New Media: The Key to Influence in Irregular Warfare

The rate at which the “New Media” global phenomenon is erupting with the integration of social media and mobile technology is important to Special Operations because most aspects of irregular warfare involve a focus on populations and the ways they are influenced, either as the enemies Center of Gravity (COG) or the friendly COG. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the change in the definition of population brought about by new media and the tools needed to influence populations. Specifically, this writing will focus on how need for Special Operations to incorporate new media into operations when conducting the assigned functions of counterterrorism, unconventional warfare and Foreign Internal Defense.
New Media: The Key to Influence in Irregular Warfare

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

20 May 2013
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**Paper Abstract**

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The rate at which the “New Media” global phenomenon is erupting with the integration of social media and mobile technology is important to Special Operations because most aspects of irregular warfare involve a focus on populations and the ways they are influenced, either as the enemies Center of Gravity (COG) or the friendly COG. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the change in the definition of population brought about by new media and the tools needed to influence populations. Specifically, this writing will focus on how need for Special Operations to incorporate new media into operations when conducting the assigned functions of counterterrorism, unconventional warfare and Foreign Internal Defense.
INTRODUCTION

Senator Riady sent his last email twenty minutes into the flight from Dulles to Los Angeles and began to draft his to-do list for Monday. As he wrote, he recalled the events of the week with satisfaction. He and a majority on both sides of the aisle had laid aside their differences to write a strong piece of legislation to provide the military and Homeland Security with the authorities needed to change the fight against the new challenge of decentralized terrorism. They also had commitments for sufficient votes to pass the bill next week. After completing his to do list, Riady decided to knock out his social networking before the flight ended. He had an alert that he’d been mentioned in a tweet so he opened twitter to check it out. The mention was in a tweet forwarding a CNN Article entitled “Hacker Says Phone App Could Hijack Plane.” The article detailed a phone app containing malicious code that could allegedly impact airplane controls remotely and modify navigation characteristics with preloaded commands like “please go here” and the dreaded “visit ground.” The developer said that he’d demonstrated the app on a simulator to call out security vulnerabilities that could be exploited live.1 As Riady closed his twitter account a Facebook alert sounded. The message read “Visit Ground©.” The plane dove forward and the airbags dropped.

Mogden Fazeedi was elated when he received the “wings of birds have been clipped” tweet from 19 brothers. With 87,000 members, the movement was stronger and more effective than ever – but he did miss seeing his Colleagues in person. It would be weeks before the fog cleared. Then the world would know the attacks targeted governments that had

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banded together to invoke measures to deny continued operations to disrupt regimes and populations around the globe. Who would have thought that inexpensive technology like mobile phones and Facebook would enable such precision and destruction? Hacking into a few social media accounts, a little patience in monitoring, and tweaking some programming code to change a stolen app from “simulate” to “real world” and state actors will again spend years and vast fortunes trying to protect populations.

The preceding scenario is fiction. However, the technologies are real and the effects have been reported to be possible. In today’s environment it is likely that the rapidly deployable operational reach of Special Operations would be involved as an element of the solution against this type of extremist network. As the threats of extremist networks operating in the decentralized digital environment become more complex and require continued SOF employment to protect U.S. national interest, SOF Forces must master New Media for key influence in Irregular Warfare (IW).

Background

There is ample evidence that social media use has exploded since Facebook was introduced in 2004. The bulk of that explosion has occurred within the last two years with the increased backing of reliable mobile technology. ComScore reports that almost 38 million mobile phone users connect to online communities via their mobile devices “almost every day.” This is also evidenced by the 37% U.S. increase of time spent on Social Media sites in 2012. Today, users spend more time on social media sites than on any other category of

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Internet site. The social media excitement is not limited to the U.S. The 67% of U.S. Internet users who use social media sites\(^4\) actually lags usage in Indonesia (83%), Argentina (76%), Russia (75%), South Africa (73%), Sweden (72%), Spain (71%) and Hungary (70%) as well as other countries. In fact, U.S. social media usage is only slightly above the global average usage of 63%.\(^5\)

Mobile technology and social media are included in a new category of technology and communications platforms labeled “new media.” Definitions for new media vary slightly between communities utilizing the technology. For this analysis new media is the technology and communications platforms that support dialogue and the many-to-many flow of messages in simultaneous new media outlets such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter.\(^6\)

The rate at which new media global phenomenon is erupting with the merger of social media and mobile technology is important to Special Operations because most aspects of irregular warfare involve a focus on populations and the ways they are influenced, either as the enemies Center of Gravity (COG) or the friendly COG. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the change in the definition of population brought about by new media. Specifically, this writing will focus on how those changes impact Special Operations in conducting the

