INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN ARMY CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: CHANGING INSTITUTIONAL MENTAL MODELS

A Monograph

by

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**Title:** Interdependence Between Army Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces: Changing Institutional Mental Models

**Authors:** Maj Russell J. Ames

**Abstract:**
Interdependence between conventional and special operations forces is an important topic in future operating environments of constrained resources, adaptive adversaries, and increased demand for Army forces from geographic combatant commands. Through interdependent doctrine, education, and joint activities, Army forces prevent repeating the steep organizational learning curve and poor unity of effort in the early phases of future campaigns. The monograph concludes that interdependence in its current construct suffers from uninformed mental models. Specifically, these mental models consider task-based interdependence, focusing on employment of special operations in the direct approach, versus combined symbiotic interdependence in long-term campaigns. The Army institutional generating force manages the doctrinal and educational processes for improving organizational learning. However, the responsibility falls to special operations organizations to inform doctrine and education with special operations theory, and joint opportunities geared toward an indirect approach to special warfare.

**Subject Terms:**
Special Forces, Special Warfare, Interdependence, Organizational Learning, Doctrine, Professional Military Education

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The monograph explores opportunities to reduce institutional impediments in U.S. Army doctrine and education, and their effect on understanding interdependent capabilities between Army conventional forces and special operations forces.

Interdependence between conventional and special operations forces is an important topic in future operating environments of constrained resources, adaptive adversaries, and increased demand for Army forces from geographic combatant commands. Through interdependent doctrine, education, and joint activities, Army forces prevent repeating steep organizational learning curve and poor unity of effort in the early phases of future campaigns.

The monograph concludes that interdependence in its current construct suffers from uninformed mental models. Specifically, these mental models consider task-based interdependence, focusing on employment of special operations in the direct approach, versus combined symbiotic interdependence in long term campaigns. The Army institutional generating force manages the doctrinal and educational processes for improving organizational learning. However, the responsibility falls to special operations organizations to inform doctrine and education with special operations theory, and joint opportunities geared toward an indirect approach to special warfare.
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Despite the contributions of so many people, any mistakes in logic, understanding, or research are my responsibility, and should not reflect upon the contributions of these valuable professional educators.
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<tr>
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<td>U.S. Army Doctrinal Publication</td>
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<td>ADRP</td>
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<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
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<td>AOC</td>
<td>Army Operating Concept</td>
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<td>ARCIC</td>
<td>Army Capabilities Integration Center</td>
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<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Force Generation</td>
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<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service Component Command</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<td>CF</td>
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<td>CGSC</td>
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<td>CJSOTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COL</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>CSAR</td>
<td>Combat Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Direct Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>F3EA</td>
<td>Find, fix, finish, exploit and analyze (targeting methodology)</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign internal defense</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<td>ILE</td>
<td>Intermediate Level Education</td>
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<td>IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
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<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training</td>
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<td>JCIDS</td>
<td>Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System</td>
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<td>JCO</td>
<td>Joint Commission Observer</td>
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<td>JCOA</td>
<td>Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
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<td>GPF</td>
<td>General Purpose Forces</td>
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<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army)</td>
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<td>MND-N</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Teams</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Army Special Forces Operational Detachment - Alpha</td>
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<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<td>Regionally Aligned Forces</td>
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<td>SAMS</td>
<td>School of Advanced Military Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCCE</td>
<td>Special Operations Command and Control Element</td>
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<td>SOCCENT</td>
<td>Special Operations Command - Central</td>
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<td>SOCoE</td>
<td>Army Special Operations Center of Excellence</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SWCS</td>
<td>Special Warfare Center and School</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>Theater Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The thesis for this monograph posits that institutional impediments in doctrine and education prevent the Army from developing interdependent capabilities between Army Conventional Forces (CF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF). This particularly hinders fostering mutual reliance when building partner nation capacity through security cooperation. Because interdependence affects collaborative planning, training, and joint activities between U.S. Army CF and SOF, a lack of interdependence dilutes outcomes of theatre security campaign plans. If the forcing functions of doctrine and education, present in the Army’s generating force which influence Army CF and SOF leaders, fail to achieve collaborative organizational learning, then the risk to successful theatre security cooperation increases due to a waning shared understanding between CF and SOF. ¹

The monograph hypothesis is that the Army, through its campaign of learning, can achieve CF/SOF interdependence by breaking down organizational mental models via the institutional generating force. Therefore, this monograph will show how the current mental models are not conducive to symbiotic interdependence, and explain what changes to concepts of interdependence, revised doctrinal approaches, and enhanced educational initiatives are needed. Interdependence background, advantages of interdependence, and paper structure will complete this introduction.

Background

CF/SOF interdependence is most relevant to security cooperation. Given national

strategic directives, this appears to be the most common venue in which CF and SOF will interact in the post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan future operational environment. Every geographic combatant command, or GCC, designs theatre security campaign plans, setting the stage for consistent CF/SOF collaboration. To maximize efficiencies in future campaigns and break down mental models and barriers, both CF and SOF proponents have certain responsibilities to contribute to doctrinal and educational solutions.

This monograph utilizes contemporary research surrounding organizational dissonance in the perceived solutions and outcomes of institutionalizing CF/SOF interdependence within the United States Army. Combat and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq from 2003-2010, and Afghanistan from 2001 until present, represent the longest duration of combined CF and SOF operations since the Vietnam War.² Prior to this, large scale U.S. military interventions involving CF and SOF occurred in the Balkans, and Operation Desert Storm. The three campaign eras illustrate a progression from interoperable forces, to integration of capabilities. However, during these times, the most typical adaptations were for SOF integration with CF processes and culture.

During recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, integration involved significant coordination and liaison activities with battlespace owners – an obsolete doctrinal term as of 2008.³ CF leaders at division-level headquarters and below remained concerned regarding command and control relationships that denied them tactical control of SOF in their areas of operation. SOF leaders lacked trust and confidence in CF ability to command, control, or support SOF operations. Yet both entities learned collaboratively, largely through personal relationships, to integrate capabilities and effects.


Significance and Advantages

This monograph will not re-examine discussion on command and control arrangements during overseas contingency operations. Interdependence should cover more concepts than simply management structure. Significant relationship building and hasty organizational learning in Iraq and Afghanistan addressed inter-organizational conflict. But more significant issues emerged, such as personnel, proponency, and doctrine.\(^4\) Near simultaneously, SOF began its own renaissance and self-discovery in special operations theory and education. This same collaborative organizational learning, infused into Army doctrine and education, is the key to achieving total force interdependence.

Adapting doctrine and education improves interdependence. Increased understanding of the interdependence between CF and SOF in long-duration overseas contingency operations generated creative new constructs in concept and doctrine development, but more limited progress in professional education and training. The future operating environment, and its various stakeholders, demand interdependent outcomes within GCC areas of responsibility, requiring CF and SOF to improve symbiotic interdependence and decrease competition. Security cooperation and security force assistance lack the forcing functions of combat that occurred consistently over the past decade. Since counterinsurgency operations form the majority of mental models present in the operating force, the resurgence of conventional forces working routinely among diverse foreign cultures draws further attention to the importance of CF and SOF interdependence.

Observers and researchers, such as King’s College of London fellow David Ucko, warn that the United States military historically repeats a pattern of entering into counterinsurgency and stability operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, developing a bad taste for them, and

promptly failing to preserve any of the lessons learned from these operations. The bases of U.S. Army future capstone and operating concepts are observations and insights forged in recent stability and counterinsurgency operations. Yet, SOF integration and interdependence lessons learned not only exist in varying degrees in the curriculum of professional military education, but are also based on a direct action operating concept that does not lend itself to future operations with regionally aligned forces (RAF).

