NATO: IDENTIFYING NEW TRENDS WITHIN AN OLD RELATIONSHIP

A Monograph

by

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**Title and Subtitle:**
NATO: IDENTIFYING NEW TRENDS WITHIN AN OLD RELATIONSHIP

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**Abstract:**
NATO is a resilient organization that has stood on the vanguard of European defense for over seventy years. NATO is an organization that links North America and Europe together. Over time, a relationship of trust and respect has formed between these two entities. The relationship developed from a common threat, and it has been rooted in US leadership and resources. This trend persisted during most of NATO’s history. However, emerging trends of European ascendency begin to surface, initially in the 1960s and then gaining momentum in the 1990s and early 21st Century. These trends are shown both politically, through the emergence of a collective political European identity (EU), and militarily through several European lead NATO operations (KFOR, Operations Active Endeavor / Ocean Shield, and Unified Protector). These emerging trends are a rebalancing of NATO’s leadership and not a reversal of the US and European relationship.

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ABSTRACT

NATO: IDENTIFYING NEW TRENDS WITHIN AN OLD RELATIONSHIP, by Major Michael C. Mays, 53 pages.

NATO is a resilient organization that has stood on the vanguard of European defense for over seventy years. NATO is an organization that links North America and Europe together. Over time, a relationship of trust and respect has formed between these two entities. The relationship developed from a common threat, and it has been rooted in US leadership and resources. This trend persisted during most of NATO’s history. However, emerging trends of European ascendancy begin to surface, initially in the 1960s and then gaining momentum in the 1990s and early 21st Century. These trends are shown both politically, through the emergence of a collective political European identity (EU), and militarily through several European lead NATO operations (KFOR, Operations Active Endeavor / Ocean Shield, and Unified Protector). These emerging trends are a rebalancing of NATO’s leadership and not a reversal of the US and European relationship.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION I – HISTORICAL TREND</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION II- EMERGING POLITICAL TRENDS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Trends</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Trends</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION III – MILITARY TRENDS</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land – Kosovo</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime – Mediterranean and Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air- Libya</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION IV - CONCLUSION</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Command Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDSP</td>
<td>Common Defense Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGM</td>
<td>Precision Guided Munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Lines of Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNMG</td>
<td>Standing NATO Maritime Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STROG</td>
<td>Straits of Gibraltar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 2011 operation, Operation Unified Protector, against the oppressive Qaddafi regime in Libya in defense hundreds of thousands of civilians is widely regarded as a clear, definitive success for NATO and a blueprint for future interventions.1 NATO leveraged regional partners and alliance members to rapidly act and respond to the situation in Libya. NATO’s endurance during the operation is a testament to NATO’s political stalwartness. NATO’s response was extremely effective, costing the alliance less than previous interventions in Balkans and Afghanistan in virtually all aspects (including time, material, financial costs, and lives lost).2 NATO’s accomplishments both strategically and operationally are all the more impressive because the operation was decidedly not United States (US) led and resourced.

The Libyan intervention is in sharp contrast to NATO’s historical roots. Historically, Europe relied heavily upon the US, one of NATO’s pivotal founders, for leadership and resources.3 Europe needed US involvement for several reasons. First, Western Europe, at the conclusion of World War II, was devastated and needed assistance in its recovery. NATO, along with other organizations, helped facilitate portions of the recovery in terms of security. NATO’s charter and structure guaranteed immediate North American involvement in Europe. NATO’s


2 Ibid.

role was one of deterrence against future aggression in Europe. At the time, both European and US leaders expected military and political aggression from Moscow.⁴

NATO’s deterrence mission of defending Europe against the Soviet Union dominated NATO’s narrative, drove resourcing, and established a relationship between Western Europe and the US that was weighted heavily in the US’s favor. France’s withdrawal from NATO, however, marks an initial action representative of European political resistance to US dominance.⁵ Over a forty-five year period, NATO successfully executed its deterrence mission and provided a secure environment that facilitated the resurgence of Western Europe. Following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), NATO’s mission sets began to expand into a myriad of tasks. NATO operations such as Operations Active Endeavor / Ocean Shield, and Unified Protector mark the beginning of a general military trend that shifts NATO away from US leadership and resources toward European leadership and resources. The US’s strategic shift in focus to Asia and continued fiscal austerity and economic contraction at home provide ample reasons for NATO to continue trending toward European ascendency in the alliance.

Against this current operational environment, what is not known is whether a European led NATO has the political will and military capability to conduct operations in a non-US lead environment. This monograph, after considerable study and research, concludes that the alliance can succeed in non-US led operations; in fact, it can and has already succeeded several times. Additionally, increasing European leadership of NATO’s political and military operations is still likely to continue along this emerging path because NATO is, and will continue to be, a resilient organization that adapts and changes to situations and environments. This adaptability is

⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., 33.
important because the loss of NATO as an institution is almost unthinkable. NATO is the most successful, largest, and longest lasting multi-national alliance the world has ever known.  

**Methodology**

Military historians, pundits, and practitioners have long identified that a relationship exists between political will and military force application. This relationship is dynamic in that it is in constant flux: ebbing and flowing between support and opposition, success and failure. Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz created a sound mental model for describing the relationship between nation state politics (internal and external) and the application of military force. Clausewitz states, “war is the product of two inseparable factors, viz the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.” The first portion, total means at his disposal, refers to the resources (personnel, foodstuffs, war instruments, etc.) a state can generate and for this monograph will be referred to as military capability. The second portion, the strength of his will, refers to both the states’ political will and the will of the people. Political will is further refined in this monograph as continued political support through governmental allocation of resources, continued support and membership within the NATO organization, and public demonstrations or affirmations of state support for military actions. Clausewitz continues and draws a relationship between military force employment and political objectives.

This relationship between military force employment and political objectives develops trends when viewed over time through history. These trends remain generally consistent unless

6 Ibid., 8.


8 Ibid., 81.
impacted by contingencies that alter their trajectory. These contingencies can range from environmental impacts such as economic and political considerations, population demographics changes, and unanticipated or unexpected events (for example, the rise of Hitler or the collapse of the USSR). NATO, although impacted by several contingencies during its long tenure, has displayed identifiable trends.

This monograph is comprised of to three sections that will explore Clausewitz’s mental model for trends as it applies to Europe’s strength of will and NATO’s total means. The first section focuses at the strategic level and examines the historic trends. It seeks to show the dynamics of alliance behavior and how that behavior has trended regarding the US and Europe. It shows general historic consensus while highlighting initial dissention and organizational adaptability. The second section answers the following: “Why is a European-led NATO a question?” It builds on section one’s dissention and the establishment of a newly emerging trend. This emerging trend is explored through an examination of some foundational political, economic, and leadership elements within the strategic environments in both the US and Europe. The third section presents a series of case studies that explore NATO’s military capability and European political will through three operational level, European-led campaigns in the land, maritime, and air domains. This section answers whether European military capabilities and political will within NATO are sufficient to conduct sustained operations without significant US-led military capabilities and political direction. Analysis will show that NATO military capabilities use varies in accordance with its mission sets, but both its capabilities and political will have been, and will likely continue to be, on an ascending, positive trend.

Literature Review

Literature on NATO is prolific due to its longevity, success, and importance in history. Pertinent to this monograph and topic are several key authors and works that provide foundational understanding of the topics discussed. First among them is Dr. David Yost, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, who has published numerous articles and books on NATO ranging from NATO’s role in both nuclear and conventional deterrence to alliance structures and their inner-workings. Dr. Yost’s 2005 work, *Dissuasion and Allies*, provides a conceptual underpinning for dissuasion strategies that work against or attempt to dissuade “initiating arms races or competition in military capabilities.”\(^{10}\) The impact of Dr. Yost’s work is twofold because it highlights dissuasion effects, both externally and internally. External dissuasion shows NATO’s role in the nuclear arm races opposing the USSR. Internal dissuasion explores the roots of European dependence on US. Dr. Yost’s strategic perspective, coupled with several other historical journal articles, books, and organizational resources, provides a holistic understanding of NATO’s inception and roots.

