The African Peace and Security Architecture: Myth or Reality

by

Colonel Alhassan Abu
Ghana Army

United States Army War College
Class of 2013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT:
The author is not an employee of the United States government. Therefore, this document may be protected by copyright law.

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
The African continent has been embroiled in conflicts and insecurity for decades. Attempts to prevent and resolve some of these conflicts and security challenges have not been successful. Consequently, the African Union (AU) Heads of State adopted a Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) premised on the concept of human security. The CADSP formulated the concept of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is seen as a more promising continental security initiative. However, the APSA is facing some setbacks and depends mainly on Africa’s development partners. The research project is therefore centered on the challenges and prospects of the APSA. It recommended among others the need for African leaders to show more commitment to the cause of the AU, the AU to strengthen its partnership with AFRICOM, Africa’s development partners and civil society, build strong institutions and develop strategies for mobilizing funds.
The African Peace and Security Architecture: Myth or Reality

by

Colonel Alhassan Abu
Ghana Army

Colonel Michael V. McCrea
Department of Command, Leadership and Management
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
The African continent has been embroiled in conflicts and insecurity for decades. Attempts to prevent and resolve some of these conflicts and security challenges have not been successful. Consequently, the African Union (AU) Heads of State adopted a Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) premised on the concept of human security. The CADSP formulated the concept of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is seen as a more promising continental security initiative. However, the APSA is facing some setbacks and depends mainly on Africa’s development partners. The research project is therefore centered on the challenges and prospects of the APSA. It recommended among others the need for African leaders to show more commitment to the cause of the AU, the AU to strengthen its partnership with AFRICOM, Africa’s development partners and civil society, build strong institutions and develop strategies for mobilizing funds.
The African Peace and Security Architecture: Myth or Reality

The African continent is bedeviled with conflicts, hunger, diseases, poverty, the collapse of governments and ultimately the emergence of failed states. Over the last five decades, Africa has experienced at least thirty major conflicts in which seven million people lost their lives and more than twenty million were displaced. The most enduring and dominant of these conflicts has been the intra-state conflict. These have taken various forms such as oppressive regimes, religious conflicts, terrorism, ethnic conflicts and the emergence of non-state actors benefiting from the insecurity.¹

African leaders made various efforts to find lasting solutions to these conflicts using traditional conflict resolution mechanisms such as ad hoc committees, mediation by African heads of state and mediation commissions as well as the use of chieftaincy institutions. Unfortunately, these mechanisms have not helped much in preventing or resolving the conflicts. Efforts by African leaders to create continental peace and security mechanisms failed miserably. Consequently, Africans depended on the international community to resolve these conflicts despite its inability to achieve lasting results.² The international community’s diminished interest in Africa after the Cold War, the worsening security environment as well as the paradigm shift of African leaders to take care of the continent’s security situation forced the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to be more pragmatic towards Africa’s security and development.³

Therefore, African leaders in July 2002 decided to replace the OAU with a more structurally encouraging supranational organization, the African Union (AU). The AU has since then taken bold and promising initiatives towards the formulation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) aimed at providing peace and security by preventing and managing conflicts. It is also meant to avoid over-reliance on the
West and seek African solutions to African problems. However, the APSA is confronted with challenges that render it seemingly ineffective. This paper will therefore cover the security threats facing Africa, the evolution of African security initiatives, the structure, challenges and prospects of the APSA and provide recommendations to enhance the APSA.

Security Threats in Africa

State institutions in Africa are weak and their eventual collapse leads to intra-state conflicts. When Governments are unable to gain and maintain the popular support of their citizenry, they begin to operate through coercion, dictatorial tendencies of the cult of a strong leader and corrupt practices. The major aspect of this process is the abusive use of the security agencies and the collapse of the judicial and panel systems. This eventually leads to the emergence of warlords, the struggle for political power between different factions, violence and ethnic conflict. Examples of this threat could be traced to Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire and Charles Taylor’s Liberia. Therefore, it is crucial for Africa to develop strong institutions to ensure peace, security and development.

Terrorism is another threat to Africa’s security. Africa is gaining grounds as a safe haven for terrorist groups. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar ad Din operate freely in the Sahel and pose a threat to African and Western interests. Al Shabab is still a formidable threat in the horn of Africa. Also, West Africa is threatened by the possible collaboration between AQIM and the Boko Haram in Nigeria. Though efforts are being made to fight terrorism in Africa, a lot more needs to be done.

