THE ARMY PROFESSION: A NARRATIVE

A Monograph

by

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14. ABSTRACT

Army Doctrine 2015 depicts the Army as a profession consisting of two sub-professions: the Army Profession of Arms and the Army Civil Corps. This all-inclusive model of the Army as a profession is ahistorical and begs the question why Army leaders adopted it. Surveying key profession of arms models, the sociological study of professions, organizational theory, and narrative theory suggests Army leaders may have developed the Army Profession concept as a rhetorical device aimed at improving or reinforcing discipline within the Army. Organizational theorist, Valerie Fournier described a theory of professionalization in which an organization’s leaders could use the concept of a profession to inculcate behavioral norms within the organization. The research into the Army Profession concept supports the inference that Army leaders developed the Army Profession concept as a rhetorical device.
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ABSTRACT


In 2010, the Secretary of the Army, John M. McHugh, and the Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, directed the TRADOC Commander, General Martin Dempsey to conduct a review of the Army profession. General Dempsey’s review gave rise to the Army Profession Campaign. In the literature supporting the Army Profession Campaign, Army leaders described the Army as a profession with two sub-professions: the Army Profession of Arms and the Army Civilian Corps. Defining civilians a part of the military profession is a significant departure from existing practice and raises the question, why did Army leaders adopt the Army Profession concept?

To determine why the Army profession included civilians, it was first necessary to investigate how the concept of a profession has evolved. The concept of a profession was first applied to civilian occupations before it was imported into discussions of the military. Both history of the civilian and military uses of the term profession revealed that the Army Profession concept is ahistorical. Surveying key profession of arms models also illustrates Army leaders broke with tradition by making the Army Profession an all-inclusive model. A review of narrative and organizational theory suggests Army leaders may have developed the Army Profession concept as a rhetorical device rather than a literal description of the Army. One organizational theorist, Valerie Fournier described a theory of professionalization in which an organization’s leaders could use the concept of a profession to inculcate behavioral norms within the organization.

Examining Army doctrine and Army Profession Campaign literature supports the inference that Army leaders intended the Army Profession Campaign to serve as a rhetorical construct with which they could improve discipline throughout the force. A review of the literature and doctrine support the conclusion that Army leaders were greatly concerned with improving discipline at the time they adopted the Army Profession concept. A review of the literature and doctrine prove Army leaders were aware of narrative theory. A review of the same materials proves Dr. Snider, the chief architect of the Army Profession Campaign, was aware of Fournier’s argument that a professionalization rhetoric campaign could improve self-discipline within a workforce.

The research into the Army Profession concept through the lens of narrative and organizational theory does not conclusively prove Army leaders developed the Army Profession construct by applying Fournier’s theory. However, the evidence collected supports the inference that Army leaders did develop the Army Profession concept as a rhetorical device. Furthermore, the evidence makes clear Army leaders chose to employ professionalization rhetoric as a possible way to correct observed behavioral deficiencies or to prevent a forecasted decline in discipline.
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<tr>
<td>ACPME</td>
<td>Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Reference Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPE</td>
<td>Center for Army Profession and Ethic&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>EXCEL</td>
<td>Excellence in Character and Ethical Leadership&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Forces, Iraq</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>US Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<sup>1</sup>Formerly ACPME  
<sup>2</sup>2009 ACPME study conducted through surveys of MNF-I personnel.
INTRODUCTION

There will be times when we are going to be conducting operations that you won’t understand. They are going to make you uncomfortable. People you know and love are going to be hurt because of this; and, we want the American people to say, “That’s OK, we trust you.”

—Brigadier General Sean B. MacFarland

In April 2011, the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) hosted a panel on the profession of arms and civil-military relations. During his opening remarks, General Sean MacFarland cautioned the audience that public trust in the military could be easily lost through misdeeds and unprofessional behavior. Highlighting some egregious examples of such behavior, General MacFarland listed Vietnam body counts, the Aberdeen Proving Grounds drill sergeants sex scandals, Abu Grahib, the “Revolt of the Generals,” and the controversy preceding General McCrystal’s resignation. General MacFarland said the Army must police itself:

If we don’t hold ourselves accountable, then our political masters will. They will step in and then you get friction between civil-military relations[sic]. We need to show that we don’t need their help; that we’re doing OK. We do that through accountability, transparency, integrity and expertise.

According to General MacFarland, healthy civil-military relations rely on credibility and trust. Credibility and trust derive from discipline. Therefore, systemic indiscipline would threaten not just military effectiveness but also civil-military relations. General MacFarland was not alone in thinking the Army needed to fundamentally reexamine discipline and develop methods to reinforce it throughout the service.

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3Sean B. MacFarland, “Opening Remarks,” (Panel, The Profession of Arms and Civil-Military Relations, Lewis and Clark Center, Fort Leavenworth, K.S., 4 April 2011), Combined Arms Research Library. In its latest doctrinal publications, the Army describes discipline as “the ability to control one’s own behavior.”

The panel at which General MacFarland spoke was part of the Army-Wide Profession of Arms Campaign that Army leaders later renamed the Army Profession Campaign. These campaigns arose from a directive cosigned by the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff. In 2010, the Secretary of the Army, John M. McHugh, and the Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, tasked the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander, General Martin Dempsey, to conduct a “comprehensive review to examine the state of [the Army’s] profession after nearly a decade of war.” Secretary McHugh and General Casey specifically tasked the TRADOC Commander to provide “analysis of trends and indicators of individual and unit behavior” as part of his findings as well as “an assessment of the impacts of the last nine years on the force and to recommend changes to Army policies and programs to strengthen [the Army] as an institution.” The Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff directed this review after receiving an Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic (ACPME) report indicating a need for increased ethics training at all levels throughout the Army. General George Casey had commissioned the ACPME Excellence in Character and Ethical Leadership (EXCEL) study after he received a request from Multi-National Forces, Iraq (MNF-I) Commander, General David Petraeus. General Petraeus asked to have a study conducted to examine “factors that serve as determinants of Soldiers’ ethical beliefs, attitudes and behaviors.”

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Perceptions of a decline in ethical behavior among service members were not limited to Army leadership. In November 2012, Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta ordered General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to assess military officer ethics training. The media inferred from the order that Secretary Panetta and President Obama had lost confidence in their military subordinates. Major news outlets ran stories describing a rash of indiscrete, unethical, and alleged illegal behavior by flag officers. In U.S. News, Bill Briggs suggested “high-profile cases of alleged misconduct” were symptomatic of “a much larger issue affecting the armed forces.” In the Associated Press, Lolita Baldor described Brigadier general Jeffrey Sinclair’s alleged criminal misconduct—for which he will face court martial and a possible life sentence—as “the latest in a series of missteps by military leaders,” thereby insinuating such serious offenses had become commonplace. By providing specific examples in which the institution’s credibility came into question as the result of indiscipline, high visibility misconduct cases have reinforced General MacFarland’s argument the Army must do more to police its ranks itself.