Security cooperation and military assistance activities are only one component of the many missions and tasks given to Army forces. The emerging concept of regionally aligned forces involves preparing Army divisions and brigades to support specific theatres of operation. Because of this, Army conventional and special operations forces have a greater impetus to achieve interdependence, and realize the opportunities inherent in security cooperation. As part of the Army 2020 Campaign Plan, CF/SOF interdependence has a top priority, but its application is unclear beyond the concept of mutual reliance. Collaborative exchange and organizational learning in doctrine and education is critical to successful joint activities in training and theatre security campaigns. Organizational learning on SOF theory and doctrine informs evolving doctrine, and supplements TRADOC professional military education. Army organizational learning, collated in doctrine and education via the generating force, increases mutual understanding and awareness for future operations. Improved CF/SOF interdependence enables future operations and joint ventures between conventional and special operations organizations.

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both within CONUS, and when deployed under authority of a combatant commander. Unfortunately, these processes fall victim to cognitive dissonance and incongruent mental models on the true nature of the obstacles to interdependence. Doctrine and education processes also endure significant institutional delays and obstructions with regard to training and educating future Army forces. Together, these obstacles detract from foundational trust and understanding toward institutionalizing interdependence between CF and SOF.

Army CF and SOF operate regularly within the same human domain of cultural and social environments that influence the very behaviors upon which military success depends. Therefore, mutual capabilities must expand understanding from the physical elements of the operational environment to those elements and structures that influence human thought and behavior. The historical lack of institutional focus on integrated operations with Army and Joint SOF exposed vast differences in cultures and procedures evident in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Monograph Organization

The research on this important subject will be undertaken methodically and in a rigorous fashion. The methodology expresses the overall concept and organization of the scholarly analysis. The literature review explains organizational administrative theory on interdependence. Then an examination of the development of CF/SOF interdependence takes a historical approach to trace the process development from pre-9/11 interoperability and integration, to post-9/11 concepts of interdependence during combined operations in both contingency and stability environments over the last twenty five years. The conclusion of the monograph proposes potential institutional solutions in doctrine, education, and security cooperation joint activities to determine a possible way ahead for CF and SOF interdependence.

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METHODOLOGY

To answer the primary research question regarding the relevance of CF and SOF interdependence in the future operating environment, the remainder of this monograph applies process tracing methodology to assess the development of combined CF and SOF operations, and determine the extent of interdependence, and their effect on individual mental models and organizational learning. As adopted by former RAND Corporation analyst Alexander George, process tracing involves the historical examination of problems, to identify conditions associated with either successful or failed outcomes.9 The goal of such historical explanations is to determine if a theoretical causal process is evident.10 The process tracing herein examines causation between combined operations, and CF/SOF mental models, over the historical process of evolution from interoperability, to integration, and onward toward interdependence.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor of management Peter Senge champions the U.S. Army as the preeminent institution in developing organizational learning infrastructures.11 He specifically highlights the linkage between formal education, practice, and doctrine. Within this strong foundation of the Army learning system, Senge’s disciplines of organizational learning offer possible avenues to institutional interdependence in doctrine and education.12

10Ibid., 6.
Senge emphasizes systems thinking in learning organizations. Both CF and SOF inform and shape the Army’s institutional learning systems, and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System which provides capability-based solutions to service problems. Senge also contends a learning Army will include in its professional military education concepts that matter to the institution and create an enterprise of individual learners.\textsuperscript{13} To do so, an organization must also challenge deeply ingrained generalizations, assumptions, and other mental models which shape understanding of the world. This is the area of most potential for creativity within the Army, and the most potential for embracing CF/SOF interdependence.

**Assumptions**

The monograph hypothesis, that the Army can achieve interdependence through doctrine and education, is based on four assumptions about the current conditions in the institutional generating force. First, current concepts of interdependence are based on ad-hoc lessons learned from recent combat operations and focused on reciprocal interdependence centered on resources. Those lessons learned are sub-optimal as a mental model and will likely not lead to lasting CF/SOF interdependence. Because regional alignment is still in its infancy, the Army has no other reference but past lessons learned, which influence institutional ability to embrace different mental models of CF/SOF interdependence.

Second, one must assume that integration is a prior norm on which current the Army seeks to improve. Recognizing that Army concepts, as of 2010, envision improved interdependence and doctrine introduces the relatively new concept of purposeful reliance, a valid assumption is that old concepts of integration failed to achieve interdependent relationships.

\textsuperscript{13}Senge, 8.

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\textsuperscript{7}
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Otherwise, there would be no need to revise the status quo. Senge’s learning discipline of personal, hence organizational, mastery requires dual inputs. SOF Soldiers understand CF theories and approaches. SOF Soldiers are educated in CF venues, including noncommissioned officer education courses, officer basic courses, and intermediate and senior staff colleges. Generally, SOF applies the same doctrine as CF in land operations.

Next, SOF institutions must inform the Army about SOF, but the Army must provide proper access. This requires the assumption that close working relationships and joint activities will continue between the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and Special Operations Center of Excellence (SOCoE), as well as between the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) at Fort Bragg, and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. This is currently validated through the consistent guidance from both the Army Chief of Staff, and other entities which charge SOCoE with the lead for advancing CF and SOF interdependence. This indicates the onus is clearly on the SOF community, which drives a third assumption, that U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) will continue efforts toward SOF interdependence across all branches of the U.S. military services. High operational tempo precluded consistent collaboration, broadening experiences, and quality integrated training since 9/11. A future political crisis or threat similar to the paradigm shift which occurred after 9/11 could disrupt the Army’s campaign toward interdependence.

Finally, one must assume CF and SOF regional alignment will be consistent. This influences continuing organizational focus on interdependence. The current environment includes counterinsurgency and combat operations, enabled by ingenious coordination measures, and robust financial, human, and material resources. Conditions for future CF and SOF interdependence envisioned in regional alignment where competition for scarce resources demands interdependence, regardless of successful prior integration. This requires the assumption that SOF will conduct special warfare and/or surgical strikes in the same geographic locations as
CF regionally aligned forces, even if working with different partner nation SOF or counterterrorism forces, and subordinate to different components of the GCC. This condition is required for mutual reliance toward accomplishing the same security cooperation goals, on behalf of the geographic combatant commander.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review is organized into three sections: 1. A general background on SOF and the concept of interdependence; 2. A discussion of task interdependence that was evident in CF/SOF interoperability and integration before 9/11; 3. Discussion of symbiotic interdependence as the desired condition to which CF/SOF integration progressed after 9/11.

To answer the research question on relevance of CF/SOF interdependence, the monograph research identified current contextual background, before examining organizational interdependence using both organizational and administration theory. After determining the theoretical nature and characteristics of interdependence, publications on SOF integration during Desert Storm, Bosnia, and Iraq illustrated various levels of dependence in those campaigns, and served as an organizing logic to demonstrate types of task interdependence. For background and context on interdependence between CF and SOF in past stability operations, which are likely to occur in future operational environment, a monograph by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Findlay examined problems of SOF integration within the NATO Stabilization Force Multinational Division-North (MND-N) during operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Joint studies, publications on lessons learned, and military journal articles provided the best insight to assess the lessons learned from recent contingency operations. While current doctrine identifies interdependence in several forms, it lacks coverage of the intent and concept behind interdependence, which required research into the Army and SOF-specific doctrine, operating concepts, and the strategic guidance behind them. Finally, given the doctrinal and conceptual impetus for learning as an organization and recent emergence of educational and doctrinal functions as joint activities between CF and
SOF, the monograph benefitted from literature on organizational management and professional military education.

