THE ENGINE OF CHANGE
THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE INTO THE ARMY PLANNING PROCESS

A Monograph

By

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The human domain and culture have always been a consideration in military operations. Throughout the Army’s history, commanders have learned this aspect of war, adapting and integrating their operational plans in order to address various disparities in cultural norms. Yet during the period after Vietnam, the United States Army as an institution neither recognized nor prepared requisite organizational and doctrine as a means to address the considerations. It instead focused on preparing for state-on-state, high intensity warfare.

After the Cold War however, the Army found itself unprepared for the human domain in conflicts such as military operations other than war (MOOTW) and low intensity conflicts (LIC). The chasm between the need to understand the human domain versus the capability was exacerbated at the dawn of the twenty-first century as the Army found itself entrenched in wars among the people in Afghanistan and Iraq. By this point, the U.S. Congress demanded the military take action to become more culturally astute, launching the Army to begin to transform its doctrine. In order to demonstrate the operational shift, this research attempts to illustrate how the U.S. Army has subsequently identified several doctrinal considerations since the end of the Cold War referred to as the “engine of change” by General David Petraeus, enabling the broader force to develop necessary mechanisms for addressing cultural-related issues in the operational planning process.
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ABSTRACT


The human domain and culture have always been a consideration in military operations. Throughout the Army’s history, commanders have learned this aspect of war, adapting and integrating their operational plans in order to address various disparities in cultural norms. Yet during the period after Vietnam, the United States Army as an institution neither recognized nor prepared requisite organizational and doctrine as a means to address the considerations. It instead focused on preparing for state-on-state, high intensity warfare.

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<tr>
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<td>Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrinal Publications</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Resource Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Forces Generation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events</td>
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<td>ASI</td>
<td>Army Skill Identifier</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<td>CAC</td>
<td>Combined Arms Center</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
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<td>DLI</td>
<td>Defense Language Institute</td>
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<td>DLO</td>
<td>Defense Language Office</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Foreign Area Officer</td>
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<td>Human Terrain System</td>
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<td>Human Terrain Team</td>
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<td>IW</td>
<td>Irregular War</td>
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<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflicts</td>
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<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command Vietnam</td>
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<td>MDMP</td>
<td>Military Decision Making Process</td>
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<td>METT-T</td>
<td>Mission, Equipment, Time, Troops and Terrain</td>
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<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>Mission, Equipment, Time, Troops, Terrain and Civil Considerations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Training Center</td>
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<td>O&amp;I</td>
<td>Oversight and Investigations</td>
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<td>PME</td>
<td>Military Professional Education</td>
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<td>POI</td>
<td>Program of Instruction</td>
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<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
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<td>RVN</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>RVNAF</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers</td>
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<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>Senior Language Authority</td>
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<td>TTPs</td>
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<td>University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies</td>
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<td>USAWC</td>
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<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>VC</td>
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INTRODUCTION

[C]hanging the Army as an institution... included developing the Army's doctrinal manuals,... disseminating the big ideas, fostering debate,... overseeing the scenarios at the combat training centers where big ideas are put into practice... and... capturing lessons that need to be learned... [is the] Army's Engine of Change.

- General David Petraeus, Speech given at the American Enterprise Institute, May 6, 2010

The end of the Cold War ushered in a more integrated type of globalization that subsequently enabled various cultures to interact more openly and vigorously along religious, ethnic, and economic avenues.¹ These interactions, in turn, created a more complex environment in which both militaries and governments had to navigate. Indeed, the demand for self-determination by a variety of cultural groups defined by ethnicity, religion, and language emerged sprouting the seeds of ethno-conflict.² These conflicts, more importantly, did not fit the traditional Cold War model of state-on-state wars as the combatants did not wear uniforms or fight on an open battlefield. Rather, they emerged amongst and between populations subsequently elevating the necessity to integrate cultural norms as part of the broader military planning process. Despite this growing importance of culture considerations in military operations, the

¹ Global Policy Forum, “Globalization,” Global Policy, http://www.globalpolicy.org/globalization/defining-globalization.html (accessed March 5, 2013). Globalization: Over many centuries, human societies across the globe have established progressively closer contacts. Recently, the pace of global integration has dramatically increased. Unprecedented changes in communications, transportation, and computer technology have given the process new impetus and made the world more interdependent than ever. Multinational corporations manufacture products in many countries and sell to consumers around the world. Money, technology and raw materials move ever more swiftly across national borders. Along with products and finances, ideas and cultures circulate more freely. As a result, laws, economies, and social movements are forming at the international level.

United States Army has been slow in both recognizing and preparing requisite organizational and doctrinal changes as a means to address these practical shortfalls.

In lieu of the need for increased cultural understanding, many military leaders believed that knowing culture was only a skill required for a small segment of the force that served in specialized jobs.  

Hence, the Army considered the post-Cold War conflicts as anomalies—titling the conflicts Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) or Irregular Wars (IW). Therefore, the broader military organization refused to advocate or attempt to adapt doctrine to the changing environment.

The Army’s failure to adjust its existing strategy after the Cold War was not entirely new. In fact, during the Philippine War of 1899–1902 the U.S. Army found itself hamstrung by its lack of cultural understanding, which affected its operations. Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, a staff officer noted this point in his testimony to the U.S. Congress during hearings on the U.S. Army operations in the Philippines. In his testimony, Wagner stated that “[w]ithout the language skills or an appreciation for cultural understanding, the Americans were…blind.”

Today the Army finds itself in another conflict, this time in Afghanistan, where understanding how to integrate culture into the operational planning process is still important to the long-term aspect of isolating and defeating the identified enemy. As noted, Colonel Wagner saw success in these types of environments largely due to an understanding of how culture fit into the planning process. In fact, the Army of the early 1900s learned this aspect of war, adapting and


4 Robert D. Ramsey, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902 (Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 118.
integrating their operational plans in order to address various disparities in cultural norms. From this point of view, the current Army must also address cultural shortfalls by effectively dealing with the realities of the complex environment that consistently changes the operational framework. In order to demonstrate the operational shift, this research will attempt to illustrate how the U.S. Army has subsequently identified several doctrinal considerations since the end of the Cold War that enabled the broader force to develop necessary mechanisms for addressing cultural-related issues in the operational planning process.

In order to depict the evolutionary trend in Army doctrine, the research will first explore the U.S. Army’s efforts to enhance the planning process by clearly illustrating how the organization grappled with understanding the importance of culture and its effects on designing and planning military operations. More importantly, historical vignettes will depict the importance cultural understanding has on shaping military operations. They will illustrate how Army leaders adapted their plans once they recognized culture was a consideration affecting their operations. The importance of the historical accounts, however, is to show culture has always been a consideration in operations and that it required leaders to recognize and address it. Further, they highlight how methods to deal with the considerations evolved from grand-tactics to a national strategy. Yet, from the eras of the examples until the twenty-first century the human domain and culture were absent from doctrine. This was significant, as doctrine has always driven the structure, training and focus of the Army. Therefore, the Army was not prepared to deal with culture. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the Army finally began to recognize its shortcomings for the human domain and culture. Addressing them through doctrine, the Army created an institutional transformation, which led to a new type of operational thinking that incorporated culture into the planning process.

“Culture,” remains an elusive topic, as it is difficult to define. The Army struggled in this regard, putting forward many definitions through doctrinal and organizational resources. Still,
examples found in current Army publications such as Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Army Doctrine Resource Publication (ADRP) 5-0 and the Army Culture Strategy show no unity in defining the topic.\(^5\)

Definitions aside however, one could certainly begin to appreciate the importance of culture in war by looking at influential theorists who wrote on the topic. Consider the work of Carl von Clausewitz who defined the interrelationship between the people and their ability to influence war.\(^6\) Although Clausewitz never used the word “culture,” he alluded to the concept by describing the human aspects and attitudes of the people, as part of the “trinity” between the army and the government.\(^7\) For this reason, Clausewitz’s concept showed the interplay between the people, the army, and the government setting the “standard” for military theory and doctrinal approaches in connecting culture to operational planning efforts.

