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<th><strong>Author(s)</strong></th>
<th>Bajwa, Shahid Latif</th>
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<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td>U.S. security cooperation with India and Pakistan: a comparative study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Publisher</strong></td>
<td>Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue Date</strong></td>
<td>2013-06</td>
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<td><strong>URL</strong></td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34621">http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34621</a></td>
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This document was downloaded on August 22, 2013 at 10:36:47
U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by

Shahid Latif Bajwa

June 2013

Thesis Advisor: Carolyn Halladay
Second Reader: Thomas Young

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<td>June 2013</td>
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<td>Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943–5000</td>
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<td>The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, the Government of Pakistan or Pakistani security establishment. IRB Protocol number N/A.</td>
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<th>14. SUBJECT TERMS:</th>
<th>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
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<td>United States, India, Pakistan, Security Cooperation, South Asia, Cold War, Defense Cooperation, Kashmir, Nuclear Dimension, Post-Cold War Era, 9/11, U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, Sanctions, GWOT, Legacy of Mistrust, Technology and Arms Sales, Afghanistan Imbroglio, China Factor, Iran Factor, De-hyphenation, Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Taliban.</td>
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<th>16. PRICE CODE</th>
<th>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</th>
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<th>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
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NSN 7540–01–280–5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18
ABSTRACT

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<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Force</td>
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<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CSF</td>
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<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>Federally Administered Tribal Area</td>
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<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>Indian Air Force</td>
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<td>IMD</td>
<td>Indian Military Doctrine</td>
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<td>Indian Occupied Kashmir</td>
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<td>IPI</td>
<td>Iran-Pakistan-India</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>LoC</td>
<td>Line of Control</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MMRCA</td>
<td>Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
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<td>North Waziristan Agency</td>
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<td>NWS</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapon State</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>PNE</td>
<td>Peaceful Nuclear Explosion</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the Department of National Security Affairs for providing me intellectual freedom to express myself candidly on this strategically important and equally sensitive subject. In this context, encouragement and support provided to me by my Academic Associate, Professor Mikhail Tsypkin, needs a special mention. I would also like to thank Professor Paul Kapur, from whom I learned how to look at the bigger picture and take a balanced view of South Asian Security Affairs. Informal discussions with Professor Feroz Khan further crystallized my thoughts and helped me finalize this topic for my thesis. His expertise in nuclear affairs and his maiden book on the subject turned out to be a good source to support my arguments.

My second reader, Professor Thomas Young, not only provided me with research support but also a plenty of moral support owing to his cheerful personality. He has a knack for making things look easy.

If I were to quantify and add up the support provided by all these gentlemen and compare it with the support provided by a single lady, she would carry the day. That lady happens to be my thesis advisor, Professor Carolyn Halladay, who has made an immense contribution in bringing my thesis to this shape.

Lest she starts to feel jealous, I would like to mention the patience shown by my loving wife, Rukhsana, despite my endless hours spent in the study working on the thesis, which she thought had replaced her as my first love. Talking to my lovely children Haider, Ayesha, and Hashir always lifted my spirit and spurred me to work even harder.
I. U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

The recent increase of U.S.-Indian defense cooperation has induced certain euphoria in Washington and even in New Delhi, amid dazzling visions of the strategic dividends that will accrue to both countries. Some scholars, notably Brian Shoup and Sumit Ganguly, maintain that “India’s political and economic maturation necessitates that it be detached from Pakistan in the geopolitical calculus of the United States. This need to ‘de-hyphenate’ India and Pakistan is essential to India’s wider goals of achieving the status of a global power.”¹ However, the same feelings are not shared by an important stakeholder in the South Asian region—and a long-time ally of the United States—namely Pakistan. The discrepancy has implications for the region and the United States. The rise in India’s military stature will be detrimental to Pakistan’s strategic interests and, hence, possibly to long-term peace and security in the region. At the same time, this newly reframed relationship may well not achieve U.S. ends in Asia or South Asia. India’s limited military involvement in Afghanistan proves this latter point.²

As such, this thesis examines whether growing U.S.-Indian security cooperation will serve regional peace and security or U.S. interests, particularly if more India means less Pakistan in the U.S. security cooperation calculus. In the same context, it assesses the viability of decoupling U.S. security cooperation with India from that with Pakistan.³ As regards the immediate U.S. agenda in the region—a reduced U.S. military footprint and an increased Indian military footprint in Afghanistan—the prospects do not appear to be very bright.

³ Security and defense cooperation is imbedded in the larger context of strategic relationships. Hence, in most of the literature on the subject, the two terms—security and defense cooperation—appear to be used interchangeably. This paper, though primarily focused on “Security Cooperation,” will be set against the broader strategic background.
A. U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA: A BRIEF HISTORY

Within a decade of gaining independence from the British in 1947, India and Pakistan became involved in defense cooperation with the United States. From these first moments, the differences between South Asia’s two largest powers, refracted through the divergent U.S. views of and policies toward India and Pakistan, settled into distinctive tracks for strengthening each state’s “defense position,” as contemporary policy classified such cooperation.

Being one of the pioneers of non-aligned movement, India commenced with limited military-to-military cooperation in the form of training at U.S. military institutions.4 It turned to the United States and other allies to purchase defense equipment in the wake of the first Kashmir War and especially after India’s defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962.5 To Washington’s boundless irritation, the USSR became India’s principal supplier of arms upon the conclusion of a bilateral defense agreement in 1971; still India continued limited defense cooperation with the United States amid cooler relations. In recent years, however, this defense cooperation has witnessed an unprecedented growth as the United States seeks additional global strategic partners in the post-Cold War order.

Weak and vulnerable at its independence,6 Pakistan sought allies and secure sources of defense equipment to arm its forces. The U.S. urge to check the spread of communism in Asia coincided with Pakistan’s security interests, and the new state ended up joining the U.S.-led Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the mid-1950s.7 The United States started a steady supply of arms to Pakistan, as well, which the latter used to good effect in its 1965 war (the second Kashmir War) with India—contrary to Washington’s express stipulation that

4 Jaswant Singh, Defending India (New Delhi: MacMillan India, 1999), 143.
7 Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 64.
neither India nor Pakistan would use U.S.-supplied weapons against each other. In the wake of the war, the United States imposed sanctions on both India and Pakistan, but began to distance itself diplomatically and militarily from Pakistan.8

Pakistan’s role in “opening” China to the United States in 1971 barely brightened this dim view, though the relationship gained prominence, if not warmth, at such crisis points as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the initiation of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in 2001. Indeed, the 2010 National Security Strategy mentions Pakistan by name on seven pages—six of which identify the country as part of al-Qaeda’s home region, while the last page describes U.S. plans to “foster a relationship with Pakistan” and to deepen cooperation.9 Both formulations imply that the current relationship is underdeveloped.

B. THE END OR THE BEGINNING? WHAT SOUTH ASIA MEANS TO THE UNITED STATES TODAY

The United States intends to wind down its immediate agenda with respect to the GWOT in Afghanistan by 2014.10 This date by no means marks the end of U.S. interest or involvement in South Asia, however. The region that is home to India and Pakistan boasts of one-fifth of the world’s population.11 A brief survey of South Asia underscores its significance to U.S. policy—and global stability and prosperity, well beyond “Project Afghanistan.” To the west of the region is Afghanistan, which has been the hotbed of terrorism and consequently, the main battleground for the GWOT. India, the world’s largest democracy, is showing impressive economic growth and gaining in stature in global trade, to say nothing of its demand for raw material and resources. Pakistan, with a


diverse population of more than 190 million,\textsuperscript{12} boasts the seventh largest —and also one of the most professional military—in the world.

What’s more, South Asia finds itself in a seriously nuclearized neighborhood, the only region on earth with three nuclear neighbors—China, India, and Pakistan. West and northwest is resource-rich Central Asia, much of which still struggles to overcome decades of Soviet misrule; further still to the west is Iran, which currently is a major focus of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, if Iran makes good on its nuclear ambitions—turning the nuclear triangle into a rectangle—there will be far-reaching strategic implications for regional as well as extra-regional players, including the United States and its closest allies.

Future U.S. strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific, for which Washington needs the active support of India, can only be fulfilled if India is willing to oblige. The U.S. Asia-Pacific agenda is apparently aimed at containing China, which is also a major player in South Asia—and not strictly in the negative sense.\textsuperscript{13} China is already a strategic partner of Pakistan’s and, ironically, a major trading partner of India’s.\textsuperscript{14} China is the main supplier of military hardware and civil nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{15} The two-way trade between China and India reached $74 billion in 2011, with China becoming one of the largest trade partners of India and vice versa.\textsuperscript{16} Both countries agreed to take steps to ensure that their bilateral trade reaches $100 billion by 2015.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} Lisa Curtis, “Going the Extra Mile for a Strategic U.S.-India Relationship,” The Heritage Foundation, August 20, 2012. Available at www.heritage.org/. /2012/. /going-the-extra-mile-for-a-strategic-us-

\textsuperscript{14} “India-China Trade Hits All Time High of $73.9 Billion in 2011,” NDTV, PTI, January 29, 2012. Available at profit.ndtv.com/. /article-india-china-trade-hits-all-time-high-of-73-


\textsuperscript{17} Shobhan Saxena, “India-China Bilateral Trade Set to Hit $100 Billion by 2015,” Times of India, June 21, 2012. Available at timesofindia.indiatimes.com › Business.
Hence China has emerged as “the main strategic partner of Pakistan” and simultaneously “the main trading partner of India.”

This complex matrix of geo-politics, geo-economics, and attendant security imperatives make the theme of this study important. The timing of this study is equally important because at present, U.S.-Pakistan, U.S.-China, India-China, and India-Pakistan relations are all in a state of flux, bilaterally and in relation to all the others. It is an unsettled (and often unsettling) strategic situation, to be sure.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES: TIPPING THE NUCLEAR TRIANGLE

Enhanced U.S. interest in the region since 9/11 and the perceived threat from China ushered in a strategic partnership between the United States and India. The landmark “Civil Nuclear Deal” or “123 Agreement” between the two countries, finalized in 2009, came as the first solid proof of their growing relationship. In a way, the agreement bestowed upon India de jure status of a nuclear weapon state (NWS) and entitled it to enjoy all the perks and privileges that come with this status, albeit with a few caveats. According to Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan: “India would be eligible to buy U.S. dual-use technology ... to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium, potentially creating materials for nuclear bombs. It would also receive imported fuel for its nuclear reactors.” Arguably, this agreement lets India have its yellowcake and eat it, too.

This upward trend in the U.S.-India defense cooperation, which corresponds with a downward trend in U.S.-Pakistan relations, directly feeds into a deep sense of insecurity


in Pakistan. For example, Pakistan expressed its strong resentment over the 123 Agreement, decrying India’s special arrangement as a discriminatory deal tantamount to undermining the prospects of peace and security in the region.\textsuperscript{20} This feeling of insecurity is exacerbated by the open expression in the United States of distrust and doubts about Pakistan’s sincerity in fighting the GWOT.\textsuperscript{21} The explicit U.S. quest to assign India a larger politico-military role in Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal further complicates the picture, at least from Pakistan’s standpoint. Meanwhile, India’s growing belligerence and the unprecedented overt expression of it by the Indian military leadership casts a further cloud over the future of regional relations. In this context, the Indian military’s role in thwarting the process of rapprochement and confidence-building measures with Pakistan\textsuperscript{22} needs a special mention.

The thesis argues that India will capitalize on its burgeoning relations with the United States to equip and train its armed forces to high levels of contemporary military prowess. At the same time, however, India will continue to act like a non-aligned nation, continuing to pick “a la carte” from the offerings that other states bring. In the past, India waved the banner of the non-aligned movement while acquiring substantial amounts of military equipment from the erstwhile USSR.\textsuperscript{23} This time, India will seek advanced U.S. technology without compromising much on its military ties with Russia, Israel, and France.\textsuperscript{24}

Despite India’s decades-old reliance on multiple sources for military and economic support, it was obsessed with maintaining its ‘strategic autonomy’. According

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Dr. Nasrullah Mirza and M. Sadiq, “Indo-U.S. Agreement: Impact on Deterrence Stability in South Asia.”
to Dr. Upendra Choudhury, “The concept of strategic autonomy is one of the few hallmarks of Indian foreign policy that enjoyed unparalleled political consensus in the country.” However, a leading Indian-American South Asia expert Sumit Ganguly puts this Indian obsession to serious question:

In the wake of the disastrous Sino-Indian border war of 1962, India sought military assistance from the United States. Soon thereafter, following the first Chinese nuclear test of 1964, India actually reportedly sought a nuclear guarantee from the United States. … India’s putative commitment to an autonomous foreign policy was compromised in the aftermath of the Indo-Soviet treaty of “peace, friendship and cooperation” of 1971. … India’s subsequent dependence on the Soviets for markets, weaponry and diplomatic leverage especially in the U.N. Security Council, compromised its independence of action.

This circumstance would bolster India’s (self-) image as a rising great power and a potential counter-weight to China. India would seek to be in a position to over-awe its traditional rival, Pakistan, and to sideline the contentious issues outstanding between them. Indian leaders will put all the right words in Western (read: U.S.) ears while continuing to pursue their long-term strategic interests. India will enhance its influence in Indian Ocean region by fulfilling its ambitions of having a “blue water” navy. In the long run, it will not do the U.S. bidding; it might even challenge the United States whenever their interests diverge. In other words, India will never be an “all-weather ally” of the United States. The growing U.S.-Indian defense cooperation does not portend good things for the strategic interests of Pakistan or the peace and security of South Asian region.


27 A respected former Indian army chief, General S. Padmanabhan authored a book in 2004 titled, The Writing on the Wall: India Checkmates America 2017. In it, he paints a scenario of U.S. humiliation in a conflict with India that eventuates in the aftermath of an India-Pakistan war in which the United States supports Pakistan. In the preface, the author writes, “I have projected the events of early 2003 some 15 years into the future . . . I have made many assumptions, quite a few of which do not appear realities or even possibilities today, but, which could conceivably become realities in 10 to 15 years’ time.” Although a work of fiction, the book provides a glimpse into the Indian military mindset.
The first—and worst—losers in this game are the people of South Asia, whose welfare and advancement are affected directly by the money and attention that is diverted to the unsettled strategic situation. Although human security is not the focus of this thesis, it is, needless to say, intertwined with the traditional concept of security, particularly in the context of South Asia. As a measure of human security, the Human Development Index (HDI) provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income. India’s HDI stands at 0.554 today, which gives the country a rank of 136 out of 187 countries with comparable data. The HDI of South Asia as a region is 0.558, placing India below the regional average.\(^{28}\) According to the U.N. Human Development Report 2011, “Although placed in the medium category, India’s standing is way behind scores of economically less developed countries, including war-torn Iraq as well as the Philippines. India has the world’s largest number of multidimensionally poor, more than half of the population, at 612 million. Its gender inequality index is 0.6, the highest in South Asia.”\(^{29}\) (Pakistan’s gender inequality index stands at 0.567, marginally better than India.\(^{30}\)) In 2012, Pakistan’s HDI was 0.515 (below the regional average), which gave the country a rank of 146 out of 187 countries with comparable data.\(^{31}\) In Pakistan 49.4 percent of the population suffer multiple deprivations while an additional 11.0 percent are vulnerable to multiple deprivations.\(^{32}\) Real stability, real prosperity, real democracy is not possible in the region amid such a human crisis.

**D. LITERATURE REVIEW—AND WHAT IS LEFT TO BE SAID**

In recent years many policy papers, review articles, and a few books have been written on how U.S.-Indian bilateral relations have markedly improved over the last

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\(^{29}\) “India Ranks 134 in Human Development Index,” Hindustan Times, November 2, 2011. The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) identifies multiple deprivations in the same households in education, health and standard of living.


\(^{31}\) Ibid.

decade and the prospects for future. Defense cooperation has been portrayed as the foundation of such relations. Interestingly, much less comparable literature has come up on the variable nature and future contours of U.S.-Pakistan relations, though, the sinusoidal pattern of U.S.-Pakistan defense cooperation has been the subject of separate reports. How Iran and China factor into the U.S.-Indian and the U.S.-Pakistan relationships respectively has also been mentioned. What has not been explored much in this discourse is the prudence of U.S. policy of strategic de-hyphenation—the pursuit of relations with India and Pakistan independently of one another.

1. The United States and India

Although the landmark U.S.-India civil nuclear deal has been much discussed, its distinct security-related aspects have not been amply flagged in this broader debate. A few research reports and theses by academic institutions and think tanks have addressed either the overall phenomenon of rising India or Indian defense transformation in terms of its enhanced collaboration with a number of countries around the globe.

There is a dominant school of thought led by the U.S. policy circles that have been the most optimistic about India. A November 2011 U.S. Department of Defense Report to Congress quotes President Obama calling U.S.-Indian security cooperation one


of “the defining partnerships of the 21st century.”

A “robust and mutually beneficial” partnership has been projected to grow in the next few years in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. Maritime security, counterterrorism, defense trade, and armaments cooperation would be the key areas under focus. During a July 2012 visit to New Delhi, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter called India “an economic power with an increasing military capability.” Being the world’s largest democracy, India’s role in political stability of South Asia was termed crucial. However, a critical point Dr. Carter missed was the importance of strategic stability in South Asia, which has been elusive despite enviable democratic credentials of India.

Ironically, before becoming a U.S. defense official, Carter wrote in 2006 that the United States would not necessarily benefit from security cooperation with India because, as a rising great power, India could opt to go its own way while pursuing its national interest. A member of the current U.S. administration, which is keen to woo India, Carter explains the change in his stance on this particular issue. In the same article, he writes: “India’s diplomats and civil servants are notorious for adhering to independent positions regarding the world order, economic development, and nuclear security. The architects of the India deal have suggested that such habits will quickly yield in the face of recent U.S. accommodations on the nuclear issue. But their expectation is naïve. The same dynamic holds today.

