Strategic Analysis of Regional Alignment of United States Army Forces

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United States Army War College
Class of 2013

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14. ABSTRACT
As the Army transitions from its operational missions in Afghanistan and sets the conditions for the Army of 2020, a new strategy for managing forces has been developed that regionally aligns Army forces to Combatant Commanders. Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) provides for a scalable and tailorable approach in meeting the Combatant Commander’s requirements with the expertise and understanding of culture, geography, language, and the operating environment in which Army forces may operate. This paper provides an analysis on the ends, ways, and means through the functional areas of force structure, training and readiness, and funding. Recommendations are provided that may enable the Army to realize the full potential of RAF. They include ensuring force structure processes are focused on tailorable and scalable formations for both the Active and Reserve component; adapting innovated partnering initiatives within the Army’s current bench of experts and interagency to create a solid base of language and cultural experts; and evaluating the Army’s current funding process for the operational force.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Army Strategic Force Posture, Army Reorganization, Regionally Aligned Forces
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Abstract

Title: Strategic Analysis of Regional Alignment of United States Army Forces

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 30

Word Count: 5,423

Key Terms: Army Strategic Force Posture, Army Reorganization, Regionally Aligned Forces

Classification: Unclassified

As the Army transitions from its operational missions in Afghanistan and sets the conditions for the Army of 2020, a new strategy for managing forces has been developed that regionally aligns Army forces to Combatant Commanders. Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) provides for a scalable and tailorable approach in meeting the Combatant Commander’s requirements with the expertise and understanding of culture, geography, language, and the operating environment in which Army forces may operate. This paper provides an analysis on the ends, ways, and means through the functional areas of force structure, training and readiness, and funding. Recommendations are provided that may enable the Army to realize the full potential of RAF. They include ensuring force structure processes are focused on tailorable and scalable formations for both the Active and Reserve component; adapting innovated partnering initiatives within the Army’s current bench of experts and interagency to create a solid base of language and cultural experts; and evaluating the Army’s current funding process for the operational force.
Strategic Analysis of Regional Alignment of United States Army Forces

The United States and its military forces, often with allies and other interested nations, will remain engaged in complex power struggles worldwide in order to protect national interests. As land forces continue to evolve, they must strive for a balance of soft and hard power capabilities to meet challenges across the spectrum of conflict.

—Edmund J. Degen
Dominant Land Forces for the 21st Century¹

In 2012, the United States Army was at a critical transitional point in its role as the dominant force for U.S. landpower. As the Army adapts from its operational missions in Afghanistan and sets the conditions for the Army of 2020, four imperatives established by the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) are critical in shaping the future force. The imperatives provide the framework for implementing and integrating the CSA’s vision through modernized and ready forces, leaders developed to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, provide an Army that’s adapted to conduct effective land power, and sustainment of the All-volunteer force.² These imperatives serve as the benchmark for implementing the Army’s part of the 10 missions outlined in the President’s and Secretary of Defense’s strategic planning guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.

The imperatives listed above create a set of coordinated actions the Army will take to support the mission areas outlined in the President’s and Secretary of Defense’s strategic guidance.³ As the Army acts on the imperative to provide a modernized and ready, tailored land force capability to meet the Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements, seven near-term actions are being implemented and resourced in Fiscal Year 2014 and 2015 that will shape the Army’s warfighting role in 2020.⁴ The Army’s near-term actions include: train for operational adaptability, continue to increase
conventional and special forces, integrate lessons learned and capabilities gained in recent operations, adapt the Army Force Generation Model, set the theaters via capable Army Service Component Commands and theater support forces, provide ready and trained organizations for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) response forces for operations in the homeland, and regionally align Army forces.⁵

Regionally aligned Army forces to CCDR allows for the integration of planning and training for Combatant Command (CCMD) contingencies, focused language and cultural training, and provides predictable capabilities to the Ground Component Commander and Army Service Component Command commanders.⁶ This alignment of forces provides a new paradigm for managing Army forces and is termed Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). RAF takes a new approach in managing Army forces and aligns capabilities to meet CCDR’s requirements. A summary of the definition approved by the CSA states:

