Boards versus Bureaucracies: Field Grade Officer Education in the United States Army, 1946–1985

A Monograph

By

MAJ Edward B. Bankston
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Major Edward B. Bankston

Now that combat related deployments over the past ten years are ending, will the military be prepared in the near future to again operate in unpredictable environments in order to confront future adversaries? Specifically, is the military adequately training and educating officers to deal with future threats, or simply preparing its leaders to fight the last? Only a comprehensive review of the current officer education system could link education preparation to the future battlefield success. In order to accomplish this, one must first understand what makes a comprehensive education review effective. By comparing the context of multiple historical boards conducted within the United States Army from the conclusion of World War II through 1985, personal critiques of serving officers, and the the evolution of officer education within the Army, one can gain both an appreciation for and overall understanding of the board process.

Field Grade Officer Education, CGSC, ILE
Name of Candidate: MAJ Edward B. Bankston

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Approved by:

______________________________, Monograph Director
Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.

______________________________, Seminar Leader
D. Craig. Aitchison, COL, Canadian Army

______________________________, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Thomas C. Graves, COL

Accepted this 23rd day of May 2013 by:

______________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT


Now that combat related deployments over the past ten years are ending, will the military be prepared in the near future to again operate in unpredictable environments in order to confront future adversaries? Specifically, is the military adequately training and educating officers to deal with future threats, or simply preparing its leaders to fight the last? Only a comprehensive review of the current officer education system could link education preparation to the future battlefield success. In order to accomplish this, one must first understand what makes a comprehensive education review effective.

By comparing the context of multiple historical boards conducted within the United States Army from the conclusion of World War II through 1985, personal critiques of serving officers, and the evolution of officer education within the Army, one can gain both an appreciation for and overall understanding of the board process. Doing so makes it possible to explain what makes an effective board, identify common reoccurring issues and provide recommendations for future studies in order to help guide those responsible for the development and management of the officer education process.

The initial guidance from the review directing authority, time allocated to complete the review, member composition and experience combined with the approach developed by the board are essential considerations for directing future reviews of the officer education system. Adequate Department of the Army emphasis on the review process, the Command and General Staff College as an agent of reform, and field grade officer development is a critical requirement for the success of any officer education review. In addition cutting back the percentages of attendees to the resident course, dropping the Combined Arms and Service Staff School, failing to increase the importance of instructor positions, and granting credit to officers out of their window to attend the resident course has the potential to have a negative affect toward the U.S. Army Officer Corps.
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<td>Army Learning Concept 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALDS</td>
<td>Army Leader Development Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALM</td>
<td>Army Learning Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATLDPane</td>
<td>Army Training and Leader Development Panel</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>United States Army National Guard</td>
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<td>Brigadier General</td>
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<td>CAS3</td>
<td>Combined Arms and Services Staff School</td>
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<td>CGSC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONARC</td>
<td>U.S. Continental Army Command</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, U.S. Army</td>
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<td>DL</td>
<td>Distributed Learning</td>
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<td>GEN</td>
<td>General</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILE</td>
<td>Intermediate Level Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPR</td>
<td>In-Progress Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFE</td>
<td>Maneuver Fires Effects (Army branch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILPERCEN</td>
<td>U.S. Army Military Personnel Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMAS</td>
<td>Master of Military Art and Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCR</td>
<td>National Capital Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>OES</td>
<td>Officer Education System</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTERG</td>
<td>Officer Training and Education Review Group (same as RETO see footnote 73)</td>
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<td>Professional Military Education</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Program of Instruction</td>
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<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAMS</td>
<td>School of Advanced Military Studies</td>
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INTRODUCTION

It is terribly difficult for military men to keep their methods adapted to rapidly changing times. Between wars the military business slumps. Our people lose interest. Congress concerns itself more with cutting down the Army than with building it up. And the troops….find a large part of their time and energy taken up with caring for buildings, grounds, and other impediments. In view of all the inertias to be overcome, and in view of the fact that our lives and honor are not in peril from outside aggression, it is not likely that our Army is going to be kept in an up to the minute state of preparedness.

–1929 General Lassiter

While the quote is over eighty years old, the issues presented are alive and well today, and quite possibly, more relevant to the current time than 1929. To combat these and many other issues, General Martin E. Dempsey, Commanding General of United States (U.S.) Army Training and Doctrine Command (2008–2011, TRADOC), developed the Army Learning Concept 2015 (ALC 2015). In General Dempsey’s words, “ALC 2015 is an important component of our effort to drive change through a campaign of learning.” General Dempsey argued the need to “learn faster and better than our future adversaries” in order for the U.S Army to “prevail in the competitive learning environment.” Moreover, he explained the importance of changing the current system through a “campaign of learning” to both stay ahead of adversaries and remain relevant to the learners of today. Recently, the United States Army adopted a career-long education model to adapt professional military education (PME) through leader development in an attempt to stay ahead of any potential adversaries. Budgetary constraints, resource limitations, and required downsizing of the force now threaten leader development and the programs necessary to educate leaders.

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1Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: the Army's Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 117. The quote is dated 20 October 1929, Diary, Box 5, William E. Lassiter Papers, USMA.

In an attempt to save money, increase throughput and minimize time officers are in school, change is rapid. Yet, constant changes wreak havoc on educational programs. These changes translate to less training and less depth of subject matter, hinder facilitators responsible for teaching officers, and over-complicate curriculum. Additionally, these changes coupled with multiple deployments have the potential to create a rift between the military education system and field grade officers.

This tension will occur between the field grade officers selected to attend CGSC and those that are not, i.e. the have and the have not’s. Restricting attendance to CGSC will limit opportunities for non-selectees to pursue an advanced degree. Lack of an advanced degree hinders the opportunity for additional educational programs, assignments, and potential career advancement. Additionally, officers that do attend Intermediate Level Education (ILE) face the burden of teaching those forced to complete ILE via distance learning or through a condensed course. Both sides will feel the burden of changes to come. Now that combat related deployments over the past ten years are coming to a close, will the military be prepared in the near future to again operate in unpredictable environments in order to confront future adversaries? Specifically, is the military adequately training and educating officers to deal with future threats, or simply preparing its leaders to fight the last war with minimal dedicated financial support?

To answer these questions, it is necessary to investigate the review process for officer education. Comparing reviews of officer education conducted post World War II through 1985 provides both an appreciation for and overall understanding of the board process. Doing so makes it possible to glean valuable insights into what makes a board effective as well as the pitfalls to avoid. The goal of this study is to identify common reoccurring issues and provide recommendations for future studies to help guide those responsible for the development and management of the officer education process.
Each review is a culmination of hours of staff work, research, briefings, interviews, surveys, and years of experience from members serving on the committee. From the conclusion of World War II through 1985, multiple studies were conducted that involved officer education and training. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) initiated most studies. Others were self-studies conducted internally by institutional staffs, and the remainder by military representatives on behalf of an institution, the U.S. Department of the Army or a combination of the two.

This research does not mention all of the boards or studies conducted regarding officer education. Boards and reviews were chosen from each period based on the timing of the board, the board’s primary focus and who conducted the board. Multiple boards and reviews were selected from each period of time to provide an overall understanding of both the process and the state of officer education. While most of the boards considered officer education at large, this study extrapolates the data from these studies concerning U.S. Army field grade officers serving on active duty and the Command and General Staff College.3 In explaining the reviews and studies through time, identification of key players involved and their experience, the length of time allotted to complete the review, guidance provided to the board, the approach used to conduct the review and the recommendations and outcomes for each board or study are pivotal.

The Gerow (1946), Eddy (1949), and Williams (1958) boards were the first three boards conducted after the conclusion of World War II through the mid-1960s.4 Transitioning to the

3The exact subject matter and depth of officer education considered varied by board and study as did the format and recommendations. This was a direct reflection of the amount of time designated to the board and guidance given to those conducting the review. The overall scope of each review grew over time from the initial boards conducted after World War II through the end of this study in the Mid 1980s. The only exception for this comment is BG (RET) Huba Was de Czege’s “Army Staff College Level Training Study;” it focuses primarily on field grade officers and the Command and General Staff College.

4The formal title for each board is listed in appendix one, as well as under each section in which the board is discussed. The accepted name for all three of these boards listed above represent the last name of the president of the board conducting the review.
1970s, the Norris (1971) board and the 1978 Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO or Harrison board) provide valuable insight into officer education, the review process, and changes for the time period. Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege’s “Army Staff College Level Training Study” (WDC study) and the 1985 Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS or Bagnal study) are the two studies used to develop and understanding of the state of officer education and the review process during the 1980’s.

The CSA during each period mandated all of these studies, with the exception of one. Wass de Czege’s “Army Staff College Level Training Study” was not an official review. It was, however, conducted on behalf of senior leadership from CGSC and remains a relevant study of the officer education system. The remaining boards discussed were all official reviews with an assigned President of the board and some variant of a staff assembled to conduct a review of the officer education system.

THE BEGINNING

As soon as the requisite number of troops can be assembled at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the commanding general Department of the Missouri will take measures to establish a school of application

—General William T. Sherman,⁵

On May 7, 1881, General William T. Sherman, Commanding General of the Army, ordered the establishment of the School of Application, to both extend the education of Cavalry and Infantry officers and teach important aspects learned from the Civil War to younger generations. Sherman, a proponent of military reform, envisioned a hands-on approach where officers would spend two years at Fort Leavenworth transitioning through Infantry, Cavalry, and

Artillery training to gain an understanding and appreciation for all three combat arms branches.⁶ Since its conception, leaders have continued to develop and expand Sherman’s vision transforming the school into the CGSC.

Since the schools inception, leaders have understood the importance of officer education at CGSC. History provides multiple examples of the value placed on the “Leavenworth Men.”⁷ General John J. Pershing, General of the Armies during World War I, published a standing order dictating the pinpoint assignment for Leavenworth graduates. British Prime Minister during the Second World War, Winston Churchill claimed, “one of the greatest miracles of this conflict was the staff work of the worldwide forces of the United States.”⁸ Churchill also credited the success of such a small undermanned staff directly to “the resounding tribute to the training of the United States Military Schools.”⁹

The “Leavenworth Men” were few in number, but great in demand. Units constantly sought officers coming from the Leavenworth School with high hopes and expectations of the recent graduates. At the conclusion of World War II, leaders again looked to expand on the lessons of the war to ensure future leaders learned in the classroom instead of the more costly form of learning on the battlefield. To measure the effectiveness of education, the Army conducted periodic reviews charged with examining current practices for issues with efficiency, courseware, subject matter, and the validity of its programs and institutions.