A more typical American view of the situation comes from Robert Kaplan, who wrote that “rising India is the greatest piece of geopolitical good luck the United States


38 Ibid.


40 Ibid., 44.
has come up since the end of Cold War.” During his May 13, 2011, address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Mr. Robert O. Blake, Jr. echoed Kaplan’s optimism. In the context of strategic partnership, he claimed that rise of India was unquestionably in the U.S. national interest. He also stressed that it was a long-term relationship, but an even more important point that he made was that it should not be taken for granted. Actually this is the crucial point that policy makers and analysts tend to miss, especially when dealing with India, which has traditionally been obsessed with maintaining “strategic autonomy.” All the wishful thinking that Washington can muster may not persuade India to act consistently in line with U.S. interests.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated: “India and U.S. share the common goal of making this one of the principal relationships of our countries.” One—but not the only one … Indian policy elites seem to be less giddy and more business-like than their U.S. counterparts when it comes to mutual defense collaboration. Official statements emanating from New Delhi are much more diplomatic. During his recent visit to New Delhi, Mr. Panetta declared the strategic partnership with India “a lynchpin” of new U.S. strategy in the Pacific region. However, the Indian response was rather cool as New Delhi is not given to clear alignments when it comes to foreign policy. “We’ll never be an alliance partner with the U.S.,” said Lalit Mansingh, an analyst and a former Indian ambassador to Washington. “The limit is a partnership.” The Indians feel that

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the offer of joint exercises or training and contingency handling in the Asia-Pacific region has all the trappings of an alliance in the sense of exactly the kind of permanent entanglement that the punctiliously nonaligned India has tried to avoid.\footnote{Sourabh Gupta, “The Limits to U.S.-India Defense Ties,” Diplomat, July 30, 2011. Available at thediplomat.com/2011/07/30/the-limits-to-us-india-defence-ties/.

In India, there are two clear schools of thought when it comes to forging strategic relations with the United States. The first school feels that this bilateral relationship would be commensurate with India’s new status of emerging great power and hence in its long-term strategic interests. The other school of thought maintains that the United States is encouraging India to join a partnership that will serve mainly to contain China, even though categorically opting for the “Counter China” would not be beneficial for India in the longer run.\footnote{Arun Sahgal, “India and U.S. Rebalancing Strategy for Asia-Pacific,” Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), July 9, 2012; Lisa Curtis, “Going the Extra Mile for a Strategic U.S.-India Relationship,” The Heritage Foundation, August 20, 2012; Dr. A. Adityanjee, “India-U.S. Tango: Part-Time Lovers,” The Council for Strategic Affairs, New Delhi, India, June 27, 2012; Sourabh Gupta, “The Limits to U.S.-India Defense Ties,” Diplomat, July 30, 2012; Indranil Banerjie, “India Must Keep Distance from China-West Conflict,” Asian Age, July 20, 2012.

India has the option of following the middle course, too. It might astutely avail itself of the current U.S. benevolence by selectively acquiring cutting-edge defense technology as well as expertise through mutual exercises without clearly subscribing to a “Contain China” strategy. India is looking for U.S. arms but not its partnership.\footnote{David S. Cloud and Mark Magnier, “India Not Sold on Closer Military Ties with U.S.”

India is looking for U.S. arms but not its partnership.\footnote{Shobhan Saxena, “India-China Bilateral Trade Set to Hit $100 Billion by 2015, Times of India, Jun 21, 2012. Available at timesofindia.indiatimes.com › Business.}
Owing to its growing energy needs, India is expected to continue pursuing its robust relations with Iran, which has the world’s fourth-largest reserve of oil and the second-largest proven reserves of gas.\footnote{U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: Iran,” Last Update: October 16, 2012. Available at www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=IR.} Iran is anxious to get its hydrocarbons out of the ground and into new markets, and energy-hungry India wants to be such a market.\footnote{Christine Fair, “India-Iran Security Ties: Thicker than Oil,” in Sokolski ed. Gauging U.S.-India Strategic Partnership (Carlisle, PA: SSI, 2002), 275.} As the United States isolates Iran by pushing countries to cut oil purchases and other commerce with the Islamic republic, India is building new trade ties there, saying Iran is its path to building the influence it needs in Central Asia and Afghanistan.\footnote{Rebecca Byerly, “Why India is Trying to Expand Trade with Iran,” Christian Science Monitor, March 29, 2012. Available at www.csmonitor.com/2012/Why-India-is-trying-to-expand-trade.} Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton arrived in New Delhi in May 2012, after declaring that India should reduce imports of Iranian oil and comply with Western sanctions. Yet across town, India and Iran were trying to figure out ways to do business together.\footnote{Jim Yardley, “Indians Host Clinton While Also Wooing Iran,” New York Times, May 8, 2012. Available at www.nytimes.com/2012/india-and-iran-keep-economic-relations-d.} Hence in some of the literature on U.S.-India relations, the latter’s relations with Iran are portrayed as a stumbling block.

2. **The United States and Pakistan**

In the realm of U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation, the usual diplomatic homilies notwithstanding, the dominant narrative in the literature is that this relationship has been intermittent and is likely to remain so in the future as well.\footnote{Salma M. Siddiqui, “Pakistan Weary of U.S. Alliance,” International Relations and Security Network (ISN), November 18, 2010. Available at www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id.} U.S. interest in this relationship has transformed from its imperative to check the spread of communism in the last century to its current mission to stop the spread of terrorism in the new millennium. The threat of and from India, as well as the drive for attaining strategic
parity with it, drives Pakistan’s relations with the United States.⁵⁶ There is also a feeling that the United States has been the primary beneficiary of this asymmetric partnership, which some analysts term a “marriage of convenience.”⁵⁷ While complaining about U.S. “strategic unfaithfulness” toward Pakistan, the analysts tend to forget the famous statement by the British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston that “a country does not have permanent friends, only permanent interests.”⁵⁸ Pakistan has also benefited from this relationship. Instead of just bemoaning the fragility of this alliance, analysts should concentrate on how best Pakistan can continue to benefit from it. In this sense, the partnership is at least half full, rather than half empty.

Another common refrain is that growing U.S.-India defense cooperation threatens Pakistan’s security interests. Riaz Haq writes: “The U.S. support is emboldening India’s military, and its leadership has already started saber rattling against Pakistan and China.”⁵⁹ In the context of Pakistan’s security concerns, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal (Assistant Professor of International Relations at Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad) writes: “Pakistan’s strategic outlook has been influenced by a geo-military disequilibrium that is highly favorable to India.” He goes on: “India is a strong motivating factor in Islamabad’s willingness to renew the defense relationship with Washington. India’s earnest desire is to disrupt Pakistan-U.S. defense cooperation.”⁶⁰ A leading Pakistani security analyst, Dr. Shireen Mazari states: “The deepening U.S.-India strategic relationship, particularly in nuclear field, hardly bodes well for the regional security.”⁶¹

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⁵⁷ Ibid.


Recent and unprecedented belligerent statements by the Indian generals and even the army chief are quoted to lend credence to this argument.\textsuperscript{\textit{62}} However, the point that such analysts miss is that such outbursts could be aimed more at their domestic or Western audiences than their adversarial neighbors. Another point that is missed is that such Indian military rhetoric provides an opportunity for Pakistan, too. Islamabad can present these “threats” as “opportunities” to seek assistance from interested stakeholders in a bid to strengthen itself. It might be difficult to dismiss totally the assertion that growing military muscle will turn India even more belligerent and intransigent in dealing with its neighbors, especially Pakistan. The analysts, however, tend to overlook the possibility of drawing some benefit out of this strategic challenge, provided Pakistan plays its cards well.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis adopts the comparative approach, commencing with the exploration of primary sources such as declassified U.S. documents as well as secondary open sources like official statements and reports from the United States, India, and Pakistan. Additionally, analyses by the leading experts in the field of security and strategic studies as well as think tanks provide the basis for much of the analysis that follows. In the interests of balance, sources from the United States and the West, India, and Pakistan inform these pages. The views of the independent U.S. experts on South and Central Asia and U.S. scholars of Indian and Pakistani origin (though relatively few) enjoy special emphasis, including books and papers authored or edited by such renowned regional experts as Alan Kronstadt, Andrew Scobell, Christine Fair, Feroz Khan, Henry Sokolski, Maleeha Lodhi, Michael Chambers, Paul Kapur, Rifaat Hussain, Shireen Mazari, Stephen Blank, Stephen Cohen, Strobe Talbott, Sumit Ganguly, Sunil Dasgupta, Teresita Schaffer, and Zafar Jaspal.

As this topic is a current issue, much has been written and continues to be written in the leading newspapers and journals. To that end, major U.S. newspapers like \textit{New}

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York Times and Washington Post, Pakistani newspapers like Dawn and News, and Indian newspapers like Times of India and Hindustan Times provide valuable, current material. Other credible news sources would also be tapped. Apart from these sources, reports by the Congressional Research Service, the Center for Security and International Studies, and the Heritage Foundation represent scholarly viewpoints on emerging question. Analyses from Indian think tanks like Institute for Defense and Strategic Analyses, United Services Institute and Pakistani Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, and Institute of Strategic Studies Research and Analysis at the National Defense University Islamabad also figure in the present study.63

The analysis that follows is objective in the scholarly sense but perhaps not neutral—in the sense that the author is a senior officer in the Pakistan armed forces with a decided stake in the outcome of the strategic contest in South Asia. Stability and prosperity on the subcontinent clearly would benefit a billion or so souls, the author included; reliably peaceable relations between India and Pakistan would allow both powers to focus on the not inconsiderable regional and global security concerns that they both face—separately—today. Most certainly, this thesis is not a screed or a blind rant against a demonized “hereditary enemy.” Built on scholarship from all sides of the South Asian question, it elucidates the strategic concerns that have shaped U.S. security cooperation in the region to date and the ramifications in the near and medium term of the likeliest strategic and political decisions to emerge, particularly as the United States shifts gears in Afghanistan and other contender powers, including India, orient themselves for the next challenges.

**F. THESIS OVERVIEW**

Chapter II traces the genesis and development of U.S. security relations with the major powers of South Asia, in the Cold War era. First, it addresses India amid the broader context of the respective foreign policies in which these relations are embedded.

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63 While selecting the sources, effort has been made to represent the views of various stakeholders and experts on the subject across the policy and intellectual divide in the United States, India, Pakistan, and beyond.
Then, it dilates upon U.S. relations with Pakistan, using the same format and context. These two studies provide a comparative analysis of these relations, which are basically driven by the U.S. view of India and Pakistan and that, thus, color the whole security cooperation venture.

Chapter III deals with the transformation of the respective relations in the last decade of the 20th century and first decade of the new millennium—which has been unprecedented in case of U.S.-India relations. It has not only affects the current strategic and security environment in South Asia but it might also affect Central Asia, Indian Ocean Region, as well as Asia-Pacific.

Chapter IV, in essence, forms an informed “crystal-ball gazing” with respect to this complex trilogy of relations. The vital question of de-hyphenating U.S. relations with the two lead players in South Asia forms the core of this chapter. Pakistan’s role and interests in this connection receive detailed attention; in part because these aspects tend to get lost first in the heated rhetoric that punctuates the peaks and valleys of its relations with the United States.

The final chapter contains the conclusions and recommendations for the policy and security elite of the lead actors in this “strategic love-triangle.” Going by the historical precedence and current trends, U.S.-India defense relations are not likely to flourish in a significant way in the near future, nor are U.S.-Pakistan relations likely to undergo any major transformation for the better. If U.S.-India relations develop the way they are being projected by the two sides, especially if that means exclusion of Pakistan from the equation, it will have serious ramifications for the security and strategic stability in the region.
II. SECURITY COOPERATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS—THE UNITED STATES, INDIA, AND PAKISTAN IN THE COLD-WAR ERA

India, a British colony for more than a century, was granted independence in 1947 not as one country but as two: India and Pakistan. The two countries were formed on a communal basis—roughly dividing the Muslim and non-Muslim population of the erstwhile “jewel” of British imperialism, and their conflicting founding narratives/identities made for fraught relations right from the beginning. The emergence of these two states in South Asia coincided with the growing U.S. interest in the region owing to its urge to check the spread of communism. Within a decade of gaining independence, India and Pakistan got involved in defense cooperation with the United States. From these first moments, the differences between South Asia’s two largest powers, refracted through the divergent U.S. views of and policies toward India and Pakistan, settled into distinctive tracks for strengthening each state’s “defense position,” as contemporary policy classified such cooperation. Consequently, over the next four decades, U.S-India and U.S.-Pakistan relations were primarily driven by the cold war dynamics on one hand and Indo-Pak rivalry on the other.

A. THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA: A RELUCTANT RELATIONSHIP

From the outset, the United States regarded India with a slightly wary optimism—and still managed, at most turns, to expect rather more from India than it got.

1. Getting the Post-Independence Period Right

The stakes were high. Echoing concerns floated throughout the U.S. national security community, the State Department’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs wrote in 1952: “Communist gains in the recent elections in India show clearly that the conditions our program is designed to combat are being successfully exploited by Communist agents. [The office] believes that if South Asia is subverted it will be only a matter of time before all of the Asian land-mass and over a billion people will be under Communist domination, and our national
security will face an unprecedented threat.” The concern was overwhelmingly economic—could India become reliably self-sustaining before the next elections, which would happen in 1956–1957 at the latest?

Policy recommendations were primarily economic, as well—for example, a contentious $125 million in proposed aid to India in 1952–1953. As U.S. Ambassador to India Chester B. Bowles expounded in a telegram that he intended to reach President Truman:

[India is the] [s]econd largest country in world in a key strategic position in Asia. Present government devoted democratic way, sound development program ready to go, great natural resources, willing people. Short on food, capital, technical know-how. Half measure can result disintegration present democratic government, despair of people, open invitation to waiting Communists take over.

Your proposed program aimed to reach 120 million village people India in 4 years time and make India wholly self-supporting in food and probably cotton within that period. Our entire emphasis on making dollars produce several times their value in production here. Total 4-year cost for 360 million Indian people no more than amount spent on economic aid Greece and annual total economic and military aid committed to Formosa, an island of 8 million which symbolizes Communist victory in China, a nation of 400,000,000.

If Republican Party refuses to support this program for India then the basic political motivation and dishonesty of their criticism past Chinese policy

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will be dramatically evident to all concerned. I believe this program is not only minimum on an economic basis but also sound politically and truly vital if we not to share responsibility India going way of China.66

Military aid was also forthcoming, as befit an independent emerging democracy in a tough strategic neighborhood. Soon after Indian independence, the United States supplied 200 Sherman tanks worth $19 million to India, thus becoming the first country to establish defense trade with India.67 Despite Pakistan’s insistence that further military sales to India would deform the regional military balance in India’s favor,68 the United States also supplied fifty-four C-119 Fairchild military transport aircraft to India.69

The difficulty arose with India’s founding leader and Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who opted for non-alignment as the basis of India’s post-independence foreign policy. For Nehru, non-alignment meant pursuing Indian national interests independent of

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67 The U.S. Congress had approved $ 190 million food aid. For more details, see Dinesh Kumar, “Defense in Indo-U.S. Relations,” Strategic Analysis, vol. 20, no. 5, August 1997, 751.


the Cold War antagonists: the United States and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{70} This stance meant that foreign aid or assistance to India had to come, officially at least, with no strings attached—which proposition Nehru’s government tested early and often. For example, the United States discovered in 1953 that India had authorized shipments of thorium nitrate to China, despite its acquiescence to the Battle Act that precluded such sales or shipments to the communist world.\textsuperscript{71} (Thorium can be used as a nuclear fuel.) When the American embassy in New Delhi—now led by George Allen, a career diplomat who did not share Bowles’s ardent boosterism of India—leaned on Nehru to uphold India’s end of the Battle Act, preferably in public, Nehru reminded his interlocutors of the no-strings requirement.\textsuperscript{72} In a telegram that ultimately landed before the president, Ambassador Allen advocated the Nehru be required to make a “clear-cut” request for U.S. aid that thus would activate the Battle Act—and that Washington be prepared to curtail its assistance for some time in the (very likely) absence of such an avowal.\textsuperscript{73} In the end, the United States had to content itself with a collection of variously official statements since 1951, assembled by embassy staff, to stand in for an assertion of India’s commitment to

\textsuperscript{70} Sumit Ganguly and Brian Shoup eds., \textit{U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation into 21st century: more than words}, 2.


\textsuperscript{73} The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State (telegram), August 14, 1953, Document 1053 in U.S. Department of State, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954}, volume XI, Part 2, Africa and South Asia (in two parts), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952–54v11p2/d1053. The routing of this communication to President Truman’s office is captured in the subsequent document in the series.
the West in return for U.S. aid.\textsuperscript{74} Washington also undertook to buy thorium compounds from India as a replacement for such sales to China.\textsuperscript{75}

Worse from Washington’s perspective, India’s foreign policy in fact distinctly inclined toward the USSR, in no small part due to Nehru’s personal leanings toward socialist ideals.\textsuperscript{76} Nehru and his successors stood a common ground with USSR on a host of issues. “The Soviet leaders endorsed the entire range of Indian foreign policy based on the Panch Shila and supported India’s position against Pakistan on Kashmir. The Soviet Union also supported India’s position vis-à-vis Portugal on Goa, which was territorially integrated into India as a union territory by the Indian armed forces in December 1961.’’\textsuperscript{77} However, Nehru visited the United States in 1949, 1956, and again in 1961,\textsuperscript{78} and India never hesitated to accept U.S. military assistance whenever it was available.\textsuperscript{79} In all, during this period, India received some $10 billion in U.S. assistance.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{74} Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Acting Secretary of State and the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), August 20, 1953, Document 1055 in U.S. Department of State, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954}, volume XI, Part 2, Africa and South Asia (in two parts), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952–54v11p2/d1055.