**Terminology**

A potential for a gap in institutional knowledge exists if CF and SOF return to their respective lanes of independent operations as operations in Afghanistan culminate. Concern over this potential knowledge gap spurred collaboration between Brigadier General Wayne Grigsby, then director of the Army’s Mission Command Center of Excellence, and Major General Bennet Sacolick, of the Army Special Warfare Center and School.\(^{14}\) In their June 2012 article in *Army* magazine, these leaders advocate for reinforcing systems that institutionalize CF and SOF interdependence.\(^{15}\) While joint doctrine does not define interdependence, integration is defined in joint publication 1-02 as “the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.”\(^{16}\) Army doctrine, however, addresses interdependence in Army doctrinal reference publication (ADRP) 3-05 *Special Operations*, describing SOF as “a necessary adjunct to the capabilities of existing conventional forces.”*\(^{17}\) Special Operations follows a concept of purposeful reliance, advocating for CF and SOF to rely on capabilities in order to realize the “complimentary and reinforcing effects” inherent in both organizations.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{14}\) As of publication, BG Grigsby is currently assistant Division commander for maneuver in the 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas. MG Sakolic left Fort Bragg, and serves as the Director of Force Management at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

\(^{15}\) Sakolic and Grigsby, 40


\(^{18}\) Ibid.
These organizations include U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), which is the Army service component command to USSOCOM, and serves as the major command headquarters for Army SOF including Army Special Forces Command, Special Warfare Center and School, 75th Ranger Regiment, Army Special Operations Aviation Command, Military Information Support Operations Command, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, and the 528th Support Battalion (Special Operations). However, CF/SOF interdependence is not exclusive to Army SOF. Geographic theatre security campaigns include joint special operations forces from Naval Special Warfare Command, Marine Special Operations Command, or Air Force Special Operations Command.

The term general purpose forces, used frequently in research and other publications, has a reductionist tone, and does not exist in joint doctrinal definitions. As stated in Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, conventional forces are any forces other than designated special operations forces, which are generally those forces under the Combatant Command of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The specific conventional forces in theatre security cooperation are United States Army regionally aligned forces at the brigade combat team level, resourced by their divisional headquarters, which ostensibly provide training and readiness oversight for those brigades, and coordinate their deployment in support of worldwide Army service component commands (ASCC).

Using this current doctrinal concept of interdependence as a reference point, it is useful to contrast this current concept with historical occurrences and concepts of interdependence in the joint force. The guiding rules and principles since the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, known as the Goldwater-Nichols act, up until the War on Terror era, were driven by

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19 ADRP 3-05, 3–12.

20 JP 1-02, 74.
organizational theory, equating service capabilities to interdependent tasks conducted by the joint force.

Task Interdependence

As explained by Mary Jo Hatch in *Organizations in Action*, French sociologist Emile Durkheim pioneered work on interdependent tasks in industry, thus founding modern organizational theory.\(^{21}\) With advances in the technologies of activity, process, and knowledge, task interdependence demanded the integration of coordination measures into organizational structures.\(^{22}\) To that end, James Thompson authored a 1968 study, *Organizations in Action*, which is the genesis of pooled, sequential, and reciprocal task interdependence referenced by Hatch. Thompson’s complex organization theory analyzed interdependence of organizational parts, in concert with organizational outcomes, to determine that interdependence does not infer that each part is dependent upon the other for success, but rather failure of one part can jeopardize the entire organization.\(^{23}\) Thompson’s findings influenced additional writings more pertinent to military organizations by COL Chris Paparone and James Crupi on joint military interdependence, published in *Military Review* in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, which illustrates task interdependence in joint operations.\(^{24}\) Finally, sociology theory augments organizational theory by explaining symbiotic and competitive interdependence between organizations, informing the monograph on joint CF and SOF institutional and operational


\(^{22}\)Hatch, 164.


dependencies, which include initiatives in doctrine and education, as means to manage and achieve interdependence. The task-based process of CF/SOF integration from Desert Storm onward will be discussed in four areas: pooled, sequential, and then reciprocal interdependence, and a recent historical timeline.

Pooled Interdependence

In pooled interdependence, each organization provides a discrete contribution to the whole organization. Inputs to each organization come from a common pool, which may or may not be unlimited. Outputs from each organization benefit the general pool of resources, including information, financing, other capabilities, or even legal and procedural authorities. However, the failure of one organization to limit resource consumption, or failure to contribute to the resource pool, threatens the entire group. Individual organizations might operate perfectly fine unilaterally, yet find themselves working toward separate outcomes, illustrated by early CF and SOF operations in Iraq, for example. COL Sean Swindell and other SOF leaders from the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula, or CJSOTF-AP, assessed this condition:

Before 2009, our attempts to achieve unity of effort and unity of command within the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula, or CJSOTF-AP, can best be described as achieving only general strategic direction and compartmented execution.25

According to Thompson, organizations exhibiting pooled, generalized interdependence coordinate via standardization of rules, processes, or procedures.26 This is the least expensive and easiest in terms of communication and decision effort. However, policies and standard operating


26 Thompson, 56.
procedures are too detailed for the broad scope of military doctrine. Such routine and periodic processes are targeting meetings in conjunction with battle rhythm routines, coordination procedures, liaison officers, and other staff processes which Army forces are accustomed to. These organizational level solutions are employed in joint operations to solve complex problems of integration and interoperability.

**Sequential Interdependence**

In sequential interdependence, one organization relies on another’s completed output. The “downstream” organization, if sequentially interdependent, cannot continue effective operations until it receives necessary inputs.27 Paparone contends that in Desert Shield, the joint force conducted sequential operations.28 Coalition air forces conducted transport, refuel, and air interdiction operations. Ground forces deployed, consolidated, and prepared for combat operations. Interdependence of CF and SOF sometimes follows a sequential model. SOF can be present before CF arrive, or deployed forward of CF to employ regional assessment and shaping mechanisms, or serve as the initial foundations of a Joint Task Force.29 Combined planning is one coordination tool to enable sequential interdependence, but this only works if the organizations are dedicated to quality joint planning prior to the operation. In Desert Storm, with SOF leadership limited to the O-6/Colonel level of command, and limited CF exposure to SOF capabilities prior to the war, it was easier to limit SOF participation in planning and influence on the commander. One could argue that because of weak interdependence, SOF remained in a pooled interdependence environment, contributing to the joint force effort, yet out of sync with land component forces, and relegated to missions on the periphery.

27Ibid., 54.

28Paparone and Crupi, 39.

29ADRP 3-05, 1-8.
Reciprocal Interdependence

Reciprocal interdependence has a pooled aspect, since organizations contribute to, and consume resources of, the main organization. Sequential tendencies also exist with reciprocal interdependence, especially where one organization must act before the other acts, and problem solving becomes dependent on that prior action. By nature however, reciprocal interdependence takes on a cyclical relationship, in that combined performance is required, and organizations assimilate to a certain extent with one another. The colloquial “one team – one fight” moniker often alluded to by operational commanders, is an example of this concept of reciprocal interdependence. Reciprocal interdependence concerns the output from one organization becoming the input of another, but in cyclical fashion, with resources flowing both up and downstream. In either situation, concerted action comes through coordination. One organization’s competencies and skills might not necessarily equal the sole desirable solution for a problem, however. Efficiency in one domain does not equal effectiveness in another, and the opposite is likewise true. To summarize Thompson’s tools for building interdependency, pooled and generalized interdependence benefits from standardization, which relates directly to standing doctrine and procedure. Planning best enables sequential interdependence. Reciprocal interdependence relies on mutual adjustment, often done in real time, variable and unpredictable environments as in counterinsurgency. Mutual adjustments to achieve reciprocal interdependence demands the most of leadership, especially in communication and decision-making efforts illustrated over the past years of progressive integration.