Regionally Aligned Forces are those forces that provide the Combatant Commander (CCDR) with up to Joint-capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to Combatant Commands (CCMD), allocated to a CCMD, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for CCMD regional missions. RAF includes Army Total Force organizations and capabilities. Regional missions are driven by CCMD requirements requiring an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed.⁷

The concept of regionally aligning forces is not new. It has been used with great success with U.S. Special Operation forces and to a lesser extent by the U.S. Marines for many years.⁸ One example is the U.S. Marine’s Special-Purpose Marine-Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Africa which began a four-week training evolution with Djibouti’s Group Intervention de la Genarmerie Nationale (GIGN) back in August, 2012. The four-
week training evolution focused approximately 60 students from the GIGN partnered with the Theater Security Cooperation Team-3 of Special-Purpose MAGTF Africa to familiarize with American weapon systems and American medical skills.9

The intent of the Army's RAF strategy is to regionally align U.S. Army brigades and other supporting units through the Army Force Generation process focused on a geographic region in support of CCDR’s land force mission requirements. This alignment of operational capability provides much needed and readily usable cultural expertise and builds capacity for Army brigades to operate in a complex environment with an emphasis on the human domain.10

By aligning forces regionally, the Army is moving from a focus on overseas contingency operations to supporting CCDRs with predictable Army forces providing support to each CCMD’s Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). The benefits of predictability to Army forces provide many other advantages the Army can capitalize on during this time of financial austerity. In order to mitigate the effects of reduced budgets, the Army will reduce in overall end strength. This will require the force to be optimally manned, trained, and equipped to meet the numerous operational requirements of the volatile and uncertain global environment challenging U.S. national interests. RAF provides a way for the United States to economically apply landpower as an element of national power.

A critical aspect for consideration is managing, training and developing Soldiers to support the regional alignment while ensuring appropriate programmed resources are available to implement the RAF strategy. This paper addresses three functional areas that provide an analysis on implementing the regional alignment strategy into the Army's
force structure and operational mission sets. These functional areas provide the context to assess the RAF strategy. The functional areas provide the essential ways and means in which the strategy will be implemented to accomplish the strategic ends which are stated as:

The Army Total Force will meet the Combatant Command demand signal, as well as the unpredictable requirements of the prescribed defense strategic guidance missions. To Prevent, Shape and Win, the Army Total Force will be versatile and agile, able to rapidly deploy and sustain itself in support of Defense Planning Guidance driven missions and Combatant Command demand.\(^\text{11}\)

The three functional areas for analysis are:

- **Force Structure** – Does the current mix and alignment of forces adequately meet the strategy requirements?
- **Training and Readiness** – Will the strategy of regional alignment satisfy current and future organizational training and readiness requirements?
- **Funding** – What are the impacts of the strategy in light of anticipated future budgets? Critical to each functional area are which risks can the Army mitigate to acceptable levels in the current fiscal environment of declining budgets throughout the Department of Defense (DoD).

**Analysis of Force Structure (Ways)**

Force structure choices provide one of the ways in which the Army can adequately address the type force that is adaptable and versatile to meet operational requirements.

From a force structure perspective, this strategy nests well with the emerging “Air Sea Battle” doctrine and the Army of 2020 requirements. One important question to address as the Army progresses toward the Army of 2020 is: does the current force mix
and alignment adequately meet the strategy for regionally aligning forces? The prevailing theme for force structure decision making processes will be to build agile and flexible formations for the Army of 2020 that are ready, trained, and equipped to operate across a diverse range of missions. Time is of the essence in getting the right force structure and capability to operate in the future environment of 2020. The Army has two more Future Years Defense Program cycles to direct the right course toward 2020 and bring the CSA’s vision into alignment with the organization. The CSA will have to be actively involved at each level in the process ensuring his vision is addressed in determining and resourcing the requirements through the next two Total Army Analysis (TAA) cycles (TAA 15-19 and TAA 16-20).