\textsuperscript{75} See, for example, Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Kalijarvi) to the Secretary of State, October 7, 1953, Document 1067 in U.S. Department of State, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954}, volume XI, Part 2, Africa and South Asia (in two parts), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952–54v11p2/d1057.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{80} Arthur Rubinoff, “Incompatible Objectives and Shortsighted Policies,” in Sumit Ganguly and Brian Shoup eds., 43.
2. **Bold Step: The Indian Invasion of Goa**

Goa on the Indian Ocean had been a Portuguese colony for four and a half centuries, one of a handful of Portuguese possession on the Indian subcontinent after independence from Britain. A local resistance to Portuguese rule on Goa arose, coinciding with the broader wave of regional independence movements in the early 20th century, including the formation in the interwar period of a Goa Congress Committee with Indian support and solidarity. Armed groups also formed as the struggle over Goa’s future intensified following Indian independence. In 1955, the death of a few Goan and Indian protesters on a “liberation march” at the hands of Portuguese forces provided the opportunity for India to intervene. A large number of Indian troops, duly supported by the navy and air force, invaded the territory and annexed it after defeating the grossly outnumbered Goan forces.81

The United States condemned the Indian invasion and pointed out the double standards of Nehru, who had been lecturing U.S. leaders against use of force in foreign affairs. President Kennedy wrote to Prime Minister Nehru on January 18, 1962:

… I should like to say a word about the more immediate issue, that of the effect of the Goan episode on the relations between our two countries. It has not been good, but there may be useful lessons from the experience.

I have also been disturbed by the chain effect of this action on other parts of the world. Public opinion does not easily differentiate between the use of troops for good and bad purposes. And all countries, including of course the United States, have a great capacity for convincing themselves of the full righteousness of their particular cause. No country ever uses force for reasons it considers unjust.

I fear that the episode in Goa will make it harder to hold the line for peace in other places.

But my major concern was and continues to be the effect of the action on our joint tasks, especially in terms of its impact on American opinion. Unfortunately the hard, obvious fact for our people was the resort to force—and by India. This was a shock to the majority who has admired

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your country’s ardent advocacy of peaceful methods, and reinforcement to those who did not enjoy what they called “irresponsible lectures.”

Public opinion in the United States did sour briefly, though popular press coverage at the time tended to focus on the United Nations’ silence on the invasion, enforced by a sure Soviet veto of any Security Council response and the momentum of decolonization, at least where European imperialism was concerned. From the American vantage, Goa was just a sign of the times. Kennedy’s own school-masterly tone notwithstanding, Washington ultimately did nothing to curtail foreign aid and security assistance on India. In his letter to Prime Minister Nehru, President Kennedy also wrote: “There is also the problem of aid appropriations. This, I should make clear, is not a question of strings; nothing could be farther from my thought than to make our assistance to India contingent on her acceptance of our particular wishes in foreign or domestic policy.” Thus, did Kennedy establish Washington’s tendency to tiptoe around India’s much-touted but tendentiously practiced non-alignment.

3. The Sino-Indian War: A Rude Awakening and Reorientation for India

Emboldened by their Goan adventure, the Indians sought to resolve their long-standing border dispute with China again by the use of force. In late 1961 and early 1962, Indian troops moved forward into Chinese-occupied territory. During the next few months, tensions continued to mount due to Indian failure to withdraw despite clear warnings by the Chinese. Instead, the Indian government resorted to its characteristic diplomatic double-speak to build its own wiggle room. Finally, the Chinese lost their

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83 See, for example, Robert Wallace, “Is the UN Worth all the Effort?” in Life Magazine, vol. 52, no. 1 (January 5, 1962), 60–66. The same article reported the “shocking” speech by India’s ambassador to the UN, C.S. Jha, asserting that “India will have its way, ‘Charter or no Charter, Council or no Council.’”

patience and wiped out a brigade of Indian forces through a “punitive expedition” on October 20, 1962.  

Nehru was so unnerved by the humiliating rout that he frantically sought U.S. aid in two letters to President Kennedy in November 1962. In his biography of Nehru, Gopal summarized these two letters as:

… describing the situation as “really desperate” and requesting the immediate dispatch of a minimum of twelve squadrons of supersonic all-weather fighters and the setting up of radar communications. American personnel would have to man these fighters and installations and protect Indian cities from air attacks by the Chinese till India personnel had been trained. If possible, the United States should also send planes flown by American personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in any battles with the Chinese in Indian air space; but aerial action by Indian elsewhere would be the responsibility of the Indian Air Force. Nehru also asked for two B-47 bomber squadrons to enable India to strike at Chinese bases and air fields, but to learn to fly these planes Indian pilots and technicians would be sent immediately for training in the United States. All such assistance and equipment would be utilized solely against the Chinese.

Ironically, Nehru, who cherished socialist ideals and had been a pioneer of the non-aligned movement, cited the common democratic values between the United States and India, to curry favor with Kennedy. (The Soviets, who had praised the intervention in Goa by their new friend and client, India, had rather less to say about the set-to with China, a “fraternal” communist power with which relations were deteriorating.) The United States responded favorably and, as a result, India received a steady flow of U.S. grants and military sales between 1963 and 1965.

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This brief period of bonhomie ended with the U.S. embargo of both India and Pakistan in the wake of their 1965 war. Moreover, the American Congress was taking an ever dimmer view of foreign aid. By the later 1960s, with the United States sinking into the “quagmire” of the war in Vietnam, the Conte and Symington amendments sought to regulate U.S. foreign aid, particularly in states that seemed, to American taxpayers, only to turn around and use the money to finance more turmoil and violence. Both acts had the potential to limit significantly U.S. aid to India, but they had less effect than their authors might have hoped. In the event, the Indians carried on with their plans—playing carefully to Cold War geo-strategic concerns all the while.

Indira Gandhi vigorously followed the same no-strings track as Nehru had pioneered. Washington was disappointed, though not deterred. Walt Rostow, then acting as special assistant to President Lyndon Johnson, wrote to his president: “We have tried to use the delay to find ways to use the loan as political leverage with Mrs. Gandhi and to impress on her how painful it is to get these large sums for a country that isn’t always as helpful as we could wish. I am afraid we have come up empty.” Indeed, that same year, Indian Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Morarji Desai, told the U.S. ambassador: “One thing must be clear: no matter how much money you give us, we cannot compromise our right as a sovereign nation to make our own decisions regarding

89 Ibid.
90 The Conte-Long Amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968, adopted January 2, 1968 directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (PL 90–249; 81 Stat. 936).
91 The Symington Act required the President to withhold economic assistance if in his view the recipient country excessively and unnecessarily diverted resources to military expenditures (PL 90–137; 81 Stat. 445).
military defense. If this has become a condition of U.S. aid, we shall have to get along without it.”

When the Republican Nixon administration replaced the Democratic Johnson administration, it maintained the high level of White House interest in South Asia but to even less effect. As a part of her world tour aimed at conditioning the international environment for ultimate Indian invasion of East Pakistan, Indira Gandhi had visited the White House on November 4 and 5, 1971—for discussions that Henry Kissinger later characterized as “the two most unfortunate meetings that Nixon had with any foreign leader.” In a follow up to her visit:

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House on the morning of November 5, 1971, to discuss Nixon’s conversation with Prime Minister Gandhi on the previous day. Kissinger’s overall assessment was that “the Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there…. To them East Pakistan is no longer the issue. Now, I found it very interesting how [Gandhi] carried on to you yesterday about West Pakistan.” He felt, however, that Nixon had achieved his objective in the conversation: “While she was a bitch, we got what we wanted, too. She will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn’t give her a warm reception and therefore in despair she’s got to go to war.”

Despite the famous personal antipathy between Richard Nixon and Indira Gandhi, in the interlude between Indian-Pakistan wars, 1965–1971, “India received $4.2

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95 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 878.

billion of American economic aid, about $1.5 billion of it during the Nixon years” starting in 1969.97

4. Indian Invasion of East Pakistan: The Birth of Bangladesh

Due to inept policies adopted by successive governments based in West Pakistan, the majority Bengali population of East Pakistan progressively developed a sense of political and socio-economic deprivation and neglect at the hands of their dominant West Pakistani compatriots. This feeling was exacerbated by the inadequate response by resource-constrained Islamabad to two natural calamities that befell East Pakistan in 1970: a huge flood in August and a devastating cyclone in November.98 The East Pakistanis vented their feelings by heavily supporting the Awami League in December 1970 national elections, thus giving the East Pakistani party an overwhelming majority to form the national government. However, a political crisis was created when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto—whose Pakistan People’s Party had won a simple majority in the West Pakistan—thwarted the constitutional right of Awami League to form the national government.99

India sought to capitalize on simmering Bengali discontent in the wake of this political crisis. According to Feroz Khan:

Among the brewing conflicts and growing polarization of Pakistan’s two ends, Indian intelligence operatives intensified their subversive activities by exploiting Pakistani miseries and openly abetting the Bengali rebels. As tens of thousands of East Pakistani refugees fled to India, many of them volunteered to be trained for the insurgency. India established hundreds of training camps and prepared a rebellion force that would famously be known as the Mukti Bahini (“Freedom Fighters”).100

97 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, 848.
99 Ibid.
100 Feroz H. Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, 75.
Consequently, the Pakistan Army, being chief custodian of the integrity of the country, launched a crackdown against the dissidents on March 25, 1971. The resulting civil war-like situation presented India with a golden opportunity to intervene and peel off the poor but populous East Pakistan. That would shatter Pakistan’s ideological foundation (nationhood based on common religion: Islam) and a vivisected Pakistan would no longer pose a “two-front” situation to India in any future conflict.101 “Throughout the summer of 1971, the U.S. embassy in India tried to mediate between New Delhi, Islamabad, and Mujibnagar [Awami League’s headquarters established in the Indian city of Calcutta], but to no avail.”102 When India formally launched an invasion of East Pakistan on December 3, 1971, heavily out-numbered and ill-equipped Pakistan Army formations—with only one air force squadron at their disposal—gave a good account of themselves in the opening days of war. However, they could not long withstand India’s overwhelming multi-pronged thrusts, duly supported by thousands of Mukti Bahini forces, toward East Pakistan’s capital, Dacca. After the final Indian assault on Dacca on December 15, 1971, Pakistani forces finally surrendered on December 16, thus heralding the creation of Bangladesh.103 This humiliating surrender and resultant Indian arrogance left deep scars on Pakistani psyche which guided its security and foreign policies in the following decades.

5. The Nuclear Dimension

As India embarked upon its nuclear program in mid-1950s, it was fully supported by the United States, which trained Indian scientists at U.S. facilities, built Indian nuclear infrastructure at Tarapur, and provided heavy water for that facility. In 1974, India made demonstratively real the potential for the dual use of the infrastructure meant for nuclear energy when it tested a nuclear explosive device, which could form the basis for production of nuclear weapons. On May 18, 1974, All-India Radio announced, “At 8:05

101 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, 52.
102 Feroz H. Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, 75.
103 Ibid., 76–77.
a.m. this morning, India successfully conducted an underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes.”

By whatever name, the U.S. reaction to India’s nuclear detonation can be gauged from the excerpts of a Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency on May 18, 1974:

The nth power has finally come forward. The Indian test is a setback to nonproliferation; we had made it clear to the Indians that we opposed a test by them, even one labeled, as in this instance, a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). The implications could be considerable, both with regard to South Asia and in the broad nonproliferation context. … The most immediate problem will be containing the Pakistani reaction.

The Indian test is bound to have an unsettling effect on the South Asia scene, most particularly on the Pakistanis. Whatever the Indians say, the Pakistanis will regard India’s going nuclear as posing a new threat to Pakistani security. It will intensify their efforts to get a change in our arms policy; they could seek added security assurances from China and the U.S. They could conceivably decide to launch their own crash program, although we estimate that their capabilities for doing this are extremely limited.

Interestingly, during his October 1974 visit to India, Kissinger remarked, “India and the USA now shared another common tradition.” He also renewed commitment to supply nuclear fuel for U.S.-built Tarapur reactors despite the fact that Indians had used the U.S.-supplied heavy water in their Canadian-built CIRUS reactor to produce the fuel for their PNE. By this time, Kissinger was himself immersed in his shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. The United States was reeling from the oil crisis, while Richard Nixon was girding for the so-called Watergate scandal that was about to end his presidency. To the extent that Kissinger concerned himself with nuclear weapons, his focus went to the Soviets and arms-limitation negotiations.

104 Ibid., 117.
106 Feroz H. Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, 120.
Later, however, in order to have a formal mechanism against such exploitation of peaceful nuclear energy programs by regulating nuclear exports, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed in 1975 under the auspices of the United States. In 1978, the NSG introduced regulatory guidelines to ensure that nuclear exports that were meant for generating nuclear energy could not be diverted towards nuclear weapons programs. In 1978, the U.S. legislature introduced stringent rules to govern nuclear exports to non-nuclear states by passing the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Act. However, the U.S. nuclear fuel supply to India continued through 1980.

6. Genuine Reciprocity?

The 1971 Indo-Pak war, highlighted Cold War political dynamics, and India was forced to review its avowed policy of non-alignment. Indian perceptions about the United States and China leaning toward Pakistan, threw it squarely into the Soviets’ lap. In the wake of the bilateral “Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation” of 1971, USSR emerged as a principal arms supplier for India. United States and India embarked on even frostier relations than during almost the entire period of the Cold War.

Still, the United States kept extending itself and its offers of goodwill, partnership, and aid in the name of keeping South Asia out of the Soviet camp. As Henry Kissinger noted to Lakshmi Kant Jha on the eve of the Indian ambassador’s departure from Washington in 1973:

We had always treated you with a mixture of narcissism — seeing things in you that flattered ourselves. The noble savage. I am being very candid. Then you acted like a great power; you got in our way and we had to oppose you.

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109 Amit Gupta, *The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests?*, 2.

But now we can deal in a mature way with each other. We recognize you as a major power in South Asia—from Indochina to the Middle East. Therefore, your concerns have to be taken seriously by us. And your concerns and interests are rather parallel to ours. We do not want any outside power to dominate South Asia. So I think we can deal on the basis of genuine reciprocity.\textsuperscript{111}

The question for U.S. policymakers then—and later—is whether this reciprocity ever genuinely eventuated.

\textbf{B. THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN: A MIXED MILIEU}

The United States moved quickly to establish bilateral relations with Pakistan upon independence, just as it had with India. The U.S. motive behind establishing its relations with Pakistan was the same as its relations with India: having regional allies against the Soviet threat. Unlike India, Pakistan tended to share some of the American alarm about Soviet designs in the region—and found reasons to worry about Chinese expansionism, as well—and, thus, actively oriented itself toward the West, particularly the United States,\textsuperscript{112} though Pakistani leaders did not shy away from critical observations about, for example, the French colonial policy in northern Africa or the generally dismal record of in attaining any kind of resolution in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{113} But, as the U.S. National Security Estimate of 1953, prepared by the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), noted, “Pakistan’s neutralism lacks the doctrinaire quality of India’s. Pakistan’s sympathies are definitely with the U.S. and its allies. Its failure to align itself [formally] with the Western camp can be attributed


\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. See also, “Study Prepared by the National Security Council” [NSC 5409], undated, Document 623 in \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States}, 1952–1954, volume XI, Part 2, Africa and South Asia (in two parts), available at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952–54v11p2/d623. Para. 9 notes that “there are certain restraints to close association with the United States—(1) psychological inhibitions common to the area, and (2) serious restraints peculiar to each country except Pakistan” (emphasis added).

in part to its preoccupation with the Kashmir problem and to its desire to win friends and supporters in the Moslem Middle East, but results mainly from the lack of any sufficiently attractive Western offer in return for its support.” 114 As such, the wisest course for Washington, according to top-level advisers, was to “[g]ive special consideration to Pakistan in providing grant military assistance, in view of Pakistan’s attitude and key position among the countries of South Asia with respect to military collaboration with the West.” 115

Both sides understood that, in the first instance, Pakistan’s urge to seek U.S. security assistance was rooted in its deep sense of insecurity vis-à-vis India. 116 The tensions—and contentions—between the two South Asian powers led the United States to think of defense cooperation with both states in the same breath. For example, the draft document that eventually became the first Eisenhower administration’s National Security Council policy for South Asia, NSC 5409, included among its courses of action: “Make clear to India that by providing military assistance to Pakistan, the U.S. is not seeking to make Pakistan the dominant state of South Asia.” 117 The hyphen had not yet appeared in American relations with India and Pakistan, but the basic premise made the first steps possible.

In March 1954, President Eisenhower accepted the policy statement on South Asia that included this view of Pakistan. In May of the same year, the United States and Pakistan formalized their bilateral security understanding in the form of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, which opened U.S. training facilities for the Pakistani security forces’ personnel. It also enabled the U.S. military advisors to be stationed in

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114 Ibid.


116 Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army, 60.

Pakistan.\textsuperscript{118} Pakistan was firmly planted in the pro-U.S./anti-Soviet camp when it joined two regional defense pacts, the SEATO and the CENTO, in 1955.\textsuperscript{119} As a result of these alliances, Pakistan received more than $700 million in military aid from 1955 to 1965.\textsuperscript{120}

1. Flying High or Flying Solo? The U-2 Debacle

Almost from the beginning of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, Washington had its eye on rights to facilities and infrastructure in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{121} This ambition was no arm’s length arrangement with a non-aligned power. Even after the prospects of an imminent Soviet incursion into South Asia dimmed, the United States still wanted to launch its spy aircraft from the bases in the region to monitor Soviet military activities. Pakistan, owing to its geographical location and consistently pro-American attitude, seemed to be the right choice. Hence, in 1956, the United States approached Pakistan with a request to lease its northwestern base at Peshawar. Initially, Pakistan’s civilian leadership demurred as Pakistan was going through domestic crisis owing to conflicting interests of two ethnically diverse wings of the country (West and East Pakistan) which were 1000 miles apart geographically. That crisis spanning over almost a decade motivated General Ayub Khan to carry out a military coup in 1958.\textsuperscript{122} Once in power, President Ayub Khan who was looking for the U.S. support accepted its request for using the Peshawar airbase. Consequently, U.S. U-2 spy planes commenced their operations from Pakistan’s Peshawar air base.\textsuperscript{123}

In May 1960, one such plane—bearing the purposefully nondescript identifier “Article 360” and piloted by one Francis Gary Powers, was shot down by a Soviet

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\textsuperscript{119} Stephen Cohen, \textit{The Pakistan Army}, 64.

