¹¹⁴

Procurement of goods and services for sustainment of NATO’s running needs and operational costs are ensured via a mechanism known as Common Funding.¹¹⁵ While NATO “does not buy platforms (e.g. ships, planes, tanks) weapons systems or personal equipment,” it tries to improve its capabilities and interoperability through the number of multinational cost sharing procurement projects such as NATO Airborne
Early Warning and Control System (AWACS), Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) and the C17 Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC). These interoperability efforts are aimed to “reduce duplication; enable pooling of resources, and produce synergies among 28 NATO member states.”

The financial crisis in 2007-2008 and “the Libya campaign once again highlighted the well-known European NATO member countries capability deficiencies, especially concerning strategic enablers – 90 percent of which the U.S. provided.”

Conclusions

The post WW II period brought a long lasting era of peace and stability to the continent of Europe. Europe has used this time to create a pluralistic security community, characterized by the absence of the risk of war between European countries.

The stable security nucleus in Europe has been reinforced since the creation of NATO and the EU. The membership of the majority of European countries of both of these organizations has only strengthened their political, economic and security ties. However, while the EU has made significant progress as an entity, it remains a “union of the willing”. Even within the EU’s CSDP framework its member states protect their sovereignty and advance their own national interests.

Different threat perceptions among European countries are among the main driving factors why, despite CSDP and European Security Strategy’s attempts to establish a common security umbrella for EU members, the Eastern European countries will prefer to cooperate with NATO. For these countries NATO will remain as the only
defense guaranty under its Article 5, which the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 42 (7) in its current definition cannot provide.

The primary interest of the Eurocontinentalists is to revise the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 42 to the similar definition of NATO’s Article 5. It would help to mitigate the U.S. influence in at least Europe’s security and defense field. But it is very unlikely that under current fiscal and economic challenges in Europe, this attempt will take place in the foreseeable future. Under current economic conditions, even big European countries understand that the lack of resources and capabilities is too big to generate and maintain Europe’s hard power without U.S. support. However, this factor will not prohibit the Eurocontinentalists from discussing the utility of NATO in the future, especially after the conclusion of the NATO mission in Afghanistan in 2014.

The economic recession in Europe has created considerable social tensions in some of the European countries. This is forcing European governments to prioritize their budgets toward social needs, being well aware that under current circumstances increasing military spending will not gain popular support. Therefore European governments will continue to fortify mutual cooperation under the Ghent Framework and will look for new possibilities for pooling and sharing.

The main goal of the Ghent Framework is to deal with Europe’s current military capabilities shortfalls. However, along with its economic and fiscal challenges Europe is facing a broader dilemma of security issues reinforced by the strategic shift of the U.S. toward the Asia-Pacific region. The ongoing changes in the strategic security environment raise the question whether the Ghent Framework can be used as an impetus for a paradigm change in Europe’s ability to project its “hard power,” thus
ensuring its own credible defense posture and becoming a more valuable contributor to global security.

Today Europe is concerned about the U.S. shifting its strategic focus towards the Asia-Pacific. Many fear this will lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe thus weakening the security posture in the continent. However, it is very unlikely that the U.S. will leave Europe on its own as it possesses the risk of “backdoor commitments”, which means that if any non NATO European country will be involved in the conflict, the U.S. will have to be involved in the conflict resolution anyway but most likely under different terms and conditions. Nevertheless, this should not discourage the U.S. from promoting and assisting Europe in its quest for strategic autonomy as it will allow the U.S.’s smooth and safe pivot towards the Asia-Pacific.

One way of minimizing or at least using scarce military resources in a more effective way, could be achieved through connecting, or at least co-locating the NATO and EU military staffs, committees and headquarters. All these institutions of both organizations are located within a few miles of each other using separate facilities, but duplicate many of the same personnel. The European taxpayers are the ones, who pay for this expensive duplication.

As the Lisbon Treaty and CSDP in their present forms do not provide a legal basis for the constitution of a European army, the European countries will continue to apply their military capabilities based on consensus and voluntary case-by-case basis. However, the continuous downsizing of the individual EU member states’ military spending under pressure of economic recession will lead to the situation, where member states will be forced to make their decisions based not on consensus, but
rather on the capabilities of the individual members. In the terms of its military power, the union will turn to coalitions of the willing and capable.

Partially, this is already happening through increased bi-lateral and multi-lateral defense cooperation among individual European states. The Franco-British Defense and Security Cooperation Treaty, signed in 2010, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg Defense Cooperation agreement and the Nordic-Baltic Battle Group are just a few examples of such a paradigm. And this form of bi-lateral defense cooperation between individual European states will only increase in the future.

In the post WW II period Europe was focused on developing its civilian power and proved itself to be quite successful and effective in doing so. By the end of the Cold War, Europe is facing new security challenges in the form of global terrorism, energy security and unstable peripheries. To meet these security challenges and to strengthen its position as a global player, Europe needs to refocus its efforts toward developing its military power, which can be used as a stand-alone or in support of civilian efforts in different crisis situations. But one can doubt, whether Europe is capable of doing so under the EU`s current institutional and legal framework, and without strong support from the United States.