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30 Thompson, 55.
31 Ibid.
32 Thompson, 56.
Theory Application: Progress Through the 1990s

In Desert Storm, SOF conducted combat search and rescue, special reconnaissance, and direct action missions. While they required little support from the land component command and hardly affected the larger ground force, SOF outputs still were essential to the Joint Force Commander. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, conventional force divisions and brigades conducted lethal and non-lethal targeting within geographically defined areas of operations. Meanwhile, organizations assigned to CJSOTF-AP conducted similar targeting operations, focused on the entire Iraqi theater and at the entire region in some cases. Sometimes these organizations developed the same target set, like Iranian influence or Ba’athist influence. In this counterinsurgency environment, the failure of one coalition organization to disrupt insurgent activity increased the targeting workload for the other organization, or even the risk involved in daily operations.

Paparone and Crupi, while explaining interdependence among joint forces, did not address SOF specifically in their application of interdependence theory to military operations. David Tucker and Christopher Lamb chronicle dependence and operations between SOF and the joint force across three conditions since the end of the Vietnam War. First came early 1980s, where the Army rebuilt SOF capacity, but struggled with ownership of training, equipping, and organizing SOF for joint operations. The interoperability focus arose after joint operations exposed problems and difficulties between CF and SOF. Next, stability operations in the Balkans demonstrated rudimentary integration between CF and SOF. Finally, irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan stimulated advances in integrating CF and SOF operations and activities.

From Interoperability to Integration

After Vietnam, the Army marginalized SOF in funding and training, given the higher

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priority of a heavy, mechanized force justified by Cold War requirements for active defense of European allies. After the failed 1979 Iranian hostage rescue, Operation Eagle Claw, defense leadership prioritized greater interoperability between the joint services and Special Operations Forces, empowered by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1986, known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and subsequent Nunn-Cohen Amendment. As a result, USSOCOM took charge of training, organizing, equipping, and employing joint special operations forces.

The interoperability zenith came in Operation Desert Storm, where joint communications and targeting systems enabled swift destruction of Iraq’s military. Yet, interdependence between SOF and Army Forces in Desert Storm did not proceed at the same pace. During the Cold War, the intent for SOF operations had been to effect Soviet rear areas through the building of insurgent capacity to interdict Soviet lines of communication. Comparatively, in Desert Storm, SOF operated at the Joint Force level, where Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Strategic Reconnaissance, Coalition Support, and limited Unconventional Warfare directly benefitted the land and air component commands, with ancillary effects at levels below the Army Corps.

Dismissive sentiments regarding SOF Rambo-type operations emanated from the Central Command Combatant Commander, GEN Norman Schwarzkopf evidenced of his lack of comfort with SOF capabilities, but understandably low tolerance for risk. This also illustrates a predominant mental model at the time. The mission sets for Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), although important to the combined/joint force, did not require Army leaders to manage SOF capabilities and effects. They also did not increase contact between CF and SOF, or require mutual reliance on Army capabilities. SOF effects were arguably transparent to leaders

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below the division level, most of which had neither personal nor organizational exposure to special operations, unless they had served in SOF-related billets.

After heralding successes in interoperability within the joint force of Desert Storm, the Army embarked on a decade of stability operations during which it attempted integration of joint SOF, most notably in Operation Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard in the Balkans from 1995-1997. In the early 1990s, air-land battle doctrine slowly embraced a new multi-polar world, complete with ambiguous threats and operating environments such as the fragmented Balkan states. LTG Montgomery Meigs saturated Multinational Division-North (MND-N) with SOF to gain ground-level, unfiltered atmospherics from the Bosnian populace. An asset inherited from British predecessors, the Joint Commission Observer teams (JCOs) provided liaison, information exchange, and expedient communications with the Bosnian former warring factions. As special forces Operational Detachments –Alpha (ODA) would be years later in Iraq, the Joint Commission Observer teams reporting to MND-N were under the operational control of a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), which was based three hours south in Sarajevo away from the MND-North headquarters in Tuzla.

Due largely to this lack of command relationship, but also to the lack of CF experience working with SOF, local CF commanders neither knew about, recognized, nor sought assistance and information from readily available teams. The Cold War-era division-level Special

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38Author time-distance estimate from prior 2000-01 deployment and travel between Tuzla and Sarajevo.

39Baumann et.al., 204.
Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) served its function to advise CF staff, and coordinate operations, but CF trust in SOF labored under the perception that SOF had neither ties nor commitment to MND-N success, given the two separate headquarters involved. SOF reliance on CF fell victim to the mental model that CF provided neither clear mission guidance nor assigned appropriate tasks.\(^{40}\) Regardless of successful SOCCE integration, the operational SOF JCOs were omnipresent throughout the area of responsibility. Their frequent interaction with CF units and leaders, regardless of any higher level unity of effort, led to clashes in interpersonal and organizational cultures.

Whereas the combat environment of Desert Storm the Army of relying on the niche capabilities of SOF and functionally separated SOF from CF, stability operations in Bosnia required mutual reliance and frequent interaction. Army commanders, specifically in the American sector of Multinational Division – North, had no purview over SOF intelligence and direct action operations coordinated out of the CJSOTF in Sarajevo.

In the fifteen years after Goldwater-Nichols, mutual reliance between CF and SOF was tested through command relationships, but dually influenced by the quality of guidance and support provided. As the Bosnian mission closed out, CF and SOF integration had come from intense discourse and negotiation between commanders and staff personnel at all levels.\(^{41}\) The task interdependence thus far was undoubtedly sequential and unidirectional from SOF to CF. Future operations against violent extremists would force yet another change.

**Symbiotic Interdependence: Post-9/11**

This section traces CF/SOF integration following 9/11, the resulting evolution in Army concepts, the interchange of symbiotic interdependence, and future opportunities for

\(^{40}\)Findlay, 47.

\(^{41}\)Ibid., 53.
collaboration. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Phillip Nowak co-authored *Joint Ventures and Interorganizational Interdependence*, a 1976 study which builds on Thompson’s task-based organizational theory, and incorporates sociological principles of symbiotic interdependence. In this theory, symbiosis is a mutual dependence between unlike organizations.\(^4^2\) If one considers future operational environments where CF and SOF embark on simultaneous endeavors to build partner nation capacity, then security assistance and security cooperation resemble joint ventures, but between military forces.

Per Pfeffer and Nowak, joint ventures are a form of linking organizations to manage interdependence, whether competitive or symbiotic, that involves separate entities under joint control, or at least dual influence, of both organizations.\(^4^3\) But joint activities, like security cooperation, force organizations to collaborate due to the need for resources.\(^4^4\)

**Forced Integration**

With Islamist terrorism increasing as a global threat throughout the late 1990s, actions following September 11, 2001 forced the integration of CF and SOF to unprecedented levels. However, this integration occurred under duress, with rapidly changing environments and adaptive adversaries consuming the intellectual capital of the institutional force. Ad-hoc organizational solutions formed to address imminent concerns such as improvised explosive devices.

