DOES U.S. ARMY HUMINT DOCTRINE ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES? WHAT HAVE IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN TAUGHT US?

by

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March 2013

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The most vital source of National Intelligence information is derived from Human Intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT, the eldest intelligence discipline, has proven to be a force multiplier for commanders during the Global War on Terror.

As the Army downsizes its forces, refocuses priorities, and prepares for its Army 20/20 vision, it will need to ensure that HUMINT remains at the forefront. In the coming years, the Army plans to downsize its force by 80,000 troops; it will also shift its focus toward the Asian Pacific region. As this transition happens, the Army should capitalize on ten years of operational experience. The Army currently possesses a large number of professional and experienced collectors; and has a unique opportunity to analyze their knowledge to answer the question: Does U.S. Army HUMINT doctrine achieve its objectives?

To address this question, the author describes problems encountered by HUMINT in Iraq and Afghanistan. By identifying issues, the Army can adjust its doctrine and training to meet the changing needs of the nation. The author proposes that the Army should restructure the HUMINT MOS to better fit the current operations. This would improve the quality of the collector and eliminate shortcomings identified by HUMINT professionals.
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2013

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ABSTRACT

The most vital source of National Intelligence information is derived from Human Intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT, the oldest intelligence discipline, has proven to be a force multiplier for commanders during the Global War on Terror.

As the Army downsizes its forces, refocuses priorities, and prepares for its Army 20/20 vision, it will need to ensure that HUMINT remains at the forefront. In the coming years, the Army plans to downsize its force by 80,000 troops; it will also shift its focus toward the Asian Pacific region. As this transition happens, the Army should capitalize on ten years of operational experience. The Army currently possesses a large number of professional and experienced collectors; and has a unique opportunity to analyze their knowledge to answer the question: Does U.S. Army HUMINT doctrine achieve its objectives?

To address this question, the author describes problems encountered by HUMINT in Iraq and Afghanistan. By identifying issues, the Army can adjust its doctrine and training to meet the changing needs of the nation. The author proposes that the Army should restructure the HUMINT MOS to better fit the current operations. This would improve the quality of the collector and eliminate shortcomings identified by HUMINT professionals.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

35F   HUMINT Officer
35M MOS HUMINT Collector (After 2007)
351M  HUMINT Warrant Officer
35L MOS Counter Intelligence Agent
97E MOS Interrogator (Prior to 2007)
AAR   After Action Reviews
AF    Afghanistan
AIT   Advanced Individual Training
ALC   Advanced Leadership Course
AO    Area of Operations
AOKM  Army Operational Knowledge Management
ASI   Additional Skill Identifiers
ASPG  Army Strategic Planning Guidance
ASOC  Advanced Source Operations Course
ASVAB Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
BCT   Brigade Combat Team
BNCOC Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course
CALL  Center for Army Lessons Learned
CCIR  Commander’s Critical Intelligence Requirements
CDR   Commander
CELLEX Cellular Phone Exploitation
CHATS CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set
CHIMS CI/HUMINT Information Management System
CI    Counter Intelligence
CID   Criminal Investigation Department
CIDNE Combined Information Data Network Exchange
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency
COCOM Combatant Commands
CSP  Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph
CTL  Critical Tasks List
CTSSB  Critical Task / Site Selection Board
CW2 (3-4-5)  Chief Warrant Officers
DATC  Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course
DCGS-A  Distributed Common Ground Station–Army
DCHC  Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center
DCI  Director of Central Intelligence
DCS  Defense Clandestine Service
DHA  Detainee Holding Area
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency
DIIR  Draft Intelligence Information Reports
DLAB  Defense Language Aptitude Battery
DLPT  Defense Language Proficiency Test
DLI  Defense Language Institute
DNI  Director of National Intelligence
DoD  Department of Defense
DOCEX  Document Exploitation
DOMEX  Document and Media Exploitation
DP  Displaced Persons
DTA  Detainee Treatment Act
EPW  Enemy Prisoners of War
EEFI  Essential Elements of Friendly Information
FBI  Federal Bureau Investigation
FRAGO  Fragmentary Order
FDS  Field Detention Site
FM  Field Manual
FORSCOM  U.S. Army Forces Command
FOUO  For Official Use Only
G-2  Deputy of Staff for Intelligence

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSO</td>
<td>Military Source Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSOH</td>
<td>Military Source Handler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTOE</td>
<td>Manpower and Equipment Requirements &amp; Authorizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCS</td>
<td>National Clandestine Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPF</td>
<td>National Intelligence Priorities Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Counsel</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLC</td>
<td>Office of Legal Counsel</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMT</td>
<td>Operational Management Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>Operational Tempo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Open Source Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>Priority Intelligence Requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLDC</td>
<td>Primary Leadership Development Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>Request for Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCIF</td>
<td>Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Source Directed Requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Sergeant First Class (E-7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Sergeant (E-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH</td>
<td>Source Handler</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPR</td>
<td>Secure Internet Protocol Router</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>Source Operations Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Staff Sergeant (E-6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>THT</td>
<td>Tactical HUMINT Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training &amp; Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAIC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Intelligence Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>WLC</td>
<td>Warrior Leader Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>WO1</td>
<td>Warrant Officer 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOBC</td>
<td>Warrant Officer Basic Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOCS</td>
<td>Warrant Officer Candidate School</td>
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I. DOES U.S. ARMY HUMINT DOCTRINE ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES? WHAT HAVE IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN TAUGHT US?

A. INTRODUCTION

The most vital source of National Intelligence information is derived from Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Human intelligence, which is the oldest intelligence discipline,\(^1\) through the course of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has proven a force multiplier for combat commanders. Information gathered directly from human interaction is immensely valuable and indispensable. Prior to the development of modern day technical intelligence collection platforms of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), HUMINT was the chief method of gathering intelligence. Throughout its history, U.S. Army Human Intelligence professionals have exploited spies, deserters, prisoners, and captured documents to provide commanders the most reliable intelligence picture.

As the Army resets from Iraq and Afghanistan, downsizes its forces, refocuses its priorities, and prepares for the new Army 2020 vision, it will need to ensure that HUMINT remains at the forefront. Recently, the Army announced it plans to downsize its force by 80,000 troops, and it will shift its focus toward the Asian Pacific region. As the Army transitions, it should capitalize on ten years of operational experience. The Army fortunately possesses a sizeable number of professional and experienced HUMINT collectors, and has a unique opportunity to analyze challenges faced by HUMINT. By analyzing these challenges, TRADOC can modify its training and doctrine to prepare for future conflicts. This is the intent of this thesis.

The 9/11 attacks exposed a national need for additional intelligence professionals, as well a demand for larger and a more skilled HUMINT capability. Washington Times journalist Frank J. Cilluffo wrote that “there is no substitute for experienced and

knowledgeable human intelligence specialists,” and although the Army has made tremendous efforts to fill this need, institutional problems still exist. The Army’s objective has been to expand its HUMINT capabilities by increasing the size of its force, and by enhancing training and employment of collectors at all levels. The Army’s effort to improve its capability has included changing the HUMINT Field Manual, expanding training by establishing a new HUMINT training center and deploying thousands of troops to gain valuable real world experience. These efforts have made notable strides in professionalizing the HUMINT corps, but nevertheless, Army leadership continues to express frustration with its HUMINT capability.

Although over the years there have been many recommendations on Army intelligence reform, this thesis is unique in that it recommends restructuring the HUMINT military occupational specialty (MOS) to meet changing objectives. Before discussing MOS restructuring, it is necessary to identify existing problems and other professional recommendations on improving HUMINT.

B. PROBLEM 1—HUMINT ROLE IS CHANGING

The primary problem stems from the expanding role of the conventional Army HUMINTer. Traditionally, the role of the HUMINT military occupational specialty (MOS) centered on interrogations but has since evolved beyond the interrogation booth. During past conventional wars, such as WWII and Vietnam, there was a need for a large number of young interrogators; this was due to the large number of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs). Young interrogators frequently shared characteristics with the EPWs they interrogated. This commonality between the detainee and interrogator aided the collection of intelligence. As the nature of U.S. conflicts changed from conventional warfare to operations other than war, such as in the Balkans, or counterinsurgency


(COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the role of the Army Interrogator expanded. Army interrogators no longer solely interrogated. The missions necessitated the use of trained interrogators in military source operations (MSO), force protection screening, debriefings, and analysis. The Army needed fewer specifically trained interrogators and more individuals to perform a wider range of military source operations and other HUMINT related tasks. Regrettably, training did not teach these tasks to collectors.

Since the beginning of the Global War on Terror, the Army human intelligence MOS has continued to evolve and collectors are required to perform more tasks than ever before. While the role is changing, HUMINT training has failed to sufficiently keep up with the growing responsibilities. This represents the primary problem facing Army HUMINT. The U.S. Army’s HUMINT mission is not appropriately supported by its doctrine and training. In 2007, the Army recognized the growing duties and responsibilities of an Interrogator and changed of MOS’s name and nomenclature. The new 35M (HUMINT collector) replaced the old 97E (Interrogator) MOS.5

Along with the changing of the MOS’s nomenclature, changes also came to doctrine and training. In September of 2006, the Army released the new Army Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3 that “provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing the employment of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and analytical assets in support of the commander’s intelligence needs.”6 The new manual, mixed with command guidance, necessitated lengthening initial training to accommodate for 19 newly identified critical tasks.7

HUMINT doctrine describes the critical tasks as Debriefing, Liaison, Screening, Tactical Questioning, Document and Media Exploitation (DOCEX/DOMEX) Analysis, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), Military Source Operations and Interrogations.8 The Army employs HUMINT in a variety of missions, depending on the military operation, to

6 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations (Ft. Huachuca, AZ: DoA, 2006), VI.
7 Andruszka and Stemler, “Training the Corps.”
8 Headquarters, FM 2-22.3, vi.
include offensive, defensive, stability, and reconstruction operations. HUMINTers collect intelligence through screening, interrogation, debriefing, liaison, and human source operations. Sources of HUMINT can include first- or second-hand knowledge from ally, neutral, or enemy forces. “Categories of HUMINT sources include but are not limited to, detainees, enemy prisoners of war, refugees, displaced persons, local inhabitants, friendly forces, and members of foreign governmental and nongovernmental organizations.”

In spite of the Army’s efforts at changing doctrine and improving training, they have not done enough. Army HUMINT has grown at a rate with which training has not been able to keep up. The Army still trains interrogation as the primary skill even though collectors are performing fewer and fewer interrogations. Military Source Operations (MSO) and other tasks are considered secondary. “In terms of training, only six weeks of 18 weeks of the 35M Course is devoted to MSO vis-à-vis interrogations.” Having been through the course, this thesis’s author remembers the MSO instruction as inadequate. Soldiers require comprehensive training to conduct proper MSO.

Trainers only briefly mention other HUMINT tasks and devote almost no time to teaching and perfecting them. DOMEX, analysis, and OSINT, although important, are traditionally thought of as less critical than Interrogations or Source Operations. While training does not emphasize these skills, unit commanders still expect proficiency in them. One task in particular, analysis, is extremely crucial regardless of the HUMINT activity. The fact is that analysis of HUMINT reporting is extremely vital. FM 22-2.3 states “analysis is an integral part of HUMINT collection … [and] occurs throughout the HUMINT collection process;” but unfortunately, it takes a back seat to collection. Since the collection aspect of HUMINT is extremely time-consuming, collectors often neglect or do not have time for the analysis portion. Analysis at the human collection team (HCT) level is often non-existent. Additionally, unlike SIGINT’s, the human intelligence field does not have designated analysts. All Source Analysts (35F), which

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9 Headquarters, *FM 2-22.3*, ch. 12, para. 12–1.
rarely interact directly with collectors, do the majority of the analysis of HUMINT reporting. This creates a problem, where the analysis of reports and sources is far removed from the collectors. Moreover, collectors often are not able to discuss and explain the nuances of reports or sources with the analysts, leading to misinterpretation or dismissal of crucial information.

Another contributing difficulty to analysis is that traditionally, unit intelligence “fusion” centers exclude HUMINT collectors. There are two root causes for this. The first, HUMINT soldiers lack the clearance to enter Top-Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF), preventing collectors from participating in intelligence briefings and operational planning.12 As a result, HUMINT operator’s concerns and opinions are excluded from the decision-making process. Second, HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs) accompany maneuver units to small patrol bases, away from the intelligence centers whereas; the analysts are located with the Brigade fusion centers.

The current objectives and tasks identified in Army FM 2-22.3 are clear and valid; however, amid a changing operational environment the problem arises in identifying which tasks are the most crucial. The Army seems to prefer MSO collectors to interrogators, and while analysis is extremely vital, it gets insufficient attention.

C. PROBLEM 2—ARMY HUMINT INCREASED QUANTITY AT THE EXPENSE OF QUALITY

In addition to the expanding role of HUMINT, the Army also adopted a policy of “Growing HUMINT Capability.”13 For the past several years in the Army’s Posture Statement, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 has said that the Army plans to create a “robust, well-trained HUMINT force.”14 During the Global War on Terror, the U.S. Army drastically increased the number of HUMINT collectors in the field, tripling the size of

12 Until recently, HUMINT collectors were required to have only a Secret Security Clearance. The Army has since changed this policy.
14 Ibid.
its force. The active duty HUMINT force grew from 950 soldiers in 2004 to approximately 3,500 in 2011.\textsuperscript{15} Currently, Army Intelligence is the largest force provider for worldwide full-spectrum Department of Defense (DoD)-level HUMINT operations.\textsuperscript{16} This increase in size, regrettably, came at a price. Quality of collectors has suffered at the expense of quantity.

1. **Lowering of ASVAB Score**

   To fill the need for additional HUMINTers, the Army lowered the qualification requirements for entry into the MOS. The U.S. Army’s Recruiting Command responded by reducing the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery’s (ASVAB) Skill Technical (ST) score from 100 to 95.\textsuperscript{17} Recruiting Command, feeling the pressure to provide more HUMINTers, granted waivers to individuals who previously would not have qualified for the MOS. Allowing these soldiers into the MOS required Advanced Initial Training (AIT) standard to lower to the least common denominator. “One officer in charge of an aspect of the 35M training admitted that the Army had ‘lowered the standards for these HUMINT soldiers in order to get more of them out to the field and into the fight.’”\textsuperscript{18} While this facilitated the Army getting soldiers into the field quickly, it decreased the quality of the soldier’s collection ability.

2. **Suspension of DLAB and Language Training**

   Standards were further reduced when, in 2004, the Army suspended the foreign language proficiency requirement. Language suspension facilitated quick deployment of soldiers but further decreased the quality of the collector. Previously, recruits were mandated to pass the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) with a minimum score


\textsuperscript{17} The ASVAB is the entrance exam all soldiers are required to take, it measures developed abilities and predicts academic and occupational success in the military.