Building on the ACPME report recommendations from the EXCEL study, Army leaders converted the Army Profession of Arms Campaign from a dialogue about the profession of arms into an educational campaign designed to teach service members—both uniformed and civilian—that they are members of the Army Profession and as such must behave as professionals. In fact, “inculcating the ideas of the Army Profession” became part of the Army’s Strategic Planning

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Guidance in 2013. Both academics and military service members have written numerous articles debating the nature of the profession of arms and the concept of an Army Profession reaching no consensus on any point of the debate. This suggests the concept of an Army Profession has been misunderstood. This misunderstanding may reduce the potential benefits of the Army Profession Campaign.

In 2010, having concluded his internal review of the profession, the TRADOC Commander published a 60-page pamphlet, *The Army Profession: 2012, After More Than a Decade of War*, which became an Army White Paper. In it, he declared the Army to be a profession. This declaration was an abrupt departure from preceding scholarship regarding the profession of arms and professions in general. Most debates involving whether or not a military is a profession have typically involved refinements of the notion of a profession of arms. The TRADOC Commander broke with both academic and military tradition when he asserted the Army was a profession in itself—consisting of two subordinate professions: the Army Profession of Arms and the Army Civilian Corps. The Army’s description of itself as a profession is clearly at odds with earlier descriptions of professions. Army leaders must be aware the concept of an Army Profession is problematic to many members of their audience. Yet, the Army spent millions of dollars socializing the idea and included it in its latest doctrinal manuals. Army leaders have made the concept of the Army Profession an integral part of Doctrine 2015. Assuming Army leaders recognized describing the Army as a profession begged academic resistance bordering on scornful ridicule, why did Army leaders adopt the concept of an Army Profession?

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13U.S. Army, ADP 1 *The Army*, 2-1.
To answer this question it is first necessary to understand how people have historically used the concept of a profession to describe certain occupations. Understanding how people have historically used the concept of professions will establish the fact that the Army’s description of itself as a profession is ahistorical. It will also suggest possible motives behind occupational leaders’ attempts to garner recognition of their occupation as a profession. The best place to uncover the evolution of the profession as a concept is in the field of sociology. Having established the definitions and the application of the concept of professions, it becomes necessary to examine how the concept has been applied to the US military. This can best be done by examining models of what is traditionally called the profession of arms. Examining models of the profession of arms will reaffirm the ahistorical nature of the Army’s Army Profession construct and support inferring Army leaders were aware they were breaking with academic and military tradition by adopting the Army Profession model. Examining the profession of arms concept will also explain—at least partially—why so many people resist the Army’s inclusion of DA civilians in the Army Profession. Establishing the contentious nature of including DA civilians in the Army Profession will support the inference Army leaders did so because including DA civilians added them to the campaign’s audience in terms of a narrative rhetorical construct.

Sociology and political science demonstrate the Army Profession Campaign breaks with history and tradition but those fields do not offer answers as to why Army leaders chose to do so. A review of narrative and organizational theory is necessary to answer the question. Narrative theorists argue reality is subjective; it is both experiential and contextual. In this way, according to narrative theory, discourse can create an individual’s reality. Organizational theory builds on narrative theory by suggesting organizational leaders can shape individuals’ self-identities and their understanding of their roles within an organization through discourse and development of an

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organizational culture. Valerie Fournier documented business leaders trying to make employees self-regulate their behavior by telling those employees they were members of a profession and explaining what constituted acceptable behavior within that profession. James Pierce built on Fournier’s concepts examining how leaders could use the concept of a profession to inculcate “values, beliefs, assumptions, perceptions, [and] behavioral norms” within the organization.  

A basic understanding of narrative theory and Fournier’s contribution to organizational theory supports the inference that Army leaders were attempting to implement Fournier’s model by adopting the Army Profession construct. 

Examining Army doctrine, Army Profession Campaign literature, official Army publications, memorandums, and Army sponsored research will support the argument Army leaders intended the Army Profession Campaign to serve as a rhetorical construct with which they could improve discipline vis-à-vis Fournier’s professionalization model. Examining those sources will provide evidence indicating 1) Army leaders perceived a serious and systemic discipline problem, 2) Army leaders were aware of Fournier’s model or a similar one, 3) Army leaders knew including DA civilians and others traditionally excluded from the profession of arms would create resistance to the concept of an Army Profession. The evidence supports each of these inferences. 

The examination of the Army Profession concept through the lens of narrative and organizational theory suggests Army leaders developed the Army Profession Campaign as a rhetorical device to establish and control an internal-Army narrative with which they could reinforce individual self-discipline. Army leaders were never interested in an academic debate. They were, from the outset, looking for a way to correct observed behavioral deficiencies or to prevent a forecasted decline in discipline.

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15 James G. Pierce, “Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of Its Senior Level Officer Corps?” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 20.
NON-MILITARY PROFESSIONS

To understand the questions surrounding the Army Profession concept, it is necessary to know how and why people have historically applied the concept of a profession to other occupations. Reviewing the evolving concepts of a profession serves three purposes. First, it highlights the ahistorical nature of the Army’s description of an all-inclusive Army Profession. Second, it reveals the motives people have had when they applied the concept to their own or other favored professions. Third, it suggests that the act of categorizing occupations as professions or something other than professions is not simple classification in accordance with a set of unbiased and generally accepted criteria. It is important to demonstrate this point since so many of the scholars supporting the Army Profession Campaign purport to do just that. To accomplish the above listed purposes, this section presents a brief history of the sociological study of professions. It then presents five sociological theories of professions which taken together represent the broader field of study. Contrasting the Army Profession Campaign with these theories also illustrates in what particular ways it diverges from sociological applications of the theory of professions.

Sociologists began studying professions as early as 1934 when Carr-Saunders and Wilson published, *The Professions*. The study of professions has undergone many changes. At first, the study was limited to classification of occupations into categories. Those categories were little more than a division of skilled labor into profession and non-profession. Sociologists who espoused these models argued professions were occupations that had certain organizational and social characteristics that differentiated them from nonprofessional occupations. The authors of these early models did not address how occupations became professions.  

Theories of that

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process, or *professionalization*, did not emerge until the late 1940s. Proponents of early professionalization theories assumed occupations became professions through a gradual progression. They assumed the occupation’s practitioners did not intentionally drive the process. Researchers later developed theories of professionalization in which occupational practitioners motivated by several factors drove the process of their own professionalization. The practitioner-driven theories differed mainly in whether the practitioners were selfish or altruistic in wanting their occupation to become a profession. During the early to mid 1960s, some sociologists began to see professionalization in terms of social mobility and egalitarianism. To them, professionalism became movement along a spectrum with professions on one end and labor on the other. This reduced any distinction between professions and non-professional occupations to a distinction of degrees instead of a true demarcation. Although the study of professions had entered a theoretical realm, it fundamentally remained categorization of occupations.