Other disparate influences that shaped the post-Cold War doctrinal evolution placing culture as a critical element in the planning process included the works of counterinsurgency theorists like David Galula, Mao Zedong, and Roger Trinquier, to name a few.\(^8\) These theorists, as indicated throughout the research, were instrumental in bringing Clausewitz’s ideas forward by


\(^8\) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Reference–3.
presenting plausible methods to incorporate the population and their culture as a critical component of operational planning.

Other sources used in this research formed a foundation to help frame the context of the discussion about enhancing cultural understanding to benefit operational planning. To begin, two U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) manuals formed the basic framework for all modern day doctrinal changes posited. First, the USMC counterinsurgency manual, a carryover from the USMC’s experiences in Central America in the early 19th century, offered the Army a tested set of basic principles that integrated cultural aspects into military planning. The second manual from Barak Salmoni, and Paula Homes-Eber, *Operational Culture for the Warfighter, Principles and Applications*, published in 2008 was a response to the Marine Corps efforts to operationalize culture for units deploying to the complex environments of Afghanistan and Iraq. The work offered the Army principles to make culture practical for the Soldier. The principles were so powerful, the U.S. Army’s University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFCMS), at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas used their work to train soldiers in Red Teaming.9 Salmoni a Middle Eastern expert, and Homes-Eber, an anthropologist, focused on culture’s role in combat. The authors suggested that, ‘our wars will be "wars amongst' the people”—not wars against the people and not wars oblivious to the people.’10 Finally, William Wunderle’s, *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness*, published in 2007 during the height of the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency

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9 “Red Teaming,” *UFMCS | Homepage*, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/UFMCS/index.asp (accessed March 18, 2013). *UFMCS* is an Army-directed education, research, and training initiative for Army organizations, joint organizations, and other government agencies; *Red Teaming* is a structured, iterative process, that provides commanders an independent capability to fully explore alternatives to plans, operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities in the context of the operational environment from both allies’ and adversaries’ perspectives.

efforts in Iraq, provided immediate solutions to the Army’s cultural understanding dilemma by offering methods to insert culture into the Army’s military decision-making process (MDMP).11

The works of the various authors helped the Army to develop an understanding of culture for the twenty-first century, as they offered a sound theory and practical outlook in developing and implementing the understanding. In essence, the work provided a place where the U.S. Army could establish a foundation to develop doctrine that incorporated methods to develop cultural understanding. However, seeing how the authors’ work fit into the realities of conflict proves most powerful. Historical vignettes offer this opportunity by providing examples of culture identification, providing a link to the application of the various authors’ ideas.

OLD LESSONS RELEARNED: EXAMPLES OF CULTURE IDENTIFICATION THROUGH HISTORY

The U.S. Army’s own history can provide insight for commanders and doctrine writers in how to deal with cultural considerations from the operational perspective. Culture and its impact on operations is not a phenomenon that only came about since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. Army has grappled with such issues from early in its history. From the time the Army first fought on foreign soil, it has had to consider the people who lived on that soil. Often there were no established policies or doctrine to guide leaders for considering this complex and ambiguous domain. Yet the leaders of the time were astute in realizing the impact that culture could have on their operations, and therefore developed plans and policies to meet the challenges created by culture.

The conflicts, examined in this section, show a relationship between the effects culture had on operations and the planning needed to address the effects. The campaigns are the

11 William D. Wunderle, Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries: (Government Printing Office, 2007), 57–81.
Peninsular Campaign of the Napoleonic Wars, 1806–1814, the Mexican-American War 1846–1848, the Philippine-American War 1899–1902, The U.S. Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952 and the Vietnam War 1964–1972. These events, while taking place in different settings each show that cultural considerations are not a new phenomenon. All five conflicts varied in terms of their objectives, tactics, force structures and policies. Yet each army at the time had to grapple with considerations outside of the enemy or friendly forces in developing plans and policies to conduct military operations.

Vignette: Napoleon Bonaparte’s Lack of Cultural Consideration during the Peninsular Campaign, 1806–1814

This example is not about how the U.S. Army considered culture but rather, it is a historical account highlighting the impact that not considering culture has on the overall outcome of an operation. The campaign is important as it set the tone for insurgency and the role people play in war. Moreover, it draws attention to the impact cultural miscues in planning can have on an operation. The campaign has become an important reference in the evolution of the U.S. Army doctrine.

The Peninsular Campaign was part of the Napoleonic Wars, took place in Spain from 1806–1814. The campaign is an example of a military failure due to an inability to identify and then account for culture in its planning process. In essence, Napoleon Bonaparte, the Commander of the French Army, misunderstood the Spanish culture, which in turn led to poor operational plans and decisions. Napoleon never appreciated how independent the Spanish people were of their government; he misjudged the extent of their nationalist pride, the tenacity of their religious faith and their loyalty to Ferdinand. Napoleon assumed that the Spanish people would

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12 George W. Smith, *Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation?)* (Marine Corps War College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2004).
accept changes to their cultural norms with “demur;” instead, he found himself in a violent and complex war.\textsuperscript{13}

Napoleon’s ill-considered decision to invade Spain was a product of his opportunistic character.\textsuperscript{14} He viewed Spain as an opportunity rather than a war of necessity and he had three real motivations for invading Spain. First, he wanted to strengthen the Continental System.\textsuperscript{15} Spain secretly kept ports in Iberian open to British traders allowing their goods, banned through the Continental System, onto the continent.\textsuperscript{16} Second, Napoleon viewed the Spanish government as incompetent and so believed that an occupation of Spain would be easy.\textsuperscript{17} Third, he saw potential in the corrupt Spanish royal family for extortion allowing him to shape the Spanish response to his invasion. In the end, Napoleon was attacking the source of the Spanish people’s identity or the things that made the Spanish truly Spanish, their culture.

When Napoleon first arrived in Spain, the Spanish people enthusiastically greeted and accepted the French Army. However, Napoleon had already determined the violent path that his Army would take in conquering Spain. To gain the obedience of the Spanish people, on February 16, 1806, Napoleon began a violent campaign seizing Spanish territory and imposing French military rule. Shortly thereafter, he would, replace the Spanish royal family with his brother

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{13} David G. Chandler, \textit{The Campaigns of Napoleon} (Simon and Schuster, 1973), 608.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 602.

\textsuperscript{15} T. Dugdale-Pointon, “The Continental System,” \textit{Continental System}, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/concepts_continentsystem.html (accessed March 24, 2013). The Continental System was a blockade aimed at denying the British any trading access to ports in Europe, theoretically destroying British trade and denying them the money they needed to fund Napoleon’s enemies on mainland Europe.

\textsuperscript{16} Chandler, \textit{The Campaigns of Napoleon}, 602.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

8
Joseph Bonaparte, and prosecute leaders of the Catholic Church, in an effort to control the country. 18

The French Army’s actions emboldened the Spanish people to fight back creating a protracted conflict. Yet, Napoleon remained oblivious to the idea of considering the people and their culture as significant in the calculus of his operations. 19 The result was a French Army that existed only to defend itself, which contributed to the demise of the French gains in Spain and ultimately to its defeat.

Napoleon once said, "[e]verything on earth is soon forgotten, except the opinion we leave imprinted on history." 20 The opinion from Napoleon’s Peninsular Campaign was significant as the campaign formed the nexus of Clausewitz’s book six of On War. In the book, Clausewitz used the lessons from Napoleon’s campaign as the motivation for discussing the interrelationship and influence that the human dimension had on a conflict. 21 In fact, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency depicts this very humanistic dimension as a critical requirement in the iterative counterinsurgency campaign design. For instance, this doctrine highlights that “the mosaic nature of insurgencies and the shifting circumstances within each area of operations (AO) requires a different emphasis on the interrelationship among the various lines.” 22 Hence, FM 3-24 effectively codified the military leadership’s attempts to understand this humanistic aspect of warfare, as well as to capture the true meaning of Clausewitz’s interpretation of the issue. In the end, much of the

18 Ibid., 605.
19 Smith, Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer, 22.
21 Clausewitz, On War, 479.
22 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, 4–5.
lessons from the Peninsular Campaign became a reference for considering the population in operations. As such, U.S. Commanders when confronted with situations in which the people were to play a major role, reflected on lessons from the Peninsular War in preparing their plans for which they would interact with the populace. A clear example of a commander who used lessons from Napoleon’s Peninsular Campaign was Winfield Scott.

