

## Security Force Assistance: What Right Looks Like

by

Colonel William J. Butler  
United States Army



United States Army War College  
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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Colonel William J. Butler  
United States Army

Professor William J. Flavin  
Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **Abstract**

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Significant global economic challenges, a war weary nation and coalition, and rising competitors in the Asia Pacific region are causing significant changes in our national security strategy. Military wide force structure reductions, smaller budgets, and the realization that allies, partners, and coalitions enhance regional stability and security all impact the ways in which we attempt to achieve our strategic objectives. A new emphasis on regionally aligned forces to build partner capacity and provide security cooperation will allow the United States to collaborate with key partners and allies to address regional and global problems. This paper examines the existing security cooperation initiatives and proposes recommendations to enhance allied interoperability and effectiveness.



## Security Force Assistance: What Right Looks Like

The United States must place even greater strategic emphasis on building the security capabilities of others. We must be bold enough to adopt a more collaborative approach to security both within the United States government and among allies, partners, and multilateral organizations.

—Leon E. Panetta  
Secretary of Defense<sup>1</sup>

In the vast majority of our wars and military endeavors, the United States participated in or led a coalition of allies and partners. Today's domestic and international fiscal constraints and rising near peer competitors in the Pacific are precipitating a significant American military drawdown, restructuring, and change in strategic focus and employment. The two constants that the United States can plan for in the future are that the conditions in the world will remain *volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous* and the employment of the U.S. military will be as part of a coalition. The U.S. Secretary of Defense, in his budget request to the Senate, clearly described his vision for future changes within the Department of Defense and U.S. strategy. His strategic guidance to the force listed five priorities, the third being, "we will build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships elsewhere in the world."<sup>2</sup> In light of changing conditions, this clear priority and reduced Army force structure will make our reliance on partners and allies more important than ever to succeed in coalition operations and to maintain regional stability.

The Army Security Cooperation Strategy provides comprehensive guidance for Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and Army Service Component Commanders (ASCCs) to develop plans that assess and assist our partners in building their institutional capability and capacity for security. GCCs and ASCCs already execute a variety of security cooperation initiatives, but as the Army increases its efforts to build

partner capacity the institution can learn from the program executed by the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) to assist the Romanian Land Forces.

The National Security Council, Departments of Defense (DoD), State (DoS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and civilian defense contractors all play significant roles in providing expertise, training, or resources to supported nations. This paper highlights the manner in which the United States Army plans for and supports the security assistance requirements of partners and allies. The essay also evaluates the ongoing efforts of USAREUR in providing security force assistance to the Romanian Land Forces. Finally, there are recommendations for the Army to improve our efforts to provide security force assistance to key strategic partners and allies.

All of our published national security documents describe the importance of developing strong international partnerships to foster greater security, prevent conflicts, enhance interoperability with allies, and maintain stability in vital regions of the world. The National Security Strategy very succinctly describes the importance of alliances, partnerships, international institutions, and interagency cooperation in achieving our national security goals.<sup>3</sup> It further articulates the importance of partnership and collaboration in preventing conflict and / or winning the peace by addressing underlying political and economic instability issues that undermine security and stability in nations.<sup>4</sup> The President of the United States also provides guidance to strengthen security relationships with key allies in Europe, Asia, and North America.<sup>5</sup> More importantly, he asserts that a significant challenge is “our ability to advance peace, security, and

opportunity will turn on our ability to strengthen both our national and our multilateral capabilities.”<sup>6</sup>

In the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) highlights the importance of strong partnerships in his cover letter, where he posits, “this review brings fresh focus to the importance of preventing and deterring conflict by working with and through allies and partners, along with better integration with civilian agencies and organizations.”<sup>7</sup> The QDR further highlights the importance of partnership “as a global power, the strength and influence of the United States are deeply intertwined with the fate of the broader international system – a system of alliances, partnerships, and multinational institutions that our country has helped build and sustain for more than sixty years.”<sup>8</sup>

The QDR provides the strategic guidance and vision to the entire Department of Defense, and as the capstone national security document for the military helps align capabilities and resources to meet our long term goals. Four sections of the QDR address issues with building the security capacity of partner states, strengthening key international and interagency relationships, and reforming the manner in which we execute security assistance.<sup>9</sup> Key in this is the recognition that security assistance is not just the responsibility of the Department of Defense, but that it requires a whole of government approach and significant interagency cooperation.<sup>10</sup>