The CSA has about three years remaining to see his vision implemented based on his current tenure. As the force structure actions are implemented, it must be noted these actions, once resourced, take time to provide trained and ready forces prepared to execute the strategy. Normally these changes take about two years in the Active Component (AC) and four years in the Reserve Component (RC) to implement due to time constraints with resourcing, manning, training, and equipping. For stationing requirements associated with these force structure changes, military construction (MILCON) is a key component to organizational changes. Lead time on new MILCON projects can be lengthy, taking as long as seven years from initiating projects to “move in” of units. As the Army staff embarks on this path to implement the RAF strategy, the CSA’s vision will be the guiding light in organizing and structuring the Army to meet its requirements for the nation.

The Army is globally engaged and regionally responsive; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to
Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national (JIIM) environment. As part of the Joint Force and as America’s Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility and depth to Prevent, Shape, and Win.¹³

TAA 15-19 will shape a smaller Army sized to defend the United States and have the capability to conduct a broad range of concurrent operations in disparate Theaters. TAA 15-19 will bring a force design construct consisting of steady-state Army activities while supporting multiple overlapping contingency operations and building capacity to implement the RAF strategy.¹⁴ In addition to the implementation of the RAF strategy, the Army will have to prepare to provide the capability and capacity to support the ten Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) mission areas. Two critical aspects are: 1) continuing to contribute to global security and rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region and 2) maintain options to regenerate key capabilities and capacity by preserving Officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) as a core for new units and maintaining the right training capacity. TAA 15-19 incrementally makes the next step toward the Army of 2020 by incorporating mature force structure concepts associated with this force shaping action. This TAA informs the structure actions needed to adjust Brigade Combat Team (BCT) force structure to optimal levels for required capability. Based on TAA 15-19 force reductions, the Army will assume a greater degree of risk in their Operational Force for conducting current operations than in their Generating Force. The Generating Forces will basically remain the same size with few exceptions. The objective is to rapidly expand current capacity and mobilize if required to support future crises.¹⁵
TAA 16-20 will shape the POM 16-20 Force by incorporating directed changes and consider proposed emerging growth, evolving designs and the latest strategies in accordance with the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), and the new Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) and Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) processes and policies. Major friction points expected during TAA 16-20 include the new ARFORGEN impacts resulting from the rules developed and associated with the regionally aligned force construct. As these force structure decisions develop, critical strategic force structure options must be fully examined and supported. Does the Army have the relevant and ready force mix, composition, and alignment?

As to force mix, does the Army have the optimal level of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces to address the strategic requirements for conducting warfare and other non-combat operations? The force shaping principles applied in TAA 15-19 and TAA 16-20 will address the essential parameters for the right structure in meeting the nation’s requirements set in the DPG.

As to Force Composition, does the Army have the right capabilities embedded in its formations to conduct its operational mission requirements? TAA 15-19 and TAA 16-20 address the force composition of combat and enabling formations that provides the right capability in the right quantity. Due to budget constraints and uncertainties, the force composition strategies applied may give the appearance the Army is changing the composition of its forces to meet budgetary constraints rather than operational requirements. This appearance is wrong. The Army has expended great effort in developing the RAF strategy, to meet future operational requirements, by ensuring troop
reduction levels and force composition is synchronized and integrated with strategic guidance and risk.

As to Force Alignment, are Army forces positioned to meet the geographic combatant commanders (GCC’s) operational requirements in support of national security objectives? The base assumption in the RAF strategy is the active Army will maintain 32 to 35 BCTs and the Army National Guard (ARNG) will remain at 28 BCTs. Based on these number of BCTs and the pending ARFORGEN requirements, there can be 10 to 12 BCTs in the available force pool on any given year to regionally align a unit to a Combatant Command.¹⁷ It is important to note that the regional alignment of forces is not restrictive to BCTs. The regional alignment also includes: The Total Army Force (AC/RC/NG), enabler brigades such as fires and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, institutional organizations that include DoD Civilians and contractors, and the concept of aligning conventional forces to Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions.¹⁸

In analyzing the above force structure choices leading to an effective strategy of regionally aligning Army forces, the Army is currently making the right decisions to significantly enhance the implementation of this strategy. The RAF strategy allows for the AC and RC rotational force flow adding predictable and dependable use of forces to meet the CCMD requirements. The current force structure capacity can align at least one Corps or Division Headquarters to support each CCMD for planning and executing theater shaping activities. Also, the current force structure mix allows for tailorable and scalable formations for varying degrees of operational duration. The current fiscal
environment is forcing the Army to take a detailed look at its force structure to maintain relevance to the Joint Force using reduced resources.