A Second Vignette: General Winfield Scott used his Understanding of the Mexican People and their Culture to facilitate his March to Mexico City 1846–1848

General Winfield Scott’s march to Mexico City emphasized the importance of understanding the human domain around which operations took place. Recognition of the human domain enabled General Scott to consider history as a method to developing an operational plan. For Scott, there were no established principles or doctrine for dealing with the civilian population. However, he knew his history and studied Napoleon’s Peninsular Campaign. Scott was able to use these lessons of Napoleon’s campaign coupled with his understanding of both the Mexican people and his own Soldiers to develop a pacification plan that would become the foundation to guide Scott’s Army in dealing with the Mexican culture during the Mexican-American War.

Interestingly, Scott’s approach closely resembled the first section of Roger Trinquier’s, *Modern Warfare*. Trinquier was a theorist who wrote about the French experiences in counterinsurgency warfare in Algeria. His first section discussed adapting the military force to the warfare at hand and not the war last fought. In this regard, Scott clearly understood that he was not fighting the grand Napoleonic battles of the European plains, but rather a war among the people.

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General Winfield Scott, who led the U.S. Army in its first foreign war, realized before he began his campaign that he had to account for the Mexican people in his operational approach. Scott came to his realization through studying the Napoleonic Wars. He was well aware of the mistakes that Napoleon made during the French occupation of Spain and Scott was determined not to repeat them. Further, he had seen the issues that Brigadier General Zachary Taylor’s force had encountered in dealing with the Mexican people in northern Mexico. The two areas of reflection allowed Scott to understand how the Mexican people viewed themselves— independent and proud, yet reverent toward the Catholic Church. To challenge either identity could lead to unfortunate results for his force. Finally, he knew that his own force had a cultural bias of their own towards the Mexican people and their religion that would affect operations if he did not address it.

Aware of the issues, Scott developed a plan to prevent a hostile uprising by the people both during and following his forces movement to Mexico City. An uprising would lead to a guerilla war that would disable his force along its march. To prevent the potential uprising Scott’s plan included both pacification, to avoid alienating the local population and martial law, to control the Mexican people and his own force’s actions.

His pacification plan was both sophisticated and noteworthy for the ways in which he understood and accounted for the human domain within his operational environment. Key to his successful operation was that his plan appealed to the source of identity within the local population. His force purchased goods and services from the populace, helping to sustain and grow the local economies. Further, he applied martial law equally to both his force and the people


25 Ibid., 16.
of Mexico. The parity was important as Mexican local magistrates levied the punishment on the populace, keeping the terms and punishments consistent with cultural norms. Finally, Scott’s forces showed respect for Mexico’s Catholic culture. Scott’s reverence went as far as to proclaim, “We [the U.S. Army] are friends of the peaceful inhabitants of the country we occupy and the friends of your Holy Religion…”26

Scott was ultimately a successful commander as his approach addressed the cultural identity of the Mexican people.27 Scott was especially astute of his formations own biases, and how those biases would affect their decision-making. The awareness provided Scott the freedom of maneuver he needed to move to and then to hold Mexico City. He was able to maintain a balance between pacification and security operations, as he identified the culture in his operational environment.

Scott’s pacification plan gave the Army an effective approach to use in future campaigns as Timothy Johnson notes in his work:

Scott’s pacification plan was… a model for waging war in a foreign country and occupying enemy territory without alienating the civilian population. As America’s first foreign war, the government had no experience in such matters, but Scott’s system of martial law, despite its imperfections, established a noteworthy pattern for waging war in another country.28

His understanding of the Mexican cultural identity prompted him to treat the Mexicans equal to his soldiers and revere their religion— both key components to his operational plan. The success

26 Ibid., 62.
27 Daniel T. Canfield, Winfield Scott’s 1847 Mexico City Campaign as a Model for Future War (DTIC Document, 2009), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getrecord&metadataprefix=html&identifier=ADA515166 (accessed March 16, 2013). The author argues that Scott’s understanding of his environment allowed him to develop a successful campaign plan and that his campaign can provide steps to be taken to win both the war and the peace within an overarching campaign design that integrates combat and stability operations from the start.
28 Johnson, A Gallant Little Army, 58.
of this plan, prompted the Army to use it as a template for dealing with cultural-related issues in the Philippine-American War. Unfortunately, unlike the Mexican-American War the U.S. Theater Commanders and Soldiers alike did not understand the Filipino culture their plan was trying to affect.

Vignette Three: Major General Fredrick Funston’s Past Experiences with Culture help him to develop an Operational Approach in the Philippine-American War, 1899–1902

The Philippine-American War underscored how a commander’s experiences could shape his understanding of culture. In the Philippines, the Army had established a pacification plan early in dealing with the local populace. However, because the U.S. Army did not understand the Filipino culture, pacification was merely a set of requirements to deal with the people. Therefore, the operational approach failed, until Major Fredrick Funston stepped in. Funston had a clear understanding of the people and their culture, and was able to use that understanding to develop a plan that led to a successful campaign in the Philippines.

During the early part of the Philippine-American War, the U.S. Army was culturally inept towards the Filipinos. Because of the cultural inexperience of the U.S. Army, it misunderstood the Philippine environment and as a result conducted actions that were counterproductive to the Army’s endstate.\(^{29}\) Early on in the war, the Army tried to use a pacification approach similar to Scotts. Unlike Scott, however, in the Philippines the Army was unaware of the environmental factors that necessitated the need to pacify. Brian Linn in *Intelligence and Low Intensity Conflicts in the Philippine War*, notes the phenomenon:

> [f]ew [U.S. Soldiers] understood the local dialects or Spanish…. The Soldiers had little respect for native culture or society…. Lacking any empathy for indigenous traditions and customs, Americans interpreted all events in a narrow ethnocentric framework. Filipino devoutness was dismissed as superstitious, Filipino sports were banned as

\(^{29}\) Brian McAllister Linn, “Intelligence and Low Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902,” *Intelligence and National Security* 6 (January 1991): 94–95.
barbaric, Filipino emphasis on family connections was slighted in the interest of efficiency, and Filipino politeness and courtesy manifested often in the desire to put information in the best possible light, was interpreted as dishonesty or shiftiness.30

One commander, however, was aware of his environment and accounted for the difference in culture. Major General Fredrick Funston’s approach during the American-Philippine War is one of the most useful examples of how a commander who considered culture as he built his plan, specifically the interrelationships of the human dimension helping in shaping a successful operational approach.

Major General Fredrick Funston entered the Philippine-American War predisposed for an appreciation and understanding of the native people’s culture. His innate understanding was largely the consequence of his prior experiences and study. Funston participated in the Cuban War of independence between 1895 and 1898 as a rebel, and knew the power that the people could have on the direction of a conflict. Additionally, he was a commander influenced by his tenure as the Commander of the 20th Kansas Volunteer Infantry during the early part of the Philippine-American War. As such, Funston knew better than to adhere to the established counterinsurgency practices advocated by theater commanders, Major General Elwell Otis and later Major General Arthur MacArthur. 31 He understood the essence of the problem would indicate the methods for his approach. Further, unlike other districts in the Philippines, the history of the second district offered him unique opportunities.

The fourth district was one of the few areas that had three mutually antagonistic ethnic populations, which presented ethnic tensions ripe for exploitation by the Americans.32

30 Ibid.


32 Ibid., 66.
Additionally, prior guerrilla operations in the area had generated dissatisfactions and alienated a portion of the population. Through Funston’s experience, he understood that to defeat an insurgency he needed support. Given the dynamics of his district, he knew that the opportunity for support for his operational approach would come from the disillusioned portion of the population.

