Enabling Partner Capacity Building

by

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United States Army War College
Class of 2013

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The current National Security Strategy emphasizes building the capacity of our allies and partner countries to share the burden of global leadership. The Army is transitioning from a force focused on counterinsurgency operations to one that operates across the full range of military operations to include regional engagement to build security capacities. In this transition, the Army is focused on providing combat commanders with land forces to support their theater support cooperation activities and contingency response. The Army’s solution is to use regionally aligned general purpose forces to conduct these missions. Though Regionally Aligned Force concept provides a robust capability to combatant commanders, the cost in dollars and time to specialize general purpose forces in language, regional, and cultural expertise required to fully implement the strategy is high. To mitigate these expenses and better synchronize theater support cooperation activities, the Army should develop a capacity building force at the Army Service Component Command with the regional expertise to enable the regional aligned force concept’s execution.
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Abstract

Title: Enabling Partner Capacity Building

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 36

Word Count: 5,597

Key Terms: Security Cooperation, Force Structure, Regionally Aligned Forces

Classification: Unclassified

The current National Security Strategy emphasizes building the capacity of our allies and partner countries to share the burden of global leadership. The Army is transitioning from a force focused on counterinsurgency operations to one that operates across the full range of military operations to include regional engagement to build security capacities. In this transition, the Army is focused on providing combat commanders with land forces to support their theater support cooperation activities and contingency response. The Army’s solution is to use regionally aligned general purpose forces to conduct these missions. Though Regionally Aligned Force concept provides a robust capability to combatant commanders, the cost in dollars and time to specialize general purpose forces in language, regional, and cultural expertise required to fully implement the strategy is high. To mitigate these expenses and better synchronize theater support cooperation activities, the Army should develop a capacity building force at the Army Service Component Command with the regional expertise to enable the regional aligned force concept’s execution.
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Introduction

U.S. Army participation in the Afghanistan conflict is beginning to draw down. With deployments reducing from a high of nearly 100,000 Soldiers to numbers ranging from 9000 to no forces deployed to Afghanistan, the US Army is left without specific missions or near term threats. Indicators from senior military leaders as well as respected think tanks with national security watchers such as LTG David Barno (R) and Michael O'Hanlon believe that the planned reduction of Army active duty end strength from 535,000 to 490,000 could be only the first resizing effort in the Army. Additional resizing and restructure of the active army’s forces structure may be required to address budget concerns and allow Department of Defense (DOD) to reallocate funds to other programs designed to address future threats. In addition to budget concerns, the United States strategic direction has subtly shifted to increase regional involvement in shaping the security environment during peace time. The increased emphasis in building partner capacity to enable our regional allies and partner countries is a prevalent theme in DOD’s strategy.

This paper will examine the Army’s current capacity building concept, Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), which utilizes units in the general purpose force to support combatant commanders and offer recommendations to slightly modify in the active component (AC) force structure to enable those RAF units achieve the combatant commander’s theater engagement objectives (steady-state activities). Further this paper will argue that the recommended force structure changes will also allow the Army to preserve critical leadership capacity and training resources if the declining budget
environment. To begin this analysis it is helpful to understand how the Army’s recent force structure was developed.

Background

Resizing the Army to achieve a “peace dividend” after conflict is nothing new in the United States. Resizing has occurred after every major conflict in our history. Most recently, after the collapse of the Soviet Union as the dominant threat and the stunning victory during Desert Storm, US forces were significantly reduced. During the 1990’s, domestic fiscal pressures caused the congress to question how the Department of Defense determined its required budget and force structure to meet national security requirements. The Congress used the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 1997 to require the Department of Defense to produce a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR was implemented to force a “comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, forces structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan and other elements of the defense program.”¹