Several challenges have surfaced through this analysis that should be noted. RAF forces need more planning, training, and coordination to conduct missions in theater than forces assigned permanently to a CCMD. Army input to the CCMD is essential in managing RAF forces. Also managing the requirements across the ARFORGEN pools to support steady state missions and surge events can impact the Army’s ability to meet operational requirements.

The following recommendations on Army force structure are for consideration in future programming and stationing actions. In accordance with the 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance in support of Asia-Pacific rebalance, the Army should continue with its shift of resources and priorities to United States Army Pacific. As future budgets are developed, the need to focus on meeting the requirements of the GCC’s should be first priority. As resources continue to decline, Army force structure must be tailored and scalable to meet the demands of the CCDR in those high priority regions in United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The RC force, consisting of both the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG), must be fully integrated into the overall program to ensure they can meet requirements where AC Army forces fall short in capability or capacity. Specific enabling capabilities that are critical to the implementation of RAF are resident within the USAR and ARNG. Capabilities include logistics, engineering, security, medical and civil affairs support. The RC force should not be considered a stop-gap capability that only provides for shortfalls in the AC, but a
total integrated force within the context of RAF. A thorough analysis and understanding of landpower capabilities needed for the high priority CCMD’s (USPACOM and USCENTCOM) should be conducted. Given resource constraints, a thorough review of emergent growth requirements are needed and what capabilities to reallocate must be conducted to ensure the Army can meet DoD’s highest priority AORs.

Analysis of Training and Readiness (Ways)

The current concepts of training Army forces are in line with the development of the RAF strategy. The CSA stated in October 2012 at the Association of the United States Army Conference, “The approach to accomplishing operational tasks is by organizing around highly trained Squads and Platoons that are the foundation for our Company, Battalion and Brigade Combat Teams, organized for specific mission sets and regional conditions.”20 This strategy allows for fully trained troops to be available with the requisite skills providing the nation a full range of capability to address global requirements and the CCDR those unique regional requirements for executing and accomplishing a specific Theater Campaign Strategy. The CSA also stated, “The Army will build on current capabilities to improve responsiveness, agility, and precision for a range of contingencies while supporting the CCDR.”21

The most critical component to having trained and ready forces for implementing the regional alignment strategy is utilizing the “Decisive Action” training standard. The term decisive action is a standard requiring the unit or force involved with the regional alignment strategy is trained to execute a full range of mission sets across the warfighting spectrum. “This standard of training features a hybrid threat that reflects the complexities of potential adversaries in the operating environment that the Army could face in the 21st century. This threat includes guerrilla, insurgent, criminal, and near-peer
conventional forces woven into one dynamic environment. This training standard prepares units through a complex set of training challenges focused on expected threat skills and capabilities. This training, currently utilized at the Combat Training Centers (CTC), will have to be modified and structured to the future global environment as the Army transitions out of Afghanistan.

In addition to being decisive action trained, regional language and cultural expertise will be a baseline requirement for regionally aligned Army forces. This type of training can be fully conducted at home station through the use of cultural trainers and then brought into complex training scenarios at the CTCs and integrated into the unit’s Mission Essential Tasks List (METL) training required by the CCDR. The degree of expertise in each of these capabilities has not been determined yet and on-going staffing efforts will determine the best training methods to increase the level of regional expertise for a given unit. One method to reduce personnel growth in regional expertise needed to implement RAF should be to utilize the Army’s foreign area officers and civil affairs units that have been building culture expertise for years. Another method to consider is utilizing other government agencies such as the United States Department of State (USDoS) and the Agency for International Development (USAID). These agencies can provide a vast amount of experience that can be translated to the Army while not requiring a growth of personnel as cultural experts.

