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Reflections on 10 Years of Counterterrorism Analysis

The Death of Secrecy: Need to Know...
with Whom to Share?

French and American Intelligence Relations During
the First Indochina War, 1950-54

Reviews:

Triple Agent: The Al-Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated
the CIA

Our Kind of Traitor

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
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Corrections:

Studies Vol 55 No. 2 contained two errors in the Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf:


Institutionalizing Best Practices

Reflections on 10 Years of Counterterrorism Analysis

Jeffrey A. Builta and Eric N. Heller

Introduction

Numerous government commissions, academics, book writers, and journalists have dissected the 9/11 attacks and focused on the presumed failure of intelligence to disrupt al-Qaeda's attacks. These examinations have played a role in reshaping the look, feel, operation, and, particularly, the bureaucracy of the counterterrorism (CT) community and, by extension, the larger Intelligence Community (IC).

At the same time, those in the CT community have had nearly a decade of creative experimentation and learning, which has led to equally, if not larger, changes [than those mandated by commissions].

Those in the CT community have had nearly a decade of creative experimentation and learning, which has led to equally, if not larger, changes. Perhaps more than any conflict of the modern era, the war on terrorism has required operators to depend on intelligence for a range of requirements, from defining the enemy to determining and targeting their critical vulnerabilities. Along the way, the IC has had to adapt old processes and develop new ones to improve effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability.

The operation that resulted in Usama bin Ladin’s death in May 2011 has generated much-deserved congratulation throughout the IC. Bin Ladin’s death, the result of sustained cooperation and focused long-term analysis, demonstrates the impact of bringing to bear disparate relationships, organizational constructs, and capabilities throughout the CT intelligence community. Nevertheless, euphoria over the monumental event should not prevent a dispassionate analysis of the IC’s progress over the past decade or its continued shortfalls. A decade after 9/11, we, as experienced practitioners in the CT field, offer answers to four questions that we believe provide the measure of the CT intelligence community’s—particularly Defense Department’s—adaptation since 9/11.

• How has the IC adapted its information-sharing practices to meet the amount, pace, variety, and disparate sensitivities of information collected?

The endnotes for this article can be found in its digital version on cia.gov.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Lessons Learned in CT Analysis

How has the IC’s analytic cadre adapted to meet the evolving adversary?

What organizational constructs have proven successful?

How has the IC changed to address the CT issue as a holistic problem, as opposed to a narrow problem of hunting high-value targets (HVT)?

Each of these questions could be addressed separately, but because we believe the answers are so intertwined we will look at them together, in the following broad areas: how the IC has responded through integration, fusion, diffusion of information flows, and cooperation via centralized mission sets and broadened situational awareness. We contend the IC has some answers to the questions above, however, the current state of the CT intelligence community and the degree of institutionalization of best practices leaves much room for progress.

The expression “lessons learned” is a common and recognizable nomenclature, in actuality, most of the practices we will describe could more properly be termed “lessons relearned” or “lessons reinforced,” as few are completely new to the IC. Most have been cultivated and successfully employed by small intelligence organizations supporting specific operations for the better part of three decades. Unfortunately some of best practices were learned long ago and scrapped, only to be resurrected after a terrorist attack or attempted attack. Employing these practices today, collectively across our broad CT enterprise, will require another level of implementation and institutionalization.

Some readers may perceive in our insights lessons mainly for tactical, rather than strategic intelligence support. In terrorism, perhaps more than in any other kind of conflict, tactical events and data have strategic impact. The tactical success or failure of one counterterrorism operation and the resulting insights could, and frequently do, have strategic consequences for the United States and its allies.¹ Thus, the high-risk nature of today’s terrorist adversary inherently blends traditional levels of war—strategic, operational, tactical—and makes these lessons applicable to all levels of counterterrorism professionals.

Moreover, the obligation of intelligence organizations to deliver actionable intelligence to affect tactical CT targets in the near-term continue to be levied along with long-range, threat estimates intended for executive, policymaking levels.² Improvements in intelligence sharing and new information sources have been leveraged, but shortcomings in these areas continue to impede mission success.

Our most important and persistent challenge is the need to continually enhance the amount and quality of intelligence available to CT operators and planners and to more efficiently share that intelligence among key players. Multiple recommendations within the 9/11 Commission Report centered on issues related to information sharing, but within Defense intelligence, lack of sharing remains the most-often cited impediment to mission success in the CT arena.³

Experience in the war on terror has reinforced the importance of making intelligence data available to all elements of national power. The data available—and conversely the intelligence gaps that exist—determine where an element of national power expends intellectual energy, finite analytic capacity, and collection resources. The availability and precision of information needed for counterterrorism operations and to track diffuse transnational terrorist networks have expanded to a level not dreamed of prior to 9/11. This development has reinforced for many counterterrorism intelligence professionals that the
need to share intelligence must trump the old paradigm that put protection ahead of sharing. Codifying this notion, the 2008 US Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy demanded a shift in mindset from “need-to-know” towards “a responsibility to provide.”

In the deployed and intelligence task force environments created to carry out the intelligence operations in this conflict, information sharing often works well, driven by a sense of shared purpose based on operational urgency, mission focus, and personal relationships that form in these environments. Moreover, rapid feedback on intelligence analysis culminating in CT successes provides tremendous satisfaction and reinforces effective information sharing practices.

Historically, lessons in information sharing have been learned and relearned through tragic circumstances. Following the 2000 attack against the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, the Cole Commission recommended that the secretary of defense embed analysts from the national, commander-in-chief (CINC) (now, Combatant Command)-level, and component command level to the joint task force level. The Downing Commission Report, which investigated the 1996 attack against Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia highlighted the need for fusion centers to combine national intelligence with local intelligence collection and provide the result to tactical forces. This was to enable pattern identification, prevent information from falling through cracks, and focus US and allied intelligence services on the same pieces of information at the same time. Equally important, the function emphasized timely delivery of useful information to the tactical commander. Then Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, G2 of NATO forces in Afghanistan, wrote in 2010 about the need to increase US and allied focus on population-centric intelligence and described the CT successes that resulted from work on enemy-centric intelligence carried out in fusion centers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

By assembling bright, capable individuals under the same roof, Fusion Centers were able to coordinate classified SIGINT and HUMINT, and real-time surveillance video, allowing commanders to “action” the information with airstrikes and special operations that led to the death or capture of notorious terrorists...The concept has been replicated in Afghanistan and has achieved important successes.

Recently, however, we have been reminded of the information-sharing challenges that continue to hinder force protection, even within the continental United States. A congressional report on the attack against Fort Hood personnel by Maj. Nidal Hassan found that DoD and FBI collectively had sufficient information necessary to have detected Hasan's radicalization to violent Islamist extremism but failed both to understand and act on it.... Specific and systemic failures in the government's handling of the Hasan case raise additional concerns about what may be broader systemic issues.

In Washington, the establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center in 2004 and then the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) represented starts of this kind of fusion at the national level. In NCTC the US government has worked through legal, technical, security, and policy issues and brought more than 30 intelligence networks into one shared environment—and
Lessons Learned in CT Analysis

When analysts complete deployments or interagency task force assignments and return to jobs at their home agencies they rarely keep the level of access they had enjoyed.

information is shared well within the building. This unprecedented access has helped to ensure that NCTC analysts have as close to all the information available to the US government on a given topic as is possible.

Because of the agreements the center has made with the agencies and departments providing the networks, however, the data access in NCTC is largely physically bounded within its property. Even with these accesses, most analysis remains focused on production supporting policymakers at the most senior levels of the US government. However, those mandated to support forces operating against terrorists—those who seemingly need the highest level of fidelity of information—sit outside NCTC, at CIA, DIA, the Combatant Commands, FBI, and elsewhere. In addition to hindering analysis, such an arrangement can create an “us versus them” environment in which professional tensions fester.

Despite what is frequently trumpeted as major success in information sharing, the practical reality for most IC analysts is that information sharing among CT intelligence organizations is in many ways no further along in sum than it was on 10 September 2001. To be clear, the information sharing challenges today are different from those that existed before 9/11. Since then, the volume of intelligence data available to all analysts has expanded dramatically. While some of that expansion has been the result of policy and process improvements, much more of it resulted from expanded collection capacity and emphasis. Consequently, many of today’s problems are rooted in the problem of having too much data, too many diverse stovepipes creating it, and difficulties in scrutinizing the abundance across unique data sets. Nevertheless, information-sharing still is hampered by too many restrictions against sharing high-value data with the wider, expert CT analytic community because of operational concerns.

Some of the concerns about sharing operational data are justified, but too often the concerns seem to be based on perceptions without foundations, with the result that useful material is denied to the broader CT analytic community. In the field, these barriers tend to break down and the sharing of data within deployed and task force environments is good, but dependence on such environmental factors does not represent a systemic solution to the problem, as can be seen by the fact that when these analysts complete deployments or interagency task force assignments and return to jobs at their home agencies they rarely keep the level of access they had enjoyed.

Personal relationships and practices in a particular building in Northern Virginia are not a systemic answer to the problems laid out by the 9/11 Commission. Instead, we must build on the successes we have had to deploy information architecture and cross-domain data sets to secure CT communities of interest (sets of analysts covering the same or similar CT issues) managed by, but outside of, NCTC. Such an effort should include cross-leveling common databases and tools across the CT community, a community that already must deal with more databases than analysts can reasonably be expected to use.

In his July 2011 confirmation hearing, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper noted the need for a single repository of terrorism-related data as a foundation against which a variety of sophisticated technologies and tools could be applied. Clapper described it as a robust search engine that could range across a variety of data and data constructs to help connect information. At present, Clapper...
commented, the IC is spending too much manpower doing manually things that could be done by machines.\textsuperscript{12}

We can achieve fundamental improvement in our intelligence structure in relatively short order by mandating data access across a defined, audited, and controlled—but distributed—intelligence community-of-interest, modeled on the success at NCTC, so that CT intelligence professionals have equal access to terrorism data, within reasonable need-to-know parameters, in Langley, Washington, Stuttgart, Baghdad, Kabul and wherever else our expertise is deployed.

Analysis of recovered documents and media have been key to successes, but they are likely to become diminishing assets.

Analysis of recovered documents and media have been key to successes, but they are likely to become diminishing assets.\textsuperscript{12}

Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations. It has also provided unprecedented insights into the inner workings of al-Qa'ida that form the baseline of our strategic knowledge of the network.

The work of the US Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center with its Harmony database is an exemplar of the insights on terrorist groups, networks, and ideology captured documents provide.\textsuperscript{13} In 2007, the center produced a report entitled Al-Qa'ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq, which was based on a cache of recovered documents detailing the processes and personnel involved in facilitating the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq in support of al-Qa'ida in Iraq. The report provided information about the flow rates of foreign fighters, their identities, and their home countries. Moreover, the type of information in those documents could have been used to identify and target terrorists and disrupt terrorist attacks elsewhere. Other notable examples include the exploitation of information contained in laptops that had belonged to senior members of al-Qa'ida and which were procured in the fall of 2001. The contents of these computers included communication among senior leaders, budgets, training manuals, reconnaissance reports, bureaucratic squabbles, and theological debates, all providing strategic insight into al-Qa'ida’s inner-workings.\textsuperscript{14}

Our current short-term challenges in this area center largely on maintaining sufficient resources—such as translators, analysts, and technologies to process and analyze this material. However, we should note we are beginning to face larger challenges that will increase in the mid- to long-term. These center on diminishing US advantages in this area. Among them are greater terrorist awareness of our exploitation capabilities and the looming end of combat operations in Iraq and eventual troop reductions in Afghanistan. These events will diminish media and document exploitation and detainee interrogation opportunities. A recent study by the Center for a New American Security, though focused on intelligence networks, is easily extrapolated to media exploitation and detainee interrogation:

A second-order effect of the rapid withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan is the probable collapse of intelligence networks on both sides of the border that currently enable targeted counter-terrorism operations. The presence of US forces in Afghanistan, closely work-
In order to sustain counterterrorism operations in the most efficient and effective ways possible, the IC has developed and institutionalized a coherent and consistent process to make intelligence operationally useful for counterterrorism forces.

Evolved processes and empowered analysts have driven the CT mission forward: the future CT environment will challenge business methods.

In order to sustain counterterrorism operations in the most efficient and effective ways possible, the IC has developed and institutionalized a coherent and consistent process to make intelligence operationally useful for counterterrorism forces. The method is a continuous, non-linear cycle of "finding, fixing, finishing, exploiting, and analyzing" (F3EA) targets. In this cycle intelligence drives operations, which, in turn produce new intelligence for new operations. The four steps are shown in the figure on the right. I identify a critical node, develop intelligence to target it, employ an element of national power, and finally, gather intelligence related to how components of the targeted network react, using the new intelligence for future, generally near-term, CT actions. These concepts can also be applied to CT targets addressed by other elements of national power—political, social, economic, or something else.

The need for a standardized process is driven in part by the granularity of intelligence required to support current CT operations. Counterterrorism commanders require a high level of shared situational understanding, delivered with unprecedented speed and accuracy. Terrorism targets are very granular by nature, and often fleeting. This requires optimal use of all-source analysis and collection, to include persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools.

The F3EA process, a tactical process supported by operational and strategic elements, nests into larger strategic frameworks of terrorist networks. Through the F3EA process, all facets of a terrorist network are collected, analyzed, and intelligence products prepared. The reliance by terrorists on global travel and communications are also vulnerabilities that the United States can exploit in preventing terror attacks and degrading networks. As described by the 2003 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism:

The terrorist threat is a flexible, transnational network structure, enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose interconnectivity both within and between groups. In this environment, terrorists work together in funding, sharing intelligence, training, logistics, planning, and executing attacks....The terrorist threat today is both resilient and diffuse because of this mutually reinforcing, dynamic network structure.

Employing the F3EA process against those layered processes and network components, including those that give terrorist networks their resilience and facilitate travel, finance, and communications of operatives and their leaders, is and has been essential for effectively combatting terrorists.

The United Kingdom's success in August 2006 in stopping a planned attack against several airliners and the Christmas Day 2009 "underwear bomber" attempt against a Northwest Airlines flight to Detroit provide interesting contrasts. The UK plot was disrupted because of successful
surveillance and sharing of data among the UK’s counter-terrorism departments and agencies and the United States and Pakistan.\(^\text{21}\) The Christmas Day attempt failed because of the terrorist’s own limitations. That he got as far as he did was at least partially a failure to connect data points in intelligence channels and in some data sets not traditionally considered CT intelligence.\(^\text{22}\)

In congressional testimony following the Christmas Day incident, one witness highlighted the range of information available, which in isolation might not have been thought of as “counterterrorism” information. Some of these data sets included passenger manifests, flight paths, as well as other information such as method of payment, whether luggage was taken, and co-travelers, which in aggregate provides valuable clues to aid terrorist threat analysis.\(^\text{23} \text{24}\) As another expert testified in the wake of the UK disruptions, “the West built these networks and must find ways to use them against terrorists more effectively than the terrorists use them against us.”\(^\text{25}\) The persistent challenge in exploiting this kind of information continues to be making it available for CT purposes while at the same time protecting civil liberties of innocent travelers.