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⁷Nenninger, *Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army*, 135. Leavenworth Men is a common term referring to the service of officers in World War I that were graduates of CGSC, located from its inception in Fort Leavenworth Kansas.


THE WAR IS OVER, WHAT IS NEXT?

The teaching of those entrusted to our care is the most important legacy any officer can leave to the U.S. Army….Our legacy is then left with those we have mentored and developed to be our successors, whereby we enrich and perpetuate our proud Army institution. Only by teaching can we truly prepare soldiers to be successful and survive in combat.

–General John A. Wickham 30th CSA

The end of World War II marked a turning point for the United States military. Following the war, the Army ordered several boards and studies to evaluate the current state of the education system and track its progress (or lack thereof). Immediately following the conclusion of World War II through the end of the 1950’s, three studies took place. The Gerow (1946), Eddy (1949), and Williams (1958) boards were the first three boards conducted post World War II. Each board was tasked to review officer education while the later boards were also tasked to compare the effectiveness of its predecessor.

The U.S. War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army 1946

The first board conducted after World War II was the “U.S. War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army”, more commonly known as the Gerow board. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower (1945–48) issued instructions in the form of a directive to the board. In his directive, the CSA directed the board to prepare a plan for the postwar educational system of the Army, and to provide specific recommendations concerning the plan for schools operated by the major commands and by the War Department. The directive further tasked the board to analyze

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11John Wukovits, Eisenhower (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 169. General Eisenhower took over as Chief of Staff of the Army 19 November 1945 and would hold this position until his retirement in 1948.
the necessity of reopening the U.S. Army War College as well as the retention of both the Army and Navy Staff Colleges. The board was nicknamed after the appointed president of the board, Lieutenant General Leonard Townsend Gerow. LTG Gerow served as president of the board immediately after taking command of the Command and Staff College in November 1945.

In addition to LTG Gerow, the board consisted of three other voting members. Major General (MG) William G. Livesay represented Army Ground Forces, MG Donald Wilson represented Army Air Forces, and MG Stanley L. Scott represented Army Service Forces. LTG Gerow’s appointment as commandant of CGSC would be his first and only position within the officer education system. MG Scott’s membership on the board was also his only encounter with officer education, but MG Livesay and MG Wilson had prior encounters with education and training. MG Livesay served four years in the training section office for the Chief of Infantry, three as the Chief of Training (1936–40). MG Wilson had a more direct influence within the officer education system, having served as an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS).

As the first board after the conclusion of the World War II, there were multiple requirements for its members to develop a plan to carry the Army forward and limited time given

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in which to conduct the review because of its immediate necessity. The board had great latitude to
address anyone necessary in the directive, but insufficient time to conduct a thorough review. The
board requested and received an extension, which only allowed twenty-four additional days,
shifting the original due date from January 1, 1946 to the 25th. The timing of the review was
another issue. LTG Gerow received the task of conducting the review board the same month he
became the commandant of CGSC. Having not served in an educational role prior to his
assignment as commandant, a month was not adequate time to familiarize himself with the inner
workings of neither the college, the staff, nor the requirements of an educational review. General
Eisenhower issued the task just four days after taking over as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.
Similar to Gerow, Eisenhower did not have adequate time in his new position to assess the state
of officer education in 1946 before mandating the review. Examples of this become evident in the
requested extension by Gerow, and the multiple modifications of the recommendations presented
by the board made by Eisenhower following the hasty review.

Despite issues, the board did convene and publish results of the study in February of
1946. In response to the task of developing a plan for schools, the board proposed the Army
develop a five-tier system for education. Under this model, officers would participate in a four-
month basic officer’s course followed by a five-month basic branch course that introduced tactics
at the battalion level with the primary focus on company level operations. Between the third and
tenth year of service officers would attend a ten month advanced course that would prepare
officers for company command and introduce divisional level operations while stressing

\[\text{Gerow board, 17.}\]

\[\text{Combined Arms Center, “Commandants of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff}
\text{December 10, 2012). LTG Gerow served as Commandant of the Combined Arms Center from}
\text{November 1945 until January 1948.}\]
regimental combat teams. The third tier, completed between the seventh and fifteenth year of service consisted of a ten-month course at the CGSC that focused on administration within War Department and Theater tactics within the Army and stressed Division level operations. The forth tier conducted between year eight to sixteen was the Armed Forces College, a five month course that focused on joint operations, joint overseas expeditionary and theater operations. The fifth and final tier was the National War college, a ten month course that focused on national planning and strategy completed between years ten and twenty-nine.

The board also addressed the question of attendee selection to schools within the system. The consensus of the board concluded officers that were not fit to attend schools should not be fit for service, and therefore removed. The board recognized no function or system was in place to catch or correct these issues. In the interim, the board concluded a selective system was essential for selection of students for any schools beyond advanced branch training. Selection percentages for the basic and advanced courses would remain one hundred percent, the command and staff college would be fifty percent, and both the Armed Forces College and all programs under the National Security University would be individual select.\footnote{Gerow board, 9. The board noted it was not possible to determine the number of personnel selected for the final two tiers of schooling based on variables and factors not available to the board. Additionally, the board claimed the major commands and War Department would determine these figures once the size and organization of the postwar Army and Navy was determined.}

The board also concluded there was not a sufficient need for the Army War College, stating its mission and curriculum had been absorbed in the recommended five-tier system. Finally, the board recommended discontinuing the Army and Navy Staff Colleges.\footnote{Gerow board, 5–11 entail recommendations from the Gerow board. The five-tier system recommended consists of a National Security University, an Armed Forces College, Ground College (Air and Service would have their equivalent), Advanced Branch School, and begins with a Basic Branch School. Selection criteria page 9 paragraphs P and Q, selection criteria numbers for schools chart Tab A 8.}
Regardless of the recommendations put forth by the members of the Gerow board, the War Department modified the results in the form of a nine-page memorandum. With regard to the Command and General Staff College, the school reorganized to a combine four schools into one (Administration, Intelligence, Combined Arms, and Logistics). The modified curriculum consisted of 31 weeks of general training with an additional 10 weeks of specialized training, and selection for school based on time and rank. In the end, time constraints placed on the Gerow board limited its ability to develop any great changes or complete revise the officer education program. The War Department’s more timid approach was a reflection of the time, the conclusion of World War II, budgetary constraints, and numerous other changes within the Army.

The U.S. Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers 1949

The next board commissioned by the Army to analyze officer education was the 1949 “U.S. Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers’, more commonly known as the Eddy board. Lieutenant General Manton Sprague Eddy assumed command of CGSC in January 1948. Similar to his predecessor, Eddy served as the president of the board tasked to evaluate officer education. General Omar N. Bradley (CSA, 1948–49) appointed Eddy to conduct the review. General Bradley believed the previous Gerow board had done little more than define the problems within the officer education system. Bradley also agreed with both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower that the officer education system was in need of renovation.

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20 U.S. War Department Memorandum for the Commandant, Command and General Staff College 27 May 1945.

While both Gerow and Eddy had many similarities as leaders and veterans, LTG Eddy did have an advantage over Gerow in terms of experience within the officer education system. Eddy had served in multiple instructor positions ranging from Reserve Officer Training Command (ROTC) duty, the Infantry School house and CGSC where he served as an instructor and member of the tactics committee.22 In choosing Eddy, Bradley commented on Eddy’s outstanding performance as an instructor, and how that, coupled with his knowledge of the college, would assist in his position as commandant.23

Another stark difference between the two boards related to time. LTG Eddy had an additional two months to complete the review compared to his predecessor. The timing of the board was another advantage for LTG Eddy. The board began in February and avoided the disruptive holiday break that the Gerow board suffered. Moreover, LTG Eddy had over a year as commandant before serving as the president for his Department of the Army review.

Eddy also had the advantage of seeing the college in its prime as both a student and instructor. His personal knowledge gained while teaching at the college, and experience gained over time as the commandant, reinforced and enabled his position as president for the 1949 review. Immediately upon taking command of the college, LTG Eddy addressed some of GEN Bradley’s concerns by reorganizing the faculty and curriculum. The directive for the review published months later would list these same issues. By addressing them early, Eddy created an opportunity to study the issues in-depth and focus attention toward the CSA’s concerns.24

Similar to the Gerow board the instructions issued were short in length, but broad in scope, and included multiple tasks for its members. The board was to determine if the current education system was adequate and to judge the appropriateness of the scope of educational programs throughout the levels of education. The board also had to identify any “gaps or excessive overlaps” in the current tier system from the officer basic course through the National War College. Similar to the previous study, the directive repeated the question asking the board to assess the need for an Army War College similar in scope to the Naval or Air War colleges. The final all-encompassing statement in the instructions to the board required its members to review the previous board (Gerow) and recommend changes.

The Eddy board was twice the size of the Gerow board and consisted of eight voting members including LTG Eddy. The other voting members include Major General (MG) William G. Livesay, MG Clift Andrus, MG Withers A. Burress, MG Douglas L. Weart, Colonel (COL) Edward H. McDaniel, COL Cecil W. Nist, and COL Phillip C. Wehle. MG Burress, MG Livesay, MG Andrus, and MG Weart were the commandants of the Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, and Engineer schools respectively. All of these members were more familiar with issues pertaining to officer education compared to the voting members of the previous board.

In addition to their current positions as board members and commandants, all four had served previous assignments dealing with officer education or training. Major General Burress served two years as an instructor at the infantry schoolhouse (1920–22), a professor of military science, and a member of the board of education. MG Livesay served as a professor of military science at the training school and was a member of the board of education. MG Andrus served as a professor of military science at the training school and was a member of the board of education. MG Weart served as a professor of military science at the training school and was a member of the board of education.