Another source of insecurity and conflicts in Africa is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). There are huge numbers of SALWs in circulation in
Africa due to conflicts. There is also evidence of international and local dealers who exchange arms for minerals (especially diamonds) and other resources.\(^7\) Disarmament during post conflict peace agreement has been ineffective in Africa. So most SALWs imported or manufactured locally before or during a conflict are unaccounted for and thus continue to pose security threats even during post-conflict situations. These weapons end up in the hands of criminals and are used for armed robbery, hostage taking, hijacking and even an insurrection.\(^8\)

Drug trafficking is also a source of insecurity in Africa. Africa has become a transit hub for illicit drugs from Latin America and South Asia to Europe and to a limited extent the United States. This is attributed to weak law enforcement, high level of corruption and effective monitoring along the direct routes from the source of supply to the Western markets. An estimated 48 metric tons of cocaine worth $1.8 billion transited West Africa in 2007.\(^9\) Most countries along the West Coast of Africa, especially Guinea Bissau, are believed to be transit centers.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean is a major security threat to Africa, the maritime system and world trade. Pirates emanating from Somalia attack ships in the aforementioned areas taking the crew hostage and ask for huge sums in ransom. This affects the transportation of goods, humanitarian relief to Africa and increases the costs of world trade. Additionally, piracy fuels the rise of militias and destabilizes the Horn of Africa. Also, terrorist groups in that part of Africa may benefit from piracy to finance their activities.\(^10\)

Diseases are a threat to Africa’s security and stability. HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, which are among the biggest killers in the world, have adversely affected
Africa with financial and demographic implications. For instance, HIV/AIDS is having a heavy toll on South Africa with a consequential loss of about $30 billion per annum of its economy. Also, HIV/AIDS has orphaned over 12 million children in sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, it has been estimated that a child dies of malaria every thirty seconds in Africa. Various attempts were therefore made to formulate security initiatives to deal with some of the security threats.

Evolution of African Security Initiatives

Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, proposed the concept of the African High Command during the All African Peoples Conference in 1958. However, his proposal was rejected and he renewed his call in 1963 for the formation of a unified military command to “ensure the stability and security of Africa.” For the second time his idea was not endorsed and instead a permanent military staff directorate was created in the OAU Secretariat.

Various attempts to create a Pan-African force were unsuccessful. Despite that, an African military intervention was launched in Chad in 1982 to help end the conflict there. That was seen as an initial phase of instituting a continental military cooperation. Unfortunately, the force faced serious challenges and was withdrawn the same year. The failure in Chad created the impetus for further security initiatives and thus gave rise to sub-regional groupings such as the Front Line States’ Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). That notwithstanding, the OAU chalked some successes in conflict management. These included the border disputes between Mali and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Somalia and Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and Algeria and Morocco. Despite these efforts, the OAU’s overall record of providing peace and security in Africa
from 1963-1993 was a fiasco.\textsuperscript{16} A number of factors account for the disappointing performance of the OAU. These include lack of political will by African leaders at the time, lack of financial support, limited capacity to deal with peace and security issues and the Cold War politics where the super powers injected military and financial resources in Africa in pursuit of their national interests. Another limitation of the OAU was its mandate of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states in order to maintain the sanctity of their sovereignty.\textsuperscript{17}

Pursuant to the worsening security environment in Africa in the early 1990s, the OAU had to reconsider a more pragmatic approach to deal with its security and development agenda. The OAU Secretary General (Salim Ahmed Salim) in 1992 at the OAU summit in Dakar submitted a report on the proposals for an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in order to adequately and better address conflicts in Africa. The mechanism was inaugurated at the OAU summit meeting of June 1994. The primary focus of the mechanism was to anticipate and prevent conflicts in order to avoid the complex and highly expensive peace support operations that OAU members could not afford.\textsuperscript{18} The mechanism had a Conflict Management Center, which was responsible to the OAU Secretary General for the execution of strategies to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. It also had key elements such as an early warning system to identify flash points, gather information and provide an advance warning of likely or impending conflict situations. Additionally, the center had a Peace Fund, which was established to financially support the mechanism’s operational activities.\textsuperscript{19}
The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution made some strides in its attempt to prevent and manage conflicts in Africa. It helped to broker the Arusha Peace Agreement for Rwanda in 1993 and de-escalated political tensions in Congo-Brazzaville in the same year. The OAU implemented the mechanism in support of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In 1997, it mediated the crises in the Great Lakes Region and supported a mission to monitor the implementation of the Bangui Agreement in the Central African Republic. Unfortunately, the mechanism was beset with some drawbacks and could not make a significant impact in the security landscape in Africa. It was faced with budgetary, organizational and mandate related constraints. Nevertheless, it provided the impetus for the OAU to assume much more responsibility for security issues on the continent.\textsuperscript{20} Hence, a more promising continental security initiative, the APSA was established.