The institutionalization of the F3EA process and its use across the CT enterprise has generated critical successes for the US and its allies, but as restrictions on unilateral US CT operations grow, along with troop withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan, even greater precision will be needed. Similarly, enhancing the accuracy of intelligence inputs into the cycle and maximizing intelligence gain following operations will be of utmost importance.

There are two separate but parallel phenomena that threaten the effectiveness of the F3EA process: resource constraints and withdrawal from conflict zones. Because the potential political consequences of CT operations outside of combat zones are high—especially so in today’s resource-constrained environment—arguments against conducting such operations will be more powerful. Second, as noted earlier, the diminished intelligence resulting from US withdrawals from the conflict zones will have adverse effects. In this environment, the CT community would be faced with trying to find ways to compensate for decreases in intelligence resulting from a diminished presence and operations in conflict areas.

As the intelligence processes supporting counterterrorism efforts have evolved, so too have the roles of intelligence analysts. Arguably one of the most vital of these changes has been the tethering of analysts to their “finishing forces.”
Lessons Learned in CT Analysis

The key for analysts and their managers is to balance development of long-term subject matter expertise with support for the dynamic priorities of policymakers and operational elements.

Whether this “force” is a policymaker, law enforcement official, collector, or military operator, analysts must be acutely aware of the decision cycles and intelligence requirements of that force. Put another way, analysts must simply know for what purpose they are producing a given product. Not every product can or should translate into a direct operational decision.

In this context the report of the Downing Commission should be remembered. Assessing intelligence reporting before the Khobar Towers attack, the commission criticized the singular focus on current events and the distribution of an amalgamation of threat reporting, surveillance incidents, and general advisories. The commission concluded that the military intelligence community lacked a sufficient, in-depth, long-term analysis of trends, intentions, and capabilities of terrorists.26 The key for analysts and their managers is to balance development of long-term subject matter expertise with support for the dynamic priorities of policymakers and operational elements.

Additionally, because of the fidelity and complexity of intelligence supporting CT actions, all-source analysts have learned the intricacies of single-discipline collection from their HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT, GEOINT counterparts; they have learned what questions to ask to accurately confirm or deny reporting and to drive further collection. By more accurately and completely understanding targeting and collection, they can more accurately guide these systems and in turn provide more useful intelligence to both efforts.

Another element of the CT, to be addressed in more detail later, involves analytical support to operational efforts to address the environmental factors that lead to terrorism and the efforts of local foreign leaders to address the problem. This kind of analytical support also provides the strategic framework for an “all-of-government” approach that will allow movement beyond the “whack-a-mole” approach to manhunting. Understanding of environmental factors demands of CT analysts understanding of issues beyond those involved in simple targeting. To gain expertise in these topics CT analysts have needed to work with geographical and functional experts and with organizations that can provide political, military, ideological, social, and economic information and analysis as it relates to counterterrorism.

Finally, many CT professionals have developed simultaneously as strategic and tactical analysts. Reflecting the networks they investigate, through consistent movement between deployed operational and tactical-level units and back to headquarters, as well as with various IC agencies and policymaking venues in Washington, DC, analysts gain the skills to support tactical CT operators, collectors, and policymakers. As policymakers have become attuned, so too have analysts recognized the strategic relevance of tactical developments, leading them to think about how they can tailor their follow-on analysis, both to the most tactical operators and the most senior policymakers.

Focused organizational constructs and international cooperation to address counterterrorism networks have been vital, but these mechanisms and relationships need to be institutionalized.

Collaboration works best in situations in which analysts and operators (the intelligence consumers) are co-located as close to their targets as practicable. Joint Inter-Agency Task Forces (JIATFs) and similar organizations abroad are exemplars of effective interagency
Lessons Learned in CT Analysis

Complementing deployed analysts, a cadre of formal liaison officers has been optimized and professionalized.

activities overseas. Interagency integration can take place virtually, but such approaches are generally harder to make truly effective in the absence of physical ties into operational environments. In order to be most effective, CT organizations must have forward-deployed components as well as rear-garrison support. When they do, forward and rear area people can collaborate on analysis of common problems and can offer tailored support both to deployed CT forces and to policymakers at home.

Complementing deployed analysts, a cadre of formal liaison officers (LNO) has been optimized and professionalized. LNOs establish new network nodes and thicken the existing network, both on the battlefield with the battlespace owners and throughout the community of agencies involved in the CT fight. The record of today’s LNOs shows that the custom of filling liaison positions with less-capable employees is a thing of the past.

Getting interagency integration right depends principally on engagement, and leading through continuous engagement is one of the most critical roles for CT managers. This function, however, places heavy costs on organizations. One of them is the personnel grind; a second is the demand for continuity. Professionals in CT organizations are in a constant state of deployment, recovery, and preparation for redeployment. In addition, to be effective, CT managers require a 24/7 reachback capability to subject matter experts, an interaction that places heavy demands on those at home to maintain situational awareness through a rigorous schedule of regular video teleconferences and other means to discuss developments and operational planning.

Experts at home are well-positioned to research and present the strategic picture in which tactical operations are, or should be, developed. When optimized, a continual cycle of analysts from headquarters to the field and back ensures a cadre of deeply knowledgeable CT experts, capable of operating at strategic and tactical levels and sensitive to the requirements of both.

Notwithstanding the costs of the CT effort, inevitably intelligence managers are asked to continue to support their agency’s own organic production and priorities, a difficult challenge in light of the demands of CT work. In today’s resource environment, this tension is unlikely to change as the focus on CT activity, deployments, and rotational assignments remain the norm. Thus, today’s intelligence officers must be trained to work in all sorts of environments, from war zones to the White House and many places in between. Despite the costs to the other priorities of home agencies, the intelligence, insights, experience, and skills gained by intelligence officers engaged in CT-related support activities, far outweigh the costs of providing it. Furthermore, deployments to joint operational components exemplify the spirit of the ODNI’s Joint Duty Program as professional development vehicles, cultivating cross-organizational networks, expanding knowledge of IC programs and operations, and facilitating information sharing.27

The same principles for improving and maintaining the collaboration of agencies and departments—i.e., co-location in physical or virtual environments—should also apply to individual analysts, operational planners, and collectors. As the IC has pursued integration and collaboration, we have and must continue to de-emphasize internal boundaries between disciplines and agencies and focus on the CT mission.

Within the CT community, the benefits of fusing operations and intelligence have been real-
ized in a number of examples, including movement toward fusion efforts in the Defense Intelligence Agency after the October 1983 attack against the US Marine unit in Beirut and creation of CIA's Counterterrorism Center in the late 1980s.\(^{29,28}\) In the latter, elements of the CIA's directorates were brought together and directed against the CT problem. The IC's response to 11 September and lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom greatly expanded the fusion of operations and intelligence. The Department of Defense doctrinally instituted some of these lessons into Joint Intelligence Operations Centers as the vehicle to combine intelligence disciplines and operations.\(^{30}\)

The results have been improved accuracy, credibility, relevance, and responsiveness of analysis and collection. The measures have enhanced the ability of the IC to drive and focus collection to support all-source analysis by improving the quality of reporting, providing more informed oversight of the vetting of sources, making collection more responsive to fleeting targets of opportunity, and creating hybrid all-source targeting officers.

Despite the success in bringing operations and intelligence professionals closer together, there remain impediments to intelligence support to prosecutorial and law enforcement efforts. While our expertise is limited to the CT experience within defense intelligence, we believe lessons learned by law enforcement deserves its own treatment by practitioners in that field. Still, we hold that there are opportunities and challenges that persist at the seams of defense intelligence and law enforcement.

Interpretations of legal restrictions and evidentiary chain of custody issues continue to impede defense CT intelligence from providing intelligence and operational opportunities to law enforcement partners where military options are not possible or prudent. Although some positive steps have been taken, such as the formation of the fusion centers and coordination groups to provide information to INTERPOL, as well as to CONUS-based state, local, and tribal law enforcement, gaps remain in timeliness, access, and fidelity of information. Some efforts have been heralded as driving a level of unprecedented connection between field personnel, providing extremely high levels of situational awareness. Others describe federally-coordinated intelligence products as not meeting the needs of local law enforcement in terms of subject matter or timeliness. Especially during international terrorist events, local US leaders rely upon the media more often than from the reporting of government officers overseas.\(^{31,32}\)

Any one nation's counterterrorism programs or organizations will not by themselves prevent attacks by terrorist networks spread across the world. The threat to the US homeland frequently emanates from terrorists operating in areas in which the United States lacks authorities or access. Many of our successes today and in the future will rely on our ability to quickly disseminate specific, reliable intelligence on terrorists to foreign partners and to convince them to act on our information.

Another trend that speaks to the need for international cooperation is the growth of local extremists with global ambitions. As al-Qa'ida expands its influence via franchise endorsements of regional terrorists in Pakistan, North Africa, Yemen, and Iraq, we have seen groups elsewhere change their targeting criteria and strategic views to resemble al-Qa'ida's anti-Western outlook.\(^{33,34}\) For example:

- The failed effort of the Christmas Day 2009 operative Umar Faruq Abdulmutallab reflects an increasing threat from al-Qa'ida's regional affili-
ates, in this case from al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula.35

• The attempt of Faisal Shazad to explode a vehicle bomb in Times Square in New York City in May 2010, highlights the close ties Tehrik-e Taliban in Pakistan maintains with senior al-Qa’ida leaders, the critical support TTP provides to al-Qa’ida, and the shared radical, global goals of both networks.36

Two CT successes involving international cooperation during the past decade demonstrate the importance of international intelligence partnerships. One was the aforementioned disruption of the plot to blow up airplanes coming from the UK in 2006. A second, more recent, example was disruption of terrorists’ attempts to ship improvised explosives devices as air cargo in 2010.37 A consistent application of cooperative efforts in the years to come, will require, in our judgment, use of the same techniques for integration and fusion of intelligence efforts with foreign partners that we have used in US CT intelligence operations.38

We believe, much of the burden for success in this area lies with the US Intelligence Community rather than with our foreign partners—who, along with local law enforcement, should be seen as another set of “finishing forces.” With expanded international cooperation comes several challenges, among which are cultural bias within the IC, overclassification, and variations in how the United States and its international partners perceive threats. And while expanding the CT network to international partners inherently increases the risk of compromises of secret information on both sides, the benefit of and need for their support and actions must outweigh these risks.

Addressing terrorism effectively means addressing root causes and providing intelligence support to efforts to address them.

Intelligence and operations targeting the activities, locations, identities, social networks, and operational planning of terrorists will continue to be critical in the fight against terrorists. However, in the long-term, the US government’s ability to understand and address—or enable others to address—the root causes of terrorism will also depend on our ability to collect, analyze, and carry out activities that shape the environments from which terrorists and their networks emerge.

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A key lesson from [high-value target case studies] is that targeting of enemy leaders does not work unless it is contained within a larger strategy. Finding the right balance between broader counter-insurgency efforts and HVT activities is vital.... A myopic focus on the removal of insurgent or terrorist leaders at the expense of broader initiatives often has negative consequences.39

These kinds of activities, so-called “indirect lines of operation,” as defined by a former vice commander of the US Special Operations Command, include those in which we enable partners to combat extremist organizations themselves by contributing to their capabilities through training, organizing and equipping. This includes efforts to deter active and tacit support for violent extremist organizations in areas where the existing government is...
The group of issues we have discussed will endure as the prime drivers of effectiveness in the CT community and the topics around which decisions concerning the CT community’s evolution should evolve.

either unwilling or unable to remove terrorist sanctuaries.40

In many ways, these kinds of operations are far more difficult to support and conduct than traditional CT operations because of the scope and the range of analytic skills and organizational entities required to carry them out. To develop effective plans and approaches, analysts and operators must understand the roles of religious leaders, local politicians, and non-governmental, international and multi-national organizations present in a region, together with understanding of foreign internal defense forces, civil affairs, and the public, in effect, all those that shape the environment in which terrorist networks are spawned and operate.41

This is no small task and worthy of an entirely separate discussion. Suffice it to say for our purposes in this evaluation, analysts and operators will have to build even more diffuse communities of interest and sources of information than are normally considered for lethal operations against terrorists.42

In addition, different ways of thinking about timelines must be developed as efforts to engage others in “indirect lines of operation” will take place over much longer for periods of time from conception, to development, to execution, and finally to results. And lastly, all we have said above about the importance of engaging foreign partners applies equally if not more so in this realm.

Conclusion

Over the past nearly 10 years, the US CT community has restructured and implemented new processes to optimize the CT effort. Many of these have been mandated from above; others have been institutionalized through battlefield successes and failures. The implacable nature of the CT threat means future terrorist attacks will undoubtedly occur, and when they do post-event commissions will most likely offer new suggestions and wiring diagrams for improvement. But our experiences during the post 9/11 decade suggests that the group of issues we have discussed will endure as the prime drivers of effectiveness in the CT community and the topics around which decisions concerning the CT community’s evolution should evolve.

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For endnotes go to the digital version of this article in cia.gov under Studies in Intelligence.
Commentary

The Death of Secrecy: Need to Know...with Whom to Share

Bowman H. Miller, PhD

The US envoys expelled from Mexico City and Quito for remarks made in cables to Washington were among the first victims of WikiLeaks, but there will be more. The only “crime” these ambassadors committed was reporting candidly in accordance with the best traditions and expectations of the US Foreign Service. While there will doubtless be many more casualties of such global disclosure manias, the real victims may encompass other entities and processes that will suffer the second-order effects of these disclosures. Analysts as well as policy- and decisionmakers should be concerned, for these effects are likely to endure and to prove very damaging. What is truly endangered now is the ability to keep anything secret, along with the ability to write for or brief policy- and decision makers with as much candid, relevant information as possible. Wary of having sensitive information revealed on the Internet, foreign interlocutors will clam up, and reports officers in diplomatic posts abroad will err on the side of extreme caution in telling Washington what they have learned.