The fundamental training characteristic for the future of Army forces to provide decisive land power is operational adaptability. At all levels throughout the training model, from individual soldier skills through collective brigade operations, a training
effect that allows Army leaders, Soldiers, and Civilians to shape conditions and respond effectively to a broad range of missions and changing threats must be established.\textsuperscript{23}

Preparing units aligned to a CCMD will utilize a balanced training approach in achieving and sustaining readiness. The expectation is that unit alignment to a CCMD will occur in the available phase of its ARFORGEN Cycle. Units are expected to be rated as C1 in readiness throughout the Available Phase.\textsuperscript{24} Concerns on maintaining the readiness level throughout the available phase have been raised by 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The unit is the first in line for executing the RAF strategy. This brigade will be the main force provider for security cooperation and partnership-building missions in support of U.S. Africa Command beginning in the spring of 2013. The unit is tasked to perform select theater engagement events in support of the CCDR’s requirements for one year. These events are not necessarily linked with the usual regular warfare role but also entail other critical missions such as building capacity in humanitarian assistance and stability operations.\textsuperscript{25} Other units will be assigned to follow this unit when their year-long tasking is complete. Those future unit assignments will follow the Army force generation model.\textsuperscript{26} Outcomes required by the CCDR have to be in proportion to what the unit can actually accomplish at its current training status. It is imperative that requirements from the CCMD have been vetted and agreed to prior to the unit moving into the Available Phase. The planning factors to distribute Army BCTs across the ARFORGEN pool have specific assumptions that include 32 AC BCTs and 28 USA NG BCTs available to meet the Joint Force operational requirements. As an example, if three AC BCTs in the rotational pool are planned on a 2:1 ratio of availability, only one will be available or distributed to the RAF pool. This is supportable
using a 24 month ARFORGEN cycle. This would also be supportable using a 36 month ARFORGEN cycle if increased bog-dwell is desired.

Maintaining training and readiness standards for meeting CCMD requirements can become problematic for some Army BCT units. Heavy Brigade Combat Teams could become so focused on RAF training that they lose their ability to effectively master the combined arms maneuver warfighting skills. In a CCMD such as USPACOM, Heavy BCTs training on their major weapon platforms could be reduced in response to meeting RAF theater requirements. M1 tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles would not likely be utilized to conduct operational requirements in USPACOM’s region except in Korea. Operations focused in jungle environments with small elements are more typical in the AOR rather than wide-area combat maneuver. This example illustrates that the unit’s doctrinal capability should be foremost taken into consideration when regionally aligning forces to a CCMD AOR.

The Army is at a critical juncture as it transitions out of Afghanistan. Due to the past decade of combat operations, the Army finds itself in a position of strength with a high level of operational expertise. The Army is better positioned now, than any other time in history, to implement the RAF strategy. The Army is currently engaged in the decisive action training model and is executing this model at the CTCs. There is a fundamental understanding across the organization of how the ARFORGEN model can adapt and be responsive in the training phase to prepare and meet CCDR requirements. Already in place in the Army’s inventory is a cadre of foreign area officers and civil affairs specialists that have been providing culture expertise for years. The Army needs to evaluate the potential of partnering with other governmental agencies
such as USDoS and USAID to lessen the cost for training. Already in place is an effective training model and approach to receiving CCDR operational requirements through the TCP objectives. Building on these items enhances the ability to ensure RAF is fully implemented per the CSA’s vision.

There are other training and readiness challenges that the Army needs to address. METL task skills such as combined arms maneuver have declined over the past decade while fighting a predominately counter insurgency conflict. This training dilemma also emerged after the Vietnam War. The Army had to refocus its training base and adapt to operations across the warfighting spectrum to meet new requirements. The Army is now faced with the same dilemma in a post Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom environment. Instituting regional language and cultural training will be costly at a time of diminished funding. Coordinating resources and synchronizing the RC force’s manning and equipment requirements to their training requirements for RAF may prove difficult.