Endnotes


3 The concept of “security community” was introduced by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues in 1957. By security community Deutsch meant a group of people that had become integrated to the extent that there is a “real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.” Karl Deutsch, Political

4 There are two types of security communities for Deutsch. One amalgamated – unified – security community of which United States is an instance. The second type is a pluralistic security community where the member governments retain the legal independence of a separate government. Ibid.

5 Dr. Jan Hallenberg, “The Extension of the European Security Community to the Periphery: France in the Mediterranean and Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Countries,” NATO Fellowship final report (Stockholm: National Defense College, Department of Strategic Studies, June 2000), 2. In his paper Hallenberg analyses the question of how a security community might be extended to Europe’s peripheries that are unstable.

6 In his report, Dr. Jan Hallenberg defines European security peripheries as those designated areas outside the European security nucleus, areas that are sufficiently close to the border of the security system to pose real problems of possible spillover of various problems, such as migration, terrorism, internal disturbances etc., Ibid., 2-3.

7 Ibid., 3. Hallenberg identified the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as a fifth periphery of the EU security. This has changed since Baltic States became members of EU and NATO. Russia on the other hand, after brief war with Georgia, is a new security challenge for the EU and should be considered as a fifth periphery.


9 Ibid., 3.

10 Ibid.


12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 In his paper Hatjiadoniu explains that the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) functioned as a forum for the political deliberation between the two blocks during the Cold War. Hatjiadoniu, “The Daedalus European Security: The Interactions of NATO, EU, WEU,” 3.


21 Ibid., 7-8.


28 Ibid., 9.


31 The Benelux is an economic union comprising the states of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The union’s name is formed from joining the first two or three letters of each country’s name. It is used in more general way to refer to the geographic, economic and cultural grouping of the three countries. More information on Benelux union available from http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/benelux (accessed February 10, 2013).


33 Ibid., 81-82.

34 Ibid., 83.

35 Ibid., 83-84.


38 Ibid., 8-9.


43 Ibid., 6.


47 Ibid.


49 Ibid.

50 Gegout, “European Foreign and Security Policy, States, Power, Institutions, and American Hegemony,” in Foundations for “Constrained Intergovernmentalism:” A New Theoretical Approach. On pages 23-24 Gegout defines Intergovernmentalism as a theory which highlights the importance of relations among states, along with state sovereignty and interests, in negotiations within the European Community and European Union. Gegout argues that the concept of intergovernmentalism was created by Hoffmann in reaction to Charles de Gaulle’s promotion of the French national interest to the detriment of supranationalism. The theoretical origins of intergovernmentalism are to be found in realism. Intergovernmentalism uses the same assumptions as realism. Both intergovernmentalists and realists assume that the state is the most important actor in international relations. They also assume that a state is a unitary actor and acts rationally, and that its aim is to defend and enhance its self-interest.


52 Ibid., 25.


54 Ibid.
Ibid, 15.

Ibid.

Ibid, 15.

Ibid, 8.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Lindstrom, Enter the EU Battlegroups, 9.

Dejong, Missions and Challenges of the European Battlegroups, 8.

Ibid, 14.


Ibid.


79 Biscop, As the EU Said at the NATO Summit, 2.


81 Ibid., 2.

82 Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, Pooling & Sharing: From Slow March to Quick March?, (Brussels, Belgium: Royal Institute for Security Studies, 23 May, 2011), http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/11/sec-gov/SPB23-BiscopCoelmont.pdf (accessed December 2, 2012), 1. The Ghent Framework began initially as a German led bilateral agreement with Sweden to share Air assets and was widened and taken under the EU’s wing. In December 2010 the informal meeting of Ministers of Defense took place in the city of Ghent, Belgium, during which the decision on pooling and sharing was reached giving this initiative the name – Ghent Framework.

83 Biscop, As the EU Said at the NATO Summit, 1.

84 Biscop and Coelmont, Pooling & Sharing: From Slow March to Quick March?, 1.

86 Biscop, As the EU Said at the NATO Summit, 2.


89 Ibid.


91 Biscop, As the EU Said at the NATO Summit, 1.


93 Ibid., 47-48.


99 Ibid., 8.

100 Ibid., 43.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid., 9.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


NATO member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running NATO and implementing its policies and activities. The greatest part of these contributions comes through participations in NATO-led operations and missions. Member countries incur the deployment costs involved whenever they volunteer forces to participate in NATO-led operations. With a few exceptions, member countries also pay for their own military forces and military capabilities. Direct contributions to budgets managed by NATO are made by members in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on relative Gross National Income. There are three budgets that come under common funding arrangements: 1) the civil budget; 2) the military budget, and; 3) the NATO Security Investment Program. Ibid.

Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Biscop, “As the EU Said at the NATO Summit,” 1.


122 Biscop, “As the EU Said at the NATO Summit,” 3.