All-source analysts, whose insights and judgments have long relied in part upon the candid, often sensitive observations and reporting from our diplomatic missions around the world, will see their perspectives and interpretations suffer. To the extent foreign affairs analysts are forced to rely on classified, clandestinely acquired intelligence—from that much smaller pool of recruited or co-opted foreign sources, whose identities are never fully disclosed in intelligence reporting—the confidence level of their assessments may also decline. The rolling disclosures from the 2010–11 WikiLeaks scandal—an aberrant manifestation of transparency advocacy—are having a chilling effect on the reporting that policy makers and analysts rely upon for interpretive perspective, cogent assessment, and informed policy formulation and implementation.¹

One need not be paranoid to wonder if this tourniquet on US reporting concerning foreign states and leaders does not also serve a more deleterious purpose. It is one thing to see part of one’s source information shrivel up and die based on the hacker world’s credo of “information wants to be free.” This blatant disclosure can partially blind US analysts and decision-makers to foreign developments and intentions by forcing the United States to rely more heavily on clandestine intelligence, a sparser, more difficult, and more costly enterprise—as well as to depend upon often dubious, open-source information. However, the WikiLeaks episode can also serve America’s adversaries the world over, from pariah regimes and ideological foes to a host of hackers and fabrica-

¹ A key difference between intelligence and diplomatic reporting has long been in the area of source protection, where diplomatic traffic generally has named its sources but then noted “(please protect)” in the text. Clandestine human source reporting, already classified much higher than diplomatic reporting and more restricted in its dissemination, never actually identifies any source beyond a generic description of the human source’s access and record of reporting credibility. The debate over the WikiLeaks phenomenon continues to rage among politicians and legal minds concerning issues of transparency vs. secrecy, a realignment of First Amendment interpretive thinking, definitions of journalism vs. a kind of information voyeurism, and the like. What has escaped us thus far is a reasonable, defensible balance between freedom of expression and irresponsible license in the context of preserving protected communications impacting US national security.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in this article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

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tors, since the whole notion of operational security and protection of sensitive sources has been turned on its head. The alleged WikiLeaks leaker, a certain Private Manning, was either stupid or disingenuous in claiming that he could have acted more maliciously by giving the leaked reports "to China or Russia." In making them available globally via WikiLeaks, he did all of that and much more.²

Need to Share—Overshooting the Target

The US national security information environment has gone from being overly protective and constricted to becoming unmanageably complex and dispersed. The problem now is less one of vertical stovepipes and more one of uncontrolled, anonymous cyberspace—an "irrational exuberance" of sharing. The United States needs to refocus its efforts on finding the "happy medium," a sensible and sustainable middle course that can shield sensitive information from inordinately wide, unauthorized dissemination and "data-basing" but also enable the critical obligation to get key information to those who actually need it and can use it appropriately and responsibly.³ While some worry about how to bring to justice culprit insider leakers who hold security clearances and have sensitive information access, others try to right the disrupted balance between responsible and minimally restricted information sharing. A credible damage assessment must address the effects that these and similar unauthorized, mammoth disclosures have on the US government's ability to talk with and report candidly on foreign counterparts.

This costly outcome for US interests already takes on at least two forms. Foreign interlocutors are markedly reticent to share sensitive information and internal perspectives with American diplomats for fear of seeing their comments portrayed, out of context but with attribution, in the public sphere. Secondly, desire to preserve others' security, safety, and continued candor is causing US diplomatic reporters to pull their punches in reporting fully what they see and hear abroad.

This latter concern will no doubt prompt a move to reporting in channels often beyond the reach of most analysts, and to hedging on disclosing sources in diplomatic reports. Socio-political insights in these reports, so valuable to the analyst, are based on candid, closed-door discourse with foreign actors on a broad range of issues and trends as they affect US entities, personnel, interests, and foreign and security policy objectives. In the future these areas will more often be reported through highly restricted reporting channels, e.g., via secure telephone and in "addressee only" e-mails or via compartmented dissemination pathways. Even e-mail transmission is not sacrosanct, however, and many shy away from that channel. Few, if any, of these reports will reach most analysts, become part of a searchable database, or become a part of the researachable historical record. This diminution will continue an already observable trend toward compartmentalizing both raw and finished reporting and analysis, erecting more and more computer firewalls, and layering additional access restrictions.

The Information Spectrum's Mid-range Reporting and Ground Truth in Jeopardy

One of the most valuable kinds of information for all political analysts comes from those with a true sense of the pulse of a country. These can be scholars and journalists steeped in a country's history, society, culture, and trajectory; they also be observant, schooled diplomats, whose personal radars are attuned to everything going on—publicly and behind the scenes—in the country to which they are

posted. Unlike instant global news accounts and the accompanying paid “talking heads” dialed up for “instant analysis,” US diplomats can provide validated on-scene accounts, continuing coverage between news cycles, and interpretive reflections on the significance, impact, and implications of foreign events and decisions. Diplomatic reporting is not just airing others’ dirty laundry; it is not relaying to Washington the galloping gossip in foreign capitals; nor is it solely reminding Washington policymakers and analysts how US policies and pronouncements are being received, interpreted, and affecting events abroad. While it does include all of these at times, most important is each US foreign mission’s work in informing and analyzing for Washington what is going on in the thinking and behaviors of foreign actors, most especially as they affect those matters about which the United States cares most.

All of these critical areas of coverage will now suffer from a decline of regular, especially candid, reporting. Several senior Foreign Service Officers have asserted they will no longer put anything sensitive in their reporting to Washington, an indication of how sparse “ground truth” perspectives threaten to become. And this loss of highly relevant current information and insights will exacerbate a steady diminution of US Foreign Service analytic reporting per se, a negative trend already visible over the past two decades at the least. Embassies never have written primarily for the use and benefit of Washington analysts. Indeed, the idea of doing so is an abomination to many diplomats, especially those in the senior ranks. However, as more and more requirements have been placed on already over-stretched and understaffed US missions, political reporting increasingly has found itself on the chopping block, sacrificed to time pressures and operational priorities. Instant news reporting has edged out quality analytic reporting from US diplomatic missions in many respects, but this does not include those unique, sensitive conversations with senior foreign interlocutors—and their plans and perspectives shared in intimate, often one-on-one, settings. It is in these arenas that the WikiLeaks intrusion will prove most costly and destructive. Moreover, the threat of a continuing spiral of revelations from the WikiLeaks treasure trove of sensitive State Department reporting will keep both diplomats and analysts on tenterhooks for years to come.

A Leak is a Leak is a Leak?

What makes WikiLeaks different from leaks to other media outlets? The short answer is twofold: first, bona fide journalists operate cognizant of an ethical code which, despite their calling to hold government to account, helps to govern their actions and underline their responsibility in dealing with national security issues and information; secondly, those journalists write for a public, large or small, and have a purpose and are selective in their reporting. On the other hand, WikiLeaks’ actions have no stated purpose beyond disclosing, without restraint, what it illicitly has received from unnamed sources. Contrary to some claims, the leaker of the vast amounts of Department of State and other reporting was not and is not a whistle-blower. That name only deserves to be used for those revealing embarrassing, illegal, unethical, or negligent behavior by those enjoying the public’s trust and confidence. The WikiLeaks leaker defies this definition. For its part, limited dissemination diplomatic reporting protects information that serves a specific set of consumers and legitimate purposes for the benefit of America’s foreign and security policy aims, just as the trade secrets of a company enjoy the benefits of proprietary or intellectual property protections under the law.

4 These statements were made to the author by two senior US Foreign Service Officers, who confided their attitudes in confidence. No change in reporting doctrine or guidance, however, has been issued by the Department of State per se, according to a third senior official there with access to such policy decisions.
In the “WikiLeaks” era, diplomatic reporting (as noted, already thinner and sparser than in years past) is likely to find analysts tapping into dry wells for information in many instances. This will put added pressure on analysts to build mutually advantageous relationships with reporting officers and outside experts. While the mythology persists that analysis should drive intelligence collection, and perhaps elements of diplomatic reporting as well, the fact is that most analysts have little, if any, contact or relationship with those diplomats and “collectors” reporting this kind of information. This is all the more true as the generational change in the US analytic workforce continues to bring in more and more untested, less experienced analysts. Thus, while desirable, encouraging more give-and-take—perhaps via “secure” internet connections—with those stationed abroad as Washington’s “eyes and ears” will continue to be sporadic and often personality-dependent.

Moreover, because the emphasis on getting diplomats into the field as “transformation agents” (under the aegis of former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice) has further drained on reporting out of embassies and consulates, it has become that much more critical to broaden analysts’ networks of “informants,” e.g., in the academic, think tank, and journalistic worlds even as the bulk of the US Intelligence Community (IC) remains captive to a hidebound, inflexible security regimen that stresses strict avoidance of contact with the uninitiated interlocutor, be he an American or foreign citizen. That culture is the polar opposite of the diplomatic approach, which seeks to maximize information acquisition, but not through recruitment and direction of paid informants committing espionage for the United States. Both types of information gathering depend on trust, and while the data that WikiLeaks obtained was not intelligence, it did include a host of diplomatic telegrams in which there has been much less focus heretofore on masking the identities of foreign information sources. Denying access to what were becoming IC-wide data-base assets will no doubt be another by-product of this damage.

**Death of the “Need to Know” Sacred Cow**

The 9/11 Commission found great fault with the stovepiping and bureaucratic hoarding of national security information, some of which (in proper hands and at the right time) might have aborted or altered the devastating terrorist assaults in New York, Washington, and in the skies over Pennsylvania in September 2001. The recipe for correction, however, was an overstated, virtually unqualified call for greater sharing of information—an implicit overturning of the prevailing “need to know” culture, one admittedly in need of revision. However, in this age of rapid and ready access to electronic information in a variety of locations, the newly enshrined emphasis on “need to share” has swung the pendulum much too far in the opposite direction. In essence, any tin pot hacker or information junkie can probe data access portals and data-base entry points (both private and government-owned) to intrude on all manner of information holdings—some classified, many others merely sensitive. The hackers’ motives may be adversarial, but they may also simply be to prove they can succeed.

For all of its untold advances and advantages, the Internet has proved itself also to be the bane of national security. The more we rely on computerized networks, the more juicy they become for our adversaries to target, interdict, and damage, whether those adversaries are in the ranks of hostile governments, hackers, or foreign actors. Their motivations run the gamut: from proving a system is vulnerable and insecure, to embarrassing a government or

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5 “The biggest impediment to all-source analysis...is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information.... [The ‘need to know’ system] implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Those Cold War assumptions are no longer appropriate.” The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (WW Norton: New York, 2002), 416–17.
official, to inflicting major damage to a critical piece of information infrastructure. Thus, the government is increasingly focused on cyber security, both for its own systems and for the larger public infrastructure, upon which rests the functioning of our economy and the information society writ large.

Need to Know ... With Whom to Share

Transparency advocates in the extreme ask: Why is anything classified? Shouldn't the American public be entitled to know what its government knows and is doing? Such naïve questions are reminiscent of the now-ridiculed credo of nearly a century ago, i.e., that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail." The fact is that—after the Cold War and a half century in which deterrence could only succeed if the adversary knew some but not all of one's capabilities and intentions—in today's world, the explosion of information sources of varying value and validity still requires that some kinds of information be kept secret. Given the expansion and variety of threats to the nation's security and interests, a number of things deserve to be kept to a limited audience with, yes, a "need to know"—in the best interests of the American public. Some examples are: how to make nuclear and biological weapons; how to access nuclear and other sensitive facilities (physically and electronically); US plans and capabilities, given different contingencies and demands, both at home and abroad (e.g., war plans); and who is providing us insights into the plans and actions of foreign entities and terrorist and criminal enterprises.

In information dissemination terms, there is no longer any such entity as "the American public." In the contemporary environment, any public, regardless of how small or seemingly remote, can instantly morph into a global audience. Examples are plentiful. Recall the demise of a politician who spouted an ethnic slur, suffered a slip of the tongue, made an untoward remark on a microphone wrongly assumed to be inoperative, committed a glaring error in judgment or timing, or said virtually anything controversial, even to a "closed," hometown Rotary Club gathering. If it can be made newsworthy, it will be, particularly in our world of ubiquitous cell phone filming, recording, blogging, and tweeting. Given the present-day technological reality, one cannot simply insist on a sunshine policy to govern the actions and information disclosure decisions of the US or any government. Indeed, many foreign governments—in particular their intelligence, security and law enforcement components—are increasingly leery of providing the United States with sensitive information that could end up in the wrong hands, appear in the news or on the Internet or in a courtroom, and thereby be compromised, along with its originator.

It will be a lot harder in the future to get foreign sources to provide under-the-table insights into their governments' leaders, inner workings, policy plans and disputes, and more. It should go without saying that this information has never been easy to acquire. And this elicitation is not espionage but rather the work of socio-cultural cultivation best accomplished by diplomats who can (or could, in the past) display behaviors worthy of another's trust and confidence. Just as diplomacy seeks to build and then steer relationships, the damage of a WikiLeaks exposure sows mistrust and undercut those relationships in whatever phase they find themselves. In the world of spotting, assessing, recruiting, and handling human intelligence assets, trust is the ultimate coin of the realm: we must be able to trust in the credibility of information from a source (lest he be a plant, swindler or fabricator); and, in turn, the

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6 See Nakaskima, 10f.
7 A contemporary bumper sticker reflects this zealotry in the words "Secrecy Promotes Tyranny." Those of this view clearly have no appreciation for the vulnerability of some aspects of national security, were it not for the ability to avoid publicizing them to our adversaries.
8 One definition of diplomacy is "the art of letting the other guy have your way." (Originator unknown)
source must have a basic trust in this handler that the source’s identity, reporting, and personal security will be fully protected. These principles also hold in the world of diplomacy.

**WikiLeaks Copycats**

As potentially harmful as the exposure of sensitive, US government communications and reporting has been and most likely will continue to be, the technology of a globalizing world makes it more than likely that we will continue to witness exposures akin to that of the contemporary WikiLeaks case. Indeed, leaving WikiLeaks aside, concerns over privacy and information retention already explain Europeans’ reluctance to provide “[airline] passenger name recognition” data to the United States for security purposes, absent binding agreements as to who will have access to it and for which purposes, and how long it can be retained in US computer holdings.9 Skeptical European partners have already witnessed such data of theirs appearing in US airline industry hands, when it was supposed to be fenced off solely for US government databases and access.

Keeping anything secret in today’s world, outside of an effective police state that chooses isolation and persecution as its tools, will become increasingly difficult. That, after all, is also the thrust of part of America’s concerned focus on cyber security, both for information integrity and for shielding information technology from “denial of service” and virus attacks. While one can hope that future “transparency crusaders” might exercise some caution and consideration by sifting out the most devastating information from blanket Internet exposure, the likelihood remains that many will grab and broadcast sensitive reporting simply to prove their capabilities or to embarrass authorities. Leakers with a security conscience seem to be the ultimate oxymoron. The same holds for hackers, who joyride into others’ data bases and e-mail troves to plant worms and viruses, and to extract or destroy data.

A strange irony in all of this may even find government users of WikiLeaks revelations in a catch-22: if they use WikiLeaks-disclosed secondhand data in any unclassified product, oral or written, they may fall prey to violating secrecy stipulations that forbid publishing or broadcasting information that the government still considers classified, whether leaked or not. This situation already prevails concerning the news media milieu, i.e., government personnel, especially intelligence officials, are on notice never to corroborate leaked information by lending it the aura of legitimacy when it appears, unauthorized, in unclassified form.10

The challenge for the IC is to right the balance between finding the appropriate safeguards and compartmentation of information on the one hand, while on the other sustaining candid, analytical reporting from across the world to the benefit of the president, his cabinet, military planners and decisionmakers, Congress, and, only when appropriate, the US (and thus global) public. Expecting the Internet or the likes of a WikiLeaks enterprise to police itself is a vain hope. In safeguarding the nation’s critical secrets, officials have encountered one more major hurdle and dangerous adversary.

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10 I am indebted to Dr. Cathryn Thurston, Director of Strategic Intelligence Research, National Intelligence University, for this insight.
The “Unquiet’Alliês”

French and American Intelligence Relations During the First Indochina War, 1950–54

Jean-Marc LePage, PhD, and Elie Tenenbaum

French-American intelligence relations were famously presented in literature through the prism of Graham Greene’s brilliant novel, The Quiet American. The book portrays Alden Pyle, a soft-spoken, intellectual, serious, and idealistic CIA officer meddling in badly corrupt French colonial affairs. This embroidered vision, though not completely disconnected from reality, has concealed the true nature of French-US intelligence relations in the region, which were part of a necessary, though unwelcome by the French, alliance.a

For war-torn France of the late 1940s, an alliance with the United States was a matter of necessity. For Washington, deeply distressed by the “loss” of China in 1949, containment of communist expansion into Southeast Asia had increasingly become a major objective. As early as 1950, the United States was financing the main part of the French war effort, supplying money and material. But even as the French gladly accepted military aid, they refused to return the favor with information or influence. And so began, within the greater conflict between the French and the revolutionary Viet Minh, a covert small war between the two allies for intelligence and influence.