The following recommendations represent a strategic view on what the Army should examine as it addresses the RAF strategy. The ARFORGEN cycle must be thoroughly coordinated and synchronized allowing units to be manned, equipped and trained in time to meet requirements. By doing this, competition for resources and training time can be mitigated allowing optimally trained forces in the RAF alignment to conduct their mission for the CCMD. The RAF strategy includes the Total Force (AC and RC components) and Headquarters Department of the Army must ensure the USAR and ARNG are fully integrated into the plan. Training and readiness must be synchronized with the RC component ARFORGEN cycles and include the resources to
accomplish METL tasks. One prevailing trend over the past 11 years of fighting is the amount of time units spend modernizing and equipping for rotations into the theater of operation. One consideration would be to slow down the rate of modernization in the Reset phase. This would allow not only reduce costs but would allow for more time in the training phase of ARFORGEN. This slower rate of modernization could allow for a better ARFORGEN flow while allowing the unit to focus on the numerous regional and cultural tasks required vice having to constantly go through numerous New Equipment Training (NET) programs for each piece of equipment received. A thorough analysis can determine any aspects of unit METL degradation through slowed modernization and mitigation measures can be developed. The Army will have to ask, as the unit enters the availability phase, can the unit perform its missions equipped at “good enough” capability?

Manning and equipping strategies must be adjusted to allow RC forces the requisite priority in attaining the required training standards as they enter the “available” phase. Units aligned to the RAF strategy must be provided the time to adequately address the requirements of the CCMD. It is imperative that a thorough understanding of CCMD requirements is achieved before entering the “training” phase of the ARFORGEN model. This understanding allows the unit to construct a detailed training plan to maintain proficiency in all individual and collective tasks meeting the CCMD requirements as the unit enters the available phase.

Analysis of Costs (Means)

As the Army proceeds with the RAF strategy, a cost informed approach must be used. The costs for implementing this strategy may be substantial and could put the Army at significant risk in accomplishing its operational requirements in support of the
Joint Force. This cost informed approach guides Army senior leadership on a path to understanding how funding will impact the RAF strategy and allowing the best decisions to be made ensuring the strategy's success. As stated in the Department of the Army Execution Order for RAF:

At a time of fiscal austerity, balancing this requirement against an ever reducing budget will require stringent oversight. It is therefore imperative that the full cost of implementing the regional alignment of Forces is understood as quickly as possible. While most of the training costs will be covered through current and planned Army Operations and Maintenance dollars, and most of the employment costs will be covered by CCMD Security Cooperation (SC) funds (both Title 10 and 22), there may be some additional costs, significantly transportation costs, that require planning and programming.27

The CSA has reiterated that innovative ways of funding the RAF strategy must be developed across the board to accomplish this task. As a part of the strategy formulation, RAF must have a “means” balanced approach. This approach ensures that the Army’s resources are tightly integrated into the “ways” in which we attain our strategy’s “ends.” The Army’s total obligation authority (TOA) is not growing and funding to support RAF will come from the Army’s TOA and the CCMD’s ability to exercise the available funding within their Theater Security Cooperation and Host Nation funding capacity.28 Additional facts that provide cause for concern in conducting a RAF cost informed analysis is that there are no proposed changes to current equipping and manning policies. Priority for manning and equipping for the global employment of the force will still go to those forces aligned to the operational mission pool within the ARFORGEN model. RAF forces should not exceed their authorized level of equipment. A thorough equipping analysis, of each unit distributed to RAF, would need to be conducted to determine if authorized levels of equipment meet specific regional requirements.
The RAF strategy, if implemented as designed, may create increased costs that will need to be covered above and beyond normal unit METL training as past training models have utilized. These requirements will have to compete along with other training needs and established priorities of those units in the global force pool that have been identified for specific or contingency operations. Significant costs will go to cultural and language training to meet the baseline requirements for RAF. The Army must conduct an informed approach to meet the baseline training requirements for RAF. Building force structure into units that provides this type of training will create growth or take from other critical capabilities of an already over-tasked organization. The Army should utilize its available language and cultural subject matter experts to establish the training cadre rather than building new organizations to conduct training as has been done in the past. Creating teams of cadre from civil affairs and language specialties across the Army may provide a simple way to reduce RAF costs.