Many of the concepts, including alliance dynamics and deterrence, captured in Dr. Yost’s works are echoed in the book *NATO 2.0 Reboot or Delete?* by Sarwar A. Kashmeri. Kashmeri provides many of the same historical insights Dr. Yost has observed, but he furthers one’s understanding by exploring Europe’s developing and expanding security apparatus, specifically

the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Recent security apparatus expansions show empirical evidence of increasing political strength within Europe. Although CSDP is in competition with NATO for resources, and both are working through how the two security apparatuses (new and old) will work together, they both share the new political assertiveness.

Finally, Guy Toremans’ interview NATO’s Counter-piracy Operation OCEAN SHIELD: Interview with Rear Admiral Sinan Azmi Tosun, Commander SNMG-2 and Acting Commander CTF- 508 and Canadian Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard’s Hampton Roads article Coalition Building and the Future of NATO Operations both provide commander level insights into the operational workings of NATO and the challenges faced in their operations. These articles explain the successes of NATO and the evolution of European led operations. Additionally, they show how far the evolution still needs to go.

SECTION I – HISTORICAL TREND

“NATO was created to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”
- Lord Ismay, NATO’s First Secretary-General, 1949

Understanding the past assists in putting the present into context. In studying NATO’s storied history, a past that ranges back over sixty-three years, one comes to understand how adaptable NATO has been to political and environmental change – a feature that will likely continue into the future. NATO’s US and European relationship began as one of mutual need and became one of US dominance: dominance in terms of leadership and military resources (nuclear and conventional strength). During this period, the early embers of divergence and an emergence of European political leadership also begin to take shape as both Britain and France acquired nuclear armaments. France then withdrew from NATO in an attempt to lead Europe in a different direction.

The concept of NATO started at the conclusion of World War II. Two main thoughts were behind the concept. First, the European powers, namely Britain and France, were seeking a measure that would bring North America, namely the US and Canada, immediately into a European war should the need arise again. Secondly, an antagonist East-West dichotomy returned Europe to an environment of hostility, which called for a mechanism to provide equilibrium. The USSR, with Moscow as its symbolic capital, presented the West with both a military and a political threat. The political threat was a “threat nearer home; a rising tide of Communism in Western Europe.” This dual threat required both political and military solutions. Politically, the US sought a free and prosperous Western Europe to counter Communist ideology, and therefore the US initiated programs such as the Marshall Plan, which poured much needed resources into a

12 Kashmeri, NATO 2.0 Reboot or Delete?, 22.

13 Hanning, NATO Our Guarantee of Peace, 15.
recovering Western Europe. The balancing between former allies turned competitors continued for several years until the 1948 Berlin Airlift crisis. Because of all these pressures and events, the Western nations created an official military mechanism called NATO on April 4, 1949. The organization formalized a mutual defense treaty, Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, in response to the USSR’s perceived threat to North America and Europe. Article V of the Treaty specified that if any nation attacked an alliance member the other alliance members would come to its defense. Western Europe’s solidarity in uniting with North America and creating NATO played an immediate role in affecting Moscow’s decision-making. For example, as NATO was formed, “within 5 weeks the blockade [Berlin] was lifted.” Five months after the NATO treaty was signed the USSR successfully tested its first nuclear weapon, changing the political and military dynamics of the organization. The test shook the international community and made Europe the regional nuclear focal point. Prior to this, the US was the only nuclear power in the world, and as the economic power post-WW II, the US assumed a principal position within NATO. US contributions to NATO anchored strategic nuclear deterrence capabilities and


16 NATO, “NATO and the Scourage of Europe,” http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm (accessed March 14, 2013). “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

17 Hanning, NATO Our Guarantee of Peace, 16.
provided the alliance with a strong conventional partner. The US role in NATO was particularly
evident in its leadership of both the political and military direction of the organization.

US leadership helped NATO develop strategic concepts that would adapt and change to the politics and environment of the time. NATO, at its founding, faced a Russian-led force that was militarily conventionally superior to the combined strength of NATO. In January of 1951, the “USSR had 175 divisions [and] 20,000 tanks; NATO had 19 divisions which could climb to 34 after mobilizations.”18 Assessing the USSR’s conventional superiority and relative nuclear weakness against NATO’s conventional inferiority and relative nuclear strength, NATO, therefore, created its initial strategic concept of “Massive Retaliation” in 1954 at the direction of the Eisenhower administration. Massive Retaliation’s was the use of US nuclear forces with the intent of making war ‘too costly’ for the USSR. In response, the USSR created its own mutual defense organization, the Warsaw Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, commonly known as the Warsaw Pact, to mirror NATO in 1955.19 NATO’s strategic concept and the East/West standoff placed NATO clearly in the role of deterrence. In addition to setting NATO’s role, Massive Retaliation placed Western Europe’s defense in the hands of others, primarily the US. As Yost observes, “Western Europe effectively abandoned responsibility for their own defense. Their own armed forces, forces which have always had the social role of embodying national self-consciousness and will to independent existence, became almost peripheral, part of a mechanism of nuclear deterrence the ultimate control of which lay

18 Ibid., 25.
19 NATO, Strategic Concepts.
elsewhere.” The role of deterrence and nuclear dependency firmly rooted the US in a position of dominance within the organization.

US leadership then undertook a campaign to dissuade the development of nuclear capabilities in order to retain its strategic advantage. US dissuasion efforts to prevent the expansion and proliferation of nuclear development targeted both internal and external audiences. Internally, the US was successful in curbing many NATO allies’ desires to obtain nuclear capabilities. Both Britain and France, however, veered away from US dissuasion efforts. Yost notes that both “France and the United Kingdom have long traditions of national autonomy as great powers, and remain correspondingly less willing to accept dependence on others... both are nuclear weapon states and have the greatest expeditionary and power-projection capabilities among the NATO European allies.” Britain’s nuclear armaments would peak to 350 by 1975, while France’s nuclear weapons would eventually peak at 430 in 1988.

The USSR was the US’s external target. Nuclear armaments had achieved a level where their use was counter-productive and the ensuing arms race was reaching levels of absurdity between the external competitors (the US nuclear stockpile peaked at 27,296 weapons in 1972; the USSR nuclear stockpile peaked at 40,723 weapons in 1986). In the late 1940s Winston Churchill commented on excessive nuclear weapons use, saying, “‘There is no point in making the rubble bounce.’” Twenty years later [during the 1960s], Dr. Kissinger arrived at the same

20 Yost, Dissuasion and Allies, 6.
21 Yost, Dissuasion and Allies, 5.
22 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
conclusion: ‘What is the use of nuclear superiority?’ he said, ‘What do you do with it?’”

The fear of global nuclear destruction then created social pressures that influenced the political environment. NATO’s participation in various treaties, namely the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) resulted in nuclear inventory and delivery capabilities reduction.

The US nuclear dominance relative to Europe far surpassed its dominance in conventional capabilities. Conventionally the US was more of a partner and shared contributor to European defense. NATO’s Massive Retaliation concept would endure until the early 1960s when US leadership, under President John F. Kennedy, changed the concept to “Flexible Response” as the result of the US’s experience in Korea and Vietnam. Flexible Response forced NATO to change its military capabilities mixture from one dependent upon US nuclear capabilities for nuclear deterrence to one more adaptable and able to fight along numerous conflict levels, from total warfare to irregular or guerrilla warfare. The general concept of Flexible Response would experience several minor permutations and adjustments over the next twenty years; however, in principle it remained relatively intact.

A vote of confidence on US leadership happened shortly after Flexible Response became the new strategic concept. France, in an effort to assert itself and lead Europe, withdrew from NATO because of French President Charles De Gaulle’s belief that Europe needed a European Army with France in the lead. According to the NATO Information Service, “In March [1966] the French Government announced it intended to withdraw French personnel from the NATO


26 NATO, Strategic Concepts.

27 Ibid.
integrated Military Headquarters, terminate the assignment of French forces to the international commands, and request the transfer from French territory of the International Headquarters, allied units and installations or bases not falling under the control of the French Authorities.”