One of the key initiatives in the QDR is to strengthen and institutionalize the capabilities of general-purpose forces in providing security force assistance to our international partners and key allies.<sup>11</sup> There are a number of resources provided to the Army, such as, the authorization of additional trainers to facilitate security force

assistance train-the-trainer programs.<sup>12</sup> Millions of dollars for language training detachments and centers that can support deployed forces in Afghanistan or other contingency operations with trained linguists or preparatory basic language skills.<sup>13</sup> The guidance and authorization to regionally align general-purpose forces, commensurate with the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, to take advantage of their regional knowledge.<sup>14</sup> Further reinforcing regional alignment the National Military Strategy of the United States posits, “Strengthening international and regional security requires that our forces be globally available, yet regionally focused.”<sup>15</sup>

The FY 2011-2017 Army Security Cooperation Strategy highlights five principles required to guide Army security cooperation. First, “security cooperation is derived from National and Combatant Command objectives and strategies, and it focuses on the long view.”<sup>16</sup> Security cooperation emphasizes developing partner capacity, with participating U.S. Army units benefiting by training and operating in multinational environments.<sup>17</sup> This guidance further articulates the responsibility of ASCCs to identify the partner nation requirements, and to plan, prepare, and execute them in support of GCC security cooperation objectives.<sup>18</sup>

Additional guidance is that ground forces will be able to execute full spectrum operations, as well as, sustained and effective counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners.<sup>19</sup> As articulated in the QDR, “sustaining existing alliances and creating new partnerships are central elements of U.S. security strategy.”<sup>20</sup> Guidance to the military regarding the relationships with our most important partners and allies in NATO is to promote peaceful resolutions to protracted conflicts, build their security capacity, support defense reform efforts as they

modernize and transform from their Warsaw Pact doctrine, formations, and equipment, and achieve a more complete integration into existing trans-Atlantic institutions.<sup>21</sup>

In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton published the first ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), modeled after the Department of Defense's (QDR), in an effort to provide a vision and align resources for American diplomatic and development efforts that span the globe. She highlighted four broad areas to focus these efforts, the third one being to "strengthen civilian capability to prevent and respond to crisis and conflict by building conflict prevention and response capabilities and integrating an effective capability to reform security and justice sectors in fragile states."<sup>22</sup> She also described her vision to develop a shared budgeting process with the National Security Staff and interagency partners that facilitates a more nested effort to prioritize and achieve our national security goals.<sup>23</sup> The Secretary of State recognizes the critical role that the DoD plays in shaping security environments, preventing military conflict, and influencing the strategic decisions made by other nations, which is the reason the QDDR attempts to institutionalize the budgeting and planning efforts of the U.S. government.<sup>24</sup>

Although the DoS has primacy for planning and conducting security cooperation (SC), security assistance (SA), and security force assistance (SFA), the DoD definitions will be used since this paper focuses on Army efforts in this endeavor. Security cooperation is:

Activities undertaken by DoD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments

cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operation; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.<sup>25</sup>

There are a number of programs approved by the State Department, but in many cases executed by the Department of Defense to build partner capacity with our partners and allies. Foreign military sales (FMS) are programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and encompass the sale of defense articles and services, at full cost, to foreign countries.<sup>26</sup> International military education and training (IMET) is another very successful program that provides grants to nations for informal or formal training and education of officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel.<sup>27</sup> IMET ranges from support for foreign officers or NCOs to attend professional military education courses in the U.S. to mobile training teams or civilian contractors travelling to a nation to conduct technical skills training.

More and more countries want to partner with the U.S., as indicated by the \$48 billion increase in FMS over the last decade.<sup>28</sup> This continued desire for nations to receive security assistance from the U.S. will place ever increasing demands on our forces. Additional security assistance missions coupled with the planned drawdown thru 2017 will place additional stress on the Army to meet the demands for this critical mission. Army senior leadership and geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) have to think of more and more creative ways to meet these requirements.