In the 1997 QDR debate, elements in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) argued that the Army should be downsized by two divisions to pay for modernization efforts of other services. During this time, the threat driving force sizing “effectively boiled down to maintaining forces sufficient to fight two major regional conflicts.”² The most likely adversaries were Iraq and North Korea. The Army successfully argued that the likelihood of these conflicts occurring was high enough to retain its force size. The National Panel which reviewed QDR 1997 results viewed “the two-military-theater-of-war construct as a force-sizing function and not a strategy.”³ The panel members felt that “this threat construct may have become a force-protection mechanism -- a means of justifying the current force structure -- especially for those
searching for the certainties of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{4} Further they contested that the two regional theater construct did little to address of other future challenges and threats in the homeland from asymmetric threats, particularly weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

QDR 2001 attempted to address the panel’s critique and a more “nuanced strategic paradigm, abbreviated as 1-4-2-1” was developed.\textsuperscript{5} The “1” represented the defense of the homeland and defense support to civil authority; while the “4” indicated the requirement to deter aggression with forward presence in Europe, Northeast Asia (Korea), East Asian littorals, and the Middle-East (Iraq). The “2” provided the requirement to fight in two regional conflicts with the last “1” describing a general notion of a decisive victory in one regional conflict with regime change or occupation. QDR 2001 directed that force structure planning and changes “serve as a bridge” to from 1997 QDRs two Major Theaters of War (MTW) concept to the new 1-4-2-1 concept.\textsuperscript{6} Before these forces structure changes could be fully analyzed and implemented, the 9-11 attacks occurred. Faced with managing a conflict in Afghanistan and soon another in Iraq, the focus on forces structure changes to meet future challenges of 2020 diminished. In force structure terms, the 9-11 attacks preserved the Army.

The conflicts in “Iraq and Afghanistan dominated” QDR 2005. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan required significant ground forces.\textsuperscript{7} The Army began to modify its forces structure to the BCT configuration to rapidly generate combat power. This force structure change was enabled by a temporary increase of 30,000 personnel supported in the QDR. This increase provided the personnel space need to adjust force structure and build new brigades to support the rotation policy and reset timelines. Further, the
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the increased emphasis in developing local and state capabilities made “troop requirements routinely associated with Homeland Security ... largely civilianized.”\textsuperscript{8} This allowed the Department of Defense (DOD) to focus on Iraq and Afghanistan in developing the basis of their force structure and resource allocation decisions. The Army’s base budget was underfunded for the force structure size it had built for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those additional costs were made up with the supplemental funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The conflicts and supplemental funding effectively delayed any real discussions between the Pentagon and Congress on the appropriate long term force structure, modernization, and defense strategy for future threats. The danger to the Army’s future force structure existed when the “supplemental funding one day disappeared.”\textsuperscript{9}

Recent Guidance

QDR 2010 continued with QDR 2001s strategy of 1-4-2-1 but acknowledged two key differences as it relates force design. First, the QDR 2010 clearly identified that DOD role in the homeland “will almost always be in a supporting role” and provided direct guidance to establish capabilities primarily in the National Guard to support other lead federal agencies and governors to respond to WMD events in the U.S.\textsuperscript{10} Secondly, the 2010 QDR calls for improvements six areas. Though 2010 QDR established an optimized force level for each of the services, it “does not endorse any easily summarized set of metrics for determining the size and makeup of the force” as the demands of the current war diminishes.\textsuperscript{11} It specifically provides a caveat that diminishing demands in Afghanistan would allow further review of force structure and other resource changes.
Regardless of force sizing, the 2010 QDR clearly emphasizes “building the security capacity of partnered states” as a major objective. The 2010 QDRs shift to “helping our allies and partners build capacity to fulfill their responsibilities to contribute to regional and global security” directly reflects the National Security Strategy goal to share both the burden and cost of global security with our partnered nations. Their increase capacity would allow the United States address its own fiscal concerns while maintaining a leading role on the global stage. Effectively, building partner capacity (BPC) in “4” regions enables US deterrence as the second priority in the 1-4-2-1 strategic paradigm.