\textsuperscript{18} Randazzo, “Fixing Tactical HUMINT,” 24.
of 95% to be eligible for the MOS. The suspension of the language requirement essentially meant that soldiers no longer had to take the DLAB, although the Army never officially removed the requirement. The DLAB test measures a person’s ability to learn a foreign language. Those who are able to learn a foreign language are usually far more effective HUMINTers. Strong collectors, who demonstrate an ability to learn a foreign language, are remarkably familiar with the language after spending a year in Iraq or Afghanistan, even if they did not formally study it.

When the HUMINT MOS required soldiers to learn a foreign language, new recruits attended the Defense Language Institute (DLI), where they would learn one of 24 languages.\(^\text{19}\) DLI Language programs vary in length from 26 to 64 weeks of training, depending on the language difficulty. Arabic, for example, is a 64-week course while Dari, Pashto, and Persian Farsi are 48-week courses. While at DLI, soldiers learn vital information about the language, culture, and customs of their country. DLI offers Cultural Exposure Exercises that provides students a sense of the operational environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, during language training, students study in a combined Army/academic environment that allows students mature and gain precious knowledge of a target language and culture. DLI’s military training permits soldiers to develop a deeper understanding of basic Army policies and procedures. Soldiers also foster writing skills and acquire a greater understanding of military operations by interacting with instructors, senior military personnel, and experienced soldiers from other job fields. In some cases, soldiers are even able to earn associates degrees from DLI. Since 2001, DLI has awarded more than 4,000 associate degrees.\(^\text{20}\) During this additional time spent in language training, soldiers build up confidence, maturity, and cultural understanding of target countries. These traits, as the data will suggest, are vital to be effective HUMINTers in combat environments.


By lowering the entrance qualification, requirements and removing the language requirement the Army reduced the abilities of the collector. This has created a knowledge gap among collectors and, although not their fault, many collectors do not possess the skills required to perform proper their job.

D. PROBLEM 3- REWRITING THE INTERROGATION MANUAL

A third problem arises from the legality of past and present interrogation doctrine. Since the scandals associated with Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay interrogation facilities, there have been debates on the legal and ethical conduct during interrogations. These debates led the Army to establish new legislation governing interrogation. Based on this new legislation, the Army rewrote its interrogation manual the new FM 2-22.3 “Human Intelligence Collector Operation.” Despite this change in doctrine, problems remain within the interrogation function of the MOS.

Problems with interrogations include several factors. First, mistakes made within interrogations facilities have placed a black eye on the Army interrogation program, putting practices under severe scrutiny ever since. This scrutiny often led to commanders not wanting to conduct interrogations in fear of repeating past mistakes. Additionally, as the U.S. transfers responsibility over to host countries, the Security Agreements often restrict the length of detainment. In Afghanistan, for example, according to the Memorandum of Understanding between Afghanistan and the U.S. states that the U.S. should turn detainees over to Afghan security forces or release them within 72 hours.21

In addition, initial entry soldiers receive a mere 44 days of interrogation training, but the Army expects them to be both professional and effective in the booth. This shortage of training, as the data will show, has proven to be insufficient during combat operations. The Army lacks an adequate amount of follow-on training or sustainment training, further compounding the problem. As the literature review will demonstrate, that

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while the new manual is highly regarded as a significant improvement to interrogation operations, many have voiced concerns that it has shortcomings that hinder future interrogation operations.22

The combination of these issues makes one wonder whether interrogation should remain as the MOS’s primary task. Should the Army change its policy on training young initial entry soldiers in interrogations; or should interrogation become the responsibility of mature and experienced collectors?

E. METHODOLOGY

To develop insight into problems facing HUMINT, the author relied upon data collected from a combination of, personal experience, and research. Initially, the author’s unique perspective, as a Human Intelligence Warrant officer, formed the research topic and hypotheses driving this study. Beyond personal experiences, this research project analyzes literature from multiple sources to offer a comprehensive examination on whether U.S. Army HUMINT’s current doctrine meets its objectives. The author reviewed scholarly books and articles, military academic theses, and papers on intelligence reform. By understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the National HUMINT effort, one can apply these opinions directly to improving U.S. Army HUMINT.

The author will argue that the best method on solving HUMINT issues would be for the Army to restructure the MOS and align soldiers exclusively to one geographical region. Geographical regional alignment has succeeded with other Army communities, such as Foreign Area Officer and Special Forces. The author suggests that soldiers entering the MOS should be designated as HUMINT analysts in order to emphasize the primacy of the analysis mission. First term HUMINTers would have limited collection responsibilities and focus on report writing, OSINT, DOMEX, cultural knowledge and

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other aspects HUMINT. The Army would reserve collection for the second term soldiers, primarily E-5 and above. HUMINT collection would be divided into two tracks; soldiers would choose between interrogation and MSO. They would receive advanced training in their chosen field and be assigned an additional skill identifier (ASI). Upon completing advanced MOS training, they will attend DLI to acquire a language in their assigned region. With a designated ASI and language identification, code (LIC) it would be easy for Human Resources Command (HRC) to assign soldiers to appropriate units. Chapter V will discuss this recommendation.

1. **Personal Experience**

   The author drew motivation for this research from personal experience as a HUMINT Platoon leader and Operational Management Team (OMT)\(^\text{23}\) Chief during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq from 2008 to 2010. As 172nd Infantry Brigade’s OMT Chief, the author guided the operations of eight individual four–five-man HUMINT collection teams operating in five separate provinces. The Brigade’s footprint stretched across the Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit provinces. This large area was conducive to HUMINT source operations, and each HCT collected intelligence from numerous sources.

   The Brigade conducted limited interrogation operations during its one-year deployment. Of approximately forty-two HUMINT collectors only three, (including the author), received the required “Theater Interrogation Training.”\(^\text{24}\) At the Brigade level, less than a dozen actual interrogations took place. Most HUMINT collectors strictly performed Military Source Operations. About half of the collectors had previous real world HUMINT experience; of these, only one Staff Sergeant had ever worked as an interrogator in a combat environment.

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\(^{23}\) The OMT performs a necessary function when two or more HCTs deploy by assisting the HUMINT element commander in tasking and providing technical support to assigned or attached HCTs. *FM 2-22.3*, ch. 2, para. 2–10.

\(^{24}\) Theater Interrogation Training is required before being authorized to interrogate. Training consists of Geneva Conventions Training, Authorized Approaches Training, Separation Training, Force Protection Training, as well as conducting left and right seat ride interrogations.
Although the 172nd Brigade (BDE) acquired additional collectors for the Iraq deployment, the Manpower and Equipment Requirements & Authorizations (MTOE) only authorized the Brigade with seven HUMINT and Counterintelligence personnel. This authorized number of HUMINT assets was woefully insufficient. The Brigade’s MTOE authorizes the Military Intelligence Company (MICO) one CI team consisting of one CI Warrant officer, one CI Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) and one CI lower enlisted. Likewise, the BDE’s MTOE authorizes only one HUMINT team; that includes one HUMINT Warrant, one Senior NCO, and two lower enlisted soldiers. This authorized number of HUMINT assets is dreadfully unrealistic, and without additional supporting assets, the Brigade could not fulfill its wartime mission.

The Brigade’s lack of HUMINT assets continued as they prepared to deploy to Afghanistan in 2011. The MICO struggled to maintain an adequate number of HUMINTers to support their upcoming mission. For the first eight months upon returning from Iraq, the HUMINT platoon lacked a Senior NCO to act as a Platoon Sergeant. The Army assigned many of the experienced collectors to follow-on units or the soldiers exited military service. By the beginning of the Afghanistan deployment, only two sergeants of seventeen soldiers remained from the previous deployment. One additional Staff Sergeant had arrived to the unit with previous HUMINT experience. An experienced and capable Warrant Officer (WO1) became the platoon leader/OMT chief; however, but he arrived to the unit only a few weeks before the deployment and did not have time to become familiar with the unit’s collectors.

The majority of the HUMINT collectors were young and inexperienced. None of the soldiers ever attended any foreign language training. The bulk came straight out of AIT (advanced initial training). The unit made every effort to train these soldiers, but mandatory non-HUMINT unit training trumped any distinct MOS preparation. Before deployment, the unit only managed to send four soldiers to the Source Operations Course, which is the primary course for MSO. The collective knowledge of the HUMINT platoon was well short of what was needed.

Even with an available 17 soldiers, the MICO struggled to fill a 3-man OMT and 4-four-man HCTs. Five of the newly arrived soldiers were non-deployable. Three
soldiers had physical profiles that prevented them from deploying. The soldiers acquired these physical limitations during basic training, AIT or even before entering military service. These tactical HUMINT collectors would likely never be able to deploy or perform their job in the real world scenarios. Units throughout the Army had similar complications.

Two areas in which the author felt the HUMINT platoon needed particular training on are automation & research tools, and reporting cycle & intelligence requirements. These skills were not sufficiently taught during AIT and created problems as the unit prepared to deploy to Afghanistan.

a. **Automation and Research Tools**

Soldiers had limited knowledge of the automation, communication, and research tools they would use in the field. In past deployments, many soldiers were not familiar with the classified systems they were expected to use. Inexperienced HUMINT soldiers rarely conduct research at the unclassified and classified level, often become frustrated with complex systems, and simply stopped using them.

There are two good examples of this practice. The first is the misuse or non-use of the HUMINT Tool Kit. The tool kit, known as CI/HUMINT Information Management System (CHIMS) and CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS), is the primary equipment issued to HUMINT teams. It includes a computer, scanner, digital camera, printer, GPS, secure telephone, and other hardware to meet mission requirements. Unfortunately, because of unfamiliarity with the operation of many of the peripherals, teams often only used the laptop computer, and left the other devices in storage.

To complicate this matter was the Army’s policy on banning thumb drives. To ensure that Soldiers were not using external storage devices, unit S6 shops often blocked USB ports on all computers. This practice essentially rendered the

peripherals useless. Although these systems technically should not have had their ports blocked, many times when HUMINT teams requested to be connected to the Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR), S6 shops would, by routine, make the ports inoperable. Remedying the issue was a lengthy process, for which the teams often did not have time.

A second example was the practice of not using programs designed specifically for HUMINT reporting. It was commonplace for soldiers to default to using MS Word and Outlook to write and send reports because they were more familiar with them. A specific example was a system used by CENTCOM. It is a reporting tool named the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE). Of which MG Flynn said, “CIDNE provides a platform for organizing knowledge in order to answer the fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.”

This program offers multiple features, such as routing intelligence information reports (IIRs), searching for additional intelligence reports, plotting and mapping tool, as well as a system to send and receive intelligence requirements. Though it is a valuable tool, soldiers who are not familiar with it are unable to fully utilize its potential. Bandwidth shortage and complexity of the system further encouraged teams to default to using MS Word and secure email to communicate, practically rendering CIDNE useless at the HCT level.

Training should produce soldiers that are familiar with HUMINT tools before using them in a combat environment. Additionally, shoulders should be taught to use other research tools such DCGS, SOMMS, M3, Intellipedia, and other open source resources.

b. Reporting Cycle and Intelligence Requirements

Another issue is soldiers not completely understanding the reporting cycle. Many soldiers fail to understand the reporting cycle beyond the HCT/OMT level. Novice collectors should recognize that their reporting fits into a larger intelligence picture.

Information collected from one source could answer intelligence requirements from other units or agencies. Unfortunately, collectors often fail to look beyond reporting for the company or brigade that they support.

Along with this, new soldiers are not familiar with intelligence requirements on which they should collect. The reason for this is simply that they are not taught how to do so. Ten level training concentrates so much on appropriate questioning techniques, it fails to explain why the soldiers are asking questions in the first place. It has been said that there is no such thing as intelligence for intelligence’s sake. FM 2-22.3 states, “The HUMINT collector needs not only to know, but also to understand the requirements that he will be attempting to answer. These requirements can include Commander’s Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIRs), Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs), Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP), specific requests from national level consumers such as HUMINT collection requirements (HCRs), source directed requirements (SDRs), or even vocal orders given by the local commander. These all will determine the objective of the questioning plan.”

HUMINTers should be taught how important requirements are and should understand where requirements derive. “All intelligence requirements for collection are and must be based on and traceable to the NIPF [National Intelligence Priorities Framework].” The NIPF is the “sole mechanism for establishing national intelligence priorities,” and is updated and presidentially approved semiannually. Although each HUMINT report references NIPFs and PIRs, soldiers rarely understand their importance. It usually takes one operational assignment to grasp the significance of intelligence requirements.

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2. Scholarly and Military Opinions

This research encompassed scholarly opinions from national intelligence experts, such as Amy Zegart who has written extensively on the intelligence failures of 9/11 and intelligence reform and Dr. Mark Lowenthal, who wrote *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. The author focused on scholars that addressed intelligence reform like Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber book, *Transforming U.S. Intelligence-Managing HUMINT*. Furthermore, this research utilized academic papers and theses completed by Intelligence officers from the National Defense Intelligence College, Naval Postgraduate School, and United States Army Command & General Staff College. The Evaluation of Current Policies section covers these papers that concentrate on personal opinions of utilization of Tactical HUMINT teams.

3. Professional HUMINTer Opinions

To provide current and relevant data the author evaluated testimonials and survey material from HUMINT professionals. This data originated from post deployment after action reviews (AARs), and on-line intelligence forums. The opinions reflect individual sentiments and experiences of U.S. Army HUMINTers, and largely vary. These firsthand accounts offer unique perspectives from those with deployment experience. Informative trends emerged while reviewing this material, many of which supports this thesis’ hypotheses.

Although, these opinions are useful, there are limits to there validity. These thoughts are deeply rooted in personal experiences, and contain biases that might not represent HUMINT as a whole. Likewise, comments are from opinion forums, in which individuals are not held accountable for their statements nor do the opinions have any effect on Army policy or doctrine.

F. SOURCES

To gather data that highlights the problems with Army HUMINT, the author relied upon Army websites, such as Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and the Army Professional Forum – Military Intelligence Space (MI Space). The data collected
from these sources was reviewed to determine what the consensus is on failures of HUMINT. These websites provide a wealth of information written by active duty Enlisted Soldiers, Warrant Officers, Officers, and other HUMINT professionals with combat deployments.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned collects opinions of lessons learned from combat experiences. By contacting CALL the author received more than 90 HUMINT-related documents from a senior military analyst. These documents included unit after action reviews, unit developed HUMINT standard operating procedures (SOP) manuals, intelligence articles, and other HUMINT related material on current obstacles to HUMINT policy, doctrine, and training.

Some of the most useful documents were the after action reviews written by units returning from deployment. Since, every deployment is unique, based on location and that no two units employ their HUMINT collectors in the same manner, these AARs represent the most comprehensive data available. The AARs cover both interrogation and military source operations and identify specific issues that HUMINT collectors encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. The objective of reviewing AARs was to determine if there were common systemic problem areas within HUMINT.