SC has several subsets that include security assistance and security force assistance. SFA is all DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their institutions.<sup>29</sup> The doctrinal manual that provides the most clarity for the

force to execute SC is Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (FID). JP 3-22 identifies the characteristics of FID as involving all instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic), that it can occur across the range of military operations by conventional and SOF units, and includes training, material, technical and organizational assistance, advice, infrastructure development, and tactical operations.<sup>30</sup> It goes further stating, “the FID effort is a multinational and interagency effort, requiring integration and synchronization of all elements of national power.”<sup>31</sup>

SFA can consist of indirect support, direct support short of combat operations, and combat operations, any of which can occur simultaneously.<sup>32</sup> Cooperation with the militaries of foreign nations is intended to build strong relationships that promote U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation interoperability, and enhance regional stability.<sup>33</sup> The GCCs develop their SFA plans to meet the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance specific to their regions, which is where the handoff is between strategic planning to strategic and operational execution.<sup>34</sup>

The most recent and obvious examples of U.S. military partnership are the significant efforts by our military forces during Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF). In these examples, all branches of the DoD, many interagency departments and organizations, as well as our allies partnered directly with Iraqi and Afghan forces and government agencies. In an effort to ensure a minimal level of standardization and interoperability with the forces being trained the U.S. provided security force assistance to those allies.

Each GCC is responsible for developing regional plans to execute theater security cooperation and SFA, and as a result, all vary in execution. U.S. European

Command (USEUCOM) has an extensive security force assistance program that includes NATO support, military-to-military engagements, Partnership for Peace initiatives, and state sponsorship by Army National Guard units.<sup>35</sup> U.S. Pacific Command's (USPACOM) security force assistance program is equally robust but different, given the nature of the nations that comprise PACOM and the vast distances that separate many of the countries. Their program consists of a variety of named joint, combined, and / or bilateral exercises, simulations, disaster relief, and sea control exercises.<sup>36</sup> U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM) program is the most unique since it includes direct support, indirect support short of combat operations and combat. The preponderance of their security force assistance is provided by special operations forces (SOF) in support of counterterrorism operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries in the fight against violent extremism, conventional forces in direct combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a variety of programs with allies like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain.<sup>37</sup>

The Commander, USEUCOM initiatives and goals for foreign assistance and engagement include: building partnerships, joint / multinational operations, training, and global deployment; facilitating ally and partner nation contributions to NATO operations, while maintaining regional stability and providing for their own security; USEUCOM enables U.S. participation in NATO collective defense, out of area operations, and integration of new members.<sup>38</sup> In order to achieve these goals EUCOM prioritize the following things: 1) Build partnerships to enhance security, regional stability, and support of global initiatives; 2) Strengthen NATO's collective defense and assist in its

transformation; 3) Support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; 4) Counter transnational threats.<sup>39</sup>

One of the most important changes to enhance security assistance has been the creation of less bureaucratic funding sources to facilitate the training and equipping assistance provided by combatant commanders. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund and Section 1206 “Global Train and Equip” funding have both been instrumental in supporting the Army’s efforts to provide security force assistance, training, and interoperable equipment to our key allies in support of ISAF operations.<sup>40</sup> Two key areas of the 1206 funding provide support and assistance to foreign militaries and navies to conduct counterterrorism operations and “to enable those forces to participate in or to support military or stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating.”<sup>41</sup> It is the most significant change to the manner in which the United States funds, trains, and equips foreign militaries, which since 1961 was strictly under the purview of the DoS.<sup>42</sup> The Departments of Defense and State developed a joint review process to ensure the programmed resources and training are appropriately nested with U.S. foreign policy.<sup>43</sup>

An expected challenge for SFA in the near future is that existing funds associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will expire at the end of FY2013.<sup>44</sup> Fortunately, our key national security leaders recognize the recent success of the program and advocate for the need to institutionalize similar funding paradigms. The QDDR specifically addresses the need to create a pilot program of flexible funding that can be used by the State Department, USAID, or DoD for security and justice sector stabilization assistance.<sup>45</sup> Understanding key lessons learned and fostering

environments of collaboration will be even more important as we approach the specter of significant federal budget cuts due to sequestration.