In January 2012, the Joint Operation Access Concept (JOAC) was published. It highlighted Air-Sea battle as the focal component to maintain freedom of action through the global commons that include international airspace and sea shipping land as well as the ability to utilize space platforms and cyberspace. U.S. BPC engagements could prove invaluable in providing the necessary access to conduct contingency operations in a region or to increase our operational reach into a contingency area.

Investments in technology to defeat anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) weapons from long range threats will add additional fiscal pressure to the defense budget. The Department of Defense will have to make tough trade-off to achieve the savings required to invest in this technology. Additional forces structure cuts offer to be an attractive method these cost savings. Much like in 1997 when the Army was targeted for reduction to pay for technology advances to maintain our advantage, the Army force structure could be targeted again. Fortunately the JOAC also recognizes the need for land forces and states “maintaining and expanding operational access may
require entry of land forces into hostile territory for a number of reasons.\textsuperscript{14} These reasons range from raids to destroy of anti-access/area denial capabilities influencing our naval and air forces, establishing a lodgment for ground operations, to providing logistical base to expand the operational reach of our air and naval forces all ensure that land forces certainly will maintain operational missions as part of the JOAC, but they could require relatively small and specialized forces.

In the same month the JOAC was published, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta issued supplemental guidance to the QDR. His supplemental guidance was meant to “guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force over subsequent program and budget cycles and highlighting some of the strategic risks that may be associated with the proposed strategy.”\textsuperscript{15} Again, this guidance emphasized “building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership.”\textsuperscript{16}

Reacting to this supplemental guidance the Army developed a force structure strategy that reduces its active duty force from 45 AC Brigade Combat teams (BCT), established as the requirement in the 2010 QDR, to 32 BCTs. The BCTs reductions are critical to achieving the active duty end strength of 490K, still above the pre 9-11 size, while providing the force structure room to build other key capabilities required in the joint force such as theater air defense capabilities outlined in the QDR. DOD and the Army continue to streamline bureaucratic methods and find cost savings in other areas besides personnel, including modifying key end item contracts and extending the life of many programs to meet fiscal goals. Despite these efforts, Secretary Panetta’s supplemental guidance sends a clear message that another round of force reductions
may be likely but the focus on building partner capacity remains a critical component to the overall National security strategy.

Building partner nation capacity has several components. DOD specific functions include: bilateral training; exercises; professional military education and military personnel exchange programs; equipment sales and modernization, as well as routine military engagement with our partner nation’s armed forces by defense attachés and others key leaders within the combatant commands. These interactions build trust, partner nation’s capabilities and capacity, interpretability with US Forces, and “provides US Forces with peacetime and contingency access to the Host Nation.”

BPC operations done correctly and consistently also can directly support another 2010 QDR joint area of improvement, access in potential contingency areas.

Service Solutions

The Marine Corps describes this new focus on building partner capacity as setting the “conditions that relieve U.S. forces of the requirement to engage in combat actions.” By “building of partner nation capacity (BPC) … with our allies throughout the world will provide the design required to achieve our desired ends.”

The Army outlined its approach to building partner capacity (BPC) during steady-state operations in the Army Capstone Concept, TRADOC PAM 525-3-0. The Army’s approach is to “integrate the capabilities of regionally aligned conventional and special forces” to build partner nations “self-defense capacity…in a culturally attuned manner.” The Army Capstone Concept highlights that BPC missions may “require an understanding of the languages, cultures, geography, and militaries of the countries where these forces are likely to be employed.” 

“Through military activities designed to increase the capability of partners and allies and support other U.S. Government,”
Army can contribute to shaping the environment to meet our National Security Strategy objectives of building partner nation’s security capacity so that other nations can share in the costs and responsibilities of sustaining global security.²²

Generally in the RAF concept, active army units to include BCTs will be rotationally designated to one of the Geographic Combat Commands (GCC) to conduct training exercises with partner nations and to deliver other training that enhances a particular country’s security capabilities. Senior Army leaders in combatant commands and ASCCs have reacted positively to the Army’s initiative to provide capable and predictable forces to execute steady-state activities of theater campaign plans. The ability to offer a partner nation a US ground force to conduct exercises and other assist in other training activities that builds their conventional force capabilities provides the combatant commander with greater influence in their region. Though designating units, duration of assignment and implementation are still being developed, fundamentally, the Regionally Aligned Brigade is a sound concept that supports our GCCs steady-state efforts.