Equally as valuable were opinions gathered from on-line professional forums, specifically from the Military Intelligence Space (MI-Space) forum. MI-Space is one of more than 60 professional forums available from the Army Operational Knowledge Management (AOKM) System. It is an online professional forum where members share knowledge and resources. Professional forums foster collaboration among Soldiers, subject matter experts, and units. Online forums help the Army share “expertise and experience, develop intuitive leaders, and develop organizations and teams.” They “provide a secure place where candid conversations can occur.” As of November 2012, Army Professional forum had 264,719 members, and MI-Space had more than 3,700 members.

31 Ibid.
The Army calls its supported and structured communities of practice “professional forums.” AOKM provides a nested network of more than 60 facilitated professional forums and hundreds of knowledge networks that provide a foundation for knowledge creation and exchange. These professional forums differ slightly from communities of practice found in other professions and industry. Army professional forums focus on leader development. They intersect with other knowledge networks, communities of purpose, and knowledge centers through their members and facilitators. They maintain a secure place where candid conversations can occur.

Through these online professional forums, Army Soldiers and civilians connect to share explicit and tacit knowledge to solve problems, share best practices and develop their professional skills. Leaders and staff members have access to members with similar duty positions and challenges. Functional specialists and those interested in a particular specialized domain gather virtually in focused forums. Many members of AOKM forums maintain dual membership in two or more forums and serve to vitally transfer observation, insights, lessons learned and best practices across the boundaries of organizational hierarchy.32

MI-Space forum provides the most up-to-date discussions about the Army’s Intelligence corps. MI-Space separates forums into each of the unique intelligence disciplines, which enables members to focus discussion among those with similar interests. MI-Space members include Officers, Warrant Officers, Enlisted, Retirees, and various other intelligence professionals. For this research, the author utilized the HUMINT specific forum.

To answer this thesis’ principle research questions: Does U.S. Army HUMINT Doctrine achieve its Objectives? What have Iraq and Afghanistan taught us? The author combined data from his own personal experience, scholarly opinions, military papers, lessons learned, and opinions from professional forums. This data represents opinions ranging from the National level down to the Tactical level. This collection methodology intended to gather as much relevant information possible. Chapter III will cover all relevant findings.

32 Army Operational Knowledge Management, “Professional Forums AOKM Forum.”
G. CHALLENGES

The U.S. Army intelligence corps faces challenges in the years ahead; with the reduction of troops and budget, how can the Army continue to professionalize its remaining troops? The Army’s HUMINT capabilities remain essential for successful intelligence operations. HUMINT played a critical role in the success of the Global War on Terror, and has proven to be extremely valuable in all operational environments.

The 35M HUMINT Collector MOS grew rapidly since the onset of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. During GWOT, the Army deployed thousands of HUMINT collectors. The Army currently has a robust and highly experienced HUMINT force. In a changing operating environment, the Army must ensure that it retains skilled and experienced HUMINT operators, while at the same time professionalize the entire MOS.

Although, today’s HUMINT collectors are the most experienced and capable that the Army has ever possessed, the rapid growth caused a decline in the quality of collection and reporting. Today, weak collectors occupy many positions throughout the ranks; many of these collectors have limited interpersonal skills, writing abilities and basic traits that HUMINT collectors should possess.

In addition to the presence of weak collectors, the Army faces another challenge with the availability of quality training. Advanced or sustainment training is often hard to come by. The Army is constrained by funding, course availability, and training slot obtainability, along with countless other factors. Training among the HUMINT corps varies drastically. TRADOC offers several MSO specific courses, but interrogation courses are limited. Likewise, the type and amount of training an individual collector has significantly varies. Strong collectors are often rewarded with advanced training; whereas, weak collectors rarely receive any. These drawbacks, and the problems mentioned in Chapter I, have led to the following hypotheses.

H. HYPOTHESES

1. Across the Army, experienced HUMINT collectors have conducted only a small subset of assigned tasks. The Army would better meet its intent by redefining HUMINT primary tasks.
A wide range assigned HUMINT tasks has created a force whose specialties vary dramatically from one another. This has caused limited proficiency in areas that soldiers have not worked. Those with experience with interrogations may be proficient in screening and interrogations but may have zero experience with source operations or liaison work.

The roles and responsibilities of the Army HUMINT have grown beyond what a single collector can reasonably master.

2. Human Intelligence Collectors (35M MOS) lack regional language and cultural expertise required to conduct HUMINT properly.

- Frequent assignment changes and deployments to various regions of the world have prevented soldiers from acquiring the regional knowledge and language expertise in any one country.
- The suspension of the language requirement has decreased the quality of HUMINT collector. HUMINT would benefit from reinstating the language requirement, but only if the Army assigns Soldiers to position in which they utilize the language.

3. Training suffered during the Global War on Terror. AIT allowed soldiers to complete initial training even though they lacked the skills to perform the job properly.

- Some collectors lack the age and maturity to engage the populace of the host country.
- Some collectors lack basic writing and analytical skills to write reports, in a manner that answers the commander’s intelligence requirements properly.

4. By restructuring the MOS, collectors would be better suited to satisfy assigned HUMINT tasks.

- Initial entry soldiers should not be collectors, but rather HUMINT analyst.
- Interrogations and Military Source Operation should be separated into two tracks.

I. OVERVIEW

The remainder of the chapters will expand on the problems facing Army HUMINT, while also recommending the best way to capitalize on the experience and talents of current collectors.

Chapter II discusses and evaluates current Army policies and training. It provides a short synopsis of current 10 level and advance HUMINT training programs. It then
reviews writings from scholarly intelligence experts and proposes that experience Army collects could supplement the national HUMINT enterprise. Next, the author discusses how and why the Army modified its interrogation doctrine, and rewrote the field manual governing HUMINT collection. The final portion discusses Military sentiments that express a need for greater capability and improvement of current HUMINT.

Chapter III takes an in-depth look at the findings of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website, unit AARs, and MI-Space professional online forums. The data collected here provides insight into HUMINT related issues and addresses the primary research question and hypotheses of this study. It presents questions on whether or not the current training system meets the needs of the Army, particularly what is the primary HUMINT task and is the Army training soldiers to be proficient in it. The chapter also addressed concerns about the importance of foreign language proficiency. The final two topics touched on are, making HUMINT a non-entry level MOS, or splitting the MOS into analysis, interrogation, and source operation tracks.

In Chapter IV, the author provides his conclusion and recommendations. This thesis suggests that the Army HUMINT has never been in a better position to capitalize on real world experience to professionalize the corps. The author makes recommendations on how to adjust current policies, and training to match what collectors face in the field. These recommendations provide a possible framework on how U.S. Army human intelligence can remain relevant and bring Army HUMINT on par with other Defense HUMINT agencies.
II. CURRENT POLICIES

A. CURRENT POLICIES

The U.S. Army remains committed to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns around the world and requires trained professional HUMINT collectors to achieve its goals. Claims advocate HUMINT has lost much of its stature due to the development of highly technical intelligence disciplines as signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and measures and signals intelligence. Over the past ten years, there has been renewed recognition of the importance of HUMINT. International intelligence professional Kerry Patton suggests, “America’s HUMINT is like the bald eagle--it may be endangered, but it is making a comeback.”33

With the successes of HUMINT during the GWOT, the intelligence community has identified a need for a robust and aggressive HUMINT. The U.S. Army has led the way to improve its HUMINT capability to provide proper training and professionalize the corps.

1. Doctrine

DOD HUMINT falls under the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and is executed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), COCOMs, DIA, and Military Departments. The Army field manual (FM-22-2.3) provides the “doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing the employment of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection.”34 Only specially trained collectors carry out Army HUMINT. These include enlisted personnel in the MOS 35M (HUMINT Collector), enlisted personnel in the MOS 35L (Counterintelligence Agent), Warrant Officers in the MOS 351M (Human Intelligence Collection Technician), Warrant Officers with the 351L MOS (Counterintelligence Technician), and Commissioned officers in the MOS 35E


34 Headquarters, FM 2-22.3.
(Counterintelligence Officer) and MOS 35F (Human Intelligence Officer). These trained collectors are the only authorized Army personnel that can legally conduct HUMINT operations.

Many commanders often consider HUMINT and Counterintelligence as one in the same. However, it should be noted, that counterintelligence specialties are not allowed to conduct interrogations, and conversely, Human Intelligence specialties do not conduct counterintelligence investigations. Throughout GWOT CI Agents (35L) largely worked as source handlers. MSO often took precedence over the CI mission downrange. This overlap in operations complicates the role of HUMINT. For the purposes of this paper, policies, doctrine, and training for the counterintelligence field will not be covered.

2. **Training**

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) at Fort Huachuca is responsible for providing Army personnel HUMINT training. Ft. Huachuca provides numerous HUMINT training opportunities. Similar to the increased numbers within the MOS, the Army has also expanded the HUMINT courses available. Available training includes the initial MOS producing course as well as advance HUMINT training.

In 2007, the Army G-2 and Ft. Huachuca worked closely with the DIA to establish the HUMINT Training – Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JCOE). HT-JCOE is DoD’s only training center for advanced HUMINT and, as of 2011, provides 11 advanced HUMINT training courses. In addition to providing training to Army personnel, HT-JCOE is working to “establish joint HUMINT training standards” and expand joint training across the “Defense HUMINT Enterprise.”

HT-JCOE has three separate branches, the Military Source Operations Branch, Interrogations Branch and the Debriefing Branch. A general concept of Army HUMINT training structure is described below.

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a. **Advanced Individual Training (AIT)**

The Human Intelligence Collectors course is the primary MOS producing school. During this 18 week 3 day training course, HUMINTers are trained and evaluated on 51 critical tasks. Training is divided into four modules that culminate with a field training exercise. Module A teaches HUMINT foundations. It is a 10-day training that covers, Law of Land Warfare, information security, protecting classified material, intelligence cycle and other military skills such as map reading. Module B is the longest training cycle, it consist of 44 days of interrogation training. It covers developing an interrogation plan, authorized approach techniques, questions and other related tasks. During Module C, which lasts 29 days, soldiers learn Military Source Operations. Soldiers learn about establishing rapport, the recruiting cycle, management of intelligence collection funds (ICF), and other MSO responsibilities. The Final Module D is a 10-day field training exercise where students perform all tasks in a simulated real world environment.\(^{37}\)

![Figure 1. Percent of Course by Training by Module](image)

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\(^{37}\) Andruszka and Stemler, “Training the Corps,” 30–32.
The 309th Military Intelligence Battalion (MIBN) is responsible for the HUMINT collectors’ course. The 309th MIBN says, “Soldiers graduating from the 35M 10 Course are fully prepared to rapidly assimilate into their permanent units as HUMINT Collector.”

Throughout the course, students learn to fully incorporate Military Justice and Intelligence Law into HUMINT collection services and operations. They practice interrogation techniques and procedures to include planning and preparation; questioning techniques; screening; assessment; approaches; research, and the application of analytic skills to curriculum problem sets. Students write numerous HUMINT related reports; identify information gaps; perform predictive analysis, and prepare link diagrams, time event charts, and activity and association matrices. Students learn to coordinate mission requirements with interrogators, interpreters, and translators to meet mission or unit requirements and are familiarized with Distributed Common Ground Station–Army (DCGS-A) system as part of their HUMINT automation training.

b. Advanced Training

Advanced HUMINT training can be divided into 3 categories. Training consists of Military Source operations, which are the most robust, interrogation training, and other training that includes the Strategic Debriefing Course and civilian courses.

(1) Military Source Operations. “MSO refers to the collection of foreign military and military-related intelligence by humans from humans.” Military Source Operations utilizes networks of informants to provide timely and accurate intelligence to superiors. Within the Army, only trained personnel conduct MSO under the direction of their commanders. “MSO sources include one-time, continuous, and formal contacts, from contact operations; and sources from interrogations, debriefings, and liaison activities.”

The Army divides MSO into three separate categories based on skill level. Category III MSO is taught during initial training. Level III MSO is the lowest
level, is usually overt, and does not allow HUMINTers to run formal contacts. Essentially formal contacts are recruited and can be tasked, trained, and paid. HUMINT sources are maintained or terminated based off their level of Placement and Access to intelligence information. Each source is carefully controlled to ensure oversight and deconfliction. All HUMINT and CI personnel are authorized to conduct level III MSO. To perform Level I-II MSO soldiers must attend additional certifying course. Soldiers that receive this training are awarded additional skill identifiers (ASI).

HT-JCOE’s Military Source Operations Branch offers five courses: Source Operations Course, Defense Advanced Trade Craft Course, Joint HUMINT Officer’s Course, Joint Source Validation Course, and Joint Foreign Materiel Acquisition Course. Of these courses, the two main ones are the Source Operations Course and the Defense Advanced Trade Craft Course.

The primary course that certifies collectors to conduct Level II MSO is the Source Operations Course (SOC). SOC is a Joint Certified seven-week course that prepares collectors to conduct secure MSO in hostile foreign environments. SOC awards graduates the ASI S7. This course has extremely restrictive qualification requirements, and there is no guaranty of successful completion. 42 SOC graduates are authorized to run formal contacts. During GWOT the Army made a push to have at least one member of a four man HCT to be a SOC graduate, although, this was rarely the case.

The Primary course for certification for category I source operations is the Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course (DATC) formerly known as the Advanced Source Operations Course (ASOC). This intense course is eighty-nine days long and ensures graduates can survive and conduct MSO in various environments. The course covers “MSO legal parameters; the HUMINT operational cycle; surveillance and surveillance detection; report writing; the use of intelligence funds, and other topics.”43 Candidates for DATC must have completed SOC or equivalent course, and be granted approval by a selection board. Army graduates of Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course

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43 Ibid.
receive advanced skill identifier VA. This course has a tremendously high operational tempo and students must at all times conduct themselves as they are performing MSO in a foreign country. The average attrition rate is around 21%. Commanders are advised only to send motivated personnel with the aptitude and desire to perform at their best in demanding environments. DATC/ASOC graduates are rare and a valuable commodities, the Army has made an effort for each Brigade to have at least one.

(2) Interrogation. HT-JCOE also provides five courses in interrogation. The Joint Analyst and Interrogator Collaboration Course teaches analysts and HUMINTers to work together to effectively obtain intelligence from detainees. The Joint Interrogation Management Course teaches the management of interrogation operations for HUMINT Officers. This course does not certify students to conduct interrogations. The Joint HUMINT Analysis and Targeting Course also teaches interrogators and analysts to work together but focuses on “three core competencies: Lead Development, Source Validation, and Personality Based Targeting.” The Joint Interrogation Certifications Course certifies sister service personnel, DoD civilians and Army counterintelligence personnel to conduct interrogations. Joint Senior Interrogator Course is advanced training for senior interrogators and is gear toward senior NCOs and Warrant officers that have extensive operational experience. Unlike MSO, these courses do not provide additional skill identifiers.