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26 Eddy board, 12. The other voting members for the Gerow board included: MG Livesay (Army Ground Forces), MG Wilson (Army Air Forces), MG Scott (Army Service Forces) Gerow board, 14. The scope of these jobs did not allow for adequate oversight of officer education, as did the commandant for the schools.
science at Virginia Military Institute (1935–40) and as the assistant commandant of the Infantry school (1941–42). Major General Andrus had two separate assignments as an instructor; the first at the U.S. Army School of fire (1917–19), director of the department of artillery (1919–21), and as the senior field artillery instructor for National Guard soldiers from 1921–1924. Major General Weart served a three-year tour as an instructor at CGSC (1936–38) immediately following his graduation from the two-year program. Major General Livesay served four years in the training section office for the Chief of Infantry, three of which were as Chief of Training (1936–40). Livesay had also served on the previous Gerow board as the Army Ground Forces Commander.

The final advantage for the Eddy board was in its ability to analyze the Army educational system over the previous three years. The Eddy board could see the positive and negative effects of the post war period. This allowed the board to compare the changes and use their individual experiences as a baseline for determining the future direction of officer education.

The Eddy board submitted its final report on June 15, 1949. The report initiated multiple improvements to junior officer education that would translate into better-prepared field grade officers. The board recommended the implementation of a degree requirement on future officers prior to commissioning and an initiative to provide sufficient time for officers already in service.

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without degrees to complete one. The Eddy board also addressed the need to terminate the Officer Basic Course at the Ground General School and standardize both junior officer basic and advanced officer courses. High costs, the stress induced by multiple moves in a short period of time, and redundancy of material covered were all common complaints of the basic course. Discontinuation of the Ground General School would save the Army money, prevent an additional permanent change of station (PCS) move for newly commissioned officers, and decrease the time spent away from initial postings by forty-four weeks.

The Eddy board also standardized the academic training day to eight hours, five days a week, in order to coincide with basic pedagogical principles.31 This recommendation was a realization by the board, after consulting civilian educational specialists and internal research that identified the Army tended to overwork students. This resulted in insufficient time for students to absorb recently gained knowledge. The board’s conclusion was that the total time taken to complete academic work inside and out of the classroom should not exceed ten hours and an academic workweek should be five days a week.

Concerning field grade education, the Eddy board addressed the length and scope of the current Command and General Staff College, and called for the immediate reestablishment of an Army War College equivalent to the one active prior to World War II. The initial course titled the “Regular Course” was open to all officers and a selected number of students would attend a follow on course titled the “Advanced Course.” Each course would be approximately ten months long. The advanced course would be limited to U.S. military officers only and would receive 100–300 students per year. Reinstating the War College would enable CGSC more latitude in

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31Eddy board, 4–5. While the board does site “basic pedagogical principles” and “Education specialists” in discussing the need to take class length and duration into account and the dangers of overwork students there is no reference made to what constitutes an educational specialist or what pedagogical principles the assumptions are based upon.
instructional methods and courseware to better prepare officers. While the CSA did not approve all of the board’s recommendations, the Eddy board was the most successful and influential board during the time period at modifying the educational system for officers after World War II.32

The U.S. Department of the Army Officer Education and Training Review Board 1958

The third, and final, Report of the Department of the Army Officer Education and Training Review Board, better known as the Williams board, assembled in 1958.33 Unlike previous boards, the president of the board, Lieutenant General Edward Thomas Williams, was not the commandant of the Combined Arms Center but the deputy commander for the Continental Army Command (CONARC).34 The other eight voting members included MG John A. Dabney, MG W. Preston Corderman, COL Donald P. Christensen, COL Frank W. Norris, COL John B. Morgan, COL Samuel McC. Goodwin, COL Otho E. Holmes, and Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Lee S. Stoneback.

The position of the president (i.e. not the commandant of the college) and the overall composition of the board itself were two distinct changes from the Eddy board. While all of the combat arms branches had representation, none of the officers came from any of the institutional schoolhouses or even positions dealing with officer education. These officers served in Washington DC at the time of the board with the exception of MG Dabney and MG Corderman.


Dabney served with Williams at CONARC located in Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Corderman was the commanding officer for Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Contrasting the Eddy board, there were no commanding officers of the schoolhouses presiding or participating on the Williams board.\textsuperscript{35}

There were also fewer personnel on the Williams board with prior educational experience. LTG Williams had served as an instructor at the Field Artillery Schoolhouse (1939–43) and as Commandant of the Artillery School (1954–55).\textsuperscript{36} The only other previous experiences included that of COL Norris and COL Morgan.\textsuperscript{37} Norris had served three years as an instructor at CGSC (1950–53) and Morgan had worked in training schools (1941–43).\textsuperscript{38}

Another difference came in the overall composition of the Williams board. While the Williams board did have one more officer than the previous Eddy board, it lacked the rank structure and experience.\textsuperscript{39} The composition of the Eddy board showed a clear progression in size and experience doubling in size compared to its predecessor the Gerow board. Unfortunately, this progress was all but lost on the Williams board. General Officers on the board dropped from five on the Eddy board to three on the Williams board and with this so did the experience of its members.

\textsuperscript{35}Williams board, 62.


\textsuperscript{39}Williams board, 57. With nine voting members, the Williams board did have one more voting member than the previous Eddy board and five more than the Gerow board that only had four. All voting member totals include the President of the board.
Table 1. Gerow, Eddy, Williams Rank Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>GEROW BOARD</th>
<th>EDDY BOARD</th>
<th>WILLIAMS BOARD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Created by author.

The Williams board noted two distinct advantages over the previous Gerow and Eddy boards. In terms of time, the Williams board had almost seven months to complete the review. This gave the board six more months to analyze the officer education system compared to the Gerow board and three additional months as compared to the Eddy board. The second advantage the board noted came in the form of the instructions issued to the board by CSA GEN Maxwell D. Taylor. The detailed instructions to the Williams board guided the board in both general and specific areas of concern and focused their research.

In total, thirty-two of the forty-two recommendations submitted by the board became policy, twenty-four of which without changes. Three of the remaining seven recommendations gained approval after modifications, three became approved with exceptions, and the final two generally approved. As for the ten recommendations that did not become policy, three gained approval as concepts and two as objectives leaving only five completely disapproved by the Department of the Army.

40 The data used in this chart came from the Gerow, Eddy and Williams boards. The chart depicts the difference in rank and number of voting personnel present in each study.

41 Williams board, 4.

42 Haines board, summary of the Williams board 299–314. Appendix 11 of Annex B for the Haines board provides a summary of the Williams’s board recommendations and subsequent
As with all of the boards conducted after the war, the approval and implementation of recommendations was piecemeal. The board’s thirty-two approved recommendations spanned the entire spectrum of officer education system. The only recommendation the board listed for CGSC was recommendation twenty-seven. Upon further investigation, this comes as no surprise. Of the 278-page review, the CGSC annex is five pages long. Only the first three pages pertain to the college, the fourth page discusses an associate course and the last page presented the possibility of an advanced course that would come after CGSC. Even recommendation twenty-seven is of little value, it calls for the college to maintain rigorous and difficult courses to challenge students and to continue to evaluate and rank students to maintain friendly competition. Recommendation twenty-seven gained approval after modification ranking students by thirds for each class.43

Other recommendations were more important for the college and mid-level leader education. Recommendation one was another recommendation submitted by the board that the CSA modified. The Williams board recommended the objective of the Army service school system remain in its current state that prepared leaders for wartime duties with an emphasis on the art of command. The modified recommendation changed to include performing duties in “war and peace” and changed the emphasis from art of command to the art of leadership.

Recommendation nine gained approval as a “goal.” The recommendation called for three-year stabilization for all faculty and staff serving tours within the officer education system and that tour of commandants and assistant commandants are staggered to increase continuity. As a result, the Department of the Army did establish a goal to stabilize personnel for three years but actions in which the above totals derive from. The Williams board itself provides a list of the recommendations as presented by the board and does not offer a detailed account or final actions for its recommendations submitted to the CSA.

43Haines board, 309. Individual ranking was not maintained but similar to the officer evaluation report students ranking consisted of three categories (top third, middle third, bottom third).
limited it to “whose relief would have serious effect on the accomplishment of the schools’ mission,” thereby minimizing the desired effects and highlighting the lack of importance the Army placed on instructors at the college. Department of the Army also claimed that staggering commandants and deputy commandants was already in effect.44

Analysis of the tenures of CGSC Commandants and Deputy Commandants shows that from 1945 through 1970 four of ten commandants departed the college the same year as their deputy commandants. In addition, the deputy commandant served dual roles, as the acting commandant of the college and as deputy commandant in three separate periods.45 Another issue resides with deputy commandants. Of the sixteen listed in the chart seven only serve one year at the college, admittedly not enough time to create continuity even if the stagger between commander and deputy commander was enforced. By looking at the chart below it is clear that the Department of the Army and the college did not follow the Williams recommendation of stabilizing key personnel for three years or staggering key leaders within the college.

44Haines board, 303–304., Williams board, 49.