\textsuperscript{120} Farhat Mahmud, \textit{A History of U.S.-Pakistan Relations} (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1991), pages 6–22.


surface-to-air missile over Soviet territory. Moscow was enraged, not only with the United States but with Pakistan, as well, for enabling the spying flights. (The American popular press, among other sources, had made frequent mention of the U.S. bases in Pakistan, which made them difficult to deny outright.) Without particularly veiling the threat, the Soviets informed Pakistan that it would face immediate retaliation if the U-2 operations continued from Peshawar. Ayub made an open show of bravado, responding to a press question about the Soviet pressures by asking, “Do I look like a frightened man?”

But behind the scenes, Pakistani officials sought to secure more from the United States than assurances that it would come to Pakistan’s aid in the event of an attack—notably 30 additional F-104s. Actually, the request represented an addition of 18 aircraft to an earmark already in process—and now largely bogged down in the works between the U.S. Departments of State and Defense amid the domestic budget cycles.124 The drawn-out response left Pakistan’s government in an awkward position. The U.S. embassy in Karachi reported on August 12, 1960:

Because of the U–2 episode and its aftermath, President Ayub and Foreign Minister Qadir, while not weakening their adherence to the alliance with the United States, expressed a diminution of confidence in America’s ability to act quickly, decisively, and competently in a crisis. Neutralist sentiment was expressed in some quarters and invidious comparisons were drawn about America’s aid program to its ally, Pakistan, and neutralist India and Afghanistan. The [Government of Pakistan] looked for ways to relieve Soviet pressure—by urging us to be more forceful with the Soviets, on the one hand, and by asking the Soviets for technical aid on the other hand. (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/8–1260)125

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The results of the American presidential election in November 1960—which enshrined the Democrat John F. Kennedy in the White House and portended a cooling in U.S.-Pakistan relations—only underscored Karachi’s sense of pending abandonment.\textsuperscript{126}

Pakistan’s neighbors and rivals took note, as well. In addition to the Soviets’ public histrionics, Pakistan faced recriminations from China, India, and Afghanistan for “bringing the Cold War to South Asia.”\textsuperscript{127} Pakistan found itself more or less on its own amid the tub-thumping, particularly among the “non-aligned.” Still seething, the Soviets settled the score with Pakistan by signing the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with India in August 1971,\textsuperscript{128} which emboldened India to help dismember Pakistan the same year.


The year 1964 opened with sectarian violence in South Asia of such scale that U.S. officials worried about a flood of refugees on both sides to rival the dislocations of 1947 and 1950.\textsuperscript{129} The unrest began in Kashmir, “in late December when Kashmiri Muslims demonstrated over the theft of a relic of the Prophet.”\textsuperscript{130} Amid sensationalized


\textsuperscript{128} Sumit Ganguly, \textit{Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947}, 65. See also the “Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 2, 1960, 5:45 m,” which documents the deputy foreign minister of the USSR informing Minister Qadir that the Soviets’ decidedly anti-Pakistan stances on Kashmir and the “Pushtunistan” border issues then simmering with Afghanistan owed entirely to Pakistan’s alliances with the West.

\textsuperscript{129} “Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” January 16, 1964, Document 4 in \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States}, 1964–1968volume XXV, South Asia, available at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964–68v25/d4. The memo notes a letter from Pakistan’s President Ayub, sent to India’s President Radhakrishnan a few days earlier to report some 20,000 Indian Muslims crossing into East Pakistan to flee unrest in Calcutta. The State Department counted 10 million Hindus in East Pakistan and 44 million Muslims in India at the time.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
media reports and rabble-rousing from community leaders, the situation roiled the region, culminating in the second Kashmir war a year later.

Kashmir formed a point of constant friction between India and Pakistan since independence; it also deformed relations with the United States, according to an article by President Ayub that appeared in Foreign Affairs in January 1964, just as the riots reached their violent crescendo.\textsuperscript{131} In a word, Kashmir became a hostage to Indian power politics in the region, the wedge that India meant to drive between Pakistan and a closer alliance with the United States.\textsuperscript{132} Ayub cited the correspondence, a decade earlier, between Nehru and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mohammed Ali in which the Indian leader characterized U.S. military aid to Pakistan as “a qualitative change in the existing situation” with deleterious effects on “Indo-Pakistan relations, and, more especially, the Kashmir problem.”\textsuperscript{133} Specifically, the tenuous agreement on a plebiscite for Kashmir was off if Pakistan accepted American military aid in defiance of India’s aspirations for a non-aligned South Asia: “In May 1954, Pakistan went ahead with the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States. From that point on, the fact that the Indian Prime Minister would repudiate the joint communiqué on Kashmir became a foregone conclusion.”\textsuperscript{134}

The only thing that had changed, according to Ayub, was the U.S. view of the region. Where before “neutralism—’non-alignment’ as India prefers to call it—was suspect in American eyes,” now it represents something of a badge of honor.\textsuperscript{135} “Indeed, some four years ago [with the advent of the Democratic Kennedy administration,] it gradually began to occupy, in American estimation, a privileged position.”\textsuperscript{136}


\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 197.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., n2.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 198.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
Pakistan was disappointed as the United States did not provide the military assistance that Pakistan had expected in the light of defense agreements.\(^{137}\) According to Feroz Khan:

During the war, Pakistan reached the United States and China. Its appeal to the United States did not fall on sympathetic ears and was referred to the United Nations instead. As if such a rebuff was not sufficient, on September 8, the Johnson administration decided to suspend military and economic aid to both India and Pakistan. An argument ensued between Ambassador McConoughy and Bhutto, as the latter accused Washington of poor treatment toward its ally by rewarding Indian aggression. McConoughy responded by questioning whether Pakistan had considered the consequences when it planned, organized, and supported guerrilla operations in Kashmir. The next day, when the U.S. Congress passed the resolution to stop aid, Bhutto was bitter, concluding this “would mean that Pak-U.S. relations could not be the same again.” The U.S. decision was made simply to underscore its position that it would not become entangled in an India-Pakistan conflict.\(^{138}\)

As a matter of fact, India and Pakistan both faced the same restrictions on military aid—a compromise that allowed for the provision of “nonlethal equipment” and spare parts for equipment the United States had previously supplied (while some members of Congress agitated for the curtailment of all U.S. military aid). But Pakistan felt the pinch more as it was mostly reliant on such defense imports to offset its relatively weak indigenous capability. The threat remained just as real—as Pakistan discovered in 1971, when India intervened in the war that ultimately sheared Bangladesh off Pakistan. The seeming indifference of the U.S. stance during Pakistan’s hour of crisis disenchanted Pakistanis and put a question mark on U.S. reliability as an ally.\(^{139}\)

3. **Tipping toward Pakistan, Opening to China**

The United States was still at war in Vietnam and China’s influence could help bring an end to the conflict. The United States recognized that Pakistan had established a

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\(^{139}\) Nadeem F. Paracha, “Pak-U.S. Relations: A Very Analytical History.”
relationship with China and that communication channels through Pakistan were critical in opening a dialogue with Beijing. Bringing China into the global community as a world power to counterbalance the Soviet Union could advance détente and reduce the threat of nuclear war.\textsuperscript{140} U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Beijing in July 1971 secretly via Pakistan with the blessings of Pakistani President General Yahya Khan. Kissinger acknowledged that in the absence of any other established communication channel with China at that time, Pakistan was the only opening that the United States could rely on.

Nixon’s triumph in opening to China irritated the careerists in the State Department. Consequently, even when the Indian war on Pakistan was imminent by the end of 1971, the State Department refused to tow the White House line and, in fact, refused to believe reports of Indian war plans.\textsuperscript{141} The upshot for Pakistan was the too-little-too-late parade-sail of the Enterprise and the unceremonious return of a policy, or at least a practice, of skepticism vis-à-vis Pakistan. When Congress, already at odds with the president over Vietnam and strongly inclined to remove the United States from as many “entangling alliances” as possible, got hold of the Watergate scandal, Nixon & Co. never had another chance to set up Pakistan to succeed (in the eyes of the career echelons in State, at least).

4. The Nuclear Factor

However, grateful the White House might have been for Pakistan’s good offices in the approach to China, Nixon’s State Department remained skeptical of Pakistan, much to the president’s irritation.\textsuperscript{142} For example, the spectacular discovery by Pakistani officials of a cache of several hundred Soviet-made submachine guns and other weapons in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad in February 1973—presumably destined for the restive Baluchi tribes in Iran and Pakistan—aroused as much suspicion as relief:

\textsuperscript{141} Henry Kissinger, \textit{The White House Years}, 857.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
Recently, Pakistani officials have been complaining that the U.S. fails to appreciate the magnitude of the Soviet threat to U.S. interests in South Asia. Bhutto has asked the U.S. to review its interests in the area and to fashion a new relationship with Pakistan on the basis of its conclusions. Now, more than ever, he considers that Pakistan must reach a new security relationship with the U.S.. When Governor Khar (and possibly Bhutto) visit Washington next month, Pakistan can cite the Iraqi arms offenses as “proof” of their view of Soviet intentions.143

While acknowledging the Iraqi Baath regime of arming separatists and other subversive groups in neighboring states, the department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research emphasized the “windfall” that the event would provide to Pakistan’s President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. “So well does the Iraqi arms incident serve Bhutto’s purposes that the possibility of Pakistan’s provocation in the affair cannot be excluded.”144 The bureau’s report then quoted Afghan Prime Minister Muhammed Musa Shafiq, who had his own agenda vis-à-vis Pakistan, as saying that “the incident appears ‘too pat to fit.’”145

Nixon and Kissinger wanted very much to resume military aid to Pakistan and rehabilitate relations U.S. relations with its on-again ally. In March 1973, Nixon approved the reinstatement of the policy of 1965–1971 that allowed for non-lethal military aid, to coincide with President Bhutto’s visit to Washington.146 As Kissinger noted at the time, “Pakistan must have a military force that can preserve internal integrity

144 Ibid.
and permit Bhutto to negotiate with India from a basis that is as advantageous as the basic balance between the two countries permits. It is in the U.S. interest to help in any way we can to thwart subversion in Pakistan, whoever supports it. And it is in our interest to do what we can in response to ongoing Soviet supply to India.”

There were distinct limits on the White House’s enthusiasm: “We must, however, deal with the fact that resumption of full-scale military assistance would risk an almost certain congressionally imposed embargo. Thus, it would seem to me that a return to our 1967–71 policy of limited supply is about as far as we can go.” Kissinger anticipated a negative reaction from India, but he had faith that the U.S. ambassador to India at the time, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, would, with some advance notice, be able to present the decision in the least unpalatable way. Even as the Watergate scandal occupied ever more of Washington’s attention, Pakistan seemed finally on the road to some semblance of the relationship with the United States to which it aspired.

Then the South Asian rivalry went nuclear. India tested a “device” in May 1974, which galvanized efforts in Pakistan to maintain its own pace of development. In 1975, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan managed to smuggle to Pakistan the gas centrifuge designs to which he had had access while working at the uranium enrichment facilities (URENCO) in Holland. Under his supervision significant developments were made in obtaining material and technology for developing uranium enrichment capabilities. This development only led to increased differences between the two governments, and the Carter administration finally put Pakistan under strict sanctions during 1976–1977.

147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
Compounding matters was the revelation from multiple reliable sources of Pakistan’s enrichment processing plant and procurement efforts. In a bid to foil the U.S. move to apply International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, Pakistan denied the existence of any such facility. Frustrated at Pakistani maneuvers on the nuclear issue, the United States resorted to sanctions under Symington Amendment, discontinuing all military and economic aid to Pakistan—approximately $85 million. President Carter attempted to defuse the growing threat of an Indo-Pak nuclear arms race by offering Pakistan fighter aircraft and civilian nuclear power plant as well as development assistance if existing facilities were opened to international safeguards. He made a similar offer to India. Both India and Pakistan refused.

5. **The War in Afghanistan: Realignment**

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, U.S.-Pakistan relations underwent a transformation. The United States dropped all sanctions and pledged a huge military, economic, and technical support package to counter the Soviet threat—the nightmare scenario that President Bhutto had outlined six-odd years earlier. U.S. funding grew from the initial sum of $35 million in 1982 to $600 million by 1987. As a reward for its unwavering cooperation, billions of dollars’ worth U.S. military and economic aid came Pakistan’s way, making it the second-largest recipient of the U.S. aid. Under another military ruler, General Zia ul Haq, offered his country’s full services for fighting the U.S. war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and presided over a steady flow of advanced military hardware to Pakistan. Its oft-maligned premier spy agency Inter-Services Intelligence spearheaded the CIA-funded multi-billion-dollar covert operations against the Soviets during the 1980s.

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Even during the U.S.-Pakistan partnership against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the relationship was strained due to Pakistan’s nuclear program. The United States repeatedly informed the Zia government that there would be serious consequences if Pakistan’s nuclear program continued. As the end of Afghanistan war came into sight, the United States suddenly roused itself to go beyond monitoring and reporting on Pakistan’s nuclear activities, and, due to its own strategic compulsions, decided to take some retributive measures against Pakistan. The U.S Congress passed the Pressler Amendment, which tied all types of aid to the condition that Pakistan would have to prove that the aid money it received from the United States was not being diverted in any way toward its nuclear weapons program. The Amendment required the U.S. president to certify Pakistan’s compliance—a difficult proposition considering Pakistan’s continued pursuit of its own nuclear weapon. Hence, Pakistan had to endure layers of U.S. sanctions during the 1990s.

6. The Sanctions

During the U.S.-Pakistan partnership against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the relationship was strained due to Pakistan’s nuclear program. The United States repeatedly informed the Zia government that there would be serious consequence if Pakistan’s nuclear program continued. The United States also had little effect influencing India which was heavily engaged with the Soviets for assistance in their nuclear program. As the end of Afghanistan war came in sight, the United States that had not gone beyond monitoring/reporting Pakistan’s nuclear activities due to its own strategic compulsions, decided to take some retributive measures against Pakistan. The Pressler amendment passed by the U.S. Congress, tied all types of aid with the condition that Pakistan would have to prove with evidence that the aid money it received from the United States was not being diverted in any way toward its nuclear weapons program. The U.S. president would have to make this certification, which was a difficult proposition considering Pakistan’s continued nuclear pursuit. Hence, Pakistan had to endure layers of U.S.

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156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
sanctions during the 1990s and especially after its overt nuclearization in a tit-for-tat response to nuclear explosions by its arch-rival India in May 1998.
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III. THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The end of the Cold War heralded a shift in U.S. relations with the major South Asian powers—though this change started out slowly and subtly. For one thing, the demise of the Soviet Union made nonalignment irrelevant and, thus, obviated a longstanding point of friction for U.S. policymakers. For another thing, the United States sought to recalibrate its strategic relations, which at least started a process of reassessment of allies and partners, including India and Pakistan. According to Pakistan’s leading scholar and its former ambassador to USA and UK, Dr. Maleeha Lodhi: “The end of the Cold War also persuaded the U.S. to re-evaluate and downgrade its relationship with Pakistan on the ground that the new global environment did not warrant the old strategic partnership.”

Pakistan’s nuclear activities, which had only been noted with concern by the United States during the Afghanistan War (1979–1988), came under the spotlight after President Clinton came to power and made nuclear non-proliferation his key policy priority. According to Feroz Khan:

By the mid-1990s … U.S.-Pakistani relations progressively soured over the nuclear question, and as Islamabad felt isolated under sanctions, greater national consensus and harmony within the domestic political leadership emerged over the national commitment to acquire the nuclear deterrent. Despite this sense of isolation, it was India’s aborted attempt to conduct a nuclear test in 1995 that determined the Pakistani pathway to its own nuclear tests.

During the next few years, despite concerted U.S. efforts to dissuade India and Pakistan from conducting the nuclear explosions, India did just that on May 11, 1998. In the face of enhanced Indian belligerence and U.S. offer of carrots (and sticks) over the

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159 Feroz H. Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, 259.
next two weeks, Pakistan followed suit by going overtly nuclear on May 28, 1998.\textsuperscript{160} Thereafter, both United States and India had to—or at least had the chance to—reconsider their relations with Pakistan.

On the other hand, the habits of thought and vision from the previous era persisted, limiting the scope and scale of the change. These old notions colored U.S. policy vis-à-vis both states at least as much as current events did, particularly once the Global War on Terror arrived in the region. In the period from 1991 to the present, the relationship between the United States and India, as well as U.S.-Pakistan relations seemed to find a new basis. However, a closer analysis reveals that it has been more a story of missed opportunities than fulfilled promises.

\textbf{A. INDIA AFTER THE COLD WAR: CHANGE OF FORTUNES}

U.S.-India security ties got their first boost in 1991 with the visit to India by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Pacific Command, Lt. General Claude Kicklighter. The visit marked the beginning of a new, bilateral strategic relationship and resulted, most immediately, in the so-called Kicklighter proposals, which included service-to-service exchanges and expansion of a defense cooperation framework.\textsuperscript{161} Enhanced understanding between the two militaries paved the way for the first-ever U.S.-India military exercises in line with the U.S. policy of “cooperative engagement” with friendly militaries. In February 1992, Indian and U.S. Army and Air Force paratroopers held their first joint training exercise, codenamed Teak Iroquois.