(3) Other Training. In addition to the courses already mentioned, there are numerous other HUMINT courses available. These include the HT-JCOE Defense Strategic Debriefing Course (DSDC) and civilian taught courses. “DSDC’s mission is to train the art of strategic debriefing—the collection and reporting of national-level information acquired from usually willing and cooperative U.S. and foreign sources.” DSDC is a 5-week joint certified course that awards an ASI. Civilian

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taught courses include but are not limited to the LSI Scan course, and the Reid Interrogation Course. These courses are geared more toward law enforcement but are applicable to Army HUMINT.

Although the Army offers several training opportunities, not every HUMINT collector is afforded the opportunity to attend them. Limited funds prevent a large number of soldiers from attending training. In addition, units often do not want to lose personnel for extended amounts of time other non-MOS training and daily business take precedence over HUMINT training. Many HUMINT course can last months. Getting training for soldiers is difficult in its own right but is further complicated by minimum requirements that not all HUMINTers possess. These include clearance levels, minimum rank and experience requirements.

B. EVALUATION OF CURRENT POLICIES

Researching U.S. Army Human Intelligence has its challenges. Several aspects of HUMINT impede research as a whole. One issue is that much of the research conducted in the realm of HUMINT, focuses on the CIA and national level clandestine operations. Extremely little, outside the Army, is written about military source handling at the tactical level. Additionally, since Army HUMINT operates at the Secret level, much of the information is classified, or at a minimum at the “for official use only” (FOUO) level.

This chapter identifies three themes; first, it identifies scholarly opinions from intelligence experts. These opinions come from books published about intelligence failures and reform, and advocate a need for a robust National HUMINT Capability. Based on this need the author recommends that other intelligence agencies utilize Army collectors. The Army’s experienced and trained collectors should have a greater role the DIA’s HUMINT collection effort.

Next, the chapter discusses the legal aspects of interrogation and the changes that happened since the 2004 Abu Ghraib scandal. It proposes that although the Army required a large number of interrogators in the past, in current conflicts, this is no longer
the case. Since interrogation has become a sensitive topic, within both the international community and domestically, Army interrogators need specialized advanced training to ensure it avoids repeating past mistakes.

The final theme covers opinions about HUMINT at the tactical level. The chapter examines Army literature and opinions from commanders in the field. Drawing from other’s real world experience allows for a greater understanding of overarching problems identified within human intelligence.

1. **Theme 1: Intelligence Scholars and Experts**

   Homeland Defense and Security Scholars and Experts within the Intelligence community agree intelligence reform is needed within the national HUMINT apparatus. Over the past several years, there have been several studies recognizing a need for larger and improved HUMINT capability. This includes a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) internal study that advocated that the DoD concentrated too much “on the gathering of intelligence via technological means rather than human intelligence…which emerged as a glaring capability gap as the war on terrorism ramped up.” 47 This DNI study was not the first to identify a deficiency in the national HUMINT capability. Numerous Blue Ribbon Commissions and experts in National Security have identified a similar demand for human intelligence.

   In the book *Spying Blind*, leading national expert on the Intelligence Community scholar Amy Zegart argues that HUMINT within the CIA and FBI, before and after 9/11, was not accomplishing its intended mission. She points out that even a decade before 9/11, there were several commissions, governmental studies, and task forces that examined the Intelligence Community all-urging for intelligence reforms. She states there were “twelve bipartisan commissions, governmental studies, and think-tank task-forces that examined the U.S. Intelligence Community” all of which urged for intelligence

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reforms. Of these reports, the majority found a “need to revitalize human intelligence.” “Nine of the twelve reports called for more aggressive human intelligence efforts.”

Former CIA officer Burton Gerber argues for reform with a joke that rings remarkably true within the HUMINT community. He writes, “A few years ago, a cartoon in the New Yorker depicted several executives around a conference table looking at a chart with a sharply downward trend line. The man pointed at the chart saying, ‘the dip in sales seems to coincide with the decision to eliminate the sales staff.’” This image also portrays what happened within the U.S. HUMINT community. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the defeat of Russian forces in Afghanistan in 1988, the U.S. government removed many clandestine agent handlers from the countries in which they were experts. This meant that the U.S. removed many case officers in Afghanistan and lost its eyes and ears in the country from which Al Qaida would later originate. Ex-CIA national clandestine service officer John MacGaffin also recognizes, “the need for real transformation in clandestine HUMINT.” MacGaffin argues that HUMINT is an “indispensable element of national intelligence collection,” which is in desperate need of rejuvenation.

MacGaffin, although wary about DoD conducting its own clandestine operations, makes a case for using Army collectors for broader nationally focused missions. He suggests that with proper guidance, clear lanes, and coordination the national HUMINT apparatus can utilize DoD assets to free up the limited number of CIA officers. He urges that the various intelligence agencies should stop competing with one another and lend mutual support to improve the overall national clandestine HUMINT effort. MacGaffin declares, “the intelligence community has never before been able to put aside the parochial interests of its component parts and truly organize itself for the ‘national good.’”

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49 Ibid.


52 MacGaffin, “Clandestine Human Intelligence,” 95.
Tactical Army HUMINT can learn from these scholarly opinions ensuring it avoids similar problems. Traditionally, as the military downsizes after major wars it loses experienced soldiers. These soldiers leave the military and move to civilian careers in agencies like the CIA, DIA, or law enforcement, leaving a gap of trained professional within the Army. Army Major Dylan Randazzo suggests that Army HUMINT collectors can “make $170K per year as civilian contractors conducting interrogations.” The Army must retain trained and experienced soldiers. There are two reasons for this: First, these experienced soldiers are best suited to train future generations; they can provide the practical expertise that Army training manuals cannot. Second, experienced and quality collectors can enhance the military side of agencies like the DIA, where Army collectors already have a role.

Recently, the DIA announced the creation of the Defense Clandestine Service (DSC), which consists of both civilian and military operators. Army HUMINT, which makes up the largest DoD HUMINT force, should prepare to fill the need for more HUMINT collectors in the field. Operating at this level requires the highest standards. Training must resemble and be comparable to Army’s counterparts in the DIA and CIA. With the corps current group of trained and experienced collectors, individuals can be assigned to DIA to maintain their expertise developed during GWOT.

On 24 April 2012, the Pentagon placed the Defense Clandestine Service under DIA’s direction. Understanding the need for greater HUMINT capability, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta signed off on the new agency. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Michael G. Vickers, and CIA’s National Clandestine Service carefully designed the new service to improve cross agency communication and broaden national intelligence capabilities. Congress, whose approval was not required for the creation of DCS, was subsequently briefed on the new service’s intent before its establishment.

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53 Randazzo, “Fixing Tactical HUMINT,” 27.
2011 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) internal study, which outlined gaps in DIA HUMINT collection, was the foundation for DCS’s creation.\textsuperscript{55}

This newly created DCS intends to strengthen DoD’s HUMINT effort. It plans to transfer 15% of the current DIA’s HUMINT officers into positions that complement the intelligence effort. About 300 officers will shift focus from tactical missions, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, to long-term strategic emphasis. DCS consists of DIA and military officers and its numbers will grow in the next few years “from several hundred to several more hundred.”\textsuperscript{56} DCS intends to professionalize its agents and offer “new, more clearly delineated career paths [that] will give DIA case officers better opportunities to continue their espionage assignments abroad.”\textsuperscript{57} The Army must follow suit and professionalizing its HUMINTers.

In the past, experienced DIA and Military case officers transitioned to positions within the Pentagon or CIA because their overseas clandestine operations were not rewarded.\textsuperscript{58} “The new service intends to curb personnel losses, making clandestine work part of the Pentagon’s professional career track and rewarding those who prove successful at operating covertly overseas with further tours and promotions, similar to their CIA colleagues.”\textsuperscript{59} Increasing the number of Army HUMINTers working in this capacity would strengthen not only Army HUMINT but also national HUMINT. Likewise, it will reduce the number of Army collectors leaving the military for civilian positions.

As Washington policymakers shift the emphasis from Iraq and Afghanistan toward the Asian-Pacific region, DCS ensures DoD’s officers are in locations that satisfy national intelligence requirements. Although the CIA’s National Clandestine Service

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} Oldham, “Defense Clandestine Service Formed by DoD.”
\item \textsuperscript{56} Schmitt, “Defense Department Plans New Intelligence Gathering Service.”
\item \textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
(NCS) has the lead in foreign HUMINT, the creation of DCS complements its capability. DCS will address security issues in Africa, China, North Korea, and Iran, among others. DCS agents will work closely with the NCS and other intelligence agencies to “integrate defense intelligence capabilities with the broader intelligence community by leveraging unique military capabilities.”60 DIA and military agents already work closely with the CIA in field offices around the globe; the new service will simply refocus attention to answering both DoD and National Intelligence’s global requirements.61 Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber advocate a need for greater HUMINT capability. They say: “There are state-based challenges that deserve our continuing and persistent attention, such as the rise of China, the nuclear plans of North Korea and Iran, the stability of Pakistan, the health of Russian and Ukrainian democracy and the implications of political change in states in the Middle East.”62

Intelligence reform has been a hot topic since 9/11; the failure to predict the World Trade Center attacks forced a reevaluation of the IC. Much of this debate insists on more clandestine HUMINT. The IC requires quality HUMINT agents that are able to penetrate and work clandestinely in foreign nations. During the Cold War, clandestine operators recruited spies via diplomatic circles.63 By prioritizing infiltration of foreign nations instead of terrorist groups, DIA and the military would develop source networks, able to answer national intelligence requirements. These types of operations will resemble HUMINT activities during the Cold War. Agents should work under official cover; permitting the CIA’s National Clandestine Service to concentrate on covert operations.

MacGaffin explains that HUMINT encompasses foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, counterespionage, and covert action.64 Each of these activities is complex and requires numerous man-hours. Coverage and capability intensify with every

61 Dozier, “Pentagon Spies Get New Service.”
63 Zegart, Spying Blind, 189.
64 MacGaffin, “Clandestine Human Intelligence. Spies, Counterspies and Covert Action,” 93.
new agent in the field. DCS reduces the burden on the limited number of CIA agents. DCS distributes the work, allowing individual agents to concentrate on a distinct area. This reduced burden allows time for agents to develop the cultural and language skills that are often lacking. The intent of HUMINT reform is to establish close ties with the CIA, to deconflict, coordinate missions, and provide widespread global HUMINT coverage.

With demands for clandestine HUMINT reform, the DoD must take the initiative to revitalize HUMINT. Since the U.S. military is more likely to operate in unconventional environments, it is essential that we develop HUMINT collectors that are able to collect globally. This will not be easy; considering the shortcomings identified in this thesis. Nevertheless, we should recognize that the Army currently possesses a plethora of talented collectors, who have the training and experience to enhance the national HUMINT effort.

Sims and Gerber say, “The United States is blessed with a great capacity to innovate and adapt its institutions to new requirements even when crises are not occurring.”65 The IC adapted quickly to requirement changes after 9/11. No other discipline matches HUMINT’s ability to adapt. Unlike other intelligence disciplines (INTs), technological innovation does not constrain HUMINT. HUMINT is only limited by the quality of its collectors. Thankfully, during GWOT DoD’s HUMINT collectors received both the training and practical experience needed to be productive collectors. Historically, HUMINT is the intelligence discipline that has defended this nation; and HUMINT will likely be the first INT to adapt to future conflicts.

Human intelligence endures as a crucial intelligence discipline. Continuously growing security threats require robust and skilled collectors around the world. As the nation transitions its focus on the Asian Pacific, the Army needs to lead the effort and provide long-term global HUMINT coverage.

Integrating, supporting, and fusing Army collectors into the Defense Clandestine Service guarantees a stronger national IC. Army HUMINT agents have never been in a

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better position to join their DIA and CIA counterparts in clandestine operations. Ten years of operational experience have produced highly skilled HUMINT operatives qualified to conduct clandestine missions. The U.S. needs to capitalize on this experience and support its continued growth. Tomorrow’s security requires solid HUMINT.

2. **Theme Two: Legality of Interrogation Doctrine**

After the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush declared the Global War on Terror, vowing: “it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”

This pronouncement led to a war unlike any the U.S. has fought in the past. Fighting individuals, organizations, and networks would be found to be much different from fighting nations. This new type of war presents several problems regarding interrogation laws. Nothing in U.S. law was written on the handling and protections of non-state actors. The President, Combat Commanders along with many others wondered: How do we deal with individuals that do not abide by the rules of war? Terrorists had never signed or agreed to abide by the Geneva Conventions nor were they protected by a sovereign nation. Because of this confusion, a great debate on prisoner rights commenced.

a. **Background**

In 2004, the unfortunate events of Abu Ghraib tarnished the U.S. Army interrogation practices, not only in the eyes of the international community, but domestically as well. Images of mistreated prisoners come to mind at the very mention of the word “interrogations.” While President Bush quickly condemned the Army soldiers’ pictured degrading Iraqi prisoners and vowed to punish those involved, the U.S. government responded by reevaluating the laws governing interrogations and detention operations at all levels. Newly created legislation ultimately prompted the rewriting of the Army’s Interrogation Field Manual.

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This section reviews the interrogation policies before and after Abu Ghraib. It discusses the likely causes of why Army soldiers mistreated detainees, the unclear interrogation guidance given by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel and independent working groups, as well as the subsequent legislation implemented since Abu Ghraib. Specifically, it will focus on the changes to DoD policy concerning interrogations, and the Army Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelligence Collector Operations. Ultimately, it will show that the U.S. has made an enormous effort to refine interrogation procedures, refining training so that only specially trained can enhance the new policies, and experience interrogators conduct the mission. The Army should rethink its policy on how to carry out interrogation operations and who should be responsible for them. It is no longer appropriate for young Army HUMINTer to be trained in and responsible for interrogations.

b. Interrogation Legal Advice

Even before Abu Ghraib, the Bush administration addressed the legal aspects concerning interrogations of Al-Qaeda members. Early in the Afghanistan War, President Bush requested that his legal counsel investigate and advise him on what interrogators could and could not do. President Bush surely desired to avoid incidents like to Abu Ghraib but needed to protect the American people from future terrorist attacks. This led President Bush and individuals within his administration established multiple inquiries into the legality of interrogation operations.