In the 1960s and ‘70s, the study of professions began moving away from categorizing occupations towards asking questions about society’s relationship to professions. Sociologists had become less interested in categorizing occupations and more interested in how occupations they presumed to be professions benefited society. As could be expected, another school developed that rejected the assumption professions benefitted society. This school viewed professions in terms of workplace monopoly and focused on the role of the state in professional licensing. One branch of that school focused on asking who benefited most. Did society or the individual members of a profession benefit most when an occupation’s practitioners convinced the rest of society that their specialty necessitated recognition as a new profession? Some sociologists saw the process of professionalization as an “accretion of public recognition” rather than any actual

change within the occupation. In other words, an occupation became a profession when society recognized it as such.19

In the 1980s, sociologists turned their attention to the perceived competition between professionals and non-professionals and between professionals and other professionals. Since the 1980s, interest in the study of professions generally has decreased among sociologists. If at all, they examined professions as an element of the study of the organization of labor and the study of work. Recently, the study of professions has emerged inside studies of the self-ideation of workers and worker motivation. Rather than categorizing occupations, sociologists following this line of reasoning, examine professions and professionalism as a “discourse.” They ask how managers use that discourse to mold subordinates’ self-identity and self-discipline.20

Many of the academic works examining the distinction between professions and occupations focused on developing criteria by which to measure an occupation and determine the merit of its practitioners’ claim of professionalization. In *Professions in Civil Society and the State: Invariant Foundations and Consequences*, David Sciulli presented a model based on criteria that were developed by Michael Burrage, Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist. Those criteria were:

1. It establishes a monopoly in the labor market for expert services.
2. It establishes a monopoly in the labor market for expert services.
3. It achieves self-governance or autonomy, that is, freedom from control by any outsiders, whether the state, clients, laymen, or others.
4. Training is specialized and yet also systematic and scholarly.
5. Examination, diplomas, and titles control entry to the occupation and sanction the monopoly.21

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20 Ibid.

These criteria are representative of the criteria implicitly or explicitly stated in nearly all theories of professions and professionalization proposed during the last half of the twentieth century. It is worth noting the first criterion would undermine the Army Profession model’s claim that reservists are professional. The third criterion poses issues for the Army Profession because the subordination of the military to civilian control undermines any Army claim to professional autonomy. Authors of the Army Profession Campaign have chosen to focus on the second, fourth, and fifth criteria. They have done so by emphasizing Army expertise, albeit vaguely defined, while recommending changes to Professional Military Education (PME) curriculum and a return to a system of annual recertification.

In 1964, Harold Wilensky reacted to a growing body of work which suggested many if not all occupations were beginning to meet the criteria for professions by writing “The Professionalization of Everyone?” In that article, Wilensky argued there were two criteria for determining whether an occupation was truly a profession. His proposed criteria stipulated that to be a profession the work performed must require substantial training, and second that members of the profession had to perform according to a set of shared values including one to place the interests of the client above the practitioner’s own interests. He called this the “service ideal.” That notion remains strongly tied to the concept of professions and appears to be included in the Army Profession model.

Wilensky also offered a historical sequence of professionalization that he developed from his understanding of the histories of occupations he accepted as true professions. According to Wilensky, several occupations were professions as early as the middle ages. Applying his criteria, including the requirement to have a service ideal, he said some groups of military commissioned officers had attained professional status as early as the sixteenth century but dentists, architects, engineers, and CPAs did not attain that status until the turn of the twentieth century. According to Wilensky’s theory, not all occupations will become professions. Because his criteria were fixed, his theory suggests professionalization is something that can be measured. Because anyone can
apply his criteria, Wilensky argued, a non-professional occupational group attempting to convince nonmembers that it was a profession would risk ridicule.  

Ignoring that precaution, the authors of the Army Profession model chose to focus on Wilensky’s concept of a service ideal. The campaign literature stresses the sacrifices of service members and civilians to show that all the members of the Army Profession place their needs after the needs of their client, the American people. In this way, those authors made the Army Profession model appear to fit Wilensky’s otherwise exclusionary theory. This may be one reason all the Army Profession Campaign literature stresses values, creeds, oaths, and other outward signs that members of the Army adhere to a norm of selfless-service.  

In Sociology, Work, and Industry, Tony Watson categorically rejected the utility of criteria as a means of determining whether an occupation was a profession or not. In doing so, he echoed Howard Becker’s notion that the distinction between occupations and professions centered entirely on cultural symbolism and an image. However, Watson departed from Becker by recognizing one perquisite for practitioners of acknowledged professions: social status. Echoing Wilensky’s skepticism of many occupations’ claims of professionalism, Watson suggested elevated social status was itself enough incentive to explain why “occupations as varied as industrial managers, estate agents and embalmers [were] getting together and pursuing some elements of . . . professionalization.” Although Watson’s argument appears at first glance to undermine the Army Profession Campaign’s claims, it actually does not. Since members of the Army already enjoy high social standing in the form of public trust, Watson’s argument fails to discredit the Army Profession Campaign. However, his theory must be included in this survey.

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21U.S. Army, The Army Profession, The word, service, appears 32 times in this 52-page pamphlet.
because Watson cemented the precedent of dismissing criteria as a way of objectively delineating professional and non-professional occupations. 24

Abbott approached the concept of professions by examining what he described as the “system of professions.” According to Abbott, at the time he began describing a system of professions, most other theorists considered only one occupation or profession at a time. Perhaps because he took a systems approach to professions, his theory has remained influential among military intellectuals and their academic counterparts25. Abbott centered his theory on jurisdictional competition. According to Abbott, once the client calls upon the professional, the client should take a relatively passive role and allow the professional the freedom to decide how best to resolve the matter. Like Watson, Abbott rejected definitions built on criteria. Abbott cited Geoffrey Millerson in arguing against supposedly unbiased sets of criteria with which one could categorize occupations as professions because Abbot felt such criteria usually “reflected political concerns.”26

Although they did not follow Abbott in dismissing criteria, the Army Profession Campaign’s authors appear to have been influenced by Abbott. The Army Profession Campaign literature trumpets Abbott’s notion that expert work is the application of abstract knowledge on behalf of a client. Also, comments such as those made by General MacFarland regarding US civil-military relations reflect Abbott’s theory of professions as it regards jurisdictional disputes between a member of a profession and his or her client.27 However, Abbott’s rejection of criteria lists as a litmus test for professions remains a point of departure between his theory and the Army

25Systems theory proponents argue that one must consider myriad levels of interactions between actors involved in a group dynamic.
Profession Campaign literature. In all of the Army Campaign literature, Army leaders go to great lengths explaining exactly how all five Army cohorts meet necessary criteria.28

Elizabeth Gorman and Rebecca Sandefur argued Sociology had turned away from theories of professions and professionalization. According to Gorman and Sandefur, recent trends in sociology indicate a general rejection of the classification of occupations into professions and non-professions. They suggest researchers are no longer interested in excluding any occupation from their field of study. Gorman and Sandefur argue in favor of classifying certain occupations not as professions but rather “knowledge-based work.” They suggest all occupations in which the practitioners serve their clients through the application of expert knowledge belong to this category. Knowledge-based work is, therefore, a broader category than professions. In it, what were previously described as criteria for inclusion or exclusion become “variables . . . to be explained by the characteristics and actions of individuals, organizations, and organizational groups.”29 There is no evidence to link Gorman and Sandefur’s theory directly to the Army Profession Campaign. However, their theory serves to illustrate that Sociology is currently trending away from the conceptualization of professions as objectively distinct from non-professional occupations.