With this kind of a backdrop, the relationship of French and US intelligence during the first Indochina war was anything but placid, but it could neither be characterized as perpetually antagonistic nor as consistently harmonious. They were

a This article is adapted from a presentation to the Department of State’s Office of the Historian Conference on the American Experience in Southeast Asia, 1946–1975 on 30 September 2010. The authors wish to warmly thank Dr. John Prados for his untriring help in the writing of this paper, as well as Dr. John Carland, who greatly contributed to this production by inviting the authors to The Southeast Asia symposium at the State Department. At last, may Ms. Alexandra Schwartz be thanked for her tremendous work in making this article readable in proper English.

The endnotes for this article can be found only in its digital version on cia.gov.

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often both at the same time, whether the subject was foreign intelligence collection or covert action.

Institutional Cooperation and Personal Vendettas Color Foreign Intelligence Exchange

After the end of WW II, French and US intelligence cooperation in Indochina did not resume in a significant way until the early 1950s. The relationship was naturally defined by the Cold War and the communist takeover of China in 1949, but quality of the relationship was also a product of political and personal tensions between Cold War-minded US intelligence operatives and the colonial mindset of French personnel.¹

National agencies: the gentlemen’s agreement

The French intelligence structure in Indochina was complex and dispersed. In addition to the military’s Deuxième Bureau (G2) and agencies like the Service de Renseignement Opérationnel (SRO),² present in Indochina were representatives of the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), which was under the direct control of the prime minister, though it was mostly staffed by military men. The SDECE was divided into four main sub-services: HUMINT, COMINT, Counterintelligence, and the Action Branch. During 1951–54, the SDECE director was Pierre Boursicot. Under his command, Colonel Maurice Belleux was SDECE’s station chief in Indochina.

In the United States, after the issuance on 27 February 1950 of the “Report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina,” (NSC 64) the CIA set up a station in Indochina, first in the American legation, then in the US embassy when that was officially established in 1952. From the start, relations between the French and US services had to be formalized by a specific agreement. This national-level agreement was all the more necessary because French local authorities—the high commissioners as well as the high command in Saigon—were suspicious of American activities in Vietnam.

Precedents did exist for a relationship, however. Since 1949, the SDECE had maintained a relatively close relationship with British intelligence.³ An MI6 liaison officer was working with the SDECE in Saigon, while a French counterpart stayed in Singapore. The French idea was to develop links with the CIA along similar lines.

In May and June 1951, Pierre Boursicot met Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Walter Bedell Smith, his deputy Allen Dulles, and Frank Wisner, who was head of the CIA’s newly created equivalent to SDECE’s Action Branch, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). A general protocol agreement was reached, which allowed the CIA to operate in Indochina through the US embassy in Saigon.⁴ Two officers were appointed as liaison officers to the SDECE. By 1952, there were three. Their mission was to exchange intelligence on diplomatic and military matters in the region on a weekly basis.⁵

Not surprisingly, in the minds of SDECE representatives this cooperation extended only to military matters: domestic affairs in Indochina (i.e., local Vietnamese politics) were not to be discussed. This separation did not exist in American thinking, a factor that contributed to many misunderstandings between the allies and made cooperation difficult, especially with the Action Branch.

Nevertheless, a CIA liaison officer was attached to the Action Branch, while at the same time, two French officers were assigned to the corresponding CIA service in Korea.⁶ Thanks to this “exchange program,” if one can call it that,
the French officer Roger Trinquier, who was later to be known in the Battle of Algiers, wrote that he was able to participate in Operation Ratkiller with the Americans against Korean communist guerrillas.\(^7\)

In July 1954, as the Geneva Peace Agreement was reached, the CIA offered a new collaboration proposal, which the French government accepted. Although the details of this new arrangement are not clear, French documentation indicates that Colonel Belleux and Edward Lansdale’s Saigon Military Mission (SMM) were to establish this future collaboration.\(^8\) But the end of the Korean War and the perceived expansion of the Chinese threat had expanded American collection needs, and Indochina came to be seen as a solution. American operators took positions in the Seno Base in Laos because the Okinawa stations were too far away to intercept Chinese radio broadcasts coming from South China.\(^10\)

The Korean War and the armistice that stopped the fighting had demonstrated the importance of obtaining intelligence about China. Indochina, as a Cold War battleground, provided a window onto Chinese possibilities and intentions. In these more international aspects of intelligence collaboration, French-American intelligence relations operated relatively smoothly. It would be a different picture at the local level in Vietnam.

Relations with French Indochina authorities

The CIA analyst of Vietnamese affairs George W. Allen recalled in his book None So Blind that day-to-day relationships between French G2 officers and their foreign counterparts were good,\(^11\) but he seemed to have missed how different feelings were at the higher levels, between various commanders in chief and their respective general staff officers.

With US diplomatic recognition of Vietnam in February 1950, US intelligence services functioned through military attachés and officers of the Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii. Some officers of the CIA appeared to have been posted to the embassy, but others occupied positions in organizations like the Special Technical and Economic Mission (STEM). The STEM was managed in 1951 by Robert Blum, a man close to the CIA who that year also became president of the Committee for a Free Asia.\(^12\) The committee was dedicated to sustaining the struggle of independent states against communism as well as colonialism. From a French perspective, Blum’s views were easily seen to be verging on Francophobia and to be undermining French influence in the region. General de Lattre de Tassigny, who held the ranks of high commissioner as well as commander in chief, expressly obtained Blum’s reposting. As de Lattre’s intervention shows, French authorities had a hard time accepting the US presence as soon as it began to challenge French influence.

By January 1951 a foreign affairs section had been created within the Secrétariat Per-
permanent de la Défense Nationale (SPDN)—a joint civilian-military council de Lattre initiated to coordinate top-level national security issues in Indochina—to smooth out collaboration between military attachés. It was supposed to facilitate the exchange of intelligence data as well as to control it. This unit organized daily meetings in which the French G2 took bearings of the military situation and answered questions from the US side. Nevertheless, all sensitive issues were scrupulously kept secret and away from American ears.

Theoretically, this unit was supposed to be the exclusive intelligence channel between French forces and their allies in Indochina. But some were not satisfied by the quality or the quantity of the data and searched for more by roundabout means. According to a US consulate member, the State Department in particular was discontented with reports of the military attachés and put pressure on them to improve. For instance, a Sûreté (the French political police in Indochina) report from 1952 attests that US representatives at the Hanoi Consulate bitterly complained about the French, who were overtly reluctant to help them solve the problem.

This lack of cooperation was quite typical for the period and was the result of the perspectives, if not policy, of the French Expeditionary Force Commander, General Raoul Salan (1952–53), which can be traced in his personal notes. During his tenure, Salan denounced the state of relations between French officers and foreign representatives. The “rumors” they collected, he said, were sent back and could be used against French interests. Expeditionary Force policy required French officers to make contact with military security whenever they met foreigners, even allies. As a result, 1952 was the worst year in relations between the two countries. It resulted in an extreme poverty of American reports—probably worsened by the relatively weak understanding of French among US intelligence operatives and a lack of other, non-French-speaking sources, at least according to French archives.

Salan denounced the state of relations between French officers and foreign representatives. The “rumors” they collected, he said, were sent back and could be used against French interests.
A second problem for the French authorities was the US practice of making contact with Vietnamese personalities. This activity brought suspicion upon the CIA and triggered closer surveillance of US representatives. The agreement theoretically excluded political affairs, but as the United States started to look for intelligence in a broader context, its officers started to get in touch with some murky Chinese and Vietnamese personalities, including Trinh Minh The—a Cao Dai defector in South Vietnam—or Ngo Dinh Nhu—Diem’s brother. The French political police thus reported the constitution of a cell composed of a dozen Chinese and Vietnamese close to the US consul in northern Vietnam. It also appeared that the Chinese had been given a radio transmitter. Some Vietnamese and Chinese people met the US representative directly and provided information, although their reports were usually seen as biased. General Salan, as well as many officers and civil servants in the country, could not stand the maneuvers, and the intelligence relationship under Salan came close to breaking down.

With General Henri Navarre, who took over from Salan in 1953, relations were simpler because he recognized the degree to which his forces were dependent on the United States. But he was still reluctant to provide intelligence from his technical services. For example, in the middle of 1953, Navarre wanted US help to increase airborne collection. In compensation, the Americans wanted the results of surveillance conducted in South China. Navarre at first refused, in order to protect his COMINT organization, then his most important intelligence service. But when he became privy to the secret SDECE-NSA agreement mentioned above, he finally agreed to the terms—he was probably also under pressure from Paris. At the same time, according to Vietnam historian John Prados, the French proposed an agreement with CIA over the control of South Vietnamese confessional sects in exchange for financial aid.

In sum, two main factors explain the mediocrity of the US-French collaboration. First, French local authorities in Indochina continuously tried to retain control of the conduct of the war. The French could accept material and financial aid, but it rejected interference in its Indochina policy.

Second is the behavior of General Salan, which in turn may have grown out of lingering anger over the killing in 1945 by the Viet Minh of a French officer in the presence of an OSS officer, who allegedly declared himself a neutral and refused to intervene. In addition, it had became obvious that the United States, through OSS Major Archimedes Patti’s mission in Hanoi, had given weapons to the fledgling Viet Minh—Patti was present at the declaration of Vietnam’s independence. In the minds of many French, these incidents were proof that the United States was playing both sides.

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Action Branches: From French-operated to CIA-funded Counter-maquis in Indochina

On the operational level, the French and American covert action branches cooperated a great deal in the then relatively young field of counterguerrilla operations. In Indochina, the Action Branch of the SDECE was probably one of the most advanced and innovative services in the French military. But it is generally unknown that its main innovation, the use of what were essentially guerrilla forces to counter guerrillas opposing established rule—which proved to be seminal in the future of counterinsurgency strategy across the world—was closely linked to US intelligence in Indochina.

The French-American Birth of the GCMA

The roots of French-American collaboration in irregular warfare operations can, of course, be found in WW II, as many French, US, and British intelligence operatives had fought in the French Resistance, with Americans often parachuting into France from England to activate guerrilla networks of resisters known as maquis. In France, these joint British-American-French guerrilla teams were known as Jedburghs.26

In the jungle war against the Japanese in the Pacific, the Allies had tried to use similar techniques. Two examples are Orde Wingate’s Chindits in Burma and the British-led Force 136 in Southeast Asia.27 French units were used in the same way in Indochina, although not until the Japanese were in retreat.28

With the defeat of the Japanese and the rise of the Viet Minh, one of the officers dropped into Southeast Asia late in the war, Col. Jean Sassi, and others started to apply the counterguerrilla skills acquired in Europe and briefly applied against the Japanese to fight the fledgling Viet Minh, which was itself organizing into maquis. In effect, the French aimed to use guerrilla warfare techniques to mount counterguerrilla operations in the rear of the Viet Minh-controlled areas.

However, material (planes and weapons) and money (to pay local counteraquisards) were required, and the French did not have much. It was in this environment that the United States arrived with a proposal to activate counteraquis in Tonkin, the part of Indochina most heavily infiltrated by Viet Minh maquis.

Signs of this French-American collaboration on counterguerrilla issues can be traced back to 1950. Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined its features in a memorandum to the National Security Council entitled “Collaboration with friendly governments on operations against guerrillas.”29

While there has been a certain amount of exchanges of views between military representatives, as in the case of...the French in Southeast Asia, it does appear that an organized effort has been made to pool information, skills and techniques among the friendly nations who have a common interest in defeating this kind of [communist] activity.

On the ground, those “exchanges,” as Acheson put it, were performed by intelligence service officers on both sides. Indeed, it appears that CIA may have introduced a “counter-maquis” plan as early as May 1950, when the French were setting up their SDECE station in Indochina.

Mystery surrounds the actual identity of the person who made the proposal. Memoirs of Frenchmen in the SDECE (Trinquier, Aussaresses or Puy-Montbrun)30 assert that
Edward G. Lansdale made the proposal floated in May 1950. This seems unlikely, as Lansdale, who was still a captain in the Air Force at the time and just beginning to achieve some success in the Philippines with Magsaysay, would not have had the stature to propose a program of this scope. Furthermore, a search of French archives shows that Lansdale did not visit Vietnam until 1953 with Maj. Gen. John O’Daniel and returned with the Saigon military mission in 1954. It seems likely that the French memoirists may have confused the early period of 1950–1951 and the later one of 1954–1955, when Lansdale was indeed the “omnipotent American” who traumatized the French military at the end of the war. This confusion may tell us a lot about the climate of suspicion and continuous fantasy that weighed on the two relationship of the two allies.

If it was not Lansdale, then who? In a memoir published in 2003, Thibaut de Saint Phalle claims to have carried the proposal. Saint Phalle—with an ancient French heritage but a US citizen and WWII OSS operative in China—negotiated on behalf of CIA in 1950 with the French high commissioner to Vietnam Léon Pignon and Maurice Belleux, the head of the SDECE in Indochina.

According to Saint Phalle’s account, which is corroborated by documents in French archives, he was sent to Saigon to establish a Franco-African collaboration on counterguerrilla issues. The plan, supposedly decided upon by Allen Dulles himself, was to have Vietnamese “irregulars” trained by the Americans. The Americans selected would have had guerrilla warfare experience during the [Second World] war. They would train the Vietnamese, particularly the so-called Montagnards. The Vietnamese troops led by Americans would then be turned over to the French high command that would fit these irregular units into their military strategy.

Saint Phalle was well aware that his “Far Eastern military experience” behind Japanese lines played a great deal in his appointment for this mission and his selection further establishes the role of World War II experience in the framing of counterguerrilla ideas.

The CIA plan was elaborated jointly by Saint Phalle and a very pro-American French intelligence officer, Col. Jean Carbonel, who would play a later role in this story. Lt. Col. Richard G. Stilwell, a future commander of UN forces in Korea, had been temporarily attached to the CIA and would supervise the American-led training.

Though the French were initially cautious about Saint Phalle because he would not tell them he came on CIA’s behalf—French archives talk of some “obscure American organizations” that appointed him—they finally reached an agreement in principle when they understood on whose behalf Saint Phalle was preaching.

But the plan quickly fizzled out when General de Lattre took over in December 1950. Characteristically, de Lattre feared the Americans would meddle too much in French business and oppose the plan. He first obtained Saint Phalle’s expulsion from the country. Then, at the 1951 Singapore conference de Lattre managed to oust the CIA from the countermaquis project entirely. Letters and telegrams from his personal archives reveal that he violently opposed the project and stated that his priority was to “avoid the Americans’ sticking their nose in his business” and that “the secret goal of the Americans was the realization of a guerrilla system that they controlled.”