One of the first legal opinions that the president received came from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Council (OLC), specifically, memoranda written by Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and signed by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee. Unfortunately, the OLC provided President Bush skeptical legal advice. On 1 August 2002, President Bush’s Legal Counsel Alberto Gonzales received a memorandum from the OLC. This was the OLC’s primary memorandum of three, which

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came to be known as the torture memos. The memo concluded, “Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, there is significant range of acts that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise to the level of torture.” The memo further stated: “[E]ven if an interrogation method might violate Section 2340 a, necessity or self-defense could provide justifications that would eliminate any criminal liability.” This advice was harmful in two aspects; first, it set the bar of torture exceptionally high requiring “death or organ failure,” and second, it suggests that even if interrogators were to torture prisoners, they would not be liable for their actions. This memo essentially gave the administration a blank check to conduct interrogations as they saw fit. This concept was regrettably conveyed down to tactical Army Interrogators.

This guidance is not the only legal advice obtained before the 2004 Abu Ghraib scandal. Early in 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved “expanded interrogation techniques” that combat commanders requested for use in Afghanistan. He approved techniques ranging from forced grooming to the clothing removal to without consulting the administration. A short time later, due to controversy on the legality of such techniques, Secretary Rumsfeld suspended the use of the same “expanded interrogation techniques” that he had approved earlier in the year.

Rumsfeld then asked a group of lawyers to conduct a legal review of the expanded techniques. He received an assessment from his working group in April 2003. The working group reviewed the legality of “expanded” interrogation procedures during 2003.

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71 U.S. Code - Section 2340A of Title 18, United States Code, prohibits torture committed by public officials under color of law against persons within the public official's custody or control. Torture is defined to include acts specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering. (It does not include such pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions.) The statute applies only to acts of torture committed outside the United States. There is Federal extraterritorial jurisdiction over such acts whenever the perpetrator is a national of the United States or the alleged offender is found within the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or the alleged offender.


the war on terror.\textsuperscript{74} The working group concluded that, after considering everything, the thirty-five interrogation techniques should be authorized for use in the Global War on Terror and were legal.\textsuperscript{75} The expanded techniques included hooding, dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation; sleep adjustment, isolation, prolonged interrogations, forced grooming, prolonged standing, sleep deprivation, physical training, face and stomach slap, and removal of clothing among others.

The then-current Army Field Manual 34-52 permitted seventeen of these thirty-five techniques already. CENTCOM and USSOUTHCOM commanders requested from the Secretary of Defense the additional use of eighteen techniques that were not in the field manual.\textsuperscript{76} Ten of the eighteen expanded interrogation techniques were “more aggressive counter-resistance techniques.”\textsuperscript{77} Many of these techniques originated from Special Forces training that prepare soldiers to be captured in dangerous environments. Because of this connection, people felt that if U.S. Special Forces troops could endure these practices, they were not dangerous for enemy combatants. Techniques used during special operations training included the controversial waterboarding procedure, although, not directly mentioned in the working group conclusion. Based on these conclusions, Secretary Rumsfeld authorized the use of the expanded techniques, essentially rendering the 1992 Army Field Manual obsolete.

Jack Goldsmith stated, “I, and others in the OLC had a relatively easy time concluding that these [Justice Department approved] twenty-four precisely defined and procedurally restricted techniques did not violate the torture statute or any other applicable law.”\textsuperscript{78} Additionally, despite deciding to withdraw earlier OLC opinions he advised that the Defense Department continue to employ the twenty-four expanded techniques.\textsuperscript{79}


\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 62.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 64.

\textsuperscript{78} Goldsmith, \textit{Terror Presidency}, 102. The author is not aware of why there is a discrepancy between the requested 36 techniques and Goldsmith’s 24 techniques. It is likely that the Justice Department only approved 24 techniques of the 36. However, the author is not aware of which were not approved.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 153.
Army interrogators were ill prepared to be given so much lead way with interrogation operations. Especially, since they had zero training on the approved expanded techniques. With so much riding on proper interrogation techniques, one would assume additional training and specialized certification would be required before conducting interrogations. Soldiers at these detention centers were left to follow CIA and SOF led. The Army still offers very little advanced interrogation training and during AIT, soldiers only receive 44 days of interrogation training.80

c. **Drawing a Line between the CIA and DoD**

In addition, “in spring of 2003, the [Director of Central Intelligence] DCI asked for a reaffirmation of the policies and practices in the interrogation program.”81 The National Security Council’s (NCS) Principals Committee met and concluded the “program was lawful and reflected administration policy.” The committee based their assessment on the OLC’s 2002 opinions. The NSC briefed the findings to the secretary of state and the secretary of defense in September of 2003. During this time, it was difficult to distinguish between policies that governed the CIA versus the policies that applied to DoD, not least because the CIA, civilian contractors, and DoD often worked out of the same detention facilities under conflicting and confusing guidance.

George Washington University Law School Professor and International Law expert, Laura Dickinson states:

> [A]dministration authorities circulated statements and memoranda suggesting that the law of war might not apply to certain categories of detainees, issued multiple, confusing directives to troops on the ground regarding permissible interrogation practices, allowed civilian intelligence personnel, special forces, uniformed troops, and private contractors to co-

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80 Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATTRS) only offer two interrogation courses (Joint Interrogation Course and Joint analyst interrogator collaboration course).

mingle without clear lines of authority or division of responsibility, and greatly expanded the role of private contractors.  

In April of 2004, newscaster Dan Rather shocked the administration and the world when he reported on and released the Abu Ghraib images. Jack Goldsmith, who was serving in the OLC at the time, immediately recognized that the legal opinions of his predecessor, John Yoo, were flawed. Goldsmith withdrew the OLC’s legal opinions on torture law.  

Once the Abu Ghraib images surfaced, it was blatantly evident that interrogation policies required revision. Goldsmith’s successor, Dan Levin, wrote the replacement documents. However, Levin’s advice still included the use of waterboarding and other questionable interrogation methods.  

As the story broke on CBS, President Bush ordered an immediate investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and during the next year, he ordered nine additional and separate investigations. The investigations all concluded that detainee abuse had occurred and revision of interrogation practices were required.  

d. Investigations of Abusive Interrogators

Army Major General (MG) Antonio Taguba conducted the initial investigation. MG Taguba concluded that Army and CIA interrogators and military police (MP) guards inflicted abuse on several detainees and hid unidentified captives from the Red Cross. “In Taguba’s view, the abusers violated two pertinent bodies of law: the Army’s own regulation [FM 34-52] and the Third Geneva Convention.”


84 Ibid., 162–164.


87 Ibid., 412.

88 Ibid.
Additional investigations by MG George Fay and the former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger suggest that U.S. Army interrogators and MPs assumed that harsher techniques were allowed and ignored the Army regulation because elite forces such as the CIA and Special Forces used them.\textsuperscript{89} MG Fay’s report also recognizes that the majority of atrocities committed were not by interrogators but military police. In actuality, MPs committed the majority of crimes in the photos disseminated worldwide. Sadly, the brunt of the outrage was directed solely at Army interrogators.

In the official Investigation of Abu Ghraib Detention Facility, MG Fay, lays out the number of allegations of abuse, the nature of abuse, and associated personnel. In his findings, 40 percent of cases involved interrogators with fifty cases involving military police.\textsuperscript{90} The individuals involved in the cases of torture all knew that they had violated the Geneva Convention. MG Fay states: “This investigation found no evidence of confusion regarding actual physical abuse, such as hitting, kicking, slapping, punching, and foot stomping. Everyone we spoke to knew it was prohibited conduct except for one soldier.”\textsuperscript{91} This comment suggests that although the soldiers knew their actions violated Geneva Conventions, the detainee’s status of lawful versus non-lawful combatants confused soldiers about whether or not detainees fell under these rules.

The confusion generated by the approval of different interrogation tactics for detainees depending on their classification led to a decline in the overall standards of interrogation and confinement. Many detention facilities contained a mixed group of interrogators—civilian, military, and contractor—with differing guidelines. At the strategic level, debates about what constituted torture and the extent of restrictions on it under domestic criminal statutes and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment led to further confusion. (LTC David G. Bolgiano and COL Morgan Banks.)

These investigations made clear that the Administration and Congress needed uniform legal restrictions on interrogations. Senator John McCain, who was a prisoner of war during the Vietnam War, suggested limiting interrogation techniques to the then-current Army Field Manual, regardless of detainee’s location or status. The Army Field manual authorized seventeen techniques none of which involved detainee mistreatment. The manual explicitly states that stress positions, sleep deprivation, and food deprivation are forms of torture. The severest technique authorized was Fear-up Harsh, in which an interrogator “behaves in an overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice…[and] may even feel the need to throw objects across the room.”

Senator McCain introduced a bill in 2005, commonly referred to as the “McCain Amendment,” which Congress approved and later became the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA). The DTA requires the DoD personnel to use U.S. Army Field Manual guidelines while interrogating detainees and prohibits “cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.” Although, the DTA ensured that DoD personnel abide by the Army FM and ended the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on “unlawful combatants,” the DTA did

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92 David G. Bolgiano and J. Morgan Banks, “Military Interrogation of Terror Suspects, Imagination Does Not Have to Mean Unlawful,” Military Review (November–December 2010), http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20101231_art004.pdf. These two military officers argue that strict rules on interrogation will not stop abuses. The problem often lies in “poor leadership, bad morale, and lack of oversight and simple bad actors. They state, “In the end, imposing unimaginative, inflexible, unscientific, and a historical rules will only hamper the successful educing of information from America’s adversaries and do nothing to ensure we remain on the legal and moral high ground. The Army should revise FM 2-22.3 to mandate a rigorous selection of military interrogators as a non-accession branch, remove unnecessary legal and administrative protocols concerning certain non-enhanced interrogation techniques, and allow more flexibility in the use of creative and humane methodologies supported by a growing body of research.”

93 Dickinson, Noyes, and Janis, Abu Ghraib, 413.


not constrain non-DoD agencies, law enforcement, and non-military intelligence. The DTA also did “not prevent DoD from subsequently amending the Field Manual.”

e. **DoD Releases New Interrogation Manual**

On September 6, 2006, the Army released Field Manual 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collection Operations, an updated version that aligns with the requirements of DTA. The new manual explicitly prohibits eight previously used interrogation techniques, including those that employ hoods, forced nudity, waterboarding, working dogs, mock executions, dietary manipulation and extreme environmental conditions.

There are nineteen authorized interrogation approaches according to the new Field Manual 2-22.3. Interrogators can use these approaches individually or in combination. These techniques are not new to the manual and included all of the old approaches plus a few new ones. One notable change was the removal of Fear-up Harsh and Fear-up Mild. Instead of explaining varying degrees of Fear-up, it lumps all levels into a single Fear-up method (see note for description).

The new 2006 interrogation manual includes additional techniques not authorized in the former version. The first O-6 in the chain of command must approve two new interrogation methods such as False Flag and Mutt and Jeff (see note for description). Furthermore, an additional “restricted” approach strategy called

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96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Headquarters, *Army Field Manual 34-5*, 1–18. NOTE—The Fear-up interrogation approach was divided into Fear-up Harsh and Fear-up Mild. Fear-up Harsh included yelling, throwing objects, and banging the table but no actions that include coercion or threats as contained in GPW. Article 17. Fear-up Mild is more subtle, does not require screaming or banging the table. The detainee’s “fear is increased by helping the source realize the unpleasant consequences the facts may cause.” Separation from loved ones due to long-term incarceration is common fears that may be exploited, 3–15. NOTE—Article 17 of the Geneva convention includes several provisions including prisoners of war are required to give name, rank, and serial number when captured and more importantly no physical or mental torture nor any form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners. Prisoners may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant treatment of any kind, 1–11.

99 Headquarters, *FM 2-22.3*, ch. 8, para. 8–18. NOTE—The False Flag approach is to convince the detainee that a country other than the U.S. is interrogating him and trick him into cooperating with U.S. forces. Mutt and Jeff approach is better known as good-cop bad-cop. The approach requires two interrogators, one that is unsympathetic, and another whose kind gestures build rapport with the detainee, 8–18.
Separation (see note for description) cannot be applied to Enemy Prisoners of War and must have an additional approval of the first General/Flag Officer in the chain of command and the COCOM commander.

On the second day of Obama’s administration, the president signed Executive Order 13491, which revokes all earlier executive orders with regard to interrogations and supports the authorized techniques of FM 2-22.3. The order established FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, as the new U.S. government standard for conducting intelligence interrogations, applicable to all agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. Specifically, the executive order prohibits “any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation that is not authorized by and listed in FM 2-22.3.”


Although the new manual is highly regarded as a huge improvement to interrogation operations, many feel that the old manuals provided clearer and more restrictive guidance on interrogations. In a November 16, 2010, letter sent to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, fourteen highly experienced and respected intelligence and security professionals from the field, including former CIA Director John A. Wahlquist, former FBI Director Robert Mueller, and former U.S. Attorney General William Barr, stated that the new manual was a “huge improvement” but that the old manuals were “superior” because they provided clearer and more restrictive guidance on interrogations.

100 Ibid., Appendix M, para. m-8. NOTE—The Separation approach–M-26. The purpose of separation is to deny the detainee the opportunity to communicate with other detainees in order to keep him from learning counter-resistance techniques or gathering new information to support a cover story, decreasing the detainee's resistance to interrogation. Separation does not constitute sensory deprivation, which is prohibited, M-8.


103 Ibid.
interrogator professionals wrote: “While we support efforts to adopt a single, well-defined standard for U.S. personnel engaged in the detention and interrogation of all people in U.S. custody, we are very concerned about a handful of changes that were written into the manual in 2006.”  

This group of distinguished professionals raises concerns about Appendix M of the FM 2-22.3 and suggests its removal. They claim, “The use of these techniques were clearly banned in previous versions of the manual and they ought to continue to be clearly off limits.” Appendix M is new to manual and covers the restricted interrogation technique of separation. Separation is “for use on a by-exception basis only with unlawful enemy combatants.” The Army Field manual does not authorize Separation for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW). Separation requires approval from the first General/Flag Officer in the chain of command. The FM states separation may be used on “specific unlawful enemy combatants…to help overcome resistance and gain actionable intelligence…to safeguard U.S. and coalition forces…to protect U.S. interests.”