Getting recommendations approved was only part of the process; some of the individual recommendations would take considerable time to become effective. Two recommendations that were controversial included teaching division operations to officers prior to CGSC, and increasing the attendance goal at the college from fifty percent to sixty-five percent.47 Teaching

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47Williams board, 18, Stewart, 138.
division operations in junior courses was “generally approved” with the added exception said
courses could teach higher than division “as needed.” CGSC maintained responsibility for
divisional doctrine and with the added exception to the Williams board recommendation, none of
the career courses incorporated divisional staff training.\footnote{U.S. Department of the Army, “Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review
Army Officer Schools” (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1966). This board commonly referred to as the
Haines board, volume 1,20.} In contrast, by 1959, the increase in
students was in place, which exceeded the board’s recommendation by one hundred officers.\footnote{U.S. Department of the Army, “Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review
Army Officer Schools” (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1966). This board commonly referred to as the
Haines board, volume 2,305–314.}

In the end, the Williams board would not make any substantial changes to the officer
education system. The Gerow and Eddy boards played an important role in the transformation of
the Army after World War II. Many of the changes enacted because of these reviews are still in
place today. LTC Eugene A. Salet, serving as a CGSC instructor in 1948, credited the Gerow
board for creating a new college in the fall of 1946 based on the lessons learned from the war.\footnote{Eugene Salet, “Reorganization of the Command and General Staff College,” \textit{Military
Review}, September 1948, 3–12. Salet would retire as a Major General after serving as
commandant of the U.S. Army War College.} The establishment of the National War College was another result from findings derived from the
Gerow Board.\footnote{U.S. Department of the Army, “Review of the Army School System” (Washington
D.C.: GPO 1955), 20.}

The Eddy board, conducted only three years after Gerow, had the advantage of time,
foresight, experience and key players. Eddy had over a year longer to learn his job prior to
serving as president of the board. This combined with the ability to analyze the Gerow
recommendations and process, allowed Eddy to correct many issues of the hastily prepared
Gerow Board. The Eddy board was instrumental for developing the five-tier system current in today’s officer education program. Additional noteworthy recommendations of the Eddy board included its recommendation to reinstate the United States Army War College, increasing junior officer education schools, and implementing initiatives to reduce auditorium style blocks of instruction and the introduction of small group instruction.

The improvements in personnel assembled and guidance given to the Eddy board did not carry over to the Williams board. Despite the approval of most of the Williams board’s recommendations, many never came to fruition as the board intended. The Army modified some recommendations to the point of being irrelevant and ignored others minimalizing the overall impact of the board. In light of this, the combination of these three boards did play a pivotal role in the restructuring of officer education and setting a path it would follow through the next conflict and beyond.

CHANGE IS COMING

Nothing is harder than putting a new idea into a military mind, except removing the old.
–Sir Basil Liddell Hart

Multiple reviews and boards to examine the state of officer education accompanied the post-Vietnam conflict transition in the early 1970s. While the CSA directed most studies,


53The following is a list of the majority of studies and boards conducted during the 1970s that pertain to U.S. Army officers. (Study on Military Professionalism 1970; U.S. Department of the Army Ad Hoc Committee Report on the Army Need for the Study of Military History 1971; Review of Army Officer Education Systems 1971; Leadership for the 1970's Army War College 1971; Leadership and Professionals CONARC 1971; The Military Education of Career Officers 1970 Review of Education and Training for Officers 1978; CGSC Institutional Self-Study). While important, these studies fall outside the scope of this research because of their primary subject matter did not focus on officer education. Most of these studies addressed specific issues or portions of officer development. The one exception was the internal review conducted by
individual schoolhouses also conducted internal-reviews and studies in an attempt to keep up with an ever-changing environment, and possibly in order to shape their own destiny. The notable reports with regard to mid-level officer development and CGSC during the 1970’s were the Norris board of 1971 and the Harrison board of 1978.\textsuperscript{54} Both provide insight on how the military dealt with officer education and development during and after the Vietnam conflict.

**Review of Army Educational System 1971**

Major General Frank Wade Norris presided over the 1971 Review of Army Educational System, more commonly referred to as the Norris Board. Chief of Staff of the Army General William Westmoreland (1968–72) asked MG Norris to extend his planned retirement to preside over the board. Norris agreed, with the report finalized December 1971, he retired the following year.\textsuperscript{55} MG Norris was intimately familiar with both the education system and board process. In addition to attending CGSC, the Staff College, and the Army War College, Norris served three years as an instructor at CGSC (1950–53), served as a member of the 1958 Williams Board, and his last assignment prior to the board was commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College (1967–70).\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54}U.S. Department of the Army, “Review of Army Officer Educational System” (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1971) commonly referred to as the Norris board, C-1–C-2.

\textsuperscript{55}Ivan J. Birrer “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978.” Interviewed by Robert Doughty, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas 21 April 1978, 120.

General Westmoreland tasked MG Norris to conduct the review and develop recommendations to best prepare officers to deal with the challenges the seventies would bring. Upon receiving guidance, MG Norris further concentrated the board on officer education and the eight officer education courses defined by CONARC at the time to focus on career education. The board began in November of 1970 and ended thirteen months later with the report submitted in December 1971. The full report was over seven hundred pages divided into three volumes with fifty-one recommendations, six of which pertained directly to the Command and General Staff College, others dealt with the overall education system of the Army with additional implications for CGSC and officer education. Unique to the Norris review was the third volume titled “Good Programs.”

Good Programs was a compilation of best practices observed by MG Norris during his travels to each of the schools throughout the Army. The third volume of the Norris review provided an information packet in the form of fact sheets written by the institutional owners of these good programs. The intent was to provide a list of programs for other schools to determine if a similar initiative would benefit other educational institutions.

The report and recommendations were rather lengthy compared to previous boards. MG Norris’s main arguments addressed internally created learning gaps, a lack of diversification with regard to methods of instruction, and a call for substantial changes needed to increase the opportunities for advanced degrees for officers. Major General Norris believed CGSC created a learning gap within the officer education system in three areas; company level duties, combat

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57 Norris board, Vol1, 1-1.

58 Norris board, Vol1, B-1. CON REG 350-1 defined officer education included eight course types: career, warrant officer, mobilization, specialist, refresher, orientation, functional, and peripheral.

59 Norris board, Vol3, A-1. good programs, recommendations Vol1, 6-7–6-11.
support and combat service support staff duties, and high-level staff duties. The latter two were issues that resulted from what the Norris report referred to as terminal education. Terminal education in that only 50% of Advance course graduates attended CGSC and only 21% of CGSC graduates advanced to attend a senior service college. The Norris board noted the other cause for the learning gap with regard to field grade officers was a result of the importance placed on producing command/G3 oriented personnel. His belief was the college put too much emphasis on producing command/G3 oriented personnel resulting in a gap that did not properly prepare the majority of students to serve on staffs upon graduation.

The board’s recommendations to correct these issues included changing the length and scope of the curriculum and the mission statement for the college. To correct the mission statement, the board recommended simply adding two sub paragraphs. The first stated the requirement to prepare students for high-level staff positions and the second, to impress the need to provide intellectual development and serve as a base for continuing education. The more important recommendation was to modify the CGSC curriculum from one long course with electives, to two five-month courses. The first course would serve as a condensed version of the ten-month course with the primary focus of training the Army in the field and command/operations functions. The second five-month course pertained to staff functionalization, and would be open to graduates of the first course; each student would participate in one of five standard fields (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, or force development).

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60 Norris board, Vol2, 3-5.
61 Norris board, Vol1, 3-1–3-3.
62 Norris board, Volume 1., 6-9–6-10 recommendations, 6-4 and H–H-3 composition of the new course, 3–4 the educational gap and terminal education.
To address the lack of diversity in CGSC’s methods of instruction, MG Norris declared that techniques had not changed in the twenty years since he was an instructor. To modernize the program, Norris called for a shift from instructor led training to student centered education, and an increase of quality controls and latitude for instructors. Additionally Norris wanted an overall increase in elective choices for students to better tailor to the individual student’s educational needs. For instructors, the board recommended increasing faculty stabilization to increase continuity and influence the potential pool of future instructors. Norris also recommended increasing the value and merit placed on instructor positions and a detailed list of quality objectives for all faculty and staff in an attempt to increase the quality across all Army schools. For student-centered learning, the report provided guidance that the college should strive for a student to instructor teaching ratio of 80/20. This coincided with recommendations to minimize classroom size to a maximum of twenty in order to enhance small group discussion, audience participation, and instructor feedback.

The final aspect of Norris’s findings entailed the formal educational level of officers within the Army. The Norris board described two problems that the officer education system confronted, “the undereducated hump” and “educational explosion.” The undereducated hump manifested because of the need for more commissioned officers increased during the Vietnam conflict. Due to officer shortages, over 42% of active duty and 52% of reserve officers obtained a

63 Norris board, Volume 1, Instructor centered characteristics included closely controlled, lesson-plan directed, little flexibility for instructor who is in knowledge transfer mode, same pace for entire group, measured by contact hours, practical exercise oriented, and exam motivated. Student-centered characteristics included less control, student bears responsibility for learning, increased flexibility for instructor, learning-objective oriented, learning is self-paced to a greater extent, contact hours reduced, peer-group motivated, aimed at highest level of effort, and requirements solved through individual and group study in or out of class.,9-3.

64 Norris board Volume 1, implications to student-centered instruction O1–O4, Theory of Teaching and Diversity 9-1–9-9, instructor quality and incentives 10-6–10-7.
commission without a college degree. The educational explosion was a result of the increasing popularity in civilian education, especially with regard to higher education. Both would affect the Army of the seventies and the board addressed them as important contextual situations in the coming years. To address these issues and increase the educational quality within the Army of the seventies, the board recommended increasing the degree completion program when possible, continue to expand advanced degree programs already in place, and obtain congressional approval to establish the Military Masters of Arts and Sciences (MMAS) degree.65

One of the most significant recommendations of the Norris board called for a transition of CGSC and officer education to something new. Norris called for a shift from a training base, to an education-based program in which CGSC would resemble more of a civilian college than a military institution.66 Norris’s background as both an instructor and recent commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College indubitably influenced the decisions and recommendations of the board. Competing reviews, CGSC’s culture, and competing personalities would ensure little change would come from the Norris board. Condensing an already bulging ten-month program into five months would not be feasible. The two-course recommendation resembled that of the failed Gerow board. The CONARC Commander did not consider the recommendation feasible or desirable.67

The CONARC commander General Ralph E. Haines Jr. (1970–1973), openly opposed the recommendations within the Norris Report, as did Dr. Birrer, the senior educational advisor

65 Norris board Volume 1, civilian education 8-1–8-10, MMAS and degree completion 6-3, recommendations 6-10–6-11.

66 Norris board Volume 1, 6–11.

and director of graduate degree programs at CGSC.68 Several of the recommendations were merely critiques of actions already in the process of adaptation, such as increasing elective hours and accreditation for the MMAS.69 In the end the Norris review board was nothing more than what MG Norris called “a poor man’s update of the Haines Board Report.”70 Internal-studies conducted by the college concurrent with the Norris board, dissenting opinions for changing CGSC, and the overall unpopularity of its recommendations, guaranteed recommendations from the Norris board would not be implemented. However, newly involved personalities and a rapidly changing environment would have large ramifications for the boards that followed especially the Review of Education and Training for Officers of 1978 (RETO).