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assigned functions of counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and Foreign Internal
Defense. 7

POSSIBLE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

In December 2011 testimony to the U.S. House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism
and Intelligence, Brian Jenkins, of the Rand Corporation, testified that the number of terrorist
activities in the U.S. since September 22, 2011 suggests that Al-Qaeda has not been effective
on the Internet. He also proposed that radicalization through social media had not yet reached
a level significant enough for concern. Jenkins asserted that the American response to
terrorist campaigns on social networking has been small and that few “would-be jihadists”
who have explored Jihad on the Internet have moved beyond the virtual world to seek Jihad
training. Jenkins further testified that while terrorist groups might create virtual armies
through social networking on the Internet, they remain in the virtual. 8

Even if one concedes that terrorist organizations are successfully exploiting new
media, and that riots are being instigated and regimes are being toppled with the use of new
media, few in today’s Department of Defense (DoD) environment will agree that, depending
on the objective, equal or even more time should sometimes be spend focusing on the
informational aspect of the operational environment to achieve the desired end state rather
than information operations being considered just an aspect of, or an annex to, the
Commander’s operations planning. 9 Much of the military is still convinced, even after more

7 Department of Defense, DoDD 5100.01, 21 December 2010, Enclosure 5, 22.
8 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Testimony,” House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Jihadist Use
9 Deirdre Collings and Rafal Rohozinski, “New Media and the Warfighter,” Bullets and Blogs, October 2009,
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Bullets__Blogs_new_Media__warfighter-
than a decade of fighting terrorists, that the kinetic operations have the only lasting affect on
terrorist organizations.

Finally, many would also argue that heavy resilience on new media poses an
operational security risk that is too high for the military to mitigate. Those making this
argument often assert that operations should be planned and executed only using secure
technology to maintain operational security.

Further discussion and analysis of the uses of new media in counterterrorism,
unconventional warfare, and Foreign Internal Defense will illustrate why it is necessary for
SOF to embrace new media for effective influence in future irregular warfare conflicts.

DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS

Counterterrorism

The first Special Operations function addressed in Department of Defense Directive
(DoDD) 5100.01 is Counter Terrorism (CT), which includes actions taken to make global
and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. CT is an environment where
it pays to heed Sun Tzu’s advise to “…know the enemy and know yourself,” especially
when it comes to defining both enemy and friendly COGs. The persistent presence of SOF
in critical physical locations has previously provided a deep understanding of the terrorist
adversary as illustrated by then SOCOM Commander, ADM Eric T. Olson, in a 2011
Associated Press (AP) article published soon after Osama Bin Ladin’s death. Prior to his
death there had been a common school of thought that Bin Ladin was Al Qaeda’s COG, yet

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10 Department of Defense, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, Department of
11 Department of Defense, Counterterrorism, Joint Publication (JP) 3-26 (Washington DC: DoD, 13 November
2009), 7.
13 Admiral William H. McRaven, “Testimony,” House Armed Services Committee, Commander USSOCOM,
Olson warned that the death of Bin Ladin had knocked Al Qaeda 1.0 (created and led by Bin Ladin from a Pakistani hideout) on its heels, but that it would be replaced with a new Al Qaeda version led by leaders that understand America better than America understands them. Olson predicted that Al-Qaeda would morph and he warned that, “Al-Zawahri had not yet put his stamp on the organization.”\(^\text{14}\) Today, Al-Zawahiri has lead Al-Qaeda and its affiliates to embrace new media through the distribution of videos, instruction, open meetings, and recruitment through online communities.\(^\text{15,16}\)

The continuing, though somewhat weakened, state of Al Qaeda after the loss of Bin Ladin and several key leaders has demonstrated that, while important to the mission, Bin Ladin or other leaders were not the COG of the movement. Today, some argue that ideology is Al Qaeda’s COG,\(^\text{17}\) yet the single factor that is consistent through all of the metamorphic states of Al Qaeda and other terrorist focus is populations. Two other examples of this population focus which have spanned decades include the “popular justice” the Communist Guerilla group, Shining Path provided to the local peasant population when a political void was left by the central government in Peru,\(^\text{18}\) and the Irish Republic Army (IRA) conflict with Great Britain where the population was the COG in the IRA and Great Britain conflicts. The populations in Northern Ireland provided housing, intelligence and recruits for the IRA, while the IRA, in some cases, demonstrated actions to meet the needs of certain populations

(e.g., reforms to improve housing and employment for Catholic minorities). 19

The population as a COG in conflicts of terrorism seems to be consistent, yet identifying the true population is problematic and exacerbated and, perhaps, illustrates why it has by new technology. Philip Seib’s illustration attempting to define Pakistan provides an excellent backdrop for this discussion.