The concept of professions has been discussed academically more in conjunction with non-military occupations than the military. That overview provides several lessons applicable to this examination of the Army Profession Campaign. First, although sociologists have studied the concept of professions since at least 1934, they have not reached a consensus as to what delineates a profession from an occupation. Second, many occupational practitioners have sought to professionalize or garner societal recognition of their occupation as a profession for a number of reasons ranging from purely financial to purely social. Third, it is probably not possible to

deduce a list of unbiased, subjective criteria with which to distinguish professions from non-professions. Fourth, proponents of such lists often develop their criteria to support the inclusion of a favored occupation among professions. Fifth, there is no historical precedent among sociologists for including all ancillary members of an occupation as professionals given one recognizes the occupation as a profession. In fact, many sociologists who have written on the subject have gone to great lengths to exclude certain sub-groups. Sixth, sociologists are increasingly unlikely to accept categorization of occupations as scientifically meaningful. This last point lends credence to the hypothesis that Army leaders intended the Army Profession Campaign for an Army-internal audience.

THE US MILITARY AS A PROFESSION

Having established how and why people have historically applied the concept of professions to non-military occupations, it is now necessary to apply the concept to the US military specifically. Traditionally, people applying the concept to the military have called the resultant profession, the profession of arms. Examining how the concept of a profession of arms emerged in the US serves three purposes. First, it will demonstrate that the Army Profession Campaign’s broadly inclusive definition of an Army Profession breaks with tradition. The departure from accepted definitions of a profession reinforces the inference that Army leaders made a conscious decision to include all cohorts in the Army Profession. That inference suggests the conclusion Army leaders wanted as broad an internal audience as possible to receive the Army Campaign narrative. Second, examining the concept of a US profession of arms will illustrate how models of professions have affected military service members’ self-identities to the point of effectively restricting behavior. Third, examining the concept of a US profession of arms will present a possible motive that may have influenced Army leaders to adopt the Army Profession Campaign: to provide ammunition in a jurisdictional struggle with the Army’s client. It is necessary to examine the idea that Army leaders employ concepts of military professionalism.
to gain psychological advantage over their civilian leaders, but jurisdictional struggle is not central to the larger argument about the Army Profession Campaign. However, jurisdictional struggle must be dismissed if the inference is to be made that the Army Profession Campaign is primarily an internal information campaign designed to reinforce discipline within the force. This section presents three competing models of the profession of arms to show how Americans have understood the concept of a profession of arms.

Many historians wrote about an American Profession of Arms. While many of the models contradict each other in one way or another, they nearly all agree that the profession of arms is exclusive. Historian Russell Weigley said the United States Army began to professionalize its regular commissioned officers as early as 1817. In describing those professionalization efforts, Weigley focused entirely on the regular officer corps.30 Weigley’s model described the US Army as a non-professional occupation, the Army writ-large, containing a profession consisting of regular officers. Weigley’s model of a profession of arms mirrored many models of non-military professions such as the legal profession. According to those models, the clerk filing papers or helping research cases was not viewed as a co-equal member of the legal profession. These models held that the trained practitioners, doctors and lawyers, were full members of the profession while their supporting staffs were not. Many people writing on the topic took the notion of exclusivity to extremes debating which military specialties should be included or excluded. It is not surprising that discussions about a profession of arms have so often devolved into arguments over who should and who should not be included. The very phrase, profession of arms, carried exclusive implications. That is why Army leaders replaced it with the phrase, Army Profession. The Army Profession Campaign’s authors explicitly state this in The Army Civilian Corps – A Vital Component of the Army Profession. On page 5, the text reads:

Very shortly into the campaign, however, it became apparent that the necessity to include Army civilians in the conceptualization of the Army as a military profession precluded the “of Arms” description for all the Army. With the current force structure Soldiers simply cannot perform their lethal craft effectively without the support of a highly professional Civilian Corps.31

In other words, a traditional understanding of a profession of arms could not achieve the purpose underlying the Army Profession Campaign. Weigley’s model of a profession of arms not only excluded civilians, it excluded the majority of the US Army.

Weigley was not an outlier when it came to describing a profession of arms in terms of exclusion rather than inclusion. Of course, the conceptualization of a US profession of arms has changed over time. Over the years, a few theorists came to dominate the fields of sociology and political science in studying the US military. By surveying those theories, it is possible to gain an understanding of how the concept of a US profession of arms evolved. It also illustrates how ahistorical the Army Profession is. Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Charles Moskos are the three theorists who best represent how Americans have traditionally applied the concept of professions to the US Army.

In The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington, a political scientist, presented a prescriptive rather than descriptive model of the profession of arms. His model was at its core extremely exclusive. He did so to support his arguments about United States civil-military relations. Huntington argued civilian policy-makers should defer to military leaders on purely military decisions. Huntington presented the military officer as “a professional man” worthy of the same “deference [from the public] which it gives to the civilian professionals.” In this regard, Huntington’s model of a profession of arms was similar to Abbott’s theory of professions. According to each of them, once the client engaged the professional, it was in his or her best interest to allow the professional to make any further decisions as long as those decisions remained within the expertise of the professional. Huntington’s profession of arms was highly

exclusive. At the time Huntington proposed his model, no one had yet taken any steps to professionalize the noncommissioned officer corps. Therefore, one could dismiss his exclusion of enlisted personnel. However, Huntington found reasons to exclude the majority of commissioned officers as well. Huntington centered his model on expertise and specifically defined that expertise as “the management of violence.” Huntington seized on the management of violence as a way to describe the specific act that embodied the “service” the profession of arms provided society. Huntington specifically disqualified “the auxiliary specialists contained within or serving the military profession.”

It is not surprising that a concept calling for deference to professional judgment remains highly popular among military service members. It underpins much of the writing on the profession of arms. However, it is unlikely that this notion more than tangentially motivated the authors of the Army Profession Campaign. The main reason this is highly unlikely is that the Secretary of the Army, a politically appointed civilian official, was involved in the campaign’s development from the outset. Additionally, Army Profession Campaign literature emphasizes military subordination to elected civilian leaders. The Army Profession has an entire section dedicated to civil-military relations and lists subordination as one of the foundations of those relations. In publishing ADP 1, Change 1, Army leaders made very specific changes to the text. They added section 2-26 and 2-27. Specifically addressing the issue of subordination, the text reads:

Civilian control of the military is embedded in our Constitution and serves as the cornerstone of our military. Military professionals understand this and appreciate the critical role this concept has played throughout our history. Equally important, this concept requires that military professionals understand the role of our civilian leaders and their responsibilities to the civilian leadership.