However, the majority of Western European countries did not follow France’s break with US leadership in Europe. In fact, many nations did diversify their capabilities and stayed within a US led framework. As European economies improved, Europe’s percentage of defense spending within NATO increased. For example, in 1970 the US percentage of NATO expenditures was roughly 76%, while in 1980 that amount had decreased to 56%. Conversely, the US spent a higher portion of its GDP (average roughly 5%) on defense than its Western European counterparts and other Alliance members - a trend consistent today. In terms of personnel, NATO military personnel strength within Europe was decidedly European. In 1980, for example, of NATO’s 5.2 million military personnel, 3.1 million were European. Finally, by 1986 the alliance diversification in equipment was enormous, with the alliance producing, “100 different anti-aircraft/tank/ship missiles, 36 types of radar, 23 kinds of combat aircraft and 7 different main battle tanks.”

While viewing Western Europe as a military collective, one must consider the caveat that, each nation’s contribution varied both militarily and politically. This resulted in continued US conventional dominance within the alliance.

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29 Ibid., 317.

30 Ibid., 319.

31 Ibid., 322.

32 Hanning, NATO Our Guarantee of Peace, 24.
NATO’s historic deterrence role against the USSR and Warsaw Pact ended with the completion of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR. US leadership and resourcing, especially regarding nuclear capabilities, created a trend of US dominance. France and Britain both took measures to retain their autonomy and assert their own leadership within NATO and Western Europe. France and Britain also sought nuclear weapons and became nuclear powers, but, although they had the capability to diverge from US nuclear leadership, they remained within a loose consensual nuclear framework. France’s withdrawal from NATO added complexity to the defense of Europe, but it was not representative of the rest of Western Europe. France and Britain’s actions set the beginnings of European leadership within NATO, beginnings that would form an emerging trend as the Cold War ended and NATO evolved and changed.
SECTION II- EMERGING POLITICAL TRENDS

“If we get the capabilities, NATO, along with the European Union can do amazing things.”
-Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary-General, 1999-2003

From the end of the Cold War to the early portions of the twenty-first century, a period of roughly twenty years, NATO experienced two emerging trends within an ever changing environment: an environment containing forceful dynamics (including a global recession and international terrorism), and the emergence of multi-polarity within the international system. During this period, the US trend was one of general withdrawal from Europe and reorientation elsewhere for both domestic and international security and economic reasons.34 Europe trended toward a more collective identity, which gave “Europe” a more imposing voice. Europe’s counter trend of concern is the global recession and Europe’s tendency to abdicate military strength for domestic stability.35 In short, the US position of power, while still dominant within the alliance, is receding, while European leadership of NATO is ascending in a positive trend.

US Trends

A myriad of factors affect national trends. The US historical trend toward NATO has been one of stalwart support and the primary provider of military and political leadership.36 The US will retain its commitment to Europe and NATO; however, due to resource constraints and

33 Kashmeri, NATO 2.0 Reboot or Delete?, 131.


36 Hallams and Schreer, Towards a ‘post-American’ alliance? NATO burden sharing after Libya, 315.
recent political directives, the previous levels of high commitment will likely decline, and that will require more European commitment. The US’s recent shift in focus to the Pacific region, its lagging economic performance, which has budgetary impacts, and its recent force retrenchment stateside provide evidence for this emerging trend.

The US strategic shift away from Europe and toward Asia began in the latter portions of President George W. Bush’s presidency and became official policy during President Obama’s administration. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that, “Central Europe is relatively peaceful. With the notable exception of the Balkans, Europe is largely at peace. Central European states are increasingly integrated with the West both politically and economically. An opportunity for cooperation exists with Russia. It does not pose a large-scale conventional military threat to NATO.” The changing view of a once dominate threat and focal area generated discussion on force disposition and structure. The QDR went on to note that “this overseas presence posture, concentrated in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, is inadequate for the new strategic environment, in which US interests are global and potential threats in other areas of the world are emerging.”

The shift in focus from Europe sharpened on new threats shortly after 9/11, as US attention drew first to Central Asia (Afghanistan) and later to the Middle East (Iraq). President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld held the opinion that terrorism presented a new threat to the US and required an expansive view of where the threat could come from- namely a shift from former Soviet satellites and Europe to a global jihad.


38 Ibid., 25.

This shift in perspective also required an adaptive US force that was able to meet a variety of adversaries.

The US perspective resulted in policy changes in Europe and a focus on Asia. In Europe, the US pursued (and continues to pursue) a regional engagement strategy. John Barry, a senior Newsweek magazine National Security Correspondent, noted “Washington put its emphasis on political work encouraging regional powers to negotiate their own solutions to regional problems. . . U.S. power would be used mainly as a ‘balancing leverage’ to maintain stability in regional rivalries.”\(^{40}\) The underlying intent is that Europe solves European problems. This same sentiment is echoed in the Kosovo land campaign case study. Having Europeans more involved in European problems frees up US resources for other areas. President Obama codified the current US focus area as Asia in his recent announcement of the US strategic pivot following the conclusion of US involvement in Iraq in 2011 and Afghanistan 2014. This view was later reinforced by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s America’s Pacific Century speech, when she outlined the broad concept of the Obama administration’s “Asian Pivot.”\(^{41}\) The US policy focus and increased attention towards Asia appear to have bi-partisan interest. In the 2012 US presidential election campaign, President Obama, Democrat, and Republican challenger, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, participated in a foreign policy debate and during the debate Iran, Israel, and China were mentioned over thirty times, while Europe and Africa were only mentioned

\(^{40}\) Ibid.

Once. This political change has been spurred by both relative peace and stability in Europe and increasing fiscal budgetary concerns, the result of poor economic conditions; these combined conditions have forced the US to concentrate resources and accept risk.

The global recession affects US capabilities, both domestically and internationally. America’s continual practice of borrowing money to meet budgetary shortfalls has been ongoing for over thirty years; however, the accumulated debt has reached alarming proportions with rippling domestic and international affects. Domestically, politicians, both conservative and liberal, have created automatic expenditure reductions, termed sequestration, that target discretionary spending. Among the automatic expenditure reductions, US defense spending comprises a large percentage of proposed cuts. Analysts have stated that the “sequester is a 15% across-the-board-cuts, [and] it looks at budget numbers rather than rational cuts” the effect, potentially, being the loss of new research, including projects and programs which provide the US its technical advantage, which will create serious security impacts. Sequestration is only the most recent example of the US having to deal with budgetary constraints during austere economic times. During the Great Depression of the mid-1930s, ambitious political adventurism was curtailed due to severe economic hardship. Consequently, US military expenditures shrank and the impact rippled through the services. For example, historian Michael Matheny observed, “In 1932, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, noted in his annual report to the


44 Ibid.
secretary of war “the universal and inescapable influence” of the economic depression.”45 The depression’s impact upon the Army manifested as reductions in force and program development, notably interwar period armor development, and political isolationism, which led to continental basing and employment reluctance – both trends that continue in modern times.

Internal budgetary impacts and policy changes have forced the consolidation of the US expeditionary military capability from its forward basing to domestic basing and will likely result in a decrease in monetary expenditures to allied countries and organizations. Kori Schake, former Director for Defense Strategy and Requirements in President George W. Bush’s National Security Council, states, “The Obama administration is signaling that most cuts, at least those that can be regionally allocated, will come in Europe.”46 A reorientation of defense posture must consider that the US has already begun the domestic retrenchment of its military capability by rebasing stateside numerous Army, Navy, and Air Force capabilities. This downsizing is a trend that started shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union and has continued today.47 The numbers over time validate the trend. In the late 1980s at the height of the Cold War, US forces “had 375,000 troops permanently stationed in Europe,” whereas today that number is under 70,000.48

In addition to the physical reduction of military capability, NATO also faces an additional monetary issue related to the US’s economic woes. The US’s contribution to NATO’s overall


47 Barry, *Historic Shift in US Defense Strategy will have Major Impact on Europe*. “All are in Europe: bringing home two (of four) army brigades; shutting down a CORPS headquarters; inactivating two Air Force squadrons based in Europe; closing four of twelve Army bases in Germany; bringing home 10,000 of the 80,000 U.S. service personnel in Europe.”

