Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

July 2013
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

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Executive Summary

The conflict in Afghanistan has shifted into a fundamentally new phase. For the past 11 years, the United States and our coalition partners have led the fight against the Taliban, but now Afghan forces are conducting almost all combat operations. The progress made by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-led surge over the past three years has put the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) firmly in control of all of Afghanistan’s major cities and 34 provincial capitals and driven the insurgency into the countryside. ISAF’s primary focus has largely transitioned from directly fighting the insurgency to training, advising and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to hold and build upon these gains, enabling a U.S. force reduction of roughly 34,000 personnel—half the current force in Afghanistan—by February 2014.

As agreed by President Obama and President Karzai at their January 2013 meeting in Washington, D.C., and in line with commitments made at the Lisbon and Chicago NATO summits, "Milestone 2013" was announced on June 18, 2013, marking ISAF’s official transition to its new role. The ANSF has grown to approximately 96 percent of its authorized end-strength of 352,000 personnel and is conducting almost all operations independently. As a result, ISAF casualties are lower than they have been since 2008. The majority of ISAF bases has been transferred to the ANSF or closed (although most large ISAF bases remain), and construction of most ANSF bases is complete. Afghanistan’s populated areas are increasingly secure; the ANSF has successfully maintained security gains in areas that have transitioned to Afghan lead responsibility. To contend with the continuing Taliban threat, particularly in rural areas, the ANSF will require training and key combat support from ISAF, including in extremis close air support, through the end of 2014.

Challenges with the economy and governance will continue to foster uncertainty about the long-term prospects for stability. Afghanistan has made some progress over the past decade, as reflected in the recently released United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index, which cited Afghanistan as making the largest percentage gain in the world over the last 10 years. Moreover, the economy grew 12 percent in 2012, and the Afghan government is increasingly able to execute parts of its budget and deliver very basic goods and services. Nonetheless, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world and will remain heavily dependent on outside aid. The government has yet to reduce corruption or extend governance to many rural areas effectively. Given the expected decline in international assistance, Afghanistan will need to embrace new sources of future economic growth and government revenue.

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1 This report is submitted consistent with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the eleventh in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2014 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is valid as of March 31, 2013. This is a historical document that covers progress in Afghanistan from October 1, 2012, to March 31, 2013 although some more recent updates of key events are included. The next report will include an analysis of progress toward security and stability from April 1, 2013, to September 30, 2013.
The security situation also remains challenging: Afghanistan continues to face a resilient insurgency that uses sanctuaries in Pakistan to attempt to regain lost ground and influence through continued high-profile attacks and assassinations. Although ANSF capabilities have greatly increased over the past two years, it has yet to demonstrate the ability to operate independently on a nationwide scale. Therefore, the Afghan government will require continued assistance from ISAF and the international community over the next year and a half to help enable it to address these challenges and improve long-term prospects for stability. While relations between Afghanistan and the U.S. have at times been turbulent during this period, negotiations have made progress on key issues. Assessing whether the gains to date will be sustainable will be difficult to do until the exact size and structure of the post-2014 US and NATO presence is determined. Another key factor in this assessment will be whether a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the U.S. and Afghanistan is reached.

ANSF in the Lead

ISAF’s main effort is to facilitate the conditions for the ANSF to assume full security responsibility for Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Of all lines of effort, this showed the most progress during the reporting period, culminating in the Milestone 2013 ceremony that formally marked the ANSF’s assumption of operational lead for the 2013 fighting season.

The ANSF has grown in size and capability in accordance with ISAF’s development plan. Initial force generation and training of the ANSF’s basic infantry and police force structure by ISAF is largely complete and has largely transitioned to the Ministries of Defense and Interior, which now conducts 85 percent of ANSF training. The Afghan National Army (ANA) Command and Control (C2) system has advanced to an adequately resilient level and is capable of providing the minimal essential support required for the transition to Afghan lead in plans and operations by 2014. The ANSF will, however, need continued assistance and combat support through the end of the ISAF mandate in December 2014; beyond then it will still require substantial training, advising and assistance—including financial support—to address ongoing shortcomings. Some of these include the ability of the ANSF to operate and sustain some of the more complex and technologically advanced capabilities that will be fielded, such as logistics, air support and artillery. ANSF components responsible for these more complex tasks, particularly air operations, will not be capable of fully independent operations by December 2014. In addition, the security ministries face long-term challenges in building up the personnel and bureaucratic structures necessary to manage the ANSF effectively and in training and deployment of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), particularly in the more complex occupational areas such as aviation and logistics.

During the reporting period, the ANSF has performed effectively in the field, losing no major bases or district centers to the insurgency and protecting the majority of the Afghan population. Although challenges remain, the ANSF demonstrated an increasing level of effectiveness. The ANSF led almost 90 percent of operations by the end of the reporting period and is already in the lead for security in areas covering nearly 90 percent of the Afghan population. The ANSF has incrementally increased its capability to plan, conduct and sustain large-scale joint operations. One example of this was Operation KALAK HODE VI in Regional Command–South (RC-S). This 10,000-person joint operation, which focused on disrupting the insurgency, involved
coordination among the Afghan Army, Police, Border Police and National Directorate of Security. The ANSF principally planned, led and manned the operation; Afghan-managed logistics and supply channels supported it.

The number of insider attacks declined sharply during the reporting period. Thus far, these attacks have not significantly affected the strong relationship between coalition and ANSF personnel, particularly in the field, where they face a common enemy every day. Coalition forces and the ANSF are working together on a comprehensive, combined response to insider threats and have implemented several mitigation measures. Our current assessment is that these measures are having a positive effect, although continued emphasis is required to maintain progress against this threat and ensure it does not jeopardize ISAF-ANSF cohesion.

**Insurgent Narrative Undermined**

The insurgency failed to achieve its campaign objectives during the reporting period and its ability to strike at major population centers is increasingly under pressure. Taliban territorial influence and control decreased in 2012 and continued to do so during the reporting period. The enemy is now less capable, less popular and less of an existential threat to the Afghan government than in 2011. Nonetheless, insurgents maintained influence in many rural areas that serve as platforms to attack urban areas and were able to carry out attacks with roughly the same frequency as in 2012, although these attacks tended to be in less populated areas. The insurgency can also use its sanctuaries in Pakistan to prevent its decisive defeat in the near term. But the ANSF’s growing capability has enabled it to successfully challenge the insurgency across Afghanistan and hold the security gains made in the past two years.

During the reporting period, sustained counterterrorism operations eliminated dozens of al Qaeda (AQ) facilitators and exerted pressure on AQ personnel, restricting their movement to isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan. ISAF estimates that the number of AQ fighters in Afghanistan remains very low, but AQ’s relationship with local Afghan Taliban remains intact.

Insurgent groups’ main propaganda theme for the past 11 years has been that they are fighting a foreign “occupation.” As the ANSF takes over almost all operations and coalition forces recede from combat and draw down, this message increasingly lacks credibility. This is particularly the case because insurgent actions continue to cause the vast majority of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, mostly as a result of insurgents’ indiscriminate emplacement of IEDs. As the insurgency finds itself increasingly fighting Afghans—and as even more of the victims of insurgent attacks are fellow Afghans—insurgents’ propaganda will become even more detached from reality. At the same time, a credible U.S. enduring presence as part of NATO’s RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission will contradict the insurgent message of “abandonment.”
Transition is On Track

The transition process is on track for completion by the end of 2014, with four of five tranches of provincial districts fully in transition, and the fifth tranche entering transition this summer. President Karzai announced tranche four on December 31, 2012, and all districts in this tranche began transition by March 2013. With tranche four now underway, approximately 87 percent of the Afghan population is living in areas where transition has occurred or is occurring and 23 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces are wholly in transition. Tranche four moved Afghans into the lead for security in important population centers, economically significant districts and large areas in the east and center of the country. Tranche five was announced this spring and will be implemented in late summer; it will include all remaining districts in Afghanistan, most of which are along the border with Pakistan. Areas that enter transition undergo several stages of progress that gradually increase Afghan control. Areas that reach the final stage of transition remain at that stage until December 2014 when all provinces and districts in Afghanistan will graduate from transition, regardless of what stage they have achieved.

As U.S. and coalition forces draw down and re-posture, the ANSF is taking the lead in transitioned areas and helping to expand Afghan government influence, most notably in Regional Command–North (RC-N), where ISAF forces have substantially reduced their coverage. Transition is a dynamic and uneven process, with some areas progressing quickly and others moving slowly or even regressing. Notably, some areas of Badakshan Province saw increased insurgent attacks with the ANSF taking significant casualties, indicating that ISAF will continue to have to assess the pace and scope of transition to prevent premature withdrawal and to learn appropriate lessons to make the transition process more effective.

Kabul remains the most densely populated and secure area in the country under the ANSF’s security lead despite consistent insurgent attempts to conduct attacks there. Poor coordination between the ANA and Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) is a major challenge in transitioned areas. Attacks along access routes to major population centers as well as government ineffectiveness also hamper transition. Governance and development continue to be inadequate in many transitioning areas and will require continued substantial levels of assistance from the international community well into the 2015-2024 “Decade of Transformation.”

Mixed Cooperation with Pakistan

Overall, relations between Pakistan and the United States have stabilized. Although Pakistan and Afghanistan both acknowledge that stability in Afghanistan impacts Pakistan and vice versa, relations between the two nations continue to be rocky and dominated by mistrust. Bilateral visits between Pakistani and Afghan leaders increased during the past year, including recent high-level visits to Afghanistan by Foreign Minister Khar and Chief of Army Staff General Kayani and by Minister of Defense Bismillah Khan Mohammadi and Afghan High Peace Council Chairman Rabbani to Pakistan. In February 2013, during a trilateral meeting in the United Kingdom, President Karzai and President Zadari agreed to strengthen bilateral efforts to

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2 In accordance with the 2010 Inteqal (Transition) Framework, which establishes the Afghan-led process, transition will occur in phases based on the selection of five geographic areas, or “tranches.” The first four have already entered transition. The fifth tranche began entering transition in June 2013.
further the Afghan-led peace process and reconciliation and to advance regional peace and stability. The United States and other coalition nations also began transporting a small amount of materiel into and out of Afghanistan through the Pakistani ground lines of communication (GLOC), greatly reducing the transportation time and cost of using other routes. As of the end of the reporting period, the Pakistani GLOC was capable of handling all of the cargo headed into and out of Afghanistan. Afghanistan-Pakistan military-to-military coordination has strengthened, including joint border operations and the possibility of future officer training exchanges. Nonetheless, cooperation along the border remains uneven. Some Pakistani insurgents have fled into Afghanistan and have then conducted attacks into Pakistan. Despite increased bilateral communication in some areas, frequent Afghan and Pakistani accusations of cross-border artillery strikes into each other’s territory persist.

Pakistan has conducted counterinsurgency operations mainly against Pakistan-focused militants and not against the Afghan-focused insurgents located in western Pakistan. In some areas, however, these operations have restricted the operating space and resources of these insurgents. Pakistan has also provided support to the Afghan-to-Afghan reconciliation process.

**U.S. - Afghanistan Relations**

The ongoing security transition and preparations for the upcoming political transition have created a set of challenging issues in bilateral relations between the United States and Afghanistan. Bilateral relations reached a high point at the meeting between President Karzai and President Obama on January 11, 2013. The two presidents reaffirmed the Afghan-American relationship and commitment to our shared strategy. They discussed the significant security progress of the last two years and the transition to ANSF lead; the impressive development gains in Afghanistan over the past decade and the need for continued, sustainable progress; preparations for the upcoming election and Afghan plans to ensure that it is a fair and inclusive electoral process; and the regional situation including building strong ties between Afghanistan and its neighbors. They also agreed on a way forward for transferring the Afghan detainees held by US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) at the U.S. Detention Facility at Parwan. Finally, both presidents committed to concluding the BSA (which both nations began negotiating in November 2012) as soon as possible, reaffirming that such an agreement is in both countries’ interests.

Bilateral relations faced challenges in the months after the presidential meeting. In late February 2013, President Karzai ordered U.S. forces out of Wardak Province in response to accusations that they were organizing Afghan forces who were abusing Afghans. After subsequent investigations revealed that the accusations of abuse were false, ISAF and the Afghan government reached an agreement on a plan to accelerate security transition in Wardak to the ANSF.

In early March, disagreements over implementation of the way forward decided in January 2013 delayed the scheduled handover of Afghan detainees held by the United States at the Detention Facility at Parwan. Following in-depth discussions, the U.S. and Afghan governments signed a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) on March 25 to transfer custody over Afghan detainees and control of the detention facility to the Afghan government. The MOU provides for
access to detainees in Afghan custody by nongovernmental organizations so they can monitor their treatment.

In mid-March, President Karzai publicly implied that the Taliban and the United States were working in concert to show that violence would worsen if coalition forces leave after 2014. ISAF categorically denied this allegation, and President Karzai later indicated that his comments had been misinterpreted by the media. President Karzai’s comment, the drawn-out negotiations over the transfer of Afghan detainees and the Wardak Province security transition strained cooperation between the United States and Afghanistan during the reporting period.

**Effective Governance, the Rule of Law and Sustainable Economic Development Are Necessary for Long-Term Stability in Afghanistan but Multiple Factors Continue to Hinder Them, Including Widespread Corruption; Limited Education and Skill Levels; Minimal Access by Officials to Rural Areas Due to a Lack of Security; a Lack of Coordination between the Central Government and the Afghan Provinces and Districts; and an Uneven and Evolving Distribution of Power Among the Judicial, Legislative and Executive Branches.**

Afghan government capacity to provide stable and responsive governance to the Afghan population continues to develop although progress is slow and uneven. Revenue generation, including tax collection at the municipal level, has steadily improved, but execution of the development budget remains below targets in some areas. The Afghan government is highly centralized, with revenue, budgeting, spending and service delivery authority residing with the central ministries in Kabul, limiting the efficiency of service delivery at the provincial and district levels. Decentralization is slowed by limited human capital resulting from low education levels and skillsets and migration of many Afghans to other countries as a result of decades of conflict as well as from delays in enactment of structural reforms by the central government. There are some parts of the government that do have relatively effective service delivery, such as the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

The July 2012 Tokyo Conference recognized many of these issues, and the resulting Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) included specific commitments by the Afghans to address some of the major weaknesses in sub-national governance. To date, the Afghan government has made limited progress in meeting its TMAF commitments and implementing required structural reforms.

Economic growth and development in Afghanistan will continue to be led through 2014 by investments in construction and by private consumption driven largely by donor contributions and ISAF spending for services. The macroeconomic effects of the reduction in ISAF personnel during the previous reporting period remain unclear, although as ISAF continues to drawdown, economic growth will likely be affected. The donor funding commitments made in Tokyo provided an important signal from the international community that there will be continued funding post-2014 to support the Afghan economy and mitigate the effects of transition, particularly because the economy does not yet have a basis for sustained growth without such assistance. The non-opium agricultural sector comprises about half of total GDP, according to
the World Bank, and about 75 percent of the population lives in rural areas where agriculture is the primary economic activity. Opium production, however, remains a substantial portion of overall agriculture output and will continue to fuel corruption and fund the insurgency, undermining good governance and hindering efforts to improve security. Mining accounts for a marginal share of GDP but has the potential to expand if the government implements pending legislation to modernize the rules and regulations governing this sector. The information technology sector, particularly telecommunications, is one area of Afghanistan’s economy that is showing continued growth.

Investor fears about political risk and the security situation make it particularly important for Afghanistan to show progress in regulatory reforms and the completion of major infrastructure projects. No major infrastructure projects were scheduled for completion during the reporting period. The Cabinet of Ministers approved in February a draft mining law that is now pending Parliament’s approval.

The Afghan population continues to benefit from the vast improvements in social development made over the past decade, particularly in health and education, although access and availability is limited outside population centers.

During the reporting period, several Kabul Bank employees, including the former chairman and former CEO, were convicted of breach of trust, assessed heavy voluntary fines and sentenced to five years in prison. However, several politically connected beneficiaries of the Kabul Bank scheme have yet to be indicted.

Sustaining governance, development and security gains beyond 2014 will depend in large part upon a successful presidential election and a smooth transfer of power. The Afghan government agreed in the U.S.–Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement and the TMAF to promote free, fair, inclusive and transparent elections. U.S. assistance is designed to help them meet that goal. The U.S. government has provided substantial support for election preparations including technical advice and funding for Afghanistan’s independent election institutions and capacity building for civil society and political groups. Afghanistan is currently working to establish election legislation and operational plans by the deadlines established in the TMAF.

Challenges in governance and sustainable economic development continue to slow the reinforcement of security gains. Ongoing insurgent operations and influence in parts of the country continues to inhibit economic development and improvements in governance. Unqualified and corrupt political officials in parts of the central government undermine government efficacy and credibility, threatening the long-term stability of Afghanistan. During the reporting period, the Afghan government's counter-corruption efforts have shown no substantial progress, apart from the public acknowledgement that large-scale corruption exists.

**ISAF’s Shifting Mission**

ISAF has largely shifted to a Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission focused on improving the ANSF’s capabilities rather than fighting the insurgency directly. The SFA model calls for advisor teams to train, advise and assist (TAA) the ANSF at the tactical and operational levels
until they are able to conduct operations independently. In some cases, SFA Teams (SFATs) are supported by SFA Brigades (SFABs), which have replaced U.S. combat brigades as those brigades redeploy. SFABs are redesigned maneuver units that manage risk, oversee force protection and provide key support to SFATs when necessary. During the reporting period, six U.S. combat brigades were drawn down and eight SFABs were deployed.

The SFAT model also reflects an evolution in how ISAF solicits partner nation troop contributions, moving from a focus on geographic areas of responsibility to a model more focused on ANSF unit sponsorship. Each SFAT is tailored to include individuals with specific skills associated with the ANSF unit to which it is assigned. Each troop-contributing nation determines its SFATs’ composition and disposition in order to meet ISAF requirements.

Currently, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has established requirements for 460 SFATs; as of the end of the reporting period there is a shortfall of 60 SFATs. The near-term challenge for NATO is to enlist the support of troop-contributing nations that have specific and readily usable and transferable skill sets for SFATs. SFAT requirements will decrease through 2013 as the ANSF improves its ability to independently conduct operations.

**A Note on Metrics**

ISAF has always used a comprehensive approach to assessing the campaign by considering a wide array of metrics that address security, economic, governance and other trends. Public reports such as this have, however, placed too much emphasis on enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) as a single measure of progress. As the nature of the conflict has evolved, it has become clear that a tally of EIAs is not now, nor was it ever, the most complete measure of the campaign’s progress. At a time when more than 80 percent of EIAs are happening in areas where less than 20 percent of Afghans live—a result of ISAF’s and the ANSF’s success in driving the insurgency out of populated areas—this single facet of the campaign has become significantly less relevant in evaluating progress against the insurgency. Improvements in the capabilities of the ANSF and progress in governance and development are far more indicative of success in Afghanistan than the total number of EIAs. EIA trends, localized historical comparisons and a large number of other metrics are still accurate and are used throughout this report. This report will, however, no longer use nationwide EIA totals and historical comparisons of these totals as a main metric of success in Afghanistan.

A key reason for this change in emphasis is that ISAF no longer has the ability to report most EIAs. As it shifts from a combat mission and as the number of forces in theater rapidly declines, ISAF is involved in a smaller share of tactical incidents that would be reported as compared with a year ago. Instead, EIAs are now primarily an ANSF reporting responsibility. Although EIA data are still a useable metric and comparisons with previous years are still valid under certain circumstances, the previous depth of analysis and assessments is no longer as central to assessing progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan.

In January 2013, ISAF discovered that a number of EIAs reported from independent ANSF operations had not been included in its database. The ANSF had accurately reported these data,
but ISAF mistakenly did not enter them into its main metrics database. An internal audit resulted in a revision of 2012 EIA totals from being down seven percent compared to 2011 to no change in the totals. The error revealed by the discovery in January has since been corrected, and all EIA-related data used in this report uses these corrected data.

The following four figures better illustrate the significant changes that have led to the shift in ISAF’s mission during the reporting period. Figure 1 illustrates the total number of friendly forces fighting in Afghanistan (coalition and ANSF) (not counting Afghan Local Police, which adds approximately 20,000 personnel). As the ANSF has grown in size it has taken on a correspondingly greater role in the fight against the insurgency.

**Figure One: ANSF and ISAF personnel, January 2010 – March 2013.**
Figure 2 illustrates the number of ISAF personnel killed in action (KIA) and ANSF KIAs\(^3\). ISAF is bearing a shrinking share of total KIAs and casualties as the ANSF has assumed the lead role in security.

**Figure Two: ANSF and ISAF KIAs, January 2010 – March, 2013.**

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\(^3\) ANSF casualty numbers are based on ISAF Operational Reporting. ISAF operational reporting is expected to under-represent the actual number of ANSF casualties. The accuracy of Afghan reports for ANSF casualties is unknown.
Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of EIAs involving ISAF and the percentage of EIAs involving ANSF. This graph reflects the growing capabilities and operations of the ANSF and the declining role ISAF is playing in direct combat.

Figure Three: EIAs involving ISAF and EIAs involving the ANSF, March 2011 – March 2013.
Figure 4 illustrates the number of ISAF bases transferred to the ANSF. Many—but not all—ISAF bases that have been closed have been transferred to the ANSF. This demonstrates the drawdown of ISAF forces and their shrinking footprint and evolving mission as well as the growth of the ANSF.

**Figure Four: ISAF bases transferred to ANSF, October 2009 – March 2013.**
SECTION 1 – SECURITY

1.1: U.S. MISSION

The goal of the United States is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda (AQ) and to prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven for international terrorism. Specific U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are to deny safe haven to AQ and deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). To accomplish these objectives, U.S. and coalition forces will continue to degrade the Taliban-led insurgency in order to provide time and space for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and GIRoA to increase capacity so they can assume full responsibility for Afghanistan’s security by the end of 2014. This will enable Afghanistan to achieve a level of increasing internal stability so that it no longer represents a threat to regional stability or international security.

Diplomatic efforts continue to complement military operations. The United States and the international community support Afghan reconciliation efforts with the Taliban as a means to a political solution to the conflict.

1.2: ISAF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

ISAF Operations Plan (OPLAN) 38302 was revised during the reporting period to integrate the development of the SFA model, implement a comprehensive border strategy effort with the Afghans, transition security responsibility to Afghan lead, develop and field the ANSF to end strength and refine those tasks that can be accomplished before the end of 2014. The revised OPLAN also integrates the transition to the post-ISAF mission, the evolution of Command and Control (C2) structures, base closure and realignment and retrograde operations, all without adversely degrading campaign momentum.

The initial planning for the NATO post-2014 mission in Afghanistan, or RESOLUTE SUPPORT, focuses on mission scope and the development of a concept of operations and of an OPLAN that is now under consideration. As the ISAF mission comes to an end and overall mission transition becomes the focus, ISAF is coordinating national efforts to redeploy forces and retrograde equipment to ensure NATO and troop contributing resources match campaign requirements and to mitigate any adverse impacts to both the NATO and the U.S.-only missions.

Afghan Operational Plans

Operation 1391 NAWEED (“Good News”) was in its last phase (Winter Operations) in March 2013. NAWEED represented a combined and joint order for the coalition and ANSF signed by the commander of ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and senior ANSF leaders from the Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI) and National Directorate of Security (NDS) for the period from March 21, 2012, through March 20, 2013.

In late March 2013 IJC and the ANSF began conducting operations based on a new mechanism: specifically, the ANSF transitioned to Operation 1392 OQAB (Eagle), an ANSF-authored operational approach known as layered security. Layered security uses a network of security
forces and their coordination and communications systems to protect the population, deny enemy and criminal elements freedom to operate, control key terrain and lines of communication and enable quick-reaction forces to move across the operational area based on intelligence and assessments. This approach involves employment of ANP in the population centers, ANA in areas surrounding the populations centers and remote enemy support zones and Afghan Border Police (ABP) in control of the major border crossing points, all facilitated by synchronization at the provincial and regional Operational Coordination Centers (OCCs).

Concurrent and parallel to ANSF efforts, IJC will move to a six-month seasonal operations order paradigm for achieving campaign objectives under the ISAF OPLAN. The parallel efforts between ANSF and coalition forces account for the unique mission sets of each force, the transition of security responsibility to the ANSF and the competence of the ANSF.

Coalition forces have nearly completed their shift to SFA, enabling the ANSF to execute layered security in key areas with the coalition providing capabilities such as air support, artillery, Medical Evacuation (medevac) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to ANSF-conducted operations. These operations are intended to create the conditions for improved governance from the local to the national level and bolstering GIRoA’s image with the population.

Coalition forces will continue to reduce and restructure the footprint of supporting bases and infrastructure, recognizing the need to balance the requirement to position forces in support of SFA while ensuring the timely and steady retrograde of forces and equipment to meet the transition timeline.

**Security Force Assistance**

As the ANSF’s capabilities have improved dramatically during the past two years, ISAF units have transitioned from leading kinetic counter-insurgency (COIN) operations to conducting more partnered operations with the ANSF increasingly in the lead. These partnered operations included embedded SFATs designed to train, advise and assist the developing ANSF units.

ISAF is now entering another period of transition in 2013 as the ANSF assume security lead in the population centers and key terrain areas across Afghanistan. As this occurs, ISAF will transition increasingly to a TAA role designed to more rapidly develop and enable ANSF. In fact, the ANSF is increasingly taking over planning, preparation and execution of COIN operations with SFATs only providing advice and enabler support to augment lagging ANSF capabilities that are still under development.

In November 2012, ISAF began employing tailored U.S. SFABs that have been purpose-built to support the SFA mission, protect the forces and provide critical enablers to ANSF COIN operations. During the reporting period, the United States increasingly deployed SFABs instead of regular combat brigades to Afghanistan that are much more suited to the TAA mission. SFABs will, however, maintain the capability to defend themselves and to carry out independent combat operations as necessary.
ISAF has identified requirements for 460 SFATs; as of the end of the reporting period, requirements for 60 SFATs remain unmet. Due to this shortfall, coalition leaders from Regional Commanders up to Commander, ISAF (COMISAF) have prioritized SFA efforts in specific key or decisive areas.

Figure 1: SFATs by Contributing Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SFATs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Poland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base Realignment and Retrograde Operations

At the end of the reporting period, approximately 78 percent of ISAF bases had been closed or transferred to Afghan government control. Most of these are small combat outposts and forward operating bases; most of the remaining ISAF installations are larger and will be more complex to close. Most installations designated for transfer by end of 2014 will be taken over by the ANSF. Each coalition nation submits a detailed redeployment plan that planners at ISAF synchronize with ISAF’s overall campaign goals and base closure plans.

As ISAF draws down, securing Lines of Communication (LOCs) may become an increasingly challenging task. ISAF, together with GIRoA and ANSF, must assure security for LOCs for both sustainment and redeployment flows.

As the U.S. reduces its personnel and basing footprints in Afghanistan, redeployment and retrograde have become increasingly important. Current logistical supply lines are adequate to meet ISAF needs and should remain so throughout the transition process. The responsible reduction of ISAF’s equipment levels will, however, be extremely challenging and expensive as Afghanistan is a land-locked country with limited, poorly maintained supply routes and a continued threat from an adaptive insurgency. Any of these factors alone present significant challenges for redeployment efforts, but when combined, these challenges become more serious. Road infrastructure in Afghanistan is poor, resulting in several bottlenecks, most significantly the Salang Tunnel, which effectively divides the northern and southern ground lines of communication with respect to retrograde.

Three routes are available to the U.S. to get materiel out of Afghanistan: the Northern Distribution Network (NDN GLOC) through Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia; the
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAK GLOC), and the Air Lines of Communication (ALOC). The PAK GLOC is the most cost-effective route of the three, with the ALOCs being the most expensive though the fastest and most secure. The NDN GLOC is the slowest of the three and is only used for equipment located north of the Salang Tunnel.

Several factors limit what types of cargo can traverse each route and influence route selection for various categories of equipment. All three routes are able to accept both rolling and non-rolling stock\(^4\), although sensitive and lethal cargo can only utilize the ALOC. Although the NDN can handle both rolling and non-rolling stock, rolling stock can only utilize the NDN-Russia route that departs the Hairatan Gate through Uzbekistan. Difficulties with both Uzbek border formalities and with the U.S. ability to meet agreed requirements have slowed the use of this route. In the past, PAK GLOC cargo has been frustrated at both the border crossing points and the ports. During the reporting period, the United States and Pakistan worked to resolve these issues. The ALOC is limited by the number of available aircraft and the ability to move equipment to the airports for departure.

During this reporting period, the PAK GLOC was successfully opened to the retrograde of materials. As of March 31, 2013, USFOR-A has sent 27 pieces of rolling stock across the border into Pakistan en route to the port of Karachi. Friction points still remain with the truckers’ union and because of Pakistan government inefficiencies. Pakistan has previously closed borders and routes at various times. USFOR-A anticipates that the PAK GLOC will reach full outbound capacity by June 2013. Of the inbound cargo that had been stalled in Pakistan while the GLOC was closed, 80 percent has now crossed into Afghanistan.

1.3: **ISAF COMMAND AND CONTROL**

Several leadership changes have occurred during the reporting period or will occur in the near future within the ISAF command and control structure. In February 2013, General Joseph Dunford, USMC, assumed command of ISAF, replacing General John Allen. The following commanders will transition their authority to a successor during the next six months: Lieutenant General Dan Bolger (U.S.), Commander, NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, Major General Mark Gurganus (U.S.), Commander, Regional Command Southwest (RC-SW); Major General Erich Pfeffer (Germany), Commander, RC-North (RC-N); Brigadier General Dario Rainieri (Italy), Commander, RC-West (RC-W); and Major General Robert B. Abrams (U.S.), Commander, RC-South (RC-S). In addition, Major General William Mayville (U.S.), Commander, RC-East (RC-E) conducted transfer of authority on March 14, 2013.

In anticipation of the end of the ISAF mission, ISAF has established the NATO Afghanistan Transformation Task Force (NATTF), effective January 1, 2013. This task force will identify, plan, negotiate, implement and monitor current ISAF tasks prior to transition. NATTF will then facilitate the transformation, transfer, or termination of tasks to enable the transition from ISAF to the post-2014 NATO mission in Afghanistan.

\(^4\)“Rolling Stock” refers to cargo that is able to travel by train.
1.4: NATO-ISAF Force Levels and Pledges

U.S. Force Levels

As of the end of March 2013, the United States had approximately 68,000 military personnel in Afghanistan, down from 86,692 one year earlier. President Obama announced in his State of the Union address on February 12, 2013, that the United States would withdraw 34,000 military personnel from Afghanistan by February 2014. Force adjustment planning to reach this manning threshold is ongoing and will not be complete until after this reporting period. Planning for the redeployment of United States forces as part of the wider ISAF force drawdown is also underway.

Bilateral Security Agreement

As agreed in the enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed by Presidents Obama and Karzai in May 2012, the U.S. and Afghanistan are negotiating a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) to replace the 2003 U.S.-Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement and serve as the legal framework for the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014. The BSA will also set parameters for future defense cooperation activities between the two countries, confirm their enduring partnership, and send a clear message that the United States will not abandon Afghanistan.

The BSA will not address the number of forces that could remain in Afghanistan. As agreed in the SPA, the BSA is intended to address the activities that U.S. forces would undertake in Afghanistan after 2014—including counterterrorism operations against AQ and its affiliates and participation in the NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist the ANSF—as well as authorize access to and use of Afghan facilities by U.S. forces to conduct those missions. The United States does not seek permanent military bases in Afghanistan and would only operate from Afghan bases with the consent and at the invitation of the Afghan government.

BSA negotiations began in November 2012, with a goal to conclude within one year. At their January 2013 meeting, Presidents Obama and Karzai expressed their shared desire to see the BSA concluded as soon as possible. The BSA, if concluded, would enter into force on January 1, 2015. Separately, NATO intends to negotiate a new Status of Forces Agreement with Afghanistan for its post-2014 TAA mission.

International Force Levels and Pledges

The ISAF coalition consists of all 28 NATO Allies plus 22 partner nations. Coalition forces are deployed at all NATO Headquarters in Afghanistan, including ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A), and non-U.S. NATO Allies command three of the six Regional Commands: RC-N (Germany), RC-W (Italy), and RC–Capital (RC-C) (Turkey). During the last six months, international force levels and pledged contributions from the 49-troop contributing nations (TCNs) (excluding the United States) decreased to 35,599 personnel, down from 44,883 as of September 30, 2012. The primary driver of this decrease was an 11,378 personnel reduction in overall NATO military requirements.
Several coalition members pledged additional military support during the reporting period. Albania and Ukraine pledged forces to fulfill enabling functions such as force protection, counterintelligence (CI) and medical support. Lithuania, Germany and Slovakia pledged to provide additional special operations troops, and TCNs pledged a total of 26 new SFATs. Over the past six months, Georgia increased its overall troop contribution to ISAF from about 800 to about 1,500 personnel, making it the largest non-NATO troop contributor.

Twelve PRTs have handed over their responsibilities to the Afghan Government. The 21 remaining PRTs will be phased out and closed by the end of 2014.

**Caveats**

All ISAF coalition partners in Afghanistan operate according to the ISAF Rules of Engagement. Individual coalition partners invoke national caveats to ensure their forces operate in accordance with respective national laws and policies. Although some Allies and partners have reduced these caveats, some maintain national caveats that continue to constrain ISAF operations by limiting the types of missions a given country’s forces are authorized to undertake. Senior U.S. leadership consistently emphasizes the need to reduce national caveats.

**1.5: SECURITY OVERVIEW**

**A Note on Metrics**

Previous editions of this report and much of ISAF’s public reporting on Afghanistan have relied on enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) as the primary metric for progress in the war in Afghanistan. This report will, however, no longer be using EIA totals and historical comparisons of these totals as a primary metric of success in Afghanistan due to changing conditions on the ground, evolving force numbers and the shift from primarily ISAF-reported EIAs to primarily ANSF-reported EIAs. Indeed, it is now clear that ISAF public reporting and media coverage of the war have relied too heavily on EIA reporting as a “scoreboard” for progress, something which the current version of this report is attempting to correct.

As seen in figure 2, EIAs are now increasingly being reported by the ANSF while ISAF EIA reporting has declined in tandem with its force numbers. Although ANSF-reported EIAs are accurate, they provide far less detail in their reports than ISAF EIA reports, and there is a greater lag in collating ANSF-reported EIA data. This EIA data is still a useable metric and comparisons with previous years are still valid under certain circumstances, although the fidelity and depth of analyses and assessments based upon this data will be reduced.
Since the nature of the conflict has evolved, a tally of EIAs is not the most complete measure of the campaign's progress. At a time when more than 80 percent of EIAs are happening in areas where less than 20 percent of Afghans live, this single facet of the campaign is not particularly useful in evaluating progress against the insurgency. A major ANSF operation, such as KALAK HODE VI, will result in a spike in EIAs because ISAF and ANSF are aggressively pursuing the insurgency. Likewise, the insurgency can expand its influence and strength in many ways that do not involve increased EIAs such as kidnappings, intimidation tactics and assassinations. The insurgency also uses mosques and networks of familial, tribal and ideological sympathizers to exert influence in areas otherwise controlled by the ANSF and ISAF.

The capabilities of the ANSF, the security of population centers and progress in governance and development are far more important to success in Afghanistan than the total number of EIAs. EIA trends, localized EIA historical comparisons and a large number of other related metrics are still accurate and are used throughout this report—but nationwide EIA totals, or historical comparisons of these totals, will no longer be a main metric of success in Afghanistan.

In January 2013, ISAF discovered that a number of EIAs reported from independent ANSF operations had not been included in its database. These EIAs occurred throughout 2012, although most occurred towards the end of the year. The ANSF had accurately reported this data, but ISAF mistakenly did not enter the data into its main EIA database. An internal audit resulted in a retroactive correction of 2012 EIA totals, from being down 7 percent compared to 2011 to no change. The error revealed by the discovery in January has since been corrected, and all EIA-related data used in this report uses this corrected data. This error did slightly affect the data provided in the last 1230 report, but did not impact any of the broader trends discussed therein.
Finally, during the reporting period, ISAF re-assessed its insider attacks historical database to identify attacks that were actually insider attacks but had been incorrectly categorized. This review found 11 insider attacks that had previously been miscategorized. Please see the insider attacks section for further detail.

The Insurgency

The insurgency failed to achieve its campaign objectives during this reporting period. Insurgent-held territory continued to shrink, and the insurgents’ ability to strike at major population centers continued to decline. The insurgency is now less capable, less popular and less of an existential threat to GIRoA than in 2011.

Insurgents relied on high profile attacks (HPAs) to reassert operational influence in key Pashtun areas and influence key audiences at the strategic level, compensating for insurgents’ inability to coordinate operations beyond the district level. Insurgents maintained influence in several rural areas that serve as platforms to attack urban areas, including some satellite districts to Kabul in Logar and Wardak Provinces. Northern Helmand, the area west of Kandahar City, and southeastern Farah Province are other areas of strong insurgent influence.

Taliban leaders promulgated their winter guidance to maintain pressure on coalition forces and the ANSF through the use of IEDs, infiltration and co-option, intimidation and assassinations, and HPAs in major population centers but also directed their forces to avoid causing Afghan civilian casualties. The guidance to avoid Afghan civilian casualties coincides with an increased focus by Taliban leaders on nonkinetic means of influencing the local population, such as leveraging teachers and Imams to indoctrinate students in Taliban precepts and improving relationships with influential local leaders and elders.

Partially as a result of this insurgent focus on nonkinetic means, reported ceasefires between ANSF units and insurgent forces have increased, although they remain relatively rare. Ceasefire agreements, non-aggression pacts, and other accommodations made between insurgents and security forces are not considered to be a major problem with the ANSF, nor a significant threat to the campaign at this time. These ceasefires are, however, a developing issue that ISAF is closely monitoring.

Local practicalities and traditional cultural models of conflict resolution are likely driving this highly decentralized ceasefire process. These arrangements can be positive for the campaign and enhance stability. To date nonaggression pacts are localized and their employment by local ANSF commanders may indicate a degree of flexibility that could be a significant asset to the ANSF after 2014. Furthermore, local insurgent commanders may enter into accommodations in recognition of ANSF strength and capability and to avoid fighting a superior force. In some instances, these catalysts cause insurgents to seek out ANSF elements to reach accommodations; in other cases, the ANSF is motivated to approach the insurgency. Most ceasefires are limited to specific periods of time such as during the poppy harvest, holidays, or periods of poor weather and transition.
Ceasefires can have negative effects if ANSF leaders relinquish core responsibilities and local security standards when they enter into an accommodation with insurgents. In certain instances, ceasefires and other accommodations can contribute to an increased perception of security, which initiates stronger support for ANSF personnel in their area. In other instances, these agreements can throw off the balance of power in a given area, causing more destabilization if agreements are achieved under coercion or co-option.

Although the effects of localized events have the potential to either hinder or benefit individual ANSF units, non-aggression agreements are unlikely to negatively affect the ANSF’s current campaign. As coalition forces continue to draw down, there will likely be an increase in local ceasefire agreements as low-level ANSF units and the Taliban both seek to leverage agreements to serve their own distinct purposes specific to locality and usually for finite periods of time.

Security continued to improve in major urban areas while EIAs remained prevalent in contested rural areas where insurgents retained presence or had influence. ISAF and ANSF operations reduced insurgent presence in some areas like Zharay District, Kandahar Province and Mehtar Lam District in Laghman Province, but insurgent influence and criminal networks reemerged in other Pashtun areas in Faryab Province following the withdrawal of coalition forces.

Insurgents maintained influence in Maiwand, Zharey, and Panjwa’i districts, which remain important support zones for attacks into Kandahar City. Although Lashkar Gah City and the Central Helmand River Valley remained stable, insurgents in Regional Command – Southwest (RC-SW) retained influence in northern Helmand Province, which includes some of the most violent districts in Afghanistan. Insurgent efforts in the southeastern Farah Province districts of Bala Boluk, Gulistan, and Bakwah facilitated lethal aid into northern Helmand and Kandahar Provinces. Additionally, Pakistan has continued to allow Afghan-focused insurgents sanctuary and support throughout this reporting period.

Sustained counterterrorism (CT) operations eliminated dozens of AQ facilitators and exerted pressure on AQ personnel, restricting their movement to isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan. ISAF estimates that the number of AQ fighters in Afghanistan remains very low. Despite CT pressure achieving greater impact on AQ’s Taliban facilitators, AQ’s relationship with local Afghan Taliban remains intact.

The December 26, 2012, vehicle-based IED attack on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman in Khost Province and the October 17, 2012, complex suicide attack on combat outpost (COP) Zormat in Paktiya Province highlighted the insurgency’s continuing ability to conduct high profile attacks. Overall, however, Haqqani Network (HQN) and other insurgent groups were challenged in their ability to execute attacks in Kabul due to improved security in and around the city. The death of HQN Operational Commander Badruddin Haqqani in August 2012 appears to have had a significant effect on HQN’s ability to carry out attacks.

Overall, other insurgent groups (e.g. Hezb-i-Islami-Gulbuddin and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)) continued to have a much smaller operational impact than the Taliban or HQN. These other groups’ capabilities and influence remained relatively unchanged from the previous reporting period. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba targeted ISAF in Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Kunar.
Provinces; interaction with Afghan-focused groups likely consisted of providing trainers and operatives.

ISAF has not observed any action to suggest a coherent insurgent strategy to target or disrupt the transition (*inteqal*) process, although insurgents do intend to reassert their influence in areas they have been pushed out of by capitalizing on ISAF withdrawal. Tranche three and four districts include several areas where the physical and human terrain is contested, predominantly in southern Afghanistan.

Anti-Taliban resistance movements are a phenomenon where local populations coalesce to resist perceived Taliban excesses. Several anti-Taliban resistance movements grew in strength during the reporting period. Each resistance group is unique in terms of location, composition, tribal affinity, and motivation. Most are relatively small and few spread beyond an isolated area. The sustainability of these anti-Taliban movements remains critical. Creating ties back to GIRoA through the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program, as evidenced in Andar District in Ghazni Province, Panjwai District in Kandahar Province and Pul-e Alam District in Logar Province, may increase the long-term viability of the movement in cases in which Afghans welcome GIRoA involvement. The ALP program is effective in fostering local stability at the village level, however, this results in Taliban commanders focusing efforts against ALP sites. Not all of these anti-Taliban movements have aligned with GIRoA or have ALP units.

Insurgents also used violence and assassinations to undermine perceptions of the Afghan government’s ability to provide security, including intimidation of tribal elders, local power brokers, and Afghan government officials. The attempted assassination of NDS Director Assadullah Khalid on December 6, 2012, in Kabul is an example that received significant media attention and called into question the Afghan government’s ability to protect its own officials. Khalid was seriously wounded by an insurgent suicide bomber who had hidden a bomb in his clothing.

As seen in figure 3, IED attacks, High Profile Attacks (HPAs), and indirect fire attacks were down significantly over the reporting period, although complex attacks\(^5\) increased. As mentioned previously, total nationwide EIAs were unchanged from last year, but are no longer used as a main metric in this report.

\(^{5}\) A complex attack is an attack which is conducted by multiple hostile elements employing at least two distinct classes of weapon systems from multiple locations, which indicates a higher level of planning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Total EIs</th>
<th>High Profile Attacks</th>
<th>Direct Fire</th>
<th>Total IED Events</th>
<th>IED and Mine Explosions</th>
<th>Complex Attacks</th>
<th>Indirect Fire</th>
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<tr>
<td>% change</td>
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<td>-8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANSF-ISAF Operations By RC

REGIONAL COMMAND – EAST

Al Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations continue to exploit ungoverned spaces in the extreme northeastern portions of the country, but ISAF and ANSF pressure prevented significant expansion of these safe havens. Insurgents attempted to maintain their influence in Logar and Wardak Provinces along the primary approaches to Kabul from the south. ISAF and ANSF operations prevented insurgent expansion in the region, decreasing its use as a staging area for attacks on Kabul. Some districts bordering Highway 1, which were transitioned as part of tranche four, will likely continue to be challenged by insurgent attempts to sever the main line of communication to Kabul from the south; of particular concern due to the high insurgent presence there are several districts in Ghazni Province.

The operational capability of the ANA continued to improve, with both the 201st and 203rd ANA Corps planning and conducting large-scale, multi-day complementary battalion- and brigade-level operations in Logar, Wardak, Paktika, Ghazni, Kapisa, and Kunar Provinces. Coordination and joint operations among the ANA, Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), ABP, Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and NDS continued to increase and improve. This progress lends confidence to the ANSF’s ability to retain and advance the past year’s progress, despite a reduced coalition footprint. The success of Operation HUSKY (a complementary border clearing operation with the Pakistani Army) and the follow-on ANSF clearing operations in the border area in the fall of 2012 forced insurgents to defend their support zones or flee the area.

The ANSF layered security concept, instituted along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, has contributed to reduced IED activity in RC-E. IED attacks were down 14 percent during the reporting period. The coordinated ABP, ANA, and ALP security layers provided broader coverage to mitigate the rugged terrain, corruption, and sympathetic tribal areas.

Anti-Taliban sentiment among Afghan civilians, which rose in the late summer in RC-E, forced the Taliban to shift tactics in some areas and seek negotiations in others to maintain influence. In Andar District, Ghazni Province, GIRoA increased local security and development support to encourage transition of anti-Taliban fighters into the ALP program, thereby legitimizing and
linking the movement to GIRoA. Although transition from anti-Taliban movements (ATM) to ALP has not happened in all areas with anti-Taliban sentiment, the presence of ATMs and ALP have pushed the Taliban to moderate its stance toward education and women’s rights in some areas.

In late February 2013, President Karzai ordered U.S. forces out of Wardak Province in response to accusations that the United States was organizing Afghan militias that were abusing Afghans. Despite subsequent investigations revealing that the accusations were false, an agreement was reached to accelerate ISAF withdrawals and ANSF deployments in Nerkh District only. Under the agreement, GIRoA moved ANSF units into the area to provide security, adding to the security already being provided by ALP. The arrival of the ANSF precludes the need for ISAF forces in the area, and gives the ANSF responsibility for the security and mentorship of the ALP. It is not yet clear what effect, if any, this acceleration of ISAF withdrawals will have on the security situation in Wardak and neighboring Kabul province.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTH**

Much of the fighting in RC-S took place in just three districts – Zharay, Panjwa’i, and Maiwand. These are some of the most contested districts in the country, constituting a significant proportion of attacks nationwide. With implementation of tranche four, 70 percent of RC-S’s population now resides in areas at various stages of transition to Afghan security lead.

The Taliban demonstrated a limited ability to affect large provincial population centers. EIAs in Kandahar City, Tarin Kowt, and Qalat decreased by 30 percent in comparison to the same period last year and generated 43 percent fewer civilian casualties. Kandahar City alone experienced a 50 percent decrease in EIAs when compared to the same period last year. Despite these trends, high profile attacks (HPAs) remain a persistent threat in RC-S.

Insurgent efforts remained focused on Zharay, Panjwa’i, and Maiwand districts in an effort to re-establish facilitation lines into Kandahar City, reclaim safe havens lost during the 2012 fighting season, and counter recurring ANSF-ISAF operations. These three districts are home to less than one percent of the total Afghan population, but accounted for nearly eight percent of nationwide EIAs and more than seven percent of nationwide direct fire (DF) events during the reporting period. Insurgents will likely continue efforts to gain access to Kandahar City and its surrounding districts over the fighting season. Improvements in ANSF capabilities and increased ALP presence have forced Kandahar-based insurgents to struggle to regain influence in the province.

Security improvements are most notable in central Panjwa’i district, where an anti-Taliban movement began in February 2013. This movement has spread to several villages. This anti-Taliban uprising, the first in RC-S, is noteworthy both because it emerged in an historic Taliban stronghold that remains one of Afghanistan’s most violent districts and because the villagers have agreed to work closely with the ANSF. The movement provided ALP recruits and momentum for the village stability operations ongoing at Village Security Platform (VSP)
Belambai. The Panjwa’i ALP tashkilt is now at its authorized strength, and the Taliban have major concerns regarding the ALP program’s success in this key district.