Major General Funston’s operational approach in the fourth district was to deny the guerillas their base of support from the people by isolating the population and then, through intelligence to counter attack to fix, finish and exploit guerrilla formations. Limited to a regiment, Funston combined the people and their military with his U.S. forces to create a viable operating force. Funston, familiar with the culture of his district was able to establish relationships with the people. The relationships offered him advantages such as support in terms of logistics and manpower, and intelligence. The intelligence enabled Funston to maintain the initiative through rapid responses to guerilla activity keeping the guerillas off balance. The support allowed the inclusion of the population in their own defense further denying the guerrillas access. Additionally, the logistics and local scouts gave him the capability to strike deep destroying enemy sanctuaries, which ultimately broke the guerillas willingness to continue to fight.

A significant aspect of Funston’s successful operational approach was his understanding of the civil considerations in his operational environment, specifically the dynamics of the different tribal cultures. His understanding of the tribal rivalries together with the history of the Spanish rule allowed Funston to accomplish his mission by providing insight into the intent of the different groups in the operating area, which ultimately allowed him to outthink and outmaneuver the enemy.\(^{33}\) Through the understanding Funston had of his environment and his problem, he was able to develop a relevant operational approach to guide the force in establishing conditions

\(^{33}\) Wunderle, *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness*, 1.
toward a lasting success. Moreover, his success became the foundation of the revised Philippine
plan that led to the end of the Philippine war. Further, it offered an example of the importance of
understanding the local culture.

Funston’s methods illustrate a linkage to the work of counterinsurgent theorist, David
Galula. In his work, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, Galula offered three, concepts that he termed as
“laws” to succeed in countering revolutionary and insurgency warfare. These three laws include;
*Support of the population is necessary; second, support should be gained through an active
minority; and third, support from the population is conditional.*34 From Galula’s perspective, the
support of the population was the result of the commander’s understanding of the people and their
culture. The understanding allowed Funston to identify minority groups and potential rifts within
the population. FM 3-24 outlined the concepts as “steps” for defining the environment.35 For
instance, to define the environment, doctrine outlines the considerations in order to develop a
holistic view. Part of which is culture—identified by understanding the norms of the people, their
history, their beliefs, and their religion.36 By building an understanding, Funston identified the
separate factions within the society as a means to align his operational approach with the interests
of the people.37

Other commanders through time have used their understanding of the people and culture
as a means to develop an approach. General Douglas MacArthur was one such example during
his occupation of Japan. MacArthur was able to develop plans that shaped a nation by

34 David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory And Practice* (Greenwood
Publishing Group, 1964), 56.

35 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, 3–3.


37 Ibid., 3–8.
deliberately appealing to the Japanese culture and not against. His plan took the importance of
cultural considerations from one of operational importance to strategic.

General MacArthur, the Occupation and Reconstruction of Japan, 1945–1952: A Fourth Vignette
on Cultural Understanding

The American occupation of Japan highlights the importance of understanding how the
people identify themselves in order to develop operational plans in support of strategy. The allied
leaders in World War II had laid out a plan for the occupation of Japan, but it was General
Douglas MacArthur, with his well-developed and nuanced understanding of Asian and Japanese
culture, whose plan really generated the long-lasting success of Japan following the end of
combat operations in 1945. MacArthur’s prior experiences in Asia, both during peace and in war
gave him a perspective as to how significant the Japanese culture was to its people. An example
of this was how the Emperor Hirohito was more than the ruler of Japan— he was a deity in the
eyes of the people. Through understanding such cultural intricacies, MacArthur was able to see a
propensity in the Japanese culture that would help facilitate his plan.

On August 29, 1945, days before the formal Japanese surrender, President Harry S.
Truman appointed General Douglas MacArthur Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
(SCAP). In this role, MacArthur oversaw the American occupation, and the rebuilding and
democratization of Japan. Months prior the Allied leaders met in post war Berlin to discuss the
occupation of Japan and set forth policies and procedures for the conduct of such actions. One
such policy was that the occupation force would rule Japan instead of the Japanese Government.
As such, the procedures the Allies used to enforce their rule required fundamental amendments to
the Japanese way of life.

However, given his background in Asia, MacArthur understood the tensions that the occupation plan would create against Japanese culture.\(^{39}\) Imposing a new order on the island nation would be a difficult task even with Japanese cooperation. He even noted, “It would be impossible… for foreigners to dictate radical changes to 80 million resentful people.”\(^{40}\) With this in mind, he took drastic steps to minimize the reaction of the Japanese people to change. For one, he kept the Emperor and Japanese Government in place.\(^{41}\)

The Japanese Emperor was a source of identity for the Japanese people. Understanding this, he felt it important to keep him in place. However, MacArthur established a relationship early on in the occupation that placed the Emperor subordinate to him. He explained his approach in his memoirs:

> Shortly after my arrival in Tokyo, I was urged by members of my staff to summon the Emperor to my headquarters as a show of power. I brushed the suggestions aside. "To do so," I explained, "would be to outrage the feelings of the Japanese people and make a martyr of the Emperor in their eyes…. No, I shall wait and in time the Emperor will voluntarily come to see me. In this case, the patience of the East rather than the haste of the West will best serve our purpose."\(^{42}\)

The approach worked as the Emperor did come to see him. Thus, MacArthur established a relationship on his terms giving him legitimate power in the eyes of the Japanese. The legitimate power allowed him to conduct occupation operations with little interference from the local populace.

\(^{39}\) William Manchester, *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880 - 1964* (Hachette Book Group, 2008), 65. MacArthur spent his formidable junior officer years, following his father, Major General Arthur MacArthur the Commander of the Department of Pacific; around in Asia too include Japan and the Philippines (1903-1906) as his Aide-de-Camp.


\(^{42}\) Ibid.
His decision angered many of the Allies, as the Russians and British wanted the Emperor tried and hung for war crimes. However, MacArthur defended his action, as removing the Emperor would needlessly anger the Japanese population. To this point, he was quoted in his autobiography as saying, “…I would need at least one million reinforcements should such action [be] taken…guerilla warfare would probably breakout.”

MacArthur displayed an understanding for the strategic implications of his decisions by keeping the Emperor and Japanese government intact. The Chinese Revolutionary Mao Tse-tung wrote of the importance of this principle in his work, “[the] strategist studies the laws of a whole military situation.” He went on to advise that one must consider a decision with consideration to the entire environment. Mao declared that if one “[m]akes a single careless move [then] the entire game is lost.”

Moreover, MacArthur took another bold step and allowed Japan’s military leaders to disarm their own forces. Conventional wisdom would have had the occupation force disarm the Japanese military. However, with the Emperor submissive to his plans, he knew the military would follow suit. On October 16, 1945, MacArthur stated, "[a]pproximately seven million armed men...have laid down their weapons. In the accomplishment of the extremely difficult and dangerous surrender in Japan, unique in the annals of history, not a shot was necessary, not a drop of Allied blood was shed.”

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Praetorian Press LLC, 2011), 177.
46 Eiji Takemae, The Allied Occupation of Japan (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2003), 52.
With the military disarmed and the government and Emperor firmly supporting
MacArthur, he was able to begin the transformation of Japan from a dictatorship to a democracy,
(a process that took place in less than seven years). A contributing factor to the short
transformation was the development of a new constitution. The former Japanese constitution
placed all the power with the Emperor and then the power flowed through his selected
representatives. In order to restrict this process preventing the Emperor from waging another war,
MacArthur established a working group from his staff to develop a new constitution.