The Structure of the African Peace and Security Architecture

Most probably, due to lessons learned from the conflicts in Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, the AU Constitutive Act stipulates that the AU has every right to intervene in member states’ internal affairs when crisis such as war crimes, human rights abuses and genocide erupt. This gave rise to the shift from non-interference to what is now commonly referred to as non-indifference.\textsuperscript{21} The idea was later endorsed by world leaders in 2005 and labeled the Responsibility to Protect (R2P); even though it was agreed that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations, the international community can intervene in situations involving genocide, war crimes and human rights violations irrespective of where they take place.\textsuperscript{22}

In concert with the Constitutive Act’s concept of security, a Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) was adopted in February 2004 by African Heads
of State and Government. The CADSP was based on the concept of human security and was integrated with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) into the AU structures. Thus, an overall framework for a promising continental security cooperation called the APSA was established. Below (Figure 1) is a diagrammatic structure of the APSA.

![Diagram of APSA Structure](image)

Figure 1. Structure of the African Peace and Security Architecture

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the central organ of the APSA, which is composed of 15 elected members. Its role includes promotion of peace, security and stability, provide early warning and preventive diplomacy as well as undertaking peace-making ventures through mediation, good offices, conciliation and enquiry. Also, it
provides the lead role in peace support operations, peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian intervention and disaster management.\textsuperscript{25}

The Panel of the Wise (PoW) is made up of five members selected from highly respected African statesmen and women with distinguished qualities who have made significant contributions to peace, security and development in Africa. They are nominated by the chairperson of the AU Commission in consultation with member states of the nominees but approved by the AU Assembly. They are rotated every three years and may be retained for another term of three years. The PoW is meant to assist the PSC and the chairperson in conflict prevention.\textsuperscript{26}

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is to anticipate and prevent conflicts in Africa through an early warning module based on clearly stated economic, political, military, humanitarian and social indicators used to analyze security situations in order to formulate appropriate course of action. The CEWS entails an observation and monitoring center, which is referred to as the Situation Room where data on the early warning indicators from the regional observation and monitoring units are received, collated and analyzed.\textsuperscript{27}

The African Peace Fund (APF) is a special fund established to provide financial assistance to peace support missions and activities associated with peace and security in Africa. The sources of funding for the APF include the regular AU budget, voluntary contributions from private sector, civil society, member states, well meaning individuals and fund raising events. It is also funded by sources outside Africa such as the European Union. Member states agreed to increase their contributions to the fund from
6% to 12% of their assessed contributions on incremental basis of 1.5% per annum until the 12% is attained.\textsuperscript{28}

The African Standby Force (ASF) as one of the major pillars of the APSA is organized on the basis of five regions/Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of Africa. These are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Consequently, the regional standby brigades are designated as North Africa Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG), Force Multinationale de l' Afrique Centrale (FOMAC), East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG).\textsuperscript{29} The ASF was expected to be operational by 2010 and capable of undertaking tasks based on six scenarios as indicated in the table below.

Table 1. The African Standby Force Mission Scenarios\textsuperscript{30}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Deployment Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/Regional military advice to a political mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace-building)</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low level spoilers</td>
<td>90 days with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly</td>
<td>14 days with robust military force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another component of the APSA worth mentioning is the Military Staff Committee (MSC). It is made up of the defense advisers of the members of the PSC. The MSC is the sole authority responsible for counseling and supporting the PSC in all issues associated with military and security requirements in order to promote and maintain peace and security in Africa.\textsuperscript{31}

Challenges Facing the African Peace and Security Architecture

The AU’s concept of security is premised on human security. Unfortunately, the PSC devotes more attention to military aspects of security at the expense of other threats to security in Africa such as diseases, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and piracy, to mention but a few. The PSC needs to widen its mandate and activities to include these seemingly non-conventional threats to peace and security in Africa.\textsuperscript{32} This will enhance peace, security, development and stability in Africa. Additionally, the PSC lacks the requisite human and financial resources to fulfill its mandate. The AU is generally cash strapped and that has a consequential adverse effect on the PSC. Also, most African states would hardly send their talented and experience top level diplomats or bureaucrats to the PSC in particular and the AU in general.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, the PSC is not well placed to perform efficiently and effectively. So, African governments need to be more dedicated to the cause of the AU.