Taliban leadership increased operations within Uruzgan Province during the reporting period. The ANSF have been persistently challenged in rural districts in Uruzgan, and in some cases, have consolidated to more defensible positions following coalition security-lead handover. Zabul Province remains an insurgent facilitation zone; the majority of insurgent activity within Zabul is designed to maintain ANSF and ISAF focus on key transit routes. Until recently, most districts in Zabul Province lacked a governor, resulting in a lag in governance throughout the province. Despite recent positive developments, local attitudes toward governance remain stagnant, with only fair to poor ratings; approval of GIRoA as a whole remains low.

The ANA’s 205th Corps successfully conducted Operation KALAK HODE VI in November 2012 in Uruzgan Province. This three-week operation, involving more than 11,000 personnel, was principally planned, led, and manned by Afghans. KALAK HODE VI was designed to pressure the insurgency, increase ALP resistance to intimidation and create sustainable security. The operation resulted in greater local security in rural areas and increased ANA confidence in conducting independent operations. ANSF commanders recognized that KALAK HODE VI was not merely an operation focused on disrupting the insurgency, but was an opportunity to develop coordination between the ANA, ANP, ABP, and NDS. During the operation, 205th Corps seized insurgent weapons, supplies, and explosives. Additionally, Afghan supply channels were used to logistically support this operation. This included an emergency resupply of the ALP in Gizab District by the Kandahar Air Wing.

ANSF-ISAF operations in RC-S resulted in the seizure of weapons caches, disruption of facilitation activities, and the detention or elimination of multiple insurgent leaders, all of which placed insurgents under constant pressure. The 205th Corps demonstrated the ability to conduct effective corps-level operations with the other ANSF pillars. The Corps is now developing an operational planning cycle, Operation STRONG BORDER SOUTH, designed to synchronize effects and maintain a sustainable operational tempo. Insurgent operations in RC-S will likely continue to focus on regaining safe havens, establishing freedom of movement, and increasing influence through planned HPAs against GIRoA/ANSF/ISAF facilities and personnel.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTHWEST**

Six of the ten most violent districts in the country were located in RC-SW. Nahr-e Saraj, where less than 0.5 percent of the Afghan population resides, is the most violent district in Afghanistan, generating a significant portion of nationwide EIAs.

Effective ANSF and ISAF operations targeting insurgent C2 nodes, as well as the insurgency’s logistical and financial challenges, resulted in a drop in enemy attacks when compared to the same period last year, despite strong insurgent efforts to increase the number of their attacks and to gain local influence. The ANSF and ISAF were able to improve the security situation and displace kinetic activity away from population centers and into less populated rural areas, especially in central Helmand Province. The ANSF expanded outposts throughout the valley.

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6 The manning document that specifies the number of authorized personnel in an organizational unit such as a battalion, brigade, etc.
further reducing insurgent freedom of movement. Many insurgent attacks were reactive direct-fire responses to ANSF and ISAF operations. Despite security gains, insurgents remain operationally capable and maintain strong influence in remote portions of the RC, where they retain freedom of movement, logistics bases, training areas, and C2 nodes.

Kinetic activity in Nimroz Province was limited to IED and small arms fire engagements. The majority of attacks were located along main routes such as Highway 9 and Highway 1 converging in Khosh Rod and Delaram Districts. During the reporting period, there was an increase in attacks on civilian convoys along Highway 1 in the vicinity of Delaram District due to decreased coalition force presence in the area. In southern Nimroz Province, insurgents maintained considerable freedom of movement and primarily focus on facilitating lethal aid.

The insurgency will continue its efforts to increase local support and maintain influence in northern Helmand Province using a combination of coercion, intimidation, and force. Within Nimroz Province and the southern districts of Helmand Province, insurgents will likely focus on maintaining lethal aid and narcotics facilitation routes.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – WEST**

The majority of the insurgent activity in RC-W continues to be located along Highway 1 in both the northern (Badghis Province) and southern (Farah Province) parts of the RC, and likely represents a mixture of insurgent and criminal activity. Successful targeting of insurgent commanders throughout the region pushed the Taliban, the Herat Insurgent Faction, and mid-level fighters out of the area and into surrounding countries and the rural portions of Muqur, Murghab and Jawand districts in Badghis Province. Much of the insurgent activity in the southern part of RC-W was spillover from the more violent districts in RC-SW.

Insurgent leaders and fighters continued to execute direct fire and IED attacks against ANSF to maintain relevance, influence, and freedom of movement. Within RC-W, insurgents managed to expand their foothold in the southeastern part of Farah and southern Herat, while their efforts in the rest of the RC were not as effective. Insurgents have concentrated their operational zones around ISAF bases, particularly those in Shindand District. In Badghis Province, insurgents have focused on disrupting ANSF freedom of movement and delaying the completion of Highway 1; they have also continued to expand their safe havens along the Turkmen/Afghan border. Continued harassment of isolated, poorly supplied ANSF elements in Badghis Province resulted in an increase in ALP and ANA defections.

Although Ghor Province has experienced limited kinetic activity, insurgents continued to exploit the minimal presence of ISAF and ANSF in the province to maintain safe haven and ancillary facilitation routes. Insurgents in Ghor Province will continue to be marginally effective in exploiting both historic tribal tensions and local discontent with GIRoA’s lack of development projects in the province.

Although the ANSF proved capable of maintaining security in district centers, insurgents continued to influence Pashtun pockets in northern Badghis Province, southern Herat Province, and throughout Farah Province, with limited ANSF presence in rural areas. ANSF and ISAF
security operations have limited freedom of movement in traditional support zones, creating a limited, localized disruption. The insurgency will likely continue efforts to exploit poor economic conditions and ineffective governance in order to increase influence among the populace.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – NORTH**

RC-N experienced more kinetic activity during the reporting period than it did during the corresponding period last year, likely attributable to successful ANSF and ISAF operations along key lines of communication in the Kunduz-Baghlan corridor, west of Mazar-e Sharif, and in Faryab Province. The overall security situation in the RC improved, as insurgent activity was generally isolated to areas outside of population centers. Insurgents continued to focus on HPAs, assassinations of GIRoA officials, and IED attacks.

The ANSF conducted a brigade-level operation from November 14 to December 14, 2012, in order to strengthen its control in Faryab Province, successfully clearing 28 villages and establishing three joint combat outposts in Ghormach District. ANSF expanded security and GIRoA’s authority in Kunduz Province by establishing ALP in Kunduz and Aliabad Districts.

Operations against Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) leadership effectively disrupted operations in Faryab and in Kunduz Provinces, although small pockets of IMU remain in areas of northern Afghanistan. Insurgents have increased their presence in Warduj and Jurm Districts in Badakshan Province.

Tranche four, announced on December 31, 2012, included the remaining 22 districts in RC-N; consequently, all RC-N districts have now entered the Transition process. Although there are several challenges to transition—including power-broker influence, corruption and ethnic tension—GIRoA continued to make efforts to improve security, governance, and development, albeit at varying paces. The 209th Corps’ casualty evacuation, security operations and targeting following a major bombing in Maimanah demonstrated its increased capacity, while governance and development in Baghlan-Kunduz corridor continued to lag.

As insurgent influence and capabilities remain relatively low in RC-N, ISAF forces have withdrawn, and ANSF forces have taken over, to a greater extent than in much of the rest of the country. Following retrograde and realignment of PRTs, coalition forces no longer have a permanent presence in either Faryab or Badakshan Provinces. However, in both Provinces increased insurgent activity following ISAF departure required ISAF-assisted ANA responses. These responses were ongoing as of the end of the reporting period. The Hungarian PRT in Pule Khumri closed on March 31, 2013, which further reduced ISAF presence in RC-N. ISAF is reducing participation in combined operations in other provinces as ANSF capabilities are continuously increasing. The ANSF have taken the security lead in Faryab, Samangan, Takhar and Badakshan Provinces. RC-N implemented an approach that will support situational awareness in areas without enduring coalition force presence and, if required, will establish temporary options to advise and support. This approach has set the standard for other areas of the country, which are retrograding and realigning ISAF forces in a similar manner.
Towards the end of the reporting period, ISAF and ANSF were focused on a growing battle in Warduj District, Badakshan Province. In early March, an ANSF contingent maneuvered through Warduj District to stage forces and provide logistics support to ANSF units already in the district; insurgent forces ambushed the contingent. The ANSF was caught largely unprepared, as this was the first major engagement since the start of winter. The ANSF sustained heavy casualties from the fighting and initially lost ground to the insurgents. The ANSF requested and on this occasion received coalition close air support, and called in further ANSF reinforcements. The AAF successfully provided support. As of the end of the reporting period, this fighting was ongoing.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – CAPITAL**

Kabul is one of the least violent areas of the country, with some of the best ANSF units providing security. Improved capability and cooperation between Afghan security elements continues to suppress insurgent activity within Kabul Province; however, the few successful suicide attacks that occur in the capital will continue to draw a disproportionate amount of international media attention.

The ANSF has led security operations in Kabul since August 2008 and has demonstrated improving capability every year since. There were eight HPAs in RC-C this cycle, compared to three HPAs during the same period in 2011-2012. Despite the HQN planning and facilitation for most of the attacks in Kabul, the Taliban continued to claim credit for insurgent activity in RC-C. The HQN accounted for two of the last seven HPAs targeting ANSF and ISAF stationary positions and mobile convoys, and assassination attempts of GIRoA officials. Apart from gaining disproportionate media attention, these attacks were largely unsuccessful and resulted in only minimal disruptions of GIRoA operations. Kabul City remains a primary target of operations facilitated by the HQN due to the pronounced media attention and political exposure successful attacks generate.

The number of threat reports in Kabul doubled in comparison to the same period in 2011-2012. This increase reflected persistent insurgent efforts to conduct HPAs and may also represent an increased interaction and trust between the populace and the ANSF and ISAF. The significant reduction in effective insurgent attacks and HPAs in Kabul City is the direct result of successful ANSF security measures. Combined operations by NDS and Afghan and ISAF Special Operations Forces will continue to disrupt insurgent attack cells and facilitation routes.

1.6: Transition

ISAF’s mission focus remains the protection of the Afghan people by supporting the sovereign government in the development of a national security force capable of assuming full responsibility for security operations by the end of 2014. Upon entry by Province, District or city into transition, the ANSF will assume the lead for security in that area and become the supported command, with ISAF becoming the supporting command. During the transition process, staff functions are steadily transferred to ANSF in stages as their capability increases. ISAF retains military assets in or near transitioning areas, and when required, engages in combat operations alongside the ANSF. As the ANSF takes on more of the lead for security
and become capable of more independent operations, ISAF support is reduced, and authority to provide additional support migrates upwards to the Commander IJC (COMIJC) and then to the COMISAF.

Areas proceed through transition stages on different timelines based upon demonstrated improvement in security, governance, rule of law and ANSF capabilities. Transition is a dynamic process, with some areas progressing quickly and others moving slowly or even regressing. Security considerations have become the predominant factor in district’s progress through transition stages. Once a district enters the final stage of transition, it stays there until December 2014, when all districts in Afghanistan will exit transition, including districts that have not yet reached the final stage.

As U.S. and coalition forces draw down and re-posture, the ANSF is taking the lead in transition areas and helping to expand Afghan government influence, most notably in Regional Command – North (RC-N), where ISAF forces have withdrawn from large areas. Notably, some areas of Badakshshan Province, which ISAF forces had largely withdrawn from, saw increased insurgent attacks and ANSF forces taking significant casualties during the reporting period indicating that ISAF forces may have withdrawn too quickly. In areas where the Taliban have had post-ISAF withdrawal successes, ISAF, the ANSF and GIRoA are reviewing lessons learned to improve future transitions. Although ISAF clearly aims to avoid withdrawing too quickly from transitioning areas, enough ISAF personnel and enablers remain in Afghanistan to support the ANSF if required.

The transition of security responsibility is a progressive shift in security lead operations from ISAF to the ANSF, and a shift from an ANA-led counterinsurgency (COIN) focus to an ANP-led focus on law enforcement. This shift is complete in multiple areas, most notably Kabul, where the AUP now retains command and control, with ANA support when necessary. Once the security situation allows ISAF to withdraw from the key regions and population centers, the full lead for enduring stability will eventually transition from the ANA to the Afghan police forces.

**Current State of Transition**

On December 31, 2012, President Karzai announced the transition to Afghan security responsibility of the fourth tranche of districts. With the inclusion of the 52 districts in tranche four, 87 percent of the Afghan population now lives in areas in which the ANSF are in the lead for security, and 23 of the country’s 34 provinces are now fully in transition. Similar to tranche three (comprised of 122 districts and approximately 30 percent of the population), tranche four implementation has included some districts that had not reached full readiness to enter transition. Although adding some measured risk to the process, the inclusion of these districts allows ISAF greater ability to support transition while sufficient coalition forces remain in country to train, advise, and assist the ANSF. The most secure parts of Afghanistan remain the areas within tranche one (32 districts; approximately 20 percent of the population) and tranche two (106 districts; approximately 25 percent of the population).

President Karzai announced tranche five on June 18, 2013. The 91 districts of tranche five will enter transition over the summer. The achievement of “Milestone 2013,” codified at the Chicago
NATO Summit in 2012 and discussed by President Obama and President Karzai in January 2013, marked the ANSF lead for security across the country and the shift in ISAF’s role from combat to combat support.

**Figure 4: Transition Stages, November 2012 - March 2013***

*Note: This map was current as of March, 2013. On June 18th, GiRoA announced tranche five, which includes all remaining districts and Provinces in Afghanistan. Tranche five districts will enter transition over the summer of 2013.

Between October 1, 2012, and March 31, 2013, 17 provinces (Badakhshan, Balkh, Herat, Jowzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Kunar, Kunduz, Logar, Nuristan, Paktika, Panjshayr, Samangan, Sar-e Pul, Takhar and Uruzgan) experienced progression in their overall stage rating and one province – Wardak – experienced regression. Several provinces also increased or decreased in individual ratings based on security, ANSF capability, level of ISAF assistance and/or governance and development, although they are at the same stages of overall progression.

During the last reporting period, ISAF ended its permanent presence in Faryab Province, including the accelerated closure of the PRT in Maimanah. After this drawdown, insurgent activity increased in the province. GiRoA has responded by sending additional ANSF resources
to the province. GIRoA and ISAF are reviewing lessons learned from the ISAF drawdown in Faryab, to inform future drawdowns. As of the end of the reporting period, the situation was still dynamic. An update on the status of Faryab will be provided in the next 1230 Report.

A challenge to transition has been reinforcing the fact to Afghans that transition does not mean the absolute withdrawal of ISAF’s support. In areas that entered transition, ISAF continued to provide support at the level required by ANSF to ensure they were capable of securing the areas in which they have the lead. ISAF reduced the level of support when the assessment process demonstrated that the ANSF was more capable of undertaking the lead for security operations and no longer require ISAF support.

Another challenge is the lag between the start of transition in an area and the supporting governance and development required to ensure the irreversibility of transition. Governance and development progress on a different timeline than security. However, aspects of non-security issues affect security irreversibility and need to be addressed. The most significant threats to transition remain government ineffectiveness and endemic corruption.

1.7: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

A principal priority for ISAF is to protect the Afghan population. Therefore, ISAF takes all appropriate measures to prevent civilian casualties while also seeking to minimize insurgent capabilities to cause them.

The results of ISAF mitigation actions are evidenced in civilian casualty trends and statistics.\(^7\) Over the reporting period, civilian casualties caused by coalition forces, ANSF or insurgents decreased by 10 percent compared to the same period last year. The vast majority of these civilian casualties were caused by insurgents, largely due to their indiscriminate emplacement of IEDs. ISAF-caused civilian casualties decreased by 60 percent, while insurgent-caused civilian casualties have increased by two percent.

The Civilian Casualties Mitigation Team (CCMT) coordinates ISAF’s civilian casualty avoidance and mitigation measures and provides COMISAF and other senior leaders with strategic assessments and recommendations on this issue. In addition to tracking all ISAF-reported civilian casualties in Afghanistan, the focus of the CCMT is to implement procedures for factual identification, review of post-incident management actions, assessment of causes, and identification of lessons learned, together with best practices for subsequent adoption.

In its efforts to mitigate civilian casualties, ISAF improved its tracking of the National Investigation Status Reports and worked with the Afghan MoD to transfer civilian casualty avoidance and mitigation capability to the ANSF. The COMISAF OPLAN was updated

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\(^7\) The ISAF CCMT (Civilian Casualties Mitigation Team) methodology is based on internal and comprehensive reports provided by ISAF and ANSF Forces within Afghanistan, and the activation of Joint Incident Assessment Teams comprised of Afghan government representatives as well as ISAF to review evidence and conduct interviews. The amount of available information is related to ISAF involvement in the civilian casualty event, and therefore it is likely that ISAF statistics underestimate civilian casualties caused by events where ISAF was not present. Metrics presented do not include Road Traffic Accidents (RTAs).
accordingly in October 2012. As a result of ISAF’s continued reforms in this area, there was an 81 percent decrease in ISAF-caused civilian casualties by fixed-wing assets from October 2012 to March 2013.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) 2012 Annual Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (UNAMA PoC) recognized the steps taken by ISAF to reduce civilian casualties and documented a 46 percent decrease of civilian casualties resulting from operations by pro-government forces compared with the same period in 2011, and more specifically, a 42 percent overall decrease resulting from aerial attacks. Other areas covered by UNAMA PoC show trends similar to those identified by ISAF, despite differing data sources and methodologies.

ISAF continued to work closely with its Afghan counterparts to ensure rigorous and accurate reporting of civilian casualties caused by Afghan and coalition forces. An area of focus in the transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan government is the ongoing transfer of ISAF civilian casualty avoidance and mitigation measures, procedures, and capabilities to the ANSF. The CCMT cooperated with Afghan security institutions to facilitate this process, and work culminated with the MoD hosting the first Population Protection Conference in December 2012.

**Figure 5: Total Civilian Casualties by Force and Total by Month**

![Pie charts comparing civilian casualties from October 12 to March 13 and October 11 to March 12, showing a decrease in casualties for all forces except ISAF and UNK.](image-url)
1.8: INSIDER THREAT

Insider attacks are significant threats which are taken very seriously by ISAF forces at all levels. Over the reporting period, insurgent influence and religiously inspired responses to outside events were the main cause of insider attacks. Mitigation strategies and revised tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) have been widely implemented to counter insider threats and are continuously revised to adapt to threat evolutions. The insider threat is an evolving enemy tactic. Key to defeating the tactic is a strong ANSF-ISAF partnership. The insider threat has not had a significant impact on the ISAF strategy for transition of security lead to the ANSF. Insider attacks for the period October 1 to March 31, comparing last year (2011-2012) and this year (2012-2013), decreased by two attacks (15 last period and 13 this reporting period).

Partnered operations between ISAF forces and the ANSF are rapidly decreasing in favor of SFAT operations. Insider threats have had little impact on the evolution from partnered operations to SFAT operations. The nature of SFATs’ duties includes an inherent element of vulnerability to insider attacks; however, their enhanced relationship with ANSF counterparts gives them greater capacity to mitigate insider threat risks than is the case with partnered units.

During the reporting period, ISAF reassessed its historical attack database, looking for incidents that were actually insider attacks but had been incorrectly categorized. Based upon this review, ISAF implemented changes to the reporting mechanism, resulting in an increase of the previously reported total number of insider attacks over the 2007-2012 period. The previously reported 2007-2012 total of insider attacks was 88. Based on the aforementioned investigations,
11 additional events were reclassified as insider attacks for a 2007-2012 total of 99 attacks. Additionally, there were three events that occurred in 2013, bringing the current total of insider attacks against ISAF to 102.

**Insider attacks on U.S., Afghan and coalition military personnel from January 1, 2007, through March 31, 2013:**
- Against ISAF (including U.S.): 102
- Against U.S.: 70

**The number of U.S., Afghan and coalition personnel killed or wounded in insider attacks from January 1, 2007 through March 31, 2013:**
- ISAF Casualties: 144 KIA & 208 WIA
- US Casualties: 92 KIA & 134 WIA

Insider attacks occur for numerous reasons, including insurgent influences, personal grievances, broad cultural conflicts, psychological distress and social pressures. Broad cultural insults are reinforced by *Badal* a centuries-old Pashtun cultural precept that motivates Afghans to defend their honor and seek revenge. None of the insider attacks against ISAF during the reporting period was attributable to personal disagreements. Roughly half of the attacks in 2012 involved some level of insurgent links, with a third of those only making contact with insurgents after their attack. Some of the broad cultural insults that are assessed to have influenced attacks in the past include the mishandling of religious materials, an incident in which coalition forces showed disrespect to insurgent remains, and the release of inflammatory religious videos and cartoons.

No insider attacks against ISAF or U.S. forces were conducted by Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) members. When APPF guards are hired, they undergo a vetting process that includes drug testing as well as biometrics recording.

Approximately 80 percent of total insider attacks occurred on coalition, ANSF or joint bases, with approximately 20 percent occurring during joint patrols. The majority of attackers were between 17 and 25 years old and of Pashtun descent. Most attacks occurred in the provinces that contain high numbers of coalition forces and are the centers of traditional areas of insurgent strength within the Pashtun belts. Typically, victims of insider attacks are chosen as targets of opportunity, not on the basis of their rank or position. Some insider attacks may have been targeting GIRoA officials but coalition force members became collateral damage or became primary targets if their intended target was well protected or hard to access.

There was a 120 percent increase in insider attacks from 2011 to 2012, rising from 22 to 48 incidents. Additionally, 29 percent (14) of the insider attacks in 2012 were executed by more than one person. Prior to 2012, only two attacks had been executed by more than one individual.

During the reporting period, ISAF reassessed its analysis of the motivations behind insider attacks. Motivations fall into three broad categories: insurgent influenced, personally initiated, and unknown. Insurgents conducting insider attacks have been able to gain access to coalition forces through impersonation, infiltration, or by co-opting an existing member of the ANSF to
conduct an attack. Insurgents have also been able to coerce otherwise loyal soldiers and police through blackmail and extortion. Personally initiated attacks are those attacks where an individual committed an insider attack without insurgent influence.

Post-traumatic stress disorder, religious fervor, revenge, personal grievances, or other stressors are all possible root causal factors. Retaliation for global events perceived as anti-Islamic and insurgent co-option/coercion appear to be the two leading causes of insider attacks. ISAF and the ANSF have taken steps to mitigate attacks through increased vetting and re-vetting of the forces. Furthermore, the ANA are using Imams embedded in ANA units to promote tolerance by the forces and to engage forces returning from leave in order to mitigate any possible extremist ideology to which they may have been subjected. In those cases where the perpetrator is killed on sight or is able to escape, their motivations have generally remained unknown.

**Location of Insider Attacks by RC:**
RC-S – 26
RC-SW – 22
RC-E – 28
RC-W – 12
RC-N – 7
RC-C – 7

Mitigation efforts are broad and meant to counter the multiple and interrelated factors that combine to produce insider attacks. At the tactical level, these mitigation efforts include vigilant tactical practices, enhanced close quarters shooting skills training, and effective partnering techniques. This includes the use of guardian angels – armed personnel from the partnering/training unit designated for force protection. Coalition soldiers from all TCNs receive training on Afghan culture and are now more conscious of treating Afghans with appropriate dignity and respect. Prudent mitigation measures are captured and shared through the IJC lessons-learned process.

At the operational level, ISAF initiated a counterintelligence (CI) surge after the spike in attacks in 2012. The U.S. CI surge included deployment of additional U.S. CI agents, multi-disciplined Target Focused Analysis & Neutralization (TFAN) teams to vet, collect, analyze and interview persons of interest and to exploit biometric data, documents and media and an all-source analytical cell to support theater CI and TFAN teams. In-theater teams also receive direct reach-back support from the U.S. In addition, NATO is deploying Task Force Alliance with CI agents from 11 NATO nations. ISAF is piloting a program to train and equip the ANSF with the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS) in support of personnel screening.

U.S. and ISAF forces have detected nine individuals detained by ISAF or ANSF with insurgent ties and have identified 85 suspected individuals who posed an insider threat. These individuals were watch-listed and removed from their posts. An additional 79 persons of interest have been identified for further exploitation and neutralization. TFAN identified two persons with known insurgent ties and identified 36 persons of interest who have been targeted for CI Team exploitation. In all, the CI Surge and TFAN have detected and neutralized 94 insider threats.
At the strategic level, ISAF and NATO are addressing the training, awareness and readiness of units deploying to Afghanistan. In early February 2013, the COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) concluded an IT/SFA Symposium at JFC Brunssum, producing an Insider Threat Handbook designed as a doctrinal note to NATO and a product to incorporate into all current professional and cultural training. This handbook will enhance force protection training and help deploying forces learn to identify the possible indicators leading to insider threats and attacks. A number of other multilateral NATO and TCN venues have served as forums to address concerns and broaden the understanding of the defense forces that will send forces to Afghanistan in the coming years. ISAF also continues partnering with a broad community of interest (e.g., criminal psychologists, think tanks) to identify other mitigating strategies.

ISAF provided Insider Threat-Situational Awareness Training (IT-SAT) and Force Protection-Antiterrorism Training (FPAT) to both U.S. and non-U.S. Coalition forces personnel in Afghanistan. The target audience receiving IT-SAT and FPAT are units and personnel responsible for conducting advise and assist missions while partnered with ANSF. Training has been expanded to teams and individuals with duties that involve interaction with the Afghan populace. Such duties include those performed by personal security details (PSDs) and military police teams. FPAT represents unit or team internal training delivered by a certified Anti-Terrorism Level II Officer. IT-SAT has been conducted in all six RCs inside Afghanistan.

The purpose of IT-SAT is to close the capability gap by enhancing individual coalition forces personnel skills and analysis regarding human behavior-pattern recognition to enable them to identify an insider threat. Currently, more than 1,700 U.S. and coalition forces personnel, including DoD civilians, have received IT-SAT.

The ANA and ANP have an active CI vetting program for all new recruits. These programs have been effective in identifying and rejecting potential infiltration threats.

The ANSF are at as much risk to insider attacks as coalition forces. The ANSF began to address insider attacks and threats more urgently following a spike in attacks. (Note: 12 insider attacks against ISAF in August 2012 resulted in 15 ISAF KIA and 20 ISAF WIA.) The ANA General Staff G2 and MoI Director of Police Intelligence shared all of their intelligence files on previous attacks with ISAF, which gave coalition forces better details from which to analyze possible trends and seek escaped attackers. ISAF filled numerous gaps in data on attackers from these files. Afghans are also removing the threat of insider attacks by sharing intelligence about potential attackers, and actively investigating them, arresting them, or removing them from service when they can't make the case for arrest.

Since August 2012, the ANSF detained 13 potential insider attackers after intelligence was shared that indicated the individuals were preparing to attack, and dozens of others were dismissed or barred from ISAF facilities by CI screening. Additionally, one member was reassigned, one member was cleared through investigation, and there are 36 ongoing Afghan investigations. ANSF religious and cultural advisors are also increasing their involvement at ANSF units. Afghans are taking seriously the need for cultural training for their soldiers so that they better understand coalition forces, particularly those from western nations.
The numbers of attacks during the reporting period were consistent with the attacks experienced in late 2011 and early 2012. It is probably too early to draw strong causality to the mitigation measures impacting the numbers of insider attacks. However, the cultural sensitivity training may have contributed to the fact that ISAF cannot connect any 2012 attacks to perceived personal insults or cultural misunderstandings between the victim and attacker. Furthermore, the fact that Afghans are suffering a greater number of ANSF-on-ANSF attacks reinforces the theory that cultural misunderstandings between foreign forces and Afghan forces was not as systemic a problem as once assessed. Personal- or cultural-based attacks against ISAF are dramatically decreasing but insurgent-linked attacks are on the rise.

Although some unease may persist at a personal level, many units continue working closely with their ANSF partners following an insider attack. These incidents also have a political effect, and the issue remains a factor in national decisions on future force levels to support the campaign. At least one insider attack appeared to contribute to a TCN’s decision to accelerate the withdrawal of its combat forces from Afghanistan.

1.9: Reintegration

The goal of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is to promote peace through a political mechanism that facilitates insurgent removal from the battlefield. The APRP has made strong progress, but is not yet a major influence on the conflict. This is done by implementing and coordinating the Afghan government’s reconciliation and reintegration efforts. The APRP encourages regional and international cooperation, creates requisite political conditions for successful negotiations, and provides a mechanism for mid- to low-level insurgent foot soldiers and commanders to renounce violence and terrorism, allowing for honorable reintegration back into their communities. The High Peace Council (HPC) and Joint Secretariat (JS) work with Provincial Peace Committees (PPCs) and Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs) to effectively execute the program at the provincial level. Successful execution of the APRP not only improves the security environment by bringing fighters and weapons in from the battlefield, but also promotes grievance resolution, which keeps individuals from returning to the insurgency. The APRP strengthens governance by using provincial/district structures to deliver projects to communities and, as a result, increases the legitimacy of GIRoA. Finally, Community Recovery projects provide jobs to local populations (including former insurgents) and contribute to economic sustainability. Communities that accept reintegrees propose Community Recovery projects specifically designed for their communities, which thereby provides such communities with a “peace dividend” for supporting the peace process.

The APRP, established in 2010, continues to make steady progress. In a relatively short period of time, an Afghan national program with functioning national and sub-national structures has been successfully established. Noteworthy progress has been made, specifically in the areas of APRP communication of project goals and outreach to local communities. The March 2013 Afghan National Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey revealed that 64 percent of the Afghan population is aware of the program. This percentage has continued to increase, rising

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9 This section is submitted in fulfillment of requirements specified in section 1217 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
from 53 percent in September 2012 and from 58 percent in December 2012. To date, 6,277 fighters have been removed peacefully from the battlefield and enrolled in the program. The number of reintegrees is even more important in that peaceful reintegration of former insurgents back into their communities has eliminated grievance motivation as one of the Taliban’s key methods in the recruitment of new fighters to fill their ranks. Although impressive, this number is not assessed as large enough to have significantly degraded the insurgency’s ability to fight. Despite this, the APRP has two effects: the measurable reduction of number of fighters on the battlefield and a (non-measurable) reduction in the number of personnel joining the insurgency.

Although the APRP has effectively grown its program to date, it faces a number of challenges, including slow and inconsistent delivery of services. This service-delivery capacity deficit may be addressed in part by an Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP funded\textsuperscript{10}) contract, which should be in place by September 2013. This $1.8 million program is aimed at addressing the problems related to the delivery and execution of community recovery development projects.

With continued mentoring from coalition forces and support from the international community, the APRP should continue to grow. As information about the program continues to be disseminated, more fighters will leave the insurgency, and successful community recovery projects will be completed, leading to improved GIRoA legitimacy. The continued success and reintegration of low- to mid-level fighters will continue to put pressure on insurgency leadership, in turn serving as a forcing function for overall peace and reconciliation efforts.

APRP policy is developed at the national level. The HPC advises the Afghan president on matters of APRP policy, directs the JS, and provides outreach to execute the program. The HPC organization comprises 70 representative leaders (elders, politicians, and scholars), including nine women, and is led by Chairman Salahuddin Rabbani, son of previous HPC Chairman Rabbani, who was assassinated in September 2011.

The JS provides the coordinating function to bring all strands of the APRP together and enable issues to be resolved. JS also provides technical and financial support to the provincial and district levels of the program.

The JS is led by Minister Masoom Stanekzai, CEO. The JS is divided into a corporate structure consisting of an Operations Cell, Policy Cell, Finance Cell, Support Cell, and some Special Staff (Legal, Strategic Communication, Gender Advisor, etc.). As an inter-agency body, the JS team regularly works with the Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of the Interior (MoI), National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), other GIRoA ministries, and ISAF, as required, in support of the program.

Mirroring the APRP structure at the national level, the execution of the APRP is conducted at the provincial level through PPCs and the PJSTs. Support to the communities is primarily provided by District Governors through district reintegration shuras, which incorporate local elders and leaders, representatives of ANP, NDS, and ANA, and existing District Government institutions.

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\textsuperscript{10} The Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP) is a Department of Defense fund to support reintegration in Afghanistan, including to allow local military commanders in Afghanistan to support APRP within their respective areas of responsibility.
PPCs are responsible for APRP implementation and management of reintegration within the province. The PPCs coordinate provincial representatives from GIRoA ministries, religious, and tribal elders, all in support of the APRP. The PJSTs are responsible for supporting PPC implementation and management of reintegration activity within the province. The PJSTs comprise personnel assigned to support outreach, development, administration, and finance.

APRP cells within specified Line Ministries are responsible for coordinating with all program entities in order to deliver qualified, pertinent projects to the communities supporting APRP. These ministries include the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyred, and Disabled (MoLSAMTD), Ministry of Public Works (MoPW), Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL). Other service delivery ministries that play a key part in the support of APRP include the Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Education (MoEd), Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs (MoBTA), Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs (MoHRA), Government Media Information Center (GMIC), and the IDLG.

Afghan Security Ministries, including the MoD, MoI, and NDS, play an important role in the APRP by improving security in areas that promote reintegration efforts and by vetting those individuals seeking to be enrolled in the APRP.

ISAF has established partnering and mentoring relationships at every level of the APRP structure. The Force Reintegration Cell (FRIC) engages with the HPC and JS to support APRP. The PPCs are partnered by IJC RCs through Security Committees and supported by PRTs. As PRTs disband, this support will decline.

As of the conclusion of the current reporting period, 32 PPCs and 32 PJSTs have been established and are operating in the provinces. Over the next few months, a PPC and a PJST should be established in Parwan, leaving Panjshayr as the only province without an APRP structure. Since the end of the previous reporting period, the JS conducted demobilization and reintegration missions in Herat, Faryab, Sar-e-pul, Kunduz, Parwan, Wardak, Logar, Paktya, Khost, Paktika, Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, Badakhshan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Kabul, and Daykundi. These visits are held to discuss field operations, coordinate potential reintegration opportunities, and improve APRP-related communication between Kabul and the provinces.

During this reporting period, the JS development team carried out capacity-building workshops in Kabul for 31 development officers from throughout Afghanistan on the different aspects of community recovery management. Similar training was provided to the PJST finance officers and Public Information officers in an effort to build capacity and improve communications between the national and subnational APRP structures.

In July 2010, the international community pledged funds to be used by the APRP for the duration of the five-year program ($173.5 million). Through February 2013, $71.6 million has been expended, a budget utilization rate of 41.2 percent. Such measurement should be understood in the context of a program that started in October 2010 and did not reach full operational capability until December 2011.
Approximately 60 percent of APRP funds are devoted to Community Recovery projects delivered through small grant projects (SGPs) and Line Ministry programs. To date, the implementation of 136 SGPs has been administered through the JS and PJSTs. In addition, 817 APRP projects have been executed by the Line Ministries. MAIL, MoPW, MoLSAMD, and MRRD have dedicated cells to ensure synchronization with the JS initiative.

Any Anti-Government Element (AGE) interested in the APRP may make initial contact with GIRoA, the ANSF and ISAF or through a trusted third party. The AGE will begin the interview process with the Provincial Governor (PGOV), PPC, NDS, and/or ANSF. During this time, the insurgent negotiates the terms for his pending entry into the program. Grievance resolution, position/status within the insurgency, plans for other AGEs to join with him, and types of weapons that he is prepared to turn in or register are just some of the topics discussed at this time. The community to which the potential reintegree wishes to return is also involved in the discussion and will inform the PPC of its intentions to accept or reject the potential reintegree back into society. This conversation, which could require multiple meetings over a significant period of time, will result in the insurgent completing the Intent to Reintegrate form, where the potential reintegree declares in writing his intent to reintegrate, cease violence, live within the laws of Afghanistan, and follow the official procedures of the APRP throughout the reintegration process. Once signed (or thumb printed) by the insurgent/AGE, initial humanitarian needs can be addressed and the demobilization and community assessment process commences.

If the initial interview is successful and terms of reintegration are agreed upon, the matter is turned over to the PJST’s Demobilization Officer. This individual begins the provincial vetting process. During this time, all information and background data is collected from the potential reintegree and included on the provincial vetting form. Weapons are registered per the Weapons Management Standard Operating Procedure. If the PGOV deems that the individual is in danger because of the security within his district/village, he may allow the reintegree candidate to keep one personal weapon for protection. The vetting form is then reviewed and, if acceptable, approved by the PGOV, NDS, MoD, MoI, and the PPC Chairman after they have conducted independent background investigations on the individual. Each entity must sign and stamp the vetting form verifying that the individuals are in fact insurgents and approving the individuals for enrollment into the APRP.

The provincial vetting form is then forwarded to the JS in Kabul, where the candidate is again vetted at the national level by the MoI, NDS, and JS to ensure APRP requirements are met and the candidate is acceptable to be enrolled in the program. If the candidate meets all APRP requirements, the originating PJST is notified and biometric enrollment can be conducted.

Once notified by the JS that the candidate can be officially enrolled in the APRP, the PJST will work with the JS to schedule the MoI biometric team to biometrically enroll reintegrees. Upon completion of the biometric enrollment, the JS updates its APRP database, creates a reintegree ID card for the reintegree, and provides the paperwork to ISAF’s FRIC to update the official count in reintegree numbers. It is at this time that the “official” reintegree receives his first month of transition assistance (TA) and is scheduled for disengagement training. During this reporting period, TA was changed from a monthly payment for a 3-month period to a monthly payment for a six-month period. Once the last TA payment is made to the reintegree, there is no
formal procedure for monitoring the APRP participants. The JS is currently working on a 180-day survey to provide to the reintegrees at the time of their last TA payment as a way to collect information on the APRP from a reintegree perspective.

The insurgent vetting process has improved dramatically over the 29 months of the program, and there is much review and scrutiny as to who is eligible for the program. Every reintegree fully registered in the APRP has been biometrically enrolled. Although it may take weeks or months to get MoI biometric teams scheduled following initial request, the vetting process is important in preventing re-enrollment of individuals already in the program and allowing recidivists to be tracked. As indicated by the description above, the PPCs are active in the demobilization process, including negotiating with former anti-GIRoA individuals and groups.

The total number of official reintegrees is 6,277. Of those, 549 are considered mid- to low-level commanders. Currently, it is assessed there are 158 reintegrees who have joined the ALP.

In RC-W, the total number of reintegrees is 2,501 or 40 percent of the total.
In RC-S, the total number of reintegrees is 492 (8 percent).
In RC-SW, the total number of reintegrees is 130 (2 percent).
In RC-E, the total number of reintegrees is 765 (12 percent).
In RC-N, the total number of reintegrees is 2,367 (38 percent).
RC-C has 22 reintegrees.

Figure 6: Cumulative Distribution of Reintegration Enrollment Over Time
Figure 7: Reintegrees by Regional Command

Figure 8: Reintegrees by Province
APRP funding provided by international donors is received and divided into three separate funding windows/mechanisms. Window A is administered by the World Bank; contributors are Australia ($5.9 million), Finland ($2.5 million), and the United States ($50 million). Window B is administered by UNDP; contributors are Denmark ($5.3 million), Germany ($26 million), Italy ($5.6 million), Japan ($52 million), Netherlands ($2.5 million), South Korea ($1 million), and Spain ($6.5 million). Window C is administered by Standard Chartered Bank and contributed to by Estonia ($43,000) and the U.K. ($15.9 million).

The U.S. equity in APRP through Window A is $50 million, with $20 million expended to date through the National Solidarity Program of the MRRD, which is focused on Community Recovery Implementation Plan (CRIP) districts.

Current overall expenditure rates (Dec 31, 2012):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Window</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Spent to date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>$36.2 million</td>
<td>$22.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>$54.9 million</td>
<td>$44.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>$10.8 million</td>
<td>$5.2 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For FY 2013, the anticipated expenditure is $78.9 million from all three windows.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 authorizes $35 million for the ARP and approximately $52,000 was distributed (obligated) as of February 2013. In 2012, 449 reintegrees participated in the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyred, and Disabled projects. Additional vocational training is available through other ministerial opportunities, but recipients are not necessarily recorded as reintegrees. The JS estimates 70 percent of reintegrees and more than 1,785,000 persons from communities with reintegrees have benefited from Community Recovery projects.

The APRP promotes women’s full involvement in all stages. Women are included in all initiatives undertaken under the peace program and are part of all the structures created at the national and sub-national levels. There are nine female members of the HPC and 70 female members on PPCs.

GIRoA has endorsed a gender mainstreaming policy, and the JS has implemented a corresponding strategy. A gender unit consisting of two gender advisors exists at the JS; these advisors oversee the implementation of all policies and procedures to ensure women play a role in each phase of the APRP. During this reporting period, the JS and Technical Committee recently approved an agricultural program focused on women related to reintegrees with a funding budget of $493,000. In addition, the GIRoA is currently drafting an Action Plan for Afghanistan to implement the UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. The HPC is involved in the technical advisory group drafting the plan.

In recent months, Afghan women in civil society and government have made significant efforts to accelerate the achievement of women, peace, and security issues. Female PPC representatives are participating in outreach to insurgents to promote peace and stability in the communities. Representatives have held peace shuras to message and promote peace in the provinces.
Civil society organizations and the HPC hold dialogues throughout the country. These dialogues have created the space for women to learn more about the peace and reintegration program and share their concerns and recommendations for a durable and inclusive peace process. December 6, 2012, President Karzai met with 30 female members of the PPCs. These PPC officials communicated their struggles to Karzai and advocated for women’s active participation in peace and security. During this visit, PPC members presented a number of recommendations for an inclusive peace process. President Karzai asked the women to reach out to insurgents in their communities and districts and invite them to lay down arms and reintegrate. He said he will support the women’s initiative and will do his best to provide opportunity for women to be heard and take part in future decisions regarding peace and security.

The HPC/JS has developed a Strategic Communications plan, which, along with its National Priority Plan, lays out a strategy for regular engagement with national, provincial, and district officials and civil society on peace and reintegration issues.

1.10: Public Perceptions of the ANSF

In addition to security-related metrics, ISAF also relies on surveys of the Afghan people to gauge the public’s perception of security and other issues. The predominant survey used by ISAF is the ANQAR survey. Based on data collected in September 2008 and March 2013, the ANQAR survey results present comparisons of current Afghan perspectives as compared to perspectives prior to the rapid growth in the capabilities and size of the ANSF.
Figure 9: Perceptions of the ANSF

Q: DOES THE NATIONAL ARMY NEED THE HELP OF THE FOREIGN FORCES OR IS IT CAPABLE OF OPERATING ON ITS OWN?
A: Capable as it is / Capable, but needs resources

Sep 2008

Mar 2013

Q: HOW OFTEN DO YOU SEE THE POLICE IN YOUR MANTAQA?
A: Every day / Once a week

Sep 2008

Mar 2013

Overall, the areas to which the bulk of the surge forces were allocated (i.e., Helmand, Kandahar, and the areas surrounding the capital, Kabul) showed significant improvements in many polling questions.
1.11: LOOKING AHEAD: THE NEXT 6 MONTHS

Over the next six months, the ANSF will continue to be the backbone of long-term security and stability for Afghanistan. The ANSF will take the lead for security nationwide, confronting the insurgency while setting conditions for completion of transition through continued coordination with coalition forces and the international community.

The nature and focus of the ISAF campaign will steadily evolve. ISAF will maintain campaign momentum as it shifts to a role in support of the ANSF, all the while transferring non-security functions, redeploying forces, closing and aligning bases, and evolving the command and control structure for the NATO-led, post-2014 mission. ISAF will continue to support the ANSF through seasonal shaping operations, employing all available military and interagency resources to maintain pressure on the insurgency.

The ANSF will be tested this fighting season. While insurgent capability and territory have been significantly degraded during the past two years, the insurgency remains a potent force. The insurgency’s sanctuaries in Pakistan, corruption, and the limited capacity of the Afghan government at the local level will remain the biggest risks to turning security gains into a durable and sustainable Afghanistan. Despite ISAF’s shift to a TAA mission, it retains significant combat power and will assist the ANSF as needed.

Milestone 2013 marked the shift of the ISAF mission from a leading combat role to a supporting role in Afghan-led operations, with the ANSF in the lead for security at the operational level. ISAF will, however, retain operational and tactical command of all ISAF forces in Afghanistan through the end of 2014. Milestone 2013 was announced on June 18, 2013, as was the announcement of tranche five of the transition process. Tranche five—the final group of Afghan districts to enter into the transition of lead security authority—will be implemented in late summer, subject to GIRoA and NATO approval. In the remaining months of the transition process following Milestone 2013, ISAF trainers and advisors will continue to work closely with their Afghan counterparts to close gaps in ANSF capability.

This milestone also occurred alongside ISAF’s focusing SFA at higher levels of command. By November 2013, most SFA will be focused at the Afghan brigade and provincial levels and above. This will enable the ANSF to exercise greater autonomy and leadership of security operations, while still having access to ISAF assistance when required. This concept is in line with the President Obama’s statement related to pulling patrols back from villages. SFABs will be focused on developing the capability to conduct higher-level planning and execution of operations, as well as the capability of the Afghans to support and enable those operations.

1.12: ELECTION PREPARATION

The presidential election in 2014 promises to be the first constitutional transfer of power in Afghanistan’s history, and for the first time, Afghans will be solely responsible for administering the process and providing security. A credible process with the fullest possible voter participation is critical to future stability, as well as to sustaining international assistance. The
challenge for Afghans will be to demonstrate in 2014 that elections have qualitatively improved since 2010 through better fraud-mitigation procedures and more polling stations accessible to eligible voters. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) has the lead in elections administration, while the MoI has an overall coordinating role for security of the electoral process. A three-tier approach will be employed to secure the polling centers, with MoI, the MoD, and the NDS in charge of providing security around the polling stations.

The IEC set April 5, 2014, as the date for the presidential and provincial council elections, and aims to complete a comprehensive operational plan with voter registration, voting procedures, training and fielding of observers, fraud mitigation, and public messaging explaining the process and encouraging participation. The IEC has also started coordinating with the MoI and MoD on security planning. At the end of February 2013, the IEC provided the MoI with a list of all polling centers with geo-coordinates so that the MoI could conduct security assessments for each site and take measures where possible to open stations that had not been accessible previously. ISAF is working with the MoI and MoD on preparing effective security plans and facilitating closer coordination between the two ministries.

Helping Afghans achieve a peaceful transfer of authority in 2014 is one of the U.S. Government’s highest priorities in Afghanistan. The U.S. Government encourages government and political opposition leaders to build consensus around candidates broadly representative of Afghanistan’s ethnic and political diversity. The United States provides technical advice and support, consistent with international commitments. U.S. embassy leadership meets with President Karzai and his advisors, the IEC, Parliament, the political opposition, and civil society to discuss prioritized actions and decisions to be carried out before election day.

The credibility of the elections hinges on urgent decisions and implementation of electoral reforms that incorporate internationally accepted practices. Decisions and reforms include appointing a chairman for the IEC when the term of the current chairman expires in April 2013, creating an independent mechanism for resolving electoral disputes, and passing legislation to reinforce Afghanistan’s electoral institutions. The United States urges consultation in these efforts among President Karzai, Parliament, the IEC, the political opposition, and civil society to help ensure that decisions ultimately will have buy-in from the Afghan population.

As part of the overall security transition, ISAF will maintain a low profile to avoid perceptions of international influence or interference in Afghan sovereign responsibilities. The ISAF Campaign Plan includes an appendix which outlines actions ISAF will be prepared to take only when and if requested by GIRoA. ISAF support will be confined to logistics, intelligence, route clearance, and in extremis support. ISAF will consider providing quick reaction forces across Afghanistan for international community observers. As a contingency, ISAF may deploy forces in the event ANSF are not able to provide for the safety of members of the international community and the coalition. The U.S. Force Management Level (FML) of 34,000 forces for the election period is structured to maintain operational security through the elections period (February to June 2014). Coalition forces will, together with their Afghan advised counterparts, be able to provide a rapid in extremis response, in the event the local security deteriorates beyond the ANSF’s ability to control it.
SECTION 2 – AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONS

2.1: SUMMARY

The single most important development during the reporting period was the assumption of the lead role for security by the ANSF across most of Afghanistan. Although ISAF training and enabler/combat support will continue through the end of 2014, the ANSF is now shouldering the majority of the burden of fighting the insurgency. Overall the ANSF has exceeded expectations in its ability to take over the counterinsurgency from ISAF, although progress was uneven in some geographic and functional areas.