**Review of Education and Training for Officers, 1978**

The 1978 RETO review, more commonly known as the Harrison Board, was the first directed external review conducted after the conclusion of the Vietnam War.71 Chairman of the board Major General Benjamin Leslie Harrison was familiar with CGSC and the officer

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68 Birrer, 120. General Haines did not care for Norris recommendations to change the program length and add an additional course. He himself had served as president of the board for the Haines review and felt his plan was better suited for CGSC as well as did others. The Haines board initiatives would follow, some instituted even as General Haines’ forced retirement following the end of CONARC as it was split into FORSCOM and TRADOC.

69 Robert Doughty, “The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946–1976,” Page 43 and Institutional Self Study conducted by CGSC states the history of the MMAS degree program had been in the process of gaining accreditation since 1968, well before the 1970 formation of the Norris board, 137. Norris had been privy to the last institutional self-study by the college in September 1975 as the college’s most recent attempt to gain MMAS accreditation. U.S. Department of the Army, “Institutional Self Study,” (Washington, DC GPO 1975).


education process. As a major, Harrison graduated CGSC and remained at Fort Leavenworth for three years as an instructor at the college. Additionally, from 1973 to 1975 MG Harrison served as the Deputy Commandant for CGSC. Major General Harrison was hand selected by CSA General Bernard W. Rogers (1976–79) to serve as both the Chairman and designer of the board.\(^\text{72}\)

While the Harrison board did share basic similarities with previous boards, the scope and detailed guidance of the board provided by the CSA, size of the RETO Staff to conduct the review, and the conduct of the review was completely new and different from anything the Army had previously conducted. In summarizing the RETO board in his own Army Staff College Level Training Study at the time, Huba Wass de Czege referred to the Harrison Board as “one of the most exhaustive studies ever made concerning officer development.”\(^\text{73}\)

Unlike previous review boards, CSA General Rogers provided detailed guidance on what portions of officer education to review, and highlighted the importance of recognizing that the Army was operating in a resource-constrained environment. An example of the detail put forth by the CSA was the demand for implementation of results, not just recommendations. The CSA tasked the board to develop a plan and gave a specific timeline for its implementation, 1980–88. Similar to previous studies, the Harrison board’s tasks dealt exclusively with officer education.

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The primary difference in GEN Rogers’s guidance was the increased breadth and depth of the mission statement:

The mission of the Officer Training and Education Review Group (OTERG) is to determine officer training and education requirements based on Army missions and individual career development needs. Based on those requirements, develop training and education policies and programs which combine self-development, unit development, and institutional development in a phased schedule from pre-commissioning or pre-appointment training through career completion. Develop these programs with the prospect of implementation in a constrained resource environment; present the programs to the Chief of Staff, Army for approval and coordinate the integration of approved programs into the FY 80–88 program.74

By receiving a detailed mission statement that considered all aspects of officer education from pre-commissioning through retirement, the board understood its responsibility for developing programs to assist the recently formed TRADOC in increasing the overall competency of officers within the U.S. Army.75

Another unique aspect of the Harrison board was the robust staff assigned to assist with the design and conduct of the review. Besides MG Harrison, the board consisted of thirty-six officers, five enlisted soldiers and two civilians (see figure 1).

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74U.S. Department of the Army, “Review of Education and Training for Officers VoI” (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1978), this board commonly referred to as the Harrison board, I-3. OTERG in the mission statement refers to Officer Training and Education Review Group and is how the study lists in the purpose line and mission statement from the office of the CSA to MG Harrison. All other documentation as well as the final jackets for the review all refers to the study as the RETO.

75Harrison board, v. In the preface, MG Harrison explains the general perceptions of the military at large thought that by 1977 the army was not producing officers with a desired military competency. Many shortfalls recognized at the time came about because of studying the recent actions of the 1973 Arab Israeli War.
The final and most distinctive difference for the Harrison board rests in the systems approach developed and used by the board. The board recognized that previous efforts to review education and training sought to reconcile issues, needs, and requirements through a piecemeal approach of shifting assets and modifying practices or programs. The aim of the Harrison board was to “build a system from the whole cloth of the Army’s projected requirements rather than simply modify an existing system to perceived environmental changes.” The board further realized that the future would present undetectable challenges and that “[a]n effective system for the professional development of officers must be implemented to meet those challenges.” The board developed both a systemic approach in order to analyze the whole officer education system.
and, through that approach, developed an interconnected officer education system to best prepare officers for future threats.\textsuperscript{77}

Dr. Birrer referred to Harrison’s approach as “an Army-wide scheme for the preparation of specialists” alluding to the challenges in trying to develop officer characteristics required to operate in an uncertain environment.\textsuperscript{78} Lieutenant Colonel James B. Channon, who worked in the directorate of Education and Curriculum Affairs at CGSC and served on the Harrison board, explained the importance of a systemic approach to officer development in the May 1978 issue of Military Review.\textsuperscript{79} In his article, Channon discussed the need to design a training and education system geared towards the future by looking at the requirements that would be placed upon officers and the structure of the future environment, in order to forecast the requisite problem-solving skills. In short, LTC Channon described a systems approach to fixing the education system.

Unlike preceding boards, MG Harrison sought to broaden the scope of analysis by addressing a wider range of programs and incentives from pre-commissioning through retirement in order to develop a comprehensive education system.\textsuperscript{80} Additionally, the board understood the importance of linking personnel capability and readiness with already decided equipment postures for the 1990s. Understanding the time and resources required to ensure the proper balance of personnel (concerning adequate rank, training, and doctrine) with newly developed

\textsuperscript{77}Harrison board, I-1–I-2.

\textsuperscript{78}Birrer, 264.

\textsuperscript{79}James B. Channon, “Preparing the Officer Corps for the 1990s,” \textit{Military Review}, May 1978, 22.

equipment, was essential to producing an effective fighting force.\(^{81}\) The board’s holistic approach and forward thinking is evident in its extensive recommendations and in the long-range planning horizon considered.

The Harrison board presented the CSA with 370 recommendations that addressed all aspects of the Army officer education system.\(^{82}\) With regard to field grade officers, three recommendations stood out: the development and implementation of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), the reduction in attendance rates to CGSC and the proposed comprehensive faculty development program for instructors at CGSC.\(^{83}\)

While conducting the review the board realized there were not enough adequately trained staff officers across the Army. After considering multiple options to improve this, the board recommended the development of CAS3.\(^{84}\) The CAS3 would make up for the shortfalls of the 60% of officers that were not permitted to attend CGSC by requiring 100% attendance of newly promoted field grade officers to the nine week training following a 120 hour independent home station training. The CAS3 concept for training focused on troop staff procedures for division and below. The nine-week course taught in a group seminar format covered the subjects of unit-level

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\(^{81}\)Harrison board, 1–2. MG Harrison references the similarities and difference between his board and those conducted prior specifically referencing the Norris and Haines boards in the executive summary of the Harrison board. He further explains the necessity of matching people and concepts to equipment already approved and in the procurement process for the 1990s.

\(^{82}\)U.S. Department of the Army, “Professional Development of Officers Study Vol1” (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1978), and this study commonly referred to as the Bagnal study, 6.

\(^{83}\)Harrison board, xi-5–xi-7. The Harrison board recommendations encompass forty-one pages (XI-1–41).

\(^{84}\)Harrison board, E-1–E-3. There were three documented proposals. One included 100% CAS3 attendance that failed due to costs and time away from unit for too many officers. The second was to shorten CGSC from 42 to 22 weeks that also failed due to cost and the lack of information/knowledge it would depart on the select few chosen to serve in higher-level staff positions. The third and accepted proposal was the development of CAS3.
tactical doctrine, retail logistics, interoperability, training management, and effective written and oral communication skills.\(^{85}\)

Due to impending budgetary constraints and the need to offset the costs of implementing CAS3, the Harrison board recommended dropping the annual attendance of year group Majors from 40% to 20% annually. In the board’s view, the addition of CAS3 would adequately train newly promoted field grade officers in staff functions and only those selected for command needed CGSC. By cutting selection to CGSC in half, class size could shrink, enabling the remaining students to experience a more challenging and faster paced learning environment. Another recognized advantage was that the Harrison plan shortened field grade officer’s time away from units and put more officers back into the ready force.\(^{86}\)

Lastly, like all of the previous boards, the Harrison board examined faculty composition. The Harrison board had strong views on the faculty stating, “The heart of the system is the teaching faculty.”\(^{87}\) The standard practice of previous boards included analyzing recommendations and statements of the preceding board. The Harrison board took a more holistic approach by analyzing the remarks and recommendations in detail from each of the previous boards.\(^{88}\)

\(^{85}\)Harrison board, E-1–E-3 and E-3-3.

\(^{86}\)Huba Wass, de Czege. “Final Report, Army Staff College Level Training Study.” Army War College Research Paper, 13 June 1983, b-2. Also referred to as the WDC study in this writing.

\(^{87}\)Harrison board, volume 5 y-2. The original statement underlined in the report itself for added emphasis by Harrison.

\(^{88}\)Harrison board, volume 5, y2–y5. The report notes highlights from each board in order as they took place starting with the Gerow board of 1946, The Eddy board of 1949, Williams board 1958, The Haines board of 1966 and the Norris board of 1971 to illustrate the constant call for faculty development and improvements over the years. This serves to highlight one of the inefficiencies of the boards to address later in this paper.
Starting with the Gerow board of 1946, the Harrison board examined previous findings and compared it against its own research to make a combined and complete set of recommendations on faculty development. The focus of the board was on active duty officers as instructors with several inferences from programs observed at the time from the United States Military Academy (USMA) and the U.S. Army War College. The board studied the three-tier faculty system, variable tenure, faculty role models, and instructor training at both USMA and the War College to develop recommendations across the Army School System.