Another challenge confronting the APSA is the operationalization of the CEWS. Though a number of workshops have been held in that regard, a lot still remains to be done. The AU, ECOWAS and IGAD early warning systems are the only systems to have made significant progress. However, like the other RECs’ early warning systems, they lack adequate staffing and funding to cover their vast regions and the numerous issues to be reported on under human security.\textsuperscript{34} They also lack the capacity to
effectively analyze the data collected.\textsuperscript{35} So their capabilities as effective early warning systems are yet to be realized. For example, the critics of the CEWS are of the view that there is adequate evidence of indicators of state failure and the likelihood of conflict in countries such as Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equitorial Guinea and Zimbabwe, but there is clear lack of early and well integrated preventive efforts by regional mechanisms.\textsuperscript{36}

The PoW’s mandate is more about preventing conflicts rather than managing conflicts. However, it lacks adequate human and financial resources to perform its functions.\textsuperscript{37} Currently, it requires sufficient support staff with expertise in mediation and technically qualified experts on specific conflict zones. This is relevant because the PoW’s limited membership of five may restrict its ability to appropriately respond to likely threatening situations that require its attention. It also allows for continuity when the panel members are replaced at the end of their tour of duty.\textsuperscript{38}

The ASF is the central tool that the AU intends to use to execute its peace and security agenda. Though the institutional framework and doctrines for the ASF have been completed, the actual implementing structures are still not fully developed due to the slow pace of progress. So far, ECOBRIG, EASBRIG and SADCBRIG have made significant progress. Hence, the ASF could not be fully operational by 2010 as planned.\textsuperscript{39} A number of factors accounts for this slow pace of work.

The regional mechanisms and the AU in its entirety are cash strapped and resource starved. Only a few of the AU member states are up to speed with their payments to the AU regular budget. South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria and Libya pay fifteen percent each of the AU regular budget, totaling seventy-five percent.\textsuperscript{40} Though African Heads of State endorsed the three year strategic plan of Alphar Konare (first
Chairman of AU Commission) aimed at enhancing the AU structures to curtail security threats in Africa, they only paid lip service to the plan. The plan included a proposed $600 million annual implementation budget but the Heads of States failed to commit themselves to this proposal. African governments hardly see international cooperation as a policy priority especially when it comes to making financial commitments despite the enormous resources some of them have.\textsuperscript{41} That notwithstanding, it is significant to mention that Africa is engulfed in a total debt of about $305 billion, it accounts for barely one percent of foreign direct investment, one percent of global gross domestic product and below two percent of international trade. Africa receives about $22 billion a year in foreign aid and it would cost the continent approximately $64 billion per year to implement its economic strategic plan, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).\textsuperscript{42} It is equally important to mention that AU member states are among the poorest in the world and their meager national budgets are in most cases mainly financed by international donors.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore, the AU cannot sustain its peace and security agenda without the support of donor partners and the international community. For instance, without the EU African Peace Support Facility (APSF), the AU would not be in a position to conduct peace support operations.\textsuperscript{44} Also, the AU and the RECs have not yet established logistics depots to support peace support operations (PSOs).

Another worrying situation that confronts the APSA is the institutional chaos on the continent where most African states belong to two or more of the web of fourteen intergovernmental organizations in Africa that seek to provide some form of security and conflict management mechanisms. Out of the 54 AU member states, 26 belong to two regional groups whilst 19 belong to three. Even DRC and Swaziland are members of
four regional communities. These overlapping memberships tend to adversely affect the common objective as well as the integration goals of the AU as a result of counterproductive competition and duplication of efforts. Thus some member states end up dissipating their financial, human and material resources and are unable to contribute to the AU’s peace and security effort. So, AU member states must work out their priorities and disengage from some of the regional organizations.