Since February 1992, these exercises have continued with ever-increasing scope.\textsuperscript{162} The two navies conduct four bilateral exercises annually: Malabar, Habu Naag, Spitting Cobra, and Salvex. Exercises Yudh Abhyas and Shatrujeet are conducted between the two armies and the U.S. Marines annually, whereas, Exercise Cope India is

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 269–283.
\item \textsuperscript{161} Brian K. Hedrick, “India’s Strategic Defense Transformation: Expanding Global Relationships,” The Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009, 11.
\end{itemize}
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conducted bi-annually between the two air forces. The first cycles of these exercises culminated in the January 2004 announcement of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP),\textsuperscript{163} which included cooperation in the fields of nuclear safety, space technology, and high-tech U.S. exports to India.\textsuperscript{164}

In January 1995, the Agreed Minutes of Defense Relations, which were aimed at strengthening as well as expanding defense cooperation to meet the requirements of the new post-Cold War world, were signed between the two countries. There was divergence in interpretation of the Minutes by the two sides, as the Indians saw it as an opening into the U.S. arms market. On the other hand, the Americans stressed that sale of arms or transfer of defense technology was not a part of the agreement, which to Washington was basically meant for enhancing cooperation in defense research and development (R&D).\textsuperscript{165} Moreover, the Agreed Minutes expressly specified that no arms/technology transfer would be done to Pakistan’s detriment. Despite these differing views, as a follow-up measure, it was agreed to set up the Defense Policy Group (DPG) as an inter-governmental body between the two ministries of defense. Defense cooperation was sought not only at the ministerial level but also at the service level as well as at the R&D organizations level.\textsuperscript{166}

Despite all these historic positive developments, the Indians have been wary that the continued supply of U.S. military hardware might be jeopardized if political differences between India and United States arise in future. “Nevertheless, the value of new and unprecedented major defense sales to India has continued to grow—some $8 billion in deals since 2001—with the United States now offering to sell India some of its

\textsuperscript{163} “India is the Only Country with Which the U.S. Has Next Steps in Strategic Partnership initiative,” \textit{Force}, October 2004, 33.


\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
most sophisticated military hardware." Some of the major defense sales/deals to India are:

a. Six C-130J-30 Hercules Transport aircraft for Indian Special Forces ($962 million)

b. Ten C-17A Globe Master Transport aircraft ($4.1 billion)

c. Eight P-8A Poseidon ASW aircraft ($2 billion)

d. 512 CBU-97 SFW Guided bombs ($258 million)

e. 17 F404 Turbofan for Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) produced in India ($105 million)

By virtue of combined military exercises and acquisition of choice military hardware from the United States, Indian military got a welcome break from the Soviet/Russian legacy and systems. It also got invaluable exposure to relatively more advanced U.S. military concepts and practices. Consequently, by breaking the Pakistani military’s monopoly in terms of U.S.-Pakistan defense cooperation, Indians got into a better position to menace Pakistan.

1. The Nuclear Brink: the Kargil Conflict

In the summer of 1999, the Indian and Pakistani militaries came eyeball-to-eyeball when Pakistani soldiers disguised as Kashmiri mujahedeen (freedom fighters) infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil sector of Indian-Occupied Kashmir (IOK). The Indian Army was totally surprised, indeed shocked, to find the intruders in occupation of the alpine posts that the Indians had vacated as a matter of routine at the onset of the typically harsh winter season. Even as the occupiers ran out of logistics, the posts had to be re-occupied at a huge cost in men and material, including the


168 Ibid.

active support of the Indian Air Force. The ensuing conflict—a “half war” in some estimates—spanned almost six weeks, was and was viewed by the international community as a serious risk to regional stability, as it brought the two nuclear powers on the brink of nuclear confrontation. (In the event, the Kargil conflict was the first bilateral conflict that occurred after the overt nuclearization of South Asia in 1998.)

Why the conflict remained limited is explained by the two competing but equally convincing narratives. The optimistic narrative propounded by Sumit Ganguly, an eminent South Asia and nuclear expert, attributes it to the nuclear deterrence. In contrast, the pessimistic narrative presented by Paul Kapur, another eminent South Asia and nuclear expert, attributes it to such other factors as the restraint shown by India and U.S. pressure aimed at containing the situation. Either way, nuclear equipoise figured significantly in India’s response in the Kargil conflict.

President Clinton’s Democratic administration in Washington was deeply worried over the developments. Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her aides got engaged in hectic diplomatic efforts to diffuse the crisis. They squarely blamed Pakistan for initiating the crisis and asked India to exercise restraint by not escalating the conflict by retaliating at other points along the LoC or across the Indo-Pak International Border. According to Strobe Talbott, who was serving at the time as Albright’s deputy secretary of State: “The United States condemned Pakistan’s infiltration of armed intruders … . In late June, Clinton called Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani Prime Minister, to stress that the United States saw Pakistan as the aggressor and to reject the fiction that the fighters were really separatist guerrillas.” In the face of growing diplomatic pressure,

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173 Ibid., 28–32.
175 Ibid., 159.
Nawaz Sharif visited Washington in the first week of July. After prolonged parleys between the two sides, he agreed to withdraw troops from Kargil on the promise that Clinton would take a personal interest in encouraging India and Pakistan to resolve their bilateral disputes. The neutral American stance during the conflict helped allay Indian suspicions about a U.S. tilt toward Pakistan to quite an extent. According to leading South Asia security experts, Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “Clinton’s actions were significant because they demonstrated to India that the United States was not blind to Pakistani malfeasance and that it would not necessarily support its traditional ally at India’s expense.”

This outcome was not quite what Pakistan had hoped to achieve. Pakistan’s Kargil adventure was brilliant at the tactical level as it totally surprised the Indians; had it been successful, it could have cut off the strategically significant Ladakhd region (adjoining China) from rest of IOK. At the strategic level, however, the operation was a disaster, as Pakistan emerged as an aggressor. What had been aimed at thawing the Kashmir issue, ended up thawing the formerly frosty relations between the United States and India, to the detriment of Pakistan.

2. Yes, but … : The Indian Response after 9/11

India was quick to offer unconditional support including its bases to the United States for launching operations against Al Qaeda. Although the United States preferred Pakistan’s services in this regard mainly for geographical reasons, India’s offer went a long way toward strengthening and broadening the scope of U.S.-India defense relations. In the event, the U.S. government immediately lifted all sanctions on India,

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176 Ibid., 168.
as well as Pakistan, that had been imposed mainly due to their nuclear proliferation activities.¹⁸⁰

When it came to sending Indian troops to join coalition forces in Iraq in 2003, India demurred, citing the lack of domestic political consensus. The Indian public was not in favor of committing Indian forces to take casualties at the behest of U.S. forces, which seemed to have bogged down in Iraq.¹⁸¹ This Indian response frustrated the Americans, who had hoped that Indian troops might relieve some U.S. forces so the Pentagon could send them home.¹⁸² The U.S. response was swaddled in typical diplomatic jargon, but the “U.S. State Department has let it be known that there is an element of disappointment and that it did not agree with New Delhi’s argument that the lack of a clear-cut United Nations mandate prevented it from participating in the so-called stabilization of Iraq.”¹⁸³ The Indians took the American rebuke, however glancing, to heart but also fell back on the half-century-plus-old habit of going its own way. Former Indian army Chief General V.P. Malik commented: “India’s domestic political constraints might produce outcomes that run counter to U.S. expectations. Without adequate understanding of such political factors in the two nations, there will always be a danger of a derailment of defense ties.”¹⁸⁴

Other long-standing concerns reasserted themselves, as well. After the 2007 Malabar naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal stoked Chinese concerns, India reportedly curtailed these types of multilateral exercises. Indian officials apparently fear that such

¹⁸⁰ Satu Limaye, “U.S.-India Relations: Visible to the Naked Eye,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Available at csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0104qus_india.pdf.


¹⁸² Ibid.


moves could provoke China and that the United States would not back India in a meaningful way if conflict were to erupt between New Delhi and Beijing.\(^{185}\)

Building on its earlier role in reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, India is keen on enhancing its footprint there. India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in October 2011, which was lauded by the United States, stands as an evidence of growing Indo-Afghan relations. Under the agreement, Afghan security forces would be trained in India.\(^{186}\) Pakistan’s security establishment considers the Indian presence in Afghanistan detrimental to its interests as its amounts to encirclement by the Indian influence in its backyard.\(^{187}\) The dubious activities by a chain of Indian consulates in eastern Afghanistan along Pak-Afghan border, ironically established to facilitate India’s development activities mostly taking place in the west of the country, fuel Pakistani suspicions about the real Indian intent. The new U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel came under fire during his confirmation hearings for his speech at Oklahoma’s Cameron University in 2011 that India “financed problems” for Pakistan in Afghanistan.\(^{188}\)

Despite encouragement by the United States, India is wary of enhancing its active military presence in Afghanistan as it still remembers the catastrophic experience of sending its troops to Sri Lanka in the 1980s. However, India has shared with Afghanistan, high level military advisors and personnel from its super spy agency: Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). According to Pakistani security establishment, this Indian military/intelligence presence in Afghanistan will place India in a position to foment further trouble in its restive Baluchistan province. Pakistan’s interior minister, Rehman Malik, squarely blamed India and Afghanistan of sponsoring the Baluch insurgents.\(^{189}\)

\(^{185}\) Lisa Curtis, “Going the Extra Mile for a Strategic U.S.-India Relationship.”

\(^{186}\) Ibid.


\(^{188}\) “Chuck Hagel’s Remarks Against India ‘Bizarre’: BJP,” Times of India, February 27, 2013. Available at articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com › Collections › Bjp.

Considering the unending dispute between India and Pakistan and attendant legacy of deep-seated mistrust bordering hatred, post-2014 Afghanistan will present itself as a strategic battleground between the internal stake holders and their external sponsors especially India and Pakistan. This likely future scenario in Afghanistan is already causing concerns in the Western capitals as it might not only hinder stability in Afghanistan but might also cause instability in entire South Asia. In the same context, according to Sumit Ganguly, “The prospects of any imminent diplomatic breakthrough that might enable the two sides to reach a modus vivendi on their respective positions in Afghanistan seem rather doubtful.” This is the issue on which U.S. quest and Indian obsession to have U.S.-India relations delinked or de-hyphenated from U.S.-Pakistan relations would be seriously challenged.

3. The Prize: the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

On July 18, 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced their intent to forge a civilian nuclear deal. On October 1, 2008, the U.S. Senate formally approved the deal, which bestowed upon India de jure status of a nuclear weapon state and entitled it to enjoy all the perks and privileges that come with this status, even though India was still not a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The deal ensured uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel to India by the United States and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It also allowed U.S. firms to trade with India in nuclear materials and those technologies required to set up and run the civil nuclear facilities. According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robert Blake, “U.S. firms could also get a significant part of the $40-billion commercial nuclear sector as India invests in 14 new power reactors in the next five years.”

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190 Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Role in Afghanistan.”
Despite the Bush Administration’s optimism about the strategic dividends—in terms of further strengthening U.S.-India relations—of this deal and the multi-billion-dollar nuclear trade for the U.S. companies, it was apparent to many observers that the agreement might seriously undermine the nuclear deterrence regime in South Asia.\(^\text{194}\) India was keen to secure a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel based on its previous bad experience of U.S. blockage in the aftermath of India’s “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974.\(^\text{195}\) Because the external supply of nuclear fuel for its civilian nuclear reactors is assured under the U.S.-India nuclear deal, India would be in a position to divert its surplus indigenous fissile material toward its nuclear weapons program.\(^\text{196}\)

In a sense, then, the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal is, for India, a license to split atoms—and amass weapons. Leading South Asia and nuclear policy experts Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly commented: “By allowing India access to a ready international supply of civilian nuclear fuel, the deal could enable the Indian’s to use their scarce indigenous uranium supplies to expand their nuclear weapons arsenal. This could lead to Pakistani and Chinese balancing behavior, possibly destabilizing South Asia.”\(^\text{197}\) According to Zia Mian and M. V. Ramana: “India is believed to have a stockpile of perhaps 40–50 nuclear weapons, with fissile material stocks for as many more, and plans that reportedly involve an arsenal of 300–400 weapons within a decade.”\(^\text{198}\)

4. India: Recognition without Responsibility

India is basking in the glory of quasi *de jure* status of a Nuclear Weapons State and relishing the benevolence of the United States. However, in the bargain, it has also conceded the nuclear status to Pakistan though more by default than design. Hence,


\(^{196}\) U.S. State Department, “U.S. and India Release Text of 123 Agreement.”

\(^{197}\) Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations.” 651.

Pakistan is in a position now to sufficiently affect the way that India does business on the border, even when things get ugly. But India now gets to sit at the high-stakes table among the other major nuclear powers without having to sign the NPT. Though the aid from Washington is flowing to Delhi faster than ever before, but the Americans continue to view India in the zero-sum hystericis of the early Cold War. The United States accommodates a lot of Indian misbehavior rather than risk offending and ultimately “losing” it. India plays a much more nuanced game in its relations not only with the United States but also with China and even Russia. India is more or less reveling in the benefits of major-power status without really stepping up to the restraints and responsibilities that go with it.

B.  PAKISTAN AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE SAME OLD STORY

In stark contrast to the blossoming of U.S.-Indian defense relations after the Cold War, U.S. Pakistan relations, at least as measured by foreign aid, reached a fateful nadir in 1990, when President George H.W. Bush suspended aid to Pakistan when he declined to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. The United States generally sought to disengage from Pakistan (as it also did with Afghanistan, following the Soviet collapse) and to curtail foreign aid outlays, which left little impetus to improve the state of affairs between the two countries. Pakistan’s overt nuclearization in May 1998—in a tit-for-tat response to India—only aggravated U.S. reservations about Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, and resulted in further sanctions Pakistan spent the better part of the 1990s seething about the U.S. “abandonment.”

Then everything changed dramatically at the turn of the century. Pakistan assumed the role of a frontline state in the GWOT and opened a number of its military

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bases and its airspace for U.S. operations. It also made its port facilities and overland communication infrastructure available for the smooth flow of logistics to NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The U.S.-Pakistan alliance picked up more or less where it had left off—for better or worse.

1. The Nuclear Counterpoint

One point of contention concerned Pakistan’s nuclear activities, which cut to the heart of Pakistani national self-image. Successful conduct of the nuclear explosions was officially described as “Pakistan’s finest hour.” “Others boasted that Pakistan had become the world’s seventh nuclear power and the first nuclear weapons state in the Islamic World.” Actually, that achievement meant much than just a sense of pride and boost to the self-image of the Pakistani nation. According to Dr. Rifaat Hussain, an eminent Pakistani scholar at the Stanford University, “[N]uclear weapons are central to Pakistani strategic thought, especially with regard to deterring India from initiating large-scale military operations against Pakistan.”

In a stark contrast to extra-ordinary nuclear cooperation between the United States and India over the last few years, Pakistan has almost been declared a “nuclear pariah” mainly due to proliferation activities of A.Q. Khan Network. Although, A.Q. Khan admitted his responsibility, he maintained that the government of Pakistan had had no direct involvement in his “nuclear black market.” Considering the fact that he had been given complete autonomy over Pakistan’s nuclear program, A.Q. Khan’s alibi for the government had some merit but no one in the world was ready to listen to this argument. The reluctance to absolve the Pakistani state could also be attributed to lack

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of understanding about its security culture, especially the nuclear side of it. Either way, when Pakistan asked for an agreement with the United States similar to the deal that India had secured, the request was turned down on the basis of Pakistan’s alleged nuclear proliferation.208

At the same time, Chinese support for Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear energy program has also been vilified,209 disregarding the fact that Pakistan is facing an acute shortage of electricity, which has badly affected its civic facilities and brought its industry to its knees.210 Pakistan’s desperate quest to import gas from neighboring Iran was scuttled first by India’s walking out of the IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) gas-pipeline agreement. Now further progress on the Iran-Pakistan version of the project may stall under the threat of U.S. sanctions.211 Meanwhile, India annually does some $14 billion worth of direct trade with Iran, a major portion of which comprises petroleum exports to India—with U.S. blessings in the form of legal waivers.212

2. **Pakistan Steps up after 9/11**

Initially, Pakistan tried to negotiate handover of Osama bin Laden to the United States, failing which, it agreed to extend all logistic and operational facilities including its

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212 ZeeBiz.com., “India, Iran Should Address Trade Imbalance: PM,” August 30, 2012. Available at zeenews.india.com/ . /india-iran-should-address-trade-imbalance-pm. While India’s demand for such raw materials has not abated, the India-Iran petroleum trade may well be in for a significant reduction amid new and tougher U.S. and European sanctions. See, e.g., Armin Rosen, “Why India is Finally, Complying with Sanctions on Iran,” in *Atlantic*, March 15, 2013. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-india-is-finally-complying-with-sanctions-on-iran/274063/.
bases to facilitate U.S./ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. According to Pakistan’s then-President Musharraf, the government was coerced to extend its cooperation in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. Certainly the United States produced its ripest and most irresistible carrots. As an incentive for Pakistan, a bill to repeal the Pressler and Glenn amendments was introduced in the U.S. Congress, to remove all sanctions against Pakistan. Pakistan was declared a major non-NATO ally (MNNA) in 2003, which paved its way for advanced military purchases from the U.S. And as an additional goodwill gesture, U.S. wrote off a $1 billion loan to Pakistan.

Pakistan committed a large part of its paramilitary and military forces to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban in its northwestern Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which adjoin Afghanistan. Some of these army formations were moved to FATA from Pakistan’s highly sensitive eastern border with India. Even the elements of Pakistan Army’s elite strategic reserves, which are moved only in case of imminent war, were employed in GWOT. By 2011, about 150,000 military and paramilitary troops had been engaged in this campaign.

The Pakistan Army, with direct support from the Pakistan Air Force, succeeded in clearing most of FATA except for the North Waziristan Agency (NWA). However, those active military operations against the tenacious al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, spanning some years, did not come without a cost. Pakistan Army and paramilitary forces were


216 Ibid.


218 Ibid.
over-stretched\textsuperscript{219} after prolonged operations in FATA, which themselves had entailed significant human and material losses.\textsuperscript{220} Over the last eleven years, of this state of war with al Qaeda and Taliban, Pakistani military and security forces casualties outnumber the casualties of NATO and ISAF combined.\textsuperscript{221}

According to an economic survey recently released by the Pakistani government, Pakistan has sacrificed more than 3,500 security personnel to the conflict. At the same time, the direct and indirect costs of GWOT incurred by Pakistan amounted to $67.93 billion.\textsuperscript{222} The enormous social costs attributable to the GWOT cannot be calculated. “Some three million people had been displaced because of fighting inside Pakistan. The relief and rehabilitation of the internally displaced people had cost $600 million.”\textsuperscript{223} During 2008–2009 alone, the Taliban had destroyed close to 500 schools in Swat and FATA regions of northwest Pakistan.\textsuperscript{224}

3. The Irritants on All Sides

Despite unprecedented security cooperation between the two countries post-9/11, there have been some irritants in the last few years that have threatened to derail the entire edifice. For example, the United States wanted Pakistan to launch operations in NWA, where remnants of al Qaeda and elements of the Haqqani Group of anti-U.S. Afghan Taliban were believed to be hiding and carrying out bloody attacks against U.S./ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Annoyed by Pakistan’s purported reluctance to take on


\textsuperscript{220} Zahid Ali Khan, “Military Operations in FATA and PATA: Implications for Pakistan.”