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\(^4^4\) Ibid.
devices. Material solutions focused on protection. Doctrinal solutions like Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* focused on understanding the operational environment and cultural importance. But institutionalized interdependence remained out of focus until the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) focused on integrating joint capabilities, and moving toward interdependence. Since then, countless articles, manuals, and reports have covered the gradual CF and SOF integration within operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. An overarching joint report on lessons learned comes from the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) section of the Joint Staff – J7. The report, *Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*, identifies several solutions to enhanced CF and SOF integration, which did not exist in the initial phases of recent military campaigns. Most applicable to this monograph are the following:

1. Expand leader understanding: Provide SOF-GPF leaders with an expanded understanding of each force’s capabilities and limitations.

2. Establish habitual training and mission relationships: Maintain events that allow SOF-GPF to train together, expand those events beyond pre-deployment training, and develop GPF with a regional focus and a habitual relationship with corresponding theater special operations commands.

3. Institutionalize collaboration best practices: Promote policies and mechanisms for rapidly sharing information and enabling SOF-GPF collaboration based on best practices from the past decade.

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4. Codify collaborative targeting approach: Document and maintain a methodology for collaborative SOF-GPF targeting.46

SOF Culture in Doctrine and Concepts

A new era of persistent conflict against irregular enemies and non-state actors posed a significant challenge for CF and SOF leaders alike, specifically the need for integration at the tactical level in irregular warfare. One common premise is that cooperation between leaders and staff to ensured command climates and relationships conducive to SOF integration. Another influence to accomplish integration, and even interdependence, stems from CF awareness, acceptance notwithstanding, that SOF culture contributed to successes in counterinsurgency. This appeared in formal as well as informal constructs for conventional formations to become more “SOF-like.”47 Previous reports and monographs acknowledge the presence of a broader, distinct culture of SOF, which equates to both positive and negative influence with conventional military forces. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) reports identify SOF cultural reliance on innovation and adaptation inherent in decentralized operations, absent of the layering of leadership and material present in conventional forces. Another key finding is the conventional force reliance on institutionalization of combat processes, in order to formalize capabilities.48


SOF culture effecting the next generation of operating concepts, Gleiman introduced the concept of cognitive dissonance based on competing subcultures between CF and SOF in his analysis of TRADOC institutional resistance to a special operations warfighting function.\textsuperscript{49} The evolving concept of increased interdependence between CF and SOF depends on doctrine to institutionalize the understanding of SOF cultures into institutional and operational mental models.

Doctrine is the purview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Theory on land operations and what the Army is resides in Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1 – The Army. This informs the Army operating concept of what it does, which in turn generates doctrine on how to do it, ADP 3-0, Operations. The Army considers interdependence in several different contexts. First, in its capstone document, the Army visualizes a role in joint interdependence, which is described as “the evolution of combined arms; the use of a specific military capability to multiply the effectiveness and redress the shortcomings of another.”

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The Army Operating Concept, describes the Army visualization, as a force, about the conduct of future operations to deter conflict, achieve relative advantage in war, and succeed in contingency operations. According to ARCIC, the Army Operating Concept serves as a guide for development of subordinate functional concepts covering how the Army intends to succeed in future operational environments. Each concept document, developed by its respective Center of Excellence, addresses one of the six Army warfighting functions: mission command, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, and protection. The 2009 Army Executive Irregular Warfare Conference debated and examined this perspective at Fort Bragg. Specific to interdependence, despite several prior years of integrated combat operations, doctrine remained fragmented, with no formalized or consistent link between

\textsuperscript{49} Gleiman, 60.
SOF and conventional forces.\textsuperscript{50}

Per Senge’s framework, a learning institution will examine the way it understands the world. Army functional concepts describe operational context for future Army leaders and enhance the integration of Army forces with domestic and international partners.\textsuperscript{51} In doing so, concepts not only define capability requirements for policy makers and other stakeholders, but they also drive changes in Army doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, or facilities, through the JCIDS process. Theoretically, a new functional construct would formalize CF and SOF links, to manage symbiotic interdependence between CF and SOF, stipulated by Pfeffer and Nowak. A new construct transitions mental models from reciprocal support in counterinsurgency, to mutual understanding about CF and SOF outcomes in the human domain. Lieutenant Colonel Ken Gleiman crafted an award-winning monograph detailing the 2011 demise of this initial USASOC attempt to influence Army doctrinal shortfalls.\textsuperscript{52} In another work debating doctrinal shortfalls, Major Greg Stroud examined doctrinal gaps as an obstacle to CF and SOF integration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major Stroud determined that doctrine was sufficient to enable command and control relationships between CF and SOF in combined operations, but friction resulted from a lack of familiarity, and high tactical uncertainty at the time.\textsuperscript{53} Post 9/11, the Army benefitted from forced integration to overcome tactical

\textsuperscript{50}Janice Burton, “IW Conference Charts Army’s Future Path,” \textit{Special Warfare} 22, no. 6 (December 2009): 18.


\textsuperscript{52}LTC Gleiman’s monograph won the 2011 Best Monograph award from Fort Leavenworth’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).

uncertainty and rapidly evolving environments. The long duration of combined operations provided the Army with awareness of the need for continued post-war interdependence.

New Concepts of Interdependence

The following is a summary of a theoretical definition of Army objectives and end states for interdependence. If the Army’s desired condition is one of interdependent special operations and conventional forces, then joint activities will improve efficiencies, mitigate failure by redundancy, and build trust and reliability. Instead of creating interdependent efficiencies before crises demand it, the CF and SOF of the 1990s arguably served in Desert Storm and Bosnia as separate, independent forces. Then, external circumstances required them to work together in longer duration relationships and mutual support in the war on terror.

Doctrine addresses interdependence of forces as the “purposeful reliance” on each other’s capabilities to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both. Recognizing that Army concepts, as of 2010, envision improved interdependence and doctrine introduces the relatively new concept of purposeful reliance, a valid assumption is that old concepts of integration failed to achieve a symbiotic relationship. The current operational methodology of find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze (F3EA) emerges from recent operational perspectives in surgical strike. As portrayed in Army doctrine, through Special Operations the Army vision of a SOF operational approach appears skewed toward direct action. Complementing concepts of sustainment, intelligence, and other warfighting functions are thereby influenced in the same manner. This construct upholds the mental model of SOF primary utilization in a direct approach, and limits individual understanding of how the Army might rely on, or support, the conduct of special warfare within a social and cultural human domain.

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54 ADRP 3-05, 1-15.
55 Ibid., 3-10.
Another perspective is that interdependence succeeded in the joint, task-based settings, but is not, in its current form, conducive to an irregular warfare environment where multiple interdependent parts of the operational environment resist traditional military approaches hinging on influencing causes and effects. Short term solutions are another organizational risk identified by Thompson, whose theory faults crisis-driven operations, like military contingencies since 9/11, for creating ad-hoc linkages. Ad hoc, or synthetic, organizations emerge without prior planning or pre-existing structures. Logically, the relationships that emerge are equally spontaneous, influenced and expedited by immediate necessities in the workplace, market sector, or operational environment in military terms. However, the potential for conflict within such tentative organizations arises due to internal and external factors alike. Increasing the interdependence of members themselves, or simply the outputs controlled and represented by each member, increases the potential for conflict.

A drawback of Thompson’s reciprocal, task-based independence, aside from the expected competition for resources, is the ramification of one of the organizations failing. Nowak’s theory on interdependence adds to Thompson’s coordination mechanisms by noting joint ventures and activities as a way to hedge against such failure by one organization’s oversight or inability. In business, to limit costs and streamline processes, efficiency requires improving processes to minimize redundancy.