The Marines have also committed forces to the BPC operations. In their concept paper, Send in the Marines, the Commandant of the Marine Corps outlined some changes in the organization, training, and focus of the Marines for the upcoming future to execute BPC operations. The organizational changes in the concept paper are underpinned by the Defense Intelligence Agency outlook that “a direct, large-scale military confrontation between the United States and another nation is unlikely for the foreseeable future.”²³ The Marines view high end combat operations to be episodic in the future. Their view is that the “majority of operations will be to engage our
adversaries through shaping and deterrence activities.”

Given these conditions, the Marines have committed a portion of their force structure so that “they can most effectively engage in these [BPC] operations while still maintaining full spectrum combat capability.” Similar to the Army’s concept of regionally aligned forces, the Marines concept acknowledges that there is still a requirement to maintain a full spectrum force to deal with potential wildcard scenarios. However, the Marines have committed a set of institutional changes and force structure modifications to support BPC activities in steady-state operations. The Marines have introduced their concept of Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SC-MAGTAF) (Figure 1).

**Security Cooperation MAGTF**
Task organized to meet specific COCOM requirements

- Persistent forward presence
- Regiment focuses on a specific region
- Maximizes potential of USMC language and culture training initiatives
- Personnel with language and culture expertise in region are assigned when possible to this regiment
- Regiment conducts overall full-spectrum and deployment-focused training of battalions. Specific training in line with COCOM / MarFor SC requirements
- Capable of re-aggregating for crisis response, but specifically tailored for security cooperation activities.

![Diagram of SC MAGTF](image)

GCE
Infantry Battalion forms the core of the MAGTF
- Bn conducts full spectrum training in pre-deployment dwell time
- Portion of workup in security cooperation tailored training
- Unit receives language and culture package from CACCL to augment existing expertise

LCE
Combat Logistics Battalion provides traditional CS/CES functions to MAGTF but with additional capabilities for SC:
- Engineering capability
- Additional Medical and Dental capabilities
- Other elements as required to meet COCOM / MarFor requirements

ACE
ACE is task organized for specific mission requirements. Typical construct could consist of:
- 6 x V-22
- 2 x CH-53K
- 2 x UH-1Y
- 2 x KC-130J
- 6 F-35B
- NWSS and MAGS det support

Additional capabilities / attachments as required:
- Civil Affairs det / planners
- Operational Law SME
- Information Operations
- Veterinary capabilities
- IA liaisons (State, Agriculture, Commerce, USAID...)
- Military Working Dogs, HUMINT, Bard, others as needed

Figure 1

Similar to the Army’s regionally aligned force concept, the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SC-MAGTAF) structure is formed around their basic warfighting organization and configuration, the MAGTF. Based on the specific partner
nation’s training requirements and objectives, additional low density capabilities, such as engineer, military working dogs, veterinary, and HUMINT capabilities can be added.

Again, the Marine concept is similar to the Army’s RAF concept and uses similar methods to cross attached low density forces not assigned organically to a BCT. Where the two concepts diverge is in the regional specialist assigned to the Marine organization to help achieve ‘regional understanding.’

The SC-MAGTF is supplemented with “coded... billets that facilitate the assignment of foreign area officers (FAO), regional affairs officers (RAO), linguists, and other personnel with regional expertise.” These additional specialized functions assist the SC-MAGTF to better understand the complex issues that the partner nation’s armed forces face. This understanding enables them to develop a more robust BPC program and execute training with culturally astuteness. As currently constructed no added ‘regional expertise’ is planned for our regionally aligned forces, instead the Army concept calls for additional training for the Soldiers assigned to build their regional expertise. This broad training will be costly and difficult to manage while maintaining high level of readiness at the decisive level. The Army needs to develop a solution to provide that capability to the general purpose units assigned this mission while balancing costs.