Overall, the board made seven recommendations pertaining to faculty development. Army-wide school system improvements included stabilizing teaching faculty for a minimum of three years, assigning qualified colonels to instructor positions, and the replacement of specialty codes. Recommendations that pertained directly to CGSC and the other services schools included the implementation of variable tenure and the establishment of long-range comprehensive faculty development programs. These programs aimed to increase and maintain gains of the faculty as a whole. Once again, not all of these recommendations would come to fruition.

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89 War Department, “Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army” (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1946), this board commonly referred to as the Gerow board.

90 Harrison board volume 5, y-11–y-13. Several of the faculty recommendations made by the board are a direct result of studies and observances from USMA and the war college.

91 Harrison board, volume 5, y-16–y-17. With regard to the school codes, the recommendation by the board was two-fold. First, to remove the old specialty codes 28 and 47 (instructional technology and management and education) as these had a constant tendency to be misused and not properly assigned. The second recommendation was to create two new specialty codes 50 and 01 (training developments and Senior Military Teaching Faculty) with specific criteria to assign these codes in an attempt to better track potential faculty for future assignments and provide more opportunities to previous instructors who wish to return to the teaching environment.
The Harrison board serves as a distinct example of successful change the Army made with respect to the review process. General Rogers’s detailed guidance prior to the beginning of the board was a vital difference that immediately enabled the designer and president of the board, MG Harrison, to develop an effective approach to conduct the review. Another welcome addition came in the form of the robust staff assembled to analyze the current officer education system in depth and detail. Finally, and most innovative, was the systems approach used by the board. By incorporating a systems approach, the Harrison board initiated a comprehensive review of the officer education system with actionable outcomes that resulted in two-thirds of the recommendations by the board gaining approval.92 Changes implemented because of the Harrison board would carry the officer education system well into the next decade.

THE EIGHTIES

We must be mindful of the fact that the current crop of USACGSC graduates will probably experience more change in methods and conditions of warfare and preparation for war during the balance of their active military careers than has been experienced in all of the years since World War II.

The task of maintaining the Army’s effectiveness is becoming increasingly more difficult because we must make choices about changes at an accelerating rate against a wide backdrop of uncertainties. As the conditions of warfare change, the methods and techniques of doctrine must evolve with them.

–COL Huba Wass de Czege, 198493

Multiple reviews involving portions of the education system took place in the 1980s. The SSI study on Operational Planners (1982), Leader Development Study (1987), and Leader Development Action Plan each address specific points within the Army and only encompass specific aspects of officer education. In addition, the 1985 Institutional Self Study conducted by


CGSC and MG Meloy’s CGSC study were also omitted as primary studies but do serve as references for the time period.

Two studies stand out that explain the state of officer education for the 1980s. The first, from 1983 was the Army Staff College Level Training Study presented by Colonel (COL) Huba Wass de Czege. Colonel Wass de Czege served as a research associate for the Army War College and conducted research for CGSC at the request of leadership at Fort Leavenworth. While not commissioned by the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Wass de Czege report provided valuable insight into the state of education for mid-level leaders at CGSC. The second study, “the Professional Development of Officers Study” was under a directive issued by CSA General John A. Wickham (1983–87). The basic purpose of this study was to reexamine officer professional development and its evolution since the RETO study (Harrison board). Both of these studies highlight multiple issues within the education system for officers during the 1980s.

The Army Staff College Level Training Study 1983

COL Wass de Czege was no stranger to the officer education system at CGSC. Prior to being assigned as a research fellow for the Army War College, COL Wass de Czege served two years as a CGSC instructor and doctrine branch chief in the tactics department (1980–82), and as a major he served over three years as an instructor at USMA (1972–75). Additionally, COL Wass

94 Several studies took place during the eighties including but not limited to; The SSI Study on Operational Planners (1982), the 1982 MG Meloy study of CGSC, the CGSC Institutional Self Study (1985), The Professional Development of Officers Study (1985), Leader Development Study (1987), and The Leader Development Action Plan (1988).


96 Bagnal study, iii.

de Czege served as a member of the Harrison board of 1978. Concurrent with the publication of the final report of his study, COL Wass de Czege began his next assignment as director (1983–1986) of the new School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). COL Wass de Czege’s study was an influential document at the time of its publication. The study highlighted issues with the officer education process at the college and was influential toward the establishment of the SAMS program that exists still today.

The final report of the Army Staff College Level Training Study (hereafter referred to as the WDC study) by COL Wass de Czege was published June 13, 1983. The intent of the study for officer education was twofold; first, to analyze the current education and training capability for officers and second, to determine how to increase the overall effectiveness to meet the future challenges up to the year 2000. In doing so, the study described a troublesome gap between the capability of officers produced at CGSC and what the Army would need to best cope with future adversaries. COL Wass de Czege stated to fill the gap the Army needed to produce officers with better military judgment that was achievable through upgrading the training and education received at CGSC. The study organized the issues with CGSC into the four broad categories of faculty, composition of the student body, teaching/learning methods and the curriculum.

The WDC study concluded that the primary cause of the recognized gap in student capability was the faculty. The lack of emphasis placed on the college by the Army further
compounded the deficiencies in quantity and quality of faculty members, and insufficient faculty development programs. Competing demands often left the college lacking active duty personnel, which led to an overworked faculty with little time to prepare lessons. Personnel shortages limited the time and effort needed to develop and organize faculty development programs. Overworked instructors did not have sufficient time to prepare, hindering the learning environment within the classroom.

Promotion and follow-on opportunities for instructors was low, which directly affected the pool of officers applying for positions as instructors. COL Wass de Czege summarized this lack of reward provided to the faculty as a self-fulfilling prophecy. CGSC faculty senior service college attendance and promotion rates were low. This caused a drop in morale of the instructors, which continued to drop once individuals did not make the promotion list. These issues would make it hard to recruit potential quality instructors for fear of a similar fate. Left unanswered, these issues would repeat, hence the self-fulfilling prophecy.

Figure 2. COL Wass de Czege “self-fulfilling prophecy”

Source: Created by author.

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102WDC study, 52. This chart is a visual depiction of what COL Wass de Czege termed the “self-fulfilling prophecy coming full circle” relating to a systemic issue with promotion rates and instructor quality.
Another issue closely related to the faculty involved outdated teaching methodologies and poor student diversity. COL Wass de Czege claimed outdated teaching methodologies were “spoon feeding” fundamentals and not forcing students to “dig” for answers. Additionally he believed contact hours inside the classroom between instructors and students were too high and did not allow adequate time for student reflections or individual/small group work toward problem solving. COL Wass de Czege also reported classes involving large-scale audiences were too large and that facilitator or syndicate type instruction was insufficient to meet student needs and foster a learning environment.103

Similar to the Harrison board, the WDC study concluded student diversity inhibited learning at the college. The WDC study also identified this as a common issue noted in all three studies used as external references for the report.104 Diversity between non-OPMD managed officers, allies, sister service officers and reservists forced curriculum to accommodate the lowest common denominator. As with several issues, student composition was nothing new and COL Wass de Czege was not the first to recognize or identify the problem. In the Meloy study, MG Meloy stated: “[the] student body mix forces faculty to limit [the] core curriculum [in order] to focus on [the] bottom half of class. [Because of this] [n]obody [is] satisfied at either extreme, 

103Large-scale referred to a larger classroom setting where students sit and attempt to absorb information passed to them via a central instructor whereas syndicate style instruction is more a group setting and the instructor is more of a facilitator of discussion as the students learn through discourse based on individual experience and understanding as a group. To maximize participation and interaction of students COL Wass de Czege recommended the class size for each syndicate consist of 12–13 students.

104WDC Study, 15. Wass de Czege used the 1979 RETO Study (Harrison study), 1982 SSI “Operation Planning” study, and the 1982 DCSOPS study as external references for his study.
[which] thwarts initiative and intellectual development, [and] frustrates the battle captains because they find little challenge.”

The curriculum at CGSC was another interrelated issue listed by the study. The WDC study believed the college suffered from vague priorities within parts of the curriculum. To correct this required further external prioritization from outside the college in order to focus resources. Correcting this lack of prioritization would enable the college to focus classroom instruction and limited resources to increase efficiency. To seal the gap between the current and desired conditions of the time, the study called for “better staff college level training and education” and provided a road map of recommendations intended to upgrade officer education. Aside from educating the Army, as a whole, on the importance of mid-level leader education and institutional purpose of CGSC, the majority of recommendations focused on Fort Leavenworth, specifically CGSC. Similar to the Harrison board, COL Wass de Czege’s study also broadened the scope of his approach as evident in the details and explanations of the recommendations in each category. Similar to the Harrison board, Wass de Czege looked at previous reviews, as well as other services’ and nations’ officer training programs, to obtain a complete understanding of the officer education process.

In total, the WDC study made twenty-eight recommendations. In addition, four annexes were included that expanded on certain recommendations and provided proposals.

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106 WDC study, 3–12.
107 WDC study, 5–12.
108 WDC study, 70–73. The five sections included Faculty Development, CGSOC Student Body, Reorganization of CGSC, Curriculum Revision, and Doctrinal Development Reorganization. While there were six annexes, only four expanded on proposed recommendations or provided proposals (teaching the science and art of war, proposed CGSOC Curriculum,
development, the study called for an agreement between CGSC and the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). This would allow CGSC to create a system to earmark recent graduates as potential instructors, track successful instructors to return, and build demand within the officer corps to increase the overall quality of instructors at CGSC. Internal to the college, the study called for an overhaul of internal faculty development programs to include updates in doctrinal changes, modifying methodologies to shorten contact hours, and increase efficiencies in delivery methods. These recommendations centered upon breaking what COL Wass de Czege termed the self-fulfilling prophecy.

Similar to the Harrison board, the WDC Study also called for shrinking the class size of CGSC students from 40% to 33% or less for each year group to attend CGSC. Included in this recommendation was a call to shrink specialty group attendance (Medical Service Corps, Judge Advocate General Corps, and Chaplain Corps) to 10% or less, remove any grading requirements for these officers, and allow these students to graduate after the first term. These modifications, combined with the recommendation to make CAS3 mandatory for all senior captains prior to attending CGSC, would minimize the issues of teaching the lowest common denominator and increase intellectual rigor within the classrooms.