The nature and quality of support from Africa’s development partners fall short of the desired capacity building programs required to enhance the APSA. Western and external actors have often used their financial muscle to shape and influence the parameters of security in Africa contrary to what Africans may conceive as an African solution to an African problem. For example, the idea of establishing an AU Counter-Terrorism Center is still being debated. Also, international partners focus more on peacekeeping training for AU member states relative to the provision of logistics support such as strategic airlift, communication equipment and armored vehicles. Additionally, there is no coordination and harmonization of the numerous donor support to the AU. Lastly, donor support is geared towards immediate and short-term crisis at the expense of long-term capacity building programs such as the ASF and the CEWS.

The APSA's lack of capacity to handle crisis was demonstrated when it failed to intervene in Somalia after Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006. Eventually, when the AU decided to send a force of 8,000 to Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), only Uganda provided 1,200 troops for the mission in March 2007. There were also delays in the deployment of the force. It took months to set up the force headquarters and the Support Management and Planning Unit. The force
lacked adequate financial and material resources. Though some of AU’s development partners pledged substantial financial support, the pledges were far less than the $622 million required for the initial launching of the force.\textsuperscript{48} The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had similar challenges. There was no adequate planning prior to the deployment of the force. Also, it lacked the appropriate structures for strategic and operational command and control as well as logistics backing. The mission depended solely on assistance from international donors and thus resulting in delays, uncertainty and confusion.\textsuperscript{49}

Prospects of the African Peace and Security Architecture

In spite of the challenges confronting the AU and the APSA, all is not gloomy. The design for the realization of objectives of APSA is progressing steadily. African leaders have shown the willingness to institute a paradigm shift in the continent’s peace, security and development agenda. The AU Heads of States, faced with the daunting problems in Africa and the globalized world were moved by the spirit of Pan-Africanism to forge ahead in unity through a viable regional integration. Learning from the failures of the OAU, the AU adopted the pragmatic approach of non-interference to non-indifference. With the legal provisions and structures now in place, the PSC has the legitimate right to authorize intervention in any African country that may be committing grave atrocities against its people.\textsuperscript{50} Though, critics of this paradigm shift are of the view that it has not made any major impact on autocratic leaders like Robert Mugabe and Omar al-Bashir, its significance cannot be over-emphasized.\textsuperscript{51} As Timothy Murithi said, “the politics of indifference would have continued to perpetuate the conditions that undermine the prospects for peace building on the continent.”\textsuperscript{52} It is also heartwarming to mention that the AU adopted a comprehensive, holistic approach to deal with Africa’s
peace and security threats. It addresses issues of governance, human rights, social and economic development. The PSC is the pivot and central organ in the APSA.

The PSC has chalked significant success in addressing threats to peace and security in Africa despite being overstretched by a wide range of issues vis-à-vis its meager staff level. It has conducted over 250 meetings and briefing sessions on a variety of issues, illustrating the determination and zeal of the AU to resolve security situations on the continent. For instance, the Livingstone formula was adopted to indicate the PSC’s relationship with civil society groups and how to improve the execution of sanctions in cases related to illegitimate change of government. For instance, the PSC was quick to react to ensure the right thing was done when there was an unconstitutional change of government in Togo, after the death of President Gnansingbe Eyadema in February 2005. However, the effectiveness of the PSC cannot be sustained with its present skeletal staff. The AU therefore recognized the importance of building partnership with civil society organizations in its quest for peace and security in Africa.

An AU-Civil Society Working Group was established with representatives from the five main regions of Africa and the Diaspora. The group serves as a conduit through which civil society organizations can interface with AU on peace, security and development issues. Presently, a good number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), both African and international, are involved in peace building, security and stability in Africa and are working closely with the AU and RECs. Notably among them are the West African Network for Peace building (WANEP), African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS),
Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Global Coalition for Africa, International Crisis Group (ICG), Medicin San Frontiers, Oxfam and Care to mention but a few. These NGOs bring their expertise and resources to partner the AU and RECs in policy forums, various projects, early warning, relief and humanitarian initiatives. However, there is the need to coordinate their services to avoid duplication of effort, conflict of interests, accountability and transparency. The AU under the auspices of the APSA launched a number of operations, notably in Burundi, Darfur, Comoros and Somalia.

