21st Century Civil-Military Relations: Disharmony and Dysfunction

by

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hart
United States Army

United States Army War College
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Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hart
United States Army

Professor James Smeltzer
Department of National Security and Strategy
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
The past five decades have seen two major shifts in American civil-military relations: the advent of the all-volunteer force and the end of the Cold War. These events necessitated a renegotiation of civil-military relations; however, the uptick in military engagements post-Cold War and the tragic events of 9/11 forestalled any progress in redefining that relationship. The 21st century has seen a decline in civil-military relations characterized by increased politicization of the military, a decline in the number of veterans serving in Congress, a growth of a values gap between society and the military and an increased regionalization of the military that have contributed to an erosion of trust between the Departments of Defense and State. This erosion of trust has manifested itself in ineffective civil-military discourse that resulted in policy and strategy blunders in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to repair the rent fabric of civil-military relations we should consider reinstituting a draft while we engage in more cross departmental exchanges, professional education and frank discourse throughout the strategy formulation process.
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Whether knowingly or not, our nation’s military and political elites have engaged in a renegotiation of civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War. The past twenty-plus years exhibited signs of significant stress in our nation’s civil-military relations.¹ The resulting civil-military gap caused a deterioration of the civil-military discourse that is a vital component in effective policy and strategy making. The first decade of the twenty-first century has seen a dramatic shift in the perceptions regarding civil-military relations characterized by increased politicization of the military, a decline in the number of veterans serving in Congress, a growth of a values gap between society and the military, an increased regionalization of the military and an erosion of trust between the Departments of Defense and State. These elements have fomented distrust between the military and civilian elites and led to failed strategic guidance and the dysfunctional integration of the operational level of war and national policy.² This negative cycle has damaged civil-military discourse to the point of causing foreign policy failures in the Global War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. The military has increased its role in policymaking and overly influenced policy decisions while the Department of State (DOS) has been both ineffective and feckless. DOS has failed to adequately resource its policy – preferring to have clean lines of demarcation between policy and strategy – and have intrusively monitored strategy execution. This worsening of a normal balance of civil-military relations – wherein civilian and military leaders engage in frank dialogue about policy objectives and the associated ends, ways and means – bodes poorly for the future as we face fiscal constraints, dramatic cuts in discretionary spending and reductions in force structures.³ Civil-military dysfunction is evident in the Generals Revolt of 2006, the establishment of United States Africa Command
(USAFRICOM) in 2007, the 2010 resignation of General Stanley McChrystal and the high-profile misdeeds of senior military officers in 2012. In order to address this challenge we must begin the process of redefining and renegotiating civil-military relations. Our goal is to approach the normal relations espoused by Eliot Cohen and discussed in more detail below.

Setting the Stage: Historical Context

While the civil-military gap and its inherent tension are necessary, and even productive, components of successful strategy and policymaking, the growing gap between our civilian and military elites has produced a dysfunctional relationship that adversely impacts the required synergy between policy and strategy. The costs of a dysfunctional civil-military gap are real, and high, at the national level. Mutual ignorance and systemic cultural differences in decision-making can lead to misunderstanding, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and – at worst – bad policy. As Samuel Huntington explained in his seminal work, *The Soldier and the State*, nations that develop balanced civil-military relations have great advantages in their policy and strategy application; those who fail in this balance tend to squander resources and accept excessive risk.

Huntington’s 1957 book essentially asked and answered the question, what constitutes civil-military relations that best serve the American liberal democratic values? The question for the twenty-first century may be how can we achieve civil-military relations that best ensure our nation’s security? Our goal should be good civil-military relations marked by candid and frequent discourse that results in synchronized policy and strategy.

Historically, American civil-military relations are based on a distinction between civilian and military realms that reflects our founding fathers’ inherent mistrust of large
standing armies. This was codified in Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, which gives Congress the sole power to raise, maintain and fund the military. Civil-military relations are defined by the interactions among three parties: the people of a nation, the institutions – or government – of a nation and the military of a nation. The primary focus of civil-military relations is the relationship between the military officer corps and the government. The officer corps is the directing element of the military – responsible for military strategy – while the Executive Branch is the agency responsible for foreign policy with the Department of State as the President’s primary foreign policy advisor.