COL Wass de Czege called for an immediate reorganization to the curriculum at CGSC and provided a model that in his words would be “more rigorous and better balanced to meet the Army’s needs.”109 By updating the curriculum to focus on what was most important to the Army, modifying the list of those who would attend CGSC and addressing faculty issues, the college could update teaching methodologies and focus limited resources on the Army officer education

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109WDC study, 6.
system. While the WDC study was not an official review of the education system, it did have several valid recommendations, the most notable being the implementation of the School of Advanced Military Studies.\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{U.S. Department of the Army Professional Development of Officers Study 1985}

On May 30, 1984, CSA General John A. Wickham Jr. (1983–87) appointed LTG Charles W. Bagnal to be the director of the Department of the Army Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS or Bagnal study). GEN Wickham initiated the study to analyze the professional development of the officer corps with the primary emphasis on the training and education systems. The focus of this study was to evaluate officer education across its entire spectrum and analyze how it had changed since the previous review (RETO/ Harrison board). LTG Bagnal summarized his task in the final report dated February 21, 1985: the purpose of the study was “to reexamine all aspects of the officer professional development system as it has evolved since the 1978 Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study, and to project the applicability of that system and our recommendations out to 2025.”\textsuperscript{111}

LTG Bagnal served in multiple positions dealing with officer education and training prior to the study. From 1977 to 1980, he was the deputy superintendent at USMA and from 1980 to 1981 served as the director for the Officer Personnel Management Directorate at MILPERCEN. LTG Bagnal was the deputy-commanding general for TRADOC (1983–85) at the time of his

\textsuperscript{110}There is documentation to support the pivotal role Wass de Czege and the WDC study had in the establishment of SAMS. Since the study was not mandated by the Department of the Army and was published only two years ahead of the Bagnal study there is not sufficient evidence to prove that other recommendations made by the WDC study came to fruition or if they were a result of later studies and or reviews.

\textsuperscript{111}U.S. Department of the Army, Professional Development of Officers Study Vol1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1978), this study commonly referred to as the Bagnal study, iii.
selection as study director. In addition to LTG Bagnal’s experience, his deputy director COL Richard Polo had also served on the previous Harrison board as one of five team members responsible for the design of the study.

From the initiation of the Bagnal study, there were several similarities to the Harrison board. The first was in the instructions from the CSA to the board. As with many of the previous boards, the Bagnal study makes direct reference to the previous board and specifically tasks the committee to analyze the changes that have evolved since that board, to consider officer education only, and to look at it from pre-commissioning through career completion.

Other similarities related to the approach used by the Bagnal study included its forward-looking approach similar to the Harrison board. The only change would be length of time, instead of looking six to ten years into the future the study called for recommendations to carry the educational system for officers forward to the year 2025. Another resemblance came in the form of the systems approach used by the study. The deputy director of the Bagnal study COL Polo had served on the previous Harrison board, specifically, on the team that designed the approach used by the board. Using the same approach came as no surprise and saved the smaller, already time constrained committee valuable time and confusion by negating the need to create an approach and method to conduct the study.

However, differences would outnumber the similarities between the two studies. The length of time dedicated to the board was insufficient. As a result, the board eliminated any portions of the review pertaining to warrant officers. Another issue with time related directly to

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tasks issued to the board. One of the references the Bagnal study was directly tasked to reference was the Officer Personnel Management System study (OPMS) initiated by the CSA in August of 1983. Unlike the Bagnal study, the OPMS study did receive ample time to conduct the study and did not finalize the report until September of 1984, four months after the start of the Bagnal study and three months before the final recommendations were due to the CSA.114

Another series of time constraints placed upon the study by the CSA came in the form of a preconfigured list of tentative milestones. The board designated study group members in May 1984. Approximately forty-five days later by mid-July, the board was required to conduct an initial in-progress review (IPR) for the Department of the Army Staff (DAS) and staff principles on any methodology and milestone adjustments. The following month on August 21, 1984 the board was to present a paper and briefing to the conference that detailed the objectives and methodologies of the study. Again, one month later, the board was responsible for conducting an IPR for the CSA on progress of the study. The following month between October 9 and October 13, the board was instructed to provide an information brief at the Army Commanders’ Conference. This last IPR was presented to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), General Maxwell R. Thurman for his approval.115 One month later the board would present a decision briefing to the CSA on the results of the study and the proposed implementation plan. The last brief was scheduled for January 1985 at which time the board would present its final report.

114Bagnal study, v.

The dictated timeline required a significant brief each month from the committee throughout the duration of the study. These requirements burdened staff, time, and resources from the study. In addition, despite the termination date of January 31, 1985 on the charter, all of the recommendations had to be complete, packaged, and ready to present by the middle of November pre-decisional brief to the VCSA. All of these requirements external to the review process itself would serve to amplify the final difference that hindered the review: the inadequate size and composition of the staff assembled to conduct the study.

Compared to the Harrison board, LTG Bagnal’s appointed ad hoc committee was small. At first glance, the committee is only five members shy of the Harrison board’s forty-three member compliment. However, a closer look reveals several issues. The Bagnal committee was composed of twenty-eight officers (7 COL, 16 LTC, 3 MAJ, 2 CPT) a special advisor from the Army Research Institute, and a nine member administrative team. The Harrison board was composed of thirty-six officers (15 COL, 15 LTC, 5 MAJ, 1 1LT). While the Harrison board only had eight additional officers, the discrepancy was in its composition. The Harrison board had

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Table 3. CSA Charter tentative milestones for Bagnal study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TENTATIVE MILESTONES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Jul 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Aug-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Sep 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-13 Oct 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Nov 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Dec-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*\(\text{DAS}=\text{Director of Army Staff}\) \(\text{IPR}=\text{In Progress Review}\)

Source: Created by author.

The Bagnal study, xii. This table is a recreation of the list of tentative milestones listed in the charter for the U.S. Department of the Army Professional Development of Officers Study.
twice as many COL’s than the Bagnal. The ad hoc committee was significantly less equipped in senior rank structure and experience compared to its predecessor.

Table 4. Harrison/Bagnal Rank Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>HARRISON BOARD</th>
<th>BAGNAL STUDY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>*7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>*16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>0 (admin leader)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = includes one Reserve Component officer

Source: Created by author.

The CSA’s memorandum that established the ad hoc committee called for “highly qualified” officers with “diverse backgrounds and qualifications” yet, it limited the pool of available officers to those who were serving in the National Capital Region (NCR) or on orders to NCR. The additional emphasis from the CSA to focus on the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (USAR) programs for officers took additional resources. To account for this in the directive, the CSA tasked the chiefs of both the ARNG and USAR to provide one LTC or

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117 This chart, created from information provided from both the Harrison board and Bagnal study portrays the experience gap between the committees for each of the reviews.

118 Bagnal study, vi.
COL. Each proponent only provided one individual and both of these focused on reserve component issues alone.\textsuperscript{119}

Despite issues, the Bagnal study did present its findings to the CSA on December 21, 1984. Different from previous boards, the Bagnal study included the CSA remarks, approved policies, and modified policies. Within each section, individual recommendations or portions of recommendations that were disapproved or removed were also listed.\textsuperscript{120} CSA Wickham approved twenty-one base policies in concept and five more after minor modifications. The recommendations proposed by the Bagnal study fall into two categories, recommendations for the system and recommendations for the individual. The first seven recommendations refer to development periods divided by rank from pre-commissioning through senior general officers.\textsuperscript{121} The second category contains what the study refers to as “system-wide issues.” The study further divided the remaining recommendations into two categories of those that affect or apply to the “attributes of officership” and those that apply primarily to the school.\textsuperscript{122}

The initial seven base policy recommendations focused on individual developmental periods for officers from pre-commissioning through senior general. The forth development period, “Major and Lieutenant Colonel,” contained four base policies approved in concept by the CSA. The first required all active component officers to complete a CGSC equivalent course prior to selection to LTC (resident or non-resident course). The second policy reinforced the opportunity for CGSC graduates to attend SAMS. The third policy called for the publication of an

\textsuperscript{119}Bagnal study, viii.

\textsuperscript{120}Bagnal study, 99.

\textsuperscript{121}Bagnal study, 100–101. The development periods are broken down in the following sections: pre-commissioning, Lieutenants, Captains, Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, Colonel, Brigadier and Major General, Senior General Officer.

\textsuperscript{122}Bagnal study, 73.
Army Regulation for the pre-command course, and the last policy called for the development of a pre-command course tailored for the reserve component. All of these policies were a combination of recommendations, aligned with a plan of action and phasing plan with dates and agencies responsible for implementing them once approved by the CSA.123

The larger substantive sections of the base policy recommendations reflected system wide issues that affected either officer attributes or the school system. Seven of the policies aimed to improve the attributes of officers under the titles of warrior spirit, professional values, art and science of war, decision-making, common shared operational language, self-development, and mentor/teacher. The remaining seven policies reflected system wide issues directed toward the school under the titles of individual assessment and evaluation program, common core, education and training methods, functional education and training, advanced civil schooling, control and coordination, and reserve components.

Several system improvements applied directly to SAMS. The Bagnal study called for the establishment of regulations for course attendees and the class enrollment size. In addition, the committee recommended the implementation of a DA circular to formalize the selection process. Other base policy recommendations that were approved included actions toward establishing common shared operational language, mentor and teacher initiatives, the standardization of common core curricula across each developmental period, advanced civil school, and functional training and initiative programs.124

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123Bagnal study, Annex DD. Annex DD is a twenty-one page annex broken into three sections (Command and General Staff level education, the Advanced Military Studies Program and Branch Qualification for Field Grade officers. The last two sections are action plan and phasing plan charts that depict the implementation of approved policies overtime, what agencies are involved, and the recommendations that establish the policies themselves. Annex DD only pertains to MAJ and LTC development periods.