An Alternate Solution

The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013 stresses that Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept requires units to have specific region language capabilities, cultural awareness, and discreet training to operate effectively on building partner capacity. To build these specialized skills, the Army has several options; most are costly in training dollars or force structure. Given the current forces structure pressures
and the potential for additional reduction, the low cost viable option is to make a modest change in structure to build a ‘plug and play’ element to bridge the operational gap between the combatant commander’s security cooperation requirements and the general purpose force’s extant structure. For clarity in this paper, I will designate this organization, the Capacity Building Unit (CBU). A CBU provides several capabilities that include:

1) Regionally focused training assistance to regional aligned forces
2) Language augmentation during deployments
3) Capability to evaluate partner nation training requirements
4) Capability to organize, design, and coordinate training activities with both the host country and the US Country team
5) Continuity between RAF reassignments
6) Ability to conduct immediate training with a limited scope

A Regionally Aligned Force faces a challenge to remain trained in core skills at the decisive action level while managing specific regional, cultural, and training mission specific requirements. In a May 2012 press conference, The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) discussed the pilot Regionally Aligned Force for AFRICOM and acknowledged that “we will have units that will train to certain levels and then, as they get requirements from combatant commanders, they will train and be capable of conducting operations in those areas of—for that specific combatant commander.” What is not outlined in that statement are the changes in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) required making RAF concept functional. The CSA statement indicates that there will be baseline training and then
additional mission specific training. The ability of the Army to train several BCTs or smaller units to a proficiency level required to operate independently in a region could be costly.

A small force like the CBU trained in language and cultural aspects of the region’s armed forces provides the Army an option to limit the level of specialty training required to enable each RAF force to be effective in their BPC missions. In some regions, language training will be a key limiting factor for successful training. In an interview with the Army times on Regional alignment an Army G-3/5/7 spokesman stated, “Foreign language is difficult, perishable and expensive, so to what extent do we want people to be expert?”\textsuperscript{28} The Army Operating Concept 2016-2028 envisions that “while sustained engagement may require brigade or larger units when the host nations is threatened, small units and teams down to individual advisors conduct the majority of sustained engagement activities.”\textsuperscript{29} Some of the specific BPC missions may only require units as small as squad-sized to deploy. Can the Army afford to train enough personnel to the appropriate level for these small units and teams to be effective and operate independently in a region?

CBUs can help to mitigate the language shortfall and expense. It also saves a RAF unit time and provides those units the ability to train to the decisive level of readiness.

In the Marine Corps’ BPC design, Marine advisors are assigned to the Marine Force (MARFOR) headquarters in the geographic command. Assigning this capability to the MARFOR HQ provides a critical link from the Geographic command and the partnered nation to the SC-MAGTF at a low force structure cost. The Marine structure
also enables “the maintenance of relationships between US forces and partner nation military leaders” and continuity of effort (Figure 2).\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{building_partner_nation_capacity.png}
\caption{Building Partner Nation Capacity}
\end{figure}

Using this similar construct to enable the continuity of our effort, a CBU should be assigned to the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and stationed at the same location. In \textit{Army Operating Concept 2016-2028}, theater armies (ASCCs) are responsible “coordinate Army support to allied and partner country security cooperation and efforts to build capacity as directed by the combatant commander.”\textsuperscript{31} Further ASCCs are responsible to ensure sustained engagement and “direct the activities of theater committed and regionally aligned general purpose forces.”\textsuperscript{32} A CBU provides the ASCC, a small regional savvy capability that could quickly deploy to assess most general purpose training requirements, liaise with both the host country and the US Country teams, and coordinate security training objectives with other governmental
agencies objectives. Reducing or mitigate the required time to coordinating and organizing training with the partner nation, enables RAF forces to focus on training their organization for the mission. Additionally, a CBU provides the ASCC with the ability to conduct immediate training on a limited scale to demonstrate US commitment and sends a strong signal to our partner nations.