Samuel Huntington’s theory of objective civilian control of the military advocated in 1957 is “the most influential theory of civil-military relations in the United States” primarily because our military has endorsed it and made it a central component of its professional military education – not to mention that the theory has successfully guided policymaking and the formulation of strategy for over five decades. Objective civilian control of the military is the principal institutional component of civil-military relations wherein a politically neutral, professional military is recognized as generally autonomous in strategy formulation and execution while subordinate to and divorced of civilian policymaking. Objective control militarizes the military, making them tools of the state, and reduces the power of the military with respect to civilian groups to the lowest level. This relationship maximizes the achievement of military goals – strategy – in the pursuit of policy – by drawing a strict line between the military and political spheres.

Eliot Cohen’s normal relations updated Huntington’s model when he advocated a division of responsibilities between policymaking and strategy rather than a strict separation. He coined the term “unequal dialogue” wherein civilian policy makers and
military leaders candidly exchange ideas and information about policy objectives and the associated ends, ways and means.\textsuperscript{15} The nature of the dialogue is inherently unequal due to the permanence of the military’s subordination to civilian authority.\textsuperscript{16} Cohen’s model necessitates mutual respect and trust between our civilian and military elites in order to create the required synergy to formulate policy and strategy. Policy flows from our national purpose – our enduring beliefs, ethics and values – and is an articulation of our national interests in the current strategic environment.\textsuperscript{17} The policies then provide the broad guidance for strategy formulation at the national level while civilian and military leaders ostensibly continue this formulation at the national security level. The strategy formulation process flows down to theater levels and includes the same basic elements: ends (policy and subsequent strategy objectives) served by ways (strategic concepts or approaches) and means (conception of elements of power or available tools) balanced by a comprehensive risk assessment.\textsuperscript{18} The interaction between civilian and military elites in the strategy formulation process is like a spectrum wherein military elites are only peripherally involved – if at all – in high-level policy making and civilian policy makers play a marginal role in operational planning. At the strategic level – where policy is closely synchronized with strategy – there should be strong cross-departmental coordination and dialogue.

Renegotiating Relations After the All-volunteer Force

Civil-military relations over the course of the past four decades – since the abolition of the draft and the advent of the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973 – continue to evolve. Relations during this period were rooted in the relative stability of the alignment of policy and strategy during the Cold War. The post-Cold War era, however, created a new international security environment, and the lack of consensus on the
military’s role therein resulted in a period of drift. American global hegemony – the removal of a competing protagonist, the Soviet Union – produced tensions about the military’s role in humanitarian intervention, regional instabilities, peacekeeping missions and antiterrorism. These tensions were exacerbated by an initial return to a force structure and defense spending model that was more akin to the pre-world War II force than the Cold War era. The elimination of the Soviet Union and the conventional threat posed by its 175 divisions and 40,000 nuclear weapons allowed the post-Cold War administrations to consider a return to pre-1940 levels of readiness. However, a cursory review of large-scale military engagements from 1945 to 1988 totals six, while the fourteen-year period from 1989-2003 featured nine major engagements. While the number of military engagements increased almost five-fold, on a per annum basis, during this timeframe our military force structure shrank by one-third from the pre-1990 base force, further straining civil-military relations.

The Powell Doctrine Challenges Civil-Military Relations

The most serious challenge to our civil-military relations was the effort to dictate the use of military power as an element of policy by the President’s senior military advisor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the guise of the Powell Doctrine. The Powell Doctrine harkened back to the Cold War-era Weinberger Doctrine, a post-Vietnam era doctrine for the application of military power that guided the use of military force. The Powell Doctrine differed greatly from the Weinberger Doctrine in who crafted it and the specificity of the principles therein. It was a blatant example of the military explicitly exercising policy making over-reach by essentially mandating the conditions under which its use would be permitted. It was the preeminent example of General Powell “pushing the limits of military autonomy.” The clear irony of the Powell
Doctrine was in that the change in the security environment shaped a new era of policy making wherein the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines were overly constraining and no longer applied exclusively to the array of military operations in the post-Cold War international environment. However, the military – flush with an overwhelming operational victory in Desert Storm – sought to support its own institutional agenda at the expense of political goals.\(^{27}\)