The clearest indicator of the changing roles that the ANSF and ISAF are undertaking is the number of operations conducted by each. From October 2012 to February 2013, the ANSF led 87 and 86 percent of total conventional and special operations, respectively. ISAF unilateral operations accounted for just six and five percent of conventional and special operations, respectively. In many provinces, unilateral ISAF operations accounted for less than one percent of total operations, and the vast majority of these unilateral operations were routine patrols such as securing the areas around major bases.

11 This section is submitted in fulfillment of requirements of section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, as amended.

12 IJC updated its system for counting conventional operations in December 2013 which required the RCs to report more types of operations with greater specificity as to combined operations with ANSF, i.e., unilateral, enabled, combined, and led. This change did not alter the overall trend of ANSF increasingly leading a greater share of conventional operations.
GIRoA and ISAF made a deliberate decision several years ago to focus on the rapid growth of the ANSF (force size), followed by the development of enablers and professionalization of the ranks. This decision was made with a full understanding that the ANSF, once built to size, would need to develop logistics, personnel management, and leadership skills, among others. As such, the ANSF continues to require ISAF close air support, and airlift, logistics, medical and ISR support. The lack of these enablers prevents many ANSF units from reaching the highest capability rating.

NTM-A’s emphasis for 2013 will be on measured growth, shaping both rank structure and skill sets to develop a capable and sustainable force. Most of the new units being fielded are now specialty units, such as counter-IED teams, which require more qualified recruits. NTM-A will not complete fielding of all organizational units until the end of 2013, and the AAF will not be fully fielded or mission capable until 2017. Once at full operational capability, the endstrength of both forces will be slightly below the total ceiling of 352,000 personnel. This will allow for natural fluctuations in attrition, recruiting and retention.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^\text{13}\) These fluctuations are common in most armed forces, including the U.S. military.
The principal strength of the ANA is its proven ability to engage and fight at the kandak (battalion) level, particular infantry kandaks. Many Afghan soldiers have years of military experience, and when engaged in combat, ANA kandaks, repeatedly exceeded expectations.\textsuperscript{14} The ANA has demonstrated an improving ability to conduct basic coordination and communication with other elements of the ANSF. The ANA has also demonstrated an emerging ability to conduct combined arms operations at the Brigade level in cooperation with the ANP across theatre. However, a lack of trust between the ANSF elements still remains a limiting factor, although it has improved in some areas. Cross-ANSF command and control capability will be a focal point for SFAT training in 2013.

A major accomplishment of the ANSF during the reporting period was planning for the 2013 fighting season. Prior to March 2013, coalition forces were largely responsible for the joint combined planning effort. During the reporting period, the ANSF successfully went through the entire planning process for the annual and seasonal order. These efforts were not only joint – incorporating all of the security pillars – but also the plan extended coordination between several key non-security ministries.

One overarching problem for both the ANA and ANP is their limited capability to generate new contracts and monitor existing contractors, particularly for logistics support. Building the resource management and procurement capability needed for continual self-sustainment beyond December 2014 is challenging and is a top priority for ISAF, which is emphasizing having skilled SFATs coordinating efforts across the theater to support sustainment and ensure successful transition.

Intelligence sharing across the ANSF is also problematic. The various components maintain independent information that they do not share, resulting in limited ability to analyze, verify and fuse various sources of intelligence to develop targets and drive operations.

Communications in general between the ANA and ANP are still problematic, although this is highly variable by region. There is no established MOU between the forces requiring the ANP to engage in fighting that is army-related. This makes cross-service coordination dependent upon relationships between ANA and ANP commanders. The ANP is working with coalition advisors to further professionalize its force and gradually shift organizational focus from COIN operations toward more conventional community policing.

Corruption and criminality in all sectors of Afghan society and government remain the greatest threats to ANSF development, with narcotics trafficking and criminal patronage networks (CPNs) likely to become more prominent in the years ahead. Unsatisfactory or criminal leadership remains a problem in several parts of the MoI as a result of corruption in the appointment process, lack of effective oversight, and insufficient accountability measures. In particular, the Afghan Border Police (ABP) is consistently involved in corrupt activities such as the collection of illicit border revenues, pay-for-position schemes, smuggling and insurgency collusion.

\textsuperscript{14} These fluctuations are common in most armed forces, including the U.S. military.
Renewed effort and attention, specifically in the ANSF recruiting process, is required to further reduce corruption in the security forces. Corruption and a lack of accountability in the recruitment process have resulted in the acceptance of recruits who should have been rejected on mental health or moral grounds. Reacting to the growing number of insider attacks, the Afghan government has begun to address defects in the ANSF recruiting process, though challenges still remain.

2.2: SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

As the ANA develops, the main focus of SFA efforts shifts from the kandak level to the brigade level to the corps level to the region level. At SFA Level 1, the coalition unit continually advises and assists an ANSF unit on a daily basis, either from an embedded footprint or in close proximity. This model can also apply to partnering. SFATs that provide Level 1 contact will be supporting only one ANSF unit. Level 2 SFA refers to when a coalition unit advises and assists on a less frequent basis (determined by Commanders) to ensure the continued development of the ANSF units. The frequency of this interaction varies depending on the proximity to the ANSF unit, the capability of the ANSF unit, threat, coalition resources and operational reach. SFATs that provide Level 2 contact may be supporting more than one ANSF unit. Level 2 methodology will become the acceptable approach as ANA kandak (and later brigades) are assessed as “independent with advisors” and ready to assume the lead and full authority in their areas of responsibility.

As of the end of the reporting period there was a shortfall of 60 SFATs, forcing ISAF to prioritize assigning the teams to certain key ANSF units. There are three major factors that impact the SFA coverage prioritization: threat to the ANSF and their ability to manage the violence and contain insurgency in their particular geographic area; the ability of ISAF to provide force protection and MEDEVAC in the area; and the development level of the ANSF itself. Due to lower threat and the dispersion of the ANSF units, there are more ANSF units in RC-N and RC-W operating autonomously than in RC-S, RC-E, and RC-SW. As ISAF continues to draw down SFAT coverage, there will be fewer than 200 SFA requirements by the end of 2013.

The decision to provide SFA at different levels is a fluid process that is dependent on several factors. In several locations throughout Afghanistan, particularly in the north and west, SFA coverage has already shifted above the Brigade and Province level. Still, progress in some units lags due to threat level, fielding schedules, and other factors. Because of the fluidity and variance of development among Afghan units, the decision to transition SFA levels is often made at the regional command level and is a function of four major criteria:

- Capability of ANSF units, as described by the readiness definition levels in the commander’s unit assessment tool (CUAT);
- Threat/security assessment of the provinces and districts in the area;
- Impact on campaign success (areas identified as key terrain districts); and
- The stage of transition in the area.

These data are collected and reviewed quarterly by the ISAF Joint Command Staff to ensure that milestones are being met and that development is progressing as desired. ISAF’s objective is to
have SFA focused at the brigade and province level by November 2013 and to be focused at the Corps and Zone/Region level by May 2014.

During the reporting period, the United States continued the process of replacing regular combat brigades with SFABs. The final regular combat brigade was replaced by an SFAB in May 2013. SFABs will conduct far fewer independent operations than the regular brigades they replaced.

2.3: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND ASSESSMENT

Afghan security ministries continued to progress slowly, and ISAF now assesses that neither the MoD nor the MoI will be capable of fully independent operations before 2015 at the earliest. During the previous reporting period, both the MoD and the MoI experienced changes in leadership. This period, those changes generated momentum at the senior level and ISAF observed notable progress, particularly in the MoI. Key challenges remain for the security ministries in the areas of recruiting, education, and retention of quality civil servants. Significant deficiencies exist in personnel policy, budget, and planning capabilities. Despite these challenges, notable successes include the surge in training and fielding of MoD and MoI counter-intelligence forces. No significant changes were reported in GiRoA’s intelligence agencies during the reporting period.\(^\text{15}\)

Assessment of the Ministry of Defense

The MoD and the General Staff (GS) both progressed slowly during the reporting period, in part due to minor adjustments as they worked through modifications to staffing processes in accordance with the directions of the new Minister of Defense and his staff. The new Minister of Defense demonstrated significant energy in assessing the performance of the MoD, GS, and key leaders, and has moved forcefully to correct perceived failures by removing those leaders believed to be ineffective, abusive, or corrupt.

The MoD and GS were assessed at a Capability Milestone Rating of CM-2B, or requiring some coalition assistance to accomplish their missions. NTM-A anticipates the MoD and GS moving to an overall rating of CM-1B (coalition oversight) by mid-2014, although several important offices and functions (e.g., AMoD Intel, GSG4, AMoD Education, Civilization, Gender Integration, Transparency and Accountability, Reserve Affairs, Disaster Response and Afghan Air Force (AAF)) will likely not reach that milestone until later. Full transition of most offices and functions to CM-1A (autonomous operations) is not expected before 2015. This timetable for reaching the CM-1A rating is slower than expected due to challenges in several cross-cutting functions (e.g., human resource management, life support, and logistics and contract management).

The rapid expansion of the ANA over the last several years has been complicated by the limited pool of experienced and educated personnel in the country. The MoD and GS stood up simultaneously and attempted to execute complex command, control, and logistics systems, with little to no training or practical experience. This situation was further complicated by the overly-

\(^{15}\) For a detailed explanation of GiRoA’s various intelligence agencies, please see the previous Section 1230 Report, published in December 2012.
centralized “Soviet” style of leadership that is pervasive in the Ministry. The new Minister of Defense took decisive action and made a point of delegating increased authority and responsibility to his subordinate commanders.

Budget execution continues to be an ongoing concern. Once again, over-centralization, limited educated human capital, limited experience with program management systems, and natural bureaucratic friction have led to MoD only being able to execute approximately 20 percent of its domestic budget. This was complicated in the past by the fact that most expenditures had to be approved by the Minister of Defense or his assistant. Recently, the Minister of Defense signed a decree authorizing an increase in the delegation of budget authority to corps commanders, which should increase budget execution during SY\textsuperscript{16} 1392.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} SY stands for Solar Year. Afghanistan uses the Solar Hijri calendar.
\textsuperscript{17} It is important to note for comparison purposes across fiscal years that Afghanistan’s fiscal year 2012 was truncated to only nine months (March 21, 2012 to December 21, 2012) in an effort to align its fiscal planning with the budget cycles of development partners. The new fiscal year began December 22, 2012 and now coincides with the Gregorian calendar year.
The MoD Ministerial Development Board results are shown below.

**Figure 11: Ministry of Defense / General Staff CM Ratings and CM-1B Projections as of March 31, 2013.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line of Operations</th>
<th>Current CM*</th>
<th>CM1B Date</th>
<th>Line of Operations</th>
<th>Current CM</th>
<th>CM1B Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Intel Policy</td>
<td>CM4</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
<td>AMOD Acquisition Tech &amp; Logistics</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>3Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Reserve Affairs</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>3Q, 14</td>
<td>Acquisition Agency</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
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<td>AMoD Dir Disaster Response</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
<td>Logistics Command (LOGCOM)</td>
<td>CM1A</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD Chief Health Affairs*</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>4Q, 14</td>
<td>GS G4 Logistics</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>3Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD Chief Cntr &amp; Prop Mgmt Div (CPMD)</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
<td>Army Support Command</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G2 Intelligence</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
<td>LOO #4: Exec Leadership &amp; Def Policy</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GS G3 Operations</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G5 Policy &amp; Planning</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td>1st Deputy Minister of Defense</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
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<tr>
<td>GS G6 Communications</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
<td>AMoD Strategy &amp; Policy</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
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<td>GS G6 Comm Support Unit</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td>MoD Chief, Parl., Soc. &amp; Public Affairs</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
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<tr>
<td>GS G7 Force Struc, Training &amp; Doctrine</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
<td>MoD Chief of Legal Department</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS Inspector General</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
<td>MoD Inspector General</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
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<td>GS Legal Department</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
<td>Dir Strategic Communications</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Forces Command (GFC)</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
<td>(CFA) Transparency &amp; Accountability</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Special Ops Command (ASOC)</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
<td>Chief of the General Staff (CoGS)</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force Command (AAF)</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
<td>Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCoGS)</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical Command (MEDCOM)</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>4Q, 2013</td>
<td>Vice Chief of General Staff-Air (VCoGS-Air)</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOO #2: Personnel Management</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Director of GS</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMoD Personnel</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
<td>LOO #5: Resource Management</td>
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<td>AMoD Education</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>3Q, 14</td>
<td>MoD Chief, Finance</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CFA) Gender Integration</td>
<td>CM4</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
<td>AMoD S&amp;P (Prog. &amp; Analysis)</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CFA) Civilizmation</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
<td>GS G8 Finance</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G1 Personnel</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chl Religious &amp; Cultural Affairs (RCA)</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Training Command (ANATC)</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC)</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA)</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>3Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The previous TPOR rating of CM-2B for MoD Health Affairs was in error, and there was no regression this period.

General Staff (GS) sections have been increasingly active participants in operational planning, using their growing experience to incorporate strategy in the operational and tactical levels of planning and execution. The Assistant MoD Strategy and Plans office continues to produce and refine national strategic guidance and oversight, while the GSG5 continues to focus on operational- to strategic-level plans outside of the 180-day window, and the GSG3 handles operational- to tactical-level plans. This interaction allows the ANA to develop a system of deliberate and crisis planning to create and refine annual and special policies rapidly. Additionally, the GSG5 conducted proactive planning to prepare the ANA for the reduction of ISAF combat forces in 2014. The GS also developed a Highway Security Plan for protection of travel on Highway 1, completed staff section assessments, formulated completion of the GS Planning Guidance, and wrote OPLAN 1392.

The activation of the Ground Forces Command (GFC) has initiated discussion among IJC, ISAF, and NTM-A to determine advisory duties for the levels of planning covered by GFC’s new staff sections. GSG5 will remain the lead agency for operational planning. This year's operational plan expanded last year's nascent involvement by all GS directorates and non-securities ministries with more annexes to address national issues.

Evolving and emerging ANSF organizational constructs complicated the development of the ANA Command and Control System. A number of the main elements of ANA Command and Control (C2) underwent significant changes in organizational mission and structure in 2012. The extent of organizational change and complexity introduced into the existing C2 structure and that which still needed to be assimilated within the ANA presented a significant challenge to the maturation of its overall C2 structure. These evolving new C2 nodes may internally stress the ANA capacity for developing standard operating procedures, exercising staff actions to achieve proficiency, and coordinating real world operations. Although the ANA C2 system has gained significant capability over the past several years, the system remains fragile and needs significant coalition support to ensure successful development of an independent, sustainable C2 capacity.

The MoD suffers from ethnic and political factionalism. Competition between patronage networks contributes to criminal dominance of parts of the MoD as competing agendas are exercised through the ministry’s functional arms.
Counter-corruption within MoD remains a key concern, and counter-corruption efforts remain nascent. Poor manning of MoD advisor counter-corruption efforts, limited authorities and focus on the effort from ISAF, and numerous frictions within MoD preclude scoping the problem accurately at this time. Few cases are reported and tracked at the MoD and GS level, primarily due to the lack of anonymity in reporting, fear of reprisal against “whistle blowers,” widespread belief that the investigative arms of MoD are themselves heavily corrupted, and unnecessarily restrictive language in investigative process regulations preventing or greatly slowing any investigation. MoD advisors lack the personnel authorities to oversee and assist the MoD investigative process properly. Minister of Defense Mohammadi appears to want to take decisive action to understand the scope and methods of corruption in MoD, and apply the necessary countermeasures.

Assessment of the Ministry of Interior

Relative to the last reporting period, the MoI has progressed significantly. Although still short of its fielded force generation goal of 157,000 personnel, efforts to professionalize the force have led to improvements in capability milestones (CM). The most recent monthly ISAF Ministerial Development Board (MDB) voted in December 2012 to assess the overall MoI development status at CM-2B, meaning that ministries are capable of accomplishing their mission but require some coalition assistance.

Noteworthy trends include a doubling of the ministries at CM-1B or greater from two to four (Public Affairs, Legal Advisor, Policy Development, and ANCOP (all pending NTM-A/CSTC-A Command approval)), the reduction of units at CM-4 from two to zero, and the addition of a new agency to the MDB, the Afghan National Fire and Disaster Response Emergency Services Agency. Of the 32 MoI pillars, almost three-fourths (72 percent) are at CM-2B or better. There are 19 units at the CM-2 level (CM2A=9; CM2B=10). Of these, all but two (Inspector General and Afghan Local Police (ALP)) are projected to be at CM-1B or higher in 2013, with the other two trailing in 2014.

Viewed from either a security or support perspective, the strength of MoI lies in its major security pillars. Shortfalls, however, exist in the support pillars buttressing these security elements. The five primary support areas at the CM-3 level are Gender Affairs; Logistics; Facilities; Information Technology; and Counter-IED. Trends in these areas have not changed significantly from the last reporting period. Associated challenges include reluctance of MoI provincial leadership to place female hiring as top priority; inadequate numbers of trained logisticians; inability of the Facilities Department to fill more tashkil positions; lack of Information Technology personnel to support program expansion of electronic solutions; and Counter-IED’s lack of trained teams.

Since the appointment of Minister Patang in September 2012, the MoI has made significant steps to empower ministerial leadership and professionalize MoI’s internal security force. Patang’s efforts resulted in measurable progress, including merit-based promotions, overhauling the ANP tashkil and structure, standing up community policing units, improving police training and the prison system, making timely preparations for the 2014 elections, and properly equipping the ABP.
Patang made significant changes to ministerial and police force leadership, and while he faced political pressure over some appointments, reporting indicates that the majority of appointments were competent police professionals. In spite of significant political interference, Patang also challenged the interests of local powerbrokers across the country by removing – sometimes forcibly – police chiefs beholden to powerbroker interests or engaged in corrupt activities.
Figure 12: Ministry of Interior CM Ratings and CM-1B Projections as of April, 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Interior Overall Rating CM2B</th>
<th>Current CM</th>
<th>CM 1B Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chief of Staff / Special Staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Affairs</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Policing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender &amp; Human Rights</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1Q, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DM of Counter Narcotics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Counter Narcotics</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DM of Strategy and Policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>4Q, 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy Development</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Management</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DM of Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and Budget</td>
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<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities and Installation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon Medical</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info, Comms and Tech</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition and Procurement</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DM of Admin</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>2B</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Management</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting Command</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>1Q, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DM of Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Fire Services</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPSU</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Crime Police</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP-(G)</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans &amp; Operations</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Readiness</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>2Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-IED</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DM APPF</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Also of note this reporting period was the October MDB’s approval of a new department, the Afghan National Fire and Disaster Response Emergency Services Agency. The MDB established Fire Services at CM-3 and expects it will reach CM-1B by December 2014.

For the first few years after the 2001 Bonn Conference, the MoI was heavily dominated by Shura-e Nazar, Ahmad Shah Massood’s Military Council. Militia forces were frequently transferred into the police in these early years, which set conditions for criminal dominance of local and provincial police forces. Much of this criminal influence was not reversed between 2001 and 2010, despite two reformist ministers of MoI (Ali Jalali from 2003-2005 and Hanif Atmar from 2008-2010) and multiple International Community initiatives, as criminal dominance was too deeply entrenched. Networks in the MoI affiliated largely with northern mujahideens have reemerged as the dominant faction in the MoI since 2010.

Corruption in the MoI remains a serious problem. The current mandate of the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI) is to focus on infiltration of the MoI, corruption within the MoI, and anti-terrorism. The Analysis and Investigations sections spearhead criminal investigations. During the last two years, DPI has investigated and submitted to the Attorney General’s office 84 cases related to corruption and an additional 76 cases of terrorism or other misconduct within the MoI. Unfortunately, DPI rarely receives feedback regarding how many cases are successfully prosecuted. Although the available data is limited, analysis indicates a lack of political will and motivation across all levels of leadership in the government to prosecute these types of crimes, so any progress would be encouraging.

DPI recently started a training class on internal affairs (Basic Intelligence Work inside the Police), which should increase awareness of misconduct within the MoI and teach basic techniques to counter such acts. This class is being taught to an initial cadre which, upon completion of the course, will instruct other DPI and police pillar personnel. In addition, DPI has commenced a process to re-examine credentials used by new recruits to join the force, which may result in uncovering fraudulent practices by recruits and recruiters and will help mitigate the insider threat. DPI is also using newly-acquired Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS) equipment to screen its own personnel and will expand its use to screen other MoI personnel as directed. DPI’s mandate is restricted to MoI, so misconduct within other government entities and/or the private sector is outside of DPI’s purview.
Although CSTC-A disbursed $48 million to the MoI and $158 million to the MoD at the start of the Afghan fiscal year, multiple issues hampered the ministries’ ability to execute funds. GIRoA did not approve the budget until January 20, 2013, a month after the new FY started. While there are provisions in the GIRoA finance law to operate under Article 41 of the Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law (similar to the U.S. Continuing Resolution), execution lagged original plans.

2.4: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENTOR STATUS

NTM-A requires 2,135 trainers according to NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) version 12.5 of which 1,941 are in place. Despite the current shortage of CJSOR c12.5 required trainers, NTM-A assesses that it can fully accomplish its mission with the current number of trainers. As specific capability milestones are reached for a training mission, personnel are reduced at those training sites, and in some cases the training mission is transitioned to the ANSF. This reduction in the requirement is reflected in the CJSOR v12.5 that will take effect in July 2013. More civilian and contracted police advisors are needed in many
areas to continue the development of the police, especially in areas where there are no coalition forces available to advise Afghan police.

Figure 15: NTM-A Trainer Requirement (CJSOR version 12.0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Forces/Skills to be Trained</th>
<th># of Trainers Required</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army/ground forces</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>435</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special operations</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2.5: ANSF LITERACY TRAINING

Literacy is the foundation of professional military and police forces. From November, 2009 to April 2013, 194,109 ANSF recruits passed some level of Dari and/or Pashto literacy and numeracy training, including 57,103 who achieved level three functional literacy under the UNESCO standard of “being able to identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute, and use printed written materials associated with varying contexts”).

As of April 1, 2013, 73,727 ANSF members were in some form of literacy training; of these, 29,846 are ANP/AUP and 43,881 are ANA. The entire program has been completed by 57,103 members (28,344 ANP/AUP, 28,759 ANA) and they are considered functionally literate. NTM-A held a literacy conference with senior leaders of the ANA and ANP on May 1, 2013 to determine the way ahead for the program. The main effort will be to establish the MoD and MoI’s capacity to conduct literacy instruction for the ANSF so that they may continue training after the ISAF mission ends in December 2014. The ANP intends to add eight more weeks of literacy training to the Initial Police Training Course, bringing the total course to 16 weeks and allowing all graduates to complete level three training. The ANA intends to test recruits prior to having them attend Basic Warrior Training (BWT) and to send illiterate recruits to literacy training before the course begins. This will ensure that all ANA recruits are functionally literate before starting BWT.

Currently, basic trainees receive only level one training, a 64-hour course that allows the student to do little more than read and write his own name. Those identified as non-commissioned officers or slated for technical career fields, such as Signals and Logistics, attend Pre-Branch Literacy at Darulaman Literacy Center. This program provides level 3 training, which is the minimum amount to be considered functionally literate. This degree of training is essential for implementing many of the more advanced functions required in the enablers and in the technical
fields. In mid-March 2013, the ANA implemented its newly revised BWT course, which has been reduced from nine to eight weeks. This new program of instruction (POI) has a significant impact on literacy training, which to date has been delivered during BWT in order to bring new soldiers up to level one literacy and requires them to attend classes before the regular training day begins or after it ends. NTM-A will continue coordinating with the ANA to increase their literacy programs.

Activity in the institutional training centers (Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) and the Regional Military Training Centers (RMTCs)) focuses on the attainment of level one literacy, which is equivalent to a first grade education in the U.S. Level three literacy training is offered during Pre-Branch Literacy training. However, these programs have limited capacity of only 200 soldiers per course, i.e. of the 1,400 candidates graduating from a BWT course, only 200 are selected for Pre-Branch Literacy course.

2.6: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY CAPACITY AND GROWTH

At the end of the reporting period, the ANA achieved 93 percent of its established fielded\(^\text{18}\) end-strength objective of 195,000, reaching 182,315 members, which includes 175,441 personnel in the ANA and 6,874 in the AAF.

Figure 16: ANA End Strength, Attrition, and Retention

\(^{18}\) Fielded strength refers to the number of personnel in fielded units.
In addition to the previously discussed increase in independent operations, the ANA have also demonstrated an improved ability to conduct deliberate planning and use intelligence to drive operations. While the planning efforts may not be as thorough as ISAF’s, and desired effects may not always be achieved, the ANA’s ability to conduct hasty planning and act on intelligence continues to improve.

ANA military intelligence also showed some improvements during the reporting period. Overall, intelligence results are mixed across the ANA. Improvements in analysis, targeting, signals intelligence utilization, and intelligence-driven operations were reported. However, there are still many units struggling with intelligence competencies: analysis, collection, and a lack of trust and unwillingness to share information remain problematic in some areas.

Mobile Strike Force (MSF) units began fielding during the reporting period, representing a major improvement to the capabilities of the ANA. The MSF is a combined arms organization that uses its mobility and firepower to find, contain, close with, and destroy the enemy. MSF kandaks are more mobile and heavily armed than regular infantry kandaks employing Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV), which are highly mobile light-armor vehicles. The MSF will act...
as a regional quick reaction force to support ANA Corps commanders, civil authorities, or the ANP. The MSF kandak differs from an ordinary ANA kandak in that it is under the direct control of the MoD and can operate across corps boundaries, although corps commanders will retain tactical control of the MSF. MSF brigade HQs will be located in Kabul and Kandahar. Currently, two MSF brigade HQ and three MSF kandaks are fielded. As of the end of the reporting period, 168 of 180 authorized MSFVs had been fielded. In total, seven MSF kandaks will be fielded. In addition four Special Operations Force MSF Companies will be trained and fielded as a separate ANASOC capability. Under current plans, all 623 authorized MSFVs will be fielded by December 2014.

Manning

Overall, ISAF assesses recruitment within the ANA and ANP to be able to meet desired steady-state end-strength numbers, although more stringent vetting procedures designed to help mitigate the insider threat have slowed the recruiting process to some degree. Additionally, within the ANA, many of the units that remain to be fielded are now specialty units and critical enablers. This requires adjustment to recruiting and induction procedures, enabling the necessary training to be completed to achieve force requirements.

Attrition within the ANA continues to be a significant challenge, as continued high attrition increases the overall cost of sustaining the force and creates a burden on recruiting and training structures. The ANA attrition rate remained well above the 1.4 percent monthly goal, reaching 4.1 percent in one month during this reporting period. Attrition fell to 2.5 percent in March. Since many of the underlying issues with attrition pertain to leadership, the MoD formed an evaluation commission to assess more than 500 commanders, and if need be, replace unsatisfactory leaders from battalion through corps levels. The evaluation commission has identified more than 30 poorly performing commanders; approximately 10 of these commanders have been re-assigned. ISAF continues to work with the MoD to identify root causes and develop initiatives to reduce overall attrition.

Figure 18: ANA and AAF Attrition Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sep-12</th>
<th>Oct-12</th>
<th>Nov-12</th>
<th>Dec-12</th>
<th>Jan-13</th>
<th>Feb-13</th>
<th>Mar-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high ANA attrition rate is undermining attempts to develop a trained and experienced cadre of NCOs and soldiers. Currently, the ANA is focused on the backfilling of soldiers from fielded units as opposed to the development of more advanced skill sets. In addition, shortcomings in their personnel training system often result in specialist soldiers arriving at units and being mis-
assigned outside of their given specialty. ISAF is continuing to work with the ANA on this issue, but it will not be a short-term fix.

Human Resources (HR) management is also problematic for the ANA and is hindering the professionalization of the Army, primarily due to an inability to train and assign officers and soldiers with specific military occupation specialty posts. NTM-A is working with the ANA to develop an HR management system; tangible results are expected post-2014.

NTM-A and the MoD also maintained efforts to recruit southern Pashtuns, as well as improve the overall ethnic balance of the ANA. In general, Tajiks are over-represented in the ANA officer corps, while Pashtuns are under-represented.

**Figure 19: Ethnicity of ANA Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Pashtun</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Hazara</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Delta</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>-3.5%</td>
<td>-6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Force</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>-7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Ethnic Breakout</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Force Development and Training**

Leadership development is fundamental to the professionalization of the ANA. Leadership ratings continue to improve, with only one percent of leadership rated “Negative” this reporting period. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) and the ANA Officer Academy (ANAOA) will play a pivotal role in professionalizing the ANA. The NMAA program, based on the U.S. West Point model, is a four-year course that provides future officers with leadership skills as they complete undergraduate degrees. ANAOA’s objective is to produce officers capable of fulfilling the role of a platoon commander in one year. The combined output of NMAA and ANAOA should generate the capacity to meet the ANA’s enduring requirement to sustain its officer cadre.
The professionalization of the enlisted cadre is progressing from top-down. The curriculum of the sergeants-major (SGM) academy has been endorsed, although the lack of suitably qualified instructors at the academy is causing concerns and may impact future courses. Post-2013, when fielding of the ANA is scheduled to be complete, the ANA plans to review the curricula for the NCO courses and (BWT). With respect to the BWT, the ANA have reduced their BWT course from nine to eight weeks. This course includes literacy training; the purpose of this which is to provide ANA soldiers with a level 3 literacy standard (read to learn) prior to further specialist training.

As of March 2013, ANA NCO strength is at 82 percent of the NCO end strength objective. ANA officer strength is at 82 percent of the officer end strength objective. During this reporting period, a total of 10,811 officers, NCOs, and soldiers graduated from their respective courses at Officer Candidate School (OCS), the 1 Uniform Course (1U), and BWT. ANA Training and Education Command (ANATEC), the Afghan National Defense University (ANDU) and the ANA GSG7 are working on revisions of the current course system, Programs of Instruction (POIs), and future requirements for training and education beyond 2013. The main course focus is on literacy training, which should be provided before BWT as well as in the fielded units. A major new initiative in cultural awareness training about foreign and coalition force cultures was recently implemented to help mitigate the insider threat. In addition, training specific to this issue will also be developed and implemented within the ANA.

The current challenges with ANA fielding stem from the specialized and technical nature of the units to be generated. The need to train technical soldiers, NCOs, and officers effectively and to bring them together to form an integrated and collectively coherent kandak impacts all aspects of the recruiting, training, and fielding pipeline. The equipping of those units to field in this final stage of the fielding process will be a challenge.

**Special Operations Forces**

ANA Special Operations Forces (ANASOF) are the most capable component of ANSF and have made significant strides toward becoming an independent and effective force. This capability is reflected in their high operations numbers. From October 2012 to February 2013, ANSF SOF units led 86 percent of all special operations. In March 2013, ANSF SOF led 97 percent of all special operations.
Figure 20: ANASOF Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Category</th>
<th>Oct-12</th>
<th>Nov-12</th>
<th>Dec-12</th>
<th>Jan-13</th>
<th>Feb-13</th>
<th>Mar-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAF SOF Unilateral Ops (Total)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF SOF Unilateral Ops (Total)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF-Led Partnered SOF Ops</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF-Led Partnered SOF Ops</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF SOF Advised Ops with ANSF in lead</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Partnered or Advised SOF Ops (Total)</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ops</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ISAF Led Ops</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ANSF Led Ops</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Ops Led by ISAF</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Ops Led by ANSF</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISAF SOF, April 2013.
Color scheme: Combined is purple, ANSF is green, coalition is blue, summary statistics are orange.

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) is the national-level headquarters for all special operations units within the MoD. ANASOC is the division-level headquarters for the Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASF), the Commandos and the Ktah Khas (KKA). The command has the overarching mission to train, advise, assist, and employ special operations kandaks (SOK), which are battalion-level units, through their respective brigades. Within the ANASOC structure are two brigades: 1st and 2nd Brigade. Each brigade is the higher headquarters for their respective kandaks. The kandaks include the Commando Kandaks, the ANASF kandaks and the KKA kandak. The commandos are a Ranger-type unit designed as a strike force similar in structure and design to the U.S. Army’s Ranger battalions. The ANASF are similar in structure and mission to the U.S. Army Special Forces. The KKA are GIRoA’s military national mission special operations force. The KKA are administratively managed by ANASOC but are tasked by the Afghan Operational Command Group (OCG). The KKA conduct offensive operations in Afghanistan to degrade insurgent networks in order to prevent them from establishing operationally significant safe havens.

ANASOC is headquartered in Camp Morehead, Wardak Province, and ANASOC continues generating new units and staff sections. The integration of Special Mission Wing (SMW) and Ktah Khas nighttime operations is a long-term project and will not be completed until after 2013. Commando (CDO) and Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASF) kandaks were merged to form Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs), which combine CDO companies with SF companies, resulting in streamlined command and control. Currently, all nine SOKs have achieved an average manning of 90 percent of CDO and ANASF under the tashkil, and SF teams continue to be fielded at a rate designed to meet the Full Operational Capability (FOC) target of fourth quarter of 2013.

ANASOC continues to develop its institutional capacity to conduct training programs. Currently, a majority of courses taught at the Division School of Excellence are Afghan-led, with minimal coalition force oversight. The ANASOC has produced 12,241 commandos and 1,131 ANASF. Graduation rates for both CDO and SF operators remained steady and are on schedule to meet end-strength targets. The ANASOC School of Excellence (SoE) graduated 195 Special Forces.
soldiers during the reporting period. There are 631 commandos currently enrolled in the Commando Qualification Course, including two female officers. Upon graduation, these highly trained service personnel will be placed on the battlefield in key locations. The SoE also graduated one Special Forces class that was fielded to the 9th SOK in Herat. ANA Commandos (ANA CDO) are currently at a force level of 8,876. Staff training at all levels is occurring through uniformed and civilian mentorship programs; the target of ANASOC reaching FOC for all units is 2014, with the exception of the SMW.

ANASOC continues to progress toward independent operations and self-sustaining capabilities at a measured rate. Embedded advisors in the field continue to work with coalition Special Forces (SF) teams, developing checklists to assess the readiness levels of ANASF to conduct operations, with the focus on Village Stability Operations. Additional Special Operations capabilities will be fielded with an addition of Mobile Strike Forces, which provide the ANA with assets that have the flexibility to operate across corps boundaries.

The fielding of these new units will begin during the second quarter of 2013. ANASOC generated forces in accordance with the SY1391 tashkil during the reporting period. The command is currently at approximately 65 percent fill. During the reporting period, focus was on the continued fielding of operational and support forces, as well as the first ANASOC Military Intelligence Kandak and Ktah Khas Military Intelligence Company students. The attrition rates of fielded ANASOC are roughly on par with the rates of the rest of the ANA.

The ANASOC Mobile Strike Force is scheduled to be fielded by the 4th quarter of 2013, and will be made up of four companies. These companies will differ from the rest of ANASOC in that they will have armored vehicles and more ground mobility. They will act as a quick reaction force covering specified areas or will support other ANASOC units. Like the seven ANA MSF Kandaks, ANASOC MSF will be initially trained at the Armor Branch School. These forces should then subsequently undergo a SOF-specific MSF training.

The 2nd Special Operations Brigade (2nd SOB) formed in fourth quarter of calendar year 12. They began their pre-Initial Operational Capability (IOC) staff training on January 5th, 2013. The Commander was appointed in early February 2013. He immediately embarked on an active circulation plan to meet his four subordinate Special Operations Kandak (SOK) Commanders and tour the sites of the SOKs' deployed forces, many of which are partnered with USSOF Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams at Village Stability Operations (VSO) sites. The 2nd SOB reached IOC in mid-April and is expected to reach FOC in the third quarter of CY 2013. First Special Operations Brigade (1st SOB) is scheduled to have FOC by first quarter of CY 2014.

The Military Intelligence Kandak (MIK) headquarters is projected to be fielded in April 2013. The Kandak itself will have nine detachments, which will be fielded as they graduate from training. All nine detachments will be fielded by May, 2015.

The General Support Kandak (GSK) is still in force generation. It is projected to stand up and be fielded in June 2013.
ANASOF currently operate at a high tempo, impacting the campaign far more than their numbers would suggest. However, for many of their operations they are dependent upon ISAF air transport, and in particular, helicopter lift. The AAF is not projected to be able to provide the ANASOF with enough helicopter mobility to make up for the departure of most ISAF forces in 2014. As ISAF helicopter transport becomes less available, ANASOF will have to travel more by ground. As ground transportation is difficult in many areas of Afghanistan, and is inherently slower than air transport, this will result in diminished ANASOF effectiveness.

**Equipping and Enablers**

CSTC-A procured and delivered a high percentage of ANA-required equipment to Afghan depots during the reporting period. Of the three main categories of equipment required by the ANA (shoot, move, and communicate), CSTC-A delivered 114 percent of “shoot” equipment, 91.2 percent of “move” equipment, and 99.5 percent of “communicate” equipment.

However, delivering equipment to the national and regional depots does not mean that this equipment has reached personnel in the field. There is a shortfall in distribution between the regional depots and fielded units. Equipment shortages were reported in several key areas to include: medical, maintenance, mortars, night vision goggles, communications, CIED/electronic countermeasure, and artillery Basic Issue Items. Shortages in CIED equipment also limit the ANP’s ability to conduct CIED operations. Planning for logistical sustainment of operations and supply forecasting remains a work in progress.

The ANA’s main challenge in equipping its units continues to be the delivery of equipment from depots to the units deployed in the field. Each individual ANA unit is slated to receive equipment that has been released from the national depots, shipped through the ANA Central Movement Agency, and delivered to ANA Regional Logistic Support Commands (RLSC). RLSCs subsequently issue the equipment to the field units. Some RLSCs have warehoused equipment waiting to be issued, while nearby units in the field are forced to operate in an under-equipped state. CSTC-A has limited ability to track equipment once it is delivered to the depots, although the equipment levels of partnered units in the field are tracked under the Commanders Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) system. Recent visits at Kabul Airport (KAIA), for example, identified excessive requisitioning for aircraft parts that were visibly available at the RLSC but that were not being issued. ANA RLSCs will need continued support from advisors to improve efficiencies and troubleshoot logistics bottlenecks.

Although NTM-A does not track most equipment that has been fielded to the kandak level, CSTC-A conducts 100 percent annual accountability of night vision devices and quarterly inspections of serial-numbered Class VII items such as vehicles, radios and weapons in accordance with U.S. end-use monitoring law and regulation laws and regulations. CSTC-A conducts routine inspections of weapons that have been transferred to the MoD and MoI to ensure end-use compliance.

By the end of ISAF’s mission in 2014, U.S. and coalition enabler support (close air support, medevac, direct fire, ISR) to the ANSF will be withdrawn, creating gaps which, if not addressed, will reduce GIRoA’s ability to provide security for its populace and deter external threats. The
fielding of enablers is focused on providing ANSF with capabilities to enable them to operate autonomously, including operation and sustainment of a combined arms force.

An initial set of enablers focused primarily on formations and units, including the necessary equipment and training to achieve full operational capability. This set of enablers for the Afghan National Army includes: six corps-level signal battalions; ANASOF, including nine commando battalions consisting of commando and special forces companies, four Mobile Strike Force Vehicle companies, and the 777th Special Mission Wing; seven light armor battalions (MSFV-equipped); 24 route clearance companies (C-IED); 30 engineer companies, of which 24 are combat engineer companies and six are vertical construction companies; 230 EOD teams (three-man teams); 21 corps military intelligence companies; three composite air wings for the AAF, along with one AAF training group; Afghan Forward Air Support Teams (AFAST); 24 122mm howitzer field artillery batteries; 102 82mm mortar platoons; 24 brigade combat service support battalions; six regional logistics support centers; seven national depots; a Network Targeting Exploitation Center; a range of vehicles, weapons, and communications equipment; and a range of training to include literacy instruction, leader training, and forward observer training.

This set of enablers for the ANP includes: the 19 Provincial Response Companies (PRC) of the General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) (ANP SOF); 95 EOD teams (three-man teams); one Directorate of Police Intelligence team per district; three 82mm mortar platoons; six service support battalions; seven regional logistics centers; one national depot complex; a communications network linking Kabul, zones, provinces, and districts; a range of vehicles, weapons, and communications equipment; and a range of training to include literacy instruction and leader training.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has identified a second set of areas where ANSF capacity could be accelerated or enhanced to reduce reliance on U.S. and coalition enablers and to counter emerging enabler gaps. This second set of enablers is categorized into nine capability areas. Without these accelerated enablers, the ANSF will require continued coalition enabler support post 2014. A brief summary by capability area follows:
## Figure 21: ANSF Enablers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability Area In Priority Order</th>
<th>Enabler Capability</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logistics &amp; Sustainment</strong></td>
<td>Train mid-level logistics leaders</td>
<td>Provides ANSF mid-level leaders with specialized logistics training and mentorship oriented on developing and enhancing ANSF logistics leaders to execute a logistics system that is flexible, accountable, and operationally effective, while assessing logistics management proficiency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train maintenance leaders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train distribution managers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance tools for RLSC</td>
<td>Purchase of equipment shortages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C-IED</strong></td>
<td>Portable CREW</td>
<td>Portable ECM devices for use by disembarked ANSF to counter threats posed by remote-controlled IEDs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field IEDD Hook and Line Kits</td>
<td>Vehicle-mounted system that renders surface-laid IEDs safe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field ANA Prime Mover for RCCs</td>
<td>Replace the 168 HMMWV M-1151s currently used by the 24 ANA RCCs with an up-armored medium tactical vehicle capable of pushing existing mine roller systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field mine rollers to ANA RCC</td>
<td>Enhance the capability of the ANA RCCs by standardizing mine roller systems. This is being accomplished with current stocks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field enhanced C-IED equipment to ANP RCC</td>
<td>Equipping three ANP RCCs to better conduct route reconnaissance and clearance, and to detect, investigate, mark, report, and neutralize explosive hazards and other obstacles along defined routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aviation / Airpower</strong></td>
<td>Weaponized SMW Mi-17 Training</td>
<td>Training SMW pilots in air weapons teams in order to support ANSF special operations forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium-Lift Capability</td>
<td>Enhances medium lift capability, likely with C-130Hs; replaces the G222s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Capital</strong></td>
<td>AAF English Language and Training Aids</td>
<td>AAF English language, professional military and specialized training for aviation centric technical skill sets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA training materials in Dari</td>
<td>Translating manuals and training aids into the native-language to enable the sustainment of tactical and technical skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANSF Intelligence Training</td>
<td>Improve capabilities of fielded ANSF Military Intelligence units and staff to conduct intelligence collection operations, analysis, counterintelligence, and low-level voice intercept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical skills training</td>
<td>Develop and enhance the capability of ANA technical units to employ tactical systems and enhance functional effectiveness in areas of C-IED, combat engineering, and fires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP Long-term education METTs</td>
<td>Continued basic literacy training in the native languages for fielded and institutional training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP Professionalization Training</td>
<td>Collective program to establish a professional training management system for the ANP and to establish network connectivity among the ANP Training General Command and the regional training centers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence &amp; ISR</strong></td>
<td>ANSF NMIC</td>
<td>An intelligence fusion center for the collection, fusion, and distribution of intelligence supporting all elements of the ANSF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide ANA tactical UAV</td>
<td>Capable and sustainable, unarmed, hand-launched tactical UAV capability to provide tactical situational awareness in a given area of operations via optical, infrared, and IR cameras. A proof of concept is funded and will take place in May 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persistent Stare Capability</td>
<td>Transfer of aerostats and RAID towers to enhance surveillance capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kabul Surveillance System</td>
<td>Installation of additional camera towers to enhance the ANP’s ability to conduct surveillance of illicit activities in Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fires</strong></td>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>Improve indirect fires in the near-term by equipping the ANA with 60mm mortars down to the company level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engineering</strong></td>
<td>Purchase equipment</td>
<td>Mechanical diggers and haul trailers to enhance current ANA engineer capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medical</strong></td>
<td>Deployable medical facility</td>
<td>Rapid response medical package suitable for deployment to remote locations to support combat operations, humanitarian relief, or disaster response operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support to SOF</strong></td>
<td>Purchase <em>tashkil</em> for Khab Khas</td>
<td>Purchase of equipment shortages to meet approved <em>tashkil</em> 1391v2 and enable operational capability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NTM-A/CSTC-A validated the requirement for these enablers and is nearing the final stages of approving solutions for all enablers. Delivery for approved enablers is in progress, and it is anticipated that most capabilities will be in place before the end of CY 2014.
Logistics Capability

ANA logistics capability continues to advance as a result of significant effort by NTM-A, from the national level down to logistics units. As the ANA has approached its final force growth goals, increasing the ANA’s logistics capabilities has become one of NTM-A’s top priorities. Recruiting against **tashkil** numbers is progressing well, but the current emphasis is on improving the quality of the individual by focusing on the delivery of logistics training and ensuring accountability of trained personnel. NTM-A’s strategy is to deliver sustainment training at the Regional Logistic Support Commands (RLSCs) through contractors, establish a Regional Embedded Training Capability, and maximize combat service support (CSS) training courses at the National CSS School. Mobile training teams (MTT) are also training Afghan instructors to ensure there is an enduring capability. This is also being mirrored at the CSS School. There is a shift in the training paradigm away from NTM-A MTT-led training to ANSF-led training.

Throughout this reporting period, strategic- and operational-level ANSF logistics have continued to develop, resulting in improved operations and steady progress towards the transition of national and regional institutions to Afghan control. NTM-A’s focus is to continue transitioning fuel resupply to the Afghans during SY 1392, increasing repair parts stockage across the ANA by March 2013, preparing ANP repair parts purchases, increasing distribution operations by 50 percent, and beginning transition of ammunition management functions to the ANSF. Investing in training and education of ANSF personnel is a key building block of the logistics system. 19 out of 28 logistics nodes are scheduled for transition before the end of 2013.
Since July 2012, NTM-A has worked closely with the ANSF to transition fuel management. NTM-A’s intent is to transition one-third of the total ANA bulk fuel requirement (to include Capital and West regions) for 2013, transferring the remainder in late 2014.

The ANA has increased the number of truckloads of cargo by 64 percent. The Central Movements Agency (CMA) increased truck usage by 29 percent. These distribution efforts increased the class IX stockage levels at RLSCs.

ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) continues initial fielding via push-letter authorizations for Class VII and Troop Support Major tashkil End Items. Eight of the nine Special Forces Operational Detachment-Bs (SFDBs) and 45 of 72 Special Forces Operational Detachment-As (SFODAs) have received initial equipment fielding. The remaining SFDB and eight more SFODAs will receive their initial equipment fielding by spring 2013.

The impending drawdown of coalition-administered contracts across the ANSF will be balanced by Contracting Advisory Assistance Teams (CAAT) positioned to provide logistics contracting and oversight training to the ANSF during the transition of contract management to Afghan control. Additionally, the ANA self-initiated a two-month Logistics and Contracting Course, which will provide training to approximately 250 logistics personnel. Future iterations of the course are already planned by the ANA for the summer 2013 timeframe.
Several classes of supply, including Class I Subsistence and Class II Individual Equipment, have already been fully transitioned to ANA control and demonstrate natural velocity through the logistics system. Upcoming transition of responsibility for Class III Bulk Diesel to MoD and MoI control will require ongoing accurate documented forecasting.

Retrograde policy exists for both the ANA and ANP; however, the process of replacing un-repairable weapons and vehicles has been undeveloped. The Estimated Cost of Damage (ECOD) procedure has been developed in consultation with the Afghan forces and is currently being implemented. This process, once approved and applied, will enable weapons and vehicles assessed as beyond repair to be retrograded to the national level and replaced with new items.

Another problem encountered during this reporting period was ammunition management. NTM-A is making progress with transition efforts to the ANA, and training for the ANP is underway.

**Transition of Logistics**

The MoD has increased capacity for the transition of supplies. However, with an increase in complexity of supply classes, challenges have arisen regarding differences in contracting end items. The MoD will need advisory assistance in the areas of requirements generation, contracting structure, technical assessment, and contract administration for additional transition of supply classes. Supply management is still immature and needs significant support in the areas of supply planning/forecasting, effective logistics procedures, and development of organic maintenance capability.

As coalition forces retrograde, the ANSF will be required to be increasingly reliant on organic Afghan logistics systems. Therefore, it is important that the ANA is fully capable of using a command-driven logistical system, which in turn is capable of independently sustaining ongoing operations and ANA forces within Afghanistan. ANA logistics policy and procedures must be robust, responsive, and coordinated to work in parallel to coalition force policies and procedures until required to stand alone after the coalition withdrawal.