The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was the AU’s first mission and seen as a test case for African solutions to African problems. It was hampered by lack of capacity, financial and human resources as well as lack of an explicit mandate to protect civilians. Its contribution to political and economic stability in Burundi was said to be limited. AMIB was almost declared an impossible mission. However, despite the difficulties that beset AMIB, it improved on the security situation and paved the way for the UN Mission in Burundi, ONUB (Operation des Nations Unies au Burundi). It was generally agreed that AMIB performed creditably well. The dependence on good offices, the lead nation role of South Africa and the partnership with the UN were exemplary. That notwithstanding, some lessons were learned that should guide the AU in its future missions. They include seeking different and reliable sources of funding, provision of adequate logistics, adopting a common language within the command and control structures of the mission, and application of a standardized doctrine.

The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was seen as the biggest test case for the AU’s peace and security mechanism. In view of the complexities of the situation and atrocities that were being perpetuated in Darfur, coupled with the refusal of the
government of Sudan to consent to a UN force in Sudan, the AU had no option but to intervene in Darfur to avert a possible humanitarian catastrophe.\textsuperscript{59} The AU’s concept of non-indifference was put into action. It also clearly demonstrated the willingness of the AU to execute its peace and security agenda. Additionally, the AU played a lead role in finding a political solution to the conflict as well as drafting and implementing the ceasefire agreement.\textsuperscript{60} However, AMIS was said to be without strategic guidance. It was an ad hoc mission that was launched without adequate planning. AMIS was under-funded and lacked military, logistics and institutional resources. So, there was a call for a transition of the mission to a UN peace support operation. The outcome was the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), AU/UN hybrid mission in Darfur. Despite the shortcomings of AMIS, it demonstrated the increasing determination of the AU to get involve in finding solutions to the continent’s security situation. The presence of AMIS did, at least, bring some measure of stability in a greater part of Darfur but on the whole, it failed to achieve the desired peace. However, the mission presents the AU some lessons especially in the area of planning, support from the international community and its collaboration with the UN.\textsuperscript{61}

The PSC directed the deployment of AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) on 21 March 2006. This was to supervise and ensure peaceful elections as well as prevent the possible breakup of the Union of the Comoros. South Africa played a lead role supported by Rwanda, Mozambique, Nigeria, Egypt and Congo Brazzaville. The mission was very successful and ended on 9 June 2006.\textsuperscript{62} As Benedikt Franke stated “it not only reconfirmed the utility of the lead nation concept, but also reminded everyone that there were certain instances in which the AU could make a
substantial contribution to Africa’s security without large expenditures (AMISEC merely cost US$19 million)... Another mission, Operation Democracy, was authorized to the Comoros in 2008 to restore the Union government’s authority in Anjouan. The mission known as African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission (MAES in French) was made up of Sudan, Tanzania, Libya and Senegal. Critics of the mission saw it as an easy and low profile situation undertaken by the AU to draw attention from its failure in other missions. On the whole, it was an AU success story in terms of planning, swift reaction and limited reliance on donor partners. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is another AU mission worth considering.

AMISOM was deployed to provide security in support of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance among others. Unfortunately, like other AU complex conflicts, the initial setbacks were overwhelming. Only Ugandan and a handful of Burundian forces were deployed in 2007. Self-sustainment, lack of logistics, military and financial resources as well as the worsening security situation were some of the underlying factors that discouraged most of the AU member states from fulfilling their troop pledges to AMISOM. Also, there was no political dialogue among the various factions. So, AMISOM had to operate in a hostile environment and there was no peace to keep. As alluded to, financial pledges by Africa’s development partners were far below the required amount of US$622 million for the initial deployment of the force. However, of late, AMISOM is making significant gains whilst the formidable militant group in Somalia is suffering significant setbacks. With the increase in the force level by Kenya and Djibouti, an effective coordination between TFG forces and AMISOM, and support from the international community
(especially USA), al-Shabab is in disarray and at its lowest ebb. This clearly shows a marked improvement in the AU’s willingness and capacity to address the security situation in Somalia. Despite the successes chalked by AMISOM, the conflict is far from over. Al-Shabab could still pose a serious threat through irregular warfare. AMISOM would therefore have to adopt a strategy to deal with this possible emerging threat of al-Shabab. It is therefore crucial for the US African Command (AFRICOM) to assist Africa in its quest to enhance the continent’s peace and security.