For military organizations, where the operational environment has the potential to render one or both entities ineffective due either to enemy, terrain, or climate, efficient business models are not always best. Redundancy is sometimes necessary. Thus, interdependence in future operating environments requires trust and reliability through collaboration, as well as redundant

56 Thompson, 52.

57 Ibid., 138.
Future Collaboration

SOF security cooperation occurs with partner SOF units, SOF-centric with some joint force integration, or conventional force-centered with SOF or joint force integration. The new Army field manual on security cooperation calls for a combination of integrated regionally aligned forces and SOF. ADRP 3-05 recognizes that these blended operations are more successful when conducted with CF units that habitually align and routinely train with SOF and, ideally, have an advisory cadre to augment special operations forces capabilities. Joint SOF doctrine also recognizes that lower-signature missions like training foreign security forces may exceed SOF capacity and benefit from CF assistance. Thus, integration should occur from initial planning, all the way through to a completed endstate. Army doctrine refines the interdependence concept and calls for CF and SOF to blend activities more effectively in order to increase the effectiveness of shaping activities and improve execution of counterterrorism and irregular warfare. In security cooperation and security force assistance environments, Army service component commands (ASCC) and theatre special operations commands (TSOC) have mutually supporting roles in building partner capacity.

A detailed review of integration at the geographic combatant command (GCC) component level is outside of the scope of this monograph, but staff processes at the GCC level

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59 ADRP 3-05, 7.


61 ADP 3-05, 16.
are a critical node in cooperation and integration between the ASCC and theatre special
operations command (TSOC). In October 2012, representatives from Army functional centers of
excellence conducted a workshop at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to provide USASOC with
feedback and input regarding best practices for command and support relationships, and potential
interdependent CF and SOF support based on future scenarios. This workshop provided context
for the initial regionally aligned force from the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, slated for over
one hundred various security cooperation activities in over thirty African nations.62
Representative discussed the scope and context of service-provided capabilities, which reside
largely in the protection warfighting function. The conference also revealed the extensive
integration within the sustainment community, which already plans for tailored support
operations interface at the theater level.63

Because of these multiple factors, the future operating environment has potential for
increased competition, decreased symbiotic interdependence, and complexity of CF and SOF
integration. Army doctrine provides foundational frameworks from which to employ
complementary capabilities of CF and SOF. In this theme, the design of the Army 2020 campaign
also identifies a need for improved military education, and suggests integrated efforts by all
centers of excellence to codify CF/SOF interdependence and stimulate change in operational
Army forces.

Although many lessons learned from combat operations apply, the Army’s doctrinal and
educational processes evolve slowly, and do not maintain tempo with the transition of personnel
and resultant decay of institutional knowledge regarding combined CF/SOF operations occurs.

62Army Special Operations Capabilities Integration Center, "SOF/CF Interdependence
Workshop" (workshop, USASOC Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, Fort
Bragg, NC, 5 November 2012). Author’s personal attendance at the conference. Day 1 of the
exercise focused on Phase 0 operations, to generate discussion on mutual CF and SOF support in
given scenarios.

63 Ibid.
The JCOA study advocates habitual training relationships and institutionalizing best practices for collaboration.64

**Literature Review Summary**

The literature review explained current terminology through organizational theory as it pertains to the issue of CF and SOF interdependence between two. Historical references illustrated the process of SOF integration and its growth from basic interoperability in the 1990s. This increased integration led to the emergence of a more symbiotic nature of interdependence, the recognition of SOF culture, and the appeal to solidify interdependent relationships, and break down mental barriers through Army organizational learning activities. These include doctrine development, professional military education, as well as ongoing operations. The first two are the wards of the Army institutional generating force. The latter is the realm of the operating force.

**DOCTRINAL OPPORTUNITIES**

A notable tenet of the Army operating concept involves regionally aligned forces (RAF) at the brigade level. These forces can supplement SOF by building and maintaining tighter CF relationships with theatre special operations command s, country teams, and partner nation military leadership.65 The desired condition is one of institutional interdependence in doctrine, education, and training – not ad-hoc, informal integration in operational environments. Doctrine is an example of what Nowak regards as formal arrangements to manage symbiotic interdependent relationships between SOF and RAF.66 USASOC and the Special Warfare Center

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64Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Center, 23.


66Nowak and Pfeffer, 398.
and School (SWCS) at Fort Bragg have focused on doctrinal change in order to codify lessons learned and best practices into doctrine. The changes in Army doctrine since 2010, while admirable, are simply not enough to change the current ad hoc mental model or create lasting interdependent relationships between CF and SOF. The SOF critical capability of special warfare forms the primary mental models within the SOF community and is the genesis of selection, training, and education standards. Special warfare, specifically unconventional warfare (UW) to enable resistance forces or insurgencies, remains absent from Army mental models, except for the familiar core SOF competency of foreign internal defense. The USASOC unconventional warfare evolution emerged in 2010, as a concept to stimulate doctrinal processes and dialogue to retain UW as a strategic option in the minds of senior leaders.

To overcome the barriers in developing and distributing doctrine, demonstrated by the lengthy process of developing a warfighting function, SWCS has the initiative to deliver improved special warfare doctrine throughout the Army. Additionally, it also contributes to examination of operational art and unity of command issues.67 The Mission Command Center of Excellence is assisting SOCoE with an integrated process team to enable the first phase of development, where SWCS provides lesson plans, exercise material, and training support packages to inform PME on SOF doctrine.68

As new doctrine arrives, applicable portions of previous doctrine remain valid. While joint doctrine gives brief attention to interdependence, in the service-oriented Army 2020 concept,


CF and SOF interdependence exists as one of the top objectives. The Army illustrates contemporary *integrated* relationships in doctrine by defining how SOF contribute to the overall composition of joint and indigenous forces during military operations. The 2012 publication of *Special Operations* is a landmark for USASOC since it is the first Army-produced SOF doctrinal publication beyond a field manual and cements SOF in the Army’s foundational Doctrine 2015 approach. However, although ADP 3-05 includes USASOC contributions to the body of doctrinal knowledge, it is still the larger institutional Army view on the concept and intent for utilizing SOF forces. This re-affirms the same mental models of targeting, intelligence fusion, and collaboration on direct action targeting of networks and individuals, with less focus on the special warfare core capability of SOF. In addition to the familiar foreign internal defense and security force assistance concepts covered in in the newest field manual FM 3-22 *Support to Security Cooperation*, the Army should consider how these capabilities mutually support SOF engaged in long-term UW campaigns.

The Army Operating Concept outlines required capabilities for future Army forces and specific capabilities involving combined operations with SOF. The nine required capability categories mirror the six war fighting functions, while adding SOF along with Space and Missile Defense Command. The Army operating concept also calls for another warfighting function to

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69 Army Special Operations Capabilities and Integration Center, “SOF-CF Interdependence: Army 2020 Decision Point #9” (briefing to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Fort Bragg, NC, 5 June 2012), 1.


71 COL James Tennant, Director, Combined Arms Center SOF Cell, interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 November 2012.