The main sources of funding that support these theater wide goals are commonly referred to as 1206, 1207, and 1208 Funds, from the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006, and Section 127d of Title 10, United States Code. 1206 funds are DoD funds used, with the approval of the Secretary of State, that are specifically authorized to build the capacity of foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations, participate in, or support military operations with U.S. armed forces.<sup>46</sup> 1207 Funds, on the other hand, are DoD funds that do not have to be approved by the DoS, but provided to DoS and should be nested with the overall goals of the country team to provide security and stabilization assistance to foreign countries.<sup>47</sup> 1208 Funds consist of reimbursement to coalition nations for support provided to U.S. military operations.<sup>48</sup> 127d Funds provide logistics support, supplies, and services to allied forces participating in combined operations with U.S. Armed Forces.<sup>49</sup> There are different funding sources managed by other U.S. agencies, but they focus on law enforcement, counternarcotics, and justice sectors. The wide variety of funding sources show the complex interaction and the requirement for complete transparency and synchronization between the various U.S. government agencies, defense attaches, Offices of Defense Cooperation, Geographic Combatant Commanders, and Army Service Component Commanders.

The U.S. has executed SC and SFA, with our NATO allies for over 60 years. Romania, a relative newcomer to the NATO alliance, is making significant improvements in their military capabilities and capacity because of USEUCOM and

USAREUR security cooperation efforts. The largest recipients of funds within the EUCOM Theater of Operations in FY 08-10 were the Republic of Georgia, Romania, Hungary, and Poland, who received a total of \$232.4M but provided two brigade headquarters and approximately eight battalion equivalents in Afghanistan, as part of their ISAF contribution.<sup>50</sup> The monetary support to these four nations is fiscally prudent compared to the cost that U.S. forces would incur if they were required to meet these force requirements.

Three training organizations subordinate to USAREUR are training a significant number of NATO allies and other European armies. The 7<sup>th</sup> Army Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC), the Joint Multinational Simulations Center (JMSC), and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) train thousands of foreign soldiers each year in constructive, virtual, live, and simulation training environments in Germany or at their home training areas.<sup>51</sup> In FY 12 alone 8,126 multinational soldiers from over 20 different nations trained at JMRC.<sup>52</sup> Since 2008 JMRC has trained over 35,000 multinational forces from 28 different countries, which has consistently been 32% of the total personnel trained at JMRC in Hohenfels, Germany.<sup>53</sup>

Foreign soldiers and units that train at JMRC do so in a variety of capacities that include: opposing force (OPFOR) augmentation; Host Nation Security Force (HNSF) replication; Observer / Coach – Trainer (O/C-T) support; partnering with U.S. Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) during their Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs); preparation for Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLT), Police Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (POMLT), Police Advisory Missions (PAM), or Military Advisory Missions (MAM) in support of ISAF; and U.S. led MREs for NATO allies. A measure of effectiveness for

this effort providing SFA to our NATO allies is the number of NATO countries and units currently providing forces in Afghanistan to the ISAF mission. Currently there are 41 OMLTs, nine POMLTs, two Republic of Georgia infantry battalions, a Romanian brigade headquarters and two infantry battalions, and a Polish infantry brigade, all of whom trained at JMRC or were trained by JMRC O/C-Ts in their home training areas.<sup>54</sup> Additionally, JMTC, JMSC, and JMRC support other live, constructive, and virtual training exercises and training events throughout Europe to help ensure effective interoperability with U.S. forces before they deploy.

#### A Romanian Case Study

The SFA goals with Romanian Land Forces have taken place over many years and were not easily achieved just because of the desire of Romania to participate in ISAF or support U.S. efforts in OEF. In 2005 Romanian contributions to OEF consisted of only one battalion (-) to provide force protection for the 173d Airborne Brigade at Kandahar airfield.<sup>55</sup> National caveats and limited capabilities prevented Romanian units from executing anything other than force protection patrols along the airfield perimeter. The Romanian Armed Forces wanted to do more for a number of reasons, one of which was to fulfill their military requirements as new NATO members. Under the overall guidance of the State Department, USAREUR personnel and civilian contractors from Cubic Corporation trained Romanian units, significantly building their capacity and capabilities over time. Romanian Land Forces were extremely limited in their assigned mission and force contribution in the early stages of OEF, but now have a brigade and two infantry battalions responsible for an area of operation that encompasses an entire

province. This essentially freed up a U.S. infantry battalion task force to move from Zabul Province to a different one.