“Is ‘Pakistan’ the land mass northwest of India, as pictured on maps and with the borders recognized by International law? Or is it something more, an electronically connected global entity that includes the more than seven million members of the Pakistani diaspora? More than a million Pakistanis live in the United Kingdom, another million-plus in Saudi Arabia, almost a million in the United Arab Emirates, and sizable Pakistani communities exist in 20 other countries. Where do their interests and loyalties lie: with the Pakistan homeland, with the nation where they now reside, or do they float in statelessness? Or, as another alternative, do they see themselves as citizens of a virtual Pakistan in which members of the diaspora are fully included rather than being relegated to the second-tier of expatriates? 20

The decentralized nature of populations being targeted by terrorist organizations is a significant challenge for the U.S. in counterterrorism because it changes the balance of time, space, and force. The time in which messages can be disbursed, assimilated, and responded to can be minutes with mobile technologies and social media platforms. The space across which these interested populations are physically located is no longer limited to recognized geographical borders, but can cover the globe. The forces (masses) that can be consolidated for support (i.e., fighting, financial, political) and for targeting no longer require the enemies physical presence, but more often a powerful narrative. Given the expanded space and mass that can be covered in short periods of time it is necessary for SOF to master and combine new technology that has been developed to capitalize on the New Media with the indigenous

cultural awareness tools that have been developed and fine tuned as part of the current Special Operations tactics, techniques, and procedures. Two specific types of tools for considerations are open source social media platforms along with their analytic tools and as well as technology and analytical tools like those used in the Lighthouse Project at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) laboratory.

Political campaigns that can win or lose battles within 24-hour news cycles now depend heavily on social media and social media analytics. Most social media platforms provide analytics. There are also private vendors who provide analytic tools that can be used across multiple social media platforms. Ashley Parker details how the Romney, Gingrich, and Obama campaigns used Twitter in the 2008 Presidential election to “reach voters, gather data, and respond to charges immediately.” Romney’s campaign used Twitter as a news tracker to see the messages that resonated with various voter and reporter demographics. Tracking topics allows candidates to provide information to keep the discussions going when it’s beneficial, to clarify when misrepresented. Just as political campaigns use social media analytics to provide a “scalable approach to retail politics,” Special Operations can use these tools to identify the populations which terrorist propaganda and the U.S. counters to the propaganda are resonating and adjust operations accordingly.

As important as knowing the messages that are resonating is, knowing who is being listened to, and identifying challenges to message distribution and tracking in “austere

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22 Ibid, 15.
environments” is critical. The personnel working on the NPS CORE Lighthouse Project integrate commercial-off-the-shelf hardware and software that runs on IOS and Android platforms with analytical tools developed in the lab to solve the challenges of collecting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information in support of operations. The most relevant aspect of this project is that the analytics focus on the relationships between “relevant socio-cultural” data collected, rather than focusing solely on attributes of targets, to provide a more complete operating picture for the Commander. The NPS video on the project demonstrates ways in which the tool has been used to identify individuals with strong social capital, affiliations, analyze impacts in various ways the current the social environment might be changed, as well as forecast where monetary investments are most likely to positively impact an environment.

Emerging and training Special Operators in both the social media tools and socio-cultural analysis tools will enable the SOF Commander to more effectively balance the time, space, and force challenges of CT in the 21st century by providing him the opportunity to visualize the social space through relevant information on the populations that terrorists attempt to influence in order to most effectively plan operations.

Unconventional Warfare

Another Special Operations function called out in DoDD 5000.01 is Unconventional

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Warfare (UW), which is “… activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerilla force in a denied area.” The SOCOM Commander adopted this UW definition in June 2009 to promote a common understanding of UW. It is currently published in Army Training Circular 18-01, awaiting the next publication of JP 3-05. The UW Commander seeks opportunities to support existing political, military, or social activities moving toward outcomes that benefit U.S. national interests. The time, space, force challenges identified for CT are also relevant for UW. In addition, a new challenge is introduced when determining how best to support revolutionary or insurgent efforts when new media is being increasingly used as a catalyst.