First, the group argues that the term “separation” is confusing. Traditionally, interrogators use separation to protect detainees from “negative influences of—or unnecessary exposure to—other detainees.” Second, the group advocates that the appendix may have inadvertently “authorized the use of several sensory and sleep deprivation tactics that could be employed in an abusive fashion.” Appendix M allows interrogators to use “field expedient separation [to] prolong the shock of capture…and

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104 Anderson et al., “Letter from Interrogators and Intelligence Officials.”
105 Ibid.
107 Headquarters, FM 2-22.3, Appendix M.
108 Headquarters, FM 2-22.3, Appendix M.
109 Anderson et al., “Letter from Interrogators and Intelligence Officials.”
110 Ibid.
foster a feeling of futility.”¹¹¹ This measure allows interrogators to use goggles or blindfold and earmuffs for up to twelve hours (extendable) as a method of separation.¹¹²

These stipulations can often be confusing and interpreted differently. After putting so much time and effort into revising the interrogation policy, the nation should not leave it in the hands of young soldiers. Professional interrogators with extensive training are needed to insure interrogations are carried out in accordance with the new doctrine. The U.S. Army interrogation program should be of the highest standard, and be a role model for other nations could follow.

f. Implication

Now that, Navy SEALs have neutralized Osama Bin Laden and the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are ending, it is time to ensure that interrogation legislation established since Abu Ghraib still meets its initial intent. Military officers David G. Bolgiano and J. Morgan Banks state: “regardless of their legal or political rationales, both the [Detainee Treatment Act of 2005] DTA and the new [Obama] executive order authorize only those interrogation approaches and techniques set forth in FM 2-22.3. There are two major problems with this approach: little science supports the approved techniques, and the requirements imposed by the FM are so restrictive that they are ineffective and nonsensical.”¹¹³

The question on ethical interrogations is far from over. The new manual is highly regarded as a huge improvement to interrogation operations but it has taken detainee abuse, investigations, working groups, court-martials, legislation, and a rewritten manual to get the U.S. closer to conducting interrogations in a respectable manner. To enhance this improvement, the Army should revise its training, making interrogation training more stringent and selective.

Army Interrogators, minus a few “bad apples,” have conducted interrogations respectably. Nevertheless, Army HUMINT must re-evaluate if

¹¹² Ibid., M27, M29.
¹¹³ Bolgiano and Banks, “Military Interrogation of Terror Suspects,” 5.
interrogation should be the primary skill of the 35M MOS. Despite that, previous wars required large numbers of young interrogators the changing nature of American conflicts suggests there is a larger need for highly trained interrogators able to operate within the legal restrictions. With lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army must ensure that it trains its interrogators in the rules and regulations that govern interrogations. This may require changing the training and doctrine governing tactical HUMINT. Equally, with interrogation operations remaining under a microscope of scrutiny the Army should ensure that its interrogators receive more than 44 days of training. It takes a mature and intelligent individual to understand the complex legal and ethical rules that govern modern day interrogations.

3. Third Theme: Military Professional Opinions on HUMINT

a. Need for Greater HUMINT Capability

Military opinions from the field represent the third theme. When discussing opinions from Military Professional Papers, it best to start with the Army’s official published opinion. The 2012 Army Posture statement asserts that while the budget declines the Army is still obligated to provide a lean force capable of combating future conflicts. It states: “Today the U.S. Army is the best-trained, best-equipped and best-led combat-tested force in the world. Today’s soldiers have achieved a level of professionalism, combat experience, and civil and military expertise that is an invaluable national asset. Our warriors have accomplished every assigned task they have been given.”

In regard to HUMINT specifically, the 2012 Posture Statement referenced a document written by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2. The document was titled “Growing Army Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Capabilities, and advocates that despite budget

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constraints the Army plans to create a “robust, well-trained HUMINT force.”

This document articulates the “Expansion of army HUMINT capacity is a key component of Military Intelligence (MI) transformation with HUMINT force structure more than doubling from FY 04 through FY13.” It goes on to state that the Army plans to revitalize and enhance training and employment of HUMINT forces. This includes increasing the number collectors certified from advanced courses offered by HT-JCOE and the FOUNDRY program. The Army appreciates that HUMINT is essential for future military success, and is committed to train and professionalize the corps by learning “from operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq.” This raises the question of; what have we learned? With continuous military operations for over the last 10 years, there are many opinions on the proper method on utilizing HUMINT. This section will touch on opinions from military commanders.

In January 2010, MG Michael T. Flynn published a critique of intelligence operations in Afghanistan, criticizing that intelligence focused too much on tactical threats and failed to understand the larger demographic and political environment. Throughout the article, he seems to be making an argument for more HUMINT collectors at the ground level; however, he advocates for civilian analysts, not military, to conduct these collection operations.

MG Flynn suggests that the intelligence community develop analysts that are able to work at the grassroots level; who would collect comprehensive information on geographical lines, focusing on collection of economic and political information instead of

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116 Ibid.

117 Ibid. The Foundry Program provides training to Military Intelligence personnel. For more information, visit the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 home page at http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/foundry.aspx.

118 Department of the Army, “2012 Army Posture Statement.”

simply targeting the enemy. He advocates that intelligence analysts should embrace “open source population centric” information to understand and win over the Afghan people.

This sounds surprisingly similar to MSO; although MG Flynn makes a distinction that these analysts should not be HUMINT collectors. He says, “There are, of course, limits on how far analyst can or should go in pursuit of information. Concern for physical safety is one. Rules that govern the difference between collection and analysis represent another.” Despite MG Flynn point that these analysts should not be HUMINT collectors, it would seem that Army HUMINT is in the best position in carrying out this duty. The Army could easily fill the intelligence gap identified by MG Flynn’s article, because Army HUMINTers are already at the grassroots level working with the same teams MG Flynn suggests. (i.e., Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Female Engagement Teams, Civil Affair Teams)

Army collectors are capable of collecting on more than just targeting the enemy. Priority Information Requirements (PIR), which regulates collection, simply need to reflect the topics identified by MG Flynn. If properly tasked the Army’s collectors can gather political and economic information. Additionally, to ensure that the data collected at the grassroots level is properly analyzed and disseminated the Army could develop a HUMINT analyst. These analysts could, as MG Flynn suggests, combine classified material with open source to write, “master reports” of an area of operation.

Along the same lines as MG Flynn, Army Col Ralph O. Baker makes an argument for HUMINT to concentrate less on targeting and more on the populace. While serving in Baghdad, Col Baker changed the way the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of 1st Armored Division conducted operations by transforming the BCT’s traditional intelligence collection system into what he coined “HUMINT-centric”.

This meant that his subordinate commanders changed the way they interacted with the local populous. They were encouraged to develop sources, conduct interrogations, exploit evidence, and most importantly work with the populace best

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120 Ibid.
121 Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, “Fixing Intel.”
interest at heart so that the brigade could accomplish its mission. Col Baker states, “My purpose in writing this article is to share with the reader insights and lessons learned from the reform of our intelligence operations; specifically, what we learned by conducting human intelligence (HUMINT)-centric operations in a heavy BCT in Iraq.” Col Baker makes an argument that COIN operations need to be grounded in HUMINT and explains that: “Conventional intelligence collection systems just don’t work in this type of environment; our imagery operations, electronic reconnaissance, and standard combat patrols and surveillance operations were simply ineffective. After faithfully applying these conventional ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) methods and assets to our combat operations, we netted almost no actionable intelligence.”

Early in the deployment, the BCT conducted door to cordon-and-search operations in which they found “dozens of weapons and a handful of suspects.” However, Col Baker explains that: “No matter how professionally you executed such searches, the net result was inevitable ugly.” Therefore, after training his unit commanders, the Brigade began its HUMINT-centric intelligence collection. By using a HUMINT centric campaign, which developed a source network and worked with the local populace the brigade had success. To accomplish these types of operations Col Baker advocates that the Army would need to authorize more 35M billets within its brigades.

The need for a larger HUMINT collection capability is widely agreed upon. A larger force with proper training and guidance could focus on the needs of the target population. Focusing less on targeting and more on social and political issues is a method to succeed in COIN. This concept can be applied beyond the U.S.’s current operations in Afghanistan; a HUMINT centric focus could be successful in future

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123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

operations as well. Greater capability should not mean just increasing the size of the force; it should identify and fix current issues within Army HUMINT and apply them to future training and operations.

b. A Need to Improve Current HUMINT

In 2008, Army Major Dylan Randazzo wrote a thesis on “Fixing Tactical HUMINT: the case for the Low-level Collector” for the National Defense College. Major Randazzo agrees with the Col Baker’s HUMINT-centric concept. But, he argues that the current HUMINT policies are too restrictive, and suggests that the Army revise its policy and allow more soldiers to collect HUMINT than the assigned MOSs. Identifying a need for a robust HUMINT collector capability, he recommends developing a Low-Level HUMINT collector that possesses the right characteristics to be successful in COIN operations. He suggests collectors should have specific selection requirements but do not necessarily have to be HUMINT MOS specific collectors. Randazzo suggests five characteristics should be taken into account when selecting a HUMINT collector.126

1. NCO or Officer; those who are generally older, occupy positions of authority, and experienced with tactical operations or law enforcement.

2. Possession of excellent interpersonal skills; strong ability to establish rapport.

3. Ability to write accurate, clear, and timely reports.

4. Excellent evaluation reports and counseling statements.

5. Interim security clearance.127

There is a lot of merit in the need for HUMINTer to possess certain characteristics. Since HUMINT is a highly skilled task, there should be some type of assessment for collector. The ASVAB test is not designed to assess these traits. Major Randazzo goes on to recommend the following selection method:

1. Nomination from company commander or battalion leadership.

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126 Randazzo, “Fixing Tactical HUMINT.”
127 Randazzo, “Fixing Tactical HUMINT,” 246.
2. Vote from [the battalion] S2, [Operational Management Team] OMT / [HUMINT Collection Team] HCT, and /or company representatives after conducting interviews or a board that subjectively gauges whether the individual demonstrates basic predetermined criteria.

3. Passing score on test of reading, writing, and memory recall.128

In a Monograph titled, “Some Principles of Human Intelligence and their application,” Major Robert A. Sayre identifies similar problems with HUMINT and offers some insightful recommendations on possible solutions. He states; “there currently exists no real assessment process for the enlisted HUMINT career fields, there is also no assessment process for HUMINT officers. There is such a process for HUMINT warrant officers, who nearly always come from the enlisted HUMINT career fields, and these warrant officers are usually apt, experienced, and well trained. Company-grade officers, however, undergo no screening before they are admitted to HUMINT training.” The absence of an assessment process allows ineffective collectors to occupy many positions through the HUMINT corps.

To remedy this, Sayre advocates “HUMINT collectors of both Army HUMINT MOSs [35M &35L] should not be allowed to enter the MOS on their first enlistment. Allowing recruits to enter the MOS at the recruiting station prevents any sort of assessment of their potential and suitability as a HUMINT collector. HUMINT collectors should be selected from among first and second term enlistees of any MOS who have already been successful in another career field, and who are older, more mature, and have a more fully developed and settled character.” Sayre says, after selecting soldiers, they should attend language training and follow on immersion training in the target country.

Sayre recognizes “that the collector should have a high degree of area knowledge, an understanding of the culture and politics of the region in which he is working.” Major Sayre makes two interesting and compelling points. First, he says that collectors must be properly “matched” with their targets. He advocates, “collectors should be of similar personal and professional backgrounds as their potential targets.” If

128 Ibid.
the HUMINT collector and source share similar characteristics, it is easier to establish rapport, assess the source, build a relationship, and run the asset. Next, Major Sayre recommends that the analyst reviewing the HUMINT reports also establish a personal relationship with the source. Analyst do not have time to delve into learning an individual source, analyst frequently gather reports from multiple INTs to develop their products. This might be more possible if an analyst was located with a HCT and worked solely with one their reports and sources. In most units today, analysts are at the Brigade SCIF, and do not interact with the HUMINTer that is miles away at a patrol base.\(^{129}\)

In 2006, Army Major Tony L. Thacker wrote a compelling Master’s Thesis titled; “Interrogation: Is the U.S. Army Equipped and Trained to meet the Present Challenges in Today’s Contemporary Operational Environment?” In this thesis, he conducts historical research and combines it with interrogation operations during GWOT to conclude, “The Army can and should improve training and resourcing for the Army interrogator.” Major Thacker recommends that an assessment and selection board evaluate potential interrogators before entering the MOS. This board should have four primary criteria for selection of interrogators including age, military experience, eligible for a top-secret clearance, and possess an aptitude for learning a foreign language. Major Thacker also presents an engaging “snapshot of what an ideal interrogator my look like” in the Figure 2.\(^{130}\)

\(^{129}\) SCIF—Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.

Figure 2. Major Thacker’s Example of the Characteristics of Ideal Interrogator

Major Thacker’s conclusions are still relevant today. His assertion that Human Intelligence collectors must possess language and cultural knowledge to perform in combat environments is right on the money. Collector knowledge must be matched with age maturity and, and as he put it, “command presence” to be effective. Major Thacker wrote his thesis before the changing of the interrogation field manual and although, there have been significant changes to interrogation training and implementation since the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Army still faces similar problems as in years past.\textsuperscript{131}

In an article, “Optimizing Intelligence Collection and Analysis: The Key to Battalion –Level Intelligence Operations in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” LTC Richard G. Greene, Jr. discusses successes and shortcomings of COIN intelligence operations. For the purposes of this research, only the aspects dealing with HUMINT will be mentioned.

First, while discussing organic and non-organic HUMINT collection teams, LTC Greene mentions that his Brigade had success with pushing the HCTs down to rifle companies. Having collectors operated in locations were enemy personal and

\textsuperscript{131} Thacker, “Interrogation.”
sources were should have been more effective, however, the limited capabilities of individual collectors often hampered operations. The article argued that HCT’s are not proficient enough to operate in a COIN environment; collectors “are not linguist…junior enlisted soldiers…with little or no practical experience with real-world source operations.”132

Next, while discussing interrogation operations LTC Greene states: “Early in the tour, the TF [Task Force] determined that HUMINT specialists and interrogators were unable to conduct interrogations that yielded useful results. While trained and motivated to perform duties, the interrogators lacked an adequate awareness of the intelligence that drove operations. Without this information, an interrogation can quickly devolve into a prolonged denial of insurgent associations by the detainee.”133 The article indicated that interrogators were for more successful during field questioning, but only when provided with an approved questioning plan. This article is telling in the abilities of the average young HUMINT collector. Unfortunately, like other opinions, HUMINTers lack the training, language, and cultural skills needed.

All these military commanders agree that HUMINT is extremely important in all military operations. They see a need for a robust HUMINT capability, but often find that the Army’s current collectors are not suited to perform the mission. The commanders here seem to agree that there needs to be an assessment process for selecting HUMINT personnel. Purposed characteristic include older soldiers with the maturity, security clearance, communication, and writing skills to perform the job. Having collectors with these characteristics, combined with language and cultural knowledge are essential to conduct HUMINT driven operations.

133 Ibid.
III. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

A. DATA AND RESULTS

This chapter comprises data and opinions resulting from the author’s research. The intent of the chapter is to identify common sentiments about the weaknesses of current Army HUMINT practices. The author separates findings into three categories. First, to be analyzed are units AARs. Then opinions from Army HUMINT Warrant Officer are presented. Lastly, discussion topics from the MI-Space forum are reviewed to get an idea of whether the thesis’s hypotheses are supported. These sources convey the most contemporary opinions about HUMINT and offer viewpoints directly from experts in the field.