The training methodology used to train and equip Romanian Land Forces to this level of proficiency is an excellent case study of effective SFA. Other Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and important regional allies could easily replicate it. As the U.S. Army starts regional alignment of BCTs this spring, one to Africa and one to a location not yet announced, the Army should not limit itself to only the interaction between the BCT and their regional partners.<sup>56</sup>

Romanian Land Forces are the main component of the Romanian Armed Forces and play a significant role in meeting their national security and defense obligations to the EU, NATO, and other international bodies, as published in their most recent defense guidance.<sup>57</sup> The leadership of the Romanian Ministry of Defence determined a need to increase their support of the NATO ISAF mission to Afghanistan, but they did not have the expertise, equipment, infrastructure, or experience to effectively execute a more substantive combat role. In conjunction with the defense attaché to Romania, USEUCOM, and the Department of State Office of Defense Cooperation, the Romanian Land Forces developed a comprehensive approach to achieve two things: train their units for a more significant combat role in Afghanistan and develop their own national combat training center. Romania would provide an infantry battalion (+), but requested personnel and equipment assistance through USEUCOM to provide subject matter expertise and capabilities that they had yet to develop since their admission into NATO in 2004. Because of this particular approach, Romania is achieving much greater

success, as a military, than was originally expected of a relatively small, former Warsaw Pact country.

In order to achieve a level of efficiency and capability for their deploying combat units the Romanian Land Forces worked with USAREUR for critical assistance during the deployment. This assistance consisted of a partnered unit from the U.S. that would train, deploy, and operate with a Romanian Battle Group during the deployment. USEUCOM tasked USAREUR, USAFE, and NAVEUR to provide an enhanced infantry company, critical enablers, and a command and control node for this mission. The USAREUR provided an enhanced infantry company from the JMRC OPFOR battalion to provide the subject matter expertise to work with and train the Romanian soldiers on those critical individual and collective skills to operate effectively as a battlespace owner and to plan and conduct extensive combat operations. The enablers consisted of two EOD teams from NAVEUR, Joint Tactical Air Control personnel from the USAFE, and military intelligence personnel to support route clearance, provide close air support, and targeting and intelligence analysis for the Romanian Battle Group.<sup>58</sup> The command and control node consisted of a field grade officer and staff personnel to support the deployed U.S. personnel, create an echelon of support between the company commander and the Romanian battle group commander, and to assist with additional command and control support and mentorship for the battle group.

USAREUR established the team before the deployment so they could train and execute their MRE together. This partnership achieved several things, beyond supporting a tactical mission and creating operational flexibility for the U.S. mission. It also helped cement the relationship and support of a new NATO member, fostered a

sense of camaraderie between American and Romanian soldiers, and provided partnership experience for soldiers from both countries that would be needed when they partnered with Afghan soldiers from the 205<sup>th</sup> Corps.

This deployment partnership started in 2006 and U.S. companies and tasked personnel trained and deployed to Zabul Province with their Romanian counterparts for six month deployments. It evolved to an extent where the Romanian Land Forces provided a brigade headquarters and two infantry battalions that deployed and worked side by side with American and Afghan forces. Partnership and mentoring took place at multiple levels, across all echelons; Americans mentoring Romanians, and both mentoring Afghan security forces, local government officials, and tribal leaders. As a sign of Romanian success, the last group of augmentation forces from the U.S. stopped deploying with them in January 2011, at which time they added their second infantry battalion and began operating unilaterally in Zabul Province.<sup>59</sup>

The Romanian Land Forces also identified a desire to establish their own national combat training center that they could use to train and prepare their own units for future deployments. This need and a solution was developed over a series of visits by key military officials from the Romania Ministry of Defence and USAREUR to JMRC, the only American combat training center in Europe. The Romanian Land Forces Command ultimately decided to build a combat training center, starting in 2007, with a fully manned, equipped, and operational Operations Group by 2011.