The 2011 revolutions included multiple players in the Middle East, including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, that provide a rich backdrop of affects that new media is having on revolutionary uprisings. A Small Wars Journal blog post asserting that British and French SOF provided UW support to the Libyan rebels (noting none was provided by the U.S.) and a Naval War College case study detailing the use of technology used in the revolution that eventually led to traditional military assistance from the U.S. and NATO provide sufficient detail of the Libyan revolution to identify the effects that new technology had on the revolution while exploring capabilities that SOF could consider offering in

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26 Department of Defense, DoDD 5100.01, 21 December 2010, Enclosure 5, 22.
support of 21st century revolutionary or insurgent movements that support U.S. interests.

John Scott-Railton, the author of the case study became involved with the Libyan revolution when the Mubarek’s regime shut down the Internet to keep the world from knowing what was going on in Egypt.\(^\text{31}\) Disconnecting the Internet as a means of global communications is a common response used by tyrants to repress expression. Iranian, Chinese, Burmese, and Cuban regimes have also been among those that have attempted to suppress the stories of the populations on social media by blocking Internet access.\(^\text{32}\) The interesting element of this course of action is that disconnecting the Internet and/or communications also results in loss of situational awareness for the regime – especially if the regimes have previously engaged in monitoring the content communicated via these technologies. This desperate movement by regimes often serve to shift the conflict balance of power in favor of the rebels. This was the case in Libya where John Scott-Railton and others outside Libya assisted the rebels in overcoming a complete Internet blackout by adapting with new technology as the circumstances unfolded to provide alternative methods for Libyans to tell their stories.

The first adaptations were simple when John tweeted and posted stories sent from within Libya on various social networking sites after his friends within Libya had recorded them on his cell phone.\(^\text{33}\) When cell communication was cut the rebels adapted with very low-tech communications, using colored flags for command and control when fighting Gadhafi forces and physically smuggling video clips out of Libya on thumb drives, while

\(^{31}\) Ibid, 2.
working to restore connectivity. During this time online hacker activists outside Libya also posted instructions to help Libyans circumvent the shutdowns and restore connectivity.\textsuperscript{34} Another adaptation, eventually two-way satellites were used to restore connectivity in “opposition-controlled towns,” specifically in Misuratis, where a satellite distributor installed satellites at key locations to support communications.\textsuperscript{35} Supporters inside and outside of Libya assisted the rebels in moving to decentralized communication systems that were not controlled by the regime.

Throughout the conflict, new technology including mobile technology and social media platforms like Twitter, Skype, Facebook, YouTube were used to distribute the messages and images of the violence in Libya, mobilizing global communities to empathy, support, and eventually resulting in the topple of the Gadhafi regime.\textsuperscript{36} The support the Libyan rebels received in the early stages of communications blackouts was fortuitous. This case could just as easily have ended in tragedy had the rebels not established early global communications and the parties with the technology savvy previously discussed, and had members within the movement not have emerged as citizen journalists with the ability to prepare and sustain a narrative that kept the world engaged.\textsuperscript{37}

Technology and narrative are two areas where SOF can also assist rebellions or insurgencies. With current SOF technology, knowledge of systems used by tyrant regimes, and knowledge of the characteristics of mobile technologies and social media previously discussed as needed for CT, the potential exists for SOF to provide communications

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, 37.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 30-32.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, 38.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 43-45.
assistance in the event of tyrant government shutdowns. Additionally, with the use of socio-analytic tools and current experience in messaging, assistance could also be provided to target effective narratives. A cooperative effort between U.S. Cyber Command and USSOCOM could provide SOF warriors with the tools needed to understand the virtual environments in which they might want to provide assistance in support of U.S. interests.

**Foreign Internal Defense**

FID is the SOF function\(^{38}\) in which activities are conducted to assist host nations with defense and development programs. Today’s FID mission is complex with increasing numbers of nation states falling behind in the complex global environment and not able to meet the needs of their populations.\(^{39}\) FID may be the function in which new media can have the largest positive impact for SOF gains in irregular warfare since the inability of nation-states to meet the needs of their populations is a contributing factor to both of the functions previously addressed. New media can provide tools that SOF can use to assist host nations in identifying the needs of their people, and can provide low cost, open source tools for host nations to use to implement and sustain communications and public service programs.

A key element of assisting host nation governments and militaries in security initiatives is to train and equip them to counter terrorist propaganda by engaging in on-going proactive dialogues to maintain credibility with their constituents. It is also important the host nation leadership acquire technology and expertise that will allow them to respond rapidly to “spun” images, which may require the ability to record operations and distribute “accurate”

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\(^{38}\) Department of Defense, DoDD 5100.01, 21 December 2010, Enclosure 5, 22

truth in a timely manner. New media can provide host nations with the tools to maintain credibility through accurate reporting while also providing access to needed public services.