48 Kashmeri, *NATO 2.0 Reboot or Delete?*, 27.
budget has been significant over the past decade. In fact, “The US currently accounts for 75% of all NATO spending, compared with only half of the NATO total at the turn of the century.”  

A portion of the 75% total is the result of US expenditures in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). However, as Afghanistan operations transition from resource intensive counter-insurgency (COIN) and stability operations to regional and partner assistance operations, it is unlikely that US contributions will remain at current levels.

Finally, the political shift and economic realities have forced hard decisions upon US administrations. Recently, “President Obama explained that American Leadership of NATO is not ‘going it alone and bearing all the burden ourselves. Real leadership creates conditions . . . to work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs’.”  

With regard to Europe, the US’s emerging political and military strategy is harkening back to and mirroring the pre-WW I period when US forces (both domestic defense and expeditionary) were almost entirely based within the continental US, and access to global forward operating bases was contracted through allies, either through treaty or negotiations.  

An analysis of US trends shows an America where economic troubles and political shifts have cast a die. That die shows US interest remaining in Europe, although the preponderance of its focus is oriented to the Pacific and Asia. In light of these US trends, an examination of Europe’s ability to persevere in NATO, and the associated military and political trends, is warranted.

49 Barry, Historic Shift in US Defense Strategy will have Major Impact on Europe.


51 Barry, Historic Shift in US Defense Strategy will have Major Impact on Europe.
European Trends

Europe, since the Treaty of Westphalia, has historically been a continent filled with numerous independent nation states. These nation states differed socially, culturally, militarily, politically, and economically which led to numerous inter-European wars and conflicts. Europe, as a result, has shown a propensity to seek frameworks, structures, and mechanisms that provide security and stability. Generally, once Europeans are committed to these devices they continue in them as long as possible. NATO has been and continues to be one of Europe’s most effective collective security apparatuses. Seeing the benefit of NATO and needing to compete more efficiently on an international scale, Europeans began to broaden their collective behavior into the political and economic realms. This new broadening generated an emerging trend towards a European collective identity. This collective identity took many forms, but it was formalized in the European Union (EU), Europe’s collective political apparatus. This collective identity and a feeling that “Europe” should take its rightful position in the emerging multi-polar world manifested itself in Europe’s security apparatus. The manifestation became an EU addition and competitor to NATO and a re-emergence of European leadership within NATO.

Three European nations dominate NATO as key contributors to Europe’s political environment. Britain, France, and Germany are commonly seen as the most influential nations within NATO (except for the US) and the EU. They have enormous impact on the NATO environment in setting conditions and providing leadership. According to analyst Sergey Smolnikov, “the Big Three have more capabilities in projecting their values and norms within and

[^52]: Smolnikov, Beyond Afghanistan: Recharging European Foreign and Security Policy, 81.
beyond . . . [and] their comparative advantages in certain areas of low and high politics excel.\textsuperscript{53}

In a broad sense where the “Big Three” go the rest of NATO (except for the US) and Europe follow.

France and Britain, concerned with the continuing issues in the Balkans and fear of a US withdrawal from Europe, put aside centuries of mistrust and opposition, and paved the way for the creation of an EU military capacity at the 1998 Franco-Britain Summit at St. Malo.\textsuperscript{54} The EU, as a result of the summit, created the Union’s High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which, after the 2009 Lisbon Conference, is the mechanism that consolidates foreign and security policy decision making.\textsuperscript{55} The CFSP published policy which states “the objective of interventions is not “victory” as traditionally understood, but moderation, balance of interests and peaceful resolution of conflicts – in short, stability.”\textsuperscript{56} In order to execute the political policy, the EU created the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which is a military arm of the EU. The US response to the CSDP was delivered by then US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who welcomed any new military capabilities to the defense of Europe. However, she stressed that any new additions to European security apparatus outside of NATO must confirm to three conditions: 1) not decouple from existing security apparatuses, 2) no duplication of scarce resources, and 3) must not be non-prejudicial against

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{54} Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming, “Beyond Fashoda: Anglo-French security cooperation in Africa since Saint-Malo,” \textit{International Affairs} 86, no. 5 (2010): 1129.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{55} Smolnikov, \textit{Beyond Afghanistan: Recharging European Foreign and Security Policy}, 79.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 83.}
non-EU NATO members. CSDP adhered to most of these conditions and conducted numerous regional small-scale operations typically involving civil development and governance. Notable CSDP military missions include their counter piracy and Darfur operations. In 2003, NATO and CSDP agreed that NATO retains right of first refusal on all missions; however, the EU has rarely sought NATO approval. Europeans generally look to NATO as a defender of Europe and to CSDP as an additional tool for EU policy.

The CSDP does not show increased European leadership within NATO, but it does show increased leadership within Europe and for specific operations. Additionally, the CSDP shows the beginning of European ascendency on the international stage. European ascendency began with France’s early departure from NATO in the 1960s. France’s departure from NATO, the result of too much US leadership, was reversed when France re-entered NATO in 2008. President Sarkozy brought France back into NATO under the condition that leadership positions within NATO would be addressed and rebalanced in favor of European officers. France, although arguing for more European officers in general, sought and obtained the position of Supreme Allied Commander of Transformation (SACT). This position was previously always held by the US. France’s rejoining of NATO as a key leader within the alliance and Europe’s collective regional assertiveness bodes well for the emerging trend of increased European political leadership. The trend, however, is relatively new and susceptible to counter trends within the environment, namely Europe’s tendency to favor domestic spending over military spending and the global economic recession.


58 Kashmeri, NATO 2.0 Reboot or Delete?, 106-108.

59 Ibid., 43.
Europe historically places social priorities over security in terms of resource allocation, specifically material, funding, and personnel. Europe is a formidable economic, political, and military force when taken together. Europe’s (EU-27) cumulative GDP exceeds that of the US, and it provides Europe with the capability to support the largest defense expenditures in the world. The financial ability to support defense, however, has not translated into the commensurate political support, and thus resources have not been dedicated to achieving a high level of defense capabilities. As a result, “Europe [is] the world’s second largest military power with $289 billion in military budgets in 2008 and a 2 million strong military personnel.”

Europe, with the notable exception of Britain, has continuously spent less, as a percentage of GDP, than the US. Europe, Japan, and other allied nations allied have been able to forgo commensurate GDP percentage expenses because the US has largely filled these requirements. Europe’s tendency to spend on domestic programs over military expenditures has been amplified in austere economic environments.

The recent global economic recession, in a similar manner to the US recession, is the primary factor affecting Europe’s cohesive defense environment. The resulting budgetary impacts present European governments with tough choices between domestic and intra-European (EU fiscal bailouts) spending and defense spending. According to analyst Christos Katsioulis, “virtually all member states are facing challenges of living up to their duties as NATO allies while at the same time making massive cuts in defence spending.”

60 Smolnikov, Beyond Afghanistan: Recharging European Foreign and Security Policy, 81-2.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid., 81.

63 Christos Katsioulis, “The New NATO Strategy, A Temporary Compromise,” *FES International*
members of the “Big Three”, particularly Germany’s Chancellor Merkel, has been instrumental in facilitating intra-European loans or “bailouts” to other EU countries. With the recession, the Euro zone’s population has seen record highs in unemployment: “Unemployment in the Euro zone rose in September (2012) to a record high of 11.6% . . . Spain, with its sluggish economy, has the highest unemployment rate at 25.8%, followed by Greece at 25.1% and Portugal at 15.7%.”64 In comparison, the US suffered an average unemployment rate of 15.1% during the Great Depression (1929-1939), with a peak of roughly 25% at its height.65 Understandably, governments and their equivalent defense departments are striving to strike a balance between expenditure types. Those European members not as affected as Spain and Greece are equally wary. High unemployment and tough fiscal conditions, similar to those in the US, will affect military capabilities, which will be apparent in the NATO’s counter-piracy, maritime case study. Lastly, Madeline Albright’s second condition, “no redundancy of scarce resources” becomes even more critical in this environment.