Although this US effort to establish a bilateral countermaquis effort appears to have failed, the French nevertheless went ahead on their own.
Although this US effort to establish a bilateral countermaquis effort appears to have failed, the French nevertheless went ahead on their own, internalizing it into the French military as what would later be called the GCMA (Groupes Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés), an impressive countermaquis network—in the Tonkin and Laos Highlands—some of which the Americans took over after the French-Indochina War.

The French counterguerrilla legacy and its American heirs

As the French were retreating from Indochina in mid-1954, US intelligence returned to counterguerrilla issues as it realized it would have to carry the burden of preventing a communist takeover of Southeast Asia after the French departure.

During this period, there is no doubt about Col. Edward G. Lansdale’s involvement in French-American collaboration as head of the so-called Saigon Military Mission (SMM), a covert group...entirely separate from the regular CIA station. The SMM fit in the framework of the Military Assistance Advisory Group. For a time the SMM was under the cover of the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM). According to Lansdale, who seemed very enthusiastic about it in the beginning, the TRIM was a French-American institution that aimed “to push French and Americans to work together to help the Vietnamese to take the control of their own affairs.” The official US Army history of the period describes it as a joint training institution intended to improve the ability of the Vietnamese military to stand up to communist attacks. The reality was somehow gloomier, as the French and the Americans waged a silent war over who would have the most influence over the fledgling state. The mission only lasted until April 1956, when the French withdrew the remainder of their expeditionary force from the country.

Within the TRIM was the National Security Division, which was in fact another name for pacification and counterinsurgency operations. The suspicions caused by political conditions and power struggles made for an uneasy collaboration between the French and the Americans. Nevertheless, the mission allowed Lansdale to learn French know-how in counterinsurgency, in the form of the Mobile Administrative Groups (GAMOs—Groupements Administratifs Mobiles Opérationnels), from which he derived a new kind of unit: the Civic Action Teams, which were, like the GAMOs, supposed “to go out in the countryside and work in the villages to foster self-rule, self-development and self-defense.” This kind of activity, resembling the usual practice of the Viet Minh peasant-soldiers, will be found again in the Revolutionary Development set up by Tom Donohue in 1964, then in the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) after 1967.

In the words of CIA historian Thomas Ahern in his study of CIA pacification programs:

[They] incorporated suggestions into a plan based on French pacification practice. The idea, borrowed from the so-called French Mobile Administrative Group and modified to reflect American experience in the Philippines, called for a small coordinating group in Saigon to send “trained government employees into the provinces to set up a government at the level and connect it to the national government.”

But the most impressive instance of SMM use of French methods was the very idea of countermaquis.
ond-in-command, the Franco-American Lucien “Lou” Conein. This officer, who had joined the OSS in 1940, had participated in the French Resistance and gone on to play a role in Southern China as well as in Indochina in 1945. According to the SMM report published in The Pentagon Papers, Conein was “a paramilitary specialist, well-known to the French for his help with the French-operated maquis in Tonkin against the Japanese, the one American guerrilla fighter who had not been a member of the Patti Mission.”

After arriving in Saigon in July 1954, Conein got in touch with Colonel Carbonel, the man who had worked with Saint Phalle during 1950–51. Carbonel proposed “establishing a maquis [to Conein].” In all likelihood, the maquis that Carbonel was trying to sell to Conein was the very same GCMA maquis that had flourished since 1951 and the first US proposal the year before. It now comprised thousands of Montagnard people in the High Region who were fighting on the rearguard of the Viet Minh. As the French were leaving, they counted on Washington to continue the military and financial support of these irregular units. The French had arrived at a particularly strange arrangement with the Montagnards in order to rally them in countermaquis: they would buy their opium (their only source of revenue) in exchange for the Montagnards’ agreement to fight the Viet Minh.

When Conein reported Carbonel’s proposal to Washington, it was immediately refused, and the Montagnards were abandoned. Nevertheless, the idea proved long-lasting in intelligence service circles. A watchful student of the Indochina wars would have certainly noticed the resemblance of the GCMA maquis of the mid-1950s to the CIA-funded Laotian, then Vietnamese, guerrilla operations of the early 1960s.

The countermaquis paradigm was brought up again in 1959, barely five years after being dismissed by Washington. In sum, US intelligence found itself at both the giving and receiving ends of one of the seminal counterguerrilla experiences in Indochina—that is, the countermaquis. As we saw in Laos, and then in South Vietnam through the well-known work of the Special Forces Green Berets, Montagnard maquis units were directly drawn from this operation. In addition, this brief history of counterguerrilla cooperation captures the overall French-American intelligence relations over Indochina: notwithstanding genuine and confrontational opposition between the services due to political misunderstandings, each proved able to benefit from the resources of the other.

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For endnotes go to digital version of this article on cia.gov, under Studies in Intelligence.
On 30 December 2009, a Jordanian physician named Humam Khalil al-Balawi arrived to much anticipation, at a CIA base near Khost, Afghanistan. The CIA officers there had been instructed by higher officials to greet Balawi as a welcomed guest, so he breezed through the initial security cordons. Although little was actually known about Balawi and no CIA personnel had met him, his impending arrival had been briefed all the way to President Barack Obama. Balawi promised great intelligence windfalls about al-Qaeda. Instead, a tragedy occurred: Balawi detonated his heavy explosives vest, killing seven CIA officers, two other personnel, and himself. This was the most deadly strike against the CIA in 25 years.

Shortly after the attack, Leon Panetta, the CIA director at the time, wrote an op-ed article published in the Washington Post. He understandably couldn't make public very many details. Without access to pertinent classified information, students of intelligence history such as this reviewer, were left with many questions. Answers to many of them are attempted in this work by Washington Post staff reporter Joby Warrick, who said he interviewed more than 200 unnamed, presumably knowledgeable sources in its preparation. The result is an absorbing book, although a difficult one to evaluate without personal knowledge of the events and without access to the classified internal examinations of the tragedy. The latter have not been made public, although Panetta’s public summary of their findings, posted on CIA’s website in October 2010, provides something of a guidepost for reading this book.

The Triple Agent begins its story in January 2009, when Ali bin Zeid, a Jordanian Mukhabarat intelligence officer, brought Balawi in for interrogation. A seemingly mild-mannered doctor who treated the indigent in Palestinian refugee camps, Balawi had adopted several on-line personas in his highly inflammatory, anti-Western blogs. Balawi seemed to “crack” after three days of relatively mild interrogation so bin Zeid calculated that he could use Balawi for his own aims. In retrospect, this was a grave miscalculation, and one glaring omission in this book is discussion of what led bin Zeid to think this was even worth trying. The closest Warrick comes to addressing this key question is when he writes that bin Zeid knew that sending Balawi to Pakistan was a “gamble,” and that the joint approach of the Mukhabarat and CIA was to try “dozens of long shots” to penetrate al-Qaeda’s inner circle in the hopes that at least “one of them was sure to stick.” (77–78)

Reviewed by Stephen J. Garber

This article is unclassified in its entirety.
point out what might have been red flags in Balawi's background. Although Balawi claimed to oppose violence and disavowed his inflammatory online rhetoric as "just a hobby," he had sought to join the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi insurgency in Iraq. While living in Turkey, Balawi and his future wife, Defne, had attended meetings of an Islamist radical group with ties to al-Qaeda. Ominously, Defne had translated laudatory books about Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. Not only had the couple named their first daughter after an infamous female Palestinian hijacker, they named their second daughter after a woman who had made a film about the hijacker. (51–53)

After being released by the Mukhabarat, bin Zeid tried to sway the young doctor by telling him of the Mukhabarat's exploits and offered large amounts of money in exchange for tips about al-Qaeda's leadership. Balawi proposed that he travel to the notorious tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where al-Qaeda operatives were known to be harbored.

Although Balawi did not speak Pashto and was from pro-Western Jordan, he lived in South Waziristan for several months and met Baitullah Mehsud, a Taliban commander. By fall 2009, Balawi sent bin Zeid a video of himself with Atiyah Adb al-Rahman, a close aide to Laden. (115–16) Then in November, Balawi e-mailed bin Zeid a highly enticing tidbit of information: he was now treating Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second in command. (126)

This seemed to be paydirt for the CIA, which worked very closely with bin Zeid and the Mukhabarat on this case. Balawi's medical description of Zawahiri matched what the CIA knew. No Westerner had seen Zawahiri since 2002. Panetta briefed other top national security officials, including President Obama. While Warrick's description and analysis of events is generally credible, it does include some questionable assertions such as that bin Laden was essentially a figurehead and was actually less important than Zawahiri. (128) In December 2009, Balawi met Sheikh Saeed al-Masri, al-Qaeda's number three, in North Waziristan. Al-Masri plotted to use a staged video of Balawi and Zawahiri to lure bin Zeid. (154–56) The trap worked.

While the CIA had no first-hand experience with Balawi, he apparently held tantalizing information about al-Qaeda. The timing of Balawi "turn[ing] up on the Mukhabarat's doorstep" was fortuitous, given the new Obama administration's search for fresh ways to target al-Qaeda. (83)

Yet Darren LaBonte, bin Zeid's CIA counterpart and friend in Amman, harbored serious doubts about Balawi, noting "This guy is too good to be true." (125) LaBonte, a seasoned operative, had three concerns about the Balawi case: there were too many people involved, it was moving too quickly, and Balawi was dictating the terms. (145—47)

Warrick is largely reluctant to find fault with either high-level policymakers or with overseas CIA personnel such as LaBonte or Jennifer Matthews, the CIA base chief at Khost, who had more of an analytical background than an operational one. Panetta launched two separate investigations, which blamed no single American or single organization. Warrick blandly notes, "Warnings that might have alerted the CIA to Balawi's deception were never passed along." (197-199)

Almost in passing, Warrick mentions a key point, substantiated in DCIA Panetta's public report on internal examinations of the case: there was never a formal counterintelligence vetting of Balawi. Warrick offers at least three reasons for this: CIA was too busy with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Balawi had been recruited by an allied intelligence service, and top policymakers were eager to deal a serious blow to al-Qaeda eight years after the 9/11 attacks. (144)
One other criticism of this worthwhile book is that it essentially reads like a dramatic screenplay rather than an analysis of historical events. Warrick’s many interviews in a short time are a credit to him, but he does not provide a list of his interviewees. Thus, his claims to know what specific individuals were feeling or thinking at given times are somewhat grating. There likely are other errors of fact or interpretation that cleared readers will recognize. Despite these flaws, I would recommend this book, as Triple Agent raises important questions for students of intelligence and intelligence history to consider.

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Intelligence in Public Literature

Our Kind of Traitor


Reviewed by Michael Bradford

With Our Kind of Traitor John LeCarré continues his best-selling series of spy novels set in the post-Cold War era, this time pitting a richly drawn cast—intelligence professionals and earnest, co-opted amateurs—against the corrosive tentacles and limitless resources of present-day Russian criminal syndicates. The tale benefits from the mainstays of LeCarré’s narrative style—quickly sketched yet, upon reflection, somehow fully realized characters, and an insider’s knowing, evocative, occasionally poetic sense of the story’s various locales.

Perry Makepiece, on the cusp of a brilliant Oxford teaching career, is vacationing in the Caribbean with his beautiful partner, Gail Perkins, herself a young, rising star attorney in London’s judicial bureaucracy. Coincidence places Perry in a friendly tennis match with a character introduced simply as Dima, a diminutive yet hauntingly imposing Russian, equipped with dictatorial, albeit disarmingly charming social graces, and festooned with a ragtag extended family with near comic eccentricities.

During this chance encounter, Dima—sensing his and his family’s vulnerability in the wake of a Russian mafia reorganization that renders him lethally expendable, and hoping to trade knowledge for refuge—makes a predator’s snapshot appraisal of Perry and Gail and decides to use them as go-betweens with British intelligence. Dima’s plea for help follows hard upon the tennis match, and Perry and Gail sense adventure and import beyond the classroom and cloakroom. They reach out to British intelligence officials and connect with Hector Meriduth, a close-to-retirement and marginalized senior spy manager, who judges Dima’s offer to be a career-redeeming, last big operation. He takes Perry and Gail under his wing and shepherds them through the tactical hurdles and moral questions that complicate the path to Dima’s safe reception and the anticipated intelligence windfall. Hector’s number two in the operation is Luke, a just-past-midcareer officer whose personal missteps and unfocused appraisal of his own professional worth have him quickly throwing in with Hector in another off-the-cuff stab at redemption.

The ensuing action is quick-paced and taut. The extraction of Dima from a Russian mafia convention—most likely his intended execution site—shows LeCarré’s facility at switching gears from a leisurely paced narrative to shocking, unexpected violence. LeCarré’s palette is fully brought to bear in the sharply contrasted tennis arenas of an exotic yet casual Antigua and an overly formal Roland Garros Stadium during the French Open, and in a nerve-testing moonlit getaway drive through treacherous Alpine passes. These scenes display the author at his engrossing, beyond-the-travelogue best.

The novel’s ending is abrupt and touches on several familiar LeCarré themes. Dedication to mission, commitment to personal loyalty and partnership, and determination to expose both truth and corrupt wrongdoing are all unashamedly celebrated. But to what end? Are these arguably ennobling strivings—bedrock verities of the intelligence world—doomed to be defeated by chance, personal shortcomings, or
overarching malignancies unrecognized until they strike? In the author’s lengthy and gratefully ongoing espionage universe, those questions can only be answered by his characters as they move past their shared adventure—and further pondered by the many intelligence professionals among LeCarré’s legion of appreciative readers.

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Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Current Topics


*The Threat Matrix: The FBI At War in the Age of Global Terror*, by Garrett M. Graff

*Tiger Trap: America’s Secret Spy War with China*, by David Wise

General


Historical

*America’s Nazi Secret* by John Loftus

*Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith*, by D. K. R. Crosswell

*Behind Enemy Lines: The Autobiography of Britain’s Most Decorated Living War Hero*, by Sir Tommy MacPherson

*The Brenner Assignment: The Untold Story of the Most Daring Spy Mission of World War II* by Patrick K. O’Donnell

*A Covert Affair: Julia Child and Paul Child in the OSS*, by Jennet Conant

*Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia*, by Michael Korda

*Our Man In Tehran: The True Story Behind the Secret Mission to Save Six Americans During the Iran Hostage Crisis and the Foreign Ambassador Who Worked with the CIA to Bring them Home*, by Robert Wright

*Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond*, by A. Ross Johnson

*Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall*, by Jonathan Haslam

*A Spy’s Guide to Santa Fe and Albuquerque*, by E. B. Held

*The Vietnam War: An Assessment by South Vietnam’s Generals*, by Lewis Sorley (ed.)

Memoir

*Laughter in the Shadows: A CIA Memoir* by Stuart Methven

*The Making And Breaking Of An American Spy*, by James Everett

Intelligence Abroad

*Ashraf Marwan, Israel’s Most Valuable Spy: How the Mossad Recruited Nasser’s Own Son-in-Law*, by Ephraim Kahana

*Gulag Boss: A Soviet Memoir*, by Fyodor Vasilevich Mochulsky


All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Current Topics


The eight articles in this volume, a special issue of the journal Intelligence and International Security, are expanded versions of papers presented at a conference organized by the Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies at Aberystwyth University, Wales, in 2007. This book's stated objective is to improve "understanding of the nature of the intelligence process and its importance to national and international security." (1)

The authors are academics who have written extensively on aspects of British and American intelligence. In general, they adopt normative views of the topics they cover, which include intelligence—failures, reforms, globalization, cooperation, and accountability—as well as the British perception of the Muslim extremist menace, human rights, the need for intelligence in the European Union, and Iraq and the Vietnam syndrome. With one exception, the articles are thoughtful, well documented, and impressive.