The group formed after the Japanese Government failed to produce a constitution that
was significantly different from the one they had before the occupation. The working group used
a British model, in that it had a cabinet and prime minister who was responsible to the legislature.
The new form of government was a radical departure from what the Japanese people knew. The
genius of the new constitution was to keep the Emperor. However, no longer was the Emperor the
source of all government authority, rather he was relegated to a figurehead to serve as a national
symbol. The new constitution promoted the people, acting through the legislature, as the source
of power.47

Much of the changes were radical in comparison to the cultural norms that the Japanese
people had known. Yet the way in which MacArthur had the changes enacted, through the local
government endorsed by the Emperor, helped stem the tide of distrust by the people. The
Japanese legislature found the new constitution hard to accept, but the Emperor intervened
declaring, “Upon these principles, will truly rest the welfare of Japan.”48 The new constitution

47 Constitutional Rights Foundation, “Bringing Democracy to Japan.”
48 Ibid.
went into effect May 3, 1947. Not surprisingly, the Japanese accepted the changes, concluding that their old ways had failed and thus the country was ready for a revolutionary change.49

The U.S. occupation ended in 1952, and the Japanese people were again an independent nation. Since that time the Japanese have never ratified the constitution that MacArthur created.50 Further, the document has become part of the Japanese cultural identity. MacArthur not only understood the considerations that would affect his operations, but he understood the identity that created the considerations. Thoroughly understanding the Japanese people, MacArthur was able to develop plans that appealed to the source and worked with the culture and not against. Further, MacArthur’s methods provided an example of culture as a strategic consideration in shaping a nation. An idea that would be repeated in Vietnam where culture rose to a national, strategic level, as cultural policies were established by the President in an effort to end the war.

Vietnamization, 1968–1975 as a Final Vignette: The People and their Hearts and Minds Become a National Strategy

This final historical account looks at how the Army dealt with a national strategy that focused on the people and not the enemy. Vietnamization was a national strategy to pacify the South Vietnamese people in an effort to afford the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Government space to provide for its people.51 The Army leaders had to translate the strategy into ways and means. The significance of Vietnamization for the purposes of the paper and its consideration of cultural influences lay in that it represents for the first time that cultural considerations became

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
the focus of a strategy at the national level. Further, it provided the Army a model for plans, doctrine and force structure that it used again during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The crux of Vietnamization was twofold. The first involved training the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to take over military operations, therefore allowing U.S. forces to retrograde from Vietnam. The second saw the U.S. Army protect the population allowing the RVN government to establish its authority.52

While President Richard M. Nixon proclaimed Vietnamization as a national strategy, the Army had employed the components of the strategy for much of the conflict. During the early years of the American involvement in the war, advisors collaborated with RVN units in an effort to protect the South Vietnamese countryside from the Communist influence.

The Communist Viet Cong (VC) worked to consolidate their influence over the South Vietnamese people by using a “carrot-and-stick” approach.53 The VC would move into a village and provide the South Vietnamese villagers medical treatment, education, and justice as well as propaganda and threats.54 Through these actions the VC were able to establish a shadow government in South Vietnam by controlling the people.

By the mid-1960s, the South Vietnamese Government was ineffective in countering the VC, as it could not maintain a permanent force in the villages to challenge the VC actions. To exacerbate the VC’s grip on the people, the RVNAF and their American advisors did not

52 Ibid., 157.


54 Ibid.
understand the important role that the people played in the VC’s strategy to the war. During this period, the RVNAF and Americans focused instead on searching and destroying the enemy.55

While the U.S. military focused on security, civilian agencies worked with the villages to enable governance. Unfortunately, the efforts were not unified. As a result, in 1967, President Lyndon Johnson, displeased with the disparity took action. He placed the civilian program titled, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) under the Department of Defense. Therefore, the Commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) became responsible for unifying the effort.

Through combining the two entities there was a synergy of mutually supporting effort that could address the population. Authors Dale Andrade and James Willbanks have argued that the CORDS program resulted in significant gains by 1970, as the combined efforts confronted the guerrillas at the source of their power, the people.56 Ultimately, the program was credited for a 20 percent increase in security across South Vietnam.57

By 1968, the tide shifted to training the RVNAF. The Army had relied on embedded U.S. Training Teams to teach and work with the RVN forces. However, the effectiveness of the training was suspect. General Creighton W. Abrams worked to improve the RVNAF training by ensuring that only quality soldiers filled the role of advisor.

After President Nixon’s initial inauguration, he announced his plan to get the U.S. out of Vietnam, a plan he called “Vietnamization.” Later that year, Abrams officially published his approach in the MACV Objectives Plan. Vietnamization focused on protecting the population so

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 15.
57 Ibid.
that the civil government could establish its authority.\textsuperscript{58} The plan differed from earlier strategies that saw the purpose of the war as solely the destruction of enemy forces.\textsuperscript{59} Through the President’s declaration, Abrams was able to gain momentum and provide better advisors. No longer did the Army fill the advisor role with the Army’s less desirable. Abrams established a new standard for advisors by only taking Soldiers who in his words could “lead/influence…the business of pacification,” and “feel empathy towards the Vietnamese…appreciate their good points and understand their weaknesses…to pull actions out of the Vietnamese.”\textsuperscript{60}

In the end, both facets of Vietnamization saw some success.\textsuperscript{61} By securing the people, the U.S. provided the space needed for governance allowing the focus of the war to shift to fighting the enemy. In that regard, the advisory efforts were better. In turn, the RVNAF were much improved allowing for the continued retrograde of U.S. service members from Vietnam.

The Vietnam experience taught the U.S. many lessons about the importance of the population in a war. The strategy allowed the Army to change its force structure in an effort to address the concerns towards people. Unfortunately, Vietnam left a deep chasm in the U.S. Army, contributing to the Army leadership’s aversion to the lessons learned of the war. The importance of culture faded as the Army turned to a new focus during the Cold War era.

The Cold War era saw the U.S. concerned with competing nation states. Therefore, during the era, the Army’s doctrine supported the training and organization for large force-on-force battles that favored mass formations of tanks, artillery and mechanized infantry. However, following the end of the Cold War the dynamics of conflict changed. With the Soviet Union gone,


\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 151.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 159.
it seemed unlikely that any nation would again challenge the U.S. in a head-on contest of military strength.\textsuperscript{62} Hence, the doctrine and force structures that the Army revered were no longer relevant. Yet, the U.S. training, doctrine and organization remained unchanged, focused still on the two-sided massive style of war prevalent during the Cold War.

THE ENGINE OF CHANGE WAS SLOW TO RECOGNIZE THE HUMAN DOMAIN

The U.S. Army doctrine began to evolve at the start of the twenty-first century to reflect how practitioners understood the immediate needs of the operational force operating among the human domain as part of the new complex environment. The impetus for the evolution was the emergence of transnational actors after the Cold War. The transnational actors changed the dynamic of war for the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. No longer would it be strictly two-sided state-on-state. Rather, with the inclusion of separate actors war evolved into a multi-sided conflict.\textsuperscript{63}

Indeed, operations since the end of the Cold War were multi-sided. Transnational actors became intertwined with the local populace and played an increased role in the outcome of operations such as Restore Hope in Somalia 1992–1994, Joint Endeavor in Bosnia 1995–1998, Joint Guardian in Kosovo 1999, and Uphold Democracy in Haiti 1994–1995. The conflicts highlighted that the Army was ill-prepared for such operations as it failed to address the changing environment through its doctrine, military professional education (PME), and training.

Army doctrine is an important starting point to address the future needs of the Army as it guides military education, force structure and training. Therefore, a move to change doctrine

\textsuperscript{62} Fred Kaplan, \textit{The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War} (Simon and Schuster, 2013), 2.

becomes the “engine of change” in the organization.  

For instance, new ideas are developed and written into Army publications and then introduced and reinforced through education and training resulting in a fundamental change to the Army as a whole. With this in mind, the Army started its “engine of change” towards considering culture in 2001.