Stationing forward with the ASCC, the CBU can utilize the ASCC administrative HQs to mitigate growth. As modest force structure redesign, the CBU adds to and compliments the RAF concept and meets the SECDEF intent to “whenever possible…develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives.”

Much of the intellectual and structural ground work for a CBUs specific requirements and potential force structure has been completed not only by the Marine Corps, but also in the Army. Dr John Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, U.S. Army War College proposed a comprehensive design structure that supports the Army’s role in capacity building. In a 2011 presentation to the COIN Community, he presented an independent force design construct that incorporates many of the lessons learned in Army on partnering Iraq and Afghanistan and the lessons from the Marine Corps’ approach to BPC. His model organization though small provides a robust synchronization, planning, and a limited training capability to each ASCC. In his design, each ASCC would receive an Army Theater Engagement Group (TEG) and a Theater engagement Battalion with limited force structure requirements (Figures 3 and 4).
Dr. Bonin’s structure envisions an independent organization that is robust enough to plan and synchronize all the security cooperation programs in a combatant command. Though I agree with the concept and tenants posited Dr Bonin’s seminal work, the majority of the planning and integration functions should reside in the theater cooperation staff in Combatant Command HQ and the ASCC. These headquarters are able to better able to monitor strategic intent and synchronize all BPC efforts across the region to ensure that the services BPC resources are efficiently used. Instead, a third construct that proposes a “middle ground” should be considered (Figure 5).

Capacity Building Unit (CBU)

Total Requirement 13 / 0 / 26 // 39

- Assigned to the ASCC HQ
- Coordinates with the TSC planning cell at ASCC
- Coordinates with the RAB and 162nd BCT
- Embeds with RAF when deployed
- Potential force structure bill payer – ASCC CCPs
- 162 BCT augments as required

This alternative still provides the ASCC with an organization that is capable of coordinating centrally planned capacity building efforts of regionally aligned forces, provides limited support those RAF forces when deployed, and establishes a small internal training capacity forward to the ASCC to maintain a continual engagement.
This CBU organization differs from the Marine's advisor organization at the MARFOR with respect to training rotational forces and organizational size. Unlike the Marines who envision a large role for their MARFOR Advisor team in "supporting SC MAGTF pre-deployment training program," the Army should rely heavily on the RAF units and the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade (ITB) in Fort Polk to train non-region specific skills required during CONUS training exercises prior to deployment into the region.35

In the current concept, RAFs forces focus their CONUS training efforts in on their core skills so that, as the CSA states, we have “units that are capable in their specialty. [W]e wants infantrymen training infantrymen.”36 This foundational training builds the ability to conduct their mission across the range of military operations. Individual training, small unit maneuver training, company training are essential to either a capacity building mission or a contingency operation. Regional aligned forces internal training would ideally achieve a decisive action level of training level to ensure availability in case of an emerging contingency. Following completion of this training, additional training would focus on advising skills and some regional training. This would be the role of the 162nd ITB.

The 162nd Brigade’s current mission is to “train advisor skills, combat skills, and security force assistance skills to provide the Army and the Joint Forces Commanders with trained personnel and units to build partner nation security capacity.”37 Its current training mission is focused on providing adequately trained individual combat advisors to units in Afghanistan, but as the mission statement implies, the 162nd could provide Regionally Aligned forces additional training to support a BPC deployment. Their role
would be to provide advisor training to the unit leadership and conduct company-lanes in mission-rehearsal type exercises to confirm the readiness of the unit.

The CSA’s vision calls for aligning brigades based on the combatant commanders request in some “region(s), it might be one; in some, it could be four, five or six” regionally aligned brigades. The potential for small company and platoon sized deployment as envisioned in the Army’s concept only broadens those training requirements. 162nd ITB’s ability to help RAF commanders adequately prepare their forces for the variety of missions and regions with enough regional and country specific focus could be limited. Similar to how the Army coordinates a CTC rotation with the rotational unit, operations group, and OPFOR collaborating prior to the rotation; establishing training forums with the CBU, the 162nd and the RAF force would provide the final specific mission focus to the unit’s CONUS training plan. This enables the 162nd and the deploying RAF unit to properly prepare trained and ready forces in their regional mission; while the CBU coordinates deployment details with the RAF’s parent.