\textsuperscript{222} Survey by Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, “Cost of War on Terror for Pakistan Economy,” Available at www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/Special\%20Section\%201.pdf. Also see “Pakistan suffered $67 bn losses in war against terror,” \textit{Hindustan Times}, June 20, 2011.


the Haqqanis, the United States resorted to diplomatic and military pressure on Pakistan.225

What further complicated the situation was Pakistan’s stance that despite its persistent pleas, U.S./ISAF forces were not keen on targeting Pakistani Taliban who had taken refuge in north-eastern Afghanistan after being flushed out of Pakistan’s north-western tribal regions.226 Those elements had been involved in audacious attacks against Pakistani security forces from across the Pak-Afghan border. Since 2004, United States had mounted strikes by unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), commonly known as “drones,” against terrorist sanctuaries in FATA. This campaign was intensified in 2010/2011 apparently after Washington’s disappointment with Pakistan’s approach to continued military operations in FATA.227 The claims and counter claims as to the complicity of Pakistan’s security establishment and innocent civilian casualties notwithstanding, such attacks have caused widespread resentment against the United States in the Pakistani public.228

A shadow of doubt has been repeatedly cast on the sincerity of Pakistani military in targeting the terrorists across the board. On occasions, the Pakistan Army has been castigated for tipping certain Taliban factions about impending U.S./ISAF attacks against them.229 What has really deepened the mistrust between the two militaries has been a couple of U.S. air strikes on Pakistani security forces—strikes that, although officially chalked up to miscalculation or faulty intelligence, appeared to be deliberate. The first such attack happened in June 2008 and resulted in a dozen casualties among Pakistan’s


paramilitary forces. The second and more alarming attack was launched in November 2011, when a regular Pakistan Army unit, deployed to interdict a Taliban infiltration route at Salala on the Pak-Afghan border. The entire unit was massacred by the U.S. gunships aircraft, resulting in two dozen casualties, including a couple of officers. A few weeks after the incident, U.S. military investigation claimed that “there was no intentional effort,” whereas Pakistani military investigation claimed that the incident was “deliberate at some level.” In any case, the gory incident further increased misgivings between the two countries.

Pakistani reaction to the latter incident was understandably so vehement that the U.S. forces were asked to vacate Pakistan’s western Shamsi air base. The logistics for U.S./ISAF forces in Afghanistan, commonly known as NATO supplies, which are land-routed through Pakistan, were also suspended. Shamsi air base was vacated within a few weeks. Pakistan allowed the NATO supplies to resume plying its territory after hectic negotiations spanning over more than six months and after a muted, and much-delayed, apology by the United States.

Another incident that dented U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation—as indeed their overall bilateral relations—was the U.S. Special Forces’ clandestine attack on Osama bin Laden’s hideout in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad on May 2, 2011. Operation Geronimo entailed two helicopters full of U.S. SEALs entering Pakistan’s sovereign territory without warning, consultation, or permission. Bin Laden was killed and so was

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231 Iftikhar Firdous, “24 soldiers killed in NATO attack on Pakistan check post,” Express Tribune, November 26, 2011.
any remaining element of trust between the two security establishments as the Pakistani side had not been taken into confidence.\textsuperscript{236} Worse, the Pakistani security forces felt that their competence and their ability to defend Pakistan’s sovereignty was seriously questioned domestically and hence they were deeply embarrassed.\textsuperscript{237} In June 2012, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta justified the unilateral U.S. strike by saying that the United States was losing patience with Pakistan due to its ambivalence in GWOT.\textsuperscript{238} Such irresponsible statements only added fuel to the fire—and credence to popular Pakistani resentment over being “used and abandoned” by the United States once again.

4. The Ebb and Flow and Ebb of Aid

Since Pakistan was impressed into service in GWOT, it has received about $20 billion in various forms of military/non-military aid from the United States.\textsuperscript{239} However, the aid has come with strings attached. The infamous Kerry-Lugar Bill of 2009\textsuperscript{240} made $7.5 billion in non-military aid to Pakistan contingent on its military command’s acceptance of certain humiliating conditions.\textsuperscript{241} For example, one condition required: “The security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{242} The principal at issue in this demand was entirely correct, but the condition itself amounted to direct interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. Additionally, like an undead relation of the Pressler Amendment, the Kerry-Lugar Bill also stipulated that the release of funds to Pakistan would be subject to

\textsuperscript{236} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{237} Omar Waraich, “Pakistan’s Military Tries to Explain Itself,” \textit{Time}, May 06, 2011. Available at www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2069920,00.html.


certification by the U.S. Secretary of State that elements of Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies were not supporting terrorist groups targeting U.S./ISAF forces in Afghanistan.

Then for hiding Osama bin Laden in its territory, Pakistan saw the United States suspend $800 million aid. Even such Pakistan-friendly voices as Senator John Kerry chimed in, urging Pakistan to show resolve in eliminating terrorist hideouts from its territory. In May 2012, U.S. lawmakers unanimously suspended the $650 million due to Pakistan in Coalition Support Fund (CSF) unless and until Pakistan reopened its territory to the NATO supplies. During the same deliberations, the U.S. Senate proposed to cut aid to Pakistan drastically if Pakistan’s commitment to the GWOT came into further question.

On the other hand, a positive development in U.S.-Pakistan relations, even amid such acrimony, has been their continued defense ties in terms of U.S. sales of sophisticated military hardware to Pakistan and a few combined/joint military exercises. After the lifting of the U.S. sanctions after 9/11, Pakistan has received billions of dollars’ worth of Foreign Military Sales. The latest version (Block 50/52) of F-16s and mid-life upgrade of earlier versions along with state of the art weaponry is the “crown jewel” in this revived military cooperation. Apart from being an operational boost for Pakistan, this supply of the latest F-16s also has immense politico-diplomatic significance against the

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246 “Senate Panel Votes to Cut Aid for Pakistan, Egypt,” Dawn.com. May 23, 2012. In the end, some $1.8 billion was released to reimburse Pakistan, a fraction less than the amount that Pakistan claimed to have incurred in costs related to GWOT. Also see: Muhammad Saleh Zaafir, “U.S. Agrees to Release $1.18 bn for Pakistan under CSF,” News, April 7, 2012. Available at www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13–13751-U.S.-agrees-to-release.
backdrop of Pakistan’s quarter-century-old grievance about the cancellation of a similar deal.\textsuperscript{247} The Pentagon reports total Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan worth $5.4 billion for FY2002-FY2010 (in process sales of F-16 combat aircraft and related equipment account for more than half of this).\textsuperscript{248} Major post-2001 defense supplies paid for with Foreign Military Funding (FMF) include the following:

a. Eight P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and their refurbishment (valued at $474 million)

b. About 5,250 TOW anti-armor missiles ($186 million; 2,007 delivered)

c. Six C-130E transport aircraft and their refurbishment ($76 million, all delivered and in operation)

d. 20 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters granted under EDA, then refurbished ($48 million, 12 delivered, 8 pending refurbishment for up to $115 million more).\textsuperscript{249}

Supplies paid for with a mix of Pakistani national funds (PNF) and FMF include:

a. Up to 60 mid-life update kits for F-16A/B combat aircraft (valued at $891 million, with at least $335 million of this in FMF; Pakistan’s current plans are to purchase 46 of these)

Notable items paid for entirely with PNF include:

a. 18 new F-16C/D Block 50/52 combat aircraft, with an option for 18 more (valued at $1.43 billion)

\textsuperscript{247} Christine Fair, “The U.S.-Pakistan F-16 Fiasco,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, February 3, 2011. Available at afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/03/the_f_16_fiasco.

\textsuperscript{248} Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance.”

b. F-16 armaments including 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles; 1,450 2,000-pound bombs; 500 JDAM bomb tail kits; and 1,600 Enhanced Paveway laser-guided bomb kits ($667 million)

c. 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles ($298 million, 88 delivered).250

In 2007, the Pentagon started to fund counter-terrorism training and equipment for the Frontier Corps (FC), which is responsible for security in Pakistani provinces bordering Afghanistan. More of Pakistan Army’s elite Special Service Group commandos and Army Air Assault units were trained and equipped to move quickly to find and target terrorist elements.251 “U.S.-funded military education and training programs seek to enhance the professionalism of Pakistan’s military leaders. At least 2,000 Pakistani officers have received such training since 2001.”252

In 2010, a squadron of PAF F-16 aircraft flew to Nellis AFB in Nevada and participated in Exercise “Red Flag” with the U.S. Air Force. The two air forces also conducted a joint air-air refueling exercise in Pakistan, the same year. Earlier, Exercise “Falcon Talon” had been held in Pakistan in 2005 and 2009.253 Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Navy has been an active member of the U.S.-led Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 (counter-terrorism) and CTF 151 (counter-piracy). Pakistani flag officers have already commanded the task forces three times.254

Despite some serious misunderstandings that developed between the two militaries over the last couple of years, continued military-military cooperation is like a silver lining over the dark cloud. It is significant considering the prominent role played by the security establishments in the two countries. At the strategic level, it is quite assuring as it means that this relationship has not yet reached the end of the road yet. It

250 Ibid.

251 Susan B. Epstein and K. Allen Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance.”

252 Ibid.


might just be a fork, leaving the option open for both the parties to take the right way to continue to destination: security and stability in South Asia. At the operational level, supply of latest version of F-16 aircraft (though limited in number) along with advanced weaponry, has given Pakistan a slight edge over India until it operationalizes its newly purchased Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). After that happens in the next couple of years, Pakistan will be forced to seek more advanced aircraft from the United States—failing which, it will not be left with any other option than to explore some kind of second-choice arrangement with China and perhaps even Russia.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

After having fought the GWOT in the Afghanistan Theater for more than a decade, the bulk of U.S./NATO forces are set to wind up their operations and leave the region by the end of 2014. In the overall context and by any measure, they have had mixed success in this prolonged campaign. They have been able to eliminate some of Al Qaeda’s top leadership, including most especially Osama bin Laden. However, remaining elements of Al-Qaeda have escaped to countries like Somalia, Yemen, and Mali. The Taliban are also resurgent, and they have managed to bring the U.S. and its Allies to the negotiating table in Afghanistan. And then there is the sheer cost of the intervention. “The Congressional Research Office estimates that the war cost the United States $443 billion between 2001 and 2011. More than 2,000 Americans have been killed and more than 17,000 injured.”255

Defense cooperation by the regional U.S. allies, mainly Pakistan, has been key in the success (to whatever degree) of this campaign. India, not very keen to fight GWOT despite claiming to be a victim of terrorism, opted to stay on the sidelines militarily. It assumed the role of training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) under the auspices of the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Hamid Karzai on October 4, 2012. In order to keep the Indian trainers out of harm’s way, this training is being conducted in India, which has not suffered any military casualties in GWOT. Pakistan, on the other hand has invested precious blood and treasure in fighting the GWOT.

Through 2011, Pakistan had lost more than 3500 security personnel in counter-terrorism operations and a result of retaliatory terrorist attacks on them. The direct and indirect economic costs were upwards of U.S. $67 billion; enormous social costs cannot be measured.256 Despite all these sacrifices, doubts have been repeatedly raised about


256 Survey by Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, “Cost of War on Terror for Pakistan Economy.”
Pakistan’s sincerity in GWOT. Its sovereignty has been routinely violated by the drone strikes in its northwestern FATA area. Unilateral action by the U.S. Special Forces, deep inside Pakistan, to kill Osama bin Laden added insult to injury, bin Laden’s terrorist credentials notwithstanding. The United States is on its way out of Afghanistan, and its security relations with Pakistan are clearly on a downward trajectory. Ironically, despite India’s minimal direct involvement in GWOT, U.S.-India security relations are on an upward trajectory. This trend in two sets of relations is likely to have deep impact on the regional security situation. In the meantime, the potential for future Indo-Pakistan conflicts persists. What does the future portend for South Asia and U.S. defense cooperation there?

A. U.S.-INDIA DEFENSE COOPERATION

Amid the current rush of good feeling, the U.S. image in India, like the Indian image in the United States, has undergone a positive change. However, mistrust and reservations, especially on the Indian side, which were rooted in the Cold War legacy, still tend to cast long shadows.\(^\text{257}\) According to a restricted study carried out for the U.S. Department of Defense in October 2002 and based on the assessment of U.S. diplomatic and military elite: “Indian bureaucrats, Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals could be ‘easily slighted or insulted’, are ‘difficult to work with’, harbor ‘deep-seated distrust’ of Americans, are mostly ‘obsessed’ with history than future and ‘see the world through their perennial distrust of Pakistan.’”\(^\text{258}\)

1. Two Visions of Technology and Arms Sales

“For one, India remains skeptical that the U.S. would actually defend core Indian interests in the face of Chinese aggression. It sees U.S. involvement in the region as fundamentally self-serving, with the transactional arrangement between the U.S. and


Pakistan constituting the case-in-point.”

Even unusually bold U.S. policy moves to relax export controls on defense equipment to India are not likely to make the Indians as comfortable as they are with the Russian equipment, less for its quality than for its assured availability. Indeed, India’s decades-old defense relationship with the erstwhile USSR and now Russia, mainly restricted to the acquisition of Soviet/Russian military equipment on soft financial terms, colors all of India’s expectations of defense cooperation.

During the Cold War, there was little more to the Soviet-Indian relationship than the steady flow of equipment, despite the Indo-Soviet bilateral Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, signed in 1971. Article II of the treaty obliged the parties to “declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.” In practice, USSR/Russia armed India to its teeth in the conventional domain and overlooked its nuclear ambitions.

Article IX of the Treaty provided for joint efforts if either of the parties came under attack. However, when it came to openly supporting India in face of U.S. diplomacy and Chinese military pressure favoring Pakistan, the “Soviets continued to behave in a most circumspect fashion in dealing with the crisis in East Pakistan.”

On the other hand, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the Indians were slow to condemn the action—not so much out of sympathy to their military

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259 Thomas E. Ricks, “Why India is so Half-hearted about the U.S. Rebalance towards Asia,” Foreign Policy, August 14, 2012. Available at ricks.foreignpolicy.com/why_india_is_so_half_hearted_about_the_rebalance_towards_asia_20120814.html.

260 Ibid.


benefactor but rather out of concern about the supply of U.S. weapons to Pakistan to counter the Soviet invasion.

In recent years, the Indian Air Force (IAF) was driven to acquire a fleet of MMRCA, which case study provides an insight into Indian approach when it comes to defense decision-making. The deal under consideration would be worth U.S. $11 billion, making it the world’s biggest international combat aircraft deal in two decades. Because the current IAF is outfitted mostly with Russian aircraft and a few squadrons of French aircraft, the natural choice for the new acquisitions seemed to be Russia or France. With the burgeoning of U.S.-Indian defense cooperation, however, U.S. aircraft like the F-16 and the F-18 also could have been strong contenders. According to Teresita C. Schaffer, “It had been regarded in the United States not just as a commercial bonanza at a time of economic distress, but also as the opportunity to introduce a new level of operational and strategic understanding into the growing India-U.S. defense relationship.”

The Indians thought otherwise. “The IAF was understandably wary when in 2005 Lockheed offered it the F-16 fighter. Former Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis … pointed out that reliability of support when the chips are down outweighs any other consideration.” In the end, India opted for the French Rafale. The IAF justified its decision in purely practical terms. “The Air Force was focusing on getting an aircraft that would be superior, and the American aircraft on offer just didn’t cut it,” said Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, the senior fellow for South Asia at the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

The decision came as such a shock that the U.S. ambassador to New Delhi resigned. (Publically, he cited “previous personal obligations,” but the conspicuous

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265 Ibid.
The timing of Timothy Roemer’s resignation attracted plenty of comment in India.²⁶⁷ The United States lost out not only on a multi-billion dollar deal but also on an opportunity to foster closer cooperation with the IAF.

In contrast, during the period 2006–2010, Russian military equipment constituted 82 percent of total Indian defense imports. A $3.33-billion deal for an additional 42 Russian Su 30 aircraft was inked in 2010.²⁶⁸ India has already shown interest in joint ventures like Medium Transport Aircraft Development Program, Sukhoi/HAL (Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd) Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft, and the Multi-Generation Fighter Aircraft with Russia.²⁶⁹

The Russian equipment predominates in the Indian Navy and Indian Army as well.²⁷⁰ In sum, while India is happy to accept what the United States sends it in these days of rising chumminess, Washington has little hope of seeing the balance of defense exports to India tilting in favor of the United States.

2. Working Together (or not)

U.S. and Indian understandings of interoperability of forces diverge strikingly. According to Dr. Amer Latif, the very term “has negative connotations for the Indian side because of perceptions that such concepts connote an alliance-like relationship. India’s culture of non-alignment and obsession with ‘strategic autonomy’ preclude it from entering into any alliance or exclusive partnership aimed at another country.”²⁷¹ In the context of U.S.-Indian naval exercises, for example, a policy brief notes “New Delhi’s political commitment to ‘strategic autonomy’ constricts greater interoperability between


the two defense forces these agreements would promote.” In sum, the Indians are reluctant to commit their forces into combined military operations unless India’s immediate interests are threatened.

The Indians’ disinclination toward combined operations outside of supporting UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) colors every aspect of their defense relationship with the United States—and often reads on the U.S. side as if the Indians do not take interoperability seriously at any level. According to a U.S. DoD-commissioned study from October 2002, obtained by an Indian news source:

The American military officials are “frustrated” with the “Indian unwillingness” to be active participants “in and exchange of ideas.” In fact this was reflected in the military briefings before Defense Policy Group and Executive Steering Groups—the two forums for military exchange between India and U.S. The Indian presentations were described as “elementary and pedestrian.” The presentations were either lacking in elaboration on Indian strategies, or focusing completely on Pakistan.