The change would address identified shortfalls seen in the 1990s. In essence, the Army finally realized that operations not only took place on remote battlefields, but were taking place among the people as well. Therefore, the Army identified a need to change its doctrine and structure to account for the human dimension. This section, in turn, presents a detailed overview of how the Army identified the considerations over time, as well as the organization’s actions that led to the development of necessary mechanisms for addressing this new variable known as “culture.” To understand the changing environment, however, this research will begin in the years following Vietnam.

The Old Doctrine did not help in The Post-Cold War Environment

The Army’s post-Vietnam doctrine fell short in the various complex environments presented by the emergence of low intensity conflicts (LIC) witnessed during the 1990s. The capstone doctrine of the late 1980s known as FM 100-5, Operations advocated a concept known as “AirLand Battle.” The concept is what the Army of the 1990s used to guide its training and operational planning. Faced with the Cold War mentality of the 1990s, however, the doctrine possessed no cultural references, and offered little guidance to planners on how to effectively deal with the emerging considerations of the asymmetrical environment.  

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64 Janine Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War (University of Michigan Press, 2011), 130. The “engine of change” was a term coined by GEN David Petraeus, during a briefing at Ft Leavenworth, KS on September 28, 2006.

doctrinal answers to the shortcoming in the form of FM 90-10 *Urban Operations* and FM 100-20 *Low Intensity Conflicts.* These FMs, however, were limited in distribution, and therefore were unknown to most in the conventional force.

In June of 1993, the Army released an updated version of FM 100-5. The updated version did away with AirLand Battle but offered no greater insight into, or useful reference for understanding the environment. The 1993 version did present the concept of Mission, Equipment, Time, Troops and Terrain (METT-T) as considerations that affect both offensive and defensive planning. However, the version never presented the reader with the notion that the people within the environment might have an impact on operations as well.

Important in the 1993 version of FM 100-5 was a section referred to as Military Operations Other Than War. The section was the first acknowledgement of the complexity the human domain has on operations in a capstone doctrine for the Army. Unfortunately, MOOTW had a stigma attached to it from the many years of the AirLand Battle influence. Considered an anomaly, MOOTW was thought best suited for Special Forces (SF) and Civil Affairs (CA). General John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) embodied this sentiment best as he often stated, “Real men do not do MOOTW.” However, by the end of the 1990s, even the Chairman acknowledged that the environment was rapidly changing and that the Army needed to change with it.

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67 Ibid., 52.


69 Kaplan, *The Insurgents*, 45.

70 Davidson, *Lifting the Fog of Peace*, 139.
The low intensity operations of the 1990s became the impetus for the Army to reexamine its doctrine and force structure. Yet, it took operations as recent as Afghanistan and Iraq to highlight the critical gaps in the Army’s capability to operate in different environments among the populace. The gaps, created out of an organizational ignorance towards the importance that the population would play on operations, were significant inhibitors in the U.S.’s ability to pursue its nation building efforts.\textsuperscript{71} The Afghanistan and Iraq wars, in essence, were the events that forced not only the Army but also the entire military to address the need to integrate culture into the operational planning process.

Congress Called for the DoD to Develop an Ability to Understand Foreign Cultures in Order to Adapt to the Changing Environment in War

Based on the Army’s wartime experiences of both the 1990s, Afghanistan, and Iraq, a demand arose to change the way the Army considered culture. William Wunderle highlighted this need in his book, \textit{Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness}, when he cited Congressman Ike Skelton from a letter he sent to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld:

\begin{quote}
[If] we had better understood the Iraqi culture and mindset, our war plans would have been even better than they were, [and] the plan for the post-war period and all of its challenges would have been far better…we must improve our cultural awareness… to inform the policy process. Our policies would benefit from this not only in Iraq, but…elsewhere, where we will have long-term strategic relations and potential military challenges for many years to come.\textsuperscript{72}
\end{quote}

Furthermore, Congressman Ike Skelton’s 2003 letter was a call to the Department of Defense (DoD) for action.\textsuperscript{73} In response, SECDEF Rumsfeld released a memorandum to the military

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\textsuperscript{72} Wunderle, \textit{Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness}, 3.

\textsuperscript{73} Congressman Ike Skelton was the senior Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee in 2003.
\end{flushright}
Secretaries stating, “[f]oreign language skill and regional expertise are essential enabling capabilities for DoD activities in the transition to and from hostilities.”  

Later identified in an in-depth study by the Department of Defense Science Board *2004 Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities*, the U.S. military envisioned a fluid environment in the future that necessitated the ability of the military to shift in and out of violent conflict. Therefore, the military needed unique capabilities to influence the operational environment both before and following hostilities.  

Unfortunately, the doctrine and force structure required to complete such a tasking exceeded the capabilities of the general operating force at the time. One combatant command planner put it concisely when he stated, “[f]or each of my high-priority countries, I need a good Foreign Area Officer (FAO), a civilian staff member who has been working the country for years, and an experienced special operator.” The planner would further acknowledge that combatant command staffs did not have that depth of expertise.

The Secretary of Defense’s directive established the context for subsequent DoD and service initiatives on culture and language. Starting in 2004 the DoD created the Senior Language Authority (SLA). The SLA was to determine how to bridge the gap between the assessed language and culture skills present in each service and combatant commands, compared with the skills needed in the future.

In 2005, based upon the initial findings of the SLA, the DoD issued the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. This roadmap gave planning goals and guidelines for building the needed language capacity through forty-three tasks to the services. Additionally, the

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74 Wunderle, *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness*, 3.


76 Ibid., 114.
Defense Language Transformation Roadmap created a new entity, the Defense Language Office (DLO). The DLO had strategic oversight of both the DoD language and culture requirements. Finally, DoD and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released directives, (5160.41E and 3126.01 respectively), establishing foreign language and regional expertise as critical competencies essential to the overall defense mission. The importance of cultural understanding had taken root with the Pentagon, yet the changes to doctrine were still slow to emerge as the force was engaged in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Army Began to Adapt by Augmenting its Force Structure with Cultural Experts to Address its Immediate Needs to Understand Culture in Afghanistan and Iraq

The Army was quick to recognize that the force needed help understanding the culture of Afghanistan and Iraq. Hence, early attempts by the DoD to transform cultural thinking led to the Army embracing the idea of becoming culturally astute. For instance, in 2004 the Army hastily identified Fort Huachuca as the Army Training and Doctrine Command Cultural Center. In fact, Colonel John Bird, Director, Training, Support and Development, U.S. Army Intelligence Center would openly state that, “[t]he manner in which Fort Huachuca ‘got into the culture business,’ started with a phone call from the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC).” During the call Colonel Bird was asked, “Do you guys at the MI [Military Intelligence] School teach culture?”


78 Ibid.

Colonel Bird answered, “Yes, of course, [intelligence] preparation of the battlespace.” The CAC replied: “MI School, you’re now in charge of culture training.”

In order to comply with this new directive, Fort Huachuca developed a Program of Instruction (POI), pulling from the Defense Language Institute programs already on hand and used by the Peace Corps. Cultural training from 2004 through 2008, in turn, grew from what Fort Huachuca developed into an organizational use of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). MTTs traveled to different Army units to conduct train the trainer classes on region specific cultural concepts. By 2006, the Army expanded cultural expertise to meet the demands of the force through outsourcing.

Shortly after the Iraq war began, commanders called for improvements to their capability to understand the people they were dealing with. The DoD’s response came in 2006 with a database of information about different populations of the world called the Human Terrain System (HTS). The system, however, was unresponsive to the commander’s needs and prompted a further request for experts to help decipher the system and advise the commanders as to the intricacies of the local populations.

The response from the Army was the establishment of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs). HTTs were composed of, “two general types of social scientists: one type has relevant region-specific training; the other has training and experience in a field such as ethnography.” Furthermore, the team had a leader who was familiar with MDMP and a research manager to access the HTS. The HTT conducted social science research about the local population to enable


81 Ibid., 16.

culturally astute decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share socio-cultural institutional knowledge.” The first teams deployed at the brigade level in 2008.