The US’s commitment to Europe will likely endure into the near future and beyond; however, competing global priorities and troubled economic times require a reduction in the level of support and leadership. Fortunately for Europe, emerging trends in the environment point to an ascending Europe. The EU, the political rudder for a collective Europe, is developing military capabilities and, more importantly, a willingness to assert European political will regionally. This

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assertiveness has translated into France’s return NATO and leadership reconfiguration within the alliance. All of these factors affect Europe’s ability to conduct and sustain European-led NATO operations, but NATO stands ready to shoulder the burden. The following section presents case studies that exemplify NATO’s perseverance.

SECTION III – MILITARY TRENDS

“The world has changed. The threats have changed. So has NATO.”
- NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, Lisbon Summit 2010

NATO has proven itself historically adaptive and resourceful. The following case studies provide specific evidence as to whether or not a European-led NATO has the capability to conduct and sustain operations. The case studies will analyze non-US led or European centric NATO operations in terms of leadership, material and personnel resources, and political will. The analysis will narrow case studies to within the three domains of land (KFOR), maritime (Operation Active Endeavor/Operation Ocean Shield), and air (Operation Unified Protector), and exclude cyber and space domains. The nature of warfare today routinely requires operations that encompass all these domains; however, the operational distinction between domains comes from force preponderance. The analysis is European focused and excludes Europe’s remarkable contributions to Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF), as the US had and continues to shoulder the majority of the burden.

European-led NATO operations have progressed along an increasing trajectory of intensity. The trajectory starts with NATO’s first European land campaign in the Balkans, where it conducted peace enforcement and peace keeping operations. Next, NATO’s counter piracy/terrorism maritime operations evolved from escort to interdiction missions on the high

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seas. Lastly, NATO’s recent air campaign in Libya went from a humanitarian (Responsibility to Protect –R2P) mission to a regime change operation. These operations mark positive trends toward European self-sufficiency; however, similar to the political trend, counter-trends exist. Each study will consist of a brief discussion of the strategic context within which the operation(s) was conducted, then it is followed by a description of the actions conducted, and it will conclude with a trend assessment of the operation(s) in terms of strengths and weaknesses, capability shortfalls, and adequacy.

Land – Kosovo

After the fall of the Soviet Union and the death of Marshal Tito, Yugoslavia became embroiled with nationalistic fervor and ethnic and religious strife. By the mid-1990s, Yugoslavia had degenerated from a cohesive nation into several warring regions, each claiming sovereignty. As the disparate parties, the Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats, became more ruthless in the persecution of their respective wars, calls to intervene began throughout the international community. NATO, under UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), conducted peace enforcement operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As the 1990s ended, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo began to break away from Serbia. Albanians fought in an organization called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and engaged Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s regime elements. The KLA were militarily overmatched by Milosevic’s forces, and Albanians within Kosovo began to suffer. Milosevic’s regime earned a reputation for brutality in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it continued to re-enforce its dubious distinction. Attempted diplomacy during the 1999 Rambouillet Conference failed to

curb the violence in Kosovo; therefore, the international community called for intervention.\textsuperscript{68} NATO, as a result, began an air campaign and threatened a ground campaign to follow (with planning horizon of three months).\textsuperscript{69} The air campaign, Operation Allied Force, started on March 24, 1999 and continued for eleven weeks, resulting in roughly 38,000 sorties being flown with approximately 10,500 strike missions.\textsuperscript{70} NATO strikes unleashed 12,000 tons of munitions and crippled Serbia’s economy and infrastructure with lasting effects: 70\% of road bridges, 50\% rail bridges destroyed or damaged; 100,000 unemployed due to destroyed manufacturing with another 500,000 in-directly; and repair costs in the tens of billions.\textsuperscript{71} President Milosevic, having miscalculated NATO’s political willingness to continue its relentless aerial bombardment and fearing regime collapse from internal domestic political pressures, eventually agreed to modified terms that allowed him to save face domestically.\textsuperscript{72} The terms were articulated in UNSCR 1244, which provided the framework for Serbian withdrawal and NATO’s second ground intervention and first European-led ground operation, Operation Joint Guardian. NATO’s ground forces were referred to as the Kosovo Force, or KFOR, and were a compilation of NATO alliance members, non-member forces, and international partner forces. KFOR entered Kosovo on a peace-keeping mission, and, if necessary, a peace-enforcement mission, on June 12, 1999.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 92.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 83.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 107.
KFOR entered Kosovo with an international force of 50,000 NATO alliance members and partners. The US ground force, TF Hawk, was composed of 7,000 members or 14% of the peace-keeping forces - a ratio US forces maintained until their departure in 2008. The beginning of the operation was filled with tension as Serbian forces withdrew and NATO forces entered Kosovo. The transition of responsibility complete, NATO began the initial task of ensuring security and the long, arduous process of peace keeping. NATO’s initial five years were the most tumultuous as Kosovo followed a stormy path to nationhood. The initial years were characterized by low levels of violence that were the result of multiple elements vying for power in the early elections of 2001, 2002, and 2004.

The command and control and intelligence fusion and dissemination functions of NATO’s ground forces were initial operational issues. Command and control at the strategic level resided with the US, as General Wesley Clark was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). At the operational level, senior European leaders rotated through the Commander KFOR (COMKFOR) position. Command and control became challenging at the operational level because the Kosovo mission was not considered Article V operations, and that translated into various nations placing caveats on employing and continually influencing the control of their forces. The operational impact was increased complexity among the force and a diffusion of unity of effort. The COMKFOR and subordinate commanders’ intelligence operation’s


75 Ibid., 6.

76 NATO, NATO’s Role in Kosovo.

drawbacks were antithetical to normal intelligence drawbacks. Normally, intelligence assets are in short supply and there is never enough capability. US intelligence collection assets were made readily available to KFOR. The problem was that they provided too much information, and KFOR had insufficient capabilities to analyze and fuse what was collected. Additionally, once the information was finally analyzed and turned into intelligence, dissemination throughout KFOR was slowed due to national caveats. According to the US Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, “An unprecedented amount of resources were poured into Kosovo by the international community, which as experience has shown, can actually hinder information sharing.” NATO was able to work through these issues, but they initially hampered operational effectiveness.

NATO’s successful operations led to force reductions over time. Smaller forces would prove problematic in 2004, when ethnic tensions between Serbians and Albanians resurfaced. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), the principal political decision-making body within NATO, displayed Europe’s political commitment to seeing the operation through by authorizing a surge of 2,500 additional forces, and at the 2004 NATO summit, “leaders condemned the renewed ethnic violence and reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to a secure, stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo.” By 2008, KFOR’s strength was under 17,000, and US forces withdrew from the peace-keeping operation. Sentiment for a European-led mission remained decidedly European. According to the Congressional Research Service, “Increasingly, many observers on both sides of the Atlantic emphasize that Europe has a larger stake than the United States in stability in

78 Ibid., 449.
79 Ibid., 661.
80 NATO, NATO’s Role in Kosovo.
southeastern Europe, and that European nations should lead international efforts in Kosovo. In 2012, KFOR’s strength was roughly 5,000 troops, and it is projected to decrease even further as security improves and Kosovo no longer needs a peace keeping force.

NATO’s land domain operations began many of the trends that trace through the other domains and case studies. Land operations were initially marred by complex command and control problems. This complexity would continue in future NATO non-Article V operations, but NATO has shown considerable improvement. Intelligence fusion and analysis, similar to command and control, will improve significantly in future operations; however, asset availability, the traditional drawback, will become more pronounced in succeeding case studies. Lastly, Europe’s political willingness to endure, and its propensity to increase the operational intensity of operations and its commitment to operations will become foundation for future case studies.

Maritime – Mediterranean and Gulf of Aden

Europe has a proud maritime tradition. Early European mariners traveled the maritime domain in search of riches and conquest. Many of Europe’s most powerful nations owe their ascendance to their understanding and ability to control the maritime domain. The maritime domain’s importance remains critical today because more than half of the Earth’s surface is covered in water. Human populations continue to congregate near water sources with 80% of the world’s population living in the littoral regions (within 100 miles of the coast). Lastly, the

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world’s economic arteries remain the sea line of communications (SLOC) which account for 90% of the world’s commerce.  