The exception, Rise, Fall and Regeneration: From CIA to EU, by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, characterizes the CIA as a Cold War success but assumes that after the Cold War, the Agency "declined until, during the post-2001 Bush administration, it fell into disrepute and was effectively marginalized." (97) After some historical background, not all of it accurate—Roger Hillsman never worked for the CIA, and the implication that William Donovan’s Office of the Coordinator of Information should have predicted Pearl Harbor is tooth-fairy logic—Jeffreys-Jones goes on to assert that “After 9/11, the CIA lost its standing within the intelligence community,” and the subsequent reform legislation “formally ended CIA’s primacy as America’s central foreign intelligence agency.” (99, 100–101) These undocumented opinions raise doubts about the author’s conclusion that any future European Union intelligence entity should take advantage of the CIA’s experience.

Overall, however, the collection achieves its objective. This volume is a practical, thought-provoking, and weighty contribution to the literature.


Most mornings before 9/11, the CIA briefed the president on critical intelligence matters. The sessions were known as the President’s Daily Briefing (PDB), and they continue to this day. Since 9/11, however, the PDB has been followed by a separate briefing from the director of the FBI. He reviews the global “terrorist plots” (11) summarized in a document called the Threat Matrix. This was a new role for the FBI, and The Threat Matrix explains how that role originated and how the Bureau has adapted—not always smoothly—to its expanded mission. In large measure, this is, as author Garrett Graff puts it, the story of the “Muellerization” of the FBI after Robert Mueller took the Bureau’s reins one week before 9/11.

Graff has adopted an interesting approach: This is not a formal history of the Bureau, which might have detailed footnotes, though for perspective he includes considerable historical background with general references. He dutifully pays attention to Hoover’s crime-fighting legacy—“the FBI always gets its man”—that stressed image and reputation even when it meant bending the truth. (pp122ff) Discussion of various FBI calamities—COINTELPRO, a program under which the Bureau conducted counterintelligence activities against domestic US political groups (1956–71); the performance of the first post-Hoover FBI head, Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, during the Watergate scandal (1972–74); and the FBI investigation of
CISPES, the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (1983–85), to name three. The accompanying narrative lays the groundwork for the book’s principal focus: Mueller and the global counterterrorism mission. (339)

Of particular interest is the chapter called “The Pizza Connection,” which describes the FBI’s “rise as an international crime fighting organization.” (79) Here Graff explains how the Bureau learned to cooperate with Italian authorities to bring down a major Mafia drug operation. The lessons learned, he concludes, “had all the elements of the terrorism cases that would unfold in the coming decades.” (108) He then turns to FBI responses to the terrorist attacks of the 1980s and 1990s—the airplane hijackings, the S.S. Achille Lauro hijacking, the Marine barracks attack in Lebanon, the Pan Am 103 bombing, the first World Trade Center bombing, and the al-Qa’ida bombings in Africa. Here Graff tells of then Director Louis Freeh’s successful efforts to expand the Bureau’s global presence, much to the annoyance of the CIA. But Freeh does not escape criticism, especially for his insistence on giving priority to illegal drug trafficking. When challenged to devote more effort to terrorism, Freeh responded, “You’re nuts … [drug trafficking is] our bread and butter.” (270)

Perhaps the hardest topic to grasp is the so-called “Wall” that inhibited the passage of information between the FBI and other members of the Intelligence Community, and Graff devotes a chapter to it. The rationale behind the concept is that FBI agents dealing with cases that may go to court should not exchange data with intelligence operators. There are two main reasons for this constraint: the first is to avoid the risk that if potential evidence for a trial is used for intelligence purposes a court case might be compromised; the second is to prevent bringing in information that may not have been collected properly and be unusable in a trial. Graff covers the topic well, but he does not remove the impression that in this matter, a lack of common sense dominated the Department of Justice.

From this point on, the book is devoted to the post-9/11 era and to Mueller—the professional qualities he brought to the job and the modern, character-shaping policies he instituted. “It took Mueller years to get his arms fully around the Bureau,” concludes Graff. (414) Many—though not all—of Mueller’s decisive methods were a breath of fresh air. Mueller summed up his management style by stating, “I’m here to protect democracy, not to practice it.” (414–5) Graff describes Mueller’s skillful dealings with the Congressional commission investigating 9/11, his emphasis on bringing the Bureau up to par in the digital world (an initiative Freeh had neglected), the use of Bureau teams to collect evidence from terrorist attacks overseas, expanded domestic counterterrorism operations, and Mueller’s often vexing contacts with the Bush and Obama administrations. It was not all smooth going as the challenges implementing the Patriot Act illustrate, (503) but Graff shows that progress was continuous and positive, and the Bureau of today bears little resemblance to Hoover’s organization.

Along the way, Graff does more than reprise challenging Bureau cases. He includes biographical details about special agents and illuminates the often frustrating bureaucratic culture in which they operate. The John O’Neill tragedy—he died in the South Tower of the World Trade Center on 9/11—is one instance. Another is the case of Coleen Rowley, the whistle-blowing special agent from Minneapolis, who wrote a memo after 9/11 that attacked “Mueller and other Bureau leaders for pre-9/11 failures.” While its accuracy was not challenged, she had embarrassed the Bureau, an act that violated “the number one precept of the FBI.” Her retirement followed. (417) A chapter on operations in the Iraq war zone includes the engrossing story of George Piro, whose interrogation of Saddam Hussein illustrated the Bureau’s approach to dealing with high-value enemy targets.

The Threat Matrix is based on hundreds of interviews Graff conducted throughout the government and the New York Police Department, plus various books and articles. Graff admits he has recreated some conversations, an increasingly common practice in such histories. The result, nevertheless, is a well-told story and a reading pleasure. J. Edgar Hoover would be proud of the result.

To readers of espionage fiction and nonfiction, the names CIA, FBI, DIA, KGB, SMERSH, Stasi, M15, and M16 are instantly identifiable as major players in the “Great Game.” But the list is not complete. The Peoples Republic of China is a major player, too. It just doesn’t have an iconic abbreviation. And unlike its well-known competitors, Chinese intelligence has been the subject of few books. In 1994, DIA analyst Nicholas Eftimiades published an interesting account, Chinese Intelligence Operations. ¹ This was followed in 1999 by Howard DeVore’s China’s Intelligence & Internal Security Forces,² a study that drew heavily on the 1999 report of the House Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (The Cox Report). DeVore highlighted organizations, identified high-level positions, mentioned technical capabilities, and discussed the global scope of Chinese operations, but he seldom included names. Copies were available for $1,200. There has also been a memoir and some case studies of particular operations.³ What the literature has lacked is a good account of contemporary Chinese espionage involving American targets and that explains Chinese modus operandi and tradecraft, reveals connections between operations, and identifies principal players. Tiger Trap fills this gap.

Before dealing with specific cases, author David Wise discusses how Chinese intelligence functions, and he quotes retired FBI China analyst Paul Moore to explain that while the Chinese do conduct espionage in the traditional US way—in which agents are handled by case officers with diplomatic cover—they more often employ thousands of “tourists,” each “assigned to collect a single grain of sand.” (11)⁴ Alternatively, they don’t try to recruit foreign visitors, but instead induce them to give away secrets, a tactic based on the belief that “people will almost never commit espionage, but they will often enough be indiscreet.” (13) Because this happens in China, it greatly complicates FBI evidence collection.

Wise then explains a variety of cases, all with colorful names. Two in particular, the “Parlor Maid” and “Tiger Trap” cases, are related to the Wen Ho Lee case (“Kindred Spirit”) of suspected nuclear espionage at Los Alamos. These three cases involved complex relationships which included an FBI agent. How the Bureau eventually learned of all these relationships and what it did about them is engrossing reading. Wise addresses numerous other cases: “Ethereal Throne” ruined the career of a loyal American; “Royal Tourist” involved a Cal Tech graduate who spied for money and went to jail; “Eagle Claw” describes Larry Wu-Tai Chin’s penetration of the CIA as a translator in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service; “Red Flower” reveals a family of spies, 10 of whom went to jail. And then there is an incongruous allegation about Richard Nixon and a Hong Kong hostess. The final chapter reviews the Chinese cyberthreat.

As Tiger Trap makes very clear, Chinese espionage is not always successful, but it is a serious threat.

¹ Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994).
² Dr. Howard O. DeVore, China’s Intelligence and Internal Security Forces: Jane’s Special Report (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 1999).
⁴ For a challenge to this judgment see Peter Mattis, “Shriver Case Highlights Traditional Chinese Espionage” in Jamestown Foundation, China Brief Volume: 10 Issue: 22, 5 November 2010. (http://www.jamestown.org, accessed 13 August 2011.)
General


In 2007, Loch Johnson edited five volumes of mainly original articles on various aspects of intelligence—the intelligence cycle, collection and analysis, counterintelligence, covert action, and accountability. The four-volume work reviewed here covers those same topics, but its 76 articles and extracts have all appeared elsewhere. Many come from the three journals specializing in intelligence: Intelligence and National Security, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, and Studies in Intelligence. Others come from journals that occasionally include articles on intelligence, as is the case with an article on covert action from the American Journal of International Law. There are also contributions from government reports, for example, the final report of the 9/11 Commission, the Report of the President's Special Review Board (the Tower Commission), and the report of the US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission). Several chapters are excerpts from books, some of which are out of print. One particularly useful example is "The Theorist: James Jesus Angleton" from Robin Winks's Cloak and Gown. Johnson's first volume contains a chronological listing of each contribution and its source, plus a complete table of contents covering all four volumes. Volume 4 contains an index covering the entire work.

The $1,272 price for this collection is steep, but its value is in the convenient access it provides to the literature. While some contributions are available from the Internet—the Studies in Intelligence articles, for instance—many others would be more difficult to find. For students and those refreshing their knowledge of intelligence history, these volumes will be very useful.

Finally, Johnson makes no claim of comprehensiveness. On the contrary, the articles represent only a small portion of those available, a statement that couldn't have been made just 20 years ago. But the selection here is representative and a good place to start.

Historical

**America's Nazi Secret** by John Loftus. (Waterville, OR: TrineDay LLC, 2010), 320 pp., source notes, photos, index.

In 1982, John Loftus, a former Justice Department lawyer in the Office of Special Investigations, published The Belarus Secret. The original purpose of that book, he writes in America's Nazi Secret, was "to amass incontrovertible evidence that the Justice Department had organized an obstruction of Congress with regard to specific cases" involving Nazi war criminals in the United States. He went on to charge that Justice Department officers played a role "in harboring perpetrators of the Holocaust from their victims." (260) For reasons unclear, he states he was compelled to submit the manuscript to the CIA for review, and it was severely

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“censored.” The current book, he writes, restores the material previously removed.

In the introduction to the current edition, Loftus makes additional unsupported claims. For example, “the Muslim Brotherhood came under the immediate protection of Kim Philby, the communist double agent inside British intelligence.... Kim Philby and his Cambridge Ring of communist spies were at the heart of the Anglo-British recruitment of Nazi agents.... Vice President Bush had put the Arab Nazis back on our payroll, and ... State and Justice were helping him hide the fact from Congress and the CIA.” Furthermore, “the genius who thought up the whole program of recruiting fugitive war criminals for an underground guerrilla network was ... Kim Philby.... Philby’s biggest coup was to unload the Communist infiltrated Abramchik organization on the all-too-eager Wisner,” the director of the Office of Policy Coordination. Perhaps the most egregious comment on the Philby case is that “the Americans had begun to suspect Philby before the British” and that Philby tipped off Donald Maclean because the CIA was on to him. (14, 23, 24, 59, 165)

Loftus goes on to attack the US and British intelligence services: “The British intelligence services used the American National Security Agency computers ... for warrantless wiretapping of our [US] citizens while we used their computers at GCHQ ... to tap the telephones of the British public.” (21) On the topic of Nazis in America, Loftus claims that “Although the CIA does not realize it (they never do), their own declassified records released to the National Archives in 2009 made a very convincing case that it is the J ustice Department which has been lying through its teeth to Congress.” Finally, the book claims, “the Nuremberg trials were fixed. The US Justice Department did it.” (rear cover)

Loftus provides no sources for these assertions, and a genuine scholarly analysis will easily disprove those involving Philby. Any elements of truth in America’s Nazi Secret are camouflaged by bizarre, spurious charges and messy judgments. It is undeserving of serious attention.


Most visitors to CIA Headquarters, like the employees who serve there, will walk by portraits of former directors hung along a first-floor corridor. The fourth in the series is of Gen. Walter Bedell "Beetle" Smith—the Agency's director during 1950–53—whose reputation for "firm guidance" to his subordinates and peers in US intelligence is legendary. Some may recall that he was Eisenhower's chief of staff during WW II. But few are aware that he signed the German surrender documents, was later ambassador to the Soviet Union—he wrote a book about the experience—or that he ended his more than 40 years of government service as Under Secretary of State. In Beetle, historian D. K. R. Crosswell adds details to these career milestones.

As biographies go, this one is unorthodox in two respects: First, it is Crosswell's second biography of Smith. The previous version was based on Crosswell's doctoral dissertation, which presented Smith as Eisenhower's tough consigliere and an All-American boy, a characterization Crosswell came to regret—it was too uncritical. Second, Crosswell does not tell his story chronologically. He begins after WW II with a review of Smith's service as ambassador to Moscow—where he "talked turkey" to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov (23)—followed by his years as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and his final assignment as Under Secretary of State. The chapter on Smith's three-year tenure as DCI is of mixed quality. Crosswell has Philby,
Burgess, and Maclean serving in Washington at the same time—but Maclean had left in 1948—and Crosswell’s comments about Philby instigating a mole hunt place the event many years before it occurred, an inexplicable error. Nevertheless, Crosswell depicts a decisive leader who makes major changes in CIA operations and organization that remain to this day.

The balance of the book, some 900 pages, tells the story of an Indiana boy who “always wanted to be an army officer” (110) and started as a private in the National Guard. Though without a college degree, Lieutenant Smith served with distinction in France during WW I in what was to be his only troop command. After a series of interwar assignments that established lasting links with many future WW II generals, Smith arrived at the Pentagon. Before he left, he had established his contacts with the White House and with senior British intelligence officers in the United States. But, more importantly, according to Crosswell, he redefined the job of chief of staff—adding structure and authority to its gatekeeper functions—in the service of Army Chief of Staff General Marshall and then Eisenhower in Europe.

Reaching Europe as the planning for Operation Torch—the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942—was underway, Smith confronted conflict within and between the British and American staffs; meddling from Churchill, Roosevelt, and even Marshall; monumental logistical problems; and an indecisive, often depressed Eisenhower. To varying degrees, as Crosswell shows in great detail, these problems persisted throughout the war and the short-tempered Smith became indispensable in dealing with them. Of special interest are Smith’s encounters with the sometimes unreasonable, always cantankerous General Montgomery, the profane, narcissistic, hard-charging George Patton, and the quietly persistent Omar Bradley, none of whom always obeyed orders. Time after time, Eisenhower turned to Smith to deal with clashes involving these generals, their subordinates, and even Churchill.