These opinions are largely based on human intelligence collector’s individual experiences during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Because of the wide range of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, these HUMINTers understandably have diverging opinions. Likewise, the individual collector’s skills, mission success, region of employment, and individual tasking influence these opinions. It is not the author’s intention to focus solely on the shortcomings of HUMINT collection in this section but unfortunately, little is written on the successful missions conducted by ARMY HUMINTers. This is likely because the information is classified, or as the old adage goes, there are either operational successes or intelligence failures. The Army currently possesses a wealth of knowledge from experienced HUMINTers from which we can learn. This chapter reflects the opinions of knowledgeable HUMINT professionals.

1. After Action Reviews

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website collects opinions of lessons learned from combat experiences. Military commanders, to advise future deploying units, wrote after action reviews of the pros and cons from first hand deployment experience. Based on all CALL provided HUMINT related AARs 15 commonly identified problems emerge. These common problems were derived from 19
separate AARs and include opinions from the Marine Corps and the Urban Warfare Analysis Center. Eleven AARs identified that the HUMINTers assigned to their units either had no language capability or that the languages that the HUMINTers did possess, was the wrong language for the area of operations. Ten units expressed that training was a major issue. This indicates that the 10 level training was not sufficient, and there is inadequate follow-on training at the unit level or from HT-JCOE. Nine units proposed that collectors lacked the cultural knowledge to perform the job properly. Another nine units suggested that HUMINTers lacked the interpersonal skill or experience to interact with sources. Eight AAR’s reported issues with analysts. Either the analyst did not directly work with the actual collectors or HUMINTer did not perform analysis on their own. (See Table 1)
Table 1. After Action Review Identified Weakness

| Lack of Interpersonal Skills and/or experience | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | 9 |
| Lack of Writing Skills | X | X | X | X | X | 4 |
| Lack of Cultural Knowledge | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | 9 |
| Shortage of Analyst or need for more Analysis | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | 8 |
| Garrison Training is not HUMINT focused | X | X | X | X | X | 3 |
| Problems with 35M needing in Theater Interrogation Training | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | 5 |
| MOS should be language dependent and or collectors lack target language | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | 11 |
| Had problems with civilian Interpreters | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | 7 |
| General Training Issues | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | 10 |
| Intelligence Collection Fund Issues | X | X | X | 4 |
| Vehicle Issues | X | X | X | X | X | X | 8 |
| Clear Tasks for HUMINTers | X | X | X | X | 6 |
| Shortage of HUMINTers | X | X | X | X | X | 6 |
| Command unfamiliar on how to employ HUMINT | X | X | 2 |
| Other issues | X | X | X | X | 4 |

TOTALS
These 19 separate units after action reviews identified four issues that directly relate to training problems. The first problem identified was the lack of language ability or training in the wrong language. During OIF 08-10, the 172nd BCT’s HUMINT platoon only had one qualified Arabic speaker out of 17 collectors. Similarly, before 172nd deployment to Afghanistan in 2011, the HUMINT platoon had zero Dari or Pashtun linguists.\textsuperscript{134} HUMINT collectors often rely solely on the assistance of civilian interpreters. This brings up the second issue. Seven of the 18 AARs suggest that issues with civilian interpreters hindered HUMINT collection. Without going into detail, problems included improper dialect, clearance issues, availability, and utilization of civilian interpreters.

The final two issues go hand in hand, the lack of cultural knowledge and interpersonal skills. Eight AAR’s argued HUMINT collectors lacked the cultural knowledge to interact with the local populous. Although, cultural training is mandatory before deployment it is rarely specific to the region in which soldiers operate. Furthermore, it is difficult to capitalize on interpersonal skills when individuals cannot relate to the local populace. Factors including age, religion, social status, and even gender can affect a collector’s ability to understand the cultural nuances to interact with foreigners.

The common themes that arose while reviewing the after action reviews suggest that HUMINT soldiers lack, or were not properly trained in, the skills that are required for the MOS. The following comments were derived directly from unit after action reviews or independent observers’ reviews upon completion of combat deployments.

Based on interviews with soldiers and leaders of the 201\textsuperscript{st} Military Intelligence Battalion, an observation team from the Center of Army Lessons Learned wrote a summary of issues and comments of HUMINT after a deployment to Iraq. Soldiers in the 201\textsuperscript{st} were responsible for conducting interrogations at the Joint Interrogation and

\textsuperscript{134} The author was assigned as the HUMINT platoon leader for the 504th MICO, 172nd BCT, and relied upon personal knowledge.
Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Camp Cropper Iraq in 2007. The following is an excerpt from the summary; it divides the issues into pre-deployment and during deployment and makes recommendations on improving collectors.\textsuperscript{135}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Deployment:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 35Ms need thorough situational awareness of the theater of operations and specific area of operations (AO) knowledge.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 35Ms need training in technical writing and a Basic English refresher course to develop more concise and accurate reporting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Quality control needs to be conducted on reports, and soldiers need to be required to correct mistakes and clarify any confusing areas.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>During Deployment:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• “Many 35Ms were not able to consistently pick up on leads during interrogations. This was caused by either lack of knowledge on the requirements or lack of critical thinking skills. Many 35Ms were unable to quickly transition their interrogations based on detainee responses and were not successful with shifting approaches based on detainee cues or detecting when an approach was no longer necessary.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Elicitation is a weak point for numerous 35Ms. Basic conversational skills are wanting and the ability to steer conversations and draw information out with tact is lacking.”\textsuperscript{136}</td>
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</table>

\textsuperscript{135} Amanda Meyer, “201st MIBN HUMINT Ops Lessons Learned,” Memorandum for Record. USAIC Lessons Learned (February 23, 2009).

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
The 10th Mountain Division S2 intelligence section wrote a comprehensive report on lessons learned during OEF 05-07. The following comments are pulled directly from their report.\textsuperscript{137} The first topic of discussion was HUMINT teams experience and report writing skills.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Topic:</strong> Inexperienced Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs) \textsuperscript{[HCT]} and Report Writing Skills</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discussion:</strong> Report writing continues to be an ongoing issue. It is understood that inexperienced collectors need time to hone their reporting skills. However, collectors continued to make repetitive errors despite guidance from quality control analysts. Under optimal circumstances, the THT leader was an experienced Warrant Officer or senior NCO. The experienced leader provided mentorship and immediate quality control prior to reports passing through the OMT or S2X/CJ2X. In the case of the current THT composition, the average THT leader is an E-4 or E-5 with no prior deployments or real world collection experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson Learned:</strong> OMTs need to identify chronic weaknesses in reporting and initiate mentor/coaching sessions with collectors. If coaching over the phone or via email was ineffective, then the OMT needed to conduct sessions in person. Teams that needed more assistance than could be provided by the OMT were identified to CJ2X as candidates for Operation Old School.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implications:</strong> 35M AIT must place heavy emphasis on report writing capabilities, that are similar to the report writing forced upon students going through the DOD Strategic Debrief Course. The OMT Course at FT Huachuca should also place a heavy emphasis on writing and editing of draft intelligence information reports (DIIRs) along with effective writing styles and discipline.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{137} 10th Mountain Division, “OEF 05-07 CJ2 Lessons Learned,” \textit{CALL} (March 2007): 35, 39.

\textsuperscript{138} THT is a Tactical HUMINT Team, the Army Changed the term to HCT HUMINT Collection Team.
The 10th Mountain Division’s second topic of discussion was developing a HCT leader course at the Division or USAIC level to assist junior ranking soldiers.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Topic: THT Leaders Course</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Discussion:</strong> Inexperienced/junior ranking THT leaders are in need of Army leadership and administrative skills. Due to significant shortages of mid-career HUMINT collectors, many THTs are being led by inexperienced first term junior enlisted soldiers. While we recognize these leaders need mentoring on HUMINT skill sets, it sometimes goes unnoticed that these soldiers lack critical leadership and administrative skill sets. Maintenance, time management, property accountability, counseling, and logistics are just some of the skill sets in need of development. A team leaders’ inability to manage or navigate the aforementioned tasks has a direct negative impact on team operations. We can teach them to collect; but if their vehicles break down, they lose equipment, and they cannot acquire logistics; they’re significantly hindered in their ability to accomplish the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson Learned:</strong> 10th Mountain Division or USAIC should develop a THT Leader’s course of instruction to train both identified and potential leaders prior to deployment. Course of instruction should include THT leadership functions such as mission planning, source operations management, report writing, as well as critical Army leadership and administrative skill sets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implications:</strong> Just as THTs are certified, a THT Team Leader should be certified. As we are placing an additional challenge upon extremely junior NCOs with little to no experience, it is vital that a course be established that trains and certifies potential candidates.¹³⁹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These two comments support hypothesis 3, that collectors lack age, maturity, and basic writing ability. The recommendation on establishing a HCT leader course has not occurred at the USAIC level, nor has there been any push to develop such a course. A 2007, 525th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade AAR provides more insight into issues facing HUMINT. Primarily, 10 level training is substandard and does not produce quality collectors. This reinforces the hypothesis that training suffered during GWOT, and that quantity took precedence over quality. Also, stated here is the fitness level of soldiers arriving from AIT is substandard. As the author noted in his own platoon, soldiers had physical profiles that prevent them from deploying with the units. This leaves the unit shorthanded in a critical area, making it difficult to fulfill the wartime mission.

¹³⁹ 10th Mountain Division, “OEF 05-07 CJ2 Lessons Learned,” 35, 39.
**Issue:** Advanced Individual Training (AIT) output.

**Discussion:** [U.S. Army Forces Command] FORSCOM performed miracles to provide the number of soldiers required to stand up a new company. There were, however, many issues with the Soldiers we received that could have been addressed prior to arrival. Many arrived overweight, with less than optimal levels of physical fitness, with profiles dating back over one year or to basic training, and more importantly, non-deployable. While the majority is adept at the technical skills of the 97 series MOS [35M], a significant minority of these HUMINT Soldiers lack the interpersonal skills also necessary for success.

**Recommendation:** Tighten the strict screening process to pass thru the 97E [35M] Course. If a person cannot effectively speak to someone or write a legible coherent report, they should not push them through the course. Re-examine the requirements or physical profile limitations for a 97E [35M] and 97B [35L]. Do not release Soldiers from the schoolhouse who are having medical issues that warrant a [medical evaluation board] (MEB).140

A *News from the Front* article written by members of Task Force 2-1 of the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, highlights HUMINT concerns they encountered during a yearlong deployment to Eastern Mosul, Iraq. The article says: “Enlisted personnel and junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) assigned to THTs are too young or inexperienced to manipulate the urban environment to their favor.”141 The article continues to explain that HUMINT soldiers are not linguist and lack practical “real world” experience with source operations. Interrogation operations similarly suffered because, although motivated, military interrogators were unprepared for the task. Causes for this included a shortage of language ability, nonexistence cultural knowledge and age and experience.142

The article author’s recommend that National level intelligence agencies are more suited for source operations, because of their maturity level and resource capability. Additionally, they advocate that Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were more effective during interrogations. “The ISF interrogator has an infinitely greater grasp of Iraqi cultural and social conventions…which provides far a more productive interrogation.”143

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141 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
Reviewing these AARs is incredibly revealing if one considers that each of the above units served yearlong deployments, then it can be presumed that there is 19 years of data in the reviewed AARs. This information encompasses responses from both Iraq and Afghanistan. The period ranged from 2003 until 2009, and included data from both interrogations and MSO missions. As suspected, these AAR comments confirmed many of the hypotheses of this thesis. Primarily, soldiers lack the skills to perform HUMINT collection in the most effective manner. It should be noted that some AARs also recognized practices that should be maintained. The most common included, MOS training prior to deployment, locating HCTs close out at patrol bases, and assigning more than one designated Category II linguist to each HCT.

2. HUMINT Warrant Officer Opinions

In an on-line opinion poll, U.S. Army HUMINT Warrant Officers were asked a series of questions in regard to their personal experience with HUMINT. Thirty-nine HUMINT Warrant Officers, who are subject matter experts, voluntarily participated. The respondent’s ranks ranged from WO1 to CW4. Five participants were the rank of WO1, 23 were CW2, and five were CW3 and six CW4s. Of the respondents, 100% had deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with an average of 3.5 deployments. During all deployments respondents worked within the area of HUMINT. There is well over 300 years of combined HUMINT experience represented here. (See Table 2)

Table 2. Years of HUMINT Experience.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How many years of HUMINT experience do you have?</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-8</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-12</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20+</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question 39
The first question posed to the group was: “In your opinion, is the Army currently meeting its objectives in regard to HUMINT?” Of the 39 responses 29 (74.4%) replied that the Army is not meeting its objective, whereas only 10 (25.6%) believed the Army meets its objectives. However, of the 19 individuals that elected to provide written comments, none offered an opinion of why they thought Army HUMINT was meeting its objectives. Individual comments reflect many of the problems with HUMINT, but the most common theme implies the lack of proper training for HUMINT collectors. Also, mentioned is here is that 10 level MSO is of poor quality and advanced courses are needed prior to deployment. One individual’s comment supports the author’s argument that MSO and interrogations should be divided. “Lack of experience on the collection teams requires more oversight at higher levels. Put Warrants back on teams. Split HUMINT into interrogation and source operations.”

145 Ibid.
Table 3. Is the Army Meeting its Objectives in Regard to HUMINT?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>74.4%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments:**

Current Army Objectives are not in-line with what is practical and productive in today’s rapidly-changing social landscape.

[HUMINT] continues to face the same challenges as defined in FM 2-22.3; primarily based in misunderstanding of mission by command, army operations, HUMINT support to army operations.

Leadership has put too many restrictions and requirements on conducting MSO.

Lack of experience on the collection teams requires more oversight at higher levels. Put Warrants back on teams. Split HUMINT into interrogation and source operations.

Unit level HUMINT training is being swept aside for taskings. HUMINTERS only receive proper training when away from parent unit.

BCT is not the place for MSO; quality of junior soldiers is typically not good.

Although current efforts to focus on source validation have been initiated, I believe our low levels of training on basic analytical skills greatly detracts from our ability as a force to properly conduct source validation and basic analysis.

All mikes must attend at least SOC [mikes = 35M]

Institutional training needs to be expanded. Commanders must release Soldiers to attend training.

Need closer integration with CI and CID [Criminal Investigation Department]

When new HUMINTers arrive at the parent units after AIT, we have to strip down everything they have learned and begin from scratch.

No, one big area of deficiency is operational management. We currently train the 35F HUMINT Officer and the 351M Warrant Officer for operational management, but the NCO and junior enlisted levels do not receive a lot of training covering this area. Therefore, we have to train at the local unit levels to meet this training deficiency. The G2X course partially filled this gap, but was recently removed and directly integrated into the MI Captains Career Course and is no longer available to the larger military force or for the NCOs in this field.

More training needs to be given to wide range of 35M and 351M.

HUMINT Soldiers coming out of the 10L course are being taught differently than what happens out in the field

The emphasis on quantity over quality of HUMINT soldier and training has diminished, allowing for a greater number of fully trained collectors.