NATO’s naval power remains tied to keeping the maritime domain open. NATO has focused on ensuring safe passage of traffic along the SLOC since the collapse of the Soviet Union removed direct force on force maritime threats. In 1994, NATO created the NATO Security Partnership Programs in an effort to create international frameworks that facilitate security. The maritime equivalent was the Mediterranean Dialogue Process, which encouraged participants from North Africa, the Middle East, Turkey, and others to discuss mutual security interests. These countries were chosen due to their proximity to vital SLOC. These frameworks and emphasis remain reflected in NATO’s 2011 Maritime Strategy that states, “75% of trade passes through a few, vulnerable, canals and international straits. Global trade relies upon secure and low-cost international maritime transportation and distribution networks that are vulnerable to disruption.”

Increased global economic interconnectedness, facilitated by the maritime SLOC, has created a new era of “globalization.” Globalization has spread both culturally and economically, and it is generally seen as a positive force. However, globalization has created two significant problem sets for the maritime environment. Globalization’s economic benefits have not spread equally, therefore increasing tensions between haves’ and have not’s, and increasing maritime piracy. Additionally, many think of globalization as Westernization, and it has met with

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85 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy- March 18, 2011.
discontent as traditionalists rebuff cultural and societal encroachment. This discontent, among other contributing factors, manifested itself into the tragic events of 9/11.\(^{86}\) NATO’s response was to invoke Article V, the collective defense clause, in support of an alliance member; this was the first time the clause had been evoked since the creation of the alliance.\(^{87}\) NATO maritime forces began conducting, and continue to conduct, counter-terrorism operations (including Operation Active Endeavor) to show solidarity and support Article V.

In October of 2001, NATO’s naval assets, including frigates and patrol boats, were organized into a naval task group that deployed with other assets such as the Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) to the Straits of Gibraltar (STROG). Their mission was to protect merchant shipping and deny the movement of terrorist logistics along the strategically important maritime SLOC. According to analyst Jorge Parczyk, “The strait between the southernmost point of Spain and the northern coast of Morocco, which is just 14 kilometers wide, is the narrowest strait between the European and African continents.”\(^{88}\) NATO’s naval forces, over the next three years, conducted surveillance and monitored over 41,000 vessels, boarded (compliant) over 47 vessels, and escorted over 414 Allied non-combat ships through the STROG.\(^{89}\) STROG counter-terrorism operations in support OEF and later OIF continued through 2004, when the alliance expanded the operation, through its partners, to the entire Mediterranean.


At the 2004 Istanbul Summit in Turkey, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that ‘projecting stability’ was one of NATO’s strategic priorities and listed Operation Active Endeavour among the key mechanisms to accomplish the task.\(^{90}\) NATO, encouraged by continued political support, expanded through partnerships as well as a broadening of their mission set to incorporate a more comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism operations. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue Process partners contributed to counter-terrorism efforts. The initial integration of their contributions (including vessels, intelligence, facilities, etc.) proved challenging, but integration problems were overcome through continuous efforts. Additionally, the Mediterranean Dialogue Process enticed other non-NATO nations to contribute. Notable among contributing nations was Russia. In 2006, NATO announced Russia’s participation in Operation Active Endeavor as a “historic reunion of two partners – NATO and Russia - cementing their growing ties in an operational engagement at sea countering the common threat of maritime terrorism.”\(^{91}\) Russian forces had previously been contributing members in KFOR. In addition to the political goodwill of adding additional partners, Russia also brought a fast patrol craft capability. The Russians used a craft that the Russian naval industry had produced that was 10% faster than NATO craft.\(^{92}\) The increased speed of the fast patrol boats allowed the Active Endeavor forces to react more rapidly to potential threats. Finally, Active Endeavor’s operational responsibilities expanded to include law enforcement activities, which tangentially supported their counter-terrorism mission. For example, Active Endeavor forces supported


Greece’s operations to stop illegal immigration. The NATO maritime commander, Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti, commented that, “Although this event relates to criminals, there is also a message for terrorists here- we are looking for you, and when we find you- there will be no place to hide.”

NATO’s ability to provide adequate military capabilities, expand mission sets, and incorporate and integrate partners, including both non-alliance and alliance members, were all positive trends.

NATO’s political perseverance and military stamina is displayed in Active Endeavor’s decade long prosecution and likely continuation into the future. To date, over 50 countries have contributed, more than 100,000 vessels have been contacted, and 160 have been boarded. NATO’s actions have helped ensure the strategically vital STROG and Mediterranean SLOCs are secure and that over 7,000 merchant vessels using them daily do so in the relative assurance that the passage will be free of terrorist activity.

However, the oceans are vast and resurgence of piracy presents NATO with their second major problem set in the maritime environment. The positive lessons learned from Operation Active Endeavour have informed and continued in NATO’s counter-piracy operations, Operation Ocean Shield.

NATO’s counter-piracy operations are unique in that they draw resources primarily from NATO’s standing capability and partner capabilities. NATO’s standing maritime forces are one of six alliance command operations (ACO) capabilities: 1) NATO Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff (JEWCS), 2) Strategic Airlift Capability, 3) NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), 4) AWACS, 5) NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

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Battalion, and Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMG) 1 and 2. The SNMGs fall under the operational control of Maritime Command HQ based out of Northwood, UK. The SNMGs are multinational, integrated naval forces comprised of various alliance nations with the majority coming from Europe. As an example, SNMG 1, permanently assigned to NATO, operates as a quick response force and has a 3:2 ratio of non-US to US personnel; SNMG 2’s ratio is 5:1. The SNMG’s operational flagships have historically been European.

The use of SNMGs in NATO’s counter-piracy operations has evolved through various mission names, which have changed due to success and mission expansion. In 2008, SNMG forces participated in Operation Allied Provider. Their mission was to safely escort UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels carrying out humanitarian aid missions to Africa. Increased piracy in the Gulf of Aden off the Horn of African threatened both UN operations as well as commercial shipping; therefore, in 2009, NATO expanded its mission set to incorporate this additional area of responsibility, similar to Active Endeavour’s geographic expansion. Mission expansion to commercial shipping protection and geographic area led to the operational name being changed to Operation Allied Protector. In March of 2009, NATO’s mandate was enhanced to incorporate a more comprehensive approach: expanded integration and regional maritime


capacity building. The enhanced mandate led to the counter-piracy operation’s current designation Operation Ocean Shield.

NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield is but one of several contributing organizations and efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. Operation Ocean Shield commanders meet with the US’s counter piracy force (CJTF 151), EUNAVFOR, and others (for example Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, Republic of South Korea, and Indian Maritime Forces) on a quarterly basis in Bahrain at the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meeting. Operational coordination and information sharing became very complex between EU and NATO (NATO—wise net), commercial (phone, internet), and partner systems (CENTRIX). Therefore, participants created the MERCURY system to provide a common user interface (voice/data) to share information. SNMG forces have proven capable of dealing with the threats they face; however, the recent SNMG-2 commander, Rear Admiral Tosun, noted two operational shortfalls and a critical concern. First, organic maritime UAV assets and patrol aircraft are lacking and their incorporation into operations would improve situational awareness of the vast areas SNMG must cover. Another shortfall is in logistics and a need for an organic oiler platform, which would increase operational range. Finally, the potential for alliance members to become reluctant to assign forces due to domestic economic hardships remains a concern because of the disruptive


100 Ibid., 67.
effect to operations. Fortunately, Rear Admiral Tosun’s concern has not materialized yet and, conversely, the NAC has unanimously voted to extend Ocean Shield’s mandate beyond its current 2014 expiration date.