Modernization can be costly in terms of equipment and training. The Army needs to evaluate how it modernizes its forces. Business as usual procedures across the modernization community cannot be conducted as is the past. Rapid fielding of specialized equipment for every operational mission likely cannot continue. Does an Army BCT need to be modernized at every Reset phase? Can we equip them at a “good enough” capability rather than providing every new piece of equipment on the market? This equipping strategy could provide cost savings that can be directly applied to RAF. One area to analyze is C4ISR growth. Automation equipment is routinely upgraded and fielded on a rapid basis even though the existing equipment is performing well. This is not to say that modernization should be stopped. By slowing the frequency
of modernization, any cost savings can be transferred to fund new RAF requirements. Significant costs are attributable to modernization such as transportation, administration, equipment fielding teams, and NET training. Equipping programs across the Army can be scrutinized to find the savings.

This analysis seems to present a case that the Army needs to analyze how it funds RAF. There are increased costs that have to be built into the Army’s budget for RAF in addition to the current model for operations and maintenance (O&M). These costs include transportation for personnel and equipment and sustainment costs while operating in a CCMD AOR. The Army must evaluate the current funding processes for its operational forces performing RAF and seek a new balance to funding operational, training, and maintenance costs.

The following recommendations may provide HQDA cost savings to allow for the implementation of RAF:

- Evaluate the use of Army prepositioned equipment vice transporting unit equipment from home station for deployment into CCMD AOR.
- Evaluate the potential of slowing down the modernization of units as they proceed through the ARFORGEN cycle.
- Utilize current subject matter experts in the fields of cultural awareness and language abilities that reside in DoD rather than create new manning requirements. In addition, evaluate the use of DoS personnel and training methods.
- Evaluate current Army budgeting models to ensure RAF is properly included into funding plans for operations, maintenance, and training.
Summary

Key to the success of this RAF strategy will be to fully develop a force through the complex processes that build the Army of 2020 focused on force structure, training and readiness, and costs to sustain this strategy. The current shaping process the Army is utilizing provides a force that is scalable, tailoriable and adaptable to meet the future operational environment. The Army needs to maintain current training strategies and adapt innovated partnering initiatives with other government agencies to create a solid base of language and cultural experts. The ARFORGEN model must be adjusted to meet the requirements of RAF from a Total Force perspective. The Army should evaluate the current funding process for its operational forces to better support RAF implementation. Additional costs, above and beyond current O&M accounts, may be required to cover operations, training, and maintenance in support of RAF. Addressing these recommendations may enhance RAF implementation in these times of budget austerity.

RAF leverages the strengths of our highly trained soldiers coupled with capabilities that are unmatched in the world today in meeting CCDR requirements as a first choice solution for regional challenges. The recent publication of the 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), in February 2013, is a continuation of the 2012 ASPG edition in that it refines the current Army vision while focusing on balancing long-term force structure actions with near-term fiscal constraints. The RAF strategy provides the critical component to implement this strategic guidance in a volatile and uncertain world.

Landpower is not just about combat capability and warfighting. It’s about shaping the environment and influencing people to do what you want them to do. The RAF
strategy assists in shaping the theaters and influencing our partners. By balancing the ways through force structure, training and readiness; and the “means” of finite resources of personnel and equipment the Army can attain the strategic ends it desires of a mission-tailored regional force.

Endnotes


3 Ibid., 7.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 8.

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11 LTG John F. Campbell, Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7, ANNEX Y: Communications Synchronization to HQDA Execute Order Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) Version 10, Headquarters Department of the Army, 12 December 2012, 12.

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29 Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7, “Regional Alignment of Forces Mission Analysis Brief”, 5.