124Bagnal study, 99–105.
The board also presented recommendations on values, traits, and skills officers needed to develop early in their careers and expand upon throughout their education process. Specific recommendations on the warrior spirit, professional values, the art and science of war, and decision-making were approved.125 In reference to education, the Bagnal study called for a shift toward an “education and training life-style” and stated: “[i]t is no longer realistic to think that a few years of college or graduate school are an adequate educational foundation for a lifetime of service.” This shift included a holistic approach to education within which the importance of learning from mentors in operational units was as important as learning within an academic environment.126

In the end, the Bagnal study recommended the above policies to enhance the current system by building upon its already established strong aspects. The study recommended the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) maintain “explicit overwatch responsibility for the system,” to ensure “control, coherence, and coordination of officer professional development.” The study further recommended that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS) establish a cell “to exercise those system functions inherent in [its] responsibility for individual and unit training.”127 These were the measures taken by the board to implement the approved recommendations of the Bagnal study.

Although limited documentation exists that track the implementation of recommendations for specific boards or studies, subsequent studies sometimes provide a summary of previous boards as a starting point for its intended subject. Two years after the


126Bagnal study, 81.

127Bagnal Study, 112.
Bagnal study, TRADOC Commander GEN Carl E. Vuono (1986–87) directed the 1987 Leader Development study, chaired by the Deputy Commandant of CGSC MG Gordon R. Sullivan (1987–88). While the focus of this study was specifically leader development, it did provide a summary of the Bagnal study. The summary is a two-page document that covers the purpose, subject, findings, and implementation of the Bagnal study. The following two points are the only two items listed under the implementation portion of the Bagnal study summary:

A. The Department of the Army level responsibility lies in DCSOPS. This responsibility was transferred from DCSPER to DCSOPS approximately one year ago. Currently, only one officer is specifically tasked to overwatch the study implementation; therefore, very limited information could be supplied as the current status.

B. One of LTG Bagnals’s concerns is reflected in his 21 FEB 85 Letter of Transmittal to the COS, where he said, “Implementation of approved recommendations will require a continuing effort and intense Army staff involvement in the months and years ahead. We appreciate the interest of the DCSOPS and DCSPER in seeing this accomplished as a joint effort.”128

Similar to previous boards, not all of the approved recommendations or the plans were implemented. It is doubtful LTG Bagnal would have considered the “one staff officer” adequate to meet the “intense Army staff involvement” he described in his final letter to the CSA, but it was the reality dictated by the Department of the Army. In his closing comments to the board, CSA Wickham said it best when referring to the costs associated with implementation of the Bagnal recommendations as “peanuts when contrasted with the increased professionalism of the officer corps that is sure to result.”129

Due to the difference in scope, it is difficult to compare Huba Wass de Czege’s one-man review of field grade officers and CGSC to LTG Bagnals thirty-eight member study on the complete spectrum of officer education. The two do share multiple similarities. Both studies were


129 Bagnal study, 112.
forward looking, the Bagnal study to the year 2025 and the WDC study to the year 2000. Both studies called for fundamental changes with regard to the importance of advanced education for officers, the value of SAMS, and addressed the importance of the quality and quantity of faculty. However, the dissimilar aspects are striking. The WDC study does serve as the outlier when compared to all of the other boards and studies examined since the conclusion of World War II. The CSA did not mandate the WDC study and COL Wass de Czege did not have an assigned staff to assist in any research. Unlike its predecessors, the Harrison board and the Bagnal study both examined officer education from pre-commissioning through retirement, while the WDC study focused on mid-level officer education and CGSC. Despite these differences, the WDC study does serve as an adequate review of mid-level officer education and CGSC.

From the first board conducted after the conclusion of World War II to the conclusion of the Bagnal study in 1985 the Army had made several changes and implemented multiple programs that have shaped the Army as a whole. While the Army education system is far from perfect, it is also far from failing. Analyzing past reviews provides an understanding that highlights how officer education has evolved and adapted over time. It is imperative to understand the history behind its evolution in order to best prepare officers to face any future threats.
CONCLUSION

The effectiveness of the American Army in carrying out its wartime or peacetime missions—under varying kinds and degrees of stress and in continuous compliance with the will of the American people—is directly related to the state of education, training, and commitment of its members.

An effective Army officer may be described as one who is trained in the skills he needs to accomplish his mission competently; one who is educated in the knowledge and insights necessary for successful mission accomplishment within the context of broader organizational goals; and one who is committed to do his duty faithfully and well. Commitment helps assure that reasonable return is received for investment in education and training. Reciprocally, adequate and relevant education and training reinforce and enhance commitment.

—Harrison board, 1978

Several dissonances and commonalities emerge between the review processes conducted between the conclusion of World War II and the 1980s. By comparing the review processes over time, elements of what make an effective review process become apparent and worthy of study for individuals responsible for maintaining the officer education system. Multiple characteristics warrant concern for future studies and reviews of the officer education system. Leaders who mandate educational reviews and the leadership entrusted with conducting the reviews should consider these issues in order to avoid the pitfalls of previous boards and improve the educational review process. Four areas in particular merit discussion due to their persistence of appearance over time and the effects each had toward officer education.

The first area is guidance and time. Adequate time and guidance is essential to conduct the review process. Guidance from those mandating a review must be sufficient to conduct the review, the command directing the review must provide a detailed account of known issues or areas for concern, and list any focus areas without micromanaging the process. At a minimum boards should be allowed eight months to conduct a review and this time should not start until the members of the board are identified and assembled.

130Harrison board, M-1-73.
Implementing a standardized format for the course of the review that includes a system of informal in-progress reviews minimizes external requirements and streamlines the review process. This will allow the board to keep superiors informed without taking away resources needed for the review process. Both the Williams and Harrison boards serve as examples in which ample guidance and time to conduct the reviews resulted in a quality outputs. The monthly reporting requirements of the Bagnal study provide an example of overburdening the study group, which detracted from the overall effectiveness of the study itself.

The next area is the size of the board and the quality and diversity of board members. A successful review requires an adequate amount of members assigned to the president of the board for the duration of the review. The exact number of board members depends on the scope of the review, the number of tasks to accomplish, and time allotted for the review. Upon receipt of the task, the president of the board should be allowed to develop the size and composition of the board based on a troop to task format and the composition of its members based on the tasks to accomplish. Boards should include educational experts outside of the military and, when possible, within the military yet outside of the military education system.

Quality has several meanings. Leaders responsible for mandating the review should conduct a detailed analysis of potential candidates to reside over the review board by analyzing previous experiences, educational experience, and familiarity of the U.S. Army educational process. The president of the board should be an officer currently serving within the educational system, have a minimum of one year of service in the educational system prior to serving on the board, and should have attended U.S. Army career development schools instead of sister service equivalent programs. These same requirements should apply to members of the board representing each aspect of officer education.

The president of the board must have sufficient personnel assigned to conduct the same analysis of potential board members. This enables the president to build a coherent and diverse
review board based on the same characteristics listed above. Special characteristics from which to judge possible board members include educational background, prior service as an instructor in the officer education process, possession of a graduate degree in an educational field, and, for guard and reserve forces, personnel currently serving in a fulltime academic environment. Using uniformed service members instead of contractors is preferred. Seeking individuals with previous experience within the officer education process is essential for board members. When possible, boards should also seek individuals that have served on previous reviews and or studies for insight on the review process and continuity.

The third area is the frequency and approach of the review. At a minimum, a review of the officer educational system should commence every four to six years. This should coincide with the rotation schedule of the commandant and deputy commandant of CGSC to ensure adequate time for the president of the board (commandant or deputy-experience dependent) to obtain a year of experience within the officer education system prior to presiding over the board. In addition to the frequency of the board, a systemic approach that encompasses all aspects of the educational system best serves the board. Conducting a standardized review process on a deliberate timeline increases awareness of the educational process among senior leaders and minimizes the need for a complete comprehensive review. Constantly reviewing the educational system will enable subtle changes through an update and monitor process instead of drastic changes that result from neglect or mismanagement. This concept will also require more oversight and involvement of senior leadership that will emplace education as a priority.

The final and most important area is command emphasis. This emphasis comes from those that mandate the review, and those who reside over the review down to the members of the review board itself. For those who mandate the review there must be sufficient emphasis to ensure adequate time and funding exists to conduct a proper review. Those who reside over the review must ensure the right personnel are selected for the board and a systematic command
driven process exists. For members of the board, every attempt must be made to limit bias and ensure a holistic and honest review takes place. Lastly, Army-wide command emphasis is needed to ensure approved recommendations are followed and enforced.

When asking if the military is adequately training and educating officers to deal with future threats, one must understand the institution’s emphasis on officer education and the impact reviews have on its success. In the absence of conducting a recent comprehensive review of the officer education system, the Army is not placing officer education as a priority. In drafting a report on the importance of CGSC, Dr. Birrer commented, “[w]hat is done or not done at Leavenworth doubtlessly will directly affect the future of our country.”131 Failing to organize and conduct a comprehensive review of the officer education system is a definite step in the wrong direction. The Army is slowly losing the initiative by its own inaction.

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131 Birrer interview, 266.
APPENDIX A: BOARDS AND STUDIES

1946 Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army (Gerow board) chaired by LTG Leonard T. Gerow, Commandant CGSC, initiated by CSA GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower

1949 Report of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers (Eddy board) chaired by LTG Manton S. Eddy, Commandant CGSC, initiated by CSA GEN Omar Bradley

1958 Report of the Department of the Army Officer Education and Training Review Board (Williams board) chaired by LTG Edward T. Williams CONARC Deputy Commanding General, initiated by CSA GEN Maxwell D. Taylor

1971 Review of Army Officer Education Systems (Norris study) chaired by Major General Frank Norris, Initiated by CSA GEN William C. Westmoreland

1978 Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO or Harrison board) chaired by MG Benjamin L. Harrison, initiated by CSA GEN Bernard W. Rogers

1983 U.S. Army Staff College Level Training Study, Final Report (WDC study) author of paper COL Huba Wass de Czege Research Advisor U.S. Army War College, initiated at the request of CGSC leadership

1985 Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS or Bagnal study) Chaired by LTG Charles W. Bagnal, initiated by CSA GEN John A. Wickham Jr.
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——, “U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, the U.S. Army Operating Concept” Ft Monroe, VA: GPO 2011b.

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