72 U.S. Army, TRADOC PAM 525-3-1, 54. Per Appendix C, future Army forces require
account for human aspects of cultures in conflict.\textsuperscript{73} Doctrine must be informed by theory relevant to its time, yet abstract enough to allow for changes in the future environment.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, a new theoretical construct may emerge in the revised concept for a seventh warfighting function. If so, this addresses the prevalent mental model that SOF capabilities are assets requiring management under mission command. It also contributes to reframing the concept of interdependence from internally-focused mutual reliance, to expanded mental models of landpower’s interdependence across multiple domains of human behavior and information domains. Army forces can obtain interdependence in terms of resources, but a failure to influence a changing task environment inhibits operational success. Army Special Operations Capabilities Integration Center continues work on the seventh warfighting function, as directed by TRADOC’s Integrated Concept Division in June of 2011, and the ninth version was due to the Army Chief of Staff, and TRADOC Commanding General in December 2012.\textsuperscript{75}

In the larger scope of informing doctrine, SOF requires strategic theory and operational concepts to communicate new models of purpose, value, and competencies to the Army.\textsuperscript{76} Many capabilities to: “establish relationships and synchronize operations between general purpose forces and ARSOF elements . . . support ARSOF unique intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissances, and reach back requirements . . . synchronize ARSOF units’ intelligence and knowledge management capabilities . . . support ARSOF intra-heater rotary and fixed-wing operations, deconflict fire support, provide area and fixed site protection, and integrate ARSOF requirements into sustainment operations” all for a variety of purposes and endstates focused on unity of effort and flexibility.

\textsuperscript{73}U.S. Army, \textit{TRADOC PAM 525-3-1: The United States Army Operating Concept, 2016-2028}, 20.

\textsuperscript{74}Paul Davidson Reynolds, \textit{A Primer in Theory Construction}, Allyn and Bacon Classics ed. (Boston, MA: Pearson, 2006).

\textsuperscript{75}Bud Yarborough, Analyst, Army Special Operations Capabilities Integration Center, Telephone interview with author, 13 November 2012.

SOF competencies are ignored or misunderstood, especially given the current warfighting function construct and current mental models from the last wars. Some examples of misunderstood SOF skills include operational preparation of the environment, advanced force operations, and other pre-crisis activities. SOF are present before conventional forces, but CF lack understanding of this concept of interdependence. The future focus of SOF operational art is long-duration campaign planning, well in advance of a joint task force formation, or the introduction of CF. SOF must contribute SOF campaign planning strategic dialogue to inform the Army, as well as joint community, of the need to reframe skills and capabilities from a counterterrorism context to a UW context in order to shape CF mental models away from the current direct action and COIN mindset.

**OPPORTUNITIES IN EDUCATION**

Given that SOF relies on and recruits from CF formations and CF provide the dominant theory and grammar in professional military education (PME), developing professional military education is critical to changing individual and organizational mental models of interdependence. PME includes numerous systems and processes including academic curriculum development, classroom content, selecting and assignment of instructional personnel, and oversight of their instruction. In Senge’s framework, truly altering the organizational ways of thinking about CF/SOF interdependence requires changing the dominant mental models reinforced in

February 2013), 28.


78 Cleveland.
Desert Storm and Bosnia required different concepts of interdependence. The same is true when transitioning between centralized, military-led counterinsurgency environments to the interagency and multinational realm of security cooperation. Changing from analyzing past events to understanding future challenges and underlying human structures requires creative thinking about the opportunities for CF/SOF interdependence. To enable this, SOF students and instructors must inform and influence the academic process and curriculum of PME.

Existing PME is inadequate to close the knowledge gap between and challenge mental models of CF and SOF interdependence. A surge in irregular warfare or special operations curriculum is not without precedent. In 1966, in response to Vietnam, the Continental Army Command required psychological operations training in officer basic and career courses and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) emphasized political and psychological effects in stability operations. But, as the ghosts of Vietnam faded from institutional memory, so did the focus on irregular warfare. Over two years from 1977 to 1979, instruction on Low Intensity Conflict at CGSC decreased from 40 course hours to eight. Fort Bragg followed suit as well, limiting stability operations instruction as the Special Warfare Center re-focused on unconventional warfare. Current SOF instruction across the in the Army education system mirrors this same condition, even after more than a decade of combined operations.

Instructor-created SOF electives and venues, SOF student contributions within particular class settings, and episodic exposure to SOF concepts during exercises and training occur in the Army education system. However, compulsory SOF education signifies an institutional

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79 Senge, 190.


81 Ibid., 481.
commitment and focus on increasing knowledge and understanding of SOF. As of 2012, according to SWCS, Army pre-commissioning sources, basic officer leader courses, and captain career courses all contain zero hours of compulsory SOF curriculum. ILE has four total hours of directed classes, in addition to seven optional electives. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and the Army War College both have one hour classes on SOF considerations and capabilities.82

As part of the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations, the Fort Leavenworth SOF Leader Development and Education (LD&E) clearly competes with other services and entities for sparse time in the curriculum design. While further research is required on efforts, if any, by other Centers of Excellence to teach and train relevant material on SOF in their branch-specific courses, Fort Bragg’s SOCoE still faced competition with other warfighting function centers of excellence for influence and inclusion in PME curriculum.

The Special Warfare Center and School have goals for implementing SOF educational content at every level from pre-commissioning, to warrant and commissioned officer intermediate-level education, through the School for Command Preparation and Army War College. However, legacy bias and resistance to change encumber the progression of SOF education.83 To be clear, SOF curriculum is not the only casualty of organizational resistance to change. Colonel Thomas Williams debated intermediate-level education in Military Review by affirming the Army’s propensity to defend content and stymie calls for reform.84 Williams’ argument also suggests the Army ILE is too focused on content, stifling students’ creative

82Army Special Operations Capabilities and Integration Center, “SOF-CF Interdependence: Army 2020 Decision Point #9,” 8.


84Ibid.
thinking with an over-inclusive syllabus containing more than 300 hours of instruction, and curtailing creative thought. Given the condition of limited curriculum hours and slow institutional pace of curriculum revision, improving access for SOF instruction might find less resistance in exercises and practical application portions of the curriculum, which allows for informed discussion on roles and responsibilities in concert with other warfighting functions.

Currently, SWCS is working on tailored instruction to appropriate PME levels, such as teaching basic branch officers only about battalion-level coordination. SWCS is also working toward additional instructor positions to influence and educate officers at Fort Leavenworth and expanding ILE slots to increase the number of SOF officers per small group seminar in the Intermediate Level Education courses at Fort Leavenworth. But SOF representation is only one part of the system and it appears SOF is still trying to expand a foothold. While ongoing SOF efforts and activities may fill some units’ knowledge gaps in the operational level, the Army must assist with onward integration and inclusion of SOF curriculum in the educational domain.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION

In addition to changing mental models through doctrine and education, practical application in ongoing activities also influences organizational learning. Joint ventures in security cooperation between CF and SOF support the Army’s larger concept of interdependent forces, but institutional knowledge from the previous decade lacks clarity on CF/SOF integration in non-combat environments. Developing plans for joint activities which are not imminent may take years of pre-decisional work and are more complicated. To resolve conflict and maintain interdependence demands constant rearranging of each organization’s balance of contributions to

85 Army Special Operations Capabilities and Integration Center, “SOF-CF Interdependence: Army 2020 Decision Point #9.”

86 Thompson, 56.
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade are examples of joint operations between multiple NATO partners and U.S. service branches. Theatre security campaigns are no different from contingency operations. The operational art in security cooperation however, is synchronizing strategic defense and diplomatic goals with the GCC goals through the ASCC or TSOC. Within security cooperation, SOF joint combined exchange training (JCET) event planning typically occurs as a separate venture from other security cooperation events such as Mobile Training Teams (MTT), Contact Teams, or other force packages specially tailored to fulfill the requirements of the country team. TSOCs typically facilitate SOF-specific events with partner nation SOF, while other components of the GCC coordinate with Army Forces Command or other providers of conventional forces. Given this separation at the combatant command level, it is understandable why deploying forces, even when going to the same country in the same timeframe, conduct parallel planning and rarely interact.