NATO’s involvement in the maritime domain signals several positive and negative trends for NATO. NATO’s political support to maritime operations follows the positive trend established in KFOR security operations. Additionally, NATO’s political demeanor is one of increasing activity and evolution of policies toward more comprehensive and aggressive approaches. NATO strategic military leadership remains the US (SHAPE HQ) while leadership at the operational (Maritime Command HQ) and tactical level (SNMG flagships) remains with Europe. Lastly, NATO continues its incorporation of alliance members and partners in operations, which both strengthens the political arena and brings additional capabilities. The additional capabilities, although not necessary for mission completion, enhance the operational effectiveness of NATO’s maritime forces. The lack of organic ISR capabilities, maritime UAVs, and patrol aircraft demonstrates a negative trend that will persist in European-led forces. Additionally, the maritime logistic infrastructure has been found wanting by commanders. Political support aggregated across the alliance remains resolute; however, individual nation state commitments remain a concern for the maritime domain. Many of these positive and negative trends continued in NATO’s most recently European-led operation in the skies over Libya.

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101 Ibid., 68.

Muammar Gaddafi had been one of many autocratic leaders in the Arab world since the early seventies. Gaddafi’s regime was a known sponsor of terrorism and had on-going tensions with the West. In 2002 shortly after 9/11, President Bush addressed the US public and in that speech identified three ‘rogue’ nations (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq) as the “Axis of Evil.” He accused them of sponsoring terrorism and stated that they were security threats to the international system. Libya, seeking to distance itself from the moniker of a state sponsor of terrorism and avoid being associated with the “Axis”, renounced terrorism and abandoned its attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As a result of Libya’s actions, the US and other countries reopened formal diplomatic and economic ties with the Gaddafi regime and did not block Libya’s inclusion into the United Nations Security Council as a non-permanent member.

Libya’s integration into the international system appeared to be progressing in a positive direction. However, in 2010 the “Arab Spring” began to sweep across the entire Arab world and led to a direct clash between NATO and Qaddafi’s regime. The Arab Spring is commonly understood to be a series of popular uprising against long-standing autocratic leaders throughout the Middle East. The Arab Spring originated in Tunisia, spread to Egypt, and then moved to Libya. The collapse of the autocratic rule of Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak was

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105 Kaplan, How Libya Got Off the List.
relatively peaceful compared to the destructive civil war that characterized Gaddafi’s struggle to retain power. Gaddafi’s repressive actions against opposition or “Anti-Gaddafi” forces and the economic disruptions to Europe became the catalyst for events that changed Libya’s previously positive trajectory back to one of tension within the international system, specifically regarding the US and Europe.

Political and military leaders in the US and Europe, although attentive to the deteriorating situation in Libya, were in the process of drawing down forces in Iraq and conducting surge operations in Afghanistan. These other requirements drew significant resources away from planners who were creating options. The initial hesitation by the US to quickly identify a position and course of action caused angst and caught the US’s European allies by surprise. Humanitarian conditions worsened and European leaders, namely Britain and France, called for action and asked the US to respond. European leaders implored the Obama administration to create a no-fly zone, similar to the no-fly zones created over Kosovo in 1999 and in Iraq after the Gulf War. The Obama administration again surprised the European allies, and it obtained a U.N. resolution that would go beyond the European’s original intent. “U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973


107 Ian Traynor, “NATO under pressure to back Barack Obama’s Afghanistan surge: European troop pledges totalling around 5,000 are short of figure the US is believed to be asking for in support of its Afghan surge,” *the guardian* (December 2, 2009), under “News-World News,” [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/02/nato-barack-obama-afghanistan-surge](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/02/nato-barack-obama-afghanistan-surge) (accessed December 9, 2012).

called on member states to protect the Libyan people from a massacre at the hands of Gadhafi’s army, which was then threatening Benghazi.”

On March 19, 2011, the US and its European allies began Operation Odyssey Dawn with an air campaign targeting Libyan air defense and air force capabilities. Theater command of the US operation was under the prevue of General Ham and his Africa Command (AFRICOM) with operational command of the combined joint task force (CJTF) falling to Admiral Locklear aboard the USS Mount Whitney. Within ninety-six hours the US and its allies had conducted over 336 air sorties (60% of which were conducted by US air assets-212) and launched over 162 precision guided munitions (PGM) (Tomahawk cruise missiles) resulting in the destruction of Libyan air defenses and air force capabilities, rendering them completely ineffective. Militarily this operation, with the US in the lead, was congruent with earlier NATO operations. However, US political leaders forced a transition to European leadership at a rate that was faster and more decisive than previously experienced.

On March 22, 2011, President Obama’s administration began communicating to Europe the US desire to transfer leadership of the operation. NATO reported that it “agreed as a bloc to full support of the NATO arms embargo, but that was still debating the organization’s role in the air campaign.” Led by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Europeans agreed that policy

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112 Ibid.
oversight for the operation would remain with the coalition partners and that the military operations would fall under the direction of NATO’s military component.\footnote{Ibid.} The US, in an effort not to abandon its allies, vowed to maintain support but to take a “lead from the rear” approach. This approach emphasized providing support capabilities (in-flight refueling, reconnaissance, etc.) and severely limiting offensive capability. On March 31, 2011, the US states executed what incoming Canadian Lieutenant General (LTG) Charles Bouchard, operational commander, would call an operational “Hail Mary”.\footnote{Charles Bouchard, Coalition Building and the Future of NATO Operations, 41.} LTG Bouchard’s account of his initial meeting with Admiral Locklear aboard the Mount Whitney states that Admiral Locklear’s guidance was short and to the point. He said, “Congratulations, you are the commander; you’re taking over in a week. Come back tomorrow and tell me what your plan’s going to look like.”\footnote{Ibid.} The European-led NATO assumption of the operation began with the changing of the operation’s name from Operation Odyssey Dawn to Operation Unified Protector.

Operation Unified Protector’s command and control structure, political environment, and military capabilities were the three distinct areas that differentiated Odyssey Dawn’s operational framework from Unified Protector. LTG Bouchard’s command and control structure changed in composition, location, and capability. Although LTG Bouchard’s command was ultimately subordinate to the American Supreme Allied Commander Europe and US European Command (EUCOM), Admiral James D. Stavridis, the headquarters was primarily European. LTG Bouchard’s command consisted of a British deputy commander, a French chief of staff, and a

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.}\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{114} Charles Bouchard, Coalition Building and the Future of NATO Operations, 41.}\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.}
Turkish intelligence officer to name but a few.\textsuperscript{116} Although multinational and ethnic in flavor, the European-led effort still relied heavily on key contributors from the countries with national interests and the traditional power players within NATO. For example, “Only 14 out of 28 members contributed military assets and only six European nations (Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Norway and Denmark) contributed to the strike mission- and of those (Norway) pulled out of the strikes during the campaign.”\textsuperscript{117} In addition to composition, NATO changed the location and size of the headquarters from the USS Mount Whitney, which was staffed at 900 and afloat in the Mediterranean to its headquarters in Naples, Italy which was staffed at 275 and land based. Likewise, during the prosecution of Unified Protector, NATO force structure expanded to include non-NATO members, partners, and Arab nations.\textsuperscript{118} The combination of a smaller overall staff and expanding force resulted in difficulties coordinating actions, sharing intelligence, and communicating. As an example, Swedish Gripen air assets’ integration into the NATO structure was turbulent because it was not a NATO member. Linguistically, the Swedish contingent was easily able to integrate into the operation due to their high level of English proficiency. Conversely, they struggled operationally because of NATO’s information sharing and classification processes and their inability to quickly link into NATO secure data systems such as Link 16.\textsuperscript{119} These challenges manifested into targeting delays and increased mission risk as

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 40.

\textsuperscript{117} Hallams and Schreer, Towards a Post American Alliance? NATO burden-sharing after Libya, 322.

\textsuperscript{118} Bouchard, Coalition Building and the Future of NATO Operations, 40.

capabilities and lives were needless jeopardized due to information delays. All of these problems proved temporary and were eventually overcome, but they hindered initial operational efficiency.