The Romanian goals for their training center are comprehensive and visionary, centering around five pillars to develop trained and ready units. The five pillars consist of training units across the full spectrum of conflict, developing a core group of assigned

officers and NCOs to observe and train units, using a professional OPFOR for force on force training, buying equipment to facilitate the training and AAR process, and improving existing training areas and facilities.<sup>60</sup> The Romanian Land Forces Combat Training Center (CIL-FT) Commander's vision includes developing a combat training center that prepares units for operational missions, transforming the Army's training capability to ensure it is relevant and responsive to current and future operational and tactical requirements, and support the Romanian Armed Forces strategic transformation, modernization programs, and force goals.<sup>61</sup>

They have trained or intend to train Romanian, U.S., and other coalition forces from the platoon thru the brigade level in virtual, constructive, or live environments. The operations group is comprised of highly qualified and experienced commanders and staff observer controllers, who operate under the model incorporated by all of the U.S. CTCs. Additionally, the units operate against a well equipped and trained OPFOR in a contemporary operating environment that simulates and prepares them for the anticipated deployed area of operations. In order to leverage technology to assist the trainers and the training audience the U.S. and Romanian governments made significant investments in instrumentation, training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators. These significant investments into existing technology allow the CIL-FT observer controllers to execute instrumented after action reviews that show the units real time data, video, and radio communication cuts to enhance discovery learning for the training units. Lastly, Romanian Land Forces are modernizing an existing 100<sup>2</sup> KM training area, in the heart of the country, and improving its infrastructure to allow units to conduct force on force training, as well as, live fire exercises. Infrastructure upgrades

consist of the construction of a battalion forward operating base, two company combat outposts, an urban training facility, live fire ranges, and facility updates to the Soviet era base. The ultimate goal of the Romanian Land Forces and the CIL-FT Commander “is the execution of brigade combat team level exercises – that will incorporate the live, constructive capabilities, as well as joint and coalition forces participating as either live players and / or via simulations.”<sup>62</sup>

From 2007-2011 the commander and staff of CIL-FT developed a competent, capable group of O/Cs and support staff who greatly assisted units training and preparing for operational deployments to Afghanistan. In order to achieve his mission essential tasks the commander entered into an enduring partnership with the JMRC where they work with one another to improve CIL-FT and help train deploying units. The partnership entailed an O/C-T exchange with one of the JMRC O/C-T teams, where CIL-FT temporarily assigns Romanian officers and NCOs to augment JMRC O/C-Ts for all of the rotations conducted at JMRC. Moreover, JMRC sends an officer and NCO on temporary duty to assist the CIL-FT commander and staff in scenario development, preparation, and execution of the MREs for Romanian units getting ready to deploy to Afghanistan. JMRC and JMSC also send portions of an entire O/C-T team, and other subject matter experts, to assist in the actual conduct of the MRE. Finally, the defense contractor, Cubic Corporation, maintains an enduring presence in CIL-FT with retired U.S. Army officers and senior NCOs, all of whom have CTC backgrounds and provide daily mentoring and advice to the Romanian commander and his operations group.

This exchange evolved over time and the JMRC requirement initially involved approximately 100 U.S. personnel consisting of an entire O/C-T team, a U.S. OPFOR

company(-), tactical analysts, and technical support. As the CIL-FT personnel, equipment, and capabilities became more proficient, the U.S. requirement changed over time. Ultimately, the U.S. augmentation was reduced to approximately a dozen personnel from the Timberwolves O/C-T team to assist with the Romanian MREs and two O/C-Ts on temporary duty.

The benefits of this exchange cannot be overstated and have been directly attributable to the success of the Romanian battle group in Afghanistan. The Romanian O/C-Ts benefit from learning from JMRC O/C-Ts and U.S. units, where they develop a deep understanding of U.S. doctrine and they see how the U.S. Army runs a combat training center. The U.S. personnel learn just as much from the Romanian O/C-Ts and units, the partnership fosters a sense of unity, increases interoperability, and reinforces their own technical and doctrinal proficiency. A clear measure of success is the significant improvement of the CIL-FT personnel in preparing for and executing their own scenarios and MREs through the reduced U.S. augmentation.

Indeed, when LTG Hertling, the USAREUR Commander visited CIL-FT in April 2012, he discussed his vision with MG Ionita, Chief of Romanian Land Forces, and Colonel Ioan, the CIL-FT Commander. Hertling envisioned CIL-FT playing a critical role in a division level, multinational exercise, where Romania, other NATO allies, and U.S. units would conduct a distributed force on force and simulation exercise geographically separated between training areas in France, Germany, and Romania.<sup>63</sup> For the USAREUR Commander to recognize this significant improvement in their strategic and operational contributions to NATO, the EU, and U.S. national interests is a testament to the contributions of the Romanian Land Forces as a critical strategic U.S. partner.