A prime example of the influence of the Powell Doctrine was the pressure Secretary Defense William Perry wielded during the Dayton Accords in 1995. The tenets of the accord were crafted carefully to encompass demands from the military leaders, which was reflective of the steady increase in the influence of military leaders in defense policy.\(^{28}\) Civil-military relations in the 1990s were characterized by unprecedented hostility towards the Commander-in-Chief, President Bill Clinton, by uniformed service members; cultural tension between our liberal civilian society and the military, typified by the debate on women in combat and open homosexuals in the military; and General Colin Powell's foray into civilian policy making witnessed in Bosnia and Kosovo.\(^{29}\) The systemic civil-military problems identified in the 1990s are summarized as:

- The military had become more alienated from its civilian leadership than at any time in American history.
- There was a growing gap between the military as an institution and civilian society at large.
- The military had become politicized and partisan.
- The military had become resistant to civilian oversight.
• Military elites believed that they had a right to confront and resist civilian policy makers.
• The military became overly influential in inappropriate areas of society.30

Andrew Bacevich argues that the acceleration of the use of military power abroad has obfuscated the continued debate about a commensurate shrinking of our military.31 The events of the Gulf War, the adherence to the principles of the Powell Doctrine and 9/11 forestalled any forays back into that topic. At present, the United States is still allocating three times more than the 1.4 percent of its gross national product that was spent in 1939 – the last time the international security environment changed as significantly as it did in 1989.32 The current resistance, however, to any drawdown stands in stark contrast to the post-World War II drawdown primarily because of the existence of the AVF.33

Emblematic Symptoms of a Societal Gap

The AVF of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century has grown increasingly removed from the society and institutions it serves. Less than one-half of one percent of the population has been on active duty during the past decade-plus of war.34 In the late 1970s, 77% of Congressmen were veterans; in 1997 almost one-third had served; by 2011 only 22% were veterans.35 This may make the military seem like an increasingly flexible element of national power to solve international disputes as a result of the lack of connectedness of our political elites.36 Additionally, policymakers may be hamstrung in assessing military advice due to their lack of direct experience or knowledge of military and defense issues.37 Since the advent of the AVF American elites have largely excused themselves from military service, leaving it as the purview of
minorities, working class kids and sons and daughters of military men and women.\textsuperscript{38} Andrew Bacevich puts it more bluntly when he states, “To be a member of the upper class is to have privileges, among them ensuring that it’s someone else’s kid who is getting shot at in Iraq or Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{39} Bacevich, a retired colonel, should know: his son was killed in Iraq in 2007. This leads to the next point, which is that the military is becoming increasingly a family business – service is passed down from generation to generation.\textsuperscript{40} This cultural isolation is compounded by the relative geographic isolation of the military in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. The rounds of base closures under Base Realignment and Closure mean that ten states are now home to over seventy percent of those in uniform.\textsuperscript{41} Our military has also grown increasingly politicized. In 1976 the military had 33\% declared Republicans, 46\% Independents and 16\% Democrats. In twenty years the shift to the right and away from independence – moderation – was represented by a two-fold increase to 66\% Republicans, only 22\% Independents and a mere 3\% Democrats.\textsuperscript{42} Republicans have treated the military as one of their de facto political interest groups, making public their demands about military absentee ballots for the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections.\textsuperscript{43} Republicans and lawmakers even went so far as to pursue a series of steps to ensure that these votes arrived in time, the clear implication being that these votes would overwhelmingly favor Republican candidates.\textsuperscript{44} An increasingly partisan military could undermine its own supposedly apolitical and objective advice to policymakers. Richard Kohn and Peter Feaver remarked that there is cause for concern: partisan distrust between our military and civilian elites could undercut foreign policy, making it more difficult to use military force appropriately and
effectively.\textsuperscript{45} A 2006 Military Times poll found that 60\% of servicemembers did not believe that civilian policymakers had their best interests at heart.\textsuperscript{46}

Much literature reported a growing values gap between American society and the military. The military, especially the Army and Marines, has made values an advertising campaign, advocating the goals of the group over self, self-discipline and sacrifice – essentially touting their separation from society.\textsuperscript{47} Charles Colson, former Special Counsel to President Nixon from 1969-1973 – a period that saw the end of the draft and the advent of the AVF, observed years after the advent of the AVF that the military was drifting further from American society and "many in the military no longer care to protect our way of life – because they regard civilian life in America as degenerate and corrupt."\textsuperscript{48} While a large professional and autonomous military divorced from society that sees itself as unaccountable to the people it serves is a critical concern, the fact is that there has always been a values gap between our society and military. The functional imperative of the military – to win on the battlefield – almost demands a gap of sorts. The cultural isolation from American society exacerbates the aforementioned physical – geographic – isolation. Simply put, the military cannot govern itself by the ideals of a liberal society and simultaneously carry out its functional imperative. As T.R. Fehrenbach wrote in \textit{This Kind of War}, “the military must maintain a hard and illiberal view of life…Society’s purpose is to live; the military’s is to stand ready, if need be, to die.”\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{Civil-Military Relations in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century}