When AFRICOM was created, then President George Bush stated that “This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa command will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.” In effect, AFRICOM will support the APSA to promote and sustain peace and security in Africa. However, there were misconceptions about the motives of AFRICOM. It has been confirmed that AFRICOM does not intend to establish military bases in Africa; it will be only a staff headquarters. Africa is already reaping the benefits of AFRICOM as demonstrated in the Horn of Africa (HOA). With the support from AFRICOM and Combined Joint Task Force-HOA, al-Shabab is being defeated and piracy is on the decrease. AFRICOM can be of great assistance in developing the capacity of the ASF by enhancing Africa’s centers of excellence for PSOs, through information and intelligence sharing, sustaining Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), provision of logistics and joint training. AFRICOM can also assist African countries to protect their maritime resources by enhancing their maritime
security capacities, especially combating illegal fishing which cost African countries billions of dollars annually. Hence, building and sustaining the partnership between AFRICOM and the AU would be of great benefit to both sides. The Joint Africa-European Union partnership is also yielding fruits.

The Joint Africa-European Union Partnership has developed a long-term strategic partnership in eight areas of cooperation. These are peace and security, governance, human rights, trade and regional integration, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), energy, climate change and environment, migration, mobility and employment, science, information and space. The EU is the main financial backbone of the AU. However, one major challenge facing the APSA is lack of adequate financial support. So far, the Joint Africa-European Union Strategy (JAES) has supported the APSA with 1 billion euros among other deliverables. Additionally, the EU established the African Peace Facility (APF) to support the AU’s peace and security agenda. The APF provides 250 million euros, covering a period of three years, to fund AU or regional PSOs authorized by the UN. An amount of 35 million Euros out of the amount is allocated for capacity building of the AU peace and security structures. It is important to note that the facility is financed with funds earmarked for EU development projects in Africa. Therefore, it is key to strike a balance between the amount spent directly on security vis-à-vis funding for development programs which could have a long-term impact on peace and security. The “Group of 8” (G8) also contributes to Africa’s peace and security agenda.

The G8 is assisting the AU to strengthen the APSA. They are engaged with African countries whose actions and aspirations reflect NEPAD’s objectives. These
include political and financial support for good governance and rule of law, investing in human capital as well as pursuing programs that induce economic growth and mitigate poverty.\textsuperscript{74} The G8 has supported and continues to support Africa’s economic and infrastructural development through their Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) programs.\textsuperscript{75} Additionally, the G8 provides technical and financial support to the AU, RECs and some African countries to undertake peace and security initiatives. However, the G8 concentrates mainly on PSOs relative to developing the capacity of the AU and RECs to conduct effective conflict prevention and resolution.\textsuperscript{76} Though they supported AU and UN’s efforts especially in DRC, Sierra Leone, Angola, Burundi, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire and Central African Republic, their financial pledges are not fully honored. Their assistance to Africa is also threatened by ineffective inter-agency coordination and harmonization.\textsuperscript{77}

Recommendations

Weak state institutions are one of Africa’s threats to peace and security. In collaboration with development partners, the AU and its member states must develop strong institutions at the continental and national levels. Such institutions as the judicial and panel systems must be well resourced and independent to discharge their mandate without undue governmental control.

The PSC, the central organ of the APSA, concentrates on military dimensions of security relative to other threats to peace and security. It must expand its mandate to include non-conventional threats to security on the continent. These include environmental degradation, diseases (especially malaria, HIV/AIDS and TB), drug trafficking, and proliferation of SALWs. Therefore the PSC and other components of the APSA must be well resourced, financially and with the appropriate staffing.
Consequently, African Heads of State must be more dedicated to the cause of the AU and the APSA. They should honor their financial obligations to the AU regular budget instead of leaving the financial burden on a few countries. Additionally, they must provide the AU with talented and experienced staff to execute its peace and security agenda.

The AU’s overdependence on financial assistance from its development partners causes delays, uncertainty and confusion in its attempt to resolve and manage conflicts especially when deploying troops for PSOs. It also calls to question the ownership of the APSA and contradicts the rhetoric of African solutions to African problems. Therefore, the AU must seek alternative and reliable sources of mobilizing funds to complement the assistance from its development partners. For example, the ECOWAS community levy is worthy of emulation at the continental level. Additionally, Alpha Konare’s proposed US $600 million annual implementation budget must be revisited and possibly implemented. So, the AU Peace Fund must be resourced as a matter of priority.