Oversight of the logistics system is a command responsibility and the ANA has embraced this concept through the Logistics Maintenance Terrain Walk program, which began in October 2012. Afghan senior leadership, including ANA Chief of General Staff GEN Karimi, GSG4 MG Shah Aqa, and Logistics Command commanders, travel to each corps alongside COMIJC and senior levels of ISAF leadership. Corps commanders and G4 staff provide briefings and a practical walkthrough of corps, brigade, and CSSK lines, which demonstrates their understanding, utilization, and increasing proficiency in the supply and sustainment process.

Velocity and feedback during the supply and sustainment process continues to be a challenge but revision to logistics policies (commonly known as “decrees”) is ongoing at the MoD level in order to streamline the overly staff-driven sustainment procedure. Signoff of these revisions is expected soon. Some coalition advisors report that logistics requests reaching regional or national support commands are treated with a “fill or kill” mentality, with little to no feedback.

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19 A support Kandak focused on logistics and sustainment.
reaching the original requesting unit. If continued, insufficient responsiveness to supply demands could result in a loss of confidence in the sustainment system and foster conditions for the hoarding of supplies and equipment. Robust and responsive lines of communication are therefore a key internal enabler and will continue to be encouraged within the sustainment system.

Future procurement of CL IX will be a key challenge during the upcoming drawdown of coalition-administered contracts across the ANSF. This will be balanced by CAATs, already positioned to provide logistics contracting and oversight training to the ANSF during the transition of contract management to Afghan control.

The ANA remains underdeveloped in its ability to prioritize and synchronize logistics for future operations but continues to improve its ability to conduct these activities at Operational Coordination Centers (OCC) across the regions. In addition, train-the-trainer programs and mobile training teams (MTTs) continue to enhance ANA training and education in outlying regions and corps. These programs enable units to overcome logistical challenges in sending their soldiers to institutional schools in Kabul or to Regional Military Training Centers.

To overcome the key challenges identified, the ANA must ensure that trained logistics units, personnel, and equipment are utilized in their proper roles and managed for the benefit of ANSF as a whole. It is crucial that CSSKs are used in support and sustainment roles and are not re-missioned to alternate taskings such as general infantry duties that degrade the sustainment mission.

During the recent Cycle 17 Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) reporting 10 of the 19 ANA CSSKs rated were judged to be Effective with Advisors. An additional seven CSSKs were rated at the highest Rating Definition Level (RDL) of “Independent with Advisors.” Some of these CUAT ratings, however, assess the CSSK’s ability to carry out traditional infantry missions rather than the support-focused missions for which the CSSKs were designed.

**Afghan Air Force**

The Afghan Air Force faces a number of challenges—particularly recruiting and training personnel to operate and maintain the fleet—and is not expected to be fully mission capable until at least 2018. The 86 Mi-17 helicopters programmed for the post-2014 AAF fleet will meet only minimal operational requirements, even assuming that the insurgency will weaken. The fixed-wing aircraft fleet is similarly limited. C-130Hs—which are expected to be introduced in third quarter of FY 2013—would provide an initial capability to do inter-theater lift that will take several years to mature. The first Afghan C-130 pilots began training in the U.S. in May 2013.

The AAF is increasingly capable of carrying out a range of operations. During the reporting period, RC-E was a particular focus as the main winter effort of Op NAWEEED. Two major AAF operations were carried out during the reporting period. From November 15-18, 2012, the AAF supported an ABP mission to supply local villages and secure contested territory in RC-S—possibly the first time these villages had seen GIRoA forces, let alone AAF helicopters, delivering humanitarian aid.
The AAF supported a major ANA operation in Badakhshan Province in spring 2013. The Mazar-e-Sharif Detachment’s Mi-17s were tasked for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) missions, human remains (HR) missions, and troop transport missions. The Kabul Air Wing flew C-208 CASEVAC missions and transported the Afghan Chief of General Staff for battlefield circulation. This engagement was an indicator of this year’s increasingly complex air support arena with AAF and coalition assets supporting ANA operations.

The AAF routinely performs autonomous (no coalition air advisors onboard) Mi-17 resupply, CASEVAC, HR, and passenger transport missions throughout Afghanistan. The AAF has also trained a number of Mi-17 crews, mainly in Kandahar Air Wing, to conduct combined air assault operations with coalition forces.

The AAF will retire its Mi-35 fleet in 2016. Currently, only two of six Mi-35s with remaining service life are available at any time due to a shortage of spare parts. The AAF is currently conducting autonomous patrols with the Mi-35 in the Kabul area and training crews to perform armed overwatch/escort and air to ground operations.

The AAF flies C-208s daily on operational missions carrying passengers and cargo throughout Afghanistan. Recently, C-208s have begun flying CASEVAC and HR missions to mitigate the load placed on the Mi-17 fleet for CASEVAC and HR. The C-208 currently flies missions with coalition instructor pilots (as Commanders) onboard to continue training for AAF copilots during operational missions. The first two AAF C-208 Commanders are expected to be certified in June and July 2013. Of note, the C-27 has been removed from service.

The Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft source selection was completed on February 27, 2013. Based on the source selection date, aircrew and maintenance personnel will begin training in May 2014. The first aircraft deliveries to Afghanistan will begin 18 months after contract award, which is expected for August 2014, at a rate of two aircrafts per month for 10 months. The full employment of CAS capability is not expected until sometime post-2018. The LAS will provide the AAF with the capability to conduct air interdiction, armed reconnaissance, air-to-ground support, combat search and rescue, border patrol, and aerial escort missions.

The AAF ended the reporting period with an end-strength of 6,277 personnel. By January 2013, a total of 634 AAF personnel had received level 3 aviation, maintenance or mission support professional training. The AAF’s education plan includes continuing technical training via exported courses, expanding English language training and introducing familiarization training for aviation maintenance personnel. Throughout this reporting period, coalition training and personnel officers focused on defining military occupational specialties and refining the Manning plan for the AAF based on the projected 2015 aircraft basing strategy.

As of March 31, there were 38 Mi-17 helicopters in the AAF inventory, 29 of which were operational, plus an additional 10 Mi-17s on loan to the SMW. The final 12 Mi-17s are expected to be delivered between August and October 2013, bringing the total number of Mi-17s to 60. NTM-A also accepted delivery of the final eight C-208s at Shindand and Kandahar Airbases in December 2012, bringing the total number of C-208s to 26.
Corruption and infiltration by criminal patronage networks (CPN) are significant problems in the AAF. ISAF and GIRoA continue to work together to combat corruption in the AAF, and as of the end of the reporting period, numerous investigations into allegations of corruption and other illegal activities were ongoing. As in other areas of governance, however, the Afghan Government has yet to demonstrate the political will to address corruption and remove and prosecute corrupt officials on a consistent basis.

**2.7: Afghan National Police Capacity and Growth**

The ANP continues its primary focus on generating the force; the current fielded force stands at 151,766 assigned out of 157,000 authorized personnel as of March 2013, or 97 percent of its established fielded end-strength objective of 157,000. Advisors, mentors and trainers work with senior MoI leaders to help build a well-led, professional police force while manning, training and equipping that force. The ANP includes four police pillars: AUP, ABP, ANCOP and the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP). The GDPSU, another specialized element of the ANP, reports directly to the MoI Deputy Minister (DM) for Security. These police forces are performing operations throughout Afghanistan at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, up to and including ministry-level administration and direction.
Similar to the ANA, the ANP are becoming less reliant on Advisor assistance for conducting operations. This trend towards conducting independent operations is a key indicator of success, but it also becoming more prevalent due to SFA shortfalls, especially in RC-E.

Although the ANP is performing some traditional police duties such as community policing, traffic control and development of modern criminal investigative techniques (e.g. biometrics and forensics), the forces are also actively engaged in COIN operations. The transition from COIN to more traditional policing varies in accordance with conditions from region to region. In areas like RCs South, Southwest and East, the ANP are still engaging in COIN due to the more kinetic environment. In RCs North and West, the ANP have transitioned away from COIN and are focused more on policing. A challenge associated with this transition away from COIN...
operations is the weakness of Afghanistan’s justice system. In many areas, links between the ANP and the justice system are weak or nonexistent. Corruption and police abuse of civilians remain problems in much of the country.

As part of the transition of the ANP from a COIN force to one more focused on traditional police activities, the MoI decided to disband its ANP zone headquarters in March 2013. Disbanding will create an ANP command structure that is less reflective of the ANA structure but is more in line with the structure of most non-wartime police forces. The full implementation and consequences of this decision had yet to occur as of the end of the reporting period.

The ABP and ANCOP continue to be used to support traditional COIN efforts as well as to enable or support ANA operations. Although the ABP continues its COIN mission, the force is making an effort to shift more of its focus towards the traditional border mission, including training, equipping and professionalizing the force at the major border control points (BCPs) and airports of entry.

Unfortunately, insurgent attacks, continued corruption and limited literacy across the force continue to undermine positive police recruiting, training and professionalization goals as the ANP is generated and fielded. The January 2013 attack against the Traffic Police Headquarters in downtown Kabul is an example of the insurgent attacks that are increasingly targeting the ANP.

Another challenge facing the ANP is command and control. The ANP Command and Control structure is overly complex. Communications between Kabul and the provincial and district police departments is minimal. Furthermore, the MoI has little authority over the Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCOPs) and District Chiefs of Police (DCOPs), and the authority the MoI does possess is impacted by political interference. In the future, this problem may be exacerbated by the recent decision to disband the police zones system. Finally, the lack of a dedicated civil service component often results in police officers being pulled from patrol duty in order to perform administrative actions.

These issues are exacerbated by the ANP’s continuing problems in the area of communications. Difficult terrain, the inability of the ANP to repair inoperable radios and unreliable radio communications all contribute to this problem. Many AUP and ABP units continue to rely on cell phone communications as their primary means for communicating to Operational Coordination Centers (OCCs) and higher police HQs. Cell phone usage is also an issue in areas where power is inconsistent and cell towers do not function for several hours during the day.

Corruption and the impact of local power brokers on the ANP vary by unit. The further ANP units are positioned from government centers, such as Kabul or provincial centers, the more likely the units are to feel the influence of tribal or traditional power brokers. Rural-based ANP units are also much more likely to succumb to Taliban and criminal patronage network influence. This influence may materialize in the form of non-aggression pacts, bribery or collusion with criminal networks. Endemic corruption and local power broker interference can lead to violence, as was seen with former Baghlan-e Jadid District Chief of Police LTC Kamin and former District Civil Order Police Chief Amir Gul in fall of 2012. Both men were complicit in extortion of local
nationals and, when lawfully relieved by the Minister of the Interior, both resorted to violence against ANA forces in October 2012. The ANP is locally recruited and employed in most areas, and maintains a closer connection to the populace than other branches of the ANSF. This proximity could lead to the coercive use of influence, increasing with the drawdown of coalition forces, and result in a return to traditional, more localized power structures in rural areas.

**Manning**

Attrition is not as problematic for the ANP as it has been for the ANA, despite a high op-tempo for some units. As seen in figure 24, ANP attrition remained at or below the goal of 1.4 percent for four of the five months of the reporting period.

**Figure 24: ANP Attrition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sep-12</th>
<th>Oct-12</th>
<th>Nov-12</th>
<th>Dec-12</th>
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<th>Feb-13</th>
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<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
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<td>1.4%</td>
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**Force Development and Training**

As the ANP reaches its end strength of 157,000 personnel, the MoI is shifting its focus from building the force to professionalizing and assessing the force.

A total of 41,824 ANP personnel attended training in 2012 and 39,723 graduated, resulting in a 95 percent graduation rate. Of these students, 11,284 were “reform students” who had missed initial entry training for various reasons. Of the 11,284 reform students, 10,895 graduated – a 96 percent graduation rate. Reform students comprised 27 percent of the total student population, which reflects ANP commitment to training and the professionalization of their force. From January 2013 through early April 2013, total of 14,029 ANP attended training and 13,721 graduated, resulting in a 98 percent graduation rate. Of these students, 649 were reform students who had missed initial entry training for various reasons; all 649 graduated.

In late June 2012, NTM-A and the MoI signed a Training Center transition plan, which will consolidate or close 31 training sites, leaving 13 enduring Training Centers by late 2014. Some of the 13 Enduring Training Centers will be enlarged, providing a 14,000 seat training capacity.

Afghan National Police General Training Command (ANPGTC) Training Center capacity utilization (training seats available vs. training seats assigned) averaged 63 percent monthly during 2012, but, to date in 2013, this has improved to 74 percent monthly. NTM-A expects the overall and average capacity utilization rates to improve as the consolidation plan is completed. The consolidation will ease logistics and transportation requirements improving ANP’s ability to schedule courses.
The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), chaired by the MoI, has established multiple working groups to improve MoI organizations, delineate strategic-level roles and functions, and improve literacy and Rule of Law knowledge, based on international standards and national laws. The IPCB, in conjunction with Afghan senior leaders in the MOI, has established a draft 10-year vision and is currently working on the two-year plan to begin to execute this vision.

In 2012, the ANPGTC Professional Development Board (PDB) approved and accredited 19 courses of instruction focused on professionalizing the police force.

In mid-2012, the ANPGTC commander began using the Training Management System (TMS), an internationally recognized process of conducting training needs analysis, course design, course execution and assessment. The TMS process was first used to develop an ABP NCO course. TMS revealed the need for ABP NCO literacy skills so that the NCOs could read documents (passports, visas, identity cards, etc.) and detect fraudulent documentation. In response to an emergent requirement, the TMS process was used in November 2012 to rapidly develop a new Insider Threat Awareness course. The course was approved and given accreditation at the December 2012 PDB, and subsequently taught to the ANA and ANP.

As of April 1, 2013, the following data has been collected for literacy classes: 4,186 ANP personnel tested at Level 1, resulting in 3788 passing (90.5 percent); 4390 personnel tested at Level 2, with 4059 passing (92.5 percent) and 3526 personnel tested at Level 3 (the highest level), with 3277 passing (92.9 percent). The ANP biometrically enrolled 32,268 recruits through March 2013 as part of an effort to reduce the Insider Threat and improve security.

The training priority for the ANP over the coming months continues to be focused on maximizing the seat usage for the Direct Entry Patrolmen and Satanmen20 courses. The transition of the training system to Afghan control continues, with the Course Tracker and all course planning already transitioned to Afghan control. ANPGTC continues to take increasing control of training issues and has taken the initiative to assist training the APPF. APPF training is now conducted at three sites and more training is being scheduled as capacity is identified.

Equipping

With the reestablishment of the Pakistan Ground Line of Communication (PAKGLOC) in July 2012, along with Trans-modal, and Northern Distribution Network shipments, NTM-A has received a surge of ANP equipment. Over the reporting period, NTM-A accepted 6,864 weapons, 647 vehicles and 467 radios for fielding to the ANP. NTM-A is now working with MoI senior logistical leadership and ANP regional logistics centers (RLCs) personnel to rapidly distribute this equipment to fill ANP pillar shortages. NTM-A has procured 99 percent of all SY1391 tashkil ANP equipment and expects to complete ANP fielding by October 2013.

Many of the equipping problems facing the ANP are due to a lack of training, communication and confidence in the system. Requests filled out incorrectly are often denied. In units where

20 Satanmen are NCOs in the ANP.
there is an open line of communication between the police unit and the RLC, many equipment flow issues are eliminated.

**Logistics Capabilities**

ANP conducted the ribbon-cutting ceremony for their new National Logistics Center (NLC) in Wardak Province on November 18, 2012. The establishment of NLC Wardak in its new facilities will allow RLC-Kabul to move into its permanent facilities and afford warehouse space to stock supplies and significantly increase its support to the Kabul area. MoI Support Command has provided 534 commercial truckloads of material, pushing 1,111 pallets of various classes of supply from the national depot to the RLCs during this reporting period. The RLCs are improving performance by increasing their communication with logistics officers in provinces, issuing more material from their warehouses, and better organizing supplies, weapons and ammunition.

**Figure 25: ANP Logistics Nodes**

There are several challenges within the Afghan logistics system. The first and foremost is that NTM-A has been unable to work with the ANP to develop a modern equipment tracking system. The ANP have provided data on what has been delivered, but it is very difficult to confirm these numbers with un-partnered Afghan units.

Reports from the field indicate that a number of problems face the ANP logistics system. The ANP often disregard NTM-A or ministerial recommendations for the amount of equipment they should request and instead hoard whatever assets they can acquire. One unit may have 300 percent of designated equipment while another may have 20 percent, but the units will not share. Another challenge is presented by sending all equipment to the main logistics center, and not the
smaller regional nodes; this often leaves units with shortfalls while the main logistics center waits until a full load is ready to move. A lack of logistics/transport trucks from Regional/Provincial centers to get supplies out to District centers and beyond also impedes efficiency. There is little capacity or funding for this capability; thus, more remote regions face shortages as personnel lack fuel to come in and requisition supplies themselves, or the security environment precludes movement. The final issue concerns procurement of various pieces and the quality assurance of products; Afghans have taken over procurement in several areas, but they products they procure are of lesser quality.

Currently, the ANP is entirely reliant on contracted maintenance provided through an NTM-A-managed contract. Several projects are ongoing with regard to ANP maintenance, including developing repair parts stockage lists and expanding maintenance training to enable a basic organic maintenance capability. NTM-A and MoI have developed a draft concept for mobile maintenance teams, as well as a preliminary timeline that sets the goal for establishing full organic maintenance at the regional level within the ANP by December 2014. ANP maintenance is transitioning from a coalition-managed to a MoI-managed contract in December 2013. This contracted solution will continue to develop organic ANP maintenance capability in support of a MoI long-range plan to have a hybrid organic and contract maintenance solution in place by 2015.

Major challenges facing the ANP include vehicle maintenance and contract support at large. The police have a limited preventative maintenance capability. Provincial maintenance centers are often overwhelmed or simply out of reach. The system is currently set up so that all vehicles requiring major repairs must be evacuated to provincial maintenance centers, which is difficult, if not impossible, in some of the more remote regions. The ANP are attempting to develop the ability to maintain their vehicles locally, but are making little progress. The transition of ANSF contracts in general from ISAF-managed to ANSF-managed is a major challenge that the ANSF must overcome in the next two years. Defense Minister Mohammadi has raised this issue at senior levels as a major weakness of the ANSF.

**Afghanistan National Civil Order Police**

ANCOP HQ has continued to increase in effectiveness, despite a high operational tempo. Typical Operation Deployment Cycle (ODC) requests for forces from the various Regional Commands have steadily increased. Despite the heavy deployment cycle, ANCOP attrition has remained low, at just over 1.4 percent, averaged over the past 12 months. ANCOP equipping has reached 94 percent for weapons, 90 percent for vehicles and 77 percent for communications; it is expected that ANCOP will be at 95 percent for all three categories by the end of April 2013.

Re-supply and equipping of the deployed Kandaks continues to be challenging, based on the areas of deployment, but significant improvements have been made in overcoming those issues. Communications issues and a lack of CIED equipment were the two major issues reported this cycle.

Positive leadership, high morale, coordination and ability to conduct joint ANSF operations continue to be strengths of the ANCOP. Logistical support to Kandak operations, including
deployed Kandaks, and supply flow have also improved this cycle. The ANCOP have also shown the ability to incorporate merit-based promotions by testing patrolmen before promoting. These positive developments, along with the progress made in previous reporting periods, have helped the ANCOP to remain one of the most capable, and most frequently engaged, branches of the ANSF.

The general staff of ANCOP HQ have made significant moves forward in their coordination and communications with the other ANSF pillars and are working to ensure that same level of communication is achieved at the brigade and Kandak levels. With the recent issuing of Night Vision Devices (NVDs), ANCOP deployed units will have an increased capability to conduct offensive operations at night and permit increased levels of self-defense in the outlaying checkpoints. NVDs will be issued to three brigades: 1st, 2nd and 5th during April 2013. NVDs will be issued to the 3rd Brigade once supplies have arrived. The remaining brigades (4th, 6th and 7th) will receive NVDs once they have been certified to store NVDs and supplies have been purchased. The second capability improvement will happen with the arrival of 9,500 sets of anti-riot equipment; this is expected in late summer 2013. The completion of the various facilities is progressing, with the expected construction of the ANCOP Collective Training Centre expected to be complete in June 2015. It is projected that the ANCOP will achieve Capability Milestone 1A in late June 2013. The past reporting period has seen ANCOP continue to be deployed throughout Afghanistan in support of both the other ANP pillars as well as the ANA.

**Afghan Border Police**

During the reporting period, the ABP has made progress towards self-sufficiency and will likely achieve a Capability Milestone of 2A in summer 2013, the first increase in their performance rating since 2010. Notable improvements during the reporting period included better intelligence sharing with other ANSF components, which has led to improvements in both planning and coordination. Logistical supports to operations and logistics planning have also improved this cycle, although, as discussed below, serious logistical challenges remain. Improved facilities should also enable the ABP to be more effective. Nonetheless, corruption and poor equipping/re-supply remain serious issues, and the ABP will not be capable of fully independent operations for some time.

ABP’s mission is extremely difficult, with a number of inherent factors that slow progress towards self-sufficiency as compared to other police pillars. Afghanistan is a very mountainous country, with many border posts located in extremely remote and hard-to-access areas. The challenges involved in simply fielding the ABP in remote outposts and keeping them supplied are enormous. For example, there are few vehicle maintenance facilities within a reasonable proximity of many units and minimal numbers of trained mechanics available in rural areas to repair ABP rolling stock.

The ABP continue to have issues with communications, especially with remote border crossing points and remote Kandaks. Medical issues, including a lack of trained medics and supplies, are another major issue. CIED training and heavy-weapons equipping issues also limit the ABP’s ability to operate effectively.
The still-nascent ANP logistics system is challenged by insurgent threats in such basic functions as the delivery of fuel and water. Contracted support, especially in the South, is unavailable due to a lack of providers in reasonable distance to fielded units. ABP is also heavily reliant on Afghan air support to sustain, evacuate casualties, or relieve police forces that spend long tours of duty in isolated border stations. The ABP do not, however, get priority for support from Afghan air assets, which are extremely limited.

In order to address some of these challenges, NTM-A approved new capabilities for resourcing that will increase the effectiveness of the ABP. Three route clearance companies (RCC) will be stood up in the zones with the highest rate of IED attacks to improve the protection of ABP while they patrol or sustain their forces via GLOCs. Border Control Point (BCP) equipment will be provided to improve the detection of precursor’s chemicals and opiates. More heavy-weapons capabilities will be introduced to all zones to help defend against a persistent enemy that is currently much better armed than the ABP.

Recent improvements in professionalization efforts have been realized with a top-down focus by ABP leadership in ongoing training, education and literacy. NTM-A and ABP have collaborated to significantly increase training in many functional areas, including intelligence, vehicle and weapons maintenance, communications and medical and personnel support. An NCO-level course for police employed at airports and BCPs was developed with Afghan support and is being delivered in partnership with bilateral contributors. The methodology by which this training was developed is the model that the ABP will use to create follow-on border police specific courses. NTM-A also has concentrated on building a train-the-trainer capacity within the ABP commander’s organization, per his request.

The C2 abilities of ABP have improved with better coordination with the MoI, laterally within the HQ, down to subordinate units, and with neighboring countries’ border patrols. ABP and ANSF leadership continue to engage in multiple discussions with neighboring country counterparts to improve border relations. Efforts to build pan-ANSF supporting relationships and improve cooperation along neighboring borders, especially Pakistan, are still enabled and dependent on coalition forces. Moving forward, the main effort of the coalition forces should be to continue to foster better communication, coordination and cooperation with other ANSF to provide layered and in extremis support. This approach is likely the only defensive posture that will be sufficient to reduce insurgent operations in the border zone.

Positive momentum can be seen with the ABP's mission at the regulated points of embarkation, including 5 airports and 14 BCPs. ABP has also embraced the Combined Comprehensive Border Strategy (CCBS), under which ISAF supports GIRoA with focused and coherent nationally endorsed aims to limit the ingress of homemade explosives (HMEs) precursor chemicals, insurgents and weapons, by concentrating effort at selected BCPs. NTM-A is currently equipping and training police and improving infrastructure at these sites in order to support the initiative. ISAF personnel assess that if sufficient security and force protection can be provided; airports and BCPs are the best locations to focus ABP professionalization and corruption reduction efforts beyond 2014.
The ABP continue to struggle with a number of challenges. Support of the ABP by other ANSF, especially the ANA, in many kinetic areas of operations is still insufficient. Although recently directed by the ministries of the Interior and Defense, joint operations in support of the ABP occur infrequently. ABP leadership recognizes and struggles with continued corruption of their forces, heavily exacerbated by political influence and nepotism that will endure beyond 2014. Although many units perform well, some ABP units still undermine the rule of law, fail to take action against criminal or insurgent threats, extort the population and engage in a range of other criminal activities.

**Afghan Uniform Police**

As areas of Afghanistan increasingly transition to ANSF lead, and the ANA is better able to handle the military aspects of the security mission, increased consideration is being given to Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) reform as part of security sector reforms. These reforms include the further professionalization of the AUP to create a police service that can actively deal with criminality and has a sense of integrity, a code of ethics, an ability to engage with the community and respect for the rule of law.

The greatest weakness within the AUP this reporting period continued to be corruption (both perceived and actual), reports of AUP abuse of civilians and a lack of trust in the AUP from the other ANSF components. Mistrust limits the AUP’s ability to conduct community-based policing and effectively act on intelligence from other ANSF pillars. A lack of trained patrolmen, and in some cases, DCOPs, affects all areas of police operations, especially the ability to collect and preserve evidence.

Another major issue concerning the AUP is that the current C2 structure within the organization does not provide the AUP Chief and his staff with the necessary authority to facilitate direction and implementation of policies or influence activities at the regional level and below. Whether the disbandment of the Police Zone system in March 2013 will positively or negatively affect this problem remains to be seen.

Leadership continues to improve as poorly performing officers are removed. In many areas, the removal of unsatisfactory officers has led to improved interaction with local governance, tribal elders and other ANSF components, which enables the AUP to participate in joint operations. The AUP has also improved their background checks to mitigate the risk of “Green on Blue” incidents. Intelligence-driven operations have also improved since the last cycle, as well as weapons maintenance and CIED training.

NTM-A plans to assist the international community in the long-term evolution of the AUP from a security force into an effective police service by creating the conditions required for the police to support and enforce the rule of law. The desired end-state is for the AUP to be a competent police service that upholds the constitution of Afghanistan, provides internal security, respects the rule of law and enforces the laws, while serving the people of Afghanistan in a professional, non-discriminatory, accountable and trustworthy manner. However, this is a goal that many other police forces in the region are still working towards, and the AUP will likely take many years to progress significantly in this area. Key areas of influence for police professionalization
are the development of the MoI, the institutionalization of training, the enablement of sustainment functions and the promotion of international cooperation. These areas will constitute the main focus areas for 2013.

The AUP advanced to CM-2A at the Ministerial Development Board (MDB) in September 2012, two quarters early, following a stagnation period of nearly seven quarters. The AUP is projected to advance to CM-1B by December 2013. Progression towards this goal is ahead of schedule, although work remains to ensure a sustainable AUP HQ staff is developed. NTM-A has almost completed equipment fielding for the AUP. Specific concerns remain relating to the number of untrained police in the organization. This is an issue that cannot be resolved solely by the AUP leadership; ensuring that the nearly 17,550 remaining untrained police (20 percent of the AUP force) receive the necessary training will require the support of the MoI.

While understanding the current security environment, AUP senior leadership is looking forward to extracting the AUP from combat-style operations and moving towards more “traditional” policing efforts as the security environment stabilizes. There is a desire among some senior leaders for crafting and establishing a community-focused policing model specific to Afghanistan. These efforts continue to receive significant assistance and attention from the international police community.

The Afghan National Fire – Disaster Response and Emergency Services (ANF-DRES) remains a very immature organization, but with great potential for rapid progress. The initial and current rating is CM-3, and the organization is on track to progress to CM-2B by September 2013. The equipping process is just over halfway complete. Essential equipment has been procured but not issued. As an organization, ANF-DRES continues to face challenges: inability to fill tashkil positions with sufficiently trained firefighters; an unreliable and faulty emergency dispatch system; and an insufficient maintenance capacity. Additionally, although 19 fire specific construction projects have been completed, and 24 are currently being built, there are still an inadequate number of fire stations to meet the needs of the Afghan populace.

**Police Special Forces**

The ANP continued to recruit and field elite police units under the command and control of the General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU). The GDPSU is trained by and partnered with ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF). The HQ element has centralized operational and training control of 24 units, providing GIRoA with a mature and highly functional national Special Police force.

GDPSU manning remains stable, with only the HQ, Special Police Training Centre (SPTC) and PRC Helmand, below 75 percent. Manning improved over the last solar reporting period with 19 of the 25 units now at 80 percent manning or more. Through focused mentoring efforts, attrition in the units has dropped and is now running at about five percent per annum, but there is still work to be done in this area.

The three National Mission Units (NMU) – Crisis Response Unit (CRU) 222, Commando Force (CF) 333 and Afghan Territorial Force (ATF) 444 – have emerged over the last decade from
initial bi-lateral partnering arrangements and are now capable of leading operations that are advised by ISAF. They provide a national response tackling the terrorist, insurgent and narcotic threats that GIRoA faces. The 19 provincial response companies (PRCs), as the name indicates, are provincially based Special Police units that specialize in civil order security and high-risk arrests and partner with ISAF SOF for training and operations. The closer integration of Intelligence & Surveillance Units (ISUs) with the PRCs is fundamental to the principles of GDPSU and helps enable operations through an evidential based approach. In the reporting period, the PRC have become more proficient in leading the planning, preparation, execution and consequence management of their operations.

GDPSU has a consistently high operational tempo, but the response to the high-profile attack on the Kabul Traffic Police HQ, PD3 Kabul on January 21, 2013, was notable; the incident was resolved by CRU 222 with limited ISAF SOF enablement. Both Afghan and coalition after-action reviews revealed very few areas requiring further development. Appropriate C2, an increased willingness for ANSF to work together and patience resulted in few deaths (three) and positive media coverage, demonstrating a noticeable improvement in response capability over the past 12 months.

Since the last report, the Special Police Foundation Course (SPFC) pilot began at the SPTC November 3, 2012 – a milestone in terms of development, providing all provincial and national units with a common starting point. The course graduated in February 2013, with 164 finishing out of the 180 that started. As a result, 17 of the 19 PRCs will either reach or nearly reach FOC. Advanced training for those selected continues at the National Mission Units (NMU), but will be concentrated at the Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) by July 2013, once construction is complete. The key unresolved issue for the SPTC remains provision of coordinated administrative life support, with no NATO nation taking up this request.

Further development of the GDPSU is arguably constrained by the lack of incentive pay parity across the force. GDPSU incentive payments have been introduced incrementally, and without consistency, as the force has grown. As a result, incentive pay across GDPSU is not commensurate with training, roles and missions. The potential for individual financial loss has made special policemen reluctant to accept reassignment within GDPSU, thereby constraining the commander’s ability to meet Manning and force-development requirements, resulting in an emerging capability gap. This capability gap is resultsfrom the commander’s inability to manage his force efficiently. However, management of the significant number of pay incentives across the ANSF is required to ensure GIRoA can achieve pay sustainably in the future. NTM-A has ‘frozen’ any adjustments to all currently paid incentives while they are reviewed.

The GDPSU is proactive in addressing many of the underlying leadership and organizational issues, such as job stability and pay, but many solutions reside at MOI level. A lack of pay parity with other security sector jobs (base salary and incentives pay) is still a problem, leading to attrition levels far higher than desired. Some of this is based on inconsistency between those different coalition partners funding the different parts of the ANSF’s pay.
2.8: AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE\textsuperscript{21}

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is a MoI-managed State Owned Enterprise established by Presidential Decree, to conduct all non-diplomatic commercial, development fixed-site and convoy security services (to include ISAF convoys). The APPF is intended to replace private security companies (PSCs) that currently provide these services. Per Afghan Presidential Decree, all applicable PSCs were to transition to the APPF, with security guards and contracts managed by MoI, by March 20, 2013. PSCs securing diplomatic facilities are exempt from the decree. ISAF remains committed to supporting GIRoA and will devote all efforts in the development of APPF’s organic capability and capacity so it becomes an organization capable of taking responsibility for all PSC security tasks. As of December 5, 2012, 28 Risk Management Consultants (RMC) licenses had been issued and 8 more were pending approval. 36 PSCs remained at the end of the reporting period, operating under extensions granted by the MoI in March 2013.

The process of transitioning security responsibility to the APPF was not completed by March 20, 2013, as the APPF was still building the capabilities necessary to meet transition requirements. In light of this delay, ISAF and MoI agreed to implement a bridging strategy for ISAF fixed sites, mobile security and development projects. The bridging strategy, which extends to December 31, 2014, is a conditions-based GIRoA program that would allow for continuity with no gaps in security. The MoI and ISAF will conduct assessments of the capability and capacity of the APPF and the effectiveness of the bridging strategy every six months until it is no longer necessary.

Convoys were not included in the post-March Bridging Strategy. The APPF will assume control of all convoy security requests through its National Operations Center. Convoys that the APPF cannot provide service for will be handed-off to a MoI-approved PSC.

APPF Size and Composition

The APPF provides security in a number of areas, primarily in the capital region. As of March 31, 2013, there were 16,600 security guards providing security for 147 sites. While the APPF has demonstrated the capability to perform basic operational tasks and missions (base security, convoy security, etc), it still lacks the capacity to perform all functions required of a State-owned enterprise. The APPF lacks the requisite business acumen needed to fully and independently support its State-owned enterprise and thus relies heavily on coalition advisory assistance in basic legal, accounting, logistics and procurement processes, requirement/asset prioritization and forecasting and policy development. Although the APPF headquarters is staffed at 85 percent and business operations have shown some improvements, the APPF as a business remains an immature and coalition-dependent entity.

The APPF executed its first proof of concept convoy security mission from Wardak to Ghazni on October 22, 2012. This effort was the first step in developing and transitioning APPF capacity along that segment of the Ring Road in RC-E. By December 31, 2012, the APPF transitioned

\textsuperscript{21} This section is submitted consistent with section 1531(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
more than 100 fixed governmental, commercial and developmental sites from PSCs and are in the process of transitioning an additional 75. As of October 31, 2012, the APPF has negotiated and signed 214 contracts covering 192 projects. Over the past three months, the APPF conducted several additional proofs of concept for convoy security operations without any incidents, demonstrating its capability to accept this task. Also during the last half of this reporting period, the NTM-A APPF Advisory Group (AAG) Convoy Security Team continued to assist and mentor APPF Kandak leadership in maturing their convoy security capability. Tashkils for nine Convoy Security Kandaks (CSKs) have been approved and these units will be established along the Ring Road.

To date, no convoy, government, non-government or international customers have terminated contracts with the APPF.

In late 2012, NTM-A initiated the APPF transition planning process. The intent of this process is to transition all PSC-secured, ISAF U.S.-led sites, ISAF non-U.S.-led sites and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) sites in Afghanistan to APPF-led perimeter security while maintaining the present level of service and security. As part of this process, IJC initiated the selection process for ISAF bases within the Kabul area to transition to APPF-led security.

**APPF Recruiting and Training**

APPF recruiting targets specific mission requirements, while taking into account regional considerations. Trained guards are assigned to locations in close proximity to their families, when possible, to minimize hardship. Prior to a guard being selected by the APPF to support ISAF security contracts, the individual must complete a thorough standardized application process that includes background investigation, physical examination and collection of biometric data. Recruiting is aligned with existing training capabilities. To date, recruiting is able to meet demand.

Recruiting meets Afghan Public Protection Force’s capacity to provide security. The limiting factors on APPF force production are equipment (particularly weapons) and vehicles, not guard strength.

As of April 10, 2013, the APPF has trained a total of 5,880 guards in support of ISAF requirements. The APPF has one regional training center (RTC) located in the capital region near Kabul; however, this center is slated to be replaced. The new Kabul training center’s capacity will be 600 trainees, an improvement from the previous center’s capacity of 400-500 trainees. Students are trained as static guards, convoy guards and/or personal security. Training also occurs at provincial training centers and Kandahar RTC. Future convoy security and ISAF site security missions could increase training requirements up to potentially 1,200 guards per month. Efforts are underway to identify additional capacity at other training sites. Mobile training teams (MTTs) are also utilized in remote locations to conduct on-site training.
APPF Tasks and Missions

The APPF has four missions: guard training; fixed site security; ISAF base security; and convoy security.
- Guard training: the APPF has trained 5,880 guards, with an additional 780 recruits currently in training and 634 recruits scheduled to begin training in April.
- Fixed site security: APPF has assumed responsibility for 87 percent of fixed site security (658 of 754).
- ISAF base security: with the completion of the first proof of principle, the APPF has assumed responsibility for the first ISAF base. Two successive proofs of principle will inform future transitions.
- Convoy operations: four of nine kandaks are operational. The APPF has successfully escorted over 500 convoys and over 5,000 vehicles.

APPF Measures of Effectiveness

NTM-A’s APPF Advisory Group measures and rates APPF progress based on a Capability Milestone (CM) rating scale of CM4 (lowest capability) to CM1 (highest capability). Each CM rating uses measureable criteria, such as equipment and manning numbers, to determine the current status of APPF development. The APPF Advisory Group compares the Afghan-provided data against the measureable criteria outlined for each CM to determine the current assessment. APPF progress is measured in three mission critical areas; Operations, Support, and Convoy. CM ratings for the three mission critical areas form an overall CM rating for APPF. The AAG performs this assessment every six months, with "Key Enablers" identified that are required to move APPF forward in each area. These "Key Enablers" then become the focus of AAG mentoring. The CM table below shows the current assessment of APPF capabilities.
Figure 26: APPF CM Ratings

**APPF Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>CM4</th>
<th>CM3</th>
<th>CM2B</th>
<th>CM2A</th>
<th>CM1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>** Outputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel</td>
<td></td>
<td>No Intelligence Capability</td>
<td>Able to process, analyze, and disseminate information</td>
<td>Participates in decision-making; develops enemy COAs</td>
<td>Leads in decision-making; develops enemy COAs</td>
<td>Able to implement R&amp;S plan; conduct Intel based ops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ops</td>
<td></td>
<td>No Movement Control Capability</td>
<td>Able to establish TOC; Maintains situational awareness</td>
<td>Able to send and receive reports/orders from higher/lower</td>
<td>Able to affect movement control operations</td>
<td>Staff able to conduct MDMP/Troop Leading Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Como</td>
<td></td>
<td>No ability to communicate</td>
<td>Able to establish/maintain internal communications</td>
<td>Able to maintain external communications with higher</td>
<td>Able to maintain external communications with higher</td>
<td>Able to sustain ext como for 7 days. Has capable / sustained ALT como</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inputs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy ISAF Bases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard Strength</td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited ability to recruit, train, equip, and place guards</td>
<td>Able to recruit, train, equip, and place guards for contractual commitments</td>
<td>Able to effectively recruit, train, equip, and place guards</td>
<td>Able to recruit, train, equip, and place guards for Nat'l, Convoy and ISAF sites</td>
<td>Able to recruit, train, equip, and place guards for Nat'l, Convoy and ISAF sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Achieves proficiency in &lt;50% of all mission essential tasks</td>
<td>Achieves proficiency in 50-69% of all mission essential tasks</td>
<td>Achieves proficiency in 70-77% of all mission essential tasks</td>
<td>Achieves proficiency in 78-84% of all mission essential tasks</td>
<td>Achieves proficiency in &gt; 85% of all mission essential tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Cap</td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited operational capability at fixed sites</td>
<td>Operational capability at fixed sites; developing convoy and ISAF site operational capability</td>
<td>Operational capability at fixed sites, convoy and ISAF sites</td>
<td>Operational capability at fixed sites, convoy and ISAF sites</td>
<td>Full operational capability at fixed sites, convoy and ISAF sites</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPF Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>CM4</th>
<th>CM3</th>
<th>CM2B</th>
<th>CM2A</th>
<th>CM1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outputs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td>- No production of Communication products</td>
<td>- Limited production of Communication products</td>
<td>- Robust production of Communication products</td>
<td>- Demonstration and commitment to professional, ethical and legal standards and responsibilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy &amp; Procedure</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Policy and Procedures Approval process NOT functioning</td>
<td>- Writing &lt;50% key policies and procedures w/out AAG support</td>
<td>- Writing &gt;50% key policies and procedures w/ minimal AAG support</td>
<td>- Writing 100% key policies and procedures</td>
<td>- Production of effective Communication work products including those using new Communication technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/Military Liaison</td>
<td></td>
<td>No coordination</td>
<td>Basic awareness of coordination issues with MoI and MoD</td>
<td>Engagement with MoI and MoD to address APPF requirements</td>
<td>Strategic planning in coordination with MoI and MoD</td>
<td>Effective execution of Strategic coordination plans with MoI and MoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>&lt; 50% of auth manning</td>
<td>51-69% of auth manning</td>
<td>70-77% of auth HQ manning</td>
<td>78-84% of auth HQ manning</td>
<td>&gt;85% of auth manning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics/ Sustainment: Supply</td>
<td>Capable to Secure and Store Supplies (Cl I, III, V, IX)</td>
<td>Properly account for and issue items (Cl I, III, V, IX)</td>
<td>Requisition supplies (CL I, III, V, IX)</td>
<td>Forecast and requisition supplies (CL I, III, V, IX)</td>
<td>Maintain stockage level (UBL); Forecast and requisition supplies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Logistics/ Sustainment: Maintenance

- No Maintenance Conducted
- Conducts preventative maintenance checks and reports equipment status
- Conducts preventative maintenance; requests repair parts; 30% maintenance personnel MOS-qualified
- Conducts -10 level repair; Requests repair parts; 30% maintenance personnel are MOS-qualified

### Logistics/Equipment Readiness: O/H Qty’s and Operational Readiness (WPNs)

- < 50% of OR
- 50-69% of OR
- 70-77% of OR
- 78-84% of OR
- > 85% of OR

### Finance

- Execute payroll
- Manage cost/revenue accounts
- Develop budgets
- Creates standard financial reports
- Manage budgets

### Business Administration

- Develop contracts and cost sheets
- Establish effective customer service office
- Effective coordination with operations to execute contracts
- Uses commercial accounting firm to conduct annual financial audit
- Adhere to contracts and execute short term contracts

### Procurement

- Create worksheets and announcement process
- Execute a bidding process
- Establish procedures for selection committees
- Executes procurement in a timely manner
- Manage multiple procurement programs and accounts

### APPF Convoy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>CM4</th>
<th>CM3</th>
<th>CM2B</th>
<th>CM2A</th>
<th>CM1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No capability to manage business requirements</td>
<td>Partial capability to manage business requirements with coalition support</td>
<td>Capable to manage full spectrum of business requirements with advisory support</td>
<td>Business capability has achieved CM2B and is approaching CM1</td>
<td>Fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining full spectrum of Convoy business requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partial capability to manage operational requirements with coalition support</td>
<td>Capable to manage full spectrum of operational requirements with advisory support</td>
<td>Operational capability has achieved CM2B and is approaching CM1</td>
<td>Fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining full spectrum of Convoy operational requirements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CM Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CM</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CM1</td>
<td>Unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining full spectrum security services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>Unit has achieved CM2B and is approaching threshold of CM1: unit is ready for external evaluation to be validated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining full spectrum security services with advisory support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>Unit is partially capable of conducting full spectrum security services with coalition support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM4</td>
<td>Unit is formed but not yet capable of conducting full spectrum security services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In December 2012, the United States and Afghanistan concluded an acquisition agreement (AA), establishing a framework for DoD to obtain security services from the APPF. The AA contains a dispute-resolution provision stating that any disputes regarding the AA shall be resolved first at the lowest possible level through consultation between the parties’ representatives, and will not be referred to any national or international court. If the dispute is not resolved at the site commander level, it will be resolved by the parties’ representatives first, then by DoD and MoI senior leaders, and ultimately, through diplomatic channels. During the implementation of the dispute resolution procedures, DoD reserves the right to suspend payments to, and services provided by, the MoI. DoD also has the right to terminate orders under the AA. At this time, DoD has issued one work order for security services at a FOB in the Kabul Capital Region under the AA as a Proof of Principal, and completed full transition to the APPF on March 20, 2013.

In December 2012, the NTM-A MDB officially recognized APPF as achieving Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in both support and operations. The MDB assessment included four major areas within APPF: business development, headquarters operations, fixed site transitions and establishment of convoy operations. This rating declares APPF as partially capable of conducting full spectrum security services with coalition support. In some areas (e.g., contracting), APPF has achieved IOC with assistance from outside advisors that enable APPF to handle the workload.

The APPF is making steady progress towards meeting the requirements of the Bridging Strategy. The Bridging Strategy lays out goals of the APPF: (1) to assume ISAF convoy security and (2) to assume security of ISAF bases.

(1) ISAF convoy security - APPF currently has approved authorizations on their tashkil for nine convoy Kandaks. The nine Kandak locations are: Baghlan, Gardez, Herat, Farah, Ghazni, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mezar and Wardak. The Kandak in Wardak is currently manned at 44 percent. The Kandak in Kandahar is manned at 98 percent. The other seven Kandaks are still being generated and are not yet at full operating capacity. APPF is currently conducting convoy missions in Wardak and Kandahar and has hired C2 consultant to assist with convoy missions.

(2) Security of ISAF bases - At this time, one ISAF base has transitioned to APPF security.

**Improving APPF Performance**

Significant challenges remain for the APPF to takeover convoy operations and security for ISAF bases throughout the country, independent of ISAF assistance, and in a manner which ensures no
gaps in security. ISAF base transitions will continue to be conditions-based rather than timeline based in order to ensure no gaps in security.

There are five major areas that need attention in order to improve the performance of the APPF. First, the APPF needs competent and consistent leadership. Since its establishment in December 2011, APPF has had six Deputy Ministers with the longest DM only in place for six months. Presently the APPF is led by an “acting DM”, the DM for MOI Support who is dual-hatted as the DM for APPF. This lack of a dedicated, full-time leader coupled with excessive turnover has created instability, uncertainty and confusion, diminished accountability and produces a management environment where lack of authority and responsibility has led to inaction and fearful paralysis.

Second, the APPF is currently operating without a Charter which expired on March 20, 2013. This charter not only authorizes APPF’s existence as a state-owned enterprise but also provides the legal basis to operate throughout the country. The charter needs to be revised to allow the APPF to operate independently as a true state-owned enterprise with the financial authority to manage its assets and profits without the interference from unproductive and inefficient fiscal and business policies levied from other government entities such as the Ministry of Finance.

Third, until APPF has the capacity to perform 100 percent of the security currently performed by PSCs, it is imperative that GIRoA extend a bridging strategy to continue the legal licensure of PSCs. PSCs must continue performing security roles until a safe, secure conditions-based transition to APPF can be affected without allowing gaps in security or unnecessary risks.

Fourth, the APPF should strengthen business practices to improve effectiveness and efficiencies. For example, it should leverage and coordinate security and intelligence capabilities with other elements of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to maximize capacity to protect convoys and fixed sites. It should also ensure sufficient oversight to address potential business-related irregularities concerning convoy payments, and deliveries of fuel and materials. It should improve integration and communication between the APPF field operations and APPF business management structure to identify and eliminate organizational redundancies and encourage managerial initiative-taking. It should continuously evaluate readiness and operations through annual readiness and operational inspections based upon well-defined measures of performance.

Finally, the APPF, like many other armed forces in Afghanistan, faces a serious challenge from corruption. Instances of corruption and extortion by the APPF have been reported, but corruption does not appear to be as severe in the APPF as it is in many other elements of the Afghan security forces.

2.9: LOCAL DEFENSE INITIATIVES

Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the ALP are complementary components of both the ISAF and Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) COIN strategy. VSO and ALP have made substantial progress in protecting and mobilizing rural populations, preventing exploitation by the insurgency and expanding the influence of the Afghan government. The VSO and ALP methodology incorporate both “bottom-up” (security,
governance and development built up from the village and district levels) and “top-down” (increased integration with Afghan government institutions) methodologies.

The success of the VSO/ALP program was highlighted when President Karzai issued a directive to MoI/MoD to conduct VSO and develop ALP in Warduj District, Badakshan Province and Kamdesh District, Nuristan Province. This will be the first instance of the VSO/ALP methodology being 100 percent Afghan-initiated and conducted without coalition forces support at the tactical level. The first of these new Afghan-initiated and run ALP began operating in March 2013.