Mackubin Owens argues that individual services’ organizational cultures, an over-reliance on normal civil-military relations, and the unintended consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 have contributed
to the failure of civil-military relations to produce cohesive strategy in the early 21st century. The Goldwater-Nichols Act increased the power of the geographic combatant commanders and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff while unwittingly limiting the relative power of the separate service chiefs. A prime example was the planning in late 2001 for Afghanistan when the service chiefs were excluded from the war planning.

The strategic concept behind each service becomes its foundational building block – its purpose in achieving national policy objectives. The subsequent organization and alignment of resources and functions becomes a strong organizational culture that can be an impediment to effective civil-military relations. Military leaders, knowingly or not, exert individual service preferences and, in doing so, unnecessarily constrain civilian policy makers. An overreliance on the normal theory of civil-military relations translates into disconnected policy and strategy by a resounding lack of discourse in policy and strategy making. The military is content to focus on the apolitical operational and tactical levels of war while happily maintaining a safe distance from policy making. The result is operational and tactical excellence that does not necessarily translate into achieving national policy objectives.

Nonetheless, the erosion of civil-military relations in the early twenty-first century has manifested itself in disconnected policy and strategy and a distinct lack of civil-military discourse in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Generals Revolt of 2006, the establishment of United States Africa Command, the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal and the 2012 high-profile misdeeds of general officers offer poignant examples of a dangerously imbalanced civil-military relationship.
The protracted war in Iraq subsequently uncovered “profound cracks in some dysfunctional elements that are inherent to American civil-military relations.” The context of civil-military relations has not been subject to open and honest discourse, and necessary input for senior military officers was ignored, muzzled or cut out of the process. The resources, authorities and missions of the Department of Department have continued to grow while the Department of State’s have been stagnant or shrunk. Foreign policy has become militarized; the Department of Defense has been transformational in delving into policymaking due, in most part, to the exigencies it has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. This transformation is seemingly with some merit: a 2007 poll of American citizens showed that they overwhelmingly trusted military commanders to bring the Iraq war to an end more than the Bush administration or Congress. This seems like a false positive, though. As President Dwight Eisenhower explained the cause for fear during his farewell address “that the military and its vendors will drive policy and become an end rather than a means, shaping the political landscape to their interests. Ignorance and complacency replace nefarious intent as patriotic men and women seek expedience and too conveniently see in their own interests (as) the Nation’s as well." While there is a healthy tension in the tacit restraint of the uneven dialogue of Cohen’s normal balance of civil-military relations, over-militarization of foreign policy can have disastrous results.

Tom Ricks has advocated that Operation Iraqi Freedom is regarded as a large scale operational success that lacked strategic significance. That is, the theater strategy was disconnected from the policy objectives. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) war plans were found almost solely focused on the removal of
the Iraqi regime without any rigor applied to regime replacement. As the CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks commented before the invasion, “You pay attention to the day after and I’ll pay attention to the day of.” General Ricardo Sanchez, who replaced Franks, allowed his Division Commanders to wage asynchronous campaigns in their sectors and did not understand the basics of civil-military relations. He refused to exchange information and engage in meaningful dialogue with L. Paul Bremer III, the senior Department of State official in theater. Under their joint tenure the Iraqi Army was disbanded, a move with disastrous strategic and operational consequences that could have been avoided with open and frank civil-military discourse. Perhaps the negative example of Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, in the lead up to the invasion served as a stark reminder of what frank civil-military discourse can achieve. General Shinseki expressed concern to Congress that the pre-invasion force was insufficiently sized for the post-combat operations. Replying honestly to Congressional questions got him ostracized inside the Pentagon, and he quickly retired.