During the same timeframe, the Army further developed the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The UFMCS was responsible for the Red Team concept and training. Red Teaming provided the commander a perspective allowing the staff “to break from their own cultural mindset and think from an adversary’s perspective.” The program targets mid-grade officers including Majors who serve at the tactical and operational levels. To codify the importance of the concept, the Army did two things: first, it offered Red Teamers an Army Skill Identifier (ASI), and second it changed the force structure by authorizing positions at the Division level and higher. In essence, this was the Army’s first attempt to add the ability to understand culture at the operational and strategic levels.

While these initiatives filled critical gaps during the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, they were not a comprehensive answer for the Army towards cultural understanding. The Army had met the immediate tactical needs of the force, but it had not integrated culture into the operational planning process. It would take a doctrinal breakthrough in the form of a new field manual to enable the change.

The Publication of FM 3-24 Changed the Attitude of the Army towards Cultural Understanding

By 2005, the gap between the doctrine needed in Afghanistan and Iraq and what was available was growing disparate. While Congress had provided the motivation for DoD to adopt the ideas that culture and language mattered, the practicality had not yet matriculated to the force.


84 Alrich, Framing the Cultural Training Landscape: Phase I Findings, 18.
However, in 2005 General David Petraeus was appointed as the CAC Commander at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Petraeus given his prior tours in Iraq both as a Division Commander and in charge of the training of Iraqi Security Forces knew the importance of the human domain.

Petraeus was a student of counterinsurgency and studied insurgencies as part of his doctoral thesis at Princeton University. Counterinsurgency theorist such as Galula, Mao, and Trinquier shaped his views. He knew he had to win the “hearts and minds” of the people to be successful. Petraeus would carry his knowledge and experience with him to the CAC to begin the “engine of change,” to meet the demands of the operational environment for the Army.

Petraeus found early in his tenure that the Army’s mentality still followed the former capstone doctrine AirLand Battle. As of 2005, three years into the conflict in Iraq, the Army basic branches were training junior leaders to operate as the Army had always done – through lethal effects regardless of the impact on the population. Fred Kaplan noted in his book, The Insurgents, that the interconnectivity between training and doctrine and its effect on a wartime Army were out of sync as, “[t]he training programs were out of date and the main reason was the doctrine was out of date.”

Given the magnitude of the war in Iraq, Petraeus could ill-afford to use the traditional doctrine writing process, which took up to three years to complete. For this reason, Petraeus assembled a team of counterinsurgency experts both military and civilian to work on the new doctrine. This new doctrine writing process began in November of 2005, and often included

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85 Kaplan, The Insurgents, 32.
86 Ibid., 132.
87 Ibid.
88 Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace, 153.
Petraeus writing sections of the doctrine himself. The FM – titled *FM 2-34, Counterinsurgency* was released on December 15, 2006.

The Army received the FM as a “new” way forward in Iraq, perceiving it as a formula for getting it right. A fundamental facet to the FM and different from all the previous capstone doctrine of the time was the focus on the people—a fundamental Maoist principle to winning an irregular war. The concept, however, was counter to the AirLand Battle ideas of mass, maneuver and might.

The doctrine was founded on the theories of Clausewitz in that it addressed the importance that the people and their “will” play on the outcome of warfare. Furthermore, the new doctrine incorporated many theories that advocated the importance the population plays on war. For instance, Mao’s ideas of a protracted war offered the writers a perspective towards understanding the strategic implications of a culturally in effective approach. Further, Galula’s ideas helped ensure that the doctrine integrate civilian and military activities in order to secure the population allowing for local government to address the people’s needs.

The FM was also instrumental in facilitating meaningful and practical conversations to operationalize cultural understanding for the Army. For instance, many discussions and congressional studies about culture prior to the publication of the FM, resulted in little action in training the force. The addition of culture in the FM forced the Army to consider culture in the operational planning process. In chapter 3 of the FM, “Describe the Operational Environment,” culture was now a key component. The FM defined culture and then further broke it down,

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89 Kaplan, *The Insurgents*, 133.

90 Ibid., 221.

91 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, 1–1.

92 Ibid., 1–6.
providing information about what made it up. Furthermore, the FM offered tools to help in analyzing the topic.

The Army included memory aids in the FM to help soldiers identify relevant information on the battlefield. Doctrine updated some aids as with METT-T. It changed to include “C” for civil considerations (METT-TC). Further, the Army added new acronyms as well to help illustrate the characteristics of civil considerations – area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events (ASCOPE). These acronyms essentially brought the people and their cultures to the forefront of planning by establishing the standards for the Army in considering the operational environment as part of the planning process. Subsequent field manuals, referred to as Army Doctrinal Publications (ADP) and Army Doctrinal Reference Publications, would follow this line of thought by including culture as a consideration of the environment as well. Finally, PME training had begun to teach methods to analyze the environment that included the culture of the people.

The momentum provided by FM 3-24 changed the perception of cultural understanding for many in the Army, and thus removed the roadblocks towards cultural understanding. However, there remained no unifying mechanism to drive the Army towards established standards for cultural training or organizational structure. In essence, the Army could not meet congressional demands for cultural understanding without a plan. The Army needed a cultural strategy as a means to move forward enabling cultural competence among the force.

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93 Ibid., Glossary–2.
The U.S. Congress Continued its Push for Cultural Understanding in the Military, and this Time the Army was ready to Comply

The DoD had made significant strides in implementing language initiatives by 2006; and it was time the DLO turned its attention towards what it called, culture and regional expertise. In 2007, based on the continued pressure by congress for the military to develop cultural understanding, the DLO hosted the Regional and Cultural Expertise Summit. The summit was to identify the regional and cultural competencies needed to enhance the capabilities of the 21st Century Total Force. The summit focused on, “the understanding of mission demands and developing a framework to synchronize policies, plans and programs to meet the demands.” The findings of the summit were summed up in a DoD white paper released in October of 2007 titled, DoD Regional Capabilities, The Way Ahead. The White Paper argued that “culture and language skills, need to become fundamental components of the Department’s [DoD] DNA.” The summit findings became the foundation for the DoD, Combatant Commands, services language, and cultural strategies.

In 2008 the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee’s subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (O&I) conducted a study on the state of DoD’s language and

94 Alrich, Framing the Cultural Training Landscape: Phase I Findings, 9.

95 Ibid., 9–10.


97 Ibid., Cover Memorandum.

98 Ibid., 6.

99 Alrich, Framing the Cultural Training Landscape: Phase I Findings, 10–12.
cultural strategies, in light of the DLO summit findings. What the House O&I found was that DoD had made gains in the field of language; however, it had not placed the proper influence on culture. The Army for example had identified that it needed a balanced set of cultural and foreign language competencies for its soldiers and leaders. However, the leadership acknowledged that it did not know what the right blend was.100

The House subcommittee concluded with a call for action by DoD through nine recommendations to improve the organization’s connectivity by aligning the department’s vision with what the services were actually doing. The sum of the subcommittee’s findings called for DoD to place more emphasis on culture and language through a prioritized strategy establishing both areas as a core competency essential to the DoD mission. The committee also provided a recommendation to place more emphasis on culture and language during institutional initial entry training for officers in places such as the service academies and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The Army responded to the DoD’s call for action by setting the stage for the Army to develop a culture strategy that would allow the Army to identify, develop, and measure culture competence among its force.

THE ARMY DEVELOPS A CULTURE STRATEGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Since the release of the House O&I subcommittee results, the Army led the way for the Department of Defense through a comprehensive culture strategy released in 2009. The premise of this strategy was to close the “capabilities gap” through “building unit capability and expanding the scope of leader development.”101 The capabilities were shaped through education,


101 Department of the Army, Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy, ii.
training and developmental experiences. Furthermore, the strategy used two distinct yet interrelated paths to teach the capabilities: the individual Soldier’s career path and the unit pre-deployment path.