Particularly to American officials long experienced with multilateral interoperability in such contexts as NATO, such a half-hearted effort means that real partnership is stalled at the very beginning. In a word, the new era of U.S.-Indian defense cooperation may have found less traction, at least so far, than at least one half of the relationship hopes.

Some of underlying problem is built right into the Indian armed forces. Although Indian military thinking at the operational and tactical levels has been exposed to a transformation riding on Indian ascendance in information technology, it is still some distance away from becoming compatible with U.S. military equipment and practices.

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274 Josy Joseph, “Of Insults, Obsessions and Distrust.”
The Indian Military Doctrine (IMD), which was issued in 2004, laid the foundation for the current Cold Start Doctrine that envisages quick and simultaneous armor thrusts (duly supported by their airpower) into Pakistan. In such a strike, India would seek to capitalize on the element of surprise to cause strategic paralysis in its adversary.\textsuperscript{275} Only with the 2009 review of the IMD have the Indians started to focus on asymmetric and sub-conventional threats, strategic reach, and out-of-area capabilities and operational synergy between the three services.\textsuperscript{276} (The U.S. military embarked on this path over quarter of a century ago after the signing of Goldwater-Nichols Act by President Reagan on October 1, 1986.\textsuperscript{277})

The Indian military is also facing some serious manpower and discipline problems, which might hamper its capacity to cooperate with the high-tech and highly motivated U.S. military.\textsuperscript{278} According to leading Indian defense and security analyst Brig. R. Gurmeet Kanwal:

As India’s economy is booming and lucrative career options are available to the youth in the private sector, the Indian armed forces are being increasingly faced by an acute shortage of officers. The worst affected is the Indian army that has a staggering shortage of approximately 13,000 officers out of an authorized cadre strength of about 40,000 officers. The endemic shortage of officers in the armed forces continues to have a deleterious effect on their war fighting capability.\textsuperscript{279}

Those who do wear the uniform face their own difficulties. According to Sidhart Srivastava, “Rising incidents of violent face-offs between officers and soldiers in the Indian Army are becoming a cause for worry. The reasons relate to harsh service conditions, risk to life and limb, low pay, incompetent leadership and a culture of


\textsuperscript{278} Karl F. Inderfurth and S. Amer Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement: Steady as She Goes.”

humiliation of enlisted men by their officers.”

In May 2012, men from an infantry unit deployed in the strategic Ladakh region, close to the Chinese border, staged a protest march against the unit officers, in the nearby town. It took the intervention and assurance of the Corps Commander—a three-star general—to convince the troops to return to their unit. The Indian Air Force also has a history of disruptive inter-branch rivalry and acrimony over discriminatory pay and allowances (especially for pilots) that has led to agitation, protests and litigations. “Of late it has been observed that indiscipline and discontentment in the Armed Forces due to supersession, cases of moral turpitude, scams and corruption are at its highest ebb.”

3. Organizational/Bureaucratic Obstacles

The defense bureaucracies in United States and India impede the growth of defense cooperation, albeit for different reasons. U.S. defense bureaucracy is tied by the complex legislative procedures and stringent arms export regimes. “It is claimed that export controls as currently conceived and implemented result in economic impacts detrimental to the U.S. defense industrial base, particularly on suppliers of dual use technologies, without a concomitant benefit to U.S. national security.” The U.S. Department of Defense’s control of joint ventures in weapon systems development, even with allies, adversely affects defense cooperation, especially among the more skittish would-be partners. As an example, despite DoD’s eagerness to provide them information


on F-35 Lightning (Joint Strike Fighter), the Indians turned to the Russians again for their future combat aircraft.

The Indian defense bureaucracy is known for its sluggishness owing to its lack of exposure to defense decision-making. Although Indian officials express their frustration with the Byzantine U.S. bureaucracy, the Indian bureaucracy itself is hampered by issues of personnel capacity and budgetary constraints. The civilian bureaucracy encompasses “generalist” Indian Administrative Services (IAS) officers who run various ministries without having any specialization or expertise in their assignments. The same holds true for the bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The near total absence of military officials in the MoD, combined with a generalist civil service which has considerable decision-making powers, create problems. This situation is best explained by Dr. Amer Latif: “[There is] a lack of bureaucratic capacity on the Indian side, combined with a lack of expertise on security matters.”

He added: “In the Army, Navy, the Air Force on both sides, there is a hunger; there is great desire to seek closer service-to-service relations. But, unfortunately, the civilian overseers within the Indian bureaucracy have some reservations.” And their reservations mean that change will be especially slow in coming to India’s defense institutions, including its defense cooperation arrangements.

4. Civil Nuclear Issues

India’s passage of legislation restricting U.S. companies’ ability to compete for contracts in the civil nuclear sector has angered some U.S. officials, who went to tremendous lengths to convince a skeptical international community of the merits of the

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288 Karl F. Inderfurth and S. Amer Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement: Steady as She Goes.”
U.S.-India civil nuclear deal. The expected commercial benefits of the deal would accrue to the United States only if New Delhi legalized an internationally compliant civil nuclear liability regime. What eventuated instead, however, was an ambiguous law (titled the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill and passed by the Indian Parliament in August 2012) that did not abide by the international legal norms governing the nuclear trade.

The legislation makes the suppliers of the nuclear equipment and fuel responsible—beyond the recourse already available through the courts—for any nuclear accident that happens in future. (From India’s perspective, the problem of liability has been exacerbated by the Fukushima disaster and anti-nuclear protests that have threatened the opening of the Russian-built Kudankulam reactor and development of the site at Jaitapur, where the French plan to construct a civil nuclear plant.289) The legislation disappointed U.S. policymakers and represented a failure of New Delhi to uphold its end of the civil nuclear agreement.290 There is still a lingering sense in U.S. policy circles that Washington gained little from the civil nuclear deal. Only time will tell whether U.S. companies will benefit from the deal and whether it leads to greater cooperation between the two countries in stemming global proliferation.

5. The Enemies of One’s Friends: Iran and China

U.S.-India security cooperation will not be affected by the perceptions and institutional problems only; respective/divergent positions on two crucial foreign policy issues: Iran and China would also cast shadow on it. In fact, some observers have termed India-Iran strategic relationship as a stumbling block to the furtherance of U.S.-India strategic relations.

a. The Iran Factor

Some observers justifiably question the U.S. policy of projecting India as its strategic partner despite the fact that the latter continues to maintain broad-based

289 Ibid.

290 Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations.”
relations with Iran, explicitly strong U.S. reservations on the issue notwithstanding. 291 Meanwhile, the leftist political parties in India, which are coalition partners in the current government, have no love lost for the United States. They favor the thriving Indo-Iranian strategic partnership and hence bristle at the U.S. pressure on India to curtail its relations with Iran.

And so far, India has nurtured these relations, including defense connections. Indo-Iran military ties encompass a wide array of cooperation between the two militaries. Indian Army technicians are reported to have helped maintain the Iranian tanks, artillery pieces, and infantry fighting vehicles. In the naval domain, there are reports of Iranian engineers and missile boat operators being trained in India apart from export of naval simulators to Iran. Iran is interested in having its MiG-29 combat planes overhauled or upgraded by the Indian aeronautical engineers. India is also reported to have assisted Iran in acquiring/employing the nuclear and ballistic missile technology. 292

b. The China Factor

India’s ambivalence about its relations with China could also affect U.S.-India relationship. 293 To be sure, the Indians have not forgotten their humiliation at the hands of Chinese during the 1962 Sino-Indian war, not least because some of the same border issues exist even today. China and India are also likely to have a renewed competition over the control of Indian Ocean especially between the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, which are vital for their energy and trade interests. The Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s declaration in June 2012 that India was a lynchpin in the U.S. pivot to Asia 294 indicates that Americans intend to exploit the Indian threat perception about China. “On a swing through Asia … Panetta had hoped to bring the Indian defense

292 Ibid.
293 Lisa Curtis, “Going the Extra Mile for a Strategic U.S.-India Relationship.”
establishment on board for a rebalancing strategy that many believe is aimed squarely at China.”

There is a strong lobby in the Indian strategic community that questions India’s projection as a strategic hedge against the Chinese threat, especially at the behest of the United States. It is felt that India is at least a decade away from attaining the military capability to enable it to challenge the Chinese military might. Even if India were to achieve that capability in future, Indian defense experts maintain that it would not be prudent to position itself against China for commercial interests. China is already a major trading partner of India’s. The two-way trade between China and India reached $74 billion in 2011, with China becoming one of the largest trade partners of India and vice versa. Both countries agreed to take steps to ensure that their bilateral trade reaches $100 billion by 2015.

Indians also worry, considering the U.S. track record, that Washington will not commit itself openly to support India in case it happened to provoke China. India acknowledges that the U.S. maritime presence in the Asia-Pacific will help check the Chinese naval power projection in the Indian Ocean, but it doubts whether India would benefit from close ties with the United States. Another concern expressed in this regard is: what would happen if U.S.-China relations were to get cordial due to economic considerations? According to C. Raja Mohan, “India’s success in balancing Chinese power in the region depends squarely on the quality of its relations with the U.S. … At the same time, India must reduce its vulnerability to the potential for changing dynamics in Sino-U.S. ties.” Therefore, India is not likely do the U.S. bidding when it comes to countering China. “India doesn’t want to upset China, its main competitor in Asia, by

296 “India-China Trade Hits All Time High of $73.9 Billion in 2011,” NDTV, PTI, January 29, 2012.
299 Lisa Curtis, “Going the Extra Mile for a Strategic U.S.-India Relationship.”
300 Ibid.
openly embracing the United States … . Indian lawmakers and politicians continue to have reservations over the United States … from India’s perception … that Washington has tended to side with India’s arch-rival, Pakistan.”301 And so the song remains the same.

6. Prospects for the Future

Whereas, India sees the United States as a conduit to acquisition of cutting edge military technology which it requires to project its power in the region and beyond. In the region, it must dissuade Pakistan from pursuing bilateral contentious issues; beyond the region, it needs primarily to protect its energy and commercial interests especially in the Indian Ocean. India’s quest for enhancing its military might with the assistance of the United States is not necessarily aimed at countering Chinese threat, at least in the short term.

U.S-India security relations appear to be quite promising at present, albeit a number of impediments including some of those already described above, could act as spoilers. Taken individually, those issues may not appear very serious but their combined effect might stymie the further growth of relations.302

Despite all these limitations, the developing strategic partnership between the United States and India will grow out of common national interests—defeat of terrorism, preventing proliferation, energy security, stability in South Asia, maintaining open sea lanes, economic cooperation, and counterbalancing a rising China. The extent to which the U.S. and India can cooperate on these issues and others will be tempered by international and domestic political realities.303 On India’s persistent demands, the United States has vowed to de-hyphenate or delink its relations with India from those with Pakistan. This commitment is likely to be seriously tested in post-U.S. withdrawal

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301 Nitin Gokhale, “Why India Snubbed U.S.”
Afghanistan in which India, despite its reluctance, is being offered an enhanced military role.

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN AND REGIONAL SECURITY

U.S.-Pakistan security relations have been strained over the last couple of years amid divergence over fighting certain terrorist groups (read: Haqqanis) and incidents like the killing of Osama bin Laden and the Salala massacre. But just because this relationship has hit a road block, it may not be at the end of the road if sincere effort is made to remove the obstacles. The prospects need to be assessed based on the ground realities and the prospects of U.S-India defense cooperation especially in Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal.

1. Fair and Balanced

Much of what India acquires in terms of enhancing its military capability has a direct impact on Pakistan, affecting the security calculus between the two countries. This disparity would be further accentuated in case military cooperation between Pakistan and the United States declines for some reason. Riding on the wave of modern defense technology, Indian armed forces have already devised and practiced in military exercises, a highly offensive Cold Start Doctrine.304 This doctrine, based on blitzkrieg-style rapid armor thrusts, is clearly Pakistan specific. These developments have already forced Pakistan to seek tactical nuclear weapons, which means its enhanced reliance on nuclear capability.305

Any future Indo-Pakistan conflict presents an ominous picture. Exploiting the discriminatory provisions of U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, India will be in a position to divert the surplus fissile material toward nuclear warheads.306 India also plans to acquire anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems from countries including the United States.

304 Walter C. Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?”
According to Dr. Shireen Mazari, a leading Pakistani security analyst, “If India deploys its missile defense shield then it implies that India seeks to move out of the deterrence mode into a war-fighting mode in terms of the use of nuclear weapons—that one can actually use nuclear weapons in war and prevail militarily.” Needless to say, such an Indian quest will be highly dangerous in the India-Pakistan context.

Pakistan will be left with no other option but to boost its inventory of ballistic missiles and also seek to develop its own ABM systems, leading to a debilitating arms race in the region. Pakistan’s recent overtures to Russia and memoranda of understanding on defense cooperation especially on air defense prove this point. In a bid to maintain a regional strategic balance, Pakistan will be forced either to enhance its already hefty defense budget or compromise on anti-terrorist operations, which are really sapping its material and human resources. The continued outlay of disproportionately high resources on defense would mean fewer resources for human development, a recipe for Pakistan’s internal instability that would have regional implications.

2. Pakistán’s Relevance beyond the War on Terror

The U.S. commitment in Afghanistan is likely to continue in the foreseeable future because of the complexity of achieving the objectives of political reforms and reconstruction. Pakistan has a key role in the ongoing war on terror in the border belt between Pakistan and Afghanistan and as such contributes directly to the attainment of those objectives. An unstable Pakistan could destabilize the entire region, especially U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and its growing relationship with India. As such an unstable Pakistan would not be in U.S. or Indian interests.

In the short term, the major irritant in U.S.-Pakistan military relations is the U.S. feeling that Pakistan is reluctant to take decisive action against the Haqqani network in


308 Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 87–90.


North Waziristan Agency, which allegedly launches attacks against U.S./ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis question why U.S./ISAF forces do not target the Haqqanis while they venture into Afghanistan. Indeed, most of the Haqqani network has shifted to Afghanistan in the wake of relentless drone strikes on their hideouts in the NWA. Similarly, the Pakistani security establishment also complains that despite its pinpointing of Pakistani Taliban operating out of north-eastern Afghanistan and attacking Pakistani security forces, U.S./ISAF forces have not shown any interest in targeting them. How ironic that Pakistan is blamed for not taking action against the Afghan Taliban, who pose no threat to Pakistan, while U.S./ISAF forces are not ready to target the Pakistani Taliban because they register no threat to themselves. In other words, the logic that is acceptable for U.S./ISAF forces is not acceptable in case of Pakistan.

The United States and Pakistan need each other’s cooperation in fighting war against terror. The United States requires Pakistan’s cooperation for the endgame in Afghanistan. Pakistan also wants a role in the post-withdrawal scenario - both hitting the same bull but fail to pick enough signals to implement it. Even after the bulk of U.S./ISAF forces move out of Afghanistan, a reasonable number of U.S. forces will still be stationed there. To maintain those forces, the United States will continue to need Pakistani support in ensuring unhindered flow of logistics through its territory. This circumstance calls for maintaining good relations with Pakistan’s security establishment.

3. Prospects for the Future

U.S.-Pakistan relations have been sailing on choppy waters over the last two years due to unfortunate incidents described in the last chapter. However, what is heartening is the fact that, despite the cross-currents and sneaker waves, the relations have been

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revived primarily by some deft diplomacy. While respecting his academic (not diplomatic) credentials, one tends to differ with overly pessimistic views of Mr. Husain Haqqani (Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States) when he writes, “But even though Pakistan has continued to depend on U.S. military and economic support, it has not changed its behavior much. Each country accuses the other of being a terrible ally – and perhaps both are right.”315 To conclude his essay, he adds, “After all, they [U.S.-Pakistan relations] could hardly be worse off than they are now, clinging to the idea of alliance even though neither actually believes in it. Sometimes, the best way forward in a relationship lies in admitting that it’s over in its current incarnation.”316 The U.S.-Pakistan relationship, which is so extensive and more importantly so in tune with the strategic objectives of both sides, cannot be sunk so easily. For a long-lasting and strategic relationship with Pakistan, the United States needs to allay Pakistani apprehensions/sensitivities about the Indian role in Afghanistan; the U.S. stance on Pakistan’s nuclear development program, and most importantly, its policy toward India-Pakistan relations.317

The challenge for Pakistan is to ensure that it remains relevant to the United States on the strategic level. Pakistan must mold the U.S.-Pak relationship into a more strategic partnership. It cannot afford to have India as the only south Asian country serving as a strategic partner to the only superpower.

It would be unfortunate if the U.S.-Pakistan relationship were to remain based on such narrow considerations that it can be defined only as a marriage of convenience. Provided that this relationship is expanded beyond purely security considerations into economic realm, it would benefit the 200 million Pakistanis—a considerable enhancement of the human security of the region that would pay great dividends in regional peace and stability as well as a burnished reputation for the United States. Such a redefinition of relations is not a very tall order considering the immense resources of the

316 Ibid.
world’s sole superpower. Military cooperation, which is the mainstay of this relationship, will also get a boost considering the fact that the two militaries have historically been closer to each other as compared with any other segment of the two societies.