Our involvement in Afghanistan has been characterized by consistent themes of asynchronous policy and strategy. A poignant example is the deal brokered between Army leadership and the Marines in “the surge”. Marines agreed to send their forces – no Army units were available on such short notice – only if they answered to their own chain-of-command. Marine surge forces included the overhead associated with an additional headquarters and logistics associated with a Marine-only force. General McChrystal, as ISAF Commander, could only express frustration as the Marines subsequently expended most of their units in Helmand province instead of Kandahar.
Perhaps the most telling quote came from a Marine general who was asked “What happens if we win Helmand but lose Afghanistan?” The general answered, “That would be just fine for the Corps.” Eliot Cohen’s unequal dialogue may have helped prevent this egregious misuse of manpower.

Meanwhile, the civilian war cabinet was often at war with itself with respect to policy making in Afghanistan. The late Richard Holbrooke, Doug Lute, and Karl Eikenberry were seemingly busy trying to one-up, second-guess and undermine each other. The disconnect between our military and political elites was evident in the military’s wholesale backing of COIN that demanded a large civilian engagement that the State Department was unable and unwilling to fulfill. The erosion of civil-military relations in Afghanistan was exemplified by the story of Brigadier General Ken Dahl. Dahl studied at Harvard and performed a fellowship at the Brookings Institute, in effect dedicating ten years to further his knowledge of the State Department and how to improve relations between the DOD and DOS. After taking the unprecedented step of conducting joint pre-deployment planning with the State Department – only to find out that none of the State personnel would actually be in theater – and his subsequent deployment as Assistant Division Commanding General in the 10th Mountain Division, Dahl lamented “I want the last ten years of my life back…my heart is broken.”

In 2009, President Obama weighed sending surge forces to Afghanistan; meanwhile, top military officials found ways to leak the military’s desires. General David Petraeus spoke with Washington Post reporter Michael Gerson on September 2nd saying, in effect, that “the war would be unsuccessful if the president held back on troops.” General Stan McChrystal’s classified assessment of a 40,000-troop
requirement was also leaked to news sources by Pentagon officials. On October 1st, General McChrystal gave a speech in England to the International Institute for Strategic Studies wherein he stated that any scaled-back approach to counterinsurgency from the course he had offered in his assessment would fail. President Obama subsequently agreed to a plus-up number of 30,000 troops but only after brokering a behind the scene eighteen-month surge timeline deal with military leaders. After announcing the beginning of the troop pullout, White House aides answered reporters’ questions affirmatively when asked if the announced timeline had been among the options the military leaders had presented to the White House. Within weeks several top military officers reported that the President’s final schedule was not among any of the options that they had presented. The military’s subterfuge in leaking its position on troop surge numbers, the behind the scenes brokering between the White House and military leaders and the disconnect in the pullout dates and timeline could have been avoided with candid sessions that would have reinforced – instead of eroded – the trust between government agencies.

In April 2006 a chorus of retired generals called for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to resign through newspaper opinion pieces and Time magazine, which helped rekindle the debate about the policy and strategy disconnects in the Iraq invasion of 2003. While public disagreement and even revolt by senior military officials against civilian policymakers is rare, it is not without precedent. General MacArthur’s objections to President Truman’s conduct of the Korean War led to his firing in 1951, top Air Force brass objected to President Johnson’s selection of targets during the Vietnam War, and President Clinton reversed his stance on admitting open homosexuals in the
military in 1993 by settling on the more ambiguous don’t-ask-don’t-tell policy. The Generals Revolt, however, occurred during an ongoing war. The generals’ complaints about Rumsfeld ran the gamut from disbanding the Iraqi military – arguably the greatest policy blunder in Iraq – he ignored the advice of senior military officials, he insisted on too small a force for the invasion, he abandoned the tenets of the Powell Doctrine for personal gain – he allegedly wanted to disprove its validity – and he refused to listen to views different from his own. The irony of the Generals Revolt is that it may have unwittingly given Rumsfeld more job security – at least until December when he resigned – because politically the White House was unwilling to buckle from perceived military pressure.

A seemingly benign directive from the President to the Department of Defense in 2007 warrants special consideration in light of the fraying of the relationship between the Departments of Defense and State. The establishment of the United States’ sixth geographic combatant command, United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), was deemed the worst thing that had happened in years by a State Department official. What was originally conceived as a cross-departmental, intra-agency effort – after all, USAFRICOM is the only combatant command with a State Department Deputy Commander – became perceived as a Defense-only movement that only enhanced skepticism between the two departments. While the early stages of planning were inclusive of many government agencies, many agencies repeatedly accused that their voices were not heard in the planning process. Indeed, American embassies on the continent were unprepared to even answer basic questions about their new regional combatant command. General Kip Ward, the first commander of USAFRICOM,
expressed in 2011 the unintended consequence of the perceived militarization of foreign policy on the African continent. This monumental failure in planning and execution served to foment increased distrust between the Departments of State and Defense.