**Village Stability Operations**

There has been an increase in Community Development Council (CDC) attendance and participation during the reporting period, most likely due to the increase in CDC establishment. CDCs are a GIRoA initiative with minimal oversight from NSOCC-A.

Governance at the local level continued to increase due to village, district, and provincial governance demonstrating increased connectivity. A review of the top four non-security VSO positions revealed a 92 percent fill covering 95 percent of VSO districts evaluated weekly. Most provincial and district governments support the ALP and continue to request more police. The increased security provided by the ALP has improved provincial and district governments’ ability to provide essential services and goods to the populace during this reporting period.

**Afghan Local Police**

The ALP, a village-based security force administered by the MoI, is the principal component of the VSO initiative. The program utilizes U.S. SOF and coalition forces to train Afghans in rural areas to defend their communities against threats from insurgents and militant groups. The ALP is a defensive police force; members do not go on offensive patrols and are not heavily armed. ALP units primarily man checkpoints in the vicinity of their village. When a checkpoint is attacked, the ALP defend themselves and their village until more capable military or police units arrive to conduct offensive operations.

As of March 31, 2013, the MoI has approved 169 districts for ALP development, an increase of 33 from the previous cycle. Of these 169 districts, 102 have been validated by local shuras and the MoI, a 40 percent increase from the previous reporting period.

The total ALP force of 21,958 ALP personnel as of March 2013 represents a 33 percent increase from the previous reporting period, with an overall growth of 5,484 ALP guardians. The ALP is expected to reach 23,000 personnel by end of July 2013 and 30,000 by December 2015.

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22 For a basic description of the VSO program, please see the volume of this report published in December, 2012.

23 Members of the ALP are referred to as “guardians,” rather than officers, soldiers, etc.
DCOPSs are engaged by U.S. SOF during all stages of VSO and ALP development. During initial stages, SOF personnel work with DCOPSs, in conjunction with direction from MOI through the PCOP, to ensure full understanding of the responsibilities associated with ALP. As DCOPSs are already integrated as key leaders within the AUP and the MoI, these individuals understand the logistics and finance issues associated with the ALP, although investment and involvement in ALP is uneven.

NSOCC-A, through CJSOTF-A has initiated the use of RTCs as a means to facilitate training of ALP by the AUP utilizing the established ALP training program. This approach creates a cadre that can train new recruits as ALP guardians encounter attrition within a district. The establishment of ALP RTCs also sets the conditions for GIRoA to establish ALP in authorized districts that otherwise would not be addressed by coalition forces. Currently, ALP growth has exceeded forecasts.
However, the shift from current VSO and ALP development to larger-scale RTC training is still in development, and will need further review. The outcomes of this shift will be assessed in the next 1230 Report.

Embedded coalition forces (mostly SOF teams) oversee every stage of the development of ALP units until the Guardians from across the district meet specific criteria for transition to the control of DCOPs. This approach places the ALP directly under the control of the MoI and GIRoA. Additionally, ALP is directly responsible to their local communities in the form of shuras. ALP can only be trained upon nomination and selection by local shuras. Other former GIRoA-supported local defense forces (i.e., Critical Infrastructure Police and Community Based Security Solutions) that did not meet ALP standards have been disbanded, although selected members of these groups are being incorporated into the ALP following a rigorous re-vetting and retraining process.

Because of relatively low salaries, limited equipment needs and local defensive mission, ALP costs are much lower than those of the ANP and ANA. The annual cost of an ALP Guardian in FY 2011—taking into account his share of infrastructure, equipment/transportation, training and operations, and sustainment costs—was approximately $8,000. This is compared to over $33,000 dollars for an ANP officer and over $48,000 for an ANA soldier. The price of fielding 30,000 ALP Guardians is projected to be $180 million per year, which equates to a cost of $6,000 per ALP member.

Afghan Local Police Challenges

Despite significant successes, the ALP program faces challenges that stem in part from heavy dependence on USG funding and U.S. SOF training, mentorship, oversight and initial equipping. Achieving the authorized force of 30,000 ALP personnel will challenge the capacity of NSOCC-A forces and may require additional support from U.S. SOF and conventional force enablers. ALP must also overcome personal, ethnic and tribal tensions. In most instances, local shuras are effective in ensuring fair tribal balance and ethnic representation in ALP units. U.S. SOF is currently working closely with the MoI, village shuras and the DCOPs to resolve force composition issues.

The ALP program also faces logistical challenges. Logistical resupply is hampered by many variables, including a low Afghan literacy rate, a lack of understanding of logistics, restrictive terrain, weather impacts, systemic corruption and distances. The combination of these factors threatens to undermine the legitimacy of GIRoA in rural areas and erode the durability of the program. ISAF is expanding the ALP’s understanding of the logistics system through coalition-assisted education—specifically; literacy programs provided to ALP members and associated villages. ISAF personnel are also working at the RLCs to mentor their Afghan counterparts. Additionally, the use of RTCs in conjunction with the RLCs may help alleviate many of the issues associated with logistics.

Within the reporting period, there have been two separate cases of human rights violations allegedly committed by ALP personnel that NCOCC-A is aware of. Both involved the
accusation of murder by an ALP member. In each case the individuals were arrested by the DCOP and are currently within the Afghan judicial system.

NSOCC-A has made preventing insider threat attacks within the ALP a major priority. In this reporting period, there were no reports of insider attacks from ALP guardians. However, to mitigate the risk of insider threats, NSOCC-A revalidated all 16,474 ALP personnel previously enrolled; less than one percent was removed due to illicit activities or Counter-Intelligence (CI) concerns. The revalidation process was very similar to the initial screening/validation methodology. It began at the local level by conducting shuras and intimately involving local elders, who vouched for each ALP member, ensuring the member remains in good standing. Each member’s application paperwork was re-assessed by various personnel, including coalition, MoI, NDS and DCOP members. If any ALP member was noted as suspicious, additional CI (both Afghan and coalition) measures were taken. An ALP members determined to be unfit are removed from the program. These processes are applied across the board. The prevention/elimination of insider threats will remain one of COMISAF’s top force protection priorities

The International Committee of the Red Cross began conducting medical and human rights training within the ALP program in November, 2012. NSOCC-A welcomes this partnered approach to ensure that the integrity of the ALP program remains one of the exemplars of security within Afghanistan.

The potential resurgence of militias is a justified cause for concern over the coming years as foreign security forces draw down in Afghanistan. The ALP serves as a preventative measure against warlordism and resurgence of militias due to two main factors: the ALP are under the direct command of the DCOP, providing a direct link from the ALP units and their communities, to GIRoA; and the ALP/VSO program often incorporates development projects, again tying the communities to GIRoA.

The 1.6 percent monthly attrition rate within the ALP is one of the lowest in the ANSF. Despite an increase in insurgent attacks, the ALP has been successful in more than 80 percent of its engagements with the insurgents.

**ALP Training and Advising**

NSOCC-A is responsible for VSO/ALP and exercises the program’s execution through its subordinate command, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). The program currently involves 5,509 CJSOTF-A personnel working in districts throughout Afghanistan.

Currently, 57 U.S. SOF teams and 82 civil affairs operators are supporting VSO. A National Civil Military Operations Center, five seven regional Civil Military Operations Centers and 41 Provincial Augmentation Team Chiefs (PATs) and District Augmentation Team Chiefs (DATs) are operating across Afghanistan. This manning total includes 19 Afghan Hands operating directly at the district/community level, with another 22 Afghan Hands operating at the provincial level and higher.
Non-ALP Local Defense Forces

Until recently, three main Local Defense Forces (LDFs) were supported by ISAF: (1) Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS) – aligned to RC-E; (2) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) – aligned to RC-N; and (3) Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) – aligned to RC-S and RC-SW. On December 25, 2011, President Karzai called for the disestablishment of all non-GIROA-sanctioned LDF. All CIP and CBSS have been demobilized as of November 2012. ISCI had not been demobilized as of March 31, 2013. NSOCC-A is working to assist RC-SW in the demobilization process through the ALP program. Indeed, in some cases, NSOCC-A provides ALP applications to recently demobilized LDF. This transition option is done with the express requirement that those demobilizing meet “all the same criteria” of any other ALP candidate and do not simply “crosswalk” from LDF to ALP. This initiative is addressing ALP development requirements while maintaining sizeable numbers of former LDF employed under a legitimate GIRoA endorsed program.

ALP Way Ahead

In recognition of the success of the ALP program and the need to extend its reach into new areas, ISAF has begun to transition the primary supervisory responsibility for established ALP sites to the ANSF, with U.S. forces moving into tactical overwatch roles in 46 district locations (as of March 31, 2013) and 74 districts by July 2013. The sustainability and success of these districts, however, ultimately depends on GIRoA taking increased ownership and responsibility.

In order for a district to transition to tactical overwatch, it must meet the following criteria:
(1) Leadership: The DCOP and ALP Commanders are appointed and in place, and the DCOP and ALP Commanders are competent and support each other;
(2) Legitimacy: Shura leaders are identified and validated. Seventy percent of the ALP across the district are approved by a shura and are from the local area. Shura leaders are capable of maintaining the ALP program. The local populace views the ALP as legitimate;
(3) Logistics: 70 percent of on-hand ALP in districts are regularly receiving MoI pay and have sufficient weapons, fuel, and ammunition to perform duties. GIRoA district leadership provides adequate sustainment for ALP across the district;
(4) Security: Each ALP village/element has an identified ANSF support force that can reinforce all ALP locations. The DCOP is capable of coordinating security actions across the district in support of ALP;
(5) Manning: 70 percent of the district tashkil is filled and trained. The DCOP has the ability to train ALP; on-hand ALP numbers are sufficient to protect key population centers in the district.

Transition to tactical overwatch has had positive results during the reporting period. Of the 46 districts currently in tactical overwatch, all are maintaining local security, logistics are being managed by the DCOP with the ALP Commander, and pay is distributed either by trusted agent or electronic methods. However, the longer-term success of the tactical overwatch effort has yet to be evaluated.
2.10: ANSF COUNTER-IED CAPABILITIES

The leading cause of injury and fatalities for coalition personnel, ANSF, and Afghan civilians continues to be IEDs, with more than 2,500 civilian casualties caused by IEDs and more than 4,100 ANSF casualties caused by IEDs in 2012. A significant gap remains in fielding the required number of Afghan C-IED units: as of February 2013, ANA had 59 validated Explosive Ordinance Device (EOD) teams out of an authorized 230 and ANP has 14 validated teams out of an authorized 88.

ANSF’s C-IED efforts continue to make steady progress, with fielded units in many ways exceeding the expectations of ISAF partners. However, IEDs are a major factor in the rise in ANSF casualties seen during the reporting period.

All 24 Afghan National Army (ANA) RCCs are currently fielded and operating. While conducting daily route clearance missions, they can effectively find and clear with internal enablers such as validated EOD teams or explosive hazard reduction teams. Currently, 20 RCCs are operating independently with advisors, and three others are effective with partners.

ANSF EOD and RCCs have been locating the majority of the IEDs for several months. These units are not reliant on high-end detection technologies. The ANSF “found and cleared” rates are comparable to, and often slightly better than, coalition rates. Not unexpectedly, Afghan personnel often use tips from the local population and local familiarity more effectively than coalition forces.

Afghan C-IED units have in some cases demonstrated an impressive level of capability considering their lack of sophisticated equipment. However, Afghan units, partially as a result of their lack of equipment, also face a higher level of risk in disposing of IEDs, and are not as effective as their ISAF counterparts.

In urban areas, ANP often perform IED defeat (IEDD) operations to the same level of proficiency as their ISAF counterparts; Afghan personnel understand and employ basic IEDD logic, skills, and low-technology tools and equipment to great effect.

Only one national crime lab is operational; it is located in Kabul. With assistance from ISAF, the lab will receive an interim upgrade prior to being relocated to a new facility in mid-2014. The second national lab in Herat is in the contracting phase and progressing towards Full Operating Capability (FOC) by mid-2014.

Significant challenges still exist for generating fully manned, trained, and equipped C-IED teams. ANSF face a range of challenges, specifically in the areas of training through-put and EOD retention. The GI RoA logistics chain also regularly fails to provide proper electronic counter-measures (ECM), and coalition-funded equipment often remains in local depots or unit supply rooms, forcing ANP (and ANA) C-IED teams to assume exceptional risk to remove or mitigate IEDs. ANSF reporting of report IED events is very inconsistent.
Continued ISAF support and direct mentorship is necessary to develop the nascent ANSF C-IED biometrics and forensics capability in order to counter the significant IED threat to GIRoA and its citizens. GIRoA struggles to maintain ANSF EOD/IEDD instructors. With the assistance of ISAF, GIRoA is working to develop complete biometrics and forensics exploitation capabilities. GIRoA continues executing and implementing its national C-IED strategy. The final draft of the GIRoA biometrics and forensics Presidential Decree is complete and in final staffing for the president’s signature.

ISAF supports GIRoA by providing training and resources to enable ANSF to lead and conduct C-IED operations independently. At the strategic level, ISAF focuses on institutional responsibilities and cross-functional efforts by security ministries and the rest of GIRoA. ISAF EOD teams, RCCs, and explosive hazard reduction teams assist ANSF forces in developing the operational C-IED capabilities necessary to operate safely and effectively in districts with high IED activity.

ISAF's goal is to provide ANSF with C-IED capabilities (resources and trained personnel) to allow for freedom of movement throughout the country. GIRoA and ISAF are expanding exploitation capabilities through the augmentation of current criminal techniques. The ANSF will lead this C-IED effort through directorates in the MoI and MoD with support from the NDS. ANSF leadership has consistently identified C-IED capabilities as an area in which further development is needed in order to meet the requirements of the post-2014 environment.

### 2.11: ANSF Partnering, Training, and Mentoring

**ANA and ANP Partnering**

IJC tracks all operations across the country, from ISAF independent operations to ANSF independent operations, and all forms of combined operations between ISAF and ANSF. Throughout 2013, as ISAF forces continue to transition the lead for security operations to Afghan forces, ANSF reporting of operations will increase in importance. Although IJC will continue to receive reporting of operations on a parallel track with ANSF reporting through 2013, the intent is to enable the ANSF to become the primary source of operational reporting for ANSF operations across Afghanistan. These reports are the basis for many of the security metrics on Afghanistan.

The combination of force reductions and implementation of the Security Force Assistance (SFA) concept has shifted the majority of ISAF’s operations away from a partnering relationship and towards an advisory role. Many ANSF units now operate autonomously.

To better portray capability, the previously-reported Autonomous category has been split between “Uncovered-Capable” and “Uncovered-Resources.” Uncovered-Capable units were last rated as “Effective with Advisors” or better, and are able to operate without ISAF partnering. Uncovered-Resources units are not partnered or advised due to limited operational reach, an SFA shortfall, or an inability to provide MEDEVAC or force protection for coalition forces in the area in which the ANSF unit is operating. “Not Required” units are so designated because they are too small in size, are in areas too remote, or are outside of ANSF/ISAF focus areas.
GDPSU-led operations continued to increase. During the reporting period, the GDPSU led 299 operations, of which 34 were conducted unilaterally, with NSOCC-A leading only 57. ANASOF also increased the percentage of operations it led during the reporting period.

**ANSF Assessment**

In light of the impending decrease in ISAF force levels, ISAF has amended the methodology by which it assesses ANSF operational effectiveness. ANSF unit’s CUAT ratings are assessed in bi-monthly cycles. However, due to force reductions, ISAF can no longer assess all required units every cycle. ANSF units now retain their most-recent CUAT rating, whether or not it was re-assessed in the most recent cycle.

CUAT ratings increased significantly during the reporting period. However, as ISAF force reductions continue, relying on Rating Definition Level (RDL) trends to show progress is
increasingly unsuitable. This information becomes obscured in the aggregate RDL tables due to the growing number of autonomous units that are not assessed each cycle. The CUAT system is one of many measures of ANSF effectiveness and should not be used as a measure of ANSF capability on its own. Narrative explanations of ANSF problems and challenges, operations data, violence metrics, and the many other details in this report provide a much more comprehensive view of ANSF capabilities than CUAT ratings. As with the EIA metric, CUAT ratings should not be used as a single-source “scoreboard” for ANSF progress. As ISAF forces are reduced, fewer units will be assessed each CUAT cycle, making rollups of CUAT ratings inappropriate for national assessments.

Overall, between CUAT Cycle 15 (October 2012, the data used for the previous 1230 report) and Cycle 17 (the most recent CUAT report), the total number of ANA units that have improved their RDL is 54. Also improved between the two cycles were 59 ANP units. As of Cycle 17, 153 ANA units, 23 OCCs, and 129 ANP units were rated as “Effective with Advisors” or better. Between the two reports, no OCCs, seven ANP units, and nine ANA units regressed to lesser RDLs.

**Figure 29: ANA RDLs (Cycle 17 Last Reported RDL)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANA RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)</th>
<th>HQs</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Total Required Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EA C</td>
<td>Corps/ Div</td>
<td>BDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent w/ Advisors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective w/ Advisors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective w/ Partners</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing w/ Partners</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Assessed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 30: ANP RDLs (Cycle 17 Last Reported RDL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)</th>
<th>All CUAT Required Units</th>
<th>Total Required Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>ABP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent w/ Advisors</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective w/ Advisors</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective w/ Partners</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing w/ Partners</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Assessed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main factors that caused ANP unit RDLs to improve were: integration of the ALP into operations, improved cooperation and coordination amongst the ANP pillars and with the ANA, improved ability to plan operations and use intelligence to drive police operations, and expanding the police’s Area of Responsibility in order to fill gaps left behind from the drawdown of coalition forces. Improving the relationships with local governance and tribal leaders, along with improving ties with the local populace, have been keys to success for the ANP. ANA unit RDLs improved mainly due to their increasing ability to carry out autonomous operations.
Both forces continued to struggle with NCO shortages, logistics, and various enabling capabilities, though these issues were anticipated and are being actively addressed, as discussed earlier in this report.

**ANSF Self-assessment**

ISAF is currently working jointly with the MoI and MoD to improve existing ANSF assessment tools. As ISAF personnel in theater decrease and more ANSF units are fielded, the proportion of ANSF units that are partnered or advised will decline. As ISAF starts receiving fewer and fewer CUAT reports, it will require an additional system to inform leadership and the international community on progress within the ANSF. The ANSF itself will need an Afghan-run self-assessment system after 2014.

This new system is intended to augment and improve Afghan reporting systems currently used by the ANA and ANP. The existing systems are the Readiness Reporting System (RRS), used by the ANA, and the Force Readiness Report (FRR), used by the ANP. Neither system, as currently designed, provides a sufficiently extensive assessment of the operational capabilities of the ANSF. This is where improvement efforts are now focused. ISAF is also working to augment the existing ANSF capability to validate these assessments - a crucial part of any credible assessment system. These enhancements to the existing ANSF reporting systems require Afghan assistance to be fully developed, and they also require the support of senior MoD and MoI leadership to ensure successful implementation.

During the reporting period, minimal progress was made in reforming the ANSF self-assessment system. However, a General Officer Steering Committee, and ANA and ANP Working Groups comprising Afghan and coalition leaders were established.

**2.12: 1221 BENCHMARK REQUIREMENT**

DoD has evaluated options for developing the ANSF more efficiently. In 2011, DoD conducted a comprehensive analysis to examine options for the development of the ANSF, and identified the minimum level of capabilities needed to establish and preserve security in Afghanistan. Options for ANSF development should be consistent with the Lisbon NATO Summit timeline, sufficient to support the core national security goals of the United States, and able to yield an ANSF structure that is sustainable within the limits of Afghan human capital, economic capacity, and the will of the international community to provide long term assistance.

The current planned force of 352,000 combined ANSF personnel has been deemed necessary to complete the transition to full security responsibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014, and to secure the country during the transition of power following the Afghan presidential election in 2014, while mitigating the effects of the U.S. and coalition partner drawdowns. In April 2012, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior committed to conducting six-month reviews of the ANSF force structure and other needs. As Afghanistan continues to become more secure and stable through 2015-2016, GIRoA, in coordination with NATO and other partners will begin to refocus the ANSF toward enduring security roles, and it

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24 This section is submitted consistent with section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
will consider how to reshape the ANSF into a more sustainable force. Figure 31 highlights the established institutional benchmarks related to ANSF development.

**Figure 31: ANSF Development – Institutional Metrics and Benchmarks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Sep-11</th>
<th>Feb-12</th>
<th>Mar-12</th>
<th>Aug-12</th>
<th>Sep-12</th>
<th>Jan-13</th>
<th>Mar-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruit</td>
<td>ANSF End Strength</td>
<td>305,000</td>
<td>330,014</td>
<td>332,750</td>
<td>337,187</td>
<td>349,000</td>
<td>333,368</td>
<td>352,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA trained in specialty</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP patrolmen trained</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train</td>
<td>AAF Courses</td>
<td>C-27 IQT started</td>
<td>Basic RW &amp; FW course</td>
<td>Basic RW &amp; FW course</td>
<td>Mi-17 IQT started on 15 Sep 12</td>
<td>Mi-17 IQT</td>
<td>C-208 IQT started on 8 Feb</td>
<td>Mi-17 IQT 6 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New ANA unit manning</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CS Kandaks fielded</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MP Coys fielded</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer Kandaks fielded</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RCCs fielded</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielding</td>
<td>Signal Kandaks fielded</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MI Coys fielded</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP 4 Coys fielded</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equip the Force</td>
<td>ANA Fielded unit equipment fill</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP Unit &amp; District equipment fill</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop the Force</td>
<td>ANSF Level 1 Literacy</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA Instructors assigned &amp; trained (T2I)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP Instructors assigned &amp; trained (T2I)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Development</td>
<td>New ANA officers with Branch School training</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Junior NCOs trained</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AAF officer &amp; NCO positions filled</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP NCO Positions Filled</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MoD/GS ministerial departments at CM-1B</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition the Force</td>
<td>MoI ministerial departments at CM-1B</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA training institutions transitioned</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP training institutions transitioned</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA Regional Logistics Support Commands at FOC</td>
<td>6 IOC</td>
<td>6 IOC</td>
<td>6 IOC</td>
<td>6 IOC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
1. Previously reported months (Green columns).
2. NSS established goals (Grey columns).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>How it was calculated</th>
<th>Status of Metric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruit</td>
<td>ANSF End Strength</td>
<td>ANA end strength + AAF end strength + ANP end strength</td>
<td>Behind NSS established goal. See note 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train</td>
<td>ANA trained in specialty</td>
<td>(“Branch Qualified” grads - estimated attrition) / BQ requirements</td>
<td>Behind NSS established goal. See note 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP patrolmen trained</td>
<td>Current # of trained patrolmen reported by MoI / total patrolman</td>
<td>Behind NSS established goal. See note 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AAF Courses</td>
<td>Basic Rotary Wing and Fixed Wing scheduled courses</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielding</td>
<td>New ANA unit manning</td>
<td># of assigned soldiers less over-tashkil / authorized (for new ANA units)</td>
<td>Behind NSS established goal. See note 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CS Kandaks fielded</td>
<td># of CS units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>Achieved, recommend deletion of metric.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MP Coys fielded</td>
<td># of MP units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>Achieved, recommend deletion of metric.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer Kandaks fielded</td>
<td># of engineer units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RCCs fielded</td>
<td># of RCCs already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>Achieved, recommend deletion of metric.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Signal Kandaks fielded</td>
<td># of signal units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MI Coys fielded</td>
<td># of MI units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>Behind NSS established goal. See note 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MSF Kandaks fielded</td>
<td># of MSF units already fielded / total # of units to be fielded</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equip the Force</td>
<td>ANA Fielded unit equipment fill</td>
<td>Average of Corps Shoot/Move/Comm fill rates (weighted by # of BDEs)</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP Unit &amp; District equipment fill</td>
<td>Average of overall ANP Shoot/Move/Comm fill rates</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop the Force</td>
<td>ANSF Level 1 Literacy</td>
<td>(Level 1 graduates - estimated attrition + estimated numbers of personnel literate before joining ANSF) / end strength</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA Instructors assigned &amp; trained (T2I)</td>
<td>[Assigned instructors (Satha 2 thru 4)] / (tashkil – Satha 5)</td>
<td>Behind NSS established goal. See note 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP Instructors assigned &amp; trained (T2I)</td>
<td>[Assigned instructors (Satha 2 thru 4)] / (tashkil – Satha 5)</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Development</td>
<td>New ANA officers with Branch School training</td>
<td>All new ANA officers are scheduled to attend branch school training before being sent to their first unit</td>
<td>Achieved, recommend deletion of metric.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Junior NCOs trained (E5s &amp; E6s)</td>
<td>(1U + TLC grads - estimated attrition) / total junior NCOs</td>
<td>Behind NSS established goal. See note 7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AAF officer &amp; NCO positions filled</td>
<td>Current assigned AAF officers and NCOs / tashkil authorized</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition the Force</td>
<td>ANP NCO Positions Filled</td>
<td>Current assigned NCOs / tashkil authorized</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MoD and GS ministeral departments at CM-1B</td>
<td>Current number of departments at 1B / total number of departments</td>
<td>Behind NSS established goal. See note 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mol ministerial departments at CM-1B</td>
<td>Current number of departments at 1B</td>
<td>Behind NSS established goal. See note 9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA training institutions transitioned</td>
<td>Current number of institutions at 1B / total number of institutions</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANP training institutions transitioned</td>
<td>Current number of institutions at 1B / total number of institutions</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA Regional Logistics Support Commands at FOC</td>
<td>For IOC – # of the six commands that have some functions operating For FOC – # of the six commands that have reached CM – 1B</td>
<td>On track.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.13: **Budget**

**Afghanistan Security Forces Fund**

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) provides the resources required to train, sustain, and equip a 352,000-person ANSF and 30,000-person ALP. For FY 2012, Congress appropriated $11.2B for ASFF. An additional $2B of FY 2012 funding was subsequently identified for transfer to other DoD priorities through omnibus reprogramming actions, leaving $9.2B as the FY 2012 budget authority. For FY 2013 Congress appropriated $5.1B. The FY 2013 request of $5.75B reflected a shift as emphasis moves from building, equipping, and training to professionalizing and sustaining the force. Exceptions included some equipping and infrastructure requirements for the Afghan Air Forces and Special Operations Forces as they continue to build their capabilities.

**International Community Funding for the ANSF**

The international community also provides funding for ANSF through the NATO ANA Trust Fund and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). NTM-A, acting through DoD comptroller, executes the NATO ANA Trust Fund, which is for support and sustainment of the ANA. Twenty-three nations have contributed more than $700M over the life of the ANA Trust Fund fund.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) administers LOTFA to fund police salaries and build the capacity of the MoI. Between 2002 and 2012, the United States donated roughly $1.0B to LOTFA, while the rest of the international community has committed more than $1.75B.

A team from the UN Office of Audit and Investigation (OAI) conducted an investigation into the allegations of misuse of funds and corruption at LOTFA. The allegations were contained within the small administrative budget managed by LOTFA. On February 1, 2013, the OAI issued their report and the allegations were substantiated. The investigation found procurement irregularities and travel fraud estimated at more than $1M, limited to a few individuals that were placed on administrative leave or dismissed. The UNDP management response identifies additional control measures underway to mitigate the risk and reassure donors.

Given the recommendations in the management review and the need for additional discussions with all stakeholders, and in particular the need to be coordinated with the strategic initiatives being led by the IPCB, UNDP recommends that the current phase of LOTFA be extended for an additional nine months beyond its current expiration date of March 31, 2013.

NTM-A will continue to engage LOTFA to provide reasonable assurance that direct contributions are accounted for in a transparent and auditable manner.
At the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012, the United States, GIRoA, and international donors agreed on an estimated annual budget of $4.1 billion to sustain the ANSF after 2014. International donors have committed more than $1 billion annually toward this amount and the Afghans will provide at least $500 million annually.

**Direct Contributions to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior**

In FY1392, NTM-A/CSTC-A allocated $1.26B direct contributions to the MoD in order to expand the ministry’s ability to procure items in their operations and acquisition accounts. Increases from FY1391 include transition of many service contracts, vehicle fuel, and domestic fuel requirements.

In FY1392, NTM-A/CSTC-A allocated $442.4M in direct contributions to the GIRoA MoI in order to expand the ministry’s ability to procure items in their operations and acquisitions accounts. Increases from FY1391 include transition of some service contracts, vehicle fuel, and increases in salaries and support to the Afghan Local Police (ALP). Afghan National Police salaries/food are executed through LOTFA. The contribution to LOTFA for FY1392 is $283M for salaries and an $11M administrative fee, for a total of $294M.

**International Donations**

NTM-A solicits and tracks infrastructure, equipment, and weapon donations, as well as overall international monetary donations, including bilateral donations for the ANSF.

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25 According to Afghanistan’s solar calendar, the current year is 1392.
Figure 32: NATO ANA TRUST FUND DONATIONS October 1st 2012 to March 5th 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DONOR COUNTRY</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DONATION €</th>
<th>DONATION US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>19-Nov-12</td>
<td>€ 33,063.64</td>
<td>$ 45,151.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5-Dec-12</td>
<td>€ 2,000,000</td>
<td>$ 2,731,200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9-Jan-13</td>
<td>€ 150,000</td>
<td>$ 204,840.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>31-Dec-12</td>
<td>€ 110,000</td>
<td>$ 150,216.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>21-Dec-12</td>
<td>€ 1,500,000</td>
<td>$ 2,048,400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>11-Oct-12</td>
<td>€ 40,000,000</td>
<td>$ 54,624,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>13-Feb-12</td>
<td>€ 761.62</td>
<td>$ 1,040.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12-Dec-12</td>
<td>€ 12,000,000</td>
<td>$ 16,387,200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>19-Dec-12</td>
<td>Donation in US$</td>
<td>$ 989,941.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27-Dec-12</td>
<td>Donation in US$</td>
<td>$ 199,941.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23-Jan-13</td>
<td>Donation in US$</td>
<td>$ 10,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>20-Dec-12</td>
<td>€ 1,205,274</td>
<td>$ 1,645,922.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-Jan-12</td>
<td>€ 625,036.17</td>
<td>$ 853,549.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>27-Nov-12</td>
<td>Donation in US$</td>
<td>$ 50,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.14: INFRASTRUCTURE

ISAF is nearing completion of its infrastructure building program for the ANSF. The ANSF has completed 62 percent (709 of 1134) of its major infrastructure projects. NTM-A will deliver the final 429 projects by December 2014. This will result in a program end state of more than 3,900 separate structures, valued at $9.41B, built for the MoD and MoI.
NTM-A has locked in the majority of the ANSF Permanent Infrastructure Program and has established a clear picture of the expected program completion timelines. The heaviest years of “building” in the ANSF construction program’s history will occur in 2013 and 2014. Simultaneously, NTM-A continues to review and ensure current ANSF infrastructure projects are still valid requirements. If they are not, NTM-A de-scopes or cancels the project as necessary. This has resulted in almost 100 projects being cancelled or de-scoped in size, reducing the total cost of the ANSF program from the originally planned $11.38B to $9.41B.

The ANSF program is locked in with the exception of four major projects: 4th Special Mission Wing at Camp John Pratt; 4th brigade, 201 corps at Jalalabad; 4th brigade, 203 corps at FOB Shank; and, potentially, a Regional Military Hospital in RC-SW. NTM-A engineering is working with the different stakeholders to finalize these remaining requirements. Additionally, of the 44 project contracts that need to be awarded for construction – most will occur in the next 90 days, i.e., in time for the majority of the next Afghan construction season. This timeline will essentially afford two construction seasons, 2013 and 2014, to complete the builds. Construction by foreign national and Afghan companies will occur in districts that have no coalition presence but have successfully transitioned to ANSF responsibility. The resulting risk to NTM-A’s infrastructure program is quality control, delays, and reliance on construction companies’ mandatory security plans, which may eventually include the services of the APPF. NTM-A will employ risk mitigation measures through the use of Afghan National Quality Assurance
Contracts to provide local national quality assurance/quality control, increased construction company security planning, provincial ANSF coordination, and risk management companies augmenting APPF support.

Significant challenges exist regarding the successful execution of the remainder of the ANSF infrastructure program. Many facilities remain under construction due to contractor issues and other delays. However, NTM-A remains confident that by combining proven project management disciplines with active risk mitigation measures that it can successfully complete the remainder of the infrastructure projects over the next 21 months.

Both ISAF and the Afghan MoD have established groups to assess the closure and transfer of ISAF bases. This process allows the Afghans to understand the implications of the transfer, closure, or dismantling of infrastructure, and associated sustainment costs. The purpose is to outline a process that transitions infrastructure (where applicable) from ISAF to the Afghans. One challenge has been reluctance on the Afghans’ part to turn down any bases, regardless of their ability to sustain them in the long term.

**ANA Infrastructure**

The ANA has completed 58 percent (213 of 369) of its major infrastructure projects, as of the end of the reporting period. Significant construction progress has been made across all ANA forces on the infrastructure building plan. At the end of the reporting period, NTM-A had 141 projects, valued at $3.16B, under construction for the ANA. Another 16 projects for $2.1M are in the acquisition phase. As of the end of the reporting period, a total of 208 projects, valued at $2.61B, have been completed. NTM-A is actively executing the remaining projects in the program, with a schedule to award all remaining infrastructure projects prior to June 2013 in order to complete all construction by December 2014.

ANA Corps facilities are more than adequate for the garrison requirement and constitute a lasting capability for refitting, quartering, and training ANA soldiers. Standard designs ensure consistency in the size and layout of these sites, but some locations present a challenge due to their remoteness or the security challenges inherent to the area. Specifically, the reduction of coalition forces presents an additional challenge for construction projects in all regions as this may limit the ability of NTM-A construction execution agents to get on site to perform necessary construction management duties such as quality assurance, and to assess progress.

Facilities for aviation and SOF units face particular challenges in meeting the timeline for completion, and logistics infrastructure has been forced to adapt to meet emerging requirements. Air refueling sites required numerous attempts to obtain adequate locations based on the range limitations of Afghan aircraft. The ANASOF Special Mission Wing Squadrons still face challenges in Kabul and RC-N in obtaining adequate space to construct their facilities on current operational runways. The plan for logistics facilities, developed in accordance with realistic projections for the long-term need and additional fuel capability, has recently been incorporated into the appropriate projects. Facilities for the Mobile Strike Force have been modified to include the required maintenance facilities. The final locations for these projects were defined
late in the planning process and, as a result, their completion dates are in a high risk category of not meeting the December 2014 NTM-A and ANSF construction deadline.

IJC’s Unified Implementation Plan provides the overall mission control for retrograde of forces in Afghanistan, which includes the transfer or closure of fixed infrastructure. Regional commands nominate bases for consideration to close or transfer. Decisions are driven primarily by operational factors, as well the timing and location of future builds. Sustainability, based on manning and O&M funding, is also a significant factor driving these decisions.

GIRoA’s position on ISAF infrastructure is to transfer all current structures and not close any. Although this process is not without tension, the GIRoA-led Base Closure Commission currently allows the NDS, MoI, MoD, MoF, and MAIL to assume control over sites if it meets the scope of their function and is also sustainable. ISAF is sensitive to destruction of infrastructure that could potentially have value to Afghans. IJC is exploring options to dispose of such material in Afghanistan, including to local authorities and residents.

**ANP Infrastructure**

The ANP has completed 65 percent (496 of 765) of its major infrastructure projects. Significant construction progress has been made across all ANP forces on the strategic fielding plan. The program requirements have been locked and emphasis has shifted from acquisition to execution. At the end of the reporting period, NTM-A had 246 projects, valued at $1.3B, under construction for the ANP. Another 22 projects for $1.6M are in the acquisition phase. As of the end of the reporting period, a total of 495 projects valued at $1.57B have been completed to date. NTM-A is actively executing the last remaining projects in the program, with a schedule to award all remaining infrastructure projects by June 2013 in order to compete all construction by December 2014.

The ANP program is accelerating in terms of bringing projects to completion. As the program moves out of the winter months, the pace of construction is improving and numerous projects are moving into their final phases. The number of projects coming to completion on a monthly basis is forecasted for improvement, barring any changes in the security posture. Of the nearly 280 projects left for execution in the program, approximately five percent have significant issues resulting in delays.

Suitable land (clear title to MoI, good proximity, buildable area, access to water, etc.) remains the most significant challenge to the ANP construction program. Many projects have been delayed or cancelled due to land disputes or the inability to find suitable land and water.

**Facilities Maintenance**

Facility maintenance is a tremendous challenge for the ANSF. As more than 3,900 projects come to completion, the ANSF will need to fully develop its own organic capability to maintain facilities. Limiting factors include the inability to hire and retain facility engineers; a lack of Garrison Support Units; ongoing construction of new facilities; and the termination of CF-
managed contracts. These limiting factors often result in facilities that are either too sophisticated for the ANA to maintain or insufficient facilities that need to be replaced.

The NTM-A campaign plan’s focus on building facility stewardship by 2014 is showing continuous progress towards this goal and advisors are cautiously optimistic for success. The general approach to building facility stewardship capacity is along four lines of effort: (1) hiring facility engineers; (2) training facility engineers; (3) provision of tools and equipment; and (4) delegating appropriate authorities and developing routine processes so maintenance is consistently executed to high standards.

The MoD Construction and Property Management Department (CPMD) and MoI Facilities Department are responsible for facility management within their respective ministries. These departments plan and prioritize programs; manage budgets; are executive agents for real estate; and design, construct, and maintain ANSF facilities throughout Afghanistan.

CPMD is currently authorized a total of 3,129 facility engineers positioned in the ANA Corps/Brigade Garrisons with the responsibility for the maintenance of ANSF facilities. The current overall fill ratio is 43 percent with 100 pending hires. This low fill rate negatively affects facility maintenance across the force.

The MoI is authorized 1022 total facility engineers, with 257 assigned to the Facilities Department and the remaining are assigned through the AUP in the zones and provinces. The current overall fill ratio is 42 percent.

As a bridging strategy, NTM-A utilizes the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers National O&M Contract to provide facility maintenance and training for a period up to six months following construction completion. This strategy allows time to build the capabilities of the assigned ANSF facility engineers with the MoD. The MoI is using a combination of organic support and contracting to maintain their facilities. Ultimately, the ANSF will maintain the facilities they value to their standards.

2.15: **WOMEN IN THE ANSF**

Improving the recruitment of women into the ANSF, their status and treatment within the ANSF, and the ANSF’s treatment of female civilians across the country is a priority for the United States. However, recruitment of women into the ANSF will remain a serious challenge, given Afghanistan’s history, culture, and society. The U.S. has many efforts to increase the number of women in the ANSF. The main effort of the United States in this area is through NTM-A’s ANSF training and advising programs. ISAF also has a number of Gender Advisors, who educate personnel, ensure that women’s rights and security are factored into decisions throughout ISAF, and coordinate the efforts of their subcommands and external international organizations, NGOs, and governmental organizations. However, the implementation of a gender policy within Afghanistan’s armed forces and police is a complex and long-term project.

26 This section, along with the Women in Afghanistan Section, is submitted consistent with section 1223 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
Despite the complex cultural and logistical challenges associated with better integrating women into the ANSF, there has been incremental progress regarding the role of women within the police and the armed forces. Some of the success witnessed in the past decade surpasses that of other countries in the region. As a result of this effort, gender training is now in place across much of the ANSF, harassment and violence against women are being addressed, educational projects for women are being established, and political will is present in certain areas. Gender integration policies exist in both the MoD and MoI, but need improved implementation. Support from ANSF leadership is essential to improving the recruitment and treatment of women in the ANSF.

Many challenges remain, however. The recruitment and retention of women remain difficult; the primary obstacle is likely family-related issues. Other impediments to sustainment have been identified, such as a lack of challenging assignments upon graduation, accounts of sexual harassment and violence, and difficulties concerning separate housing and bathing facilities.

Recruitment of women for the ANA, AAF, and ANP continues to fall short of the MoD and MoI female recruitment goals of 10 percent of the ANA and AAF, and 5,000 for the ANP. NTM-A consistently promotes female recruitment and gender integration in its interactions with the ANSF. Despite this, gender integration has been slow to take effect. The MoI is continuing Gender and Human Rights training and Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) programs. The MoI Ten-Year Vision incorporates Gender and Human Rights to gain the trust of local communities.

Cultural perceptions of Afghan females serving in the ANSF can still be problematic. Women can play a key role in establishing trust between community and police. The Police Pillars are using known “celebrity” voices in Afghan culture to promote the image of the ANP as being an employer of choice for Afghan women and their families. Although great strides have not been evident in the recruitment of women into the ANP, the deputy Minister for Administration has announced that he will host a Gender Recruiting Strategy Conference in spring 2013 to garner support from the religious leaders who are highly influential in the community.

To help increase the recruitment of women into the ANA, and to help safeguard women’s rights, the MoD, with assistance from NTM-A, has begun to stand up the Directorate of Human Rights and Gender Integration (HR&GI). The MoD had assigned a major general as the director and an AAF colonel to the deputy position; both are actively working to increase the Directorate’s tashkil from five to 36 positions. In a positive sign, the number of women taking the test for acceptance into the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) increased from 47 to 97. Of particular note, MoI conducted a recruiting campaign for SOF and received 34 female applicants, of whom seven were accepted.

The recruitment and retention of women in the ANA and ANP is an element of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Commission’s Democracy and Shared Values Working Group. Progress on this issue was addressed by the U.S. State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Michael Posner and Deputy Assistant Secretary Jane Zimmerman in working group meetings in Kabul in February and May of 2013. The Embassy regularly engages the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOI, and MOD on this issue.
As women continue to graduate from various ANA and ANP training courses, NTM-A advisors are working with their counterparts to find the appropriate places to assign women to achieve the most value for the ANSF. NTM-A Gender Integration Officers conduct site visits of ANA and ANP recruiting and training centers, analyzing assignments for ANSF women. Assignments that women are considered for include ANA Corps or ANP Zone Headquarters and recruiting commands or training facilities. Additionally, assignment considerations include static fixed-location with regular duty hours (i.e., not night shift). Such considerations ensure safety and security for women while providing the opportunity to return home every evening, as cultural norms currently dictate.

In addition, with robust assistance from NTM-A advisors, the MoD is working to establish courses on women’s history, gender-based customs, and gender-based harassment. The objective of this effort is to have the Afghans develop these courses based on historical values, Qur’an passages, and cultural context.

Although these are significant achievements, several issues will hinder the further integration of women into the ANA if not addressed in the near term. First, the director of the HR&GI is scheduled to retire in spring 2013 with no replacement yet identified, and no office or support staff has been assigned to the directorate. A recruiting plan must also be developed for female officers, NCOs, and soldiers. Furthermore, the decision to increase the tashkil for the HR&GI is still pending. ISAF and NTM-A personnel are working with ANSF leaders to address all of these issues.

ISAF, MoD, and MoI have a large number of other personnel and programs aimed at protecting women’s rights and promoting women in the ANSF. The MoI Human Rights, Gender and Child Rights (HRGCR) Office advanced from CM Level Four to Level Three in December 2012. Additionally, the MoI signed an order to prevent sexual harassment while continuing human rights and gender training. A mobile training team (MTT) was sent to Herat to train policewomen, and the ABP has conducted similar training. In February 2013, Afghan Training and General Command approved a new female security awareness course curriculum. Furthermore, during the reporting period the MoI’s Training General Command created gender awareness POIs for all patrolmen, NCO, and officer basic courses. Finally, the MoI HRGCR provided training on UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (on Women Peace and Security, enacted in 2000)), in 2012, beginning with the ANP leadership and staff, and expanding to the provinces and zones. Several other organizations, including UNAMA and European Police (EUPOL), also provide gender-related training.

NTM-A gender-integration officers coordinated with IJC-Female Engagement Teams (FET) to build the gender-integration network by sharing information throughout different organizations and levels. The members of this network have the lead responsibility for gender issues in their organizations. This network has over fifty personnel working in all RCs, including three in RC-N, two in CFSOCC-A, 17 in RC-E, 11 in RC-S, three in RC-SW, fourteen in RC-W, four in RC-N, and one in RC-C. NTM-A and IJC collaboration includes highlighting lessons learned, and

27 The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution (S/RES/1325) on women and peace and security on October 31st 2000. The resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.
exchanging current projects and upcoming events to support, such as graduations, training, or International Women’s Day.

On January 15, 2013, the MoD signed the new AAF recruiting and accessions policy, which established independent AAF recruiting teams at the ANA Recruiting Center (ANAREC) with clear eligibility requirements. The policy further stipulates targeted female AAF recruiting campaigns. The AAF A1 (personnel), A7 (training/education), and Religion and Cultural Affairs (RCA) directorates all support the integration of women into AAF through increased recruiting.

The RCA, lead office for women's affairs in the AAF, recently stated that more women are needed in the AAF. Furthermore, the RCA is responsible for conducting gender awareness training. In 2012, RCA conducted gender-sensitivity training for approximately 150 ANA personnel using the Afghan Women’s Network as instructors. To the greatest extent possible, women are assigned separate living quarters and facilities in the AAF.

AAF pride in the accomplishments of its female members is evidenced by regular AAF newsletter stories and pictures. Currently, its numbers are small, but the AAF has female RCA officers, maintenance officers, pilots, etc.

The RCA Family Support Office and the deputy HR&GI minister have visited all the units in Kabul, to determine how females are being treated. Findings are reported to the First Deputy Minister (FDM). In the case of the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), the FDM called the Commander of ANATEC and directed him to personally get involved with allegations of mistreatment of recruits by one female instructor.

Tashkil positions for females in the ANP have increased to 3,800. However, women only fill approximately 1,500 of these positions; men fill the rest. Furthermore, the new Afghan SY 1392 tashkil should be released on March 21, 2013, and, by decree, should include 1,000 additional female-only positions. Meetings are underway to determine whether to remove the males from the female-only positions or focus on the new tashkil and provide 1,000 female-only positions.

Without immediate buy-in from the MoI senior leadership to fully recruit women, the ANP will be unable to realize its goal of 5,000 ANP women by 2014. The ANP’s challenge is compounded further since the Chiefs of Police Headquarters in the zones are resistant to hiring females due to gender-centered security issues. As of the end of the reporting period, a total of 1521 women were serving in the ANP, with 228 officers, 619 NCOs, and 674 patrolmen (not including civilians, CPD or contractors).

The development of a sustainable, organic female engagement capability is ongoing, including employing Afghan female security forces in support of Afghan police, military, and special operations units. Notably in 2012, the Ktah Khas completed its second iteration of the Family Support Platoon (FSP) Basic Course and graduated two additional Afghan females to join the ranks of the FSP in support of their Strike Forces. This addition brings the FSP manning to 11 out of 26 slots. A concept based on the successes of the U.S. Cultural Support Team program, FSPs were developed to accompany Ktah Khas Afghan Strike Forces on missions and, working in conjunction with their CST counterparts, safeguard and interact with women and children encountered during the conduct of special operations.
In December 2012, the ANA Sergeants Major Academy graduated one female ANA and one female ANP. A new course began in January 2013 with one female ANP sergeant major in attendance. This is the first training combining both ANA and ANP with males and females. There are four seats available for females; however, the challenge is finding qualified females with the requisite education and experience. The academy’s objective is to maintain enrollment of at least one female in every course. As of early May 2013, 89 ANP women graduated, and in 2012, 307 women graduated from police training.

Female ANSF recruits have previously faced problems getting uniforms and boots in the smaller sizes, but this issue has subsequently been resolved without additional funding. NTM-A advisors worked with the ANA and ANP Chief of Logistics to advise on planning, projecting, and ordering smaller sizes for the female recruits through the same system male uniforms are ordered.

The ANA Training Command (ANAREC) intended to recruit 70 women to start the first ever One Uniform Course (F1U) on November 13, 2012; however, the command recruited only 16 women. ANAREC put all the women together and ran a simultaneous class for both Basic Recruit Training and F1U. Eleven women graduated from the Female Officer Candidate School (FOCS) in October 2012. At the request of the Commanding Officer, ANAREC, the GSG1 assigned nine volunteers, against the request for 15, to assist in recruiting women for the December 15, 2012 FOCS Class. Unfortunately, MoD and ANAREC were unsuccessful in starting the December 15 FOCS Class as planned. Seventeen women were recruited for the December 2012 class but were not tested, reportedly due to direct Iranian heritage. Two F1U NCO courses were developed; however, many women do not have a 12th grade education and do not qualify for officer courses.