4. Pakistan’s Relations with China and Iran

As India’s growing relations with China and Iran might impact India’s relations with the United States, Pakistan’s relations with these two friendly neighbors will certainly have a deeper impact on its relations with the United States. Pakistan’s relations with both China and Iran are more historical and deep-rooted as compared with India’s relations with the two countries. What is even more important to note is that Pakistan’s strategic and commercial interests underpinning these relations might, on certain issues, come into conflict with those of the United States and even India. In short, these relations and associated interests of all the stakeholders present a very complex matrix.

a. The China Factor

The most important property of Pak-China friendship that is has been rightly termed as “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans” is its reliability/durability which is in stark contrast to Pakistan’s friendship with the United States. Though Pak-China relationship is multi-dimensional, security cooperation is its corner stone. According to a report in Pakistan’s leading newspaper:

China is Pakistan’s principal source of military supplies. China has provided vitally needed technological assistance for Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Chinese military assistance to Pakistan in conventional weapons includes the JF-17 aircraft, JF-17 production facility, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks and small arms and ammunition. … the resurgence of militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas and their expanding trans-national networks may force Pakistan and China to shift their focus and concentrate more on joint mechanisms to counter the growing threat of terrorism.\footnote{Dr. Rashid Ahmed Khan, “Pak-China Security Cooperation,” \textit{Daily Times}, June 2, 2010.}
When Pakistan was shunned for its nuclear proliferation and India was showered with U.S. nuclear favors, China continued its unwavering support for Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear program, which was criticized in the United States—unfairly—as an ideologically informed move.319

b. The Iran Factor

More than the strategic and commercial interests as in case of Pak-China relations, Pak-Iran ties are rooted in common religious and cultural grounds. Pak-Iran relations that had been very cordial in Shah of Iran’s time got a little strained in the 80s and 90s due to growing Sunni-Shia rift in Pakistan in the wake of Shi’ite Islamist revolution in Iran that had resulted in the overthrow of the Shah. It coincided with the conflicting interests of the two countries in the post-Soviet withdrawal Afghanistan.320 Despite those irritants, military-military cooperation continued in terms of combined training: the author was trained alongside Iranian cadets at Pakistan Air Force Academy, in mid-80s. Having presented a mixed picture over the last couple of decades, Pak-Iran relations have undergone a tremendous improvement lately. Despite immense U.S. pressure and threat of sanctions, Iran and Pakistan inked the historic U.S. $7.5 billion deal on the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline recently.321

This commercial interest might help Iran and Pakistan iron out their differences on sectarian issues and future of Afghanistan. India had been interested in the pipeline deal for the last few years and hence it was termed as Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI). However, India, under the U.S. pressure322 and as a gratitude for the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, opted out of it last year. An interesting (but alarming for the United States)


320 Harsh V. Pant, “Pakistan and Iran’s Dysfunctional Relationship,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2009, 43–50.


development could be India’s rejoining this joint venture sometime in future. This eventuality is in the realm of possibility considering the current state of Indo-Iranian relations and especially the way in which Indians conduct their foreign policy.

C. CONCLUSION

U.S. relations with Pakistan are going to be a major hurdle in projected progress of U.S. relations with India because many Indians still believe that the United States has traditionally not been sensitive to Indian reservations about U.S. sponsorship of Pakistani military. Any U.S. transactions on one side of the Indo-Pak border cannot be considered in a vacuum as they would certainly raise concerns on the other side. Pakistan’s strong expression of disappointment over the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal and negative Indian reaction over sale of advanced U.S. military equipment to Pakistan, prove this point. This triangle of zero-sum relations will strongly come into play as India and especially Pakistan have high stakes in post-U.S. withdrawal Afghanistan. India’s likely limited military role in Afghanistan will negatively affect U.S.-India military relations.323

According to Christine Fair, “there is little evidence that regional implications are being considered by Washington … it has de-hyphenated its relations with the two major South Asian states … While this is certainly to be applauded, in reality, full de-hyphenation of policy is a rhetorical nicety.”324 The ground reality, however, is that prevailing security environment in South Asia owing to acrimony between India and Pakistan will continue to challenge U.S. engagement with both countries simultaneously. While Pakistan seeks active U.S. role in resolving outstanding Indo-Pakistan disputes, India abhors such a proposition. Hence, the security competition between the two nuclear armed rivals will continue and U.S.-supported Indian dream of attaining a great power status could take much longer time in becoming true. Christine Fair adds, “While these considerations may not change the substance of U.S.-India relations, they should inform

324 Christine Fair, “India-Iran Security Ties: Thicker Than Oil,” 300.
contingency planning with respect to Pakistan and … motivate some thinking about the role of Pakistan’s threat perception in securing regional stability.”325

325 Ibid.
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Having carried out an in-depth analysis of the comparative history of U.S. security cooperation (bordering on human security as well as strategic cooperation) with India and Pakistan, the final step is to revisit the major research question. Will the growing security cooperation between the United States and India and somewhat declining cooperation between the United States and Pakistan serve the medium-long-term peace and security in South Asia? Although, the answer to this vital question is not straightforward, one can safely say that certain straightforward but sustained measures by the three stakeholders can achieve the necessary reconfiguration of U.S. relations with both South Asian powers.

A. UNITED STATES

U.S. interest in the South Asian region neither commenced with the GWOT, nor it is going to end with that. Being the sole superpower, the United States cannot afford to simply walk away from the region as it did in late ‘80s—for which it paid/is still paying a very heavy price.

In the past, the U.S. policies towards the individual regional stakeholders have had implications for others in the South Asian region. The situation is more acute now because most of those stakeholders are either allies or major trading partners of the United States, momentary ripples in those relations notwithstanding. Hence, U.S. policy makers will be well-advised not to be duped by the enticing terms like “de-hyphenation” because they will prove to be no more than a mirage in the South Asian context.

In this connection, the following recommendations are propounded for consideration by the U.S. policy circles:

1. In the best interest of South Asia, establish broad-based long-term relations with the two main stakeholders: India and Pakistan, keeping their mutual sensitivities in view. Invest serious diplomatic capital in resolving their long-standing “blood-feuds” like Kashmir while asking India to step down from its high pedestal of
“bilateral resolution of disputes” that it obstinately draws from the Indo-Pak Simla Agreement of 1972.

2. The United States should arm India while remaining cognizant of the possibility that it might induce an element of arrogance in Indian attitude, which might seriously compromise the regional security paradigm. With India and Pakistan locked in endless security competition, a disproportionately large chunk of limited resources continuously flows into regional security mechanisms with resources dedicated for human security in inverse proportions.

3. If arming India is a strategic compulsion for the United States, then the strengthening of Pakistani military capabilities must also figure out high on the U.S. agenda for maintaining strategic balance in the region.

4. Implementation of civil nuclear deal with India needs to be closely monitored in true letter and spirit not only for safeguarding commercial interests of the United States but also in the best interest of nuclear non-proliferation. India should not be allowed to exploit the loopholes in the deal to divert the fissile material for weapon purposes, upsetting the precarious nuclear balance in the region.

5. The United States should stop losing sleep over the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Explicit and frequent voicing of U.S. concerns touches the raw nerve of the Pakistani nation and military, who take immense pride in and jealously guard the nuclear capability that has been achieved after giving huge sacrifices, virtually “eating grass” in the process. Pakistan has already put in place a fool-proof security system for its nuclear infra-structure as well as an efficient Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).

6. Afghanistan, in the near future is likely to witness strategic competition between the internal as well as regional and extra-regional stakeholders. The United States should get all the Afghan stakeholders especially the Taliban and Northern Alliance as well as outside stakeholders like Pakistan, India, China, and even Iran on board to broker a power sharing arrangement in Afghanistan. It should avoid giving any disproportionate role to India to the detriment of Pakistan.
7. Pakistani influence with factions of Taliban, Indian influence with Northern Alliance, and Iranian influence in the western Afghanistan could be used to good effect while sorting out the Afghan end game. It would be a strategic blunder on part of the United States to play favorites in this high stakes game. Giving India an unjustifiably large role especially at the cost of Pakistan will neither serve U.S. interests nor those of domestic/regional players.

8. Pakistan is facing a severe energy crisis that has brought its industry and services to their knees and created serious social problems due to alarmingly high unemployment, especially among the youth. Instead of blocking Pakistan’s nuclear energy deals with China and gas deals with Iran, the United States must invest as well to encourage others to invest in Pakistan’s energy sector while securing its standing to weigh in on these issues as a contributor.

9. At present, the U.S. approval rating in Pakistan is the lowest ever (around 8 percent). The United States should invest more into the projects that directly benefit the masses. USAID and its positive projection in the Pakistani media is a step in the right direction but it needs further expansion. An internally stable and prosperous Pakistan would suit everyone in the region and beyond.

B.  INDIA

As compared with other countries in South Asia, India undoubtedly is a great country in terms of its size, human resources, economy, and its military. However, what India seriously lacks is moral greatness. It does not enjoy cordial relations with any of its neighbors as it has always shied away from resolving mutual issues amicably and instead tried to throw its weight around. As the largest and strongest country in South Asia, India has had the tendency of interfering in the internal affairs of smaller neighbors and even picking squabbles with an eye toward its own territorial aggrandizement. It has territorial and water disputes with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Nepal. It carried out a military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, which resulted in its separation from West Pakistan and made a bloody war much worse. Heady from that success, India intervened in Sri Lanka in 1987. It had to ultimately retreat after facing humiliation and losing 1225
soldiers—ironically at the hands of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), which faction India had sought to support.

India’s bitter experience in the Sri Lankan misadventure might keep it from becoming part of any collaborative security arrangements. India’s refusal to send troops to Iraq in 2003 and reluctance to commit troops in Afghanistan now can be attributed to the same hard-won hesitancy. Moreover, the Indian attitude has placed most of its neighbors: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal firmly into the Chinese orbit. It has sought to acquire military muscle to assume the status of a regional bully. Even currently, it is trying to make most of the U.S. benevolence to further its regional and extra-regional ambitions.

As a subscriber of hard-core realism, India tends to pursue its own agenda and is usually not given to accommodating the interests of other countries even at a slight compromise to its own. This attitude served India well as long as Indian ambitions focused on being the big kid on the South Asian block, but that approach neither befits nor benefits a great power. As such, India will need to seriously consider the following policy recommendations in its own interest as well in interest of other countries in the region:

1. India must show some sincerity in resolving its outstanding disputes with Pakistan, especially Kashmir. Otherwise some 1.4 billion people in both countries will continue to live under the shadow of nuclear holocaust and the foregone opportunities the South Asian nuclear contest entails. Hundreds of millions of people in India are amongst the poorest in the world. If not for anyone else’s sake, at least for the sake of those teeming Indian masses, India should shun its belligerence and invest more in human development—and let Pakistan also do the same.

2. India should reject highly aggressive conventional military doctrines like “Cold Start” and review its plans to acquire anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. Both of these strategies and their attendant capabilities have an ominous potential to destabilize South Asia.
3. India must realize that despite its embrace of the realist school of thought, there still is some room for morality in international relations especially if a country is aspiring to become a great power. Countries in that quest have to make certain compromises and sacrifices which do not lower their stature. In fact, making compromises to amicably resolve the regional disputes, raise it. Indeed, there is no way for Indian power to be regionally secure without a proper establishment of both its legitimacy and a consensus with Pakistan on the basis of mutual respect and accommodation.

4. For the moment, India might enjoy “returning the favor” of Pakistan’s purported hand in the Kashmiri insurgency by fomenting trouble in the restive Pakistani province of Baluchistan. But Delhi must remember that lighting a bonfire in your neighbor’s backyard might burn your own fingers and its flames might travel to your backyard in no time. Wind patterns in this region are mostly westerly: blowing from west to east. In other words, what goes around comes around.

5. India should acknowledge that the Pakistani state is not a sponsor of terrorism. In fact, Pakistan is a victim; Pakistan has lost more than 30,000 lives (including 3,500 security forces personnel) and more than $67 billion in material. Instead of continuing to milk the bogey of “Pakistani terrorism” India should extend a sincere hand of cooperation in a bid to devise a joint mechanism for fighting the scourge of terrorism, which threatens both states and the region.

6. Although India’s enhanced footprint in Afghanistan might look strategically very lucrative, it has the potential of dooming the apparent lull in the Indo-Pak active conflict. India should be prudent enough to eschew any activity in Afghanistan that could exacerbate Pakistani concerns in that imbroglio. India should strongly resist temptation/encouragement to commit itself militarily into Afghanistan as that would have disastrous consequences not only for it but also for other internal and external stakeholders.

7. Finally, as a famous saying goes, you can change your friends but not your neighbors. Hence, it is better to co-exist peacefully with them but not always on
your terms. India should remember that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is in its interest, and it should sincerely help realization of that. It would be utterly foolhardy on India’s part to think that Pakistan will ultimately capitulate in the face of “Rising India”; nuclear powers are not pushovers.

C. PAKISTAN

Thanks to the faulty partition plan formulated in 1947 by the British colonists, Pakistan gained independence and an acute shortage of material and military resources vis-à-vis India. This comparative disadvantage naturally gave birth to Pakistan’s deep sense of insecurity, and the Indian attitude since independence has exacerbated it in no small measure. Being an ideological state, Pakistan, which should have ideally evolved into a welfare state, drifted into becoming a security state.

Periodic U.S. military assistance helped assuage Pakistani security anxieties but U.S.-Pakistan relationship never moved much beyond that and failed to mature into a broad-based people-to-people engagement. This relationship enhanced Pakistan’s military potential but not as much, the other elements of national power potential. Perhaps that explains the episodic nature of U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation.

If U.S.-Pakistan relations have been “consistently inconsistent,” Indo-Pak relations have been “consistently acrimonious.” A crucial thing to note here is that these two sets of relations are fundamentally inter-linked. Pakistan, materially the weakest side of this triangle, needs to play its cards really well not only to survive at present but also to thrive in future. The following recommendations are propounded for consideration by Pakistani policy makers:

1. Pakistan should proactively seek to resolve all of its outstanding disputes with India and insist on facilitation by such neutral powers as the United States and possibly EU. It should remind India that if India can ignore the 1948 U.N. resolutions on plebiscite in Kashmir, then the Indo-Pak commitment to resolve all issues bilaterally under the Simla Agreement can also be set aside for a while to break out of current impasse by accepting external facilitation.
2. Until a shift in the Indian attitude toward the acceptance of U.S./EU facilitation comes about, Pakistan should not lower its guard. It should continue to hone its conventional military capability, backed up by a credible nuclear deterrence. Learning from India, Pakistan should also expand its support base. Recent politico-military overtures to Russia, which met with positive response, must be pursued further without compromising on its relations with the United States. The aim should be to diversify Pakistan’s supporters so as to ease the burdens of alliance and expectations.

3. Considering the current state of the Pakistani economy, Pakistan can ill-afford to get into any type of arms race with India. Instead what it needs to do is to resolutely enhance its tooth-to-tail ratio: prefer fewer but more effective weapon systems. It might not economize resources in the short-term; however, in the medium to long term, it will. The savings should be voluntarily surrendered for human development at the national level.

4. Pakistan must realize once and for all that its strategic compulsions notwithstanding, it direly needs to be seen as a responsible, progressive, and vibrant member of the international community. In order to achieve this refurbished image, it needs to make a serious investment in development of its abundant human capital. It should seek to enhance other elements of its national power alongside its military power because there is no bigger virtue than being strong and no bigger vice than being weak.

5. Pakistan must continue to show its resolve in curbing nuclear proliferation and fighting terrorism. It should convince the United States and EU that it is a responsible nuclear state which has robust and foolproof nuclear command/control/security systems in place. Hence, apprehensions about its nuclear weapons/materials falling into the hands of terrorists are entirely misplaced. Pakistan’s anti-terrorism campaign and sacrifices rendered therein must be aggressively projected in the world media.

6. Pakistan should take an active part in parleys concerning the future of Afghanistan and facilitate in getting all the domestic Afghan and regional
stakeholders, including Iran on board. It should not compromise on its strategic interests while being cognizant of the emerging ground realities concerning its western neighborhood. Its relative economic weakness might not allow it to partake in Afghan reconstruction on the scale that some of other stakeholders might be in a position to do. However, Pakistan should offer training to Afghan security forces and share its surplus resources for their capacity building. Moreover, it should offer educational facilities to Afghan youth in Pakistani institutions.

7. Capitalizing on its unique status of being a strategic ally of the United States and China, Pakistan should repeat its diplomatic act of 1971 of getting both states closer. Rapprochement instead of rancor between the United States and China will bring rich dividends, both strategic and economic, to the moonstruck region that is South Asia.

D. CONCLUSION

The foundations of U.S. security cooperation with Pakistan and India have transformed from the Cold War imperatives to the GWOT and finally to counter the imminent rise of China as an Asian great power if not the world power. Although these relations have been primarily based on security considerations, they have failed to address the security concerns of the two major stakeholders: India and Pakistan. The main reason for that has been the U.S. reluctance to get entangled in Indo-Pak conflict. It is ironic; however, that despite this U.S. policy, its engagement with India and Pakistan has only exacerbated their bilateral conflict. During the Cold War, United States’ moral and material support emboldened Pakistan to confront its much larger neighbor. Now that Pakistan is losing favor with the United States, India is gaining same kind of encouragement from the sole Super Power to sideline Pakistan and confront China which it might never do.

Narrow security-centered definition of U.S. relations with India and Pakistan has resulted in U.S. engagement mostly with the establishments in the two countries and minimal interaction with the public. As a result, a vital element of security: human
security has been ignored which has greatly contributed to the menace of terrorism emanating from the region. Terrorism has not only altered the American way of life and badly shaken the U.S. economy but has also further degraded the already abysmal human development in South Asia.

If contentious issues between India and Pakistan had been resolved through a process of facilitation, if not outright arbitration, likely neither state would have to dedicate so many resources for defense. In the case of Pakistan, security, especially from India, has been an outright compulsion and a bigger dilemma considering Pakistan’s relatively limited resources. Pakistan’s acute sense of insecurity vis-à-vis India might not have motivated it to adopt the resource-intensive course of nuclear weapons—though India might have still gone that way citing Chinese threat. The two countries might have been in a position to divert more resources toward human development and resultantly, the region would not be confronted with this scourge of terrorism.

With this backdrop, when one looks at the future in light of the current trends of U.S. relations with India and Pakistan and imminent U.S. exit from Afghanistan, a mixed picture emerges. Going by the historical precedence and current trends, U.S.-India security relations are not likely to flourish in a significant way in the near future, nor are U.S.-Pakistan relations likely to undergo any major transformation for the better. If U.S.-India relations develop the way they are being projected by the two sides, especially if that means exclusion of Pakistan from the equation, it will have serious ramifications for the security and strategic stability in the region. As recommended above, certain bold, straightforward, and sustained measures by the three stakeholders can achieve the necessary reconfiguration of U.S. relations with both South Asian powers keeping the security (including human security) and stability in the region as the ultimate objective. Needless to say that the main issue of South Asia—which houses one-fifth of the humanity—is not military security but human security, which has direct impact on all other forms of security.
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