With those words, current Army doctrine shaped by the Army Profession Campaign, echoes Huntington’s call for an apolitical profession of arms. Huntington insisted that members of the profession of arms remain politically neutral. Many Army officers have so internalized Huntington’s model of military professionals that they even abstain from exercising their Constitutional right to vote. Surely, this is an example wherein a conceptualization of professions influenced an individual’s self-identity to the point of restricting what would otherwise be expected behavior.

Fundamentally, Morris Janowitz agreed with Huntington’s assertion that a profession of arms included only military commissioned officers. Unlike Huntington, Janowitz, a sociologist, was less interested in delineating who was and who was not a member of the profession. He was more interested in how the profession was changing. Also unlike Huntington, Janowitz did not describe the profession as apolitical. According to Janowitz, military professionals reluctantly became involved in political decision-making when realities forced them to accept a “broader definition of their role than their self-conceptions, traditions, and logic would have suggested.” Janowitz described a “narrowing skill differential between military and civilian elites” which blurred the boundary of the profession’s expertise. Janowitz presented a commander-centric model of the profession of arms in which the commander’s role was shifting to a more technical and managerial one. According to Janowitz, military commanders retained a “heroic leader” role mainly as the foundation for the profession’s self-identity and its public image. This understanding of Janowitz’s model of a profession of arms supports the argument that an appeal to self-identity is central to the Army Profession Campaign. Janowitz’s model also supports the assertion that the Army Profession concept is ahistorically inclusive.

Charles Moskos, who studied under Janowitz, developed a conceptualization of the profession of arms radically different from that of either the Huntington or Janowitz models. Moskos rejected Huntington and Janowitz’s models of the profession of arms in favor of a model of the military “as a social organization” undergoing changes. Although Moskos offhandedly dismissed models of the profession of arms that excluded enlisted personnel, he suggested the entire military was moving away from a professional model. Moskos argued that the US Army failed to meet two criteria: recompense linked to the “individual expertise” and the practitioner’s expectation that he or she would remain in the profession for the duration of his or her working life. According to Moskos, the Army lost its service ethic when conscription ended. He argued that the Army had begun attracting volunteers with “monetary inducements.” Moskos predicted the Army would continue to shift away from a professional model and possibly even unionize.35

Of the three highlighted theories, Moskos’s presents the most divergence from the Army Profession model; however, it tacitly supports the Army Profession’s inclusivity. Assuming there is an Army Profession, Moskos’s theory would not exclude any subordinate group within the profession. Unlike those of Huntington or Janowitz, Moskos’s theory rejects the Army Profession at its base. Given the myriad changes the Army has undergone since Moskos wrote, it is unlikely he would agree it is now a profession. If anything, Moskos would likely be surprised it has not unionized.

The theories of Huntington, Janowitz, and Moskos reveal considerable disagreement on how to define a profession of arms. However, taken together, their theories provide several points applicable to an examination of the Army Profession Campaign. First, and foremost, models of the profession of arms have been exclusive. Scholars and practitioners have gone to considerable lengths debating who should or should not be included. Although Army leaders partially

sidestepped this concern by dividing the all-inclusive Army Profession into two subsets, it is unlikely that contrivance will satisfy profession of arms traditionalists. Second, Huntington’s admonishment for military professionals to remain apolitical provides an example of professional narrative affecting individuals’ self-identity to the point of modifying behavior. Third, although military service members maybe attracted to the idea of client-professional deferment, they remain staunchly dedicated to Constitutional subordination of the military to civilian leadership. The Secretary of the Army’s involvement in developing the Army Profession Campaign negates concerns the campaign’s authors intended to influence political leaders through Army Profession messaging.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND NARRATIVE THEORIES

Having established sufficient reason to question Army leaders’ motives for adopting the Army Profession concept; and, having established that traditional scholarship on the subject of professions and the profession of arms offers no satisfactory answers, it becomes necessary to examine other disciplines. In this case, the fields of choice are organizational theory and anthropology. Anthropology offers a theory of narrative as a means by which groups establish collective identities.36 Organizational theorists apply narrative theory to organizations to describe how organizations develop organizational identities and to what degree those identities help regulate individual behavior.37 This section presents these theories to illustrate how they might provide an explanation of why Army leaders adopted the Army Profession model and why they continue to allocate resources to inculcate Army personnel in their ideas about the Army Profession.38

36 Ochs and Capps, "Narrating the Self," 22.
According to Ochs and Capps, narrative is the way people cognitively process sensory inputs into experience. Narrative explains why experiences are subjective. Ochs and Capps reject the notion that people can directly experience and share an understanding of disembodied objectivity. Instead, people create their own independent realities. Ochs and Capps call these realities personal narratives. According to this narrative theory, an individual’s subjective reality influences how the individual perceives everything including his or herself. Ochs and Capps argue that these subjective realities can directly shape individuals’ “feelings, beliefs, and actions.”

Army leaders embraced narrative theory. They embodied it in the planning process as part of Army Design Methodology. The text on page 2-5 of The Operations Process, reads:

In a broad sense, a narrative is a story constructed to give meaning to things and events. Individuals, groups, organizations, and countries all have narratives with many components that reflect and reveal how they define themselves. . . . They incorporate symbols, historical events, and artifacts tied together with a logic that explains their reason for being.

It is possible Army leaders or at least the authors of the Army Profession Campaign believed narrative theory could somehow allow them to shape the organizational identity of the Army and the individual self-identities of Army service members. In describing narrative theory, Ochs and Capps examine exactly the issues General Petraeus asked the Army to research which led to the EXCEL Study.

If the EXCEL Study helped motivate the Secretary of the Army to order a review of the Army’s profession, the Army Profession stemmed from a set of questions to which narrative theory appears to offer a tantalizing answer. Being anthropologists, Ochs and Capps made no recommendations in how exactly someone could apply narrative theory to a specific group of people. Some organizational theorists, on the other hand, appear to do exactly that.

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41 U.S. Army, EXCEL Study Report, 1.
In 1999, Valerie Fournier described a business practice in which the leaders of an organization use the concept of profession as a “disciplinary mechanism.” According to Fournier, the leaders of an organization could achieve collective behavior modification through appeals to individuals’ self-identity. Those appeals took the form of describing the collective group as a profession and describing acceptable behavior for professionals. According to Fournier’s theory, once an individual self-identified as a professional, he or she felt compelled to behave within professional norms. By establishing those norms, the leaders of the organization essentially established individual behavioral limits. In this way, organizational leaders could affect control through individual self-discipline. Fournier’s theory might appeal to Army leaders concerned with discipline. Of particular note, Fournier examined how business leaders applied this form of control in cases where employees were unlikely to self-identify as professionals. In such cases, within the workplace, leaders used the rhetoric of professionalization to describe employees as professionals and their labor as the exercise of some expertise. She argued this did not undermine its meaning. Fournier saw that a business’ employees could be motivated to behave in certain ways depending on the degree to which they internalized the profession label. In this way, Fournier’s theory explained why businesses within traditionally non-professional occupations would expend considerable time and resources describing themselves as professions. Fournier’s theory also explained why business leaders did not specify a subset of employees and instead labeled all their employees members of a profession. Assuming Army leaders were aware of Fournier’s theory or similar ones, Army leaders may have included DA civilians as one of the profession’s co-equal cohorts to ensure DA civilians also internalized the professional label.42