To facilitate CF/SOF interdependence during security cooperation, the ASCC should increase coordination and planning efforts at component level, complemented by coordination between field forces at the CF and SOF brigade/group levels.\footnote{Ibid., 146.} Although military personnel recognize the difference between TSOC and ASCC, to a State Department country team, the difference in military component is unclear. The critical capability is that military leaders can articulate mission, purpose, and desired outcomes for the duration of their mission. The expectation will be that the GCC will coordinate and deconflict efforts, but the component commands provide guidance to the deployed elements. In these settings, there is no JTF-level coordination during security cooperation.

\footnote{For example, lower level Army SOF headquarters that directly provide forces for overseas requirements are Special Forces Groups, Military Information Support Battalions, and Civil Affairs Battalions.}
multinational corps at this level, as there was in Iraq. The most efficient communications channel is from the TSOC or ASCC to both the Defense Attaché and the Office of Security/Defense Cooperation.

Specialized CF personnel and enablers offer benefits to training partner SOF. While force cap restrictions limit the total number of participants, in some cases physicians, logisticians, intelligence analysts, and airdrop systems technicians (riggers) add extreme value to SOF JCETs. While operational SOF support personnel are assigned to the unit for this reason, in the event such support is unavailable through SOF units, an opportunity for interdependence exists with regionally aligned forces. The experience from these JCETs gained by primary CF staff and leaders would be invaluable. Additionally, security cooperation exercises and JCET-type activities have the potential to augment combat training centers (CTCs) as ideal training venues for CF/SOF interdependence. Given constrained financial resources, it will be increasingly difficult for CF and SOF to deploy within the continental United States to combat training centers, and still limit the stress on the force. Future training will likely be relegated to home station, with potential training opportunities overseas, as regionally aligned forces exhaust other funds. With regional alignment, portions of units will continue deployments for security cooperation, but home station training is likely to be limited due to shortfalls in operations and maintenance funds (O&M) and the need to sustain operational tempo and dwell time within formations.

Additionally, liaison officers will enable collaboration and interdependence. A possible course of action is to staff liaisons between regionally aligned force, Army service component command, and theatre special operations command headquarters. While permanent assignment of SOF personnel is hindered by lack of doctrine, personnel management policy, and functional concepts to govern roles and responsibilities within CF headquarters, it may be suitable to at least examine the feasibility of SOF liaison in RAF headquarters on an attached or temporary duty
basis during pre-deployment cycles. These SOF liaisons would serve two theoretical functions essential to interdependence: education and training. Liaison sections could act as permanent outstations of either SOCOM or the Special Warfare Center and School. While programs at the Command and General Staff College benefit from dedicated SOF representatives to provide instructional and exercise input on SOF roles and functions, CF units do not have this continuous benefit of interaction and education. Ideally, SOF liaison elements would come from special forces, civil affairs, or regional military information support teams with recent deployments to the target region or country, including military liaison elements. The rank structure would depend on the post-mission schedule of the redeployed unit. Typically, RAF could expect SOF detachment leadership (1 each O3, E8, WO2), or at least a theatre security cooperation planner from the Group staff. In addition to informing deploying forces on SOF programs and initiatives, consistent liaison builds enduring ties between units, as well as credibility and trust, and influences the mental models of CF Soldiers and leaders. The main obstacles for this option are the financial and human resource limitations for obtaining personnel billets and authorizations for manning the liaison positions.

Synchronized CF/SOF security cooperation programs between the TSOC and ASCC are more significant than in the past. This equates to greater interdependence between CF and SOF elements since both forces seek relationships with components of host nation security forces. CF and SOF execution of theatre security campaign plans, coordinated at the ASCC and TSOC level, increases potential for preventing the operational pause that accompanies political unrest. With states in conflict, improving the resiliency and professionalism of host nation ground forces, or at least providing a stabilizing incentive against unrest, is essential to maintaining access for surgical strikes or sustaining other special warfare campaigns, by preventing a backslide into unrest and chaos.
CONCLUSION

This monograph expanded upon the premise, illustrated by Sakolic and Grigsby, that a lack of CF/SOF interdependence impedes the Army from leveraging SOF capabilities. Through detailed research of interdependence theory, the monograph informs discourse on CF/SOF interdependence by introducing the ontology of symbiosis. By changing the perspective of task-related interdependence to one more conducive to long-term joint ventures in security cooperation it is clear that organizational mental models lack understanding, visualization, and even discussion of SOF capabilities at the institutional level. Uninformed mental models impede CF and SOF interdependence because the primary inter-organizational lessons learned, which dominate current doctrinal and educational discussions and narratives center on SOF in the direct approach, and focus on management of SOF effects over combined, symbiotic effects. Shortfalls in SOF contributions to doctrine and education detract from the individual and organizational mental models of CF and SOF interdependence, which also fail to appreciate the emergent opportunities in security cooperation.

This monograph determined that a change in ontology regarding interdependence is also necessary. Combat-oriented lessons learned, while applicable for updating doctrine and determining future concepts such as regionally aligned forces, are insufficient to sustain momentum toward full interdependence of CF and SOF. Since the interoperability and frustrated integration of the 1990s, personal command and staff relationships enabled integration, and later reciprocal interdependence. Future operating environments demand new paradigms of interdependence, specifically non-competitive inter-organizational interdependence geared toward symbiotic outcomes. It is socially based, akin to joint ventures in business, and depends on how CF and SOF understand mutual roles and missions.

Research for this monograph also revealed that informing Army doctrinal and educational processes is a joint activity between both CF and SOF. Since Army culture is
institutionally resistant to change, the preponderance of effort currently falls to the SOF community to inform doctrine and professional military education to instill the understanding of the unconventional essence of special operations, not simply increase contact hours in the curriculum. The monograph discussed current doctrine based on actions and best practices to date, but identified a lack of functional construct for the addressing the human domain which influences long-term, security cooperation campaigns within immature, undeveloped geographic areas of responsibility. The lack of such a construct results from the absence within doctrine of special warfare and the indirect approach as a prevalent operating methodology.

Increased SOF education in PME provides junior leaders with reference points in their basic education to form initial mental models of SOF. Collaborative education prevents cognitive decay in mutual CF/SOF knowledge, which mitigates against any return to conditions where CF officers do not understand SOF culture and how to employ capabilities. PME also mitigates against SOF leaders’ decay of knowledge in unified land operations, while providing a venue for infusing SOF operational art and strategy into CF mental models and instructional systems.

Finally, the monograph suggested potential opportunities present in the future operating environment, specifically regarding security cooperation. These opportunities include the realized conditions of CF/SOF interdependence, where mutual reliance is symbiotic between not only organizations, but with the long-term campaign as well.

Simply because conventional forces and special operations forces integrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, does not make the two organizations capable of the same effectiveness and efficiency in other theatres or missions. Unless new mental models emerge which enable CF understanding of SOF and the application of CF and SOF mutual capabilities, interdependence gains from Iraq and Afghanistan may be lost. If, as Sakolic and Grigsby contend, the institutional impetus, or forcing function of combat to codify interdependence is going away, then operations involving both SOF and regionally aligned forces provide opportunities to prevent the gains from
recent contingency operations from decaying.

Further research is required on the effectiveness of the interdependence concept, especially after future deployments of regionally aligned forces, or combat training center (CTC) rotations involving CF and ARSOF. Such research would confirm or deny the actual reasons for success or failure at mutual reliability, and whether it occurs because of CF/SOF interdependence or in spite of it.


Findlay, Michael L. “Special Forces Integration with Multinational Division - North in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command


Tennant, James. Director, Combined Arms Center SOF Cell, interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 November 2012.