It is in his portrayal of Eisenhower as an indecisive, often infuriating commander—as well as the congenial chairman of the board—that Crosswell adds a new perspective to WW II history. Other historians have shown Ike as one or the other. “The truth is that Eisenhower fit both portrayals,” Crosswell concludes with considerable evidence. (3) Likewise Smith is shown to have been a close friend to both British and American generals who admired his effectiveness, despite his crusty no-nonsense approach in dealing with day-to-day tactical and strategic problems.

Beetle is an absorbing book that sometimes leaves the reader wondering how the Allies were able to win the war—the persistent quarreling among the principals was that pervasive. Extensively documented, Crosswell’s new look at the Allies’ role in WW II is a weighty contribution to its history.


At 18 years of age, Scottish Highlander Tommy MacPherson became a commando. His team’s first assignment was to capture Gen. Erwin Rommel, who was then in Syria. The mission failed, and MacPherson was captured and imprisoned in Italy. After several failed escape attempts, he finally succeeded and made it as far as Poland, only to be recaptured. So he escaped again and managed to reach Britain via Sweden. By then 21, he was assigned to the Jedburghs, where he met William Colby. MacPherson was then sent to France, where he served behind enemy lines, training the resistance, sabotaging rail lines, and blowing bridges, all the while wearing his kilt. The Germans tried but never managed to catch him again. (149) MacPherson’s many talents were leveraged when an inexperienced 10-man OSS team headed by a colonel joined his team; mutual cooperation prevailed. After France fell, he was off to Trieste in northern Italy, where his team helped the resistance, and MacPherson “did a brisk
business couriering escaped prisoners to Yugoslavia" (172) until the war ended. By then, at age 25, he had been awarded the UK’s Military Cross three times, as well as three French Croix de Guerre, a Légion d’honneur, and a Papal knighthood. MacPherson had also learned 3 languages and met Churchill, de Gaulle, and Montgomery. But a military career was not in his future.

MacPherson, like many veterans, seldom spoke of the war—even to his children. He was not depressed, just ready to begin a new life. He starred at Oxford University, where he beat world-class runner Roger Bannister in a race. At age 90, after a long and successful business career, MacPherson decided the time was right to record his WW II experiences.


In The Brenner Assignment, Patrick K. O’Donnell chronicles the previously untold exploits of a band of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operatives who were dropped deep behind Axis lines in Northern Italy during the final year of World War II. The saga begins when Lt. Stephen Hall, an audacious prep school-educated army officer, sends a letter to the OSS suggesting the organization dispatch a lone individual to sabotage a key Nazi supply route through the Alps. At the conclusion of the letter, of course, he volunteers to do the job himself: “Ready to go any time, under any circumstances that augur success.” (3)

What follows is the stuff of Hollywood: nighttime parachute drops, secret meetings with communist partisans, raids against vastly superior Nazi forces, downed airmen, double agents, SS torture chambers, murder, and exotic women. In captivating prose, which is well cited and based on excellent primary source research, O’Donnell brings to life an array of characters and events so extraordinary that readers could easily forget that the book is a work of non-fiction.

In the world of American intelligence, the OSS is held in the highest regard. The Brenner Assignment shows readers why. It was an organization that demanded excellence, rewarded initiative, and empowered people to get their jobs done. More than just a captivating war story, this book serves as a potent reminder of the CIA’s extraordinary origins.


In her 1947 memoir, Undercover Girl, Elizabeth “Betty” MacDonald tells of her OSS adventures in India, Ceylon, and China during WW II. She was one of many women who volunteered to serve and were assigned to the Morale Operations Branch. Two of her colleagues, the spunky, free-spirited Jane Foster and the “more serious-minded” six-feet-two Julia McWilliams9 are mentioned from time to time as their paths crossed in Washington, DC, and the Orient. The three remained lifelong friends. Foster and McWilliams would later write their own books. Foster’s An UnAmerican Lady10 was a bitter memoir of an indicted expatriate communist. McWilliams, by then Julia Child, wrote Mastering The Art of French Cooking.11 A Covert Affair

is the story of these friends and their husbands during the war and later as they worked to build careers in the shadow of the McCarthy era.

Author Jennet Conant begins her narrative in 1955, when Paul and Julia Child are living in Bonn, Germany. She is busy “testing recipes for a French cookbook.” (3) He is working for the United States Information Service (USIS) as a visual presentation specialist. Their quiet life is suddenly disrupted when he is recalled to Washington for interrogation by the FBI as a potential security risk. It soon becomes clear that the real subject of interest is Jane Foster. The story then flashes back to their OSS service in the Far East, and we learn in considerable detail what Paul, Jane, Betty, and Julia did during the war. Paul, a worldly intellectual, was initially attracted to Jane, a wealthy and knowledgeable Mills College graduate. But in the end, it was Julia, the inexperienced Smith College graduate, with whom he began an affair. They were married soon after their return to the States in 1946. After joining USIS, Paul was assigned to Paris, where they renewed contact with their friend Jane, who had also moved there. (230)

A Covert Affair dwells at length on the Jane Foster story. The Childs are shocked to learn Jane had joined the US Communist Party in the 1930s; was involved with Boris Morros and the Soble spy network; had married a Soviet agent, George Slatovski, before the war; and had worked with him in Austria afterward. When the Soble network was exposed in the late 1950s, Jane was indicted and her passport revoked. Despite Jane’s “telling [French intelligence] everything,” (291) the French refused extradition. But Jane was less forthcoming in her 1980 memoir. Though she admitted giving the Soviets some documents, she denied “engaging in espionage.” (318) She was unaware that the Venona decrypts would later suggest otherwise. Through it all, the Childs stood by their friend.

In 1961 Paul retired from USIS, and the Childs moved to Boston, where Julia completed her book. It was an immediate success—it sold 30 million copies—and a television series soon followed. Their comfortable retirement was assured.

While A Covert Affair is well documented, drawing on letters and diaries, there is no actual covert affair in it—just a catchy title. Service in the OSS was a formative experience for all involved in the story. Conant’s account adds new details to the role OSS played in WW II and the organization’s impact on the lives of Jane, Paul, and Julia.


Thomas Edward Lawrence died in a motorcycle accident in 1935. The Dictionary of National Biography lists him as an “intelligence officer and author.” The Imperial War Museum has an exhibit devoted to him, an honor given to few British war heroes. Along with other artifacts of his adventurous life, his restored motorcycle is displayed. Known to many even today because of the motion picture Lawrence of Arabia, he has also been the subject of several biographies. One characterizes Lawrence as a charlatan, another as a military genius. Jeremy Wilson’s biography,12 which was authorized by Lawrence’s family, is more balanced. His 1,188-page book dwells in depth on Lawrence’s relationship with famous contemporaries, his personal life, and his literary struggles, as well as his two years aiding the Arab Revolt during WWI. Michael Korda writes about these things too, but he envisions a heroic Lawrence, although not in the sense that he was exposed to danger. In his view, Lawrence consciously worked to attain the distinction through “the creation of a legend, a mythic figure and a man who became a hero not by accident, or even by one single act of heroism, but who made himself a hero by design, and did it so

successfully that he became the victim of his own fame. (xvii)

Korda begins his account with Lawrence serving as an army intelligence officer in Cairo. Fellow officers disdained the cheeky, five-feet-six (in shoes), disheveled mapmaker and articulate student of military history. He was only grudgingly tolerated because of his superior knowledge of the Middle East, his incisive analyses, and his facility with Arabic. Assigned to contact the leader of the disparate Arab “army” in what is now Saudi Arabia, Lawrence established a rapport, realized the group’s inherent insurgent capabilities, and arranged training, money, and arms. The unanticipated result was Lawrence’s most famous military achievement: the taking of Aqaba. The Arab Revolt had begun.

Readers may be surprised to learn how this unruly, unconventional, and unmilitary Oxford graduate came to be a successful military leader and creator of insurgency tactics. Korda supplies the answer in several chapters that explain Lawrence’s origins—he was born out of wedlock, a fact he would not discover until after the war—his education, his interest in fine art and printing, his study of archeology in Carchemish, Turkey, and his desire to serve when WW I broke out. All this was consistent, writes Korda, with Lawrence’s boyhood ambition “to be a general and knighted by the time he was thirty.” (7) Lawrence came close, becoming a colonel, but for reasons that are never completely understood by any of his biographers, he rejected a knighthood and many other honors.

After Aqaba, Lawrence led the Arab Revolt to occupy Damascus, thereby assuring the Turkish defeat. His exploits were made known to the world by war correspondent Lowell Thomas, whose dispatches created the “Lawrence of Arabia” myth. Korda describes the military battles Lawrence fought to get to Damascus and the sexual abuse he suffered in Deraa as a Turkish prisoner. Despite his victories on the battlefield, Lawrence was less successful with his political masters. Of particular concern to him was the Sykes-Picot agreement between the British and the French that divided the Middle East into the nations there today. Lawrence opposed it because it broke land distribution promises he had made in good faith to Arabs to gain their help. He was assigned to the Paris Peace Conference, but he failed to reverse the Sykes-Picot outcome. By then the dispirited Lawrence was writing his masterpiece, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, and left Paris to finish it. Recalled by Churchill to the Foreign Office, he helped decide which tribes would rule in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, and saw his favorite on the Iraqi throne, thus partially redeeming his previous assurances.

The remainder of Hero tells of Lawrence’s unconventional life, in which he inexplicably sought anonymity in writing and rewriting Seven Pillars while controlling all aspects of its printing. With the support of a general officer friend, he used a pseudonym to join the Air Force as an enlisted man, transferred to the Army when his true identity was exposed, and later rejoined the Air Force. All the while, he corresponded with many famous people, including George Bernard Shaw and his wife. During this time, he began riding motorcycles. To augment his meager service salary, he wrote Revolt in the Desert—a condensed version of Seven Pillars—which sold well, and completed a new translation of the Odyssey while serving in India.

Hero is beautifully written and thoroughly documented, drawing heavily on Lawrence’s extensive correspondence, which gave insight into his unorthodox behavior. For those unacquainted with the realities of the enigmatic Lawrence of Arabia, reading this book will be a fulfilling experience.

In their 1981 book, The Canadian Caper, journalists Jean Pelletier and Claude Adams told how Canadian diplomats rescued six Americans who had escaped the daws of the Iranian "students" occupying the US embassy in Tehran in 1979. Writing relatively soon after the event, Pelletier and Adams were unaware of the still secret US contribution to the rescue. In 1997, that omission was rectified when Tony Mendez was designated a CIA Trailblazer for his role in the operation and subsequently related the details in his memoir, The Master of Disguise. Of Ken Taylor, the Canadian ambassador in Tehran, Mendez wrote, "he possessed many of the operational qualities we could need on the ground ... he knew how to think ahead and keep a secret." Trent University history professor Robert Wright clearly agrees with the Mendez judgment. Our Man in Tehran not only adds much new detail to the Canadian role, but tells for the first time of Taylor's contributions as a surrogate CIA "liaison officer."

After reviewing the political situation that led to the hostage taking, Wright tells how the Canadians learned that the six American diplomats had avoided the Iranian secret police and what led to the Canadian decision to shelter the Americans and then help them escape. The Canadians discussed a variety of options before they finally agreed to the unprecedented step of issuing genuine Canadian passports with false names. Of course both Ottawa and Washington were involved, and their contributions are depicted from the Canadian perspective. Taylor's unhesitating, active support from the beginning was critical. A career diplomat, Taylor had volunteered for the Tehran post so he could advance trade with Iran. He had been there only a year and would leave as the crisis ended in January 1981, but during his brief tenure he devoted much of his time to three overlapping tasks: assisting in the escape of the six diplomats, serving as liaison with three other American diplomats held in the Iranian Foreign Office, and providing intelligence support. As Wright puts it, "What the Americans asked [Taylor] to do amounted to nothing less than this: they asked him to gather intelligence." Critical to his success, adds Wright, was the ability of the Canadian Department of External Affairs "to insulate Taylor from interference from Langley." The first test of the relationship came when Taylor rejected a CIA agent sent to help. A suitable replacement was found. Members of Taylor's staff also helped. An important contribution occurred when a Canadian expert discovered the CIA had made an inexcusable error in the dates on the forged visa stamps. The staff also performed surveillance and provided logistical and communications support throughout. But the most surprising fact to emerge in the book is the ambassador's role in Operation Eagle Claw, the ill-fated hostage rescue mission.

The Canadians who aided in bringing the US diplomats home received honors from both governments, but the details of their contributions were not made public. Wright interviewed most of those involved, and Our Man in Tehran completes the public picture. An amazing story, skillfully told.

15 Ibid., 275.

In the early days of the Cold War, the Soviet Union mobilized European writers, artists, and intellectuals to spread word of the benefits of communism to the world in general and to the East European nations it occupied in particular. One study of the period note that the Soviets “called upon the intelligentsia of the world to rattle their pens under the banner of communism, and hurl ink against the American imperialism.” In response, the United States sought effective countermeasures that would convey an accurate assessment of Western and Soviet reality to the “captive nation” targets. Unembellished radio broadcasting was one of the techniques implemented. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty tells the story of this program from its origins to the present.

Although he is a former director of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and a former acting president and counselor of RFE and Radio Liberty (RL), Ross Johnson has not written a personal or anecdotal account. Rather, his approach dwells on individuals and their formative ideas, the organizations they created, and the bureaucratic disputes that ensued. “Propaganda,” writes Johnson, “is the Cold War word most relevant to this book.” But not in the pejorative sense of “spin … or the deliberately misleading, manipulative pseudo-journalism known as disinformation” often associated with the term. Propaganda, as he uses the term, is “information with a purpose.”

In the beginning, the “Radios”—as RFE and RL are called—were intended to “harness the talent of recent émigrés from the Soviet Union and Soviet-controlled East Europe.” Though supported by the State Department, RFE and RL were established and controlled by the quasi-independent Office of Policy Coordination under Frank Wisner and funded clandestinely by the CIA. “Why the CIA?” Johnson asks rhetorically. “The answer is simply that the reality of US foreign policy and domestic politics in the early Cold War period was such that RFE and RL could only have been founded with covert CIA sponsorship…. The CIA protected the Radios from irresponsible interference, especially the domestic American anticommunist hysteria of the 1950s.”

In addition to the difficult problems overcome in establishing full-service broadcasters, Johnson deals with the major controversies and threats the Radios encountered. In the former category, by citing the documentary guidance provided at the time, he puts to rest persistent charges that the “RFE urged the Hungarians to fight the Soviet Army and promised the insurgents Western assistance.” Similarly, he covers RFE’s challenging performance during the Prague spring and the impact of RL broadcasts to the Soviet Union on that country’s dissidents. As to threats, Johnson covers the often successful KGB attempts to penetrate the Radios to learn what they knew and who was supplying information. The result, he explains, served as a basis for Soviet denunciations of the Radios. Contrary to Soviet charges, however, Allen “Dulles insisted that the Radios … should not be involved in espionage.”