Using new media will not work in areas like Somolia where an electrical infrastructure in not present. However, there are other states near the top of the failed states lists that have both communications and mobile technology on which to support social media platforms. For example social media has recently been used in Yemen, number eight on the list,\textsuperscript{40} to protest drone strikes\textsuperscript{41} and for protests against the Yemen President with the messages being distributed via mobile devices and Internet cafes.\textsuperscript{42} Other states on the list have leapfrogged traditional communications and business transaction methods, employing mobile technology for basic services. In Kenya, for example, nearly 70\% of the adult population uses mobile technology for banking resulting in nearly one-quarter of Kenya’s GDP being transferred each month.\textsuperscript{43} In fact, Kenya is using a model for government transparency and interaction that could be modeled in other countries. During the 2013 elections in Kenya, social media was used to allow Kenyans to question the candidates, to find polling places, and to distribute simple messages aimed at avoiding the violence that had been experienced in elections five years earlier. Some groups have also used the tools to monitor the electoral process, confirming legitimacy.\textsuperscript{44}

Finally, as with the U.S. military, operational security is important for host nation militaries. However, operational security must also take into consideration the information that can be assembled and distributed by external parties. Familiarity with new media will make host nation Commanders aware of the operational securities that can arise despite security planning. SOF should assist host nation militaries with incorporating red teams, using new media, to detect movements into exercises.

SOF providing training programs and technology to host nations to identify population needs and to forecast where limited resources might be best utilized to reap the most return on investment should qualify within the FID description of assisting with “defense and development programs.” Likewise, assisting host nation governments in moving toward new media for transparency and social services should also qualify under the FID definition. Since FID operations often include training host nation governments and military forces to also deal with CT and UW, material provided in those sections of this paper are also pertinent for assistance that will benefit host nations.

CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS

Insurgent and terrorist tactics in irregular warfare are often compared to those used by a weaker forces. However, these tactics have been successful in preventing achievement of objectives and protracting conflicts with stronger forces. New technology is also enabling these forces to quickly transfer lessons learned and adaptive techniques to new theaters and to adapt quickly under diverse operational conditions. A Commander organizing, training, and equipping forces to fight today’s irregular warfare environment must ensure that, in addition to the cultural training and the cognitive skills with which SOF warriors are traditionally equipped, that they are also trained and equipped with both the technology and

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skills to operate in the virtual environment to address the reduction in time that is now required to impact masses at vast distances. Thomas Mayfield wrote “Just as machineguns, tanks, and aircraft changed the nature of conflicts, so did the telegraph, radio, television” and he went on to assert that new media and social media can now be added to the list of technologies that have changed the nature of conflicts. \textsuperscript{46} The changes that these technologies have brought about in the balance between time, space and force require adjustments to the way that irregular warfare is fought. The following recommendations are provided for training and equipping SOF forces for this changing environment.

Recommendations

Seek opportunities to leverage the extensive network of international partners, inter-agencies, SOF affiliates, and industry partners to compile the tools and expertise needed to build the new media capability. Continuing to build only SOF unique capabilities on top of new media capabilities being established by other services and partners will continue to serve SOF well and maintain credibility with political leaders and Congress.

Centralized planning with decentralized execution that pushes informed decision-making down to the lowest level is required to enable timely responses to the unknown and to enable faster adaptation than the adversary in today’s virtual environment. Decentralized execution will require persistent knowledge of the adversary and the virtual environment. Including the acquisition, training, and incorporation of new media into SOF tactics, techniques and procedures is recommended. This change will also require a mindset change to allow information operations adjustments to be executed at the tactical level just as they are as the operational pictures adjusts for other functions. Difficult dialogues regarding the risks of delegating strategic messaging and responses to lower levels must occur with pre-

\textsuperscript{46} Thomas D. Mayfield, III, “A Commander’s Strategy for Social Media,” 79-84.
determined elevation triggers defined prior to operations. New media technology and rapid response information operations functions should also be included in all irregular warfare rehearsals and war games.

Build the agile information flow and the population of accurate information into road maps for irregular warfare. Keeping lines of communications open with the truth will develop credibility when difficult dialogues must occur. It is important to remember that you can’t surge trust when needed.47

Finally, the past decade of war has sent many wounded warriors home from the battlefield with physical injuries that prevent them from fighting in the theater of operations. The need for a SOF presence in the virtual battle space could provide opportunities to re-engage these warriors in operations. Opportunities should be sought to train wounded warriors as digital natives, or to pair them with digital natives to utilize their cultural expertise in the virtual battlespace.

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47 Admiral William McRaven, Naval War College Presentation, 8 May 2013.
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