Too much emphasis is placed on tasks that are not part of the core competency. Focus should be on Interrogation/Source Operations.

The foundation of HUMINT skills is legacy and does not aid the HUMINT effort.

Further training on Source Operations is needed prior to AIT Soldiers joining the force.
The same on-line poll asked: “In general, does the current training program produce quality HUMINT collectors?” Similarly, 73.7% of respondents answered that the current training program does not produce quality collectors. Only 10 (26.3%) out of 38 respondents considered the current training program sufficient. Common responses include; 10 level training is not sufficient, the MOS needs stricter entrance qualifications, and there has been a reduction in the quality of collector, due to quick accessions into the MOS. Recommendations cited here include requiring a selection process for potential HUMINTer and develop quality collectors by sending them to SOC and ASOC.

**Table 4. Does Training Produce Quality Collectors?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Answered question** 38  
**Skipped question** 2

**Individual Comments**

- We have been churning out garbage over the last 10 years trying to meet quotas, particularly in the Warrant Officer Corps. I’ve seen SIGINT NCO’s with ZERO HUMINT experience rammed through the 351M pipeline simply to meet quotas. Garbage in equals garbage out.
- The MOS producing 35M course does not but additional training does. (SOC, ASOC)
- The 10 level gives the Soldier the understanding of HUMINT operations, however, concurrent unit level training is almost non-existent.
- I do not believe the 10 level course produces quality HUMINT collectors. SOC and ASOC are both course that I believe produces quality HUMINT collectors.
- Source ops piece in 10 level is horrible. SOC and ASOC [are] not entirely conducive to BCT HUMINT ops.
- Screening of potential HUMINT collector candidates needs to be conducted in a manner that evaluates the maturity, personality, intelligence, motivation and capabilities of a soldier suitable to conduct HUMINT collection operations. The technical HUMINT skills can be taught but does not guarantee a proficient HUMINT collector if the soldier is not suitable to conduct such operations. Most of these operations rely on soldiers that are self-starters, highly motivated, creative and will take charge of a situation in the absence of guidance. A screening process that has been battle-tested and produces better HUMINT collectors is conducted by the USMC when evaluating CI/HUMINT Marines to become HUMINT Exploitation Team (HET) members.
I believe that once SOC and ASOC are completed you end up with a quality HUMINT collector, but the base 10-level course is not strenuous enough to produce quality collectors out of the course. Having had reduced requirements and standards within the course have led to a significant amount of incapable soldiers within the HUMINT field.

No fail rate at Huachuca; collectors not properly mentored due to [operational tempo] OPTEMPO; fill the force mentality has killed selecting professionalized and qualified force of collectors

Quick accessions, lack of institutional training opportunities/experience, and lack of focus on HUMINT training are degrading the collective pool of experience in the HUMINT community.

Personality dependent.

More time on debriefing and analysis of information received (work jointly with 35F)

Currently the Army only has a cursory selection process for 35M applicants who meet current MOS requirements, however, this process does not assess for maturity, life experience and basic social skills which are key elements in this field. We need personnel that are able to effectively communicate person-to-person in this field. The 35M entry-level course teaches the basic fundamentals for the conduct of HUMINT operations, but it cannot teach a lifetime of experience and social skills that are critical for a HUMINT Soldier.

Time limits/constraints on the 10L course prevents quality training to be conducted. We train to time, not really to standard.

Due to OIF and OEF, the Army needed to produce more 35M10. This caused the standards to be lowered and the suspension of the language requirement has hindered the MOS as well.

Again, too much focus on trying to be everything. We need to focus on questioning and report writing, because that’s all that first-termers can reasonably be expected to do. Should consider changing the requirements to not allow entry level Soldiers to join the MOS.

The training program produces Soldiers with the minimum level of skills needed to effectively do the Job. We depend on proactive leaders in the Army to grab up new HUMINTers and develop them past that minimum level of effectiveness. Where we fall short is when we have lazy leaders, or there are no experienced personnel to guide and mentor the junior collectors. Also, you cannot train maturity, and that is primarily where Army HUMINT falls short.

Relaxed standards of acceptance are producing relaxed HUMINT collectors not ready to operate as a team let alone a singleton.

More often than not Junior Soldiers are unable to perform this job. This should not be an entry level MOS.

Next, in an attempt to determine which HUMINT tasks are considered the most imperative verses which tasks are actually conducted more frequently. Two questions were posed. The first Question, “Page 1-4 of FM 2-22.3 states: HUMINT tasks include but are not limited to; -Conducting source operations. -Liaising with host nation officials and allied counterparts. -Eliciting information from select sources, -Debriefing U.S. and allied forces and civilian personnel including refugees, displaced persons (DPs), third country nationals, and local inhabitants. -Interrogating EPWs and other detainees. -Initially exploiting documents, media, and material. In your opinion, rank these HUMINT tasks in order of importance.”

Table 5. Opinions on Which HUMINT Task Are Most Important

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>Tasks are equally important.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source Operations</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMEX/DOCEX</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliciting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screening</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Answered question 39

The responses show that 23 out of 38 (60.5%) considered source operations the most important task for HUMINTers. Only two (.5%) considered interrogation as the most important task. Fifteen individuals (39.4%) considered interrogation the second most important skill. DOMEX/DOCEX ranked as the least important skill with 18 individuals placing it last. These results insinuate that the majority of warrant officers believe that MSO is a more important than interrogations. The results here advocate that tasks such as analysis, DOMEX/DOCEX, and Biometrics are deemed the least important by HUMINT professionals.
The second question asked: “According to your experience; rank these HUMINT tasks in order of frequency conducted.” Since, these Warrant Officers have a wide variety of experiences this question truly assesses whether or not interrogation is the primary skill needed by the Army.

Table 6. Which HUMINT Tasks Are Most Frequently Conducted?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interrogations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screening</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMEX/DOCEX</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Operations</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elicitation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biometrics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducted equally</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Answered question 39

Not surprisingly, MSO was the most commonly performed task for Army HUMINTers. 64% of HUMINT warrant officers surveyed conducted source operations as their primary job. Only 20.5% primarily conducted interrogations during deployments. Only one individual responded that he conducted all tasks equally. This data implies that MSO is conducted three times more often than interrogations. This supports hypothesis 1, that human intelligence collectors only perform a small subset of assign tasks.

The next question asked if these HUMINTers were properly trained in the HUMINT tasks they are expected to perform. The tasks represented here are derived directly from Army FM 2-22.3.
Table 7. Are HUMINT Tasks Properly Trained?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source Operations</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogations</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screening</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMEX/DOCEX</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elicitation</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biometrics</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Answered question 39

Most individuals considered themselves properly trained in interrogations, source operations, elicitation, screening, liaison operations, and debriefing. The least trained tasks were analysis, DOMEX/DOCEX, and biometrics. This is likely because no course specifically teaches these tasks. Interestingly, even though all HUMINTers are required to attend 10 Level MOS training that predominantly focuses on interrogation three respondents considered themselves as not properly trained to conduct interrogations.

These Warrant Officer’s opinions; advocate that source operations have become the primary skill HUMINTers perform, whereas, DOMEX/DOCEX, biometrics, and analysis are least executed missions. This data supports the hypothesis that the role of the U.S. Army HUMINTer is changing. MSO has grown to be the primary task of collectors. Collectors not only consider it the most important task; they also perform MSO the more frequently.

Many of the written comments suggest training at the 10-level does not meet the needs of Army HUMINT. Warrant officers, who manage the collectors, note that the MOS’s entrance standards have been reduced, and quantity has overshadowed quality. These comments support the hypothesis that HUMINTer lack the age and maturity to be effective in the field. Advanced courses such as SOC and DATC/ASOC improve a collectors overall skill level.
This data confirms the author’s notion that the analysis portion of the MOS is often overlooked. 69.2% of individuals considered themselves as not being properly trained in analysis. Additionally, analysis was not regarded as an important task, only one individual rank it as the most important.

In addition to the HUMINT tasks specifically mentioned in FM-22-2.3, these 39 Warrant Officers were asked if the current language program is meeting the needs of the Army. The discussion posed six language specific questions.

The first question asked; “Are you proficient in a foreign language?” 65.8% (26/39) responded affirmatively with eleven languages identified. Only one individual responded that they were not currently proficient in a language, but had been previously. Four individuals said that they were proficient in more than one language, one of which knew three languages and another was proficient in five languages. One participant skipped the question.

Table 8. Are You Proficient in a Foreign Language?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are you proficient in a foreign language?</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which Language?</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second question asked if the individuals ever attended Military language training. Twenty-three of 39 responded YES; this represents 59% of the respondents. Five individuals are proficient in a foreign language but had never attended Military language training. It is worth noting here that the majority of these Warrant Officers joined the MOS before the suspension of the language requirement in 2004. The numbers of junior soldiers would reflect a much smaller percentage of language-trained soldiers.

147 Noted Languages: Spanish=7; Arabic=6; Russian=4; Korean=4; French=3; Tagalog=2; Persian Farsi & Serbo-Croatian & Portuguese & Italian & Chinese=1.
Question 3 asked: “How important is foreign language proficiency for HUMINT collectors?” Although, the answers varied, the largest response was that foreign language proficiency was “highly” important with 41% vote. 69.2% considered language proficiency “highly” or “extremely” important. Only one individual responded that language proficiency was “not at all” important. One respondent skipped the question. Seventeen individuals shared their personal opinions.

Personal responses suggest that soldiers need to be assigned to units where they can use language skills, the MOS language requirement should be reinstated and language capability leads to cultural understanding. One notable comment says, “Foreign language proficiency familiarizes a collector with a foreign culture, mindset, and thought process in addition to speaking the language. Even if the collector does not actively collect in their control language, they still have this exposure to a foreign mindset, which makes HUMINT operations easier to accomplish by ensuring that the collector can make the distinction between an US/Western view and the target culture.”

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Table 10. How Important Is Foreign Language Proficiency?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some what</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments:</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Answered question 39
Skipped question 1

Individual Comments

The ability to navigate the target population is critical. This is impossible without being proficient in the target language. The use of interpreters is not always practical.

If for nothing else, it requires a mental aptitude, dedication, perseverance that is required for the field but not assessed in any other way than through language capabilities.

It could make a difference when you collect information.

Based on advanced training, I was successful but could’ve been more successful if I spoke the language.

HUMINT needs to transition back to being a language dependent MOS instead of Language Capable.

Sure could use some Dari, Arabic (dialect specific) and Pashto training.

Language capability is an important aspect of cultural intelligence.

Without foreign language proficiency, HUMINT collectors are less likely to be able to utilize an interpreter if need outside of their trained or native language. Language training not only decreases HUMINT’s reliance on interpreters, but also creates a better understanding of their skills and use if one is needed.

If focused on theatre of operations - no need for Spanish linguists in Afghanistan in collector positions; ref: [International Security Assistance Force] ISAF, Kabul.

Language ability enables better interpersonal skills. Bring back the language requirement.

Regionally based HUMINT to maximize language skills.

It comes down to what are the manpower needs of the Army and mission requirements? In the past when HUMINT personnel were language dependent and trained in a language, they were still mismanaged and put into positions that didn’t even utilize the target language. So if a language is important we need to ensure that personnel are put into positions to utilize the training and employ the language to support operations. Otherwise, we are wasting our time, money, and efforts.

Foreign language proficiency familiarizes a collector with a foreign culture, mindset, and thought process in addition to speaking the language. Even if the collector does not actively collect in their control language, they still have this exposure to a foreign mindset, which makes HUMINT operations easier to accomplish by ensuring that the collector can make the distinction between an US/Western view and the target culture.

Learning a foreign language gives the collector insight into other cultures that simple cultural awareness training cannot.

If the Army is willing to align HUMINTers with the regions that their languages are used, then it is absolutely worthwhile to send HUMINTers to language school.

Life experience if nothing else. Topics of interest to draw from in a casual conversation with a lead.

The level of expertise needed in a language is often unattainable.
Question four asked, “If you are proficient in a foreign language: Have you conducted HUMINT operations in this foreign language?” The most common response was yes with 35.9% of the vote. However, 30.8% said the question did not apply to them. One respondent skipped the question and five provided written opinions.

Table 11. Have You Conducted HUMINT Operations in a Foreign Language?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
- Answered question 39
- Skipped question 1

Individual Comments
- I would like to do it but never selected to do it.
- When I was proficient in Arabic, I conducted source operations in Iraq using this language.
- 4 X COMBAT TOURS, IRAQ.
- Interrogation in the target language, without the use of an interpreter.
- Unless you are a Korean linguist or Arabic linguist, the Army does not utilize language skills.

Question 5 asked: “If you have been trained in a foreign language, how often have you used your language in HUMINT operations?” Unsurprisingly, 50% of respondents said that they “never” conducted HUMINT in a language that they had been taught. Only, one respondent said that they conducted 100% of their HUMINT operations in their trained language. Four individuals offered personal comments, but unsurprisingly, respondents noted they used only languages applicable to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Table 12. How Often Foreign Language Skills Been Utilized During Operations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% of the time</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% of the time</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% of the time</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40% of the time</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% of the time</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60% of the time</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70% of the time</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80% of the time</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90% of the time</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% of the time</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:

Answered question: 36
Skipped question: 4

Individual Comments

- IC concentrates their effort in CENTCOM only.
- One deployment to Iraq, I used the language 100% of the time. Three deployments to Afghanistan, I used the language 5% of the time.
- Only in country have I utilized the use of my language in support of operations, however, outside of the country there is very limited use of the language in support of operations.
- My language is not useful in operations in [Afghanistan] AF or [Iraq] IZ.

The final language question is the most revealing in regard to the current Army language program. It asked; “Does the foreign language program meet the needs of the Army?” Of the 35 responses, 68.6% said that the current language program does not meet the needs of the Army.149 Five individuals declined to answer the question and 19 provided written responses.

Insufficient language maintenance training and command oversight are popular complaints. Additionally, respondents mention “assignments need to coincide with a Soldier’s language proficiency” and “it appears as though the army has no idea as to how to prioritize target languages…Soldiers with language training are not guaranteed

---

149 Federation of American Scientists, “Warrant Officer Opinion Poll.”
assignments in which they would utilize their target language. A Spanish-speaking soldier may end up with an assignment to a unit that deploys to an Arabic speaking location…”

Table 13. Does the Foreign Language Program meet the Army’s Needs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
19

Answered question 35
Skipped question 5

Individual Comments

Language maintenance is not currently funded appropriately, including immersion programs in the target countries.

Not enough emphasis in language but more in maintenance in the motor pool.

I believe that HUMINT and Counterintelligence professionals should have the ability to go to language training. They could make it a requirement for E-6 and above and all Warrant Officers.

Completely broken, there is no command emphasis or allocated time or resources for 35M’