The Deputy Chief of Human Rights and Gender Integration, members from the Family Support Office at MoD’s RCA Directorate, and staff from the National Defense University teamed together to recruit 97 women to take the Kankor (National Standard Test for University Entrance) in October 2012. The number of women taking the test is almost twice the total of last year’s number. It is still unknown how many women passed the test, but there are currently 30 slots for women in the upcoming freshman class.

Women serve in many support military occupational specialties (MOS) in the ANA, as well as being pilots. In some MOS, women attend training alongside male counterparts. In others, women receive MOS training as part of basic training. However, not all women receive a MOS. The MoD needs to better enforce its promotion policies to ensure all women receive MOS training and that promotion opportunities are equitable.

Six Jordanian female advisors are training Afghan women at the Kabul Military Training Center’s Female Training Battalion. NTM-A should solicit voluntary national contributions from Islamic nations with positive/progressive view on women’s roles in their respective militaries.
In addition to the many ISAF-led programs aimed at improving the rights of women in the ANSF, the U.S. Embassy also engages regularly with the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Directorate for Human Rights (which has responsibility for the implementation of UN resolution 1325) to ensure relevant ministries develop work plans that integrate protections for women into their efforts, including the Ministries of Interior and Defense. The U.S. Embassy meets with the human rights departments of MOI and MOD to encourage training on gender and human rights and to address reports of abuses of women and girls by encouraging accountability of the offenders. U.S. Embassy officials underscore the need for increased support of these departments within the respective ministries. U.S. Embassy rule of law implementing partners train and mentor female response units (FRUs) within the MOI to address gender-based violence. Implementing partners also train and mentor MOI Criminal Investigation Division investigators on gender justice issues.

The U.S. Embassy engages with the Ministries of Interior and Defense both in Kabul and the provinces to stress the importance of human rights and gender training. Through these efforts, the International Committee of the Red Cross agreed to and now provides human rights training for the Afghan Local Police. Embassy engagement also supports efforts of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA), Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, (AIHRC), EUPOL and civil society actors to advocate for implementation of human rights and gender training and programming within the Afghan National Security Forces beyond the required 32 hours of Human Rights and Law of War training. Embassy ROL implementing partners are working with the MoWA and the MOI’s FRUs to establish Education Training Committees to standardize gender-based violence training.

The U.S. Embassy’s Combating Violent Extremism Working Group, in coordination with the Public Affairs and Political Sections, regularly engages with moderate religious leaders to encourage acceptance of women in the ANSF. In addition, the Embassy encourages the MoWA and the Ministry of Hajj to work together to engage religious leaders on women’s rights and their role under Islam. The U.S. Embassy also engages with the Gender and Human Rights Departments in the Ministries of Interior and Defense to emphasize the need for the ministries to provide for clean and safe changing areas and bathrooms as well as transportation to and from work in insecure districts for female ANSF. Finally, the U.S. Embassy participates in the bilateral Criminal Law Reform Working Group to monitor recommendations made to the Ministry of Justice on various draft penal code provisions that can impact women’s security and provides guidance to Ministry of Justice on treaty and convention provisions that impact the security and interests of women in Afghanistan.

U.S. Embassy engagement on security preparations for the 2014 election with the MoI and Independent Elections Commission has focused on the need for increased temporary female security personnel, which would provide an environment where women can access polling stations while also ensuring the safety and security of the polling stations, and highlighting the role women can play in ensuring security overall. Additionally, engagement with the MoWA, MOI and others, including under the auspices of Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, on implementation of the Elimination of Violence against Women Law (EVAW), has focused on the need for women within MoI who can assist with investigation of such cases. The U.S.
Embassy also politically supports and encourages the creation and training of Female Engagement Teams in the Afghan Special Operations Forces.

In a small but significant milestone of progress, the AAF graduated its first female pilot, 2nd Lt. Niloofar Rhmani, in May, 2013. Lt. Rhmani is the first female pilot to be trained inside Afghanistan in more than 30 years. She will likely fly Cessna 208s.

2.16: CORRUPTION IN THE ANSF

Corruption within the ANSF poses a major threat to the success of the ISAF mission and the viability of the Afghan state. Diversion of international funding, narcotics trafficking, pay-for-position schemes, contract and procurement fraud, and collaboration with the insurgency all challenge the success of the ISAF mission. These issues, along with recycling of corrupt individuals, reduce the capacity and efficiency of mentored forces, contributing to a climate of insecurity in which further corruption can thrive. There are a large number of anti-corruption efforts throughout the ANSF, yet most of these efforts have yet to show useful results.

ANA Corruption: Currently, ANA units respond to national-level authorities with little interference from local power brokers. However, the influence of regional and institutional power brokers on the ANA varies by unit. Local and regional power brokers continually assess the personalities within ANA leadership and test their strengths and weaknesses in a variety of ways, including challenging or questioning local ANA operations. Local power broker influence over ANA units and operations is limited due to the ANA's relatively even ethnic distribution; rotation of officers; and the multiple layers of identified command structures from local to regional and national levels. The patronage networks that do exist are more closely tied to national political figures, not local entities, whose power bases run parallel to the ANA. Reports indicate that corrupt actors and individuals with links to Criminal Patronage Networks (CPNs) have captured key positions within the ANA at the Regional, Corps, Brigade, and Kandak levels. CPN penetration, however, is seen at an individual level, since no single CPN holds a dominant position over ANA fielded force equities. Ethnically and politically-based patronage can be found throughout the ANA. Commonplace illicit ANA activities include theft of fuel and expendable supplies/commodities, pay-for-position scams, and localized collusion with both insurgent entities and narcotics traffickers. The overall effect is a force whose capacity and efficiency are limited by competing individual and criminal interests, largely unchecked by GIRoA influence.

AAF Corruption: AAF leadership has in the past suffered from endemic corruption. The majority of illicit activity carried out within the AAF is likely centered on KAIA. Corruption and organized crime divert attention and resources from the AAF’s operational focus, and generates perceptions of corruption despite reported improvements since AAF Commander Abdul Wahab Wardak’s appointment in March 2011. Unchecked, corruption is likely to continue to impact efforts to grow and professionalize the AAF. Some corrupt AAF leaders reportedly conduct a range of criminal activities from the AAF Headquarters at KAIA, including narcotics trafficking, alcohol smuggling, the illegal sale and rental of GIRoA and ISAF property, the facilitation of customs evasion, pay-for-position schemes, and extortion of private companies transiting KAIA. These corrupt AAF officers allegedly employ intimidation and coercion to
prevent well-intentioned, reform-minded officers from reporting on or disrupting the criminal activity perpetrated by their network.

**ANP Corruption:** The ANP faces major challenges from corruption. There is continued reporting of individual Provincial and District Chiefs of Police (PCoPs and DCoPs) engaging in illicit activities, accepting/soliciting bribes, abusing civilians, and cooperating with the insurgency and narcotics traffickers. At a strategic level, there is sustained political interference with investigations and with the ANP freely exercising their constitutional role in enforcing the law. Agencies such as the MoI Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) have been blocked when they have attempted to detect and investigate corruption.

**ABP Corruption:** The ABP are particularly vulnerable to criminal influence and capture because of the lucrative financial opportunities involved in cross-border smuggling, especially in narcotics, as well as from the collection of illegal taxes and the theft of state customs revenues at border crossing points and airports. Reporting of large payments for the purchase of ABP positions suggests how lucrative these positions can be. Indeed, most (if not all) ABP officers have to buy their positions and then reimburse their initial bribe cost by accepting bribes at the border. Powerful, region-based CPNs and insurgents have sought to control revenue streams at Afghanistan’s borders, and co-opting or controlling ABP units is key to generating illegal profits. Political pressure by CPNs with politically strong power-brokers has an overbearing influence over ABP corruption.

However, substantial progress was made this reporting period in preventing opportunities for criminal interference in the security sector, including improvements across the MoD and MoI. There have been several fuel system assessments completed during this period in the MoI and MoD, with a continuing robust schedule of assessments and inspections being performed by the Afghan Inspector General teams and oversight by the coalition team. Although the MoI Transparency and Accountability Committee (TAC) has yet to have significant success removing corrupt actors, the systems are in place, and ISAF is closely monitoring these new corruption oversight institutions. Beyond three initial convictions in the National Military Hospital (NMH) case, investigations/prosecutions have progressed slowly, but the Afghan investigation team has made some progress. The Attorney Generals Office remains largely a proxy for an agenda of patronage and influence.

MoD personnel, logistics, acquisition/procurement, finance, and legal departments continue to make some progress on 50 of the 54 anti-corruption commitments made as part of the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC) Transparency and Accountability Working Group (TAWG) process. However, the ONSC TAWG, and the Senior High Commission on Anti-Corruption (SHCAC) do not regularly meet to track progress or receive status updates, and evidence of actual progress is minimal. The MoD office, tasked to implement anti-corruption systems and increase transparency and accountability within the MoD, has started to show some tangible results in tackling corruption issues in a few specific areas, although it now needs to coordinate its actions with the MoD GS to increase its effectiveness across all departments.

The MoI phase of the ONSC TAWG completed the establishment of the initial anti-corruption commissions in all seven police zones, and in eleven provinces and seven districts. The zone
committees have met on a monthly basis, but it is unclear if any corruption cases referred by these committees have resulted in the investigation and/or prosecution of corrupt police. Additionally, many of these meetings have been attended personally by the MoI Inspector General so that he could reassure the civil society and local media presence that he placed great importance on this initiative.
SECTION 3 – GOVERNANCE

GIROA’s ability to provide stable, effective, and responsive governance is slowly improving, but faces considerable challenges, including corruption at various levels, ineffective program monitoring, sub-national budget shortfalls, an inability to generate revenue sufficient to cover the cost of government operations, and limited public financial management capacity. Weak cooperation between the national and sub-national levels of governance hampers significant long-term sustainability and undermines public confidence. Limited human capacity, together with a lack of appropriate formal training and education within the civil service and Afghan populace, continue to impede the development of stable and sustainable government across the country.

The concentration of power in Kabul and the lack of coordination between the different governmental bodies and the sub-national elements continue to limit effectiveness and legitimacy. National institutions are developing but still lack the necessary checks and balances. At the sub-national level, official government services are largely restricted to provincial and district centers, despite efforts to improve capacity and project governance services to rural areas. GIROA’s inability to provide services currently managed by the international community threatens the management, oversight, delivery, and operation and maintenance of these services during and after transition.

During this reporting period, GIROA continued to work towards meeting the commitments set at the Tokyo Conference in July 2012, including drafting the concept paper for implementing the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), finalizing the Aid Management Policy (AMP), and continuing to move the remaining six National Priority Programs (NPPs) through the approval process. The NPPs outline Afghan strategic security, governance, and development reforms, as well as service delivery priorities. Four of the six remaining NPPs were endorsed by the UN-Afghan Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) on February 12, 2013; one from the Governance Cluster and three from the Socio-Economic Development Cluster. The AMP, which aims to improve the delivery and impact of the international delivery assistance, was also endorsed at the February 2013 JCMB. The remaining two NPPs within the Governance Cluster, “Transparency and Accountability” and “Law and Justice for All,” are anticipated to be ready for endorsement at the JCMB tentatively scheduled for June 2013. However, Afghan compliance with many of the provisions of the TMAF is yet to be determined.

Fighting corruption, reforming civil governance and enforcing law is imperative for the Afghan government. During the reporting period, the three branches of the government worked on Presidential Decree 45 (PD 45), issued in July 2012. This 164-point decree includes 38 anti-corruption related articles. In the eight months since PD45 was released, GIROA has issued general press releases with percentages of completion of tasks, but has not issued any detailed information. Most tasks only require tabling of a report to Cabinet for completion, not achieving a specific result. Direct inquiries with the ministries/entities indicate that most seem to be

28The four newly endorsed NPPs, as of February 2013, were “Efficient and Effective Governance,” “Water and Natural Resources,” “Comprehensive Agriculture Production,” and “National Energy Supply.” 20 of 22 NPPs have now been endorsed.
following PD 45, although they feel the deadlines were too ambitious. The general trend is one of acceptance and some quick progress after issuance of the decree. Now progress seems to have slowed down. Concerning anti-corruption, no substantial progress was observed; apart from the public acknowledgement that large-scale corruption exists. Furthermore, the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) and the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) remain ineffective.

The judicial branch, with the assistance of the international community, is making incremental progress with regard to training and staffing sub-national judicial positions. Improvements in the reach and function of sub-national governance are being made as GiRoA continues to develop opportunities for both traditional and formal modes of conflict resolution. However, constrained freedom of movement due to security concerns impedes the expansion of rule of law, especially at the district level. The time required to resolve disputes through the formal system exacerbates the separation between the formal and traditional rule of law systems, and contributes to the perception that the Afghan government is ineffective and inaccessible to many rural Afghans.

Afghanistan’s National Assembly has demonstrated slow but growing capacity and political maturity. Parliament continued to develop institutionally during its July 2012 – January 2013 session by approving a final budget and questioning ministers over their failure to properly execute their budgets. Although consistently fractious, the Parliament is occasionally capable of confronting the President and directing a public spotlight on ministries. The legislative branch remains weak in comparison to the executive, but members of Parliament appear to be trying to strengthen their hand. However, staffing struggles, corruption, and low levels of education and experience continue to plague the body. GiRoA has yet to pass the Electoral Law, Independent Election Commission Structural Law, the Land Management Act amendment, or the improved Criminal Procedure Code. President Karzai and the Parliament have not reached agreement on the selection process for members or composition of the Election Complaints Commission (ECC), raising concerns for transparency in the coming elections.

3.1: 2014 ELECTIONS

The IEC set April 5, 2014, as the date for presidential and provincial council elections, and in accordance with Afghan law, men and women should have the opportunity to participate freely without internal or external interference. The 2014 presidential election presents an opportunity for the Afghan government to demonstrate its ability to conduct a peaceful democratic transition of political power. However, the election will also challenge the government to conduct an election that is perceived by the populace and international community to be free, fair, and transparent.

There are several Afghan entities that play a role in planning for the upcoming election. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) has the responsibility for administering and supervising the elections. The MoI, with MoD and NDS support, is responsible for providing security for the elections. Over the past several months, MoI has been developing a province by province security plan, but it has not yet been finalized. The ISAF campaign plan includes an appendix that outlines the support ISAF will be prepared to provide the Afghan government, if requested. ISAF election support would primarily constitute logistics, route clearance, and other security-
related tasks in support of MoI and MoD efforts, including emergency assistance, as required. ISAF is planning to provide quick reaction forces across Afghanistan for international community observers and in the event that security deteriorates beyond the ANSF ability to control.

A significant achievement this reporting period was the IEC’s publication of “Concept of Operations: Outline of Activities,” which specifies requirements to conduct presidential, provincial council, and Wolesi Jirga elections in 2014 and 2015.29 Although this document provides guidelines for improving elections management, the Electoral Law has yet to be passed and the composition of the ECC remains a point of disagreement within the Afghan government. In February, the IEC forwarded to the security ministries its list of almost 7,000 polling centers and asked the security ministries to complete security assessments before candidate registration begins in mid-September.

Although election preparations progressed during the reporting period, a number of challenges remain which pose risks to the upcoming elections, including on-going debates between the executive and legislative branches regarding the Electoral Law, and the existence and composition of the ECC.

At the time of this report, Parliament was still considering two draft electoral laws, one prepared by the Council of Ministers and a second version prepared by the Cooperation Council, a loose association of influential political leaders in government and the opposition. The two laws have to be reconciled in order to clarify the ultimate procedure for resolving electoral complaints and the process for attaining Wolesi Jirga seats. The final version will also have to be deconflicted with the IEC Structure Law currently under discussion in a Wolesi Jirga – Meshrano Jirga Joint Committee as it also contains provisions for the Electoral Complaints Commission. If elections legislation is not passed, the current laws remain in force. President Karzai can issue laws by decree during Parliamentary recess, Parliament can overturn decrees upon returning to session, and Parliament can continue considering the current draft laws during its next session.

Efforts to improve voter registration consumed IEC planning efforts before January 2, when the Council of Ministers re-stated that the e-tazkera, the biometrically-linked electronic national identity card, would be issued and used as voter identification during presidential and provincial council elections and ordered the IEC to identify and eliminate fraudulent registration cards and only register voters not previously registered. The MoI launched the e-tazkera registration process March 23, but reported it urgently requires financial support from donors to meet its goal of enrolling 14 million Afghans by March 31, 2014. Public demand for the e-tazkera increased as public awareness of the program became more widespread. This places the MoI under considerable pressure to meet demand. Full issuance of e-tazkera cards is not anticipated prior to 2016. Following the Council of Ministers’ decision on the e-tazkera, the IEC revised its efforts to registering new voters, voters who have returned from abroad, and those who have lost their registration cards. Voters who do not receive an e-tazkera ID in time will be allowed to use their old voter cards. The IEC decided to delay the launch of its voter registration to May 26 to align its efforts with the MoI e-tazkera better and to add security features to the cards.

29 This document was developed in accordance with Presidential Decree 45.
The organization of transparent and peaceful elections leading to a legitimate government recognized by the Afghan people is the main objective for the 2014 elections and will be crucial to ensure the peaceful transfer of power.

3.2: ASSESSMENT OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

The Afghan government remains highly centralized, with budgeting and spending authority held primarily by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and other central ministries in Kabul. Service delivery is implemented by line directorates in the provinces, sometimes with little input from provincial councils or governors. Other constraints include a continuing lack of human capacity to fill key government and leadership positions at sub-national level, limited engagement with civil society, and poor connectivity between national and sub-national levels of government. Sub-national administrations, however, continue to engage in limited coordination, planning, and service-monitoring roles, and there are multiple institutional and operational programs in place aimed at improving sub-national governance, including the Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Program (ASGP II), the Performance-Based Governor’s Fund (PBGF II) and support to provincial councils.

Most of the budgetary decisions remain at the national level and the provinces play a marginal role in the decision-making process. Problems executing the Provincial Budgeting Pilot (PBP) program highlight this issue. In the current fiscal year (FY), the Provincial Budget Pilot (PBP) resulted in $5M for the Ministry of Education (MoE), while none of the other ministries under the pilot — the MRRD, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), and Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) — have received funding. It appears the PBP will continue its modest existence within the Afghan government’s highly-centralized budgeting process, since the draft budget for FY1392 has earmarked $17M for the MoE only. Major donors, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), World Bank, and United Nations Development Program (UNDP), are continuously working with the MoF to support the PBP toward building provincial budgeting capacities and establishing mechanisms by which the national government can transfer funding directly to sub-national entities, enabling the latter to deliver services directly to constituents effectively.

Sub-national governance structures currently operate to varying degrees of effectiveness at provincial, district, and village levels, and are overseen by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). Although coordination and cooperation between these two organizations has historically been poor, recent improvements have been seen, including the release of a draft National Policy for Unified District and Village Governance and Development. This policy aims at establishing District Coordination Councils (DCCs) in every district of Afghanistan as an interim approach to district-level governance and development, and confirms the role of Community Development Councils (CDCs) as an interim approach to village-level governance and development, covering all villages in Afghanistan. If approved by the Council of Ministers, this policy would clarify how the national government is linked to the sub-national levels, and provide a means for conflict resolution by linking district-level concerns with the province’s developmental priorities. Elected Provincial Councils are present in all provinces, but engagement in planning, monitoring and budget formulation activity remains limited.
Within its mandate to support sub-national administrations, and in keeping with direction under the Presidential Decree 45, the IDLG announced in January 2013 the merit-based appointment of 70 district and deputy district governors. The overall impact of these new appointees has yet to be seen, but this is a positive move towards enhancing capacity at the district level, both in terms of quantity and quality. The IDLG showed further signs of progress recently, including their establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate to conduct performance assessments of provincial and district governors, the release of a training guide to assist provinces with production of Provincial Strategic Plans, and the release of their first annual report assessing progress on sub-national governance.

A final point of contention is the dispute between President Karzai and the Wolesi Jirga over the status of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), fuelled by the latter’s desire to transform the IDLG into a Provincial Affairs Ministry that would be accountable and answerable to the legislature.

Taliban shadow governance is often seen through a military lens; however, shadow governance contributes to governmental functions at the local level. All provinces in Afghanistan, with the exception of Panjshir, have a recognized Taliban shadow governor. While many districts have established shadow governors as well, the level of influence and control fluctuates significantly. Most of the shadow governor's responsibilities entail continuing the kinetic fight against the local ANSF or ISAF elements, but where appropriate they are also responsible for administering limited governmental functions. These often do not extend beyond taxation and judicial services. Southern Afghanistan has the most robust shadow governance systems in which different commissions have been established to separate the civil and military duties. Although the extent of the shadow governance system varies by province and district, the Taliban are able to establish some influence over the population through the limited shadow governance functions they carry out. In some areas, local populations see Taliban governance as less corrupt and abusive than GIRoA.

Sub-National Governance: Capacity-Building Programs

The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) has the lead for provincial nominations and coordinates district-level nominations with the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). In parallel, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) has built up a widespread presence at the village and district level, responding to a different headquarters in Kabul.

The IDLG continues to support development of sub-national government structures in compliance with National Priority Program for Sub-National Governance (NPP4), and through policy and planning, capacity development, contract management, and coordination and facilitation. The directorate faces a number of challenges as it takes this work forward, including the lack of adequate security in some areas and remote districts, a reduction of donor assistance, limited and ineffective coordination between donors, implementing partners and ministries, and the lack of approval of some of the laws and regulations on local governance.
MRRD sub-national programs are focused on district and village levels. The ministry’s two largest programs, the National Solidarity Program (NSP), which acts in support of District Development Assemblies (DDA) in districts and Community Development Councils (CDCs) in villages, and the National Area-Based Development Program (NABDP), represent 95 percent of MRRD’s program funding. CDCs have expanded to 28,000 villages, an expansion effort that stalled recently due to security concerns in the remaining uncovered areas.

NPP 3, “Efficient and Effective Governance,” is a three-year, $180M program with the overall goal of strengthening institutional, organizational, administrative, and individual governmental capacities at central and local levels. NPP 3 was endorsed at the February 2013 JCMB. NPP 4, “Local Governance,” aims to improve capacity-building at the national and sub-national level, and seeks to enable the government to carry-out basic government functions, which will facilitate transition without support from parallel structures. NPP 4 focuses on the following components: National Basis for Local Governance; Provincial and District Administration; Municipal Administration; Accountability; and Transparency. These components have specific objectives that should be achieved through the IDLG portfolio of five other Priority Programs. These programs are dependent upon international funding, a favorable security situation, and adequate human resources. The five priority programs are:

**Strengthening Provincial Administration and Delivery Program (SPAD).** The “District Delivery Program” (DDP) has been run in selected provinces by France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) since March 2012, when the USG elected to cease funding it. Recently, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) launched the new SPAD program. SPAD provides funding to provinces and districts through the Afghan government’s operational budget. The funding flows through the line ministries. SPAD uses the District and Provincial Plans, developed by the Director of Economy, and continues to use funds from the District Delivery Program for which DFID has an allotment of $32M for three years (2011-2014). For 2012, $9.4M was reserved. The program rolled out to Uruzgan and Bamyan Provinces in December 2012.

**Afghanistan Local Government Facility Development Program (ALGFDP).** This is a construction management project that conducts needs assessments in provinces and districts and, based on available resources, acquires land and procures and manages construction services using a standard design and cost schedule for Provincial Governors Offices (PGOs) and District Governors Offices (DGOs). ALGFDP is funded by UNAMA, USAID, DFID, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France. The program’s 2012 budget amounts to $17.4M, which is half of the required budget according to the ALGFDP/NPP4 Financial Plan ($33.5M for 2012).

**Performance Based Governance Fund (PBGF II).** This is an 18-month program (October 2011 – April 2013). According to DFID’s 2012 annual review, the program has met expectations and helped provincial governors perform to a satisfactory standard. PBGF II’s budget amounts to $45.5M (off-budget), of which two-thirds is USAID-funded ($30.5M). After contributing $11.5M, the UK ceased financial support in June 2012. The future of the program is uncertain; discussions are ongoing between IDLG, USAID, and DFID on how the program will continue after USAID funding ends in April 2013. Post-July 2013, DFID wants to continue its on-budget support in line with NPP 4. For this program to continue successfully, it will need
to be exclusively run by IDLG and allow the Afghan government to take full funding responsibility gradually. USAID will likely not engage in this on-budget program. Currently, USAID is conducting a broader revision process, clarifying its engagement for the future. USAID’s future provincial level program will provide capacity building support to Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils efforts in targeted provinces.

**Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Program (ASGP).** In 2012 (SY1391), the ASGP budget was $20M and was funded by Australia, the European Union (EU), Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, and the UNDP. The program supports Afghan government efforts to implement its sub-national governance reform agenda through its main national partner, IDLG, and a network of Provincial Governors Offices (PGOs), District Governors Offices (DGOs), Provincial Councils (PCs) and municipalities. ASGPII will continue working with PGOs, concentrating efforts at the provincial level and implementing its programs at the district level as they become accessible and the Afghan government develops the capacity to absorb donor assistance. The upcoming ASGPIII (post 2014) will furthermore push the DGO’s role with regard to planning capacity. Local responsibility for planning and budgeting, transparent accountability mechanisms, and improved oversight by elected councils over provincial, district, and municipal administrations are imperative. The complete integration of ASGP with the NPP 4 is an urgent priority for the Afghan government.

**Regional Afghan Municipal Program for Urban Population (RAMP-UP).** This is a USAID-funded program established to assist major Afghan urban centers (currently all the provincial centers plus Kabul) and improve their ability to fund service-delivery projects. Funding for the sequel program, “RAMP-UP 2,” in 2014 and beyond will likely be reduced to $50M over five years, down from $80M for the current program. Due to these budget reductions, municipalities eligible for “RAMP-UP 2” must be carefully selected using a scoring system that allows USAID to judge performance indicators (e.g., transparency, good governance, budget, etc.). With significant population growth in urban centers expected to continue, RAMP-UP will be an important mechanism to help organize service delivery for an increasingly high percentage of the Afghan population. This program will enable the municipalities as they become increasingly responsible for providing security and services that facilitate and promote economic growth.

These programs help to strengthen the link between the national and sub-national levels, but until councils and committees begin to improve the delivery of basic services, the people in the districts and villages will see a limited connection to the national government. Over time, and if properly coupled with the TMAF commitments, the programs noted above aim to increase the levels of delegation, accountability, and effectiveness at sub-national level, particularly in areas of budget planning and execution. The TMAF seeks to enhance sub-national governance through three specific indicators:

i. Improve budget execution to 75 percent by 2017.

ii. Enact a legal framework to clarify roles and responsibilities of government agencies at national, provincial, and district levels, in line with 2010 sub-national governance policy.

iii. Develop a provincial budgeting process that includes provincial input to the relevant ministries’ formulation of budget requests, linked to a provincial planning process, in which provincial councils have consultative roles.
GIRoA has yet to issue specific plans on how it proposes to meet these indicators and in what timeframe, although some progress in these areas is anticipated ahead of the Senior Officials Meeting to be held in summer 2013 under the Tokyo mechanism.

Although there appears to be marginal improvement in execution of the development budget, execution rates remain low due to a variety of reasons, including delay in budget approval and disbursements from Kabul, administrative and procurement inefficiencies, and the impact of differing donor rules and regulations on budget execution. Poor budget execution has a direct impact on service delivery at the sub-national level, and these obstacles will be addressed under the TMAF indicator referenced above in order to enhance service delivery at local level.

3.3: Revenue Generation and Budget Execution

Increasing domestic revenues is a main objective of the government as domestic revenues continue to fall short of expenditures and international assistance is expected to decline in coming years. The total Afghan national budget for 2012 was $4.9B, with an operating budget of $2.7B, an 11 percent decrease compared to 2011 (due mainly to the shortened fiscal year). The development budget was $2.2B, and represents an increase of 41 percent over the previous year. As transition continues, the necessity to absorb additional expenditures for security, health and education services, and operational and maintenance costs, as reconstruction/infrastructure projects are placed on-budget, will further widen the fiscal gap.

With help from international donors such as USAID, revenues collected by GIRoA have steadily increased by more than 200 percent since 2005. The revenue level at the end of FY2012 was $2.2B, and essentially equal to the FY2011 level. However, the level can largely be attributed to shortfalls in custom duties and import taxes and the shortened fiscal year (see footnote thirteen). In FY2012, the revenue level still equaled 11 percent of GDP (nearly meeting the IMF target). Revenue collected in Q2 and Q3 of 2012 totaled $987M, 16 percent higher than the amount collected over the equivalent period a year ago, but short of the $1.1B year-to-date target for FY2012. With the gap between revenue and expenditures increasing, finding new sources of revenue has become more urgent. To that end, donors have focused on helping the government improve taxpayer compliance and tax administration. The MoF plans to introduce a Value-Added Tax (VAT) in 2014, with support from DFID, USAID, and the IMF. If successful, the VAT could increase government revenues by 1 to 2 percent of GDP by 2021 (World Bank). Tax levying and collection is an area that is beginning to show positive results. New taxes and corresponding administrative implementation are now underway; these include property taxes, customs tariffs, business taxes, and agriculture surplus taxes. These taxes produce 82 percent of domestic revenues, with non-tax revenue at 18 percent.

With regards to business taxes, several issues will require time to resolve, including the large informal economy that has grown over the past decade, corruption, and the remoteness of portions of the Afghan population.

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30 It should be noted that the IMF revenue target for Afghanistan is 12 percent of GDP for 2012 and 15 percent by 2015.
Customs revenues on cross-border trade in Afghanistan has increased steadily and significantly over the past eight years, and is viewed as a steady source of funds for the government. USAID assistance to GIRoA with customs reform over this period helped customs revenue increase by nearly 400 percent. However, customs revenue has recently struggled due in large part to increasing corruption. Much more progress is needed in countering fraud and corruption in customs collection at ports of entry. On February 23 2013, after 18 months of deliberation on how to address corruption at border posts, Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal signed the charter of the Presidential Executive Commission on Borders Airports and Customs Depots (PEC), a senior-level interagency body tasked with reducing corruption within the Afghan customs and border regimes. GIRoA has not yet clarified which ministries or agencies will be located at the border posts, nor the authority for those agencies to collect duties or other fees.

Curbing corruption in the customs sector can have a positive impact on fiscal sustainability, as customs duties currently account for roughly 60 percent of government tax revenues and continue to be siphoned off by patronage networks allegedly linked to the government. Revenue generation at the borders is expected to increase if border management improves, and the various government entities responsible for implementing recent custom legislation, regulation, and procedures, improve administratively and reduce corruption.

The sectors that show the most promise in terms of possible revenues include trade, information communication technology, extraction mining and hydro-carbons, and agriculture, in addition to the overall increase in general business formation and activity. The extraction and hydrocarbon industries have the potential to add revenue of up to two to three percent of GDP annually; however, this is a medium to long-term projection and to date, minimal revenue has been realized. As economic and infrastructure development and an improved business environment enables all manner of private sector industries to grow, a stable tax base will provide an opportunity for the Afghan government to become increasingly self-supporting.

Despite measured progress in revenue generation, Afghanistan continued to have one of the world's lowest fiscal sustainability ratios over the previous year and will likely be under increasing pressure in the future. Its fiscal sustainability ratio was 59 percent for FY2012 versus 66 percent in FY2011. The fragility of the overall revenue and expenditure relationship in Afghanistan is one that is expected to improve slowly as operating efficiencies are realized by the government. Additional efficiencies are expected to produce some cost-saving in contracting, financial systems management, increased budget planning, formulation, implementation, and monitoring, as well as effective prioritization of spending. Capacity development programs have been in place and continue to increase the capabilities of the government in these areas.

Although revenue generation is paramount for the government to have the resources to provide services for the Afghan population, it is equally important that it has the capacity to actually spend its budget in prioritized areas. Budget execution, while achieving marginal improvements from 2010 to 2011, continues its struggle to meet donor expectations. The Afghan government executed 94 percent of its operating budget in 2012, while the execution rate for the development

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31 Fiscal sustainability in Afghanistan is presently defined in terms of the measure of domestic revenues to operating expenses. This limits any ability to provide for discretionary services, which is not a desired financial state; however, collected revenues as a percent of operating expenses is a major financial benchmark presently being evaluated.
budget rose from 39 percent in 2010 to about 52 percent in 2012. Under the TMAF, GIRoA is expected to improve its budget execution rate to 75 percent by 2017. Considering the 50/80 declaration from the Tokyo Conference (50 percent of donor funding to be “on-budget” and 80 percent of donor funding aligned with approved National Priority Programs), the noted budget execution goal for the Afghan government could prove challenging.

Constrained public financial management capacity remains one of the difficult challenges that hinder public-sector program implementation and public service delivery. Specifically, GIRoA cites capacity constraints at the national and sub-national levels; weak planning and budget formulation; donor earmarking of funds and funding delays; and communication challenges across ministries, donors, and sub-national entities as key challenges.

3.4: Rule of Law

The United States and coalition partners conduct a broad range of programs that promote the rule of law (RoL) in Afghanistan. DoD’s RoL efforts include field support to civilian RoL teams; training for judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and corrections officials; providing necessary infrastructure for courts and prisons; and training MoI police forces in aspects of law enforcement, from investigations to community policing. However, RoL continues to be one of GIRoA’s weakest areas, where progress remains difficult to see.

USAID’s RoL program has three main components: building the capacity of the formal justice and traditional dispute-resolution systems; promoting governmental and civil society anti-corruption measures, and promoting human rights. The RoL portfolio has both national and sub-national impact, and promotes RoL institutionally and at the grassroots level.

The Department of State (DOS) funds projects focused on six lines of effort: formal justice sector capacity building; corrections reform; major crimes; legal education; civil society and access to justice; and gender justice. Other agencies, such as the Department of Justice, Treasury, and Commerce, provide subject matter experts to advise and train key members of Afghanistan’s justice system.

The RoL mission is shared among several military and civilian RoL actors, including USAID and the entities within the DOS focused on rule of law. Military actors include the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan’s Rule of Law Field Force – Afghanistan (ROLFF-A), as well as the NATO companion military force, the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission Afghanistan (NROLFSM-A); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition partners, ISAF Regional Commands, and NTM-A. Civilian actors include the USG; coalition civilians working in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA), including the United Nations’ agencies in Afghanistan; the World Bank; donor countries; NGOs; GIRoA; Afghan civil society; and other justice officials. Although NATO policy authorizes UNAMA to take the lead on civilian governance and RoL issues, its capacity to lead and execute programs is limited.

The Rule of Law Field Force—Afghanistan (ROLFF-A) was established to unite USFOR-A and U.S. Embassy efforts, ensuring a more unified approach to civilian-military RoL efforts.
Presently NROLFSM-A’s three main lines of effort are: (1) forensics architecture; (2) evidence-based operations; and (3) field support for justice sector development. Within these lines of effort are four main tasks: (1) developing human capacity; (2) building sustainable infrastructure; (3) promoting awareness of the legal rights of citizens and access to state-sanctioned justice actors and public trials; and (4) facilitating justice sector security. NROLFSM-A has been a key facilitator for aspects of justice development both directly, and through its support to the many U.S. and international community organizations assisting with RoL. NROLFSM-A’s leadership has directly supported the Regional Commands and ISAF SOF efforts to train, advise, and assist in Evidence-Based Operations, which is resulting in more search warrants being obtained and the better development of criminal investigations.

Pervasive corruption and insufficient transparency remain the main challenges towards establishing a self-sustaining RoL in Afghanistan. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that prosecutors and judges are among the government officials most likely to receive bribes. GIRoA continues to disagree with the international community over adopting acceptable anti-corruption programs in National Priority Program 2 on transparency and accountability. Despite public statements to the contrary, Afghanistan’s principal anti-corruption institutions, the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), lack sufficient political support to enforce transparency and accountability within the Afghan Government.

Other challenges to the formal system include the slow increase in human capacity for judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. Based on information received from the Supreme Court of Afghanistan and the Afghan Attorney General's Office, all districts now have prosecutors assigned (down from five without a prosecutor in 2012). However, the prosecutors for the 51 most insecure districts work from their assigned provincial centers which may be outside of those districts. All districts now have a judge assigned and functioning courts (down from 33 without a judge in 2012). Graduates from law and Sharia law faculties do not fill the demand for services. Even if qualified lawyers moved to Afghanistan to join the Afghan bar, a shortage of funds for payroll and associated facilities would exist. In accordance with PD 45, the Supreme Court states that as of March 2013, it has functioning courts in each district of Afghanistan. As no new judges had been hired, the Court thinned staffing to provide functioning courts. To have functioning criminal trials, the Attorney General’s Office will need to deploy prosecutors to underserved districts. This coverage of the whole country will likely stress these institutions until a new equilibrium is reached.

Weaknesses within both the formal and informal Afghan justice systems, as well as in the link between the two, remain. No appreciable changes occurred during the reporting period regarding the preference of the people to use the formal or informal Afghan justice systems. Both are generally preferred over Taliban processes, but when courts are absent, perceptions of corruption or availability of a Taliban judge lead Afghans to use Taliban justice.

Although traditional dispute resolution is often touted as a mature, longstanding system, some dispute resolution practices are inconsistent with obligations in human rights conventions to

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32 For a basic description of ROLFF-A, see the December 2012 Report on Stability and Security in Afghanistan.
which Afghanistan is a party. However, ROLFF-A continues to support USAID programs continue to work with the informal justice system, primarily linking it to the formal governance processes. These improvements bear fruit one community at a time by helping improve the decision-making of traditional dispute-resolution councils (shuras) through training on Afghan and human rights law, particularly as it relates to women’s rights.

Targeted assassinations of justice sector personnel, general threats, and the lack of personal security while traveling or in courthouses remain persistent problems that GIRoA refuses to address systemically. Except for the U.S. Marshal’s Service-supported Judicial Security Unit, which only operates in Kabul and Parwan, protection of justice sector personnel is largely dependent upon transient local solutions. The transient solutions also illustrate the lack of cooperation between different justice sector personnel; with coaxing and mentoring, these actors sometimes work together, but truly cooperative efforts to achieve justice appear to be the exception, not the rule.

Lack of progress on mining, land, local governance, access to information, and anti-corruption legislation continued to impair economic development in Afghanistan. In fact, no draft laws tied to the 2010 Kabul Conference commitments were sent to the National Assembly. The administration collected public comments on draft amendments to the Electoral Law and Land Management Law, and it is drafting a new Local Governance Law. Differences between the administration and the National Assembly may be slowing down consensus building. Those differences led to the President’s veto of amendments to the law on organizing the courts. When the government moves slowly to enable change, when governance and rule of law fail to support development, and when the government unevenly provides basic legal services, the trust of Afghans in their government diminishes, thereby impairing transition. The Afghan Senior Leader Protection (ASLP) program has a provision for the protection of judges, and a tashkil has been approved; unfortunately, the MoI has made no movement for selection and training of protection personnel.

The Taliban justice system is arguably the most effective way the Taliban are able to maintain influence, especially in rural areas, and regions where GIRoA justice systems are lacking or corrupt. In these areas, Taliban justice is often considered timelier, more impartial, and less corrupt then the GIRoA justice system. In some cases, the local populace will also seek out Taliban justices, even if GIRoA justices are available, because the Taliban system is more consistent with rural traditions. While Taliban justice systems are most prominent in areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan, these systems represent a residual, competing Taliban influence among the populace that undermines GIRoA’s credibility.

The Justice Sector

Overall, RoL progress continues to be mixed. Although difficult to determine whether there is greater support for the justice sector, the December 2012 Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey data results indicate an increased popular willingness to refer disputes to Afghan justice officials for resolution.
The Afghan judicial system continues to face numerous challenges, including inadequate coordination between the formal and informal justice systems, insufficient access to the formal justice system, poor enforcement of the human rights protections, and corruption at all levels, resulting in a lack of political will to pursue prosecutions against many politically-connected individuals. Additionally, the challenge of keeping the courthouses open and operating remains, as does the provision of security for justice sector personnel. To fulfill the requirements of security and sustainability, transition must include the transition of RoL activities and assistance from military to civilian support, with an end state of full ownership of all aspects of the justice sector — police, courts, and prisons — by local, provincial, and national Afghan stakeholders. Successful RoL efforts are more likely to be found in transitional areas where Afghan governance followed ISAF-supported stability.

In locations where the transition from an ISAF security lead to an Afghan lead has yet to occur, the Afghan government remains challenged to simultaneously stabilize areas while building capacity, effective governance processes, and personnel. These challenges are exacerbated by kinetic security issues. In many cases, particularly at the district level, justice sector actors may be viewed as "softer" targets than ANSF personnel. Generally, security conditions in RC-North and RC-West, and in limited key areas of RC-East, RC-Southwest, and RC-South, support judicial sector operations and development at the local level. Progress in RC-Southwest, RC-South, and RC-East, however, has been uneven as it is conditional on the Afghan government maintaining the momentum gained to date by the concentrated RoL efforts of the NROLFSM/ROLFF-A, and the International Community. These actors are working to ensure Afghan government awareness of the security threat to the justice sector, particularly among Provincial and District Governors, to encourage the implementation of sustainable, Afghan-led solutions.

Based on information received from the Supreme Court of Afghanistan and the Afghan Attorney General’s Office, districts lacking a judge fell from 117 to 33 between 2011 and 2012, and districts without a prosecutor fell from 88 to 50. Access to the formal justice system at the district level depends primarily on security. If the security in the assigned district is poor, the justice personnel will work in the provincial capitals, rather than in their districts. Although a lack of district-level judicial capacity is not helpful to GIRoA overall, the net result is greater access to formal justice for those in close proximity of provincial centers.

Given its limited footprint across Afghanistan, NROLFSM-A/ROLFF-A cannot accurately assess the prevalence of Taliban shadow authorities. These authorities may be present in less stable provinces. Its limited operational reach due to the “re-missioning” of its dedicated security detail prevents NROLFSM/ROLFF-A from providing enough visibility to assess, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the state of interplay between GIRoA’s formal justice sector and the customary justice system, which is commonly referred to as traditional dispute resolution (TDR). As a general matter, there is greater utilization of the formal system in urban areas, while utilization of TDR is more prevalent in the areas outside of provincial and district centers. In principle, NROLFSM/ROLFF-A does not view TDR as inconsistent with RoL and governance, so long as not administered by the Taliban or other insurgent groups. NROLFSM/ROLFF-A will continue to work with Afghan justice sector actors to build linkages between the two systems. Afghan Huqooqs (“mediators”) are recognized as an intermediate
connection between the formal and traditional justice sectors, and are increasingly present at the provincial level.

The Afghan justice sector remains vulnerable to corruption, intimidation, and political interference. Contributing to this problem are poorly qualified prosecutors and judges, gaps in the criminal procedure code, a lack of standardized procedures and enforcement, and a lack of professional licensing requirements for officials. The corrections sector is plagued by inadequate staffing and human capital, severe overcrowding, inadequate infrastructure, and a dearth of assistance for vulnerable populations such as women and children. Capacity deficits in the formal justice sector are even greater in the provinces and districts, where there is a lack of security for justice officials and the alternative of insurgent dispute resolution mechanisms is strongest. The most significant factor contributing to corruption in the justice sector is a culture of cronyism and political interference at high levels of the Afghan government. The resulting perception is that individual cases are determined based on bribery, as well as personal, political, and ethnic connections.

Specific challenges in the RoL effort include the assurance of judicial security at the provincial, district, and local levels. Threats to judges have been moderately successful in keeping some judges out of their districts. This damages the confidence of the Afghan people in the capacity of GIRoA to provide a legitimate formal justice system. NROLFSM/ROLFF-A monitors threats to Afghan justice sector officials and delivers this information to the appropriate Afghan authorities for action. NROLFSM/ROLFF-A also stresses the importance of justice sector security to Afghan leaders. As the country undergoes transition, however, an Afghan-led solution will be needed to ensure the safety of justice officials.

Widespread corruption, the popular perception of corruption, and insufficient transparency remain primary challenges in establishing a self-sustaining RoL system in Afghanistan. Many Afghans view the judiciary as one of the nation’s most corrupt institutions. Although NROLFSM/ROLFF-A’s field team officers address corruption when identified, identifying and battling corruption is a key task of CJIATF Shifafayat, with ultimate responsibility resting with GIRoA authorities.

Absenteeism among justice officials is another challenge, particularly in dangerous regions such as Helmand. Few Afghan professionals prefer to live and work in Helmand, given the inherent dangers. When judicial personnel remain absent for long periods, the judicial system stagnates, leaving a void, and is vulnerable to negative influence by insurgent shadow authorities.

Though it varies significantly by location, lack of communication between Afghan RoL actors (e.g. law enforcement, prosecutors, judicial officials) is problematic and results in a formal justice system characterized by sub-optimal performance. Examples of how to mitigate this issue include: one NROLFSM/ROLFF-A team hosts monthly justice coordination meetings in Jalalabad to foster dialogue among justice officials concerning open investigations; and the Department of State’s nationwide legal skills trainings that put CID investigators, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys in the same course.
However, there are areas of progress. For example, the Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office are working to comply with Presidential Decree 45 of 2012, which requires the courts to be open and functioning in each district in the country. The Supreme Court states that courts are not open and functioning in 79 districts; the Court is in the process of reassigning judges to cover all remaining districts. In addition, the Supreme Court has been directed to eliminate the backlog of cases before the end of January 2013. The Court claims that it has eliminated most of this backlog. Moreover, the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers (GDPDC), which performs most of its training independently, now has some classification and records capacity and plans to increase staffing levels in coming years. The Ministry of Justice’s project to rewrite the Afghan Penal Code has transitioned from a comparative criminal law study to drafting the text of an updated Penal Code.

In January 2013, a new draft of National Priority Program 5, “Law and Justice for All,” was written. The new draft, while improved, has significant shortcomings and is in the process of consultations with the donor community. When the program is eventually endorsed, it will improve the effectiveness of programs in the justice sector.

NROLFSM/ROLFF-A continually evolves in accordance with mission needs and has broadened its mission to support the Justice Center in Parwan, where staff assists civilian agencies with the capacity building of Afghan authorities to prosecute insurgents and terrorists under Afghan law. Nonetheless, in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy via its RoL entities, as well as in coordination with GIRoA officials, NROLFSM/ROLFF-A will continue to work toward the broad rule of law and governance tasks required for the peaceful transition toward a strong, transparent, and just Afghan state.

DoD’s ability to evaluate Afghanistan’s RoL programs and outcomes will decline significantly as ISAF forces are reduced over the next two years.

**Detention Operations**

Following high-level negotiations, including a meeting between Presidents Obama and Karzai during President Karzai’s January 2013 visit to the United States, the United States and Afghanistan, on March 25, 2013, signed an MOU transitioning all detainee operations involving Afghan nationals from the United States to GIRoA. This arrangement requires Afghanistan to establish an Afghan Review Board (ARB) to determine the disposition of particular Afghan nationals captured during U.S. combat operations and transferred to Afghan custody. According to the March MOU, the ARB will have the options of prosecution under Afghan law, release, or continued investigation. Afghan authorities are currently developing the particular procedures to be employed by the ARB.

On March 25, 2013, the United States transferred control of the Detention Facility in Parwan to GIRoA, with the entire facility now known as the Afghan National Detention Facility at Parwan (ANDF-P). As of that date, all Afghan nationals in the ANDF-P were transferred to Afghanistan.
CJIATF 435 is responsible for U.S. detainee operations in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan. Since its creation in 2009, CJIATF 435 has transferred more than 5,000 detainees to Afghan control. CJIATF 435 will continue to engage with its Afghan counterparts to ensure the transition of detention operations results in consistent safeguarding of our force protection interests and the humane treatment of all detainees.

The Afghan Detention Operations Command’s capacity continues to grow and expand with the benefit of the Security Force Assistance (SFA) under the command of CJIATF 435. During the ongoing transfer of detention operations to Afghan control, in accordance with the detention MOU, the ANA has demonstrated its ability to maintain secure and humane care, custody, and control of the detainee population.

The ANA continues to source, train, and develop the skills and capacities necessary to establish an independent, sustainable detention operation program at Parwan. The ANA is currently leading operations in every area of the facility where Afghan detainees are housed. They also man every checkpoint granting access into the facility. The ANA is now processing all new Afghan detainees upon their entry to the facility.