The EUCOM Commander, the Office of Defense Cooperation, national governments throughout Europe, and subordinate military and civilian leaders implement some rather unique ways to conduct SFA. The myriad relationships built and training methodologies used have ushered in a new era of cooperation, interoperability, and certainly enhanced the capabilities of NATO. The SFA allows NATO to meet their collective goal of cooperative defense but more importantly facilitated several operations in which the alliance overthrew dictators, liberated oppressed nations, secured weapons of mass destruction, stabilized key regions of the globe, and helped rebuild nations.

As the U.S. begins its historic rebalance toward the Pacific, and other parts of developing world, these lessons learned over the past several decades can clearly be used to enhance our global leadership, strengthen existing but neglected alliances, and build new strategic partnerships. The Army is cutting at least eight brigade combat teams from the active force, thereby reducing the throughput at all of the Army's combat training centers. This provides an opportunity to bring army units from new regional allies for training opportunities at JMRC, JRTC, and NTC. All of the CTCs could also be assigned a regional mission and begin partnership to start SFA with new or neglected partners. EUCOM can also start to leverage the CIL-FT CTC by creating opportunities for regional partners in Europe to train in Romania, freeing up training opportunities at JMRC for possible use by AFRICOM to train African national armies. The Army can increase its SFA capacity by building enduring relationships with prioritized, regional partners and allies and train them at the CTCs or by sending O/C-T mobile training teams (MTTs) to support the regionally aligned BCTs.

## Conclusion

Numerous regionally focused security alliances already exist throughout the world; the Arab League, the South American Defense Council, and the Multinational Force of Central Africa are just a few. Some of these alliances may be amenable to developing a training center modeled after CIL-FT, where multi-lateral training can take place to foster interoperability and enhance regional security. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a great example of nations developing a cooperative alliance to address destabilizing security and humanitarian conditions that may or may not spill over into their own countries.<sup>64</sup> CTC O/C-T teams, from any of the CTCs, could also send trainers to assist in the training and development of capability and provide additional expertise to these regional allies. General Carter Ham, USAFRICOM Commander, briefed the House Armed Services Committee about ongoing AFRICOM initiatives saying, " while it is difficult to prove that we have prevented a crisis by working with partners in peacetime, we know that the cost of intervention far exceeds that of prevention."<sup>65</sup> Low footprint and relatively low cost initiatives can increase regional stability, security, and prosperity, enhance regional interoperability, and open new markets for future investment.

In today's fiscally constrained environment, as we draw down our forces after a decade at war, our civilian and military leaders identified the importance of maintaining, reinvigorating, and starting new strategic partnerships and alliances. There is, however, very little published guidance on how the U.S. Army intends to execute SFA to meet these priorities other than initiating regionally aligned BCTs and planning multilateral and bilateral exercises. USEUCOM and USAREUR have been executing SFA since the

end of WWII and the creation of NATO. Recently, USAREUR has innovatively executed SFA with new NATO members, who have shown they are more than capable to make significant changes to their force structure, their strategy, and their doctrine to meet their shared security requirements in the alliance.

The fact that Romania, a poor small, former Warsaw Pact nation, is going to utilize their new CTC in a geographically dispersed, multilateral, division level exercise six years after they decided upon this strategic initiative is amazing. It can and should be used as a model of efficiency in current austere environments to develop new, effective and capable strategic allies and partnerships. The drawdown offers new opportunities for the Army to take advantage of and to showcase our combat training centers as models to execute security force assistance.

#### Endnotes

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<sup>2</sup> Leon E. Panetta, Submitted Statement, "Senate Budget Committee (Budget Request)", February 28, 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1654> (accessed October 30, 2012).

<sup>3</sup> Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 26-27.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 41-42.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>7</sup> Robert M. Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2011), i.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, iii.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., viii.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 28-29.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 29-30.

<sup>15</sup> M.G. Mullen, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff), 10.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Appendix 1 (Army Security Strategy FY2011-2017) to Annex D (Strategic Guidance Documents) to Army Campaign Support Plan FY 13-19* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2011), D-1-2.

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., x.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>22</sup> Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010), xiii-xv.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., xviii.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 126.