While the book focuses on the 1950s and 1960s, it also summarizes the Radios’ operations from the 1970s to the present. The CIA was ready in the early 1960s, writes Johnson, to sever its clandestine links to RFE and RL, but the “Kennedy administration considered and rejected that option.” Exposure of CIA sponsorship was revealed in 1967 and acknowledged in 1971. RFE came under independent management in 1976. (227)

This is a fine scholarly book. Superbly documented and easy to read—footnotes at the bottom of the page, no flipping back and forth—it clarifies the Radios’ contributions “to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a Europe whole and free.” (245)

The term “Cold War,” as we have come to know it, was coined by George Orwell in October 1945, writes Cambridge University historian Jonathan Haslam: “The Soviet Union was ‘a state ... at once unconquerable and in a permanent state of Cold War with its neighbors.’” (ix) Since the end of the Soviet Union, many books have been written about the subject from the Western point of view. With the increased availability of Russian archival documents in the 1990s, Professor Haslam, fluent in Russian, decided to examine the topic as the Soviets saw it. Russia’s Cold War is the result.

The basic characteristics of the Cold War were not solely the product of WWII, writes Haslam. They were also a persistent consequence of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Thus he begins with a review of the Bolsheviks’ consolidation of power and Stalin’s reasons for tenaciously mistrusting the West, his fear fed by reports from British agent Kim Philby and others. After the war, says Haslam, Stalin’s “unrelenting mistrust of American intentions ... mounted with frightening rapidity” (28) and shaped the Soviet expansionist policies that resulted in the outcome they were intended to prevent, “the emergence of the United States as a formidable force.” (76)

Haslam goes on to review Soviet attempts to spread communism to every part of the world. He discusses in detail the relationship with China, the Soviet reasons for the Hungarian invasion in 1956, the events of the Prague Spring in 1967, the Cuban situation, the Yom Kippur War, détente and Vietnam, and Nicaragua, where détente’s failure was becoming evident.

There are chapters on the events of each American presidency as seen from Moscow, though Western actions and reactions are included for context. One item of particular interest involves the Soviets’ Afghanistan problem. Haslam states that the National Security Agency had been breaking Soviet codes in the 1970s. The result, he asserts without elaboration, “enabled Brzezinski and Carter to trick Moscow into invading Afghanistan.” (319)

Among Haslam’s interesting conclusions in Russia’s Cold War is that Soviet records show they had every intention of dominating Europe after WWII. Moreover, Moscow deliberately continued expansionist policies after Stalin died, rejecting any idea of a peace settlement. The Cold War was not equally the fault of the two superpowers; he suggests, as many in the West have asserted, the Soviets were the dominant force.

The contribution of intelligence is not a major theme, and the CIA and KGB do not appear in the index. They are part of the narrative, however, throughout the book. Russia’s Cold War gives a fresh look at an old subject. Well documented, it is a valuable contribution.

Santa Fe and Albuquerque, New Mexico, played parts in two cases of KGB espionage, one Stalin era “wet operation” and one case of suspected espionage for China. Both cities were the locations of the transfer of atomic secrets to Soviet couriers by KGB agents Klaus Fuchs, Ted Hall, and David Greenglass. Former CIA officer Edward Lee Howard was living in Santa Fe when he escaped FBI surveillance and defected to the Soviet Union. The wet operation was the 1940 assassination of Leon Trotsky, planned in Zook’s Drugstore in Santa Fe. Wen Ho Lee, a scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, was living northwest of Santa Fe when he came under suspicion of espionage for the People’s Republic of China. In A Spy’s Guide, former CIA operations officer E. B. Held provides annotated maps and photos. Also included are historical summaries of each case, with background details on the principal participants and other key figures. For the espionage cases, Held emphasizes tradecraft, the reasons the agents were
caught—or weren’t—and the repercussions. Each chapter ends with suggestions for further reading.

Caution is warranted, as some historical details are inaccurate. For example, as John Haynes and Harvey Klehr explained in their book Venona, there never was an agent code-named PERSEUS at Los Alamos or anywhere else. The one-time pads the KGB used were not used twice. (58) Duplicate pages were printed in Moscow and assembled in a different sequence before distribution. Philby did not warn the KGB or the CIA about Fuchs, nor did Fuchs confess quickly; it took several weeks of patient interrogation. Americans Harry Gold and Julius Rosenberg were just Soviet agents, not illegal/non-official cover officers. (16, 30, 60).

A Spy's Guide to Santa Fe and Albuquerque is a handy reference about espionage for residents and vacationers alike.


Whether written by academics, journalists, or military scholars, most English-language histories of the Vietnam War reflect a Western view. But the South Vietnamese perspective of the war has not gone unheeded. Between 1976 and 1978, the US Army Center for Military History sponsored a series of monographs by six senior South Vietnamese participants in the war. Containing remarkably candid views on all aspects of the conflict, the interview transcripts were originally available only in limited copies, but West Point graduate, former CIA officer, and established author Lewis Sorley edited 17 of the interviews for this volume.

Included are discussions of South Vietnamese military force structure, strategy and tactics, logistics, intelligence, and various offensive operations—for example, the US and South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia in 1970 and North Vietnam's 1972 Easter Offensive. One article deals with South Vietnamese and US cooperation and coordination, although the topic also arises elsewhere. One interview subject points to communist subversion, US pressures on the government and military, and an unstable government as causes of divisiveness and infighting within South Vietnamese society. These, the interviewee said, were major contributors to Saigon's ineffectiveness. The Phoenix Program is dealt with as a war-fighting measure without citing any numerical measures of effectiveness. The chapter on logistics reveals that the South Vietnamese experienced problems common to every army in the field, but with the added difficulty of fighting in a jungle while dependent on outside forces.

A chapter on intelligence discusses each functional element and then looks at how they contributed to major offensives. The chapter emphasizes the subordinate role of South Vietnamese intelligence and a lack of command interest in its output, the problems of tactical field collection, competing priorities, not-always-timely reporting, and the value of US cooperation. Many of the difficulties experienced followed from the existence of more than 17 competing intelligence organizations in South Vietnam and the "tendency to take too lightly the enemy's will to carry out his plans." (322)

One segment deals with pacification programs, but the topic also surfaces in other articles. A major difficulty described throughout is the problem of local South Vietnamese bickering and power-grabbing that often overcame efforts to achieve unity.

A section on the US decision to leave Vietnam in 1972 argues that the South Vietnamese could have defeated the North Vietnamese—the South's army lost two provinces below the Demilitarized Zone but held elsewhere against the North's Easter offensive—but only if US logisti-

cal support had been sustained. Of course that did not happen.

Written from the South Vietnamese military point of view—which was critical of its own government and the United States—this work identifies the South's military failings and provides a solid assessment of why the war ended as it did.

**Memoir**

**Laughter in the Shadows: A CIA Memoir** by Stuart Methven. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008) 177 pp., index. (Reviewed by Joe S.)

“It was incredible, the stuff of comedy and tragedy, unexpected and improbable, ludicrous and grave,” writes Stuart Methven about the early years of the CIA. From 1952 until 1978, Methven crisscrossed the globe as an Agency case officer, finding adventure, triumph, and tragedy wherever he went. In his concise memoir, Laughter in the Shadows, he provides readers a digestible glimpse of it all.

There are tales of recruitments, failed pitches, explosions, coups, and covert wars. Lending credence to the book’s title, many of Methven’s anecdotes are genuinely funny, such as the story he tells of using his daughter to deliver his business card—concealed in a box of Girl Scout cookies—to a prickly Soviet intelligence officer. But not all of Methven’s stories are meant to provoke smiles. When he tells of watching a band of anti-communist fighters accidently kill themselves firing an artillery piece they weren’t properly trained to use, he reminds us that there is a very serious side to the intelligence business.

While Methven’s stories are, in his words, about the “early, more heady days of the CIA,” the picture he paints of clandestine operations comes across as fresh even today and contains worthwhile lessons both for those currently in the intelligence community and those on the outside looking for a concise introduction to life in the shadows. Much has changed since the Cold War, but informed readers will recognize from Methven’s account that the basic craft of intelligence has not. Methven’s description of his first recruitment, for example, reads like it could have been extracted from this week’s cable traffic.

By sharing both the good and bad, Methven provides his readers with a product that feels honest and unpretentious. He’s not shy about sharing his critiques of US policy—for example, Methven is open about his disappointment with the US government’s decision to abruptly abandon a covert action program he led in Africa—but unlike many former case officers who have picked up the pen, he does not come across as someone with an axe to grind. His writing is not motivated by malice, and his assessment of the Agency is evenhanded. “Make no mistake about it,” he notes in the book’s introduction, “even with the CIA’s flaws...[it] has much to be proud of.”

Like most good books, Methven’s is defined by its characters: from “Shower Shoes” Wilson, the Agency contract pilot who flies supplies into the jungles of Southeast Asia, to “Dmitri,” the Soviet diplomat who defects to the United States by crashing his car through the gates of an American embassy. Most importantly, there is Methven himself, a man who befriended foreign potentates, kept a pet crocodile, and survived a coercive pitch from the KGB. He is, in short, like the other personalities in Laughter in the Shadows: someone worth getting to know.
In this memoir, author James Everett tells the story of his 17-year career in the CIA as an officer under non-official cover (NOC). That means he had a regular job with a commercial company while carrying out espionage duties in 35 countries. Everett says he wrote the book for two reasons. The first was to convey a “better understanding about how intelligence works ... and shouldn't work.” (v) The second and more important reason, Everett writes, is to tell his “tale of betrayal: betrayal of the American government to fulfill its promises to one of its spies.” (vi)

The original draft of the book was completed in the late 1980s and submitted for review. Substantial changes were requested. Everett was unwilling to make them, and he put the manuscript aside for nearly 20 years. The project was revived and revised with encouragement and help of a friend, and again submitted for review. Everett dwells at some length on both review sequences, making clear his reluctance to accept the restrictions imposed.

The story itself is a chronological narrative: recruitment, training—Philip Agee was in his class—selection as a NOC, and his various assignments. Everett sympathetically returns to Agee later in the book, making clear that he accepts Agee’s contention that he was never a KGB agent. This and other claims Everett makes raise questions about the depth of his research. For example, he incorrectly asserts that Gen. Walter B. Smith was the first DCI; that Allen Dulles was DCI from 1961 to 1973; and that the US government had advance knowledge of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and did not disseminate the information in a “correct and timely manner.” (viii, x)

The balance of the book, however, is a forthright discussion of how Everett raised a family and managed his commercial job while conducting his clandestine assignments for many years in Sweden and the Netherlands. Things went well until Watergate. During the investigation that followed, it was revealed that E. Howard Hunt worked for the same firm as Everett. In the end, the clandestine relationship with the company was severed and Everett’s service with the CIA was terminated. He describes in considerable detail the trouble he had negotiating a retirement settlement. Everett left, a bitter man.

In the final chapter Everett discusses his public activities against covert action, but he doesn’t call for the demise of the CIA. Instead he encourages reforms that reflect his views.

The Making and Breaking of an American Spy is a sad personal story that conveys the difficult life of NOC officers.

Ashraf Marwan, Israel’s Most Valuable Spy: How the Mossad Recruited Nasser’s Own Son-in-Law

All parties agree that Ashraf Marwan was President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s son-in-law and security adviser; that he was President Anwar Sadat’s security adviser after Nasser’s death; that he was both an Israeli agent and an Egyptian agent; that he gave the Israelis warning of the Yom Kippur War; that he is a hero in both Egypt and Israel; that he became a wealthy arms dealer with connections to several intelligence services; and that he was found dead below the window of his 6th floor—4th or 5th by other sources—London flat. All parties disagree, however, on what intelligence service controlled him; whether his role in the Yom Kippur War was an Egyptian
deception operation; and whether his death was a suicide or a defenestration.

Ephraim Kahana, Chair of the Political Science Department at Western Galilee College in Israel, reviews Marwan’s life as an agent, his activities as an international arms dealer for Egypt and others, and his taste for the good life. Kahana also examines in detail the controversy surrounding the Israeli leak of Marwan’s name to the press, labeling him an Egyptian agent. In an appendix, Kahana examines the Yom Kippur War surprise, providing good historical background to the event.

But what Kahana does not do in the book is significant. In his preface, he writes that his book “reveals who Ashraf Marwan really was, how he became a spy for Israel and what led to his death.” (vii) Kahana accomplished the first two, only in part. But to explain Marwan’s death, Kahana admits his views are “suppositions [that] have more in common with conspiracy theories than with scientific investigation.” (125) The really important question of Marwan’s true allegiance as an agent remains unanswered. Kahana’s book is a good case summary of what is already known, nothing more.


Gulag Boss says little about Mochulsky’s road-building, diplomatic, or intelligence service. His focus is on supervising railroad-building prisoner crews in the Arctic permafrost. He describes dealing with political and criminal prisoners and the hierarchy within which they existed. While he mentions the exploitation that occurred, he does not dwell on the details. He portrays his treatment of those he supervised as fair, if not benevolent, so long as they met their quotas. This is likely to leave readers familiar with Solzhenitsyn’s stories wondering whether Mochulsky, a lifelong communist, has a distorted memory of camp reality. Yet, his tale is negative enough that he could not get his book published in Russia, which Kaple notes, pointing out that Mochulsky does castigate the Soviet government “for the monstrous inventions of the Stalinist regime and the inhumanity and basic criminal character of the Soviet leadership’s policies.” (178)

Gulag Boss is the only book that describes life in the camps from an NKVD supervisor’s point of view. As such, it fills a small niche in the literature covering the brutal history of the Gulag.


A review of the James Sanders book, Apartheid’s Friends, concluded that it provided “the most detailed and best documented treatment of the evolution of intelligence in South Africa.” Though true at the time, the publication of Kevin O’Brien’s new book requires that it be modified. Sanders focused on people and case studies. The South African Intelligence Services covers the same organizations, but from a structural and political—rather than an operational, case-oriented—perspective. It is a study of the South African intelligence enterprise, or “dispensation,” to use the author’s jargon, and its “role in supporting all national security, revolution [sic], and counter-revolutionary forces in South Africa’s modern history.” (11)

In practical terms, O’Brien’s book deals with the policy of apartheid: how it came about, how the intelligence services were used to implement and control it, and the opposition forces with which it dealt—the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party, and other liberation movements. O’Brien looks first at the apartheid period, from 1948 to 1990, then at the transition period, from 1990 to 1994, and finally at the post-apartheid period that began in 1994 and continues to this day, though his research ended in 2005.

The apartheid period saw the development of a National Security Strategy correlated and coincident with the growth of what O’Brien terms the “securocracy,” a development that resembled domestic security measures implemented by the KGB in the Soviet Union for essentially the same reasons. At the same time, various opposition groups—at home and in exile—plotted the overthrow of the government. Efforts to counter the threat resulted in competition among the domestic and military intelligence services. The policy of “permanent removal from society … detention without trial … poisoning” and other means of assassination (11) was carried out by special units of the intelligence services. With the help of organization charts, O’Brien identifies these units and other elements of the South African intelligence community—as well as the politicians in control—while discussing their interrelationships and conflicts. This makes for slow reading, but the coverage is thorough.

With the release of Nelson Mandela and the end of apartheid, the intelligence services were restructured. O’Brien reviews the difficulties encountered—and the problems still not completely resolved—in that process. With all its detail, The South African Intelligence Services is a unique, well documented study—there are only a few non-attributable sources—that will serve as the definitive work on the topic from the “intelligence dispensation” point of view.

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