In 2010, James Pierce examined professionalization in terms of organizational culture. According to Pierce, organizational culture includes “values, beliefs, assumptions, perceptions,

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Pierce argued that organizational culture regulates individuals’ behavior within an organization. Although falling short of Fournier’s suggestion that organizational leaders could actively influence the variables of organizational culture, Pierce argued anyone knowledgeable about an organization’s culture could predict future behavior by carefully analyzing the variables of organization culture. According to Pierce, the functionalist perspective of organizational theory suggested organizational leaders could manipulate the variable elements of organizational culture and affect change in behavior within their organization. Pierce’s argument supports the idea organizational culture could be used to control behavior and the MNF-I Commander’s original concern about the “determinants of Soldiers’ ethical beliefs, attitudes and behaviors”.44

This section presented the concepts of narrative, self-identity, and organizational culture. As has been discussed, narrative is a means by which people self-identify as members of groups. According to Ochs and Capps, the narrative process shapes feelings, beliefs, and actions. Pierce suggested such control was theoretically possible according to proponents of the functionalist perspective of organizational theory. Fournier described how business leaders have adopted the rhetoric of professionalism for the specific purpose of modifying employee behavior. Furthermore, Fournier argued that applying the label, professional, to non-professional occupations did not appear to undermine observed positive outcomes. This section suggested Army leaders might have adopted the Army Profession Campaign as a way to operationalize narrative theory to improve or maintain discipline by appealing to individuals’ self-identities. Fournier’s observations support Army leaders in their inclusion of DA civilians and all uniformed service members, to include reservists, in the Army Profession construct.

44Ibid.
THE ARMY PROFESSION CAMPAIGN LITERATURE

It is possible at this point to argue that Army leaders intended to use the campaign to socialize the idea of a profession so that individuals would behave within limits of professional norms. The Army argument consists of four elements. The first point is that Army leaders perceived a wide-scale current or pending problem in discipline. The second point is that Army leaders intended to target individual behavior through narrative appeals to self-identity in a manner similar to Fournier’s model of professionalism. The third point is that Army leaders knew that including DA civilians and other “cohorts” would create controversy and generate resistance to the campaign. Army leaders decided to make the Army Profession construct universally inclusive to broaden the reach of its message to the widest audience possible and thusly maximize potential benefits of the campaign. The fourth point is that, in keeping with narrative theory, large portions of the Army Profession Campaign literature serve primarily to sell the narrative. The best example of this is the White Paper, “The Army Civilian Corps – A Vital Component of the Army Profession.”

The Army, the Army’s capstone doctrinal publication, follows Fournier’s model almost exactly. ADP 1 opens with “The Soldiers Creed and Warrior Ethos” followed by “The Army Civilian Creed” and includes “The Army Values” as a diagram in the second chapter, which outlines the Army Profession. Although discipline is the topic of only one short section of the chapter, the first recommended reading is Army 2020: Generating Health and Discipline in the Force Ahead of the Strategic Reset, also known as, “The Red Book”; and the word, discipline, appears fifteen times in ADP 1. From this, it can be inferred that ADP 1’s authors were concerned with maintaining or improving discipline within the Army. The manual comingles the Army

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Profession concepts with value and belief artifacts as support for the conclusion that Army leaders adopted a Fournier-style approach to the Army Profession Campaign.\(^{46}\)

*The Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2013*, also supports this conclusion. In the section outlining the Army Campaign Plan’s second objective, the Army Profession appears twice. First, the text reads, “leadership development must inculcate the ideals of the Army Profession.”\(^{47}\) Lower, on the same page, the text reads:

Continued focus on the Army Profession, a self-policing organization, skilled in the practice of arms, is essential to inculcating the gains of the last 11 years while simultaneously eliminating the deleterious effects of prolonged combat.”

This passage suggests Army leaders want to use the Army Profession Campaign to improve or reinforce discipline throughout the force.

The idea that exposure to persistent combat has had, is having, or will have a negative effect on discipline throughout the force carries across all the Army Profession Campaign literature. Other Army documents suggest Army leaders remain greatly concerned with this issue.

In “The Red Book,” Army leaders described the problem:

Stress was increasingly placing Soldiers at risk, Soldiers who were suffering from physical and behavioral health issues and in need of more vigilant leader oversight, risk mitigation and medical healthcare . . . it also discovered a growing high-risk population of Soldiers engaging in criminal and high-risk behavior with increasingly more severe outcomes including violent crime, suicide attempts and suicide, and accidental death.\(^{48}\)

Although the above quotation and the remainder of the report clearly suggest Army leaders have been considering all available options to improve discipline, they do not directly support the conclusion that the Army Profession Campaign is itself one such effort.


CAPE Senior Fellow, and intellectual-chief-architect of the Army Profession Campaign, Don Snider, addressed the issue during an Army Profession Campaign forum at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, titled “The Army Profession – Standards and Discipline”. Dr. Snider served 30 years in the Army before starting an academic career in which he specialized in military professionalism. In his opening remarks, Dr. Don Snider explained the issue of professionalization as being one of role identity. He explained the motives behind the Army Profession Campaign by outlining all the issues that appeared in *The Army Profession*. He said initial surveys indicated two critical problems within the Army: 1) people not upholding the Army Values, and 2) a lack of trust. According to Dr. Snider, the Army Profession Campaign would address both of those issues through a process of professionalizing the force. Dr. Snider said the Army has gone through drawdowns before alluding to post-Vietnam reductions in the size of the Army. Dr. Snider told the audience that Army leaders started the Army Profession Campaign because they had, in regards to discipline, determined that, after 10 years at war, the Army was struggling to maintain current standards. During the same forum, Dr. Snider addressed why the Army Profession Campaign included an appeal to the individual’s self-identity:

> What caused you to think and accept an identity and therefore a motivation that you were uniquely a professional? This is an issue of role identity. Identity is where we start. The institutional identity of the Army is a profession and the individual identity that you are a professional.49

He indicated that individuals who assumed a professional self-identity would likely internalize the behavioral norms outlined in emerging Army Doctrine 2015. In Doctrine 2015, Army leaders communicated those norms partially by including creeds and mottos. This was exactly in keeping with Fournier’s model.

Dr. Snider was aware of Fournier’s model of professionalization because he edited *The Future of the Army Professions*, an anthology of essays in which, many of the authors refer to

49Don Snider, “Opening Remarks” [seminar, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. December 5, 2012].
Fournier’s model. The book contains numerous examples of authors describing or recommending models of professionalization similar to the one Fournier outlined. Gayle Watkins and Randi Cohen provided the best example:

> Internalized values . . . and member commitment provide the most powerful means of achieving . . . control over those engaged [in combat]. These control systems, known to organizational theorists as “clan control,” are most often developed in small, horizontal organizations and professions.50

Since McGraw Hill published that anthology in 2005, it is possible to infer Dr. Snider knew about clan control at least as early as 2005.