Although the Afghans have already taken control of key enabler missions such as food services and guard control for their facilities, they continue to face challenges in facility engineering, medical support, contracting, and overall logistics. The Afghans’ ability to assume these additional enabler mission areas will be important to complete transition. The development of a professional guard force, committed to adherence to appropriate Afghan detention policies and procedures, remains a mid-level leadership challenge, risking the provision of safe and humane care, custody, and control of detainees in ANDF-P.

3.5: PARLIAMENT

Afghanistan’s National Assembly has demonstrated slow but growing capacity and political maturity. Parliament continued to develop institutionally during its July 2012 – January 2013 session by approving a final budget and questioning ministers over their failure to properly execute their budgets. Although consistently fractious, the Parliament is occasionally capable of confronting the President and directing a public spotlight on ministries. The legislative branch remains weak in comparison to the executive, but members of Parliament appear to be trying to strengthen their hand. However, staffing struggles, corruption, and low levels of education and experience continue to plague the body.

The best example of Parliament’s growing capacity and advancement is its oversight of the national budget, where it has repeatedly and successfully reoriented executive branch spending priorities. Parliament lacks the “power of the purse” – the Afghan constitution grants it the power only to accept or reject the executive branch’s proposals on budgetary matters – but Parliament has seized its constitutional authority and leveraged it to force the executive to compromise on spending plans. Parliament has also demanded more oversight of ongoing projects, and now routinely summons officials from the Ministry of Finance, not only for budget preparation but also for performance updates.
Since the first post-2001 Parliament was elected in 2005, the Wolesi Jirga\(^{33}\) has become increasingly confident in its legislative role, as well as in its function to scrutinize the government. General sessions of the Wolesi Jirga often entail heated discussions. The quota for women has helped increase the role of Afghan women in decision and legislation making. There are over 27 female Members of Parliament (MPs).

Parliamentary groups can be broadly divided into three groups: pro-government; political opposition; and independents. Political parties are represented in Parliament, but not in sufficient numbers to command a majority block. As a result, a significant number of independent MPs, coalitions, and groupings are common. Coalitions within Parliament are not stable, and their size tends to increase and decrease sporadically.

President Karzai’s administration has strong support in the current Parliament, elected in September 2010, and is often able to rally majority votes behind new legislation. Although President Karzai has an informal support base composed of a number of Parliamentary groups, he sometimes has to rely on the support of Parliamentary groups aligned to his First Vice President, Mohammed Fahim Khan, and Second Vice President, Karim Khalili. Although President Karzai currently has adequate support from coalitions in Parliament to push through legislation on certain issues, these coalitions also occasionally vote against executive branch initiatives. There is no formal role for political parties in the Wolesi Jirga, making it a fluid and dynamic legislative body. Given that no single party dominates the Lower House, voting patterns can be difficult to predict and voting outcomes often depend on the issue at hand. Unfortunately, the current political culture in both the Wolesi Jirga and the Meshrano Jirga is often dominated by intimidation and corruption, and the purchasing of votes is common practice. Although the issue of corruption remains a challenge across Afghanistan, the Parliament continues to evolve and mature into a stronger oversight body which holds the other branches of government to account.

Parliament’s legislative agenda for the spring will address important draft legislation, including the Electoral Law and the Independent Election Commission Structure Law. Bills recommended to the Meshrano Jirga by the Wolesi Jirga are almost always ratified by the Upper House. However, President Karzai has strong support in the Meshrano Jirga and is able to use the Upper House in certain cases where he is not content with changes made to bills by the Lower House. For example, the Wolesi Jirga amended the IEC Structural Law and referred the same to the Meshrano Jirga in 2012. Karzai was not content with the amendments and was able to rally support in the Meshrano Jirga to reject the bill which was subsequently referred back to the Wolesi Jirga. Upon reconvening in March 2013, a conference committee between the Wolesi Jirga and the Meshrano Jirga will work to resolve differences in their two versions of the IEC Structural Law.

USAID continues to assist Parliament members in both upper and lower houses, parliament staff, leadership offices, and committees. In addition to institutional development, the USAID-funded Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project (APAP) activities improve Parliament’s constituency outreach efforts, communications, information technology use, and legislative reform and national budget review. USAID assistance strengthens the ability of the Parliament

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\(^{33}\) The Wolesi Jirga is the lower house of the National Assembly of Afghanistan. The Meshrano Jirga is the upper house.
to operate as an independent and effective legislative, representative, and oversight body on behalf of the Afghan people. The international community and NGOs continue to support efforts aimed at building the technical, legal, and analytical capacity of Parliamentary committees.

3.6: FINANCIAL REFORM AND THE BANKING SECTOR

An IMF Board review had originally been anticipated to occur in December 2012, based on end-September criteria. However, because of poor performance by GIRoA, the IMF decided to defer the December board review and combine it with the third review in spring 2013, based on end-December criteria. The Afghan Government has not yet completed the measures required to proceed with the combined review.

Many of the IMF benchmarks require the creation of a legal and administrative framework of a modern economy and financial system (banking law, anti-money laundering/countering financing of terrorism law, value-added tax law, etc.). The Afghan Government has not fully embraced these reforms and prioritized their implementation sufficiently to overcome its capacity constraints. In addition, the Afghan Government’s ambitious plans to increase domestic revenues have not been entirely successful, meeting only 93 percent of its FY2012 revenue target.

Resolution of the aftermath of the Kabul Bank crisis remains an important issue and a test of the government’s willingness and ability to reform. In November 2012, the independent Afghan-international community Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) on corruption issued a report of the full range of issues on the collapse of Kabul Bank, and determined that the bank was used to run a pyramid investment scheme in a “regulatory vacuum,” diverting savings assets to personal and business ventures of 12 beneficiaries. The report made 48 recommendations, primarily for government authorities, including the Central Bank, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Kabul Bank Special Tribunal. Many recommendations were technical in nature and implementation is underway; other more politically sensitive recommendations are less likely to be implemented. One recommendation called for criminal investigations of all participants and beneficiaries, and another recommended the expansion of Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) requests by the Attorney General’s Office to track money that has left Afghanistan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted MLA requests to the United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, India, Switzerland, and France.

Three major tasks remain in the resolution of the Kabul Bank scandal: recovery and disposal of the remaining assets from ex-shareholders and borrowers; sale or dissolution of the remaining “good bank,” New Kabul Bank; and prosecution of those responsible for perpetuating fraud. The first task, asset recovery, is proceeding slowly, especially for those assets in Afghanistan, even though the Afghan authorities proclaim that they are confident that they will recover a respectable amount. However, there have been important recent developments on the other two tasks. The results of the auction of New Kabul Bank produced only one bid, which the MoF-led

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34 For additional background information on the IMF Extended Credit Facility arrangement with Afghanistan, refer to Financial Reform section of December 2012 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.
review committee rejected because the bidder failed to meet “criteria minimums as specified in Expression of Interest (EOI) and tender documents.” In a brief press conference, MoF Director General for Treasury Aqa and Da Afghanistan Bank Governor Delawari announced the rejection of the bids and outlined the options for the near future: to re-advertise; to sell to an interested bank following a one-to-one negotiation; or to liquidate the bank.

On March 5, 2013, the Kabul Bank Special Tribunal convicted former Kabul Bank Chairman Shirkan Farnood and former Kabul Bank CEO Khalilullah Ferozi of “breach of trust,” and each was sentenced to five years in prison. They were fined a combined total of more than $800 million. Farnood and Ferozi were acquitted, however, of more serious charges of embezzlement, forgery, and money-laundering, and thus are under no real legal obligation to pay back fines imposed by the Special Tribunal that handled the case. The other charges would have carried longer prison terms and increased the possibilities of enforcing fines and recovering assets held abroad. Nineteen other defendants, who were low-level Kabul Bank employees or Central Bank regulators, were also found guilty of misusing official authority and failure to inform relevant authorities and received fines and/or prison sentences. Given the implications of these sentences, Afghan prosecutors have appealed the verdict and are prepared to seek harsher sentences.

A key indicator of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework calls for asset recovery and legal accountability for those responsible for the crisis. The next steps in the process will address how government authority can be constituted to confiscate assets where they exist. The case led Afghans to seek technical advice in strengthening their banking laws, fiscal control, and the role of the Central Bank in supervising Afghanistan’s financial institutions.

The Kabul Bank Crisis resulted in widespread loss of confidence in the banking sector and highlighted significant weaknesses in the industry. These weaknesses cover all significant areas of bank stewardship and will continue to require extensive reforms to address weak financial supervision, corruption, overexposure, and security concerns. Presently, the Banking Law and banking framework, which aim to strengthen central bank regulations, has been reviewed by the Council of Ministers and is now in Parliament for review. However, until corruption – and the perception of corruption – within the banking sector are addressed, public confidence in the Afghan banking system will remain deficient.

3.7: COUNTER-CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY

The international community continues to press for significant anti- and counter-corruption reforms through “mutual accountability,” so that donor money is conditioned to specific actions by the Afghan ministries. ISAF is also engaged with the international community and the Afghan government to illustrate the need for a coherent system of laws, regulations, and offices to ensure the country’s extractive industries are successful and operate in an environment of transparency and accountability. However, effective progress remains elusive due to a range of factors, including the deeply embedded nature of societal corruption, individual and group efforts to maximize wealth, and the ability and willingness of those in power to prevent effective investigations, arrests, prosecutions and punishments.
Although charged with serving as the government’s highest coordinating body for the implementation of administrative procedural reform, the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) remains a weak institution with few to no enforcement mechanisms.

Despite persistent ISAF and U.S. Embassy engagement, the Presidential Executive Committee (PEC) on Borders, Airports and Customs Depots has yet to be fully actualized. This deficiency leaves Afghanistan with no inter-ministerial process to address significant security and economic challenges through a whole-of-government approach. Additionally, significant concerns regarding inadequate prosecution of interdicted narcotics and lethal contraband persist, resulting in continued security and economic challenges. The APPF still faces a number of potential long-term corruption and capacity issues; these could contribute to an economy driven by a few ultra-rich elite and further constrain humanitarian efforts as ISAF forces redeploy.

There appears to have been a modest increase in political will to tackle corruption by some senior Afghan leaders. Within the MoD and MoI, there are signs of growing political will among several key senior leaders, as evidenced by the Minister of Interior’s actions to remove corrupt police officers and establish “Shafafiyat Commissions” in zones and provinces, and by the MoD’s progress on the ONSC TAWG action plan.

PD 45 levied anti-/counter-corruption mandates on several Afghan ministries, including the AGO and HOOAC. Unfortunately, many of the decree’s articles ordered ministries to perform actions already required by law or regulation. The decree also imposed aggressive timelines for completion of these tasks. There is an articulated general ministerial desire to meet the PD 45 mandates but there has been little progress to date. Much of the progress that has been made towards meeting PD 45’s requirements has been in the form of updates given to Parliament. None of these reports has been supported by solid evidence of progress.

**Interagency Counter-Corruption Efforts**

To achieve greater unity of effort through enhanced synchronization, ISAF executed a realignment of the Civil-Military Counter Threat Network (Integrated Counter-Narcotics, Counter-Transnational Organized Crime, Counter-Threat Finance, and Counter-Terrorism Nexus) command and control (C2) construct. Counter Threat Network (CTN) commands (CJIATF-Shafafiyat, CJIATF-Nexus, Task Force 2010, assisted by the Interagency Operations Coordination Center and the Afghan Threat Finance Cell) are now nested under the newly established CJIATF-A. The synergy that will be achieved by better coordinating the execution of all CTN operations will increase the opportunity to meet the desired effects in Theater. This new construct will organize and conduct integrated Joint and Interagency Counter-Corruption operations to support ISAF strategic-effects targeting.

In October 2012, CJIATF-Shafafiyat led the Counter Corruption and Organized Crime Interagency Effects Group (CCIEG) outbrief to COMISAF. The purpose of the review was to develop a common understanding among ISAF and international community partners of the level of corruption within the justice sector, with nine substantive areas being examined in detail in conjunction with Afghan justice sector subject matter experts. CJIATF Shafafiyat presented recommendations and courses of action in an attempt to diminish the impact of corruption, with
the key points being the fractured functionality of Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Institutions (the HOOAC and the AGO) and lack of transparency of Criminal Cases and Corrections. Work continues with these organizations to implement the recommendations.

The issue of corruption extends beyond Afghanistan’s borders; addressing this transnational element is equally as critical as eliminating domestic corruption. The transnational dimensions of the flows of money, narcotics, precursor chemicals, and weapons across Afghanistan’s criminal networks have become increasingly apparent. Key figures within both the Government and criminal networks continue to thrive due to links to the international financial system, capacity to invest the proceeds of their illicit activities abroad, and their freedom of movement outside of Afghanistan. The Middle East/North Africa Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crime Conference held in January 2013 examined the transnational corruption problem in conjunction with numerous financial and law enforcement entities working in Afghanistan to gain a better understanding of the scale of the issue and potential courses of action to address it.

ISAF is increasingly tailoring its operations to address transnational threats posed by the nexus between the insurgency, the narcotics trade, organized crime, and corruption in order to tackle the issue of corruption from all known sources. With its national jurisdiction over certain drug crimes, the Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC) continues to prosecute narcotics traffickers, and its capacity to tackle high-profile cases increased over the reporting period. Recent success on several large-scale narcotics cases has demonstrated the ability of the CNJC to apprehend and prosecute major drug traffickers, including those traditionally considered to be politically protected. However, the potential for interference from GIRoA still exists, and overall prosecution rates for interdicted narcotics remain below expectations.

As a result of ISAF’s mobilization of Afghan-vetted law enforcement units against the nexus of the insurgency, narcotics trade, and criminal patronage networks, nearly half of the sub-networks associated with ISAF’s priority narcotics trafficking organizations have been operationally degraded. Furthermore, as part of this effort, ISAF created the Strategic Targeting process, which takes direction from the ISAF Commander’s Conference and translates it into a prioritized list to be used for operational and tactical targeting, planning, and KLEs with the Afghan government. The strategic targeting process employs six working groups that focus on different key ISAF functions, and includes members from each of the HQ staff sections. The Strategic Targeting and Influence Working Group is unique among the six working groups in that it is a small part of a larger targeting effort led by DCOM ISAF. Efforts are ongoing to develop coordinated rule-of-law-based courses of action to address the interrelated problem sets of narcotics, criminal patronage networks, threat finance, and support to the insurgency.

In other countries that have struggled to overcome the interconnected challenges of terrorism, insurgency, the narcotics trade, organized crime, and corruption, success has depended on the mobilization of civil society in support of national unity and reform. Civil society mobilization is necessary because government systems will remain relatively weak until some form of independent, non-governmental oversight is established to keep the system accountable. Recognizing this, in coordination with the Afghan government, ISAF and its partners have set out to identify and connect elements of civil society, including independent media, religious figures, student organizations, and women’s groups, as well as Afghan civic education,
leadership development, and communications programs, in a long-term effort to generate positive social pressure for counter-corruption reform.

**Afghan Counter-Corruption Efforts**

ISAF and CJATF-Shafafiyat, in close cooperation with the Afghan government, continue their efforts to reduce corruption that threatens the sustainability of the Afghan state. Counter-corruption efforts, however, rely heavily on the capacity and political will of the Afghan government, with Afghanistan’s principal anti-corruption institutions, the HOOAC and the AGO, being ineffective and having little political support to take the lead in encouraging and enforcing transparency and accountability within the Afghan government.

PD 45, although expansive and aggressive in some regards, is not necessarily indicative of strong political will within the Afghan government to combat corruption. Many of the measures contained in the decree are simply restatements of previous requirements or commitments already existing in Afghan law, with the addition of often-unrealistic timelines. Additionally, the decree does not contain any form of enforcement mechanism or penalties for lack of compliance, further diminishing its potential efficacy. To date, implementation of decree mandates within the ministries has varied; the selective prosecution in the Kabul Bank case and slow progress in the Dawood National Military Hospital (NMH) case perhaps being a better measure of the desire of GIRoA to make meaningful progress on corruption.

The Afghan justice sector and international community continue to make slow progress in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of high-profile cases of corruption and organized crime. The Special Cases Committee (SCC), a joint Afghan-International unit created by the AGO, continues to initiate and investigate high-profile cases, but very few make it through to the prosecution phase. Similarly, HOOAC has continued to develop its investigative skills under the mentorship of coalition investigators and prosecutors, and is starting to produce results. However, real concern exists that there is little political will to bring these cases to prosecution, with the AGO often being responsible for lack of progress in high profile cases. The SCC and the HOOAC have shown, however, that the justice sector is capable of change, and is expected to play an increasingly pivotal role in countering corruption and bringing major crimes to justice.

**3.8: COUNTER-NARCOTICS**

Narcotics play an important role in financing the insurgency, and counter-narcotics (CN) operations remain the best line of effort available to the coalition at this time to directly affect Taliban tactical-level financing. Due to bad weather, the 2012 poppy yield was lower than previous years, leading to a decrease in narcotics-derived insurgent revenue. However, overall insurgent funding in 2012 remained largely unchanged from previous years. The 2013 poppy harvest is expected to expand considerably over 2012 due to improved weather conditions, increased prices and the drawdown of ISAF security forces. The Taliban is also showing a greater propensity to protect the poppy harvest and to control narcotics production.

GIRoA regularly partners with U.S. and international organizations to target narcotics traffickers and facilities. As part of ISAF’s CN campaign plan, ISAF coordinates with the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other U.S. government Departments and Agencies to support the overall CN strategy for Afghanistan.

The main goal of ISAF’s CN strategy is to reduce the ability of the insurgency to draw support from the narcotics industry. RC-S and RC-SW remained priority areas for military and law enforcement CN efforts during the reporting period. These regions constitute principal areas for Afghan poppy cultivation, and as such, are major sources of revenue for the Taliban-led insurgency. DoD’s role in supporting CN operations includes building the capacity of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNP-A), improving border security, promoting information sharing, and fostering regional and international cooperation.

Despite this high operational tempo and a number of large seizures and high-profile arrests during the reporting period, overall coalition and ANSF CN interdiction efforts have had a small but not insignificant effect on overall insurgent profits from narcotics. However, the narcotics market in Afghanistan is large, and insurgent penetration of that market is extensive and expanding. CN interdiction operations in one area can be supplanted by the insurgents increasing profits in other areas, such as donations and kidnapping for ransom.

CN interdiction operations, in addition to crop substitution, subsidies to farmers, targeted arrests, the disruption of narcotics trafficking networks, and increased CN-focused rule of law together have the potential to reduce significantly insurgent financing from narcotics. However, none of these efforts individually will be able to have a major effect. The political will of the Afghan government and the transition of security to Afghan forces remain the greatest challenges to implementing this comprehensive CN program.

The United States published a new CN Strategy for Afghanistan in January 2013. This revision prioritizes CN assistance during the security transition and drawdown of U.S. and coalition combat forces. ISAF continues to assist the Afghan Government in developing its counternarcotics capacity and capability for the eventual transition to greater Afghan responsibility.

Although the Afghan Counter-Narcotics Judicial Center (CNJC) continues to perform admirably, further progress is needed to reduce corruption in the justice sector and in state functions important to transition such as border checkpoints, airports, and inland customs depots. Nonetheless, U.S. Border Management Task Force-trained Afghan customs officials are making significant progress in airport security at KAIA.

Counternarcotics Operations

The DEA, the CNP-A National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and ISAF maintained a high CN operational tempo throughout the reporting period, conducting several major increasingly Afghan-led CN operations. ISAF targeting of high-value individuals and their support zones applied pressure on the networks and caused temporary dislocations; however, with their ability to quickly adapt new tactics, the narcotics networks are likely to continue to function. The concentration of raids was in northern Helmand and Nimroz; vehicle interdictions were focused in central and southern Helmand and along the RC-SW/RC-W boundary in northern Nimroz. A
majority of operations were successful, but networks remain resilient. Disruptions to these networks are the result of capital losses, including drug processing equipment and drug seizures. Occasionally, after strong evidentiary cases have been established, high-value drug traffickers supporting the insurgency are arrested and sentenced. A recent example of this is the arrest and conviction of Haji Lal Jan Ishaqzai, a U.S. Treasury-designated “kingpin.” Haji Lal Jan was subsequently prosecuted at the CNJC and received a 20 year sentence. His case is currently under appeal.

CN operations during the reporting period were facilitated by the continued progress of the DEA-mentored Judicial Wire Intercept Program (JWIP). During this reporting period, information obtained through the JWIP resulted in the arrest of 33 individuals and the seizure of 104 kilograms of heroin.

Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) is a GIRoA program funded by the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. ISAF has only a limited role in supporting and helping to coordinate the GLE program. Following the 2012 GLE campaign, which eradicated 9,672 hectares of poppies, the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) began planning and coordinating the 2013 GLE Campaign, with a nationwide goal of eradicating 15,000 hectares. The GLE campaign is ongoing as of the end of the reporting period, with eradication underway in six provinces. Preliminary verification as of April 1, 2013 indicates that 2,721 hectares of eradication have taken place. Currently-verified amounts may be revised downward in the process of secondary verification.

Preliminary reports indicate that there has been reluctance on the part of ANSF leadership to participate fully in the GLE effort this year, although as of April 1, some 26 ANP and 3 ANA had lost their lives in connection with eradication efforts during the 2013 cycle.

The GLE program has yet to prove its utility in decreasing insurgent funding, and could in fact increase it in certain areas. Although increased eradication deters some farmers from planting poppy by increasing the involved risk, this often results in the shifting of cultivation to outside the GLE areas. GLE is usually conducted in areas of GIRoA control, and does not concentrate on areas of insurgent control, which are often in more remote regions. GLE is not exclusively aimed at nor does it significantly affect insurgent funding. Indeed, GLE may actually push some opium farmers away from GIRoA-controlled areas and into more remote areas under insurgent influence. Furthermore, corrupt application of the program often results in only the fields that do not pay bribes being eradicated. The Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics believes GLE is most effective when paired with an Alternative Livelihood (AL) campaign designed to give subsistence farmers a viable alternatives to growing poppy. Evidence from the Helmand Food Zone Program and elsewhere suggests targeted AL, in combination with GLE, is more likely to result in sustainable conversion from poppy to licit cultivation. Overall, it is not clear whether GLE by itself, or even coupled with an AL campaign, has a positive or negative effect on the coalition’s goal of reducing insurgent funding.

Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units

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The CNP-A is the ANP component responsible for CN operations throughout Afghanistan. CNP-A headquarters are located in Kabul, and CNP-A has officers stationed in all 34 provinces including four forward operation bases located throughout Afghanistan. DoD continues to support CNP-A through capacity building in order to establish a capable Afghan institution that can counter the narcotics trade and resist corruption. The current CNP-A tashkil is authorized at 2,570 positions, including CNP-A headquarters elements, specialized units, and provincial units.

DoD, in partnership with the Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, is funding the CNP-A Development Unit (CDU). This unit is working toward the goal of transitioning CN responsibility to the Afghan Government. In support of this, the CDU, with the NTMA Senior Police Advisor for Counternarcotics, aided the CNP-A in completing their Ministerial Development Plan, a roadmap for CNP-A development and the transition of greater security responsibility to CNP-A at the 2014 transition.

The National Interdiction Unit (NIU) is the primary unit within the CNP-A mandated to provide tactical support by assisting in criminal narcotics investigations, executing search-and-seizure and arrest warrants, and providing other tactical support as requested by the CNP-A. The NIU actively supports the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU) with its capabilities. The NIU is currently staffed with 498 officers. The NIU is maintaining a high operational tempo against narcotics networks across the country, and is having an identifiable disruptive effect on those networks, especially those functioning at the core of the narcotics-insurgency nexus in Helmand and Kandahar.

The SIU is a specialized counternarcotics investigative unit whose mission is to identify and dismantle significant drug trafficking organizations (DTO) operating in Afghanistan through reliance on the Afghan criminal justice system. The SIU is staffed with DEA-trained Afghan officers who have passed extensive vetting, to include polygraph and a background check. All SIU investigators must successfully complete the DEA SIU Basic Investigators course that is conducted at the DEA Academy, Quantico, VA. The SIU is responsible for conducting high-level, complex investigations, as well as pursuit of high-value targets (HVT's) and national and international level DTOs. The current tashkil is 77 officers. Operational coordination among the various specialized units in the CNP-A continued to improve during the reporting period, as reflected in a number of joint operations.

**Afghan Special Mission Wing Support to Counternarcotics**

The SMW was established out of the MoI’s Air Interdiction Unit to conduct multi-functional aviation operations in direct support of GIRoA, MoI, and MoD for counternarcotics (CN), counterterrorism (CT), and SOF missions throughout Afghanistan. A U.S. Army Embedded Training Team (ETT) mentors the development of the unit's operations and maintenance capabilities and standards. A contractor logistics support team provides capacity development of SMW leaders, staff and aircrew through education, training and mentoring.

DEA liaison officers with the SMW and coalition SOF ensure DEA aviation requirements are considered and appropriately supported in the special operations allocation and tasking process. The SMW fleet is funded with a combination of ASFF and DoD CN funds. The SMW currently
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has three Mi17v1s and 10 Mi-17v5s on loan from the Afghan Air Force. The remaining 17 Mi-17s are in overhaul or awaiting disposition.

SMW development and training continues to include building night vision goggle (NVG) aircrew capacity, staff development, unit command and control (C2) battle tracking capability and preparation of the Wing HQ for activation of the Special Operations Aviation Squadrons. The SMW NVG capability now includes five full Afghan crews. The unit conducted several Afghan-planned, led and fully executed NVG missions in support of MoI and MoD taskings. The SMW has begun to increase its operational situational awareness by establishing a Situational Awareness Room (SAR) at the Wing HQs in order to track daily unit status and to conduct limited battle tracking. The HQs was issued 30 Afghan National Tracking System (ANTS) devices, which allow the tracking of aircraft operating throughout the battle space. The SAR will become fully operational once the SMW receives its ground communications equipment and is accessed into the MoD and MoI networks. The SMW's growth remains on track with the Wing HQ expected to be at Initial Operational Capability (IOC) along with the activation of the 1st Squadron by spring 2013.

International and Interagency Counternarcotics Efforts

Several interagency and international organizations support CN operations in Afghanistan, including the Interagency Operations and Coordination Center (IOCC), CJIATF-Nexus, and the Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC).

The IOCC provides intelligence and operational support to law enforcement CN operations in Afghanistan. The IOCC, led by the DEA and United Kingdom’s Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), is the central CN cell for developing an understanding of how the Afghan and regional narcotics trade supports the insurgency and drives corruption. The IOCC partners with ISAF and other CJIATF-A organizations such as CJIATF-Shafafiyat and CJIATF-Nexus to conduct law enforcement CN operations in non-secure, predominately military environments, while bringing together the necessary resources to conduct an effective civil-military campaign to counter the narcotics-corruption-insurgent nexus.

CJIATF-Nexus, an ISAF organization with representatives from the international law enforcement community, also supports interdiction operations to counter the narcotics-corruption-insurgent nexus. CJIATF-Nexus specifically targets network functions (e.g., safe havens, movement, communications, and finance), rather than individual traffickers, in order to disrupt network resiliency. CJIATF-Nexus improved and expanded its narcotics targeting support during the reporting period, providing support for law enforcement investigations and military operations by analyzing key trafficking networks and improving visibility on powerbroker corruption in RC-S, RC-SW, RC-W, and RC-E.

The U.S. and UK Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC) continued to perform strategic-level analysis. JNAC’s mission is to provide strategic counter-narcotics policy and operational decision-makers with independent, accurate all-source intelligence on the Afghan and wider regional drug trade, and to evaluate the potential and actual effectiveness of CN strategies and operations.
Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell

The U.S. National Security Staff requested the establishment of the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) in 2008 to identify and disrupt sources of insurgent and terrorist funding in Afghanistan. Led by the DEA, with deputies from DoD and Treasury, the cell consists of DoD service and combat support agency personnel, Treasury analysts, and law enforcement agents.

During the reporting period, the ATFC assisted with Treasury designations of key individuals who moved money on behalf of narcotics traffickers and the Taliban. On February 26, 2013, the ATFC provided support to the Treasury sanction of Taliban financial facilitator Mullah Ahmed Shah Noorzai. Noorzai was simultaneously designated by the United Nations under UNSCR 1988. Noorzai was one of the ATFC’s primary targets nested in an operation against illicit hawaladars supporting the insurgency. ATFC also provided support for Treasury and UN sanctions against Taliban financial facilitator Mohammad Qasim and his hawala, Rahat LTD, on November 20, 2012. After the imposition of these sanctions, ATFC worked with Afghanistan’s Central Bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), to ensure bank accounts owned or controlled by Qasim were frozen. Additionally, sanctions investigators from Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) embedded in ATFC assisted in the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act sanctions package for Taliban Helmand Province Shadow Governor Mullah Naim Barich, who was the first Taliban senior leader to be designated as a kingpin by Treasury.

The ATFC has worked closely with the Afghan Sensitive Investigations Unit Financial Investigative Team to reveal the theft of monies from Kabul Bank. Additionally, the ATFC provided support to the SIU FIT and the Herat Provincial Chief of Police in the investigation of a kidnap for ransom ring supporting the insurgency in western Afghanistan. The resulting investigation led to the arrest of 15 kidnappers who had provided more than $90,000 to help fund the insurgency.

36 Money brokers.
SECTION 4– RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

4.1: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

According to the World Bank, real GDP growth for Afghanistan this year is projected to be robust, at 10 to 11 percent, but is expected to drop in the coming years, from the decade average of nine percent annually to a more modest range of five to seven percent a year. Economic growth prospects will depend on a number of factors, including: the security environment, improvements in the business climate, the performance of the agriculture and mining sectors, and the trajectory of international assistance. The government has continued to effectively manage Core inflation and keep it within the IMF targets. Based on the Kabul Consumer Price Index (CPI), the annualized inflation rate for FY2012 of 6.6 percent was well below the FY2011/12 rate of 13.6 percent. During the same period, the annualized inflation rate for food and non-food were 2.9 percent and 9.2 percent respectively.

It has been estimated that two to three basis points of growth are attributed to the presence of the coalition forces in Afghanistan. However, one major driver of the GDP growth rate appears to be the very high level of international funding that is transferred into the Afghan economy for services such as transportation and logistics and when it covers Afghan civil service or other labor costs, such as ANSF costs. The Afghan economy’s growth rate would likely be adversely affected if a reduction in donor funding was to occur precipitously to any significant degree. These macro factors place increased pressure on the Afghan government to identify alternative areas of potential growth and to comply with the benchmarks agreed to at the Tokyo Conference to ensure continued funding commitments. Afghanistan must achieve a series of results within specific, pre-agreed priority areas in order to maintain the flow of the four-year, $16B in commitments through 2015 made by the international donor community (donors) for development, approximately $4B each year.

Afghanistan remains a very poor country with a growing youth population and increased public expectations government delivery of services, putting pressure on the government to provide a suitable enabling business environment to gain the confidence of Afghans and investors to develop a tax base to foster additional revenues. 52 percent of development budget, or $1.04B of the $2B in FY2012 funds carried on the government’s books, is executed. The FY2013 national budget is $6.8B, with the development approximately $3.2B (adding $2.2B to the development portion of the national budget.) This will pose a significant challenge in planning, prioritization, contracting, program management, and overall financial management. Progress has been made in many areas; however, service delivery has not yet achieved a level that will bring about a consensus belief in the government and financial sustainability. Comprehensive progress is not likely for a number of years. Donors have collectively provided funding and technical expertise in significant areas, advancing Afghanistan’s overall level of capacity. Programs and projects undertaken in several fundamental areas include: building governmental capacity; jump-starting and growing the economic base; developing infrastructure; building a self-sustaining security

37 Much of the data derived for this section is from the World Bank. They assert “...collecting reliable data on Afghanistan is extremely difficult. Moreover, much of the information that is available is subject to large margins of uncertainty, as well as often problems of incompleteness, incomparability, etc.” World Bank, “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014,” May 2012.
force; laying a foundation for the rule of law; and placing additional attention on local governance processes.

The challenges noted above are compounded by the responsibility of ANSF to maintain security, a fundamental requirement of government and a necessary condition for economic growth. A secure environment is needed for services to be rendered and the private sector to engage and make investments. It is the private sector that can sustain job creation and the necessary capital investment to augment infrastructure development, especially power, roads, communications, water, and rail. Much has been achieved and there will be additional infrastructure developed in the coming four years. However, with the growing population, it is important for Afghanistan to continue to create an enabling environment which businesses find attractive. The private sector has the capital that will be required to provide the demanding level of infrastructure that can support a growing population and commercial economy. Though industry-specific institutions have provided business loans, the lack of proper internal risk-management processes leaves the Afghan financial industry vulnerable. Without adequate long-term capital available, indigenous medium-sized companies struggle to undertake commitments to develop new markets and trade opportunities.

Domestic and foreign investors are acutely aware of political environments, security situations, rule of law status, and the potential for nefarious transactions that may increase costs and risks. Six months ago, Afghanistan ranked in the lowest quartile for the World Bank’s “Doing Business” annual report. The most recent report published in January 2013, shows Afghanistan ranking 160 out of 185 countries. USAID, in partnership with the World Bank, has been working closely with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) to improve key Doing Business indicators. Additionally, USAID and USTR are supporting GIRoA, with MOCI as a key interlocutor, to accede to the World Trade Organization. USAID is also supporting the government’s development of new trade legislation, and approval of regional support agreements. Yet additional legislative changes will be needed to provide sufficient incentive for non-mining investments to be made in Afghanistan. The mining sector carries great potential for providing a steady flow of funds to the government and for capital investments, yet is stalled due to delays in passing mining legislation.

Positively, this reporting period saw bids by three international companies on two oil tenders in the Afghan-Tajik basin. This reserve is estimated to hold 946 million barrels of oil and further expansion in this area is expected. Mining of the vast iron deposit at Hajigak in Bamyan Province will not move forward until the current mining law is revised. The Ministry of Mines (MoM) received other bids this reporting period for gold and copper projects but contracts and subsequent work will also be delayed pending legal endorsement. At the Aynak copper deposit in Mazar-e-Sherif, ample APPF are on station and an arrangement for security between the China Metallurgical Group Corp. and the Afghan government is being developed.

**Agriculture**

An estimated 75 percent of Afghanistan’s population is dependent on agriculture, making the sector a significant target area for U.S. and international assistance and a priority for stabilization efforts. In order to promote economic growth and increase food security for a rapidly growing
population, Afghanistan requires adequate and consistent agriculture production. The Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), has been charged with formulating agriculture policy and ensuring its alignment with the overall development goals.

Afghanistan’s agriculture policy was articulated in the Agriculture and Rural Development Cluster (ARD) of the National Priority Programs (NPPs) that were endorsed by the Joint Coordination Management Board in February 2013. The ARD NPPs focuses on boosting licit agriculture production, increasing private sector agribusinesses, expanding irrigated land, and improving water management. The ARD NPPs also include program benchmarks.

USAID’s agricultural assistance strategy and program portfolio supports these NPP goals. The strategy is grounded in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) with an emphasis on self-reliance and building ministry capacity to deliver services to farmers and promote private-sector agribusiness to further strengthen food security and economic growth.

The USAID portfolio is focused on building relationships between farmers, agribusinesses, and MAIL to increase the adoption new technologies and practices to increase production and productivity. Investments are also focused on regional economic zones to maximize geographic impact. Alternative development remains a priority and is focused on promotion of licit agricultural value chains and the lessons of past program experience. Activities are implemented in coordination with USDA, which has programs designed to strengthen MAIL and also complement INL’s counter-narcotic objectives.

The USAID Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives in the North, East and West (IDEA-NEW) program was adjusted in 2012 to move away from short-term activities, such as infrastructure interventions, to focus on high-value crop development. The project has accomplished the following to date: Some 945,026 households benefited from interventions in target areas, 46,561 full-time equivalent jobs have been created, 7,281,586 livestock are under improved management, and 36,647 hectares are under improved irrigation practices.

The new USAID Agricultural Research and Extension Development (AGRED) program is building MAIL’s capacity to develop and deploy new technology and improved agricultural production practices. Extended conflict has left Afghanistan’s farmers years behind the region in agricultural-technology deployment, leaving the sector with poor production rates and vulnerable to threats such as pests and outdated water-use practices. AGRED is complementing USDA’s Afghanistan Agricultural Extension Project by linking extension to research and expanding the target areas for improved extension activities to more farm communities.

The USAID Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Project (CHAMP) invests in Afghanistan’s acclaimed orchard and vine crops. The $40 million program was refocused in 2012 to ensure post-harvest and farm-to-market activities are the priority through 2014. CHAMP is the primary portfolio vehicle for strengthening markets for targeted perennial commodities with a proven international and domestic market share. The project to date has accomplished the training and post-harvest management training provided to 100 apple producers. The project provided market information and guidance of sorting and marketing of
pomegranates to 50 producers. It supported establishment of over 211,000 orchards on 3,552 ha of land and supported the export of 120 tons of fresh fruit to India, Pakistan, and Canada. In addition CHAMP has increased the sale of agricultural products by more than $1 million, and brought 5,116 hectares of land under cultivation by alternative crops.

The Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) and Agricultural Credit Enhancement (ACE) is a $150 million project that provides essential credit to grow agribusinesses. The program consists of a $100 million grant to establish the ADF with MAIL and a $50 million technical assistance activity supporting MAIL in the management of the ADF and outreach to Afghan agribusiness seeking credit. Key accomplishments to date include credit procedures established that support the processing of loans worth over $20 million in 24 provinces, the launching of PAYWAND, an interactive database that informs business and policy decisions in agriculture, and the design and launching of four Islamic financial products, one of which is dedicated to women.

Beginning in the fall of 2012, the five-year USAID Irrigation and Watershed Management Program (IWMP) began work with MAIL and related ministries to increase sustainable agricultural production through more-efficient and sustainable agricultural water resource management. Water is the major limiting factor in Afghan agricultural production and requires significant improvements to its management in order to realize Afghanistan’s full production potential. The project works closely with the department of irrigation in the MAIL in implementing the $130 million off-budget and $100 million on-budget project in the North and East. The project is initially focused on the Balkh watershed in the North and addresses key issues of river basin and watershed management of natural resources, water conflict mitigation, agricultural productivity, and gender issues in the target area. This project will further build capacity of the MAIL and its relevant departments to design, manage and implement projects supporting watershed management and irrigation development and put in place the appropriate local, district and regional mechanism for watershed management in line with GIRoA’s new water law and build on and promote local ownership and management of water systems.

Begun in November 2012, the USAID Financial Access for Investing in Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA AG) projects supports a sustainable, commercially viable, agribusiness-based economy to achieve long-term stability, security and enduring peace in Southern Afghanistan. Given the South region's comparative advantages in agriculture, the best opportunity for increasing economic growth in the near and medium-term is to foster improvement in production, processing, and marketing of high value agricultural products. FAIDA AG focuses efforts on assisting buyers to obtain expanded and higher quality production to be able to access larger and higher end markets. This will be accomplished through improving input supply, harvest and postharvest management and market information and linkages in selected districts of Kandahar, Helmand and Zabul Provinces. The FAIDA AG approach emphasizes technical assistance and training to help anchor firms pull supply to reach more diverse, larger and higher value export markets and to substitute for imports. Project activities will incorporate training for agribusinesses, traders, associations, and cooperatives and encourage participation of District Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (DAIL) personnel and women.
USDA continues to implement a multi-year capacity building and change management program to strengthen MAIL’s organizational capacity to support sustainable agriculture sector development. The program employs approximately 250 change management advisors throughout the ministry and teaches annual work planning, service delivery process improvement, and organizational structure analysis. The program is also improving MAIL’s information and communication technology infrastructure by establishing reliable internet connections at the Kabul offices and the 34 provincial Directorates of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock.

USDA also continues to implement a project to strengthen MAIL’s ability to deliver more effective, demand-driven extension services to producers and other rural clientele in targeted provinces, including Kabul, Herat, Balkh, and Nangarhar. Working with USAID’s Afghan Agriculture Research and Extension Development project, the USDA extension project focuses on professional development and training for MAIL’s extension staff (primarily at the province and district level) in order to demonstrate MAIL’s ability to support farmers and promote water and natural resource management, ultimately building public confidence in MAIL’s capacity to provide services.

Additionally, USDA offers assistance to MAIL to build capacity in data collection and analysis, animal and plant health capabilities, and sanitary measures (SPS). USDA’s animal and plant health capacity building project is working to strengthen MAIL’s SPS regulatory policy and methodologies to support trade and mitigate biological risks. For example, in late 2012, USDA’s implementing partner conducted a comprehensive farm-gate survey in three provinces (Balkh, Herat, and Nangarhar) as part of the ADCUS project. The survey was both the opportunity for applied training through involvement in a large data collection effort from conception to conclusion and a tool for further refining the national survey that will take place in mid-2013.

USDA maintains approximately 20 technical field advisors embedded with military units across Afghanistan. Every quarter, these advisors contribute to approximately 200 projects, partnering with the U.S. military, USAID, State Department, and non-U.S. donor partners across Afghanistan. These agricultural experts report training hundreds of MAIL employees, who in turn are estimated to train thousands of farmers each quarter. The number of field personnel will be drawn down as the U.S. Military presence in Afghanistan contracts.

USDA offers Agricultural Development for Afghanistan Pre-deployment Training (ADAPT), designed to meet the needs of U.S. Government and NGO personnel, including ADTs. Through a combination of classroom curriculum and hands-on exercises, ADAPT trainees receive an extensive overview of the Afghan agricultural environment in technical subject areas such as U.S. Government policy and strategy, animal husbandry, rangeland management, crop and horticulture production, orchard and vineyard management, post-harvest practices, water management, and soils. ADAPT has trained 502 interagency students in 17 sessions since November 2011. To complement hands-on training, USDA provides an online knowledge reach-back tool called e-Afghan Ag. The website is a growing, publically accessible, online resource that provides credible, relevant information to those helping farmers in Afghanistan. The site draws on expertise from more than 58 institutions and has extensive links to government, university, and non-government organizations.
Continued USDA capacity building efforts, along with USAID and ADT grassroots agricultural development programs, will be important to the continued stabilization and growth of Afghanistan’s agriculture sector. Most USDA capacity building projects are funded through the end of fiscal year 2014.

A key challenge faced by MAIL in implementing Afghanistan’s agriculture strategy is the need to strengthen its data collection and analysis processes. Although most of their agriculture policy documents include 3- to 10-year program goals, MAIL’s ability to track and analyze progression towards meeting these objectives needs significant improvement.

With respect to the legal framework affecting agriculture, GIRoA’s progress has been slow. MAIL has recognized the need for new laws regulating major areas such as food safety and pesticides. Draft legislation governing the use of pesticides was initiated in 2012, but will take an estimated two years to pass. MAIL has also recognized the benefit that additional dams would provide to agriculture development with respect land irrigation and power generation for value chain development.

As international donations decline, MAIL recognizes that private sector development will be the driving force for sustaining Afghanistan’s agriculture sector and achieving self-sufficiency. In September 2012, the ministry established a Private Sector Development Directorate whose primary focus is the expansion of agribusiness domestically and abroad. Despite being under-resourced, progress is being made as this directorate has already accomplished domestic agriculture marketing campaigns and is exploring the idea of establishing a system for centralizing agriculture product information from the various grower associations across the country, as a part of its future marketing strategy. Unfortunately, uncertainty remains about whether foreign investors will be willing to invest in Afghanistan’s agribusiness sector beyond 2014 due to ambiguity about the country’s security environment following the projected withdrawal of coalition forces. Although responsibility for the country’s security is not within MAIL’s span of control, this factor will ultimately determine the success of Afghanistan’s agriculture sector.

Afghanistan entered the winter 2012 to spring 2013 lean season with a higher level of food security than the 2011-2012 lean season. At the start of that lean season, many households had low levels of stock due to the low harvest from cereal crops of 2010 to 2011. However, the 2012 wheat harvest of 6.3M metric tons, the second highest wheat harvest in 35 years, brought Afghanistan to 95 percent of self-sufficiency in cereals. Afghanistan requires 6.7M metric tons of cereals to be self-sufficient and had to rely on only 400,000 metric tons of imports. The higher-than-average wheat harvest in 2012 should also help alleviate the ramifications of higher regional and global wheat prices for the impoverished population of Afghanistan. Above average wages and availability of day work, as well as higher-than-average livestock prices, will also help impoverished Afghans to stay fed until the end of the 2012-2013 lean season. The exponential effects of a good harvest will hopefully sustain the population until the higher-than-expected average wheat harvest of 2013.

A particularly wet 2011-2012 increased food security and average household income, and provided extra food and fodder crops. Precipitation from October 1, 2012 through January 31,
2013 was variable across Afghanistan. There are currently four provinces facing 30-60 percent of the precipitation from 2011 to 2012, 12 provinces at 60-80 percent, nine provinces at 80-95 percent, one province at 95-105 percent, three provinces at 105-120 percent, four provinces at 120-140 percent and one province at just under 140 percent to precipitation accumulation over 2011-2012 season. Overall, the precipitation levels and heavily fluctuating temperature means could shift crop success upward in 2013. Spring flooding is not expected to be significant compared to 2012.

The impact of the lower total volume of crops in 2012 was offset by higher market prices. Exceptions were potatoes, at 500,000 metric tons, pomegranates and wheat, which were all at or above average yields and therefore provided adequate income to those farmers. The outlook for the 2013 grain harvest also looks promising, as the planted area for winter crops was normal and MAIL and the UN “distributed approximately 20,000 metric tons of improved wheat seeds to households across the country.” Livestock conditions and prices were also higher in late 2012, supporting better nutritional variety and food security nationwide. Consequently, the overall outlook for agricultural livelihoods and food security appears positive through summer 2013.

On February 12, 2013, the JCMB officially endorsed both National Priority Programs; NPP 1 “National Water and Natural Resources Program” and NPP 2 “National Comprehensive Agriculture Production and Market Development Program.” Highlighted in NPP 1 is GIRoA’s need to establish irrigation associations at the community level that will largely be responsible for the operations and maintenance of all existing irrigation structures. The document continues by outlining the need for repairs to irrigation infrastructure, capacity building efforts, improving watershed management, extension of natural systems monitoring, and more. Highlights of NPP 2 include the goal to improve sustainable agriculture production and productivity and increase on and off-farm enterprises, contributing to food security, inclusive economic growth, and reduced dependency of subsistence farmers and laborers on narcotic crops. All of these improvements, enhancements, repairs, and local accountabilities will help lay the foundation for agricultural and sustainable economic growth in Afghanistan.

Agribusiness development continues to be key driver to increasing overall economic growth and per capita GDP with the core rural population of Afghanistan. Many donor-funded programs are also focused on supporting core agribusiness creation, improving the agricultural value chain and increasing agricultural productivity and production. Additionally, the Agriculture Development Fund (ADF), which lends credit to small commercial farmers and agribusinesses, has reached a level where 89 percent of contracts are compliant with Sharia principles. ADF has been the foundation for the future creation of an Agricultural Bank, which will be overseen by MAIL. This evolution is improving the small-agribusiness and private-sector growth opportunities for rural farmers and encouraging foreign and national investment in agribusiness development.

Agriculture’s long-term success depends on education, capacity building, and private sector development, as well as inclusion of women in the agriculture value chain. Agribusiness development, along with private and publicly funded vocational schools focused on agriculture, agribusiness, maintenance, and operations are closing the knowledge gap on agricultural advancements that were lost over the past 30 years. Proper education, better technological knowledge, improved inputs including irrigation, and value chain improvement will support
Afghanistan’s efforts to once again become a recognized global agricultural supplier with long-term sustainability and a market-driven economy.

In concert with USDA and USAID efforts, the MAIL has joined forces to support continuing transition of assets, projects, and knowledge with online reference programs affiliated with USDA and ADT’s. The program is in the initial stages and will eventually be wholly owned and managed by MAIL. In the interim, USDA is uploading and managing the knowledge transfer and responding to requests from the international community to support the program. The U.S. Embassy’s Agriculture Policy Working Group (APWG) has also begun to build a procedural draft for the benefit of, and in conjunction with, MAIL, which will eventually be a structure for all asset, project, and knowledge transfer, and prompt MAIL to be the lead in the transition process.