Operation Unified Protector’s second departure from Odyssey Dawn was that it operated under recurring ninety-day mandates. This mandating process had several effects. First, the anti-Gaddafi forces were in constant fear that NATO would falter in its commitment to their cause and leave them susceptible to the retaliation of the Gaddafi regime, which was known for its abuses. The mandate also allowed NATO to alter its mission from simply providing protection of Libyan citizens from potential massacres to a more aggressive offensive mind-set of aiding the anti-Gaddafi forces in their attempts to force a regime change. The offensive transition broadened NATO’s target aperture to military ground targets and the regime’s governmental apparatus. Lastly, the mandate process, although cumbersome, allowed NATO to show the world that it had the political will and wherewithal to prosecute operations to completion.

Operation Unified Protector’s military capability displayed several acute shortfalls in comparison to Odyssey Dawn. Aside from the staffing issues previously identified, shortfalls in logistics and intelligence capabilities plagued NATO throughout the operation. NATO lacked standing air refueling capabilities, which were provided by the US as part of its support operations. The combined nature of NATO’s force structure also presented logistical problems. The Swedish air contingent had a tactical problem which created a potential operational issue. Their air fleet used JP-8 fuel, but they were based out of a NATO airfield that only had JP-5. The solution was to use US air refueling capability to provide the Gripens with in-flight JP-8 upon returning from their missions. Without US air refueling capability, Swedish air assets would

120 Bouchard, Coalition Building and the Future of NATO Operations, 40.

121 Ibid., 44.
likely have been lost to Unified Protector, resulting in an operational loss to NATO of some 650 sorties and 2,000 flying hours that the Swedes contributed.\footnote{Pengelley, Swedish Gripens over Libya, 34.} Intelligence collection was the other readily apparent capability issue that NATO forces identified. The US’s use of intelligence assets in support of OIF withdrawal and OEF surge resulted in a shortage of available unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) aircraft.\footnote{Tim Ripley, “Analysis: Looking at lessons learned in NATO Libyan Ops,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (August 22, 2011): 13.} The US was able to provide a limited number of collection assets, which, although small, still accounted for a disproportionate amount of the operation’s overall collection effort. According to analyst Richard Wietz, “Europeans still depended upon their US counterparts for around 75% of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort . . . to perform the strategic targeting required for the PGMs.”\footnote{Richard Wietz, “Fighting Fit? Cutbacks undermine NATO’s evolving Ambitions,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (June 13, 2012): 37.} Operationally NATO forces were compelled to rely on non-traditional intelligence collection and targeting assets, which hindered targeting efficiency and situational awareness. These capability shortfalls, which Europe had been aware of for some time, became painfully apparent throughout the course of Unified Protector.

The European-led NATO operation persevered despite capabilities gaps. Tripoli, Libya’s capital, fell to anti-Gaddafi forces after four months of fighting in August of 2011. At that time, NATO had recorded flying nearly 20,000 air sorties and 7,500 strike missions.\footnote{Ripley, Analysis: Looking at lessons learned in NATO Libyan Ops, 13.} Two months later and after almost eight months (196 days), NATO declared victory in October and reflected on its achievement. Wietz notes “Europe specifically, accounted for 85% of strike missions in
Libya and 90% of PGM employed- a stark improvement over the dismal 10% PGM during the 1999 Kosovo Air campaign.”126 Beyond military accomplishments, the Libyan people had gained independence.

In review, there are several positives and negatives associated with the Operation Unified Protector. Europeans demonstrated steadfast political will to achieve their objectives. NATO’s ability to navigate through the ninety-day mandates and modify its mission sets is a testament to LTG Bouchard’s leadership and the adaptability of the NATO command structure. NATO’s political resoluteness matched the intensity level of combat and reaffirmed Europe’s assertive political trend. Militarily, NATO’s ISR, air refueling, and targeting processes hampered the efficiency and effectiveness of Libyan operations. At times, NATO struggled to sustain conventional operations against an adversary that was effectively destroyed in the first four days of air combat. The alliance, however, proved resourceful enough to accomplish its mission in the face of conflicting resource drains. Europe’s response, although fragmented and disproportionately spread across its partners, accomplished the mission.

These three case studies show a European-led NATO’s increasing capability over time. NATO’s evolution has progressed from US dependence to a more self-sufficient European-led NATO. Several trends have been identified with respect to the reviewed case studies. First, NATO has faced several systemic problems that, although they reduced initial operational effectiveness, were never insurmountable or detrimental to mission accomplishment because NATO is an adaptive, learning military organization. NATO intelligence operations during Kosovo grew from a functional analysis and dissemination issue with ample available ISR platforms provided by the US to operationally capable information-sharing and intelligence

126 Wietz, Fighting Fit? Cutbacks undermine NATO’s evolving Ambition, 37.
operations post Kosovo. The systemic issue for both maritime and air domain case studies was a general lack of ISR collection capabilities due to the US’s competing operational requirements and few, if any, European ISR capabilities. In both Kosovo and Libya, NATO forces found command integration initially difficult because of lacking infrastructure capability and the complexity of coalition operations. Coalition operations comprised of alliance members, partners, and non-members characterized all of the case studies in all three domains.

Secondly, Europe’s political will was continually tested and reaffirmed through summits and resolutions. Europe also displayed a trend toward more aggressive or comprehensive involvement and approaches. European capabilities and leadership will likely continue to increase out of necessity, as US leadership has stated the need for Europe to assume more political and military responsibilities. As observed by NATO analysts Hallam and Scheer, “the US will not hesitate to lead ‘wars of necessity’ in defence of European Allies. But it will not take the lead in ‘wars of choice’ in or around Europe.”127

Finally, while European-led NATO operations have hardly been easy, NATO has yet to lead in the initial process of reducing an opponent. In Kosovo, NATO peace keeping ground forces did not proceed until Milosevic capitulated under US-led air strikes for UNSCR 1244. The European NATO-led portion of the Libyan operation did not start until after the US-led portion had defeated Libyan air defenses and the Libyan air force.

SECTION IV - CONCLUSION

NATO operations led primarily by European leadership and resources are phenomena the world is likely to see more frequently in the future. Europe has shown increasing political will with regard to European operations and a collective European identity. This trend is gradually

127 Hallams and Schreer, Towards a Post American Alliance? NATO burden-sharing after Libya, 319.
changing the dynamics between the US and European relationship from one of US dominance to a more equitable relationship. The US retains hegemony over the international system and a principal leader within NATO, but Europe, collectively, is slowly balancing. Overall, European political will has manifested itself across the European political environment with the EU’s creation and employment of the CSDP, and specifically to NATO through NATO’s sustained European led operations. Europe’s conventional military capabilities are increasing from its early troubled employment in the early 1990s to its improved employment during recent operations. European military capabilities have critical shortfalls, but they have proven adequate for their missions. Lastly, Europe’s emerging military and political trends are both susceptible to economic turmoil. The identified economic stressors have the potential to fracture European political and military solidarity —forcing national leaders into tough resourcing choices. NATO’s historic, emerging trends and counter-trends help identify the complex and dynamic environment that political and military entities, both in the US and Europe, consistently operate within.

The implications of NATO’s continual adaptation to a changing environment and resulting trends are twofold. First, NATO’s adaptability and resilience are admirable traits. An organization that seeks adaptability instead of homeostasis is an organization more likely to survive and, potentially, thrive. In addition to adaptability, NATO has made itself relevant and beneficial to its members. These enduring attributes have created trends that enable preservation and present opportunities. Opportunities are the second research implication. NATO’s emerging trends offer Europe the opportunity to improve its posture on the world stage and remain a dominant player regionally. The more Europeans take the lead in NATO operations, the more confidence they will accumulate with each successful operation. The emerging trends also allow the US to focus its efforts on other regions of the globe, notably the Pacific theater, and accept risk due to progressing European regional ascendency and relative peace. The ability to accept
more risk allows the US to reduce expenditures in Europe and apply those saving to other theaters, programs, or general budgetary reductions.

Finally, NATO has been, is, and will continue to be a driver of stability within Europe and a critical linkage and relationship between both sides of the Atlantic. The relationship is changing for a multitude of reasons, but the underlying benefits of the organization remain.
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