Army leaders included the Army Profession Campaign’s appeals to self-identity most notably in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Leadership*. The section on character, presents the Army Values, the Soldier’s Creed, and the Army Civilian Corps Creed. On page 3-5, the text reads, “effective leadership begins with developing and maintaining a leader identity. Identity refers to one’s self-concept.”51 ADP 6-22 provides the most cut-and-dry examples of Army leaders employing Fourier’s model of professionalization.

An attempt to appeal to individual’s self-identity can be seen throughout the Army Profession literature as far back as the EXCEL Study. The authors of the EXCEL Study recommended that Army commanders:

> continue to reinforce the Army Values in all Soldiers and leaders [because] higher internalization of Army Values was related to lower transgressions, and higher moral courage, moral confidence and intentions to confront others for misconduct.52

All the Army Profession Campaign White Papers include myriad comingling of the argument that the Army is a profession and the normative artifacts of that profession. The authors of those papers couched their descriptions and arguments in support of the Army Profession with language


that appeals to their readers’ pride if not vanity. At the same time, the authors appear to have included every creed, code, oath, and set of rules available. The final section of The Army Profession: 2012, After More Than a Decade of Conflict, provided the most eloquent example of this rhetorical artistry. At one point during its evolution, the Army White Paper supporting the Army Profession Campaign included the Army Values, The Soldier Rules, the NCO Creed, the Officer and Warrant Officer Oath of Office, The Soldier’s Creed and Warrior Ethos, The Army Oath of Enlistment, the Department of the Army Civilian Corps Creed, and “Standards of Exemplary Conduct” from Title 10 United States Code Section 3583. In 2012, when speaking about the Army Profession Campaign, Dr. Snider acknowledged such artifacts were means that the Army used to maximize audience internalization of assigned values. The fact that the Army Campaign literature and the doctrine that followed contains normative artifacts wherever the profession is mentioned supports the argument that the Army Profession Campaign’s authors were knowingly trying to follow a theory of professionalization similar to the one Fournier described. Fournier described corporate leaders appealing to employees’ professionalism while simultaneously offering lists of competencies and codes of conduct. Army leaders have done exactly the same thing in the Army Profession Campaign.

No other feature of the Army Profession Campaign was more controversial or caused more rancorous debate than its near universality. Before Army leaders cemented the Army Profession in Army doctrine, they socialized the concept by publishing a series of Army White Papers, and conducted numerous surveys in what began as an educational campaign. Although everyone involved in the campaign who has discussed it on the record insists the Army Profession emerged from the previous profession of arms due to simple logical necessity, that


54Don Snider, “Opening Remarks.”
explanation discounts all previous scholarship on professions and the profession of arms. In fact, surveying works by the same scholars who authored the Army Profession literature demonstrates they did not previously concluded that the US Army was in itself a profession. Nor had they previously argued that all members of any military were professionals or equal or even near-equal standing. Given those facts, it is difficult to see how the Army White Paper, *The Profession of Arms*, gave rise to the Army White Paper, *The Army Profession*. Army leaders themselves all but acknowledged the logical discontinuity between the two by producing the extremely belabored Army White Paper, *The Army Civilian Corps - A Vital Component of the Army Profession*. Civilians were never previously included in any definitions, scholarly or otherwise, of a profession of arms. When Army leaders decided to include civilians and all service members, they invented the Army Profession. It is difficult to accept arguments that the Army Profession arose logically through earnest dialogue.

In 1999, Dr. Snider co-authored a monograph with John Nagl and Tony Pfaff. In that monograph, the authors gave only the most cursory nod to acknowledge the idea that non-commissioned officers and Army civilians were professionals. In nearly the same breath, they explained their model of the profession of arms based on sacrifice and obligation:

> The trucker, while he may have certain contractual obligations, cannot be morally obligated to put his and others' lives at risk to fulfill them. He will simply have to live with the penalty, and the customer will simply have to live without the goods. For this reason, especially given the kinds of sacrifices that the officer is required to make, it is important that the obligation run much deeper than a mere “contract.”

This example illustrates a cognitive discontinuity between the Army Profession literature and Dr. Snider’s earlier works. This suggests that Dr. Snider and his fellow Army Profession authors

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might have developed their revised, inclusive model of the Army Profession for more reason than simple logic would offer.

Perhaps the change was inevitable since members of each of the Army’s five cohorts, Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers, Noncommissioned Officers, Soldiers, and DA Civilians, conducted TRADOC’s review of the profession. It certainly seems unlikely such a panel or panels would fail to include themselves and their peers in the Army’s profession of arms given the previously established fact that the rhetoric involved appeals to individual pride. Of course, it is more likely Army leaders simply directed the campaign’s authors to include everyone in the profession. No model of professions existed with which the entire Army could be described as a single, all-inclusive profession, the campaign’s authors. For this reason, when it emerged, the Army Profession concept included two subordinate professions: the Army Profession of Arms and the Army Civilian Corps. The authors of the Army Profession Campaign described the professions within a profession construct:

The Army Profession has two complementary and mutually supporting components—the Army Profession of Arms and the Army Civilian Corps. The Army Profession of Arms is composed of uniformed members of the Profession, those skilled in the art of warfare and under unlimited liability in its “killing and dying” aspects. The Army Civilian Corps is composed of all non-uniformed members of the Profession working for the Department of the Army.56

The authors of the campaign had not mentioned Army civilians at all in their previous White Papers. Doing so apparently sparked enough debate to necessitate writing another White Paper dedicated entirely to explaining how Army civilians can be seen as a unique profession and how that profession nests with the Army’s profession of arms.57 By the time it became doctrine, the Army Profession had divided into four fields of professional knowledge that together formed the Army Profession: a “profession of professions, some uniquely military and others with close

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57U.S. Army, *The Army Civilian Corps*. 

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civilian counterparts." It is reasonable to infer from the fact that the model was changed before becoming doctrine that some people found the concept of an Army profession of arms and co-equal professional civilian corps unconvincing.

To allow the construct to include everyone in the Army, the authors of the Army Profession had to redefine the Army’s expert work or the service it provides the American people. Including all uniformed service members required a broader interpretation of expert work than Huntington offered. Including Army civilians in the construct led the campaign’s authors to the limits of sophistry. Until Army leaders ended the debate by incorporating the concept into Doctrine 2015, they produced many versions of the White Papers. Each subsequent White Paper included a more complicated description of the Army Profession’s expert work. One of the least satisfying was “the ethical design, generation, support, and application of land combat power.”

Army leaders may have decided to include Army civilians in the model of the profession to explain how the profession generates, refines, and controls its own special body of knowledge:

The Army creates its own expert knowledge, both theoretical and practical, for the defense of the Nation through land combat power. This land power is normally applied in Joint Operations through the full spectrum of conflict and the subsequent establishment of a better peace. Such knowledge is unique and is not generally held outside the Army Profession.