ASCCs are the Army’s BPC managers in a theater, however, the current ASCCs organizational structure does not support effective management. The CBU provides the ASCC with a coherent structure with personnel specialized in regional language, cultural skills, and charged with the mission to develop and coordinate the various aspects of a BPC deployment with a host nation and US country team. The ASCC and CBU can build a lasting relationship with the partnered countries. CBU’s capabilities and utility are beyond coordination and support in training. Based on the specific mission, members of the CBU could deploy to assist the unit through the duration of the
training mission or provide the initial coordination and instruction in conjunction with the Defense Attaché office in the country for the deploying RAF unit.

Adding a CBU capability in the ASCC, provides a significant return on investment in the coordination and execution of what appears a primary role for the Army to support combat commander's steady-state and phases 0/1 activities. This small change in our force structure also provides the Army some strategic flexibility if further force reductions are required to save money.

Reversibility

Secretary of Defense Panetta instructed the service to begin to look at the concept of reversibility and reduce “the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.” In the chairman’s guidance to the force, he also highlight that he “anticipate(s) a new evaluation of risk. Today’s troubled political economy is elevating the relevance of cost and reality of financial risk.” His guidance was to “anticipate shrinking forces” and that any cuts would not be equitable but rather targeted to create a flexible versatile joint force.

Center for New American Security (CNAS) offered 3 active component end strength scenarios below the anticipated 490,000 to produce cost savings (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army active duty end strength</th>
<th>Cost Savings</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>482,000</td>
<td>41.1 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>63.8 Billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>105.1 Billion</td>
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Michael O’Hanlon, another influential defense pundit from the Brookings Institute offered that “the size of the active-duty Army could be reduced modestly below their 1990s level … to 450,000.” These recommendations along with the guidance from the SECDEF and Chairman Dempsey indicate that the services should create branch plans to be prepared for at least another small cut in force levels and expenditures to meet the fiscal realities the nation face.

Reversibility has become a key force structure planning factor to prepare for reduce our operational risk. Structure changes and personnel policies to retain middle level operationally trained officer and NCOs in the event of a large scale contingency or the rapid rise of a near peer competitor that threatens our national interests is imperative the current force structure planning. The Army has already begun to make some personnel assignment changes to retain this middle level talent and experience by reducing specialization in discreet fields.

In congressional testimony on personnel matter, LTG Thomas Bostick as the Army G-1 testified that “placing more noncommissioned officers in drill sergeant status and in recruiting will enable the Army to reverse and ramp up more quickly if it needs to for an emergency.” He stated that “placing mid-grade officers and mid-grade noncommissioned officers in the institutional Army would provide some flexibility to grow the Army.” Similar to the changes in the institutional Army structure, the CBU force structure provides the Army’s added capacity to rapidly reverse downsizing.

CBUs not only provide an opportunity to retain the rank structure, skill sets, and depth of experience to rapidly expand, it also provides a broadening experience for mid-grade leaders. CBU provides assigned personnel additional regional, cultural and
language experience they can apply in their future operational assignments while providing useful insights into higher level headquarters, joint operations and relationships between Army operations and the strategic goals.

Managing Risk

Building a CBU force structure contributes to the Army’s ability to manage risk. The defense risk management framework provides an approved framework to discuss risk mitigation. Operational Risk is “the ability of the current force to execute strategy successfully with acceptable … costs.” A small specialized capacity building unit support and enhances the Army’s general purpose forces ability to conduct BPC operations by providing specialty skills and planning through the ASCC that support the training and deployment of the regionally aligned force at a potentially lower cost than training each regionally aligned brigade to a level needed to properly execute this strategy. It also enables the Army operational concept for “sustained cooperation” by coordinating with host nations and the country teams.  