**Mining**

The mining industry (both hydrocarbon and extraction) is projected to be a significant source of potential revenue for the Afghan government. Additionally, under the World Bank’s “Natural Resource Corridor” model, the sector could contribute to local economic growth. Under this development model, the activity surrounding a cluster of extraction mines and/or hydrocarbon fields would jumpstart economic activity up and down the corridors where the extraction occurs, such as logistical support, food services, etc. Maximizing the economic potential of the sector in this way would provide two sources of income for GIROA: a revenue stream from the extractive industry; and business taxes from the growing private sector.

Afghanistan has an adequate hydrocarbon law in place, however political issues surrounding a new mining law will need to be overcome and the law passed with its key points intact if the revenues from the minerals extraction industry are to be realized. Significant investments in infrastructure will also be needed to facilitate local economic activity and growth. Investments in the mining sector may be interrupted due to delayed passage of a new mining law. This law would link exploration and extraction rights, thus providing greater incentive for companies to invest in exploration by guaranteeing the right to extract.

The Ministry of Mines (MoM) had great success in the recent tenders of four major mineral deposits. These deposits consisted of two gold and two copper deposits, and are located in Sair-Pul/Balkh Provinces, Herat Province, Ghazni Province, and Badakshan Province. Bidding opened for these tenders in August 2012, and after a selective and transparent process, the winners were selected and announced to the international community in December 2012. The MoM has begun contract negotiations with the winners of these deposits, but the contracts are not expected to be signed until after the draft mining law is passed.

The Afghan hydrocarbon industry continues to mature. Currently, CNPCIW, a consortium of China’s CNPC and the Afghan company Watan, is capable of producing oil in the Amu Darya Basin, but missed its production requirements for 2012 because it has not reached an agreement to sell or process the crude oil. In November 2012, the MoM announced that a consortium of four companies consisting of Kuwait Energy, Dubai-based Dragon Oil, Turkey’s state-owned oil company TPAO, and Afghanistan-based Ghazanfar Group submitted a bid for two blocks in the
Afghan-Tajik oil tender. The Afghan-Tajik basin is estimated to contain 946 million barrels of oil, 7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 85 million barrels of natural gas liquids. This tender is expected to be awarded in spring 2013.

**Trade and Exports**

Increased trade and regional economic integration will be important for sustaining Afghanistan’s economic development beyond 2014. Over the last decade, Afghanistan has persistently run a large current-account deficit (about 40 percent of GDP) that has been offset by external funding. Afghanistan remains in a significant trade deficit position; exports remain roughly one-tenth the size of imports. The IMF expected that the Afghan current account would be in deficit, at 1.1 percent of GDP, in FY2012. This represents a decline from the current account surplus of 1.7 percent of GDP in 2010, and a slight deficit of 0.01 percent of GDP for 2011. Prospects for increased exports of traditional goods like carpets and dried fruit are only likely to be realized with greater facilitation of transit trade with its regional partners. Potential future export of petroleum, natural gas, and extractives are important for offsetting the deficit; however, progress in the near term will be limited as Afghanistan continues to build its capacity to monetize its natural resources.

Afghanistan has focused on rehabilitating and building new cross-border transportation facilities to connect with Central Asian countries, better harmonize border systems, and bring into line trade agreements with regional standards to take advantage of improved security. The Five Year Plan for improving and expanding custom facilities and practices at major border crossings for some $200M is at a mid-point. This expansion should facilitate trade, expand throughput, and encourage travel/transit through Afghanistan to other locations. Increased security at border portals and new equipment will produce an overall positive effect for trade.

At this time, Pakistan remains the single largest trading partner and most convenient source of goods and transit routes to markets for Afghanistan. However, strained political relations have limited the potential of the trade partnership. Although the Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement (APTTA), signed in 2011, was a hopeful restart of the bilateral trade relationship, there have been recent clashes, with each side imposing difficult procedures and holding trucks at the border in recent months. USAID’s trade programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been working with both governments to overcome technical, administrative, and legal issues. Nevertheless, this relationship will require a greater deal of commitment and discussion by both countries.

**Information Communication Technology**

The information and communications technology (ICT) sector has been the most successful sector of the Afghan economy and the largest contributor to GIRoA treasury other than donor funds. The ICT sector employs more than 100,000 Afghans and pays some of the highest wages in the country. This sector has accounted for nearly $2B in private investment to date. Presently, there are 19.8M mobile phone subscribers, and 88 percent of Afghans live in areas with cell phone service.
Recent developments in the ICT sector hold promise for continued economic growth. Since the introduction of 3G mobile broadband service in June 2012, 3G service is now provided by three mobile companies, available throughout 11 provinces and covering 13 provincial capitals (as of early February 2013), according to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. More than 200,000 Afghans have adopted 3G so far, with that number growing every day.

On November 18, 2012, the Afghanistan Telecommunication Regulatory Authority issued three broadband wireless access licenses, which will allow Afghan Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to provide high-speed last-mile connectivity to Afghan enterprises and institutions, thus improving access to broadband Internet service. Afghan Telecom Corp. decreased the price of terrestrial, fiber-based Internet bandwidth from $300 per megabyte (MB) per month to $97/MB/month in January 2013; this price reduction will continue to stimulate Internet demand and usage. These developments are significant because, according to the World Bank, increased broadband Internet penetration in developing countries like Afghanistan is estimated to correlate to an increased GDP.

**Fiber infrastructure.** Approximately 2,400 km of fiber, or nearly 73 percent, of the originally planned 3,300 km Optic Fiber Cable (OFC) is complete and operational to date. The strategically significant southeast sector – Kabul to Kandahar – was completed in January 2013, but is not yet operational due to security issues that correctly preclude Afghan Telecom Corporation (AfTel), the state-owned wire line and wireless telecommunications operator, from activating and maintaining this segment. The completion of the southeast segment will improve governance, development, and security in key coalition areas of operation, and provide an alternate and redundant path of connectivity into Pakistan and undersea cables to the south. Additionally, completion of the southeast segment will allow for additional fiber installation resources to be shifted to the southwest, thereby accelerating progress in that region. There are approximately 900 kilometers of fiber remaining to be installed in the southwest region.

**Cellular infrastructure.** The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology recently awarded a 3G license to the firm Roshan to join the private firms Etisalat and MTN in offering service. The ministry's goal is for 50 percent of Afghans to use 3G networks within two years. A report by the telecom research company BuddeComm estimates that in 2012, some 20 million Afghans subscribed to a mobile phone plan, an increase of 14 percent over 2011. Ten years ago, only 20,500 Afghans were subscribers.

As of June 2012, 4,670 base transceiver stations (BTSs) were in place throughout Afghanistan, providing cellular coverage to 88 percent of the population. In November 2012, AfTel announced it was embarking on a plan to roll out a new 2G and 3G GSM technology cellular network throughout the country. In support of ISAF’s and GIRoA’s stability and governance objectives, Afghan Telecom is primarily focusing on bringing communications to the underserved rural districts and providing continuous 24/7 cellular service in some of the most dangerous districts of Afghanistan. Based on an ambitious restructuring and operational effectiveness improvement program, the company is targeting June 2013 for the commercial network launch. Afghan Telecom plans to establish service in approximately 250-300 additional locations.
However, during the reporting period, as in the past, insurgents used intimidation tactics, such as threats of murder or rape, to force cell tower operators to cease cell phone service at night and during other sensitive times. This ability to intimidate is present throughout Afghanistan, but is most prevalent in the south and east. This practice reduces the positive impetus data and telecommunications operations could otherwise have.

**Satellite Infrastructure.** One of the priorities of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology is to commercially lease and use its orbital satellite slot. Afghanistan was assigned slot 50° east longitude by the International Telecommunication Union. Leasing and using its orbital satellite slot will allow GIRoA to extend communications, e-government, and broadcast services to rural and remote areas, thereby expanding its influence in both governance and development. The ISAF Telecommunications Advisory Team (TAT) advised and assisted GIRoA in devising and issuing an international competitive tender, which was released on October 9, 2012, and concluded on December 9, 2012. TAT also assisted to evaluate responses to the tender, and GIRoA is expected to award a contract to a satellite vendor in spring 2013.

**4.2: INFRASTRUCTURE**

Donor-funded development efforts continue to improve Afghanistan’s infrastructure, including roads, rail, power, and border controls. However, regulatory authorities and operations and maintenance mechanisms necessary for the long-term sustainability of this infrastructure are immature or have yet to be developed. Major infrastructure projects continued this reporting period with slow improvement.

Afghanistan’s strategic economic infrastructure continued to improve and is generally on schedule, although some projects have experienced delays. The contract award process for installation of the third turbine at Kajaki Dam has experienced further delays and will not be completed until after 2015. Progress expanding electrical distribution via the northern and southern grids, NEPS and SEPS, continued with contracts awarded this quarter, pushing the NEPS south to Ghazni and Gardez. Short-term repairs of the Salang Tunnel road surface are ongoing, keeping the tunnel passable to traffic through the winter. The more extensive Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP)-funded rehabilitation, in partnership with the Ministry of Public Works, will occur in 2013 and include road, ventilation, and drainage upgrades.

**Roads**

The expansion of the road network in Afghanistan has begun to slow, with many projects still unfunded and others experiencing significant security delays. To date, 5,430 km of provincial, regional, and national roads have been completed, while 2,266 km are under construction or partially completed. Of particular concern is the yet-to-be-completed section of the Ring Road in northeast Afghanistan.
For the East-West corridor, Italy will fund part of the road in Herat Province from Herat City to Chest-e Sharif (155 km), and also from Maiden Shar (Wardak Province) to Bamyan (Bamyan Province). The Asian Development Bank and Japan have nearly completed the road from Bamyan City to Yakawlang in Bamyan Province. The remaining sections of the East-West corridor are unfunded.

DoD is currently conducting emergency repairs to the Salang Tunnel. The Salang Tunnel runs north of Kabul through the Parwan Province along Highway 1 and is viewed as a major component of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The non-emergency Salang Tunnel reconstruction project is using CERP as its funding mechanism, and solicited for bids in August 2012. In September 2012, the Omran Holding Group, an Afghan-owned and -operated company, was selected as the preferred bidder. Currently, design and procurement of materials processes are underway. The project is expected to begin major construction efforts in spring 2013 and be completed by December 2013. The intent of the project is to make the route trafficable for another three years to allow the Ministry of Public Works enough time to find an international donor that is willing to build an alternative route to the Salang Tunnel. The search for an international donor is underway, and thus far, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank have both expressed interest in funding this project. In response to a request from GIRoA and to complement activities underway, USAID will provide operations and maintenance support for the Salang Tunnel for the next three years.

Rail

Rail infrastructure remains limited in Afghanistan, despite a number of internationally-funded rail projects. The Afghan Rail Authority (ARA) has been approved and a budget was created in November 2012. The budget included staffing at 50 percent, as the other half will not be needed until the second year of operation. This budget was not included as a line item in the Ministry of Public Works (MoPW) budget for this year, primarily because the Afghan government could not fund the ARA. Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Union (EU) have come up with a way to fund the top five to seven positions for this year, provided that MoPW appoints and funds the director’s position. This proposal was sent up in January 2013, and as of February 7, there has been little to no movement on this action.

The ARA is urgently needed, as there are several governmental and non-governmental organizations considering the possibility of constructing and operating rail in and through Afghanistan. Without the ARA, no regulatory authority exists to set rail construction standards or a standardized rail gauge for the nation. Three to five different organizations have conducted rail feasibility studies for the Afghan government, which must make a decision soon to determine which study makes the most sense for the nation, stand up the leadership of the ARA, and produce the basic rail construction laws, policies, and regulations to prove to the international community that they are serious about the potential for railway operations within their borders. Failure to do so will result in billions of dollars being pulled from this project and reallocated to current projects that are making progress.

In addition to the budget, ADB has produced the legal and regulatory framework needed for the ARA, which must be approved by Parliament. The legal and regulatory framework has been
reviewed by MoPW personnel, U.S. Department of Transportation personnel, and the U.S. Army Rail Advisory Team in-theater. Suggestions have been made and changes have been accepted to the legal and regulatory framework. This comprehensive piece of legislation now only needs the review and approval of Parliament prior to being put into law. The legal and regulatory framework is an integral part of ensuring the ARA has the proper authority to execute its duties.

**Power**

Improvements to energy transmission and distribution systems continue to be one of the top priorities for the current infrastructure development strategy because of the foundational role it plays in fostering economic development and growth. During the reporting period, Afghanistan achieved significant progress towards capacity development and strengthening of energy institutions. However, a major challenge continues to be effective commercialization and efficiency in the sector. Currently, power is only available to one-third of the population and power imports, along with domestic generation, do not provide 24-hour supply to those connected. The sector requires extensive development in capacity and skills at every level.

Major weaknesses of Afghanistan’s power sector are its lack of nationwide metering and pay mechanisms. This results in the overuse of low-cost and no-cost electricity, thereby limiting revenue potential and investment in the sector.

The major power initiative in Afghanistan is USAID’s Power Transmission Expansion and Capacity (PTEC) project, whose aim is to strengthen the North East Power System (NEPS), expand it, and ultimately connect it to the Southeast Power System (SEPS). The NEPS brings in imported electricity from the Central Asian Republics to provide power to Kabul and the communities north of Kabul. The SEPS services the areas south of Kabul in the Kandahar and Helmand areas, drawing most of its power from the Kajaki Dam and, currently, from diesel generators in Kandahar City. The NEPS and SEPS transmission lines will connect the north and south with the Gardez region into one unified system. The Kajaki Dam and power plant requires structural and power generation refurbishments and upgrades. These projects will improve employment, manufacturing capabilities, and quality-of-life in the region. Estimated completion date for the majority of the project is December 2014, although the third turbine will not be installed until 2015.

USAID’s Kandahar-Helmand Power Program (KHPP), which will improve distribution in the SEPS, has maintained activity on all project components, which include the rehabilitation of two substations (partially complete) and improvements to the Kandahar medium voltage network (early stages). Installation of unit two at Kajaki Dam was originally an off-budget project and is now being implemented as an on-budget program through Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), the national electric utility. The eight-month closure of the Pakistan GLOCs created a significant backlog of electrical materials required for this project and resulted in delays of some project components of KHPP. Following the reopening of the Pakistan GLOC in July 2012, all electrical equipment arrived at the project site. The Durai Junction substation, one of the KHPP components, is nearing completion, and the Breshna Kot substation is now progressing, following early subcontractor delays.
Additionally, DABS, has executed all urgent transformer installation upgrades in the Kandahar City distribution system. In July 2012, USACE awarded the contract for replacing and updating the 110 kV line from the Kajaki substation to Durai Junction with Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) funding. The 110 kV line from Durai Junction to Kandahar was awarded in September 2012 under the PTEC. As mentioned above, PTEC will strengthen the NEPS and extend it into the south, to the SEPS. Additionally, USAID’s PTEC project will also focus on significant technical and managerial capacity building activities with DABS, and on commercialization of the utility system. The scopes of work for these activities have been in development in recent months and will be awarded on-budget through DABS in late 2012. DABS has already issued tenders for commercialization and transmission line construction under the PTEC. USAID has received $101M in AIF funding for the first section of the connector from Kabul to Ghazni. USAID will fund the remaining segments with Economic Support Funds (ESF) funds.

The Salma Dam in Herat Province has overcome persistent security and contractual issues and work is proceeding, although the dam, a 42-megawatt (MW) power plant and transmission line to Herat, remains significantly behind schedule. The project is not likely to be completed until 2014.

Civil Aviation

The aviation capability within Afghanistan remains weak, with only limited progress made to date. The Civil Aviation Law passed Parliament in late 2012 and was published in January 2013. This law enables the establishment of a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) as an independent agency reporting through the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MoTCA). This ministry has not yet finalized the organizational structure and administrative processes for the establishment of the CAA.

Donor nations continue to provide support through the Donor Coordination Board, while aviation-derived revenues are paid directly into the general fund of the Afghan government. Direct international support continues to be provided to Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif airfields. Training for aviation services, including air traffic, airfield management, and fire support, is conducted both internally and externally to Afghanistan for Afghan personnel at Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. Despite the increased training and capacity of airspace coordination and control, transition of the Civil Aviation System operation and management directly to MoTCA will not be possible by the end of 2014 due to the lack of qualified Afghan personnel.

KAIA is currently the only airfield with some qualified Afghan personnel (air traffic control and firefighters), with additional Afghan personnel currently in training. However, by the end of 2014, there will not be enough qualified Afghan personnel available (even at Kabul) to perform necessary airport functions. MoTCA will, in order to provide uninterrupted Civil Aviation System operation, be required to contract for a third party to provide Civil Aviation System operation and management as well as continued training for Afghan personnel in these areas.

Airfield transition plans have been developed for Afghanistan’s main airfields of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-E-Sharif. Kabul, however, is currently the only airfield with a fully
endorsed transition plan. Although the transition plans for Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-E-Sharif have been provisionally endorsed by SHAPE, there is currently no resourcing for these plans. An alternate transition plan, which puts the focus on transitioning KAIA first and moves transition for the other airfields in the post-2014 period, has been developed, but not yet endorsed by SHAPE.

Although there has been limited progress, the airspace and airfield transitions are not on track for implementation by the end of the ISAF mission. President Karzai signed the Civil Aviation Law, and MoTCA, assisted by the United States and Germany, is moving forward to establish an International Civil Aviation Organization-compliant CAA. With assistance from the U.S. Embassy, MoTCA held a high-level Aviation Donor Coordination Board in March 2013. Additionally, assistance from USCENTCOM Joint Theatre Support Contracting Command will enable MoTCA to issue a contract for the high sector of the Kabul Area Control Center, albeit six months after the required Aviation Action Plan Milestone. It will be years before Afghanistan has the human capital to execute these functions independently beyond Kabul without contractor assistance.

**Operations and Maintenance Capacity**

The Afghan government continues to develop the capability and capacity to build significant transportation networks and power infrastructure. However, the ministries responsible for maintaining this infrastructure possess limited ability to adequately execute an O&M plan on the scale required in Afghanistan. The consensus among the international community and coalition military forces is that the number of assets requiring O&M support will exceed Afghan and donor resources that have been included in prospective budgets. ISAF estimates that the Afghan government currently expends approximately $330M annually on O&M, while the World Bank estimates that expenditures up to $1.3B annually will be required to sustain “known” capital investments, including security, resulting in a $1B gap between resources and projected expenditures. During the reporting period, USAID shifted focus, particularly in the transportation sector, to supporting GIRoA to increase O&M capacity.

Identification, budgeting, and financing of externally financed assets will be a significant challenge facing transition. Over the past year, various U.S. Embassy, international community, coalition military, and Afghan entities have engaged, on an ad-hoc basis, to address O&M requirements to sustain these assets. Unfortunately, data is insufficient for key stakeholders to even clearly understand the scale of the problem beyond general estimates by various entities, such as the World Bank. Although much of the recent discussion has focused on the additional funding requirements that will be required to support off-budget funded assets as they are transferred to the Afghan government, the current level of O&M funding is inadequate to support even the current assets built on-budget.

Even if a comprehensive asset registry could be obtained quickly and adequate funds were made available for O&M, the Afghan government’s nascent budgetary capacity would still be a significant limitation to successful O&M execution. A World Bank study assesses that the limitations in internal technical capacity, including contracting and procurement to seek outside assistance, would inhibit the effectiveness of any increase in O&M budget disbursed through the
Afghan Government. Currently, the systems and internal controls needed to both determine appropriate O&M spending levels and ensure that the amounts budgeted for O&M are deployed and disbursed for the appropriate activities, are uniformly deficient throughout the ministries.

The Afghan Government must maintain this political will for reforms to grow internal capacity in order to sustain existing infrastructure. Improvements in capacity will support both the budgeting process for O&M costs, as well as the disbursement of the O&M budget throughout the year, thereby increasing the likelihood of sustainability for assets and service delivery.

4.3: Health

USG assistance to the Afghan health sector, focused primarily on increasing access to health services to 90 percent of the population by the end of 2013 and reducing under-five and maternal mortality by 50 percent by 2015, is directly linked to impressive gains in national health indicators. Key positive results and connections to U.S.-supported programs are illustrated in the USAID and other donor-funded surveys. These include the Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010 (AMS), as well as the annual household survey of health status in the 13 USG-supported provinces. Survey data are especially pertinent, since the 13 provinces represent approximately 51 percent of the current Afghan population.

While this is significant progress, Afghanistan continues to have some of the poorest health indicators in the world. The health situation of women and children remains grim, particularly among migrant and rural populations, including people living in insecure areas. For example, 88 percent of married women do not use any method of family planning, and only 56 percent of all Afghans have access to clean drinking water. High levels of chronic and seasonal malnutrition, and the widespread prevalence of infectious diseases, including polio (26 cases during 2012) and tuberculosis, continue to contribute to high levels of morbidity and mortality.

To maintain and consolidate the gains made, and to move toward sustained efforts, USAID works in partnership with the Afghan government to reach four goals:
1- Meet the immediate healthcare needs of the population by supporting the provision of primary healthcare services);
2- Address the long term sustainability of the healthcare system by strengthening the capacity of the Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) at the central and sub-national level;
3- Improve the health related behaviors of individuals, families, and communities; and
4- Increase demand and access to quality health products and services through the private sector.

Key achievements and challenges

In 2012, USAID continued to build government capacity at the central and provincial levels to better manage the delivery of quality health services, with a focus on strengthening leadership, resource management, monitoring, and policy and strategy development. For example, specialized technical assistance enhanced the Ministry’s Health Management Information Systems (HMIS). As a result, 91 percent of facilities in USAID-supported provinces reported data in the HMIS during 2012.
In addition, USAID works with MoPH leadership to guide and manage the delivery of health care services in the provinces, and empowers provincial health teams to implement MoPH policies, strategies, and standards. In FY2012, an assessment of the Provincial Health Systems was designed to determine the readiness of the provinces to accept the devolution of responsibilities from the central level. In addition, the MoPH Executive Board approved the Provincial Public Health Office core functions, task guidelines, and self-assessment tools that will be integrated and used across the country in all provinces. USAID resources also supported the formal establishment within the MoPH of a Management and Leadership Development Department. This new department will institutionalize management and leadership capacity building within the MoPH. Finally, with MoPH initiative and USAID support, the Afghan government made the decision to convert the hospital sector’s legal status to that of “state-owned enterprise,” an important step toward hospital autonomy. Consequently, the MoF and MoPH were able to endorse the transfer of responsibility for procurement and finance to fourteen national and specialty hospitals.

USAID health programs have emphasized community engagement and leadership, as well as increased availability of female health staff, in order to increase access to and use of life-saving services by women. In FY2012, working closely with the MoPH, USAID continued to prioritize the training and hiring of female staff through both the Community Midwifery Education program and the new Community Health Nursing Education (CHNE) program. 53 women graduated from USG-supported midwifery education programs and, for the first time, 13 ongoing Community Midwifery Education programs were transitioned to the MoPH for implementation with on-budget resources; 259 midwifery students are currently in training through this on-budget program. In addition, Learning Resource Packages for four semesters of the new CHNE Program were completed and training for student nurses began for four programs. The faculty for the first two semesters of the CHNE program was also trained.

The most common cause of maternal mortality is postpartum hemorrhage, estimated to account for 30 percent of maternal deaths worldwide. In FY2012, USAID continued to fund community efforts in 20 districts to reduce postpartum hemorrhage occurring during home births in Afghanistan. USAID activities supported training for 497 female community health workers who counseled 2,598 pregnant women and their families on safe motherhood practices, including the use of medication to prevent postpartum hemorrhage. After counseling, 1,935 pregnant women reported using this medication; none of them reported using it inaccurately and no drug-related adverse events were reported.

The USG increased Afghan use of family planning services in 2012 by employing innovative community-based strategies, including the training of 646 health providers and approximately 23,300 community health workers (CHWs) on postpartum family planning and provision of Depo-Provera. A recent household survey in USAID-supported provinces found that the modern contraceptive prevalence rate is now 37.3 percent, significantly higher than the 16 percent prevalence rate achieved in the same provinces in 2007-2008 and the national average of 20 percent.

USAID resources continued to promote private sector support for the achievement of public health objectives in FY2012. Social marketing efforts resulted in the sale of more than 11.5
million condoms and oral and injectable contraceptive products, with a cumulative total sold since 2006 of more than 85 million socially-marketed products. This increase over the FY2011 total of 10.5 million products sold is attributed primarily to a USAID-funded communication campaign that increased demand.

The lack of trained female providers continues to pose a challenge to increasing access to, and use of, preventive and life-saving maternal and infant/child health interventions. Although USAID continues to fund activities in support of increasing the numbers of trained midwives, nurses, and CHWs, the numbers trained still lag behind what is required to significantly improve the health of target populations. Ongoing bridging activities and a new portfolio design encompassing both on- and off-budget activities will continue to address this challenge by supporting additional on-budget community midwifery training and the new community nursing program. Innovative approaches will also be explored to overcome barriers to access in areas challenged by insecurity and in other remote or hard-to-reach rural areas. These measures will be important as USAID moves through the transition process and confronts potential difficulties implementing and/or monitoring program activities. Finally, the health portfolio will undergo a dramatic shift over the coming year as bridge activities wind down — or are extended, if necessary — and new projects come online. This period will be particularly important for on-budget activities that will not only expand in scope and scale, but will also be implemented through one or more instruments that differ from existing instruments but which may facilitate a faster flow of funds to health facilities and implementing organizations. Any one of the aforementioned challenges could potentially impact future performance of the health portfolio.

4.4: EDUCATION

Education continues to be one of the most vulnerable social development sectors and is an important foundation for progress for the people of Afghanistan. Since 2002, the Afghan populace has experienced a dramatic increase in access to basic education. The Ministry of Education (MoEd) is projecting to provide access to basic education to more than 77 percent of the school age population by 2015. This is a positive aspirational goal for reducing the number of children exposed to radicalization, improving opportunities for women and girls, and increasing the literacy rate and life expectancy of the populace.

For this period, the MoEd has not yet released statistics for FY2012, but from the estimates that were shared with ISAF; the general education student enrollment at MoEd-registered schools is estimated at 7.8 million, with 4.8 million males and 3.0 million females in 13,556 government general education schools across the 34 provinces. However, the exact number of students who are enrolled, or who are actually attending school, is unknown because the MoEd does not have the infrastructure or organizational capacity to collect data that are reliable and timely. These schools are staffed by more than 180,000 teachers trained to Afghan government standards and more than 52,617 candidates enrolled in Afghan teacher training programs. MoEd, USAID and the Global Partnership for Education coordinated to launch 100 new community-based pilot education courses in southwestern rural communities and plans for further expansion, pending budget approvals. Although the quality of instruction and facilities remains uneven, the education of girls and women in the southern and eastern segments of the country has increased.
The education system has expanded to provide vocational training to young adults and literacy training to Afghans of all ages. More than 27,000 students are enrolled at 62 Afghan government Technical and Vocational Education and Training schools, which is an increase of approximately 11,000 students and 14 schools from the prior school year. A number of issues remain that impact access to and quality of basic education, including: the absence of textbooks and school supplies for multiple content areas; the lack of infrastructure in some locations; and the demand for more trained education staff.

The Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) continues to face a shortage of space (i.e., classrooms, labs, dorm facilities), qualified instructors, and student program options, and faces a youth bulge as Afghan secondary-school graduates continue to increase annually and are projected to continue for the next 10 years. Although progress has been made, the pace of material acquisition, recruitment of teachers, and support operations for schools must increase in order for MoHE to be at the necessary level of capacity and capability to improve and maintain an effective education system.

The focus on education by Afghan families varies throughout the country and by tribe. When families do not fully understand and accept education as a right as outlined in Afghan law, males not enrolled in school will be more vulnerable to illegal activities, and the implications are even starker for women and girls as they continue to be marginalized and deprived of opportunities. In the past, insurgents have used education as a weapon against the people. When the insurgents terrorized communities and blocked access to education to leverage control, they threatened the stability and security of the area. The reporting of death threats to teachers for delivering instruction and to parents for sending their children to school, and the exercise of force to close schools, negated progress made by the village, district, or provincial education leaders and development of the future of Afghanistan.

4.5: WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN

Overall, circumstances for Afghan women and girls have improved significantly since 2001; gains remain tenuous, however, and civil society organizations are concerned progress will be reversed and rights bargained away in the peace process. Many Afghan women view a possible reconciliation process with the Taliban skeptically and with legitimate concerns as to what peace talks might mean for the progress they have made over the last 11 years. The USG takes these concerns seriously and recognizes that promoting security for Afghan women and girls must remain a top foreign policy priority.

Women face entrenched societal discrimination and limits to their freedom. Violence against women is widespread but underreported. Recent ISAF efforts to get Afghan authorities to respond to complaints by women have resulted in an increase in reporting of such violence. However, large gaps remain in our understanding of this problem, and major challenges exist in Afghan attempts to address it.

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38 This section, along with the Women in the ANSF section, is submitted consistent with section 1223 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
The main U.S. Embassy body responsible for interagency coordination and monitoring of gender-related issues is the Interagency Gender Working Group (IGWG). The IGWG brings together representatives from the Embassy’s Political, Political-Military, Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs, Rule of Law, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Public Affairs, Interagency Provincial Affairs, Refugees and Economic sections, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. military, and other interagency partners as well as representatives from ISAF and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). In September 2012, the Ambassador approved the Embassy’s Gender Strategy which serves as the basis for policy and programmatic engagement on gender issues. The Strategy strongly supports the priorities of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security; among its five core goals are access to justice and security and promoting economic development for women. The Strategy also highlights the need for USG agencies to continue to mainstream gender issues into all policies and programs so that decreases in USG funding and presence in Afghanistan do not disproportionately affect women as transition proceeds.

One segment in which women continue to make notable gains is the political arena. Women hold 27 percent of the seats in the National Assembly and 25 percent of the seats in provincial councils, seats that are reserved for women by law. There are also nine women serving on the High Peace Council (HPC). With strong support from the USG and international community, Afghan women have been included in many countrywide political decision-making processes since the end of Taliban rule: the Bonn Conference in 2001; the Loya Jirga in 2002; the 2004 Constitutional Loya Jirga; the Consultative Peace Jirga of 2010; the Kabul Conference in 2010; Bonn Conference in 2011; and the Tokyo Conference of 2012. Women have also increased their presence and visibility through the National Solidarity Program and constitute 24 percent of participants in the local Community Development Councils. In aggregate, women make up 19 percent of the GIRoA workforce.

Women’s education in Afghanistan continues to improve. As of the end of the reporting period, nearly 40 percent of school-aged girls—over 3 million—are enrolled in school, including 165,000 girls in secondary school. An additional 40,000 young women attend public or private universities or technical and vocational training institutes, with more enrolling each year.

To reduce discrimination and violence against women, GIRoA enacted the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law prohibiting violence against women and adopted the convention on the elimination of discrimination against women. However, implementation of these agreements remain slow, and violence against women and girls remains prevalent. Despite advances, the troubles of poverty, illiteracy, weak security and poor health care continue to affect women disproportionately, and solutions will require a long-term, sustained effort.

GIRoA affirmed at the Tokyo Conference that the human rights of its citizens, in particular the equality of men and women are guaranteed under the Afghan constitution and in international human rights obligations. Key USAID engagements in this area include support for women’s political and civic participation through: the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC); the Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Program (APAP); Support for Increased Electoral Participation in Afghanistan (CEPPS); Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMP-UP); Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil
Society (I-PACS); the Ministry of Women’s Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment (MORE) program; the PROMOTE program; and the U.S. Embassy Kabul Public Affairs grants. The PROMOTE program will focus on increasing women’s access to leadership positions in social, economic and political sectors as well as providing women with a specially designed Women’s Leadership Development program. During the conference, the USG and key international community allies underscored that the protection of human rights of women and the gains women have made is a priority as the transition process moves forward. The TMAF includes several indicators pertaining to the rights of women, including the implementation of the EVAW and the National Action Plan for Women (NAPWA).

Ensuring women’s civic and political participation, as well as enhancing women’s status and equality, is dependent on an effective rule of law, which allows women to rely on both the informal and formal sectors to provide security and access to justice as well as raise awareness of and implement existing Afghan laws protecting their constitutional rights, such as EVAW. There are now approximately 150 female judges, up from 50 in 2003, and the Afghan Association of Women Judges was re-launched in 2012. Civil society organizations and female Afghan leaders continue to advocate for the appointment of a qualified female candidate on the Supreme Court, to no avail. Achieving greater equality within Afghanistan relies on the meaningful inclusion of Afghan women in every phase of the justice system – as police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, civil and family law attorneys, as litigants and as Islamic law scholars.

Although DOS and USAID administer the majority of women’s initiatives, DoD also oversees several programs focusing on women. These programs include assistance to the Department of Women’s Affairs in Kandahar and the District Development Assembly for Women’s Affairs in Parwan District. Additionally, coalition forces continue to incorporate Female Engagement Teams with general purpose forces on patrol in order to engage women and children of local communities in open communication, thus facilitating civil-military interactions and building trust, cooperation, and security. Similarly, U.S. SOF employs U.S. Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) that provide an enduring female engagement capability in support of special operations and VSO/ALP expansion.

USAID plays a leading role in implementing the USG’s civilian strategy for assistance to women in Afghanistan in the areas of health, education, economic development, access to justice and political empowerment, and it plays a supporting role in implementing the strategy in the area of security. All USAID programs undergo gender analysis to attribute primary and secondary benefits to gender. USAID has completed 27 gender analyses thus far.

The USG is committed to removing constraints on women’s potential, viewing their contributions to Afghan society as essential. USG policy supports the principles of equality for men and women as encapsulated in the Afghan constitution; Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). Furthermore, the USG supports GIRoA’s implementation of the Bonn Agreement, UN Resolution 1325, and the EVAW Law.

ISAF has different Gender Advisers (GA), Gender Field Advisers (GFA) and Gender Focal Points (GFP):
GAs are full-time positions in their respective division. They advise on gender issues, collate information about gender, educate the personnel and coordinate the efforts of their subcommands and external International Organizations, NGOs, and Government Organizations. The aim is to mainstream gender throughout the command structure.

GFAs may have this as a full-time position or may have it as additional duties to their main role (G-9, G-7, etc.). They advise on gender issues in order to implement a gender perspective through planning and execution of operations at their level. They collect information through visits with the local population and coordination and collaboration with different agencies. If needed, they educate local staff and GFPs on gender.

GFPs are personnel tasked to be the gender POC on gender issues within their field of expertise (Intel, Operations, Logistics, etc.). Security metrics, such as EIAs, IEDs, and complex attacks, are not disaggregated by gender. However, ISAF’s ANQAR survey is disaggregated by gender and is one of ISAF’s best tools for tracking broad trends in the security and perceptions of Afghan women. The latest wave of this survey (completed in March, 2013) interviewed 12,673 Afghans, ages 18 years and over, living in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. These interviews were completed using a multi-stage random sampling. The set of interviewees were divided into male and female sub-samples. Each province was allocated an equal number of male and female respondents per sampling point. The interviewers were matched to interviewees of the same gender, to conform to local cultural norms and preserve the accuracy of interview responses.

The following charts show female responses to several security-related questions. The ANQAR has been conducted quarterly since September 2008. All three charts show improvements in perceptions of security over time.
Figure 34: Perceptions of Security Among Afghan Women

Female Response: How is the security situation in your mantaqa?*

Female Response: Is security in your mantaqa better, the same or worse than it was 6 months ago?

* mantaqa: A term used in Afghanistan to refer to a neighborhood or area.
Female Response: How safe do you feel traveling outside of your *mantaqa* during the day?

![Survey Wave Graph](chart)

Source: ANQAR Survey wave 19.
* Mantaqa is Pashto for “local area.”
Section 5 – Regional Engagement

5.1: PAKISTAN

The United States continues to seek a relationship with Pakistan that is constructive and mutually beneficial, and that advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has normalized since 2012 and both countries have reaffirmed the importance of maintaining bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual concern. Sanctuaries in Pakistan from which the Taliban attack into Afghanistan remain a serious problem, particularly in areas of Pakistan that the Pakistani government does not fully control.

Pakistan has demonstrated a willingness to cooperate on some key U.S. goals, although challenges remain. Pakistan has publicly committed to playing a positive role in a genuine Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process, and Pakistan’s support has been essential to U.S. retrograde operations in preparation for the drawdown in Afghanistan. In addition, Pakistan continues to cooperate on some counterterrorism activities. The Pakistani military has made many sacrifices to achieve significant territorial gains against Tehrik-e Taliban (TTP) and other militant groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which have disrupted insurgent groups by reducing their safe haven. In spring 2013, the Pakistan military launched operations against TTP in Khyber Agency to enhance security near the border and deter attacks against Pakistani and Afghan targets.

Since July 2012, Pakistan has also sought to increase its engagement with Afghanistan. Bilateral visits between Pakistan and Afghanistan have increased over the past year, including recent high-level visits by Foreign Minister Khar and Chief of Army Staff General Kayani to Afghanistan and Minister of Defense Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, Foreign Minister Rassoul, and Afghan High Peace Council Chairman Rabbani to Pakistan.

However, there are limits to Pakistani cooperation. While Pakistan values stability in Afghanistan, it also seeks sufficient Pashtun representation to prevent Pashtun discontent on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, and to restrict India’s influence. To achieve these goals, Pakistan continues to adopt a posture of acceptance, and occasional support, to Afghan-focused insurgent groups that attack U.S. and coalition forces. Pakistan still falls short on interdicting and disrupting the production of IED components, despite greater engagement and recent cooperation on the issue. Cross-border incidents and lingering mistrust remain points of tension in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and both countries continue to question each other’s commitment to advancing a political settlement in Afghanistan.

5.2: INDIA

The Indian government continues to support GIROA, believing a secure and stable Afghanistan will not serve as a sanctuary for anti-Indian militants and will facilitate New Delhi’s efforts to build economic corridors into Central Asia. India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership declaration in 2011, which formalized cooperation on governance, economics, commerce, education, public administration, and security/law enforcement. Subsequent engagements have continued to reinforce the positive relationship between Afghanistan and India.
India supports a variety of high-visibility projects and initiatives in Afghanistan. Indian assistance is primarily focused on major infrastructure projects such as electricity generation and transmission and road construction. In a broadening of its focus from development to investment, India’s SAIL Consortium was awarded 75 percent of the rights at Bamyan Province’s Hajigak iron ore mine in November 2011.

India has also expressed interest in bidding on future tenders throughout Afghanistan. For example, India and Afghanistan finalized plans for construction of the Indian-funded Afghan Parliament building. India continues to support the construction of the Salma hydroelectric dam in Herat Province. Although the dam project has been chronically delayed, recent funding by the Indian government contributes to the projected completion date of late 2014. Beyond construction, India continues to support the development of Afghan human capital through scholarship programs to Indian universities (more than 1,000 scholarships per year), agricultural training programs, and other vocational training activities. Public opinion surveys continue to show that Afghans have a favorable view of Indian involvement in their country.

India continues to show interest in Afghan security assistance through strengthening ANSF capabilities, although activities in this area have been limited to date. India currently provides scholarships for ANSF personnel to study in India, and the Indian government also is exploring options to train female Afghan police in India.

5.3: Central Asian States

The Central Asian States host the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a cargo delivery network which provides multiple ground and air transportation routes into and out of Afghanistan for commercial carriers and U.S. military aircraft. Prior to the November 2011 closure of the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) to ISAF cargo, the air and ground routes of the NDN already functioned as the primary routes for sustainment goods into Afghanistan. Maintaining the NDN LOCs remains critical to ongoing operations in Afghanistan. Over the past couple of years, the NDN has diversified with new over-flight permissions and expanded ground transit agreements encompassing “reverse” transit and transport of wheeled armored vehicles.

Beyond the NDN, the Central Asian States have participated in infrastructure and economic development to Afghanistan. As Afghan infrastructure continues to develop, expanded road, rail, electrical power, and air networks should serve to facilitate increased commercial activity between Afghanistan and its northern neighbors.

The Kyrgyz Republic hosts the Transit Center at Manas International Airport (TCM), a key transit point for U.S. and coalition force movements to and from Afghanistan.

Narcotics, arms trafficking, and smuggling are transnational threats in the region. These activities threaten legitimate commerce and the flow of strategic resources, damage societies, and often benefit terrorist networks. The Central Asian states’ concerns in Afghanistan include the

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39 Central Asian states are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.
spread of violent extremism in the region and threats stemming from the narcotics trafficking and other related criminal activities. According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Tajikistan remains the primary route for Afghan-produced narcotics to Russian markets, with conduits through other Central Asian States. Border security remains a top concern for the Central Asian States, which are closely attuned to the implications for their own countries stemming from events in Afghanistan and developments in narcotics trafficking.

A lack of security relations between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries continues to hamper border security. Security relations with Central Asian states, including military-to-military and police-to-police relations are underdeveloped at both at the upper and middle levels. Exchanges and meetings between security officials are rare. Some progress was made in improving security relations between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan when the Kazak defense minister visited Kabul during the reporting period.

5.4: CHINA

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has two primary interests in Afghanistan: security and economic. It continues to seek improved relations with, and stability for, Afghanistan, while it devotes diplomatic effort to developing a deeper economic relationship. Beijing has given no indication of plans to commit security personnel to Afghanistan, although it does have a program to help train Afghan police.

Since 2002, the PRC has committed more than $200M in aid to the Afghan government, and in 2009, China announced it would provide an additional $75M over the next five years. Further, PRC companies will likely continue to invest in Afghanistan, most notably in the development of Afghanistan’s mines and infrastructure. The PRC has begun development of a section of the Amu Darya oilfield, and is currently conducting a feasibility study for a rail system to support extraction efforts at the Aynak copper mine. However, the PRC continues to have security concerns, including issues such as Uighur separatists who find haven in lawless border areas, the safety of PRC workers in Afghanistan, and narcotics trafficking into western China. The PRC and Afghanistan exchange regular political visits and seek cooperative bilateral efforts on counterterrorism and counter-narcotics issues. Beijing has also voiced its support for reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and the Taliban.

Although the PRC maintains a strict policy of non-involvement with ISAF security operations, it has provided ANSF personnel a variety of non-lethal, PRC-based training to bolster Afghanistan’s security and stability since 2006. Training for the ANP conducted at People’s Armed Police municipal training facilities has covered policing skills, crowd and riot control, criminal investigations, and internal security duties. The PRC has also offered basic, advanced, and senior military courses for ANSF officers at Peoples’ Liberation Army military training colleges and universities.

Beijing has continued to support regional diplomacy, most notably by involving President Karzai in regional economic summits. Following years of informal involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Afghanistan was awarded observer status at the SCO during
this reporting period. The PRC is also an active participant in the ongoing Istanbul process, and PRC representatives attended the ministerial conference in Kabul in June 2012.

5.5: RUSSIA

Russia seeks a stable Afghanistan to minimize the threat of terrorism and stem the flow of narcotics into Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus. Russia has also supported Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts. Based on a commitment made at the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Russia continues to expand the types of cargo shipped by rail and air via the NDN and also permits the reverse transit of goods back through the NDN.

Russia recognizes terrorism as being closely intertwined with narcotics trafficking. Hence, Russia’s interest in expanding CN cooperation has continued with its participation in multilateral meetings, UNODC programs, and calls for greater international support for CN efforts in Afghanistan. The NATO-Russia Council plans to expand its Central Asian CN program, which trains CN personnel from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and now Pakistan, in Russia, Turkey, and via mobile training teams.

Russia supported Afghanistan’s bid for observer status within the SCO and has welcomed that designation. This has highlighted the increasing emphasis Russia places on regional cooperation mechanisms for economic, development, and security in Afghanistan as ISAF draws down.

5.6: IRAN

Iranian determination to have a long-term role in Afghanistan is consistent with its aspirations for regional influence. Iran continues to call for the permanent withdrawal of all foreign forces from regional nation-states. Iran’s attempts to influence events in Afghanistan includes overt support for the Afghan Government; economic and cultural outreach to the Afghan population, particularly to the Shi’a minority populations; and covert activities, including the provision of weapons and training for various insurgent and political opposition groups.

Politically, Iran seeks to maintain positive relations within the highest levels of GIRoA while attempting to steer Afghanistan away from an enduring Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States. In addition to maintaining a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, Tehran often uses high-level visits and key leadership engagements to criticize the presence of international forces in Afghanistan and to call for the withdrawal of ISAF publicly. Various Afghan officials continue to solicit further Iranian support, despite evidence of Tehran’s covert support to insurgents.

Since 2001, Iran has pledged more than $1B in aid to Afghanistan and given more than $500M. Iran’s reconstruction and development efforts have been largely concentrated in western Afghanistan. Iran’s intent is to increase its influence among the local population in order to foster pro-Iranian sentiment. Iran also wants to expand its sphere of influence beyond border regions into other parts of Afghanistan, particularly Kabul. Iran currently maintains consulates in Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif and is considering opening additional
consulates in Bamiyan and Nimroz Provinces. Iran also participates in the regional Istanbul process.

Iran continues to provide lethal assistance, including light weapons and training, to elements of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Since 2007, coalition and Afghan forces have interdicted several shipments of Iranian weapons. Tehran’s relationship with the insurgency, though not ideologically based, is consistent with Iran’s short- to mid-term goal of undermining coalition efforts and opposing the international military presence in Afghanistan.

Beyond economic and security issues, the protracted Afghan refugee situation continues to be a contentious issue between Iran and Afghanistan. Approximately 1M registered Afghan refugees and about 1.4M undocumented Afghan migrants (non-refugees) currently reside in Iran. Economic pressures and the Iranian government’s discontinuation of subsidies on basic goods and services has led to a rise in the repatriation of Afghan refugees since 2011, but during this reporting period, Iran has not forcibly expelled or returned registered refugees. The deportation of undocumented Afghans (non-refugees) continues, though at a reduced pace compared to previous years.

5.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES

The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) continue to provide support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and have worked to provide financial support in the interest of a stable Afghanistan. Private Gulf citizens, however, are also a source of considerable funding for the Taliban and other terrorist groups that operate in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

GCC states provide the United States key basing facilities and access in support of the mission. Many of the GCC countries provide important air bases and over-flight and transit rights for operations in Afghanistan and logistical support of these operations. GCC countries host USCENTCOM’s forward headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Headquarters, and U.S. Army Central Command Headquarters (Third Army). GCC countries host key air and naval facilities and provide staging capability for combat, ISR, and logistics operations in support of U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan. On the ground, the UAE has contributed combat forces, with about 250 Emiratis serving alongside coalition forces, and Bahrain has deployed a small contingent primarily tasked with guarding Camp Leatherneck.

Further, GCC nations have supported humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, including the establishment of refugee camps in Pakistan, financial assistance, and aid for Afghan refugees. GCC countries are likely to continue support to Afghanistan after U.S. and coalition combat operations end.

Gulf countries and their ongoing large-scale construction projects provide opportunities for migrant labor. Afghan participation in this labor force has been large and could continue to be a

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40 GCC members are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
major source of remittances, further contributing to the economic development of Afghanistan. A number of wealthy Afghan expatriates choose to live in the GCC states, deepening the economic, political, and familial ties between the countries.

5.8: JORDAN

Jordan continues to be a key supporter of the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. To this end, Jordan contributes forces to train the ANSF and provides specialized capabilities such as SOF, aviation, medical, and religious and cultural engagement. Jordan provides more than half of the advisors to the female training battalion at the Kabul Military Training Center and maintains female engagement and cultural advisory teams. Additionally, a Jordanian Engagement Team conducts training for ANA Corps leaders, religious and cultural affairs officers, ANA soldiers, and local religious leaders to counter the insurgency’s narrative.
ANNEX A: SECURITY METRICS

A.1: ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS\textsuperscript{41}, NATIONWIDE YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE (APRIL 2009 – MARCH 2013)

The figure below depicts no change in EIAs from the corresponding period one year ago.

\textsuperscript{41} Enemy-initiated attacks comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks only (IED/mine explosions); potential or attempted attacks (i.e., IEDs/mines found and cleared, prematurely detonated IEDs, and IEDs turned in) are not included.
A.1: **MONTHLY SECURITY INCIDENTS**\(^{42}\) (April 2009 – March 2013)

Security incidents include direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, and IED events. IED events include IED explosions, IEDs found and cleared, mine explosions, and mines found and cleared.

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\(^{42}\) Security incidents include direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, and IED events. IED events include IED explosions, IEDs found and cleared, mine explosions, and mines found and cleared.
A.2: ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS (April 2009 – March 2013)