Not including DA civilians in the model would mean the Army applied expert knowledge that it, as a profession, created with the help of non-members. Of course, such reasoning ignores the fact that the Army’s own description of its professional expertise or special body of knowledge involves joint operations. Therefore, members of the profession must rely on members of other services to help develop that knowledge. If that is the case, the Army Profession concept remains susceptible to questions regarding the development of its special body of knowledge whether or

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not DA civilians are included. Since the inclusion of DA civilians did not fully resolve the issue of who creates the Army’s expert knowledge, the question remains as to why Army leaders included civilians. The supposition that the Army Profession concept was actually narrative packaging to support a model of professionalization similar to the one Fournier described is one possible explanation. The same supposition could answer the final issue the Army Campaign literature raises. At what point does someone become a professional within the Army Profession?

According to the Army Profession literature, members of the Army become professionals immediately upon entering service. According to the model, Army service members become aspiring professionals when they swear or affirm their service oaths. Then, after a period of education and training, the Army certifies members as practicing professionals subject to periodic recertification. Then, upon leaving the service, prior-service members become non-practicing professionals or non-practicing retired professionals.61 The assertion that everyone in the Army became a professional when he or she swore or affirmed an oath of service has been hotly debated.62 Traditional views of the profession of arms and theories of professions do not lend themselves to supporting the concept of a profession into which someone could enter by simply swearing an oath. A few scholars have argued in favor a profession of arms model which includes all uniformed personnel. Usually those arguments lean heavily towards philosophy relying on the concepts of unlimited liability or social responsibility.63 However, such arguments do not readily support including DA civilians. Army doctrine writers reached a compromise regarding when service members and DA civilians become members of the profession. They did so by implying someone can be a member of a profession without being a professional. By

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retaining the Army Profession Campaign’s *aspiring professional* but replacing *practicing professional* with *professional*, the writers of ADP 1, confused the issue by implying aspiring professionals are somehow both professionals and non-professionals.\(^6^4\) There are many reasons Army doctrine might contain obvious self-contradictions. Conscious use of narrative through rhetorical devices of Fournier-type professionalization is one such possibility.

Army doctrine and the Army Profession Campaign literature readily support the supposition that their authors were applying a model of professionalization similar to the one Fournier described. Army leaders remain concerned that deployments in support of ongoing hostilities have stressed Army personnel. They are further concerned that some level of indiscipline has been one of the results of that stress.\(^6^5\) The chief architect of the Army Profession Campaign, Dr. Snider, prior to the creation of the Army Profession construct, appears to have employed a more traditional model of the profession of arms. That model specifically included commissioned officers and may have included other uniformed service members. It did not include DA civilians.\(^6^6\) Dr. Snider acknowledged artifacts such as creeds and lists of values are artifacts the Army uses to help service members internalize behavioral norms.\(^6^7\) The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013 directs Army leaders to communicate the narrative of professionalization and specifies reasons for doing so that parallel those outlined in Fournier’s model of professionalization.\(^6^8\) As of early 2013, Army doctrine describing the Army Profession contains several self-contradictions that can most easily be explained if the Army Profession construct is understood as a rhetorical device rather than a literal description of the Army.

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\(^6^7\)Snider, “Opening Remarks.”

CONCLUSION

In Army Doctrine 2015, Army leaders adopted a description of the Army as a profession. According to the Army’s model, the Army Profession includes uniformed service members of all ranks as well as all DA civilians. Individual members of the profession become members as soon as they swear or affirm their service oath. The broad inclusivity of the model is at odds with earlier descriptions of professions in general and traditional understanding of the profession of arms. The model also breaks with traditional concepts of a profession of arms by including DA civilians. There are many possible explanations as to why Army leaders chose to adopt such a model and why they have allocated resources to socializing the concept of an Army Profession within the force. Evidence suggests Army leaders did so in an attempt to follow a model of professionalization in which a business’s leaders use the rhetoric of professionalization to convince employees to behave in a manner specified by the business leaders. Fournier, and occupational theorist, described such a model.

In developing the Army Profession concept, authors of the Army Profession Campaign borrowed some elements from earlier sociology of professions. They appear to have been most heavily influenced by Abbott’s notion that expert work is the application of abstract knowledge on behalf of a client. Unlike Abbott, the authors of the Army Profession Campaign followed earlier sociological models of professions by establishing lists of criteria by which occupations can be judged as being professions or non-professions. Army literature supporting the Army Profession construct implies there is a commonly understood definition of professions. A survey of sociology suggests otherwise. However, there is no historical precedent among sociologists for including all ancillary members of an occupation as professionals given one recognizes the occupation as a profession.

The Army Profession model is incongruent with traditional models of a US profession of arms. Sociologists and political scientists have written extensively describing models of an American profession of arms. Although Huntington, Janowitz, and Moskos disagreed in many
respects in how best to describe a profession of arms, Huntington and Janowitz agreed on several points. Most notably, their models of the profession of arms were exclusive. Although Moskos described more inclusive model, his model of a profession of arms discounted anyone enticed by monetary inducements. For that reason, he predicted the shift to an all-volunteer force would lead to a deprofessionalization of the Army. In these ways and other particulars, the Army Profession model does not cognitively nest with any of the profession of arms models examined. However, the Army Profession literature retained the message of military subordination to civilian political leaders found in Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State*.

Second, Huntington’s admonishment for military professionals to remain apolitical provides an example of professional narrative affecting individuals’ self-identity to the point of modifying behavior. Third, although military service members maybe attracted to the idea of client-professional deferment, they remain staunchly dedicated to Constitutional subordination of the military to civilian leadership. The Secretary of the Army’s involvement in developing the Army Profession Campaign negates concerns the campaign’s authors intended to influence political leaders through Army Profession messaging.

A brief examination of narrative and organizational theory suggested Army leaders might have adopted the Army Profession Campaign as a way to operationalize narrative theory to improve or maintain discipline by appealing to individuals’ self-identities. Ochs and Capps provided a theory of how individuals’ self-identities may be formed not only through direct experience but also through interpretation of those experiences as well as discourse about those experiences. Army leaders have included narrative theory explicitly in doctrine. That evidence supports inferring Army leaders were aware of narrative theory at the time they undertook the Army Profession Campaign. Pierce suggested it was theoretically possible to strongly influence individual behavior by altering elements of organizational culture. Fournier observed business leaders actively employing such methods through the rhetoric of professionalization Fournier reported positive outcomes. Furthermore, Fournier reported the occupation of the individuals
involved had little or no bearing on the outcome regarding behavior. Although there is no evidence Army leaders read Fournier, there is evidence that the chief architect of the Army Profession Campaign, Dr. Snider, was aware of Fournier’s work.

Examining Army doctrine and the Army Profession Campaign literature supports the supposition that their authors were applying a model of professionalization similar to the one Fournier described. The literature showed Army leaders were highly that increased operational deployments between 2001 and 2012 had negatively affected discipline throughout the Army. Evidence suggests but does not prove that Army leaders included uniformed service members and DA civilian in the Army Profession construct to maximize potential benefits of the construct as a rhetorical device. *The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013* directs Army leaders to communicate the narrative of professionalization and specifies reasons for doing so that parallel those outlined in Fournier’s model of professionalization.69

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