Force structure risk consists of the ability to recruit, retain, train, educate and equip the army to conduct operations across the range of military operations. In the recently published Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013, the intent is that “all units will train to combined arms proficiency, and develop regional and cultural expertise in support of regional alignment.” Regionally aligned forces ability to allocate time and training to focus on developing a higher state of readiness for contingency operations could be enhanced if they could rely on ASCC and the associated CBU to coordinate, develop mission specific regional training, and assist deploying units assigned to build partner capacity.
Institutional risk is “the capacity of management and business practices to plan for, enable, and support the execution of DOD missions.” A small CBU regionally trained allows the Army to limit the depth of regional specialized training in language and culture required in the general purpose regionally aligned forces. The CBUs specialization limits to scope of intense specialization to a manageable and affordable size.

Future risk is the ability to “execute further missions successfully, and hedge against shocks.” “In the domestic context, political risks relates to the public support of national strategic priorities and associated resource requirements.” Financial tensions exist between levels domestic spending and defense spending. Political refusal to support DOD financial recommendations such as base closures and changes to health care management could prevent the Army from preserving existing force AC structure. The CBU structure supports the concept of reversibility. Creating a viable and functional force manned by a cadre of mid-level operational qualified leaders provides the Army with some of the manpower to rapidly reverse force downsizing if the strategic environment changes.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Army needs to develop a CBU structure functionally designed to bridge the gap from the general purpose forces conducting BPC operations and the combatant command. Currently, the Army faces few choices to meet overall force sizing requirements through FY 19 that makes finding the 200 spaces to build five CBUs easy to do. However, the pay-off in steady-state operations is too great not to seriously consider this force structure option to build this AC force. Several options exist.
One option is to use spaces already in the 162d Brigade. 175 spaces were added to the 162d specifically to perform functions much like a CBU, but the brigade is out of position to effectively support the ASCC in their role as the Army’s BPC managers. With the reduced advisor workload from termination of operations in Iraq and reductions in Afghanistan, the 162d could be prudently reduced and mission rerolled to provide basic advisor and RAF training.

Another option is to convert the existing ASCC contingency command post (CCP) 96 personnel spaces into the CBU. The roles of the ASCC, Corps, and Division, need to be carefully examined to determine if the CCP structure efficiencies can be harnessed. The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013 directs a review of echelon above brigade headquarters to “make sure we have the right command functions, war fighting capabilities and personnel structures at each echelon.” Corps headquarters are designated as “the Army’s primary operational level headquarters… or joint forces land component command headquarters.” Further the documents states that Divisions augmented “can serve as JTF headquarters in small scale contingencies.” The Corp and Division HQ roles could allow some force structure efficiency in the ASCCs particularly the CCPs.

However, until the headquarters review is completed and headquarters roles refined, the ASCC CCPs remains the only deployable Army HQs capability actually assigned to all GCCs and available for immediate use. Transferring some additional operational capability to the RC or converting division, corps and ASCC headquarters staff to multi-component units is another alternative that should be explored to provide the force structure space to build CBU-like organizations.
Regardless of the force structure trade-off the Army chooses or the final design construct chosen, building a Capacity Building Unit at the ASCC is necessary to properly enable our BPC strategy with regionally aligned forces to work at a low cost.

AFRICOM is slated to receive the pilot regionally aligned force in FY 13. Building a pilot CBU for AFRICOM provides an ideal opportunity with low risk to test the concept and refine the structure to employ in the other combatant commands in the future.

Endnotes

1 NDAA of 1997, Public Law 104-201, 104th Cong., 2nd sess. (September 23, 1996), 205


4 Ibid.

5 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 227.


7 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 274.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., 278.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 2.


16 Ibid., 3.


19 Ibid.


21 Ibid., 16.


24 Ibid., 13.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., 17.


32 Ibid.


41 Ibid., 7.


44 Ibid.


48 Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 90

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., 95


53 Ibid., 24.