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 1, 2011), 9.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Andrew J. Shapiro, *A New Era for U.S. Security Assistance*, *The Washington Quarterly*, Fall 2012, 31.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November, 8, 2010, as amended through January 31, 2011), 326.

<sup>30</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Foreign Internal Defense*, Joint Publication 3-22, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), I-5.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., I-7.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., I-10.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., I-11.

<sup>35</sup> *The United States European Command Home Page*, <http://www.eucom.mil/key-activities> (accessed November 9, 2012).

<sup>36</sup> *The United States Pacific Command Home Page*, <http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/exercises-engagements.shtml>, (accessed November 9, 2012).

<sup>37</sup> *The Central Command Home Page*, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/posture-statement/>, (accessed November 11, 2012).

<sup>38</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress on Foreign-Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Years 2008, 2009, and 2010* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2012), 13.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>41</sup> Nina M. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform: "Section 1206" Background and Issues for Congress*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 13, 2012), 1.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 6-7.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 203.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 4-5.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 15-16.

<sup>51</sup> James R. Becker, "Rotation 13-01 Saber Junction," briefing slides with briefer notes, Hohenfels, Germany, Joint Multination Readiness Center, November 20, 2012.

<sup>52</sup> James R. Becker, "How we Train: The Training Pillars," briefing slides with briefer notes, Hohenfels, Germany, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, November 20, 2012, 3-4.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>54</sup> James R. Becker, "ISAF/SFA Training Support," briefing slides with briefer notes, Hohenfels, Germany, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, November 20, 2012.

<sup>55</sup> While assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade from 2003 – 2005, the author served as the Brigade Executive Officer and deployed to Kandahar Airfield in support of OEF VI. During this time, the author worked directly with the Romanian Battle Group commander and staff to develop and review the Kandahar Airfield security plan.

<sup>56</sup> Paul McLeary, "1<sup>st</sup> ID BCT deploying to Africa in pilot test," *The Army Times*, September 26, 2012.

<sup>57</sup> Romania Ministry of National Defence, *Romania Defence: 2004-2009 Five Years of NATO Membership*, (Bucharest, Romania: Ministry of National Defence Military Technical Publishing Center), <http://www.scribd.com/doc/34459134/Romanian-Defence>, 9 (accessed December 1, 2012).

<sup>58</sup> Gregory A. Cannata, "1-4 Infantry (OPFOR): Dual Mission Battalion, The Other Mission – The Romanian-American Battlegroup and Task Force Zabul," Hohenfels, Germany, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, 2009, 1.

<sup>59</sup> While assigned to the Joint Multinational Readiness Center from 2011-2012, the author served in an advisory capacity assisting the development of the Romanian Land Forces Combat Training Center (CIL-FT) at Cincu, Romania. In this endeavor, the author worked directly with the U.S. Defense Attache, senior officers from the Romanian Land Forces, the CIL-FT commander, and civilian personnel from Cubic Corporation who support the technical development of personnel at CIL-FT. The author also trained units and/or observer controllers from Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia in Poland, Croatia, and Germany.

<sup>60</sup> Romanian Land Forces Combat Training Center, "Information Paper on the Romanian Land Forces Combat Training Center (CIL-FT)," Cincu, Romania, 1-2.

<sup>61</sup> Nicolae Ioan, "Combat Training Center: Cincu, Romania," briefing slides, Cincu, Romania, Romanian Land Forces Combat Training Center (CIL-FT), November 2012, 4.

<sup>62</sup> Romanian Land Forces Combat Training Center, "Information Paper on the Romanian Land Forces Combat Training Center (CIL-FT)," Cincu, Romania, 1-2.

<sup>63</sup> The author helped escort LTG Mark Hertling, the USAREUR Commander, on a visit to CIL-FT on April 29, 2012. During the luncheon, LTG Hertling discussed the possibility of executing a division level exercise with a division headquarters and U.S. and NATO brigades operating from training centers throughout Europe, one of which would be CIL-FT, in Cincu, Romania.

<sup>64</sup> *The African Union Mission in Somalia Home Page*, <http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-mandate/> (accessed December 2, 2012).

<sup>65</sup> Carter Ham, Submitted Statement, "USAFRICOM 2012 Posture Statement," March 1, 2012, <http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Article/8832/2012-posture-statement-statement-of-general-carter> (accessed January 17, 2013).