The ASF as the AU’s central tool for its peace and security mechanism is still not fully operational. The AU and RECs must adhere to timelines and also establish the continental and RECs’ logistics depots to address the logistics gap. In addition, AU missions must be furnished with clear strategic guidance. Furthermore, the AU and RECs must pursue scenario-based planning with appropriate strategies and contingencies to avoid ad hoc missions with disastrous consequences. Also, the overlapping chaotic institutional membership of most AU member states must be streamlined and harmonized to avoid duplication, dissipation of resources and counterproductive competition.
The relationship and connectivity between the CEWS and the regional early warning systems must be strengthened to ensure relevant and speedy passage of information from the RECs to the CEWS and vice versa. The AU must build its capacity to analyze the raw data collected from the field. Thus, the AU must strengthen its partnership with AFRICOM, civil society and its development partners to take advantage of the partnership to enhance its capacity holistically in its quest for peace and security in Africa. The development partners’ support must be more than just training. It should include logistics support such as strategic airlift, communication, transportation and long-term capacity building programs.

Conclusion

Intra-state conflicts and other threats to peace and security continue to confront the African continent and will no doubt continue to do so in this twenty-first century. This has brought untold hardships to the continent as a whole. Various security initiatives have failed to yield the desired effects.

African leaders have come to the realization that unless Africa puts in place the appropriate effective measures and mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts more seriously than ever before, Africa would continue to bear the disastrous effects of conflicts. Additionally, the diminished interest of the Western powers in Africa prompted the OAU to take serious review of its role in terms of Africa’s economic development and security.

The OAU mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was put in place but it did not lead to a paradigm shift due to the OAU’s financial, organizational and mandate-related limitations. The OAU was then transformed to the AU with a broad political mandate within the parameters of conflict prevention,
management and resolution, which includes the R2P. The AU therefore formulated the APSA with the ASF at the centre of its peace and security agenda. Unfortunately, the AU lacks adequate financial and logistics resources as well as the capacity to undertake and accomplish its peace and security initiatives. Additionally, African leaders lack the political will and commitment and are not willing to contribute to regional initiatives at the expense of their individual national programs. So, the APF is under resource. It was therefore not surprising that the AMIS and AMIB which were test cases for the AU’s peacekeeping initiative missions faced severe shortcomings until the UN and Africa’s development partners got involved in these missions.

Funding, logistics requirements and capacity-building from Africa’s development partners are essential in order to enhance the AU’s capacity to implement its peace and security agenda. African PSOs are largely funded by the development partners and are greatly influenced by international advisers and expertise. Thus, the popular rhetoric of African solutions to African problems becomes a dilemma.

However, Africa’s development partners do not honor some of their financial pledges to support African peace and security programs, thus creating delays and uncertainty. It was also observed that they concentrate more on providing training assistance to the AU and its member states but failing to provide the badly needed logistics requirements.

Despite the challenges facing Africa, there is hope for the continent in its efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. That notwithstanding, it is equally important to recognize Africa’s limitations in respect of financial and logistics resources as well as its lack of capacity to successfully implement its peace and security agenda. Therefore,
African leaders must show more commitment to the cause of the AU. Also, there is the need to continue to solicit and mobilize resources from Africa’s development partners and other alternative sources for the implementation and realization of the objectives of the APSA.

Endnotes


2 Ibid.


10 Ibid., 4-5.


15 Ibid., 7-8.

17 Ibid., 7.

18 Ibid., 8-9.


20 Ibid., 91.

21 Ibid., 106.


26 Ibid., Article 11 (1,3).

27 Ibid., Article 12.

28 Ibid., Article 21.

29 Ibid., Article 13.


33 Ibid., 615, 618.


41 Mark Malan, “Conflict Prevention in Africa: Theoretical Construct or Plan of Action?,” 11.

42 Ibid., 3


46 Ibid., 259-262.


Mark Malan, “Conflict Prevention in Africa: Theoretical Construct or Plan of Action?,” 3.


Ibid., 29.


Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa: A Reappraisal, 118.


Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa: A Reappraisal, 119-123.

Ibid., 124-125.

Ibid., 125.

Ibid., 125-127.

Ibid., 127-130.


Ibid., 7.


75 Ibid., 9.