On Monday, 21 June 2010, Rolling Stone pre-released an article titled “Runaway General,” a profile of General Stanley McChrystal the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan commander. In the article General McChrystal and his personal staff made disparaging and disrespectful comments about President Barack Obama; Vice President Biden; General James Jones, President Obama’s National Security Advisor, a retired four-star general and former Commandant of the Marine Corps; Richard Holbrooke, the President’s Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan; and retired Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, US Ambassador to Afghanistan. The remarks were especially vexing not only for the naked disdain and disrespect that they represented, but in light of the fact that Vice President Biden and Ambassador Eikenberry both previously disagreed with McChrystal’s strategic options during the 2009 Afghan strategy review. “Their professionalism—especially those professional competencies related to understanding the roles and responsibilities of military leaders vis-à-vis the civilian political leadership in the context of democratic civil-military relations—was found wanting.”

2012 brought several high-profile misdeeds of flag officers. Admiral James Stavridis, the top North Atlantic Treaty Organization officer and Commander of United States European Command, flew worldwide in a Gulfstream V — sometimes with family members. The Department of Defense Inspector General concluded that he broke the rules; Navy Secretary Ray Mabus disagreed, and Stavridis stayed in place.
General William "Kip" Ward was demoted to Lieutenant General and forced to pay back $82,000 over travel discrepancies – some involving family members – and using staff members to run personal errands for him. Brigadier General Jeff Sinclair was charged with sexual misconduct in Afghanistan with five women including four subordinates. Lastly, retired General David Petraeus resigned as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency after an affair he had with his biographer surfaced; no charges are pending to date. This perceived spate of transgressions caused Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta to order the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, to investigate the state of senior officer ethics. What makes this germane is that Panetta’s announcement resulted in several prominent civilians, including one former Secretary of Defense, to opine that it should be civilians who are looking into the matter. This shows a further deterioration in the level of trust between our civilian and military elites that exacerbates the strain on civil-military relations.

Insights for the Future

Repairing the fabric of contemporary civil-military relations requires a comprehensive program. The first element that must be addressed is professional military education (PME) at all levels. Currently, for example, the Army and Marines are the only services with civil-military relations-themed books on professional reading lists. The McChrystal affair highlights the deficiencies in our PME system that does not adequately address civil-military relations. Although General McChrystal did not attend a senior service college, opting to attend a fellowship at Harvard University, PME should have covered the bases which may have prevented the failings reported in the Rolling Stone article. Sadly, the Army War College only devotes an elective focused on civil-military relations; while it certainly comes up throughout the core curriculum as a by-
product of the strategy formulation process, there are no specified learning objectives associated with civil-military relations. It is heartening to hear that the Army is currently conducting a Profession of Arms Campaign. Chief among its review is civil-military relations. Our PME at the senior service college level needs to do more to educate its future senior leaders about the importance of civil-military relations – especially the interaction with and support of elected and appointed officials – and its impact on policy and strategy making. Sadly, our PME stops before flag officer. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President Bush’s senior military advisor from 2001-2005, General Richard Myers stated that in the twenty years between the Army War College and when he became Chairman, “he had received no formal education to prepare for managing the civil-military relationship, neither at the CAPSTONE course for general officers nor at the Harvard Kennedy School program for senior executives.” Neither of these educational opportunities is adequate to address what is a critical component of strategic leadership for flag officers.

The propensity of retired senior officers, especially flag officers, to speak out against policy and strategy needs repairing as well. Simply put, retired senior officers must adopt self-limitations on their words and deeds as part of their continued professional responsibility to the state and society. To that end, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey has recently taken to rebuking retired generals for their decidedly politically tinged public comments. Another endeavor worthy of consideration is an explicit code for the military profession that defines the fundamentals of the military professional “dedicated to this republic’s values and institutions; denotes the rights, privileges, and obligations of retired senior officers; defines the expectations
for loyalty, obedience, and dissent in clear terms; and clarifies for both branches of
government the necessity for the institutional integrity of the armed forces of the United
States above reproach. The expectations for retired officers should not be a radical
departure from the expectations placed on them during their service; after all, they have
not resigned their commissions and still subject to recall to active duty.