The cultural strategy was to facilitate an understanding at some level of the role people and their culture in a given area has on operations. Further, it effectively would enable requisite culture planning techniques as a means to integrate combat tactics into an operational approach. More interestingly, this strategy seemed to validate Clausewitz’s insight that that war is human in nature, and that the social conditions of the environment outline “the forces that give rise to war.” Given the humanist nature of war, it was appropriate that the Army began to focus on a culture strategy in an effort to develop soldiers.

Soldier Career Developmental Training

The Army’s idea of developing cultural understanding involved the concept of building competence as a method of increasing the fundamental knowledge base and attributes associated with both the individual and unit in combat. There are fundamental differences between “competencies” that are skills and “competence” which is status. The Army defined the former as “the ability to perform tasks and supporting skills and knowledge to the required standard” (like do X to Y standard). It defined the latter as “a set of knowledge, skills, and attributes that enables leaders and Soldiers to adapt and act effectively in any cross-cultural environment.”

Often practitioners assumed or implied that mastering the requisite competencies (skills) was the

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102 Ibid., 6.
103 Clausewitz, On War, 76.
104 Department of the Army, Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy, 83.
105 Ibid.
only way to attain competence (status) – a clear reductionist approach.\(^{106}\) Hence, understanding the parts did not equal a holistic understanding of the system.

For the Army to achieve competence, the leadership decided to focus its efforts on the Soldier. For instance, the Soldier’s career developmental path spans the length of a Soldier’s service with “cultural capability milestones” that coincided with career milestones. The Army divided the program into two major components: cross-cultural competence and regional expertise.\(^{107}\) This approach essentially provided both the Soldier and the Army the depth and expertise required for future missions.\(^{108}\)

The Army Established the Mechanisms to Achieve Cross-Cultural Competence

The Army referred to cross-culture competence as the “essential building block to developing culture capability.”\(^{109}\) The Army further sub-divided cross-culture competence into three sub-components, as seen in (Figure 1).


\(^{107}\) Department of the Army, *Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy*, 10. Cross-cultural competence: “Culture General” knowledge, skills, attributes that all leaders and Soldiers require.

\(^{108}\) Ibid.

\(^{109}\) Ibid., 11.
In essence, cross-cultural competence taught through Army institutional training was part of the PME process. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), in turn, led the integration of the three sub-components of cross-culture competence through training and educating the Army. The thought process behind the technique was that the training would become a prelude to a Soldier’s ability to develop regional expertise.

Regional Expertise is Declared Part of Cross-Cultural Competence

Regional expertise allowed a Soldier to both specialize in a region of the globe for future operations and to expose the Soldier to foreign cultures from which to learn and experience. According to the Army’s Culture Strategy, a Soldier’s cultural proficiency level would increase over time and experience through three different levels: cultural awareness, cultural understanding and cultural expertise (Figure 2). Soldiers then focused on a region for the duration of their career, gaining a depth of knowledge on the specific culture they worked in.

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110 Ibid. Cultural Fundamentals: The knowledge of the major factors that describe any culture (e.g. values, beliefs, behaviors, norms and other factors) and other aspects that describe a culture.

111 Ibid., 14.
However, a soldiers’ knowledge would not limit them to assignments confined to a specific region.

![Image of cultural capability changes over time](image)

Figure 2: Culture capability changes over time\textsuperscript{112}

Learning a region in depth opened a Soldier up to accept different ideas and foreign concepts. This increased purview, in turn, encouraged a propensity for understanding holistic viewpoints by developing the learning of other regions and cultures through life-long study. The second method of training the Army took place at the unit level in accordance to the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) tailored training approach.\textsuperscript{113} The approach involved pre-deployment education and training of leaders and Soldiers in communication skills, and the impact and influence of their operations on the culture of a specific region. The training provided through the Defense Language Institute (DLI), which in a query of regional training resources, offered sixty-nine different culture orientation programs to support regions across the world.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 12.

Finally, to affect culture proficiency at the unit level, the Army incorporated the human dimension into the combat training centers (CTC). In 2010, the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California boasted of six to eight “Hollywood-quality” villages manned by four hundred actors, of which at least half were from the country the unit was training for. The intent of using the actors was to “bring Soldiers face-to-face with the culture they [would] encounter.” Training at the CTC takes place as part of the ARFORGEN cycle and is generally one part of pre-deployment training.

Pre-Deployment Training Includes Region Specific Cultural Awareness

The purpose of pre-deployment training was to ensure that all leaders and Soldiers had a common baseline in cultural capabilities for the specific region in which the Soldier was deploying. Additionally, the Army intentions were to help the unit understand and apply culture to planning and conducting operations. The training broken into three sub-components (Figure 3) was designed to prepare a unit for a specific region or country.

![Figure 3: Pre-deployment sub-components](image)

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117 Ibid.

The Army strategy goes on to establish a checklist in its appendix in order to help units establish measures of effectiveness for their pre-deployment training.\(^{119}\) The checklist identified the cohort as “Officer, NCO or Enlisted” against the backdrop of the sub-component for either cross-culture competence or regional expertise. It further defined learning objectives by major subject areas compared to the cohort’s stage in their career. Finally, it concluded with another checklist that outlined the unit pre-deployment training.\(^{120}\)

The Army’s intent for this specific training layout was to build culturally astute soldiers who better grasp foreign cultures and therefore could benefit the Army and its operations. Through exposure to different regions in training, the Army inherently wanted a soldier to create experiences that would build a foundation of knowledge about culture. In the end, the strategy would prepare Soldiers and units for the cultural intricacies of their environment.

The evolution of culture as a competence has grown out of lessons over the last twenty years. Recognizing the importance culture would play in the future, the U.S. Congress called for the DoD to take action. This call implemented a shift in how the U.S. viewed the future conflicts from a two-sided to a more diverse and complex multi-sided conflict. The Army, in turn, developed a strategy to develop cultural understanding that made the Soldier successful in unified land operations.

\(^{119}\) Ibid., 22.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., 74–76.
CONCLUSION: THE ENGINE OF CHANGE HAS POSITIONED THE ARMY FOR THE FUTURE

What will win…will be people that can cross the cultural divide. It’s an idea often overlooked by people [who] want to build a new firebase or a new national training center for tanks.\[121\]

— John Abizaid

The unique challenges that the people and their culture create will continue to challenge the Army in the 21st century, just as it proved to be a challenge for the commanders of centuries ago. The past has also shown the importance of how culture influenced operations in areas where the tactical units mingle with populations. However, the Army’s memory was short; it took the more recent experiences of Afghanistan, and Iraq to generate an appreciation for the significance culture plays in operations. The experiences were the impetus to prompt an evolution in doctrine, PME development, and force structure integration that included culture.

The historical vignettes used in this research offered a glimpse into the past, and showed that culture always had an impact on the environment. Unlike Napoleon, the commanders that understood the cultural influences on operations were able to envision how their actions would interact with the population enabling them to develop plans to address the issues. Like Scott, Funston and MacArthur, they were commanders who had an intuitive understanding for how culture affected their operational environment. Clausewitz referred to this as the “Coup D’oeil,” or the inward eye.\[122\]

The dynamics of the human domain within a new operational environment are never certain. However, cultural understanding can offer a road map to guide one in military planning. The culturally astute operational artist, much as an experienced driver understands the patterns of


\[122\] Clausewitz, On War, 102.
busy traffic, will understand how their planned actions will cause a reaction in the cultural environment, allowing them to shape their operational approach to work within the cultural norms, such as seen in the vignettes.

The U.S. Army has had to develop a strategy to enable cultural understanding in the force. The Army’s timing is important, as culture again has become a defining factor in the nature of today’s complex global environment. In light of the rediscovery of culture on the battlefield, the Army has worked towards changing the doctrine. The move away from AirLand Battle and towards a holistic strategy, acknowledged that the people and their environment affected operations. The change enabled by doctrine, allowed the Army to develop the necessary mechanisms to deal with cultural-related issues. Through the change in doctrine, the Army can develop better plans to deal with the considerations within the human domain for future operations.

\(^{123}\) Kim, “Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy.”


Smith, George W. *Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation?)*. Marine Corps War College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2004.