Another potential mitigation measure for the civil-military gap is advocating cross-
departmental training and education between the Departments of Defense and State.
Rosa Brooks has proposed plans ranging from a simple two- or three-day "Military 101"
course for senior civilians, opportunities for career military professionals to take a
sabbatical in civilian institutions and organizations, and opportunities for civilian officials
to join a military organization for a specified period of time – at least a month and maybe
up to a year. The Office of the Secretary of Defense offers a week-long Joint Civilian
Orientation Course wherein selected civilians join military units, but it is only available to
100 participants and is not long enough to be effective.

In order to begin closing the gap between American society and the military, it
may be time to consider a return to a modified version of the draft. While politically
infeasible – an October 2011 Pew Research Center poll found that 74% of the public
opposed a return to the draft – it would go a long way to mend fences between
Congress, political elites and society at large. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen stated earlier that same year about the military-civilian gap,
"I fear they do not know us…they do not comprehend the full weight of the burden we
carry or the price we pay when we return from battle." That same poll bears that point
out when it concludes that 71% of Americans have "little or no understanding…of the
A return to a draft would ensure that a larger percentage of society would at least understand the military, and the representation of former military members in Congress would surely increase – albeit not for some years after a draft’s implementation. While there may be no political stomach for a discussion about a draft, active and retired flag officers have been vocal in bringing it up as an option. Three weeks before his retirement former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine General James Cartwright stated that a draft needed to be looked at as an option in this era of fiscal constraint. In June 2012, retired General Stanley McChrystal called for a reinstatement of the draft. “I think if a nation goes to war, every town, every city needs to be at risk...you make that decision and everybody has skin in the game.” In essence, without the counterweight of Congress – representing the people – civil-military relations have devolved into a tug-of-war between the White House and the Pentagon with the President waging war without Congressional assent despite the Constitutional mandate. Both sides of the tug-of-war can game the system to their advantage, as needed, without the open and rigorous debate that the Congressional authority to wage war should engender. Proponents of a return to a draft like Tom Ricks argue that a draft is possible and ultimately a cost-savings measure for the nation and Department of Defense. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue the particulars of what a new draft might look like, it is an option worthy of discussion.

Lastly, and arguably most importantly, our civilian and military elites need to embrace frank civil-military discourse. Both parties have some work to do in order to repair the current state of relations; however, robust and honest – even contentious – dialogue should be the goal. Contentious dialogue can be an indicator of healthy
discourse.\textsuperscript{106} The bedrock of a productive relationship is mutual trust. If our civilian policy makers make it clear that healthy discourse is the goal, our military leaders can reciprocate by assuring that civilian orders will be executed vigorously and leaks of dissenting opinions will not be tolerated.\textsuperscript{107}

Civil-military relations will continue to evolve with our changing political and social landscape. The increased politicization of the military, fewer veterans serving in Congress, the growth of a values gap between society and the military, and the increased regionalization of the military increases the gap and causes an erosion of trust between society, Congress and the Departments of Defense and State. As civil-military relations – and the inherent gap – have always been a component of our national dialogue, all parties must recognize that they must guard against erosion that can cause foreign policy and strategy failures. While accomplishing this both our civilian and military policy and strategy decision makers must ensure that civil-military discourse remains healthy and viable.

\textbf{Endnotes}


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18 Ibid, 4-5.


21 Ibid, 10.

22 Ibid.


26 Ibid, 49.
27 Ibid, 51.


30 Ibid, 3.


39 Ibid, 97.


41 Thompson, “The Other 1%.”

42 Ibid.


44 Ibid.


50 Owens, “What Military Officers Need to Know,” 81-82.


52 Owens, “What Military Officers Need to Know,” 82-83.


54 Noonan, “Mind the Gap.”

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56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.


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63 Ibid, 410-412.

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94 Bryan, “Know Yourself Before the Enemy.”

95 Reveron and Stiehm, Inside Defense, 206.


97 Noonan, “Mind the Gap.”


101 Ibid, preface.

102 Ibid, 59.

103 Thompson, “An Army Apart.”

104 Ricks, “Let’s Draft our Kids.”

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106 Ricks, The Generals, 450.

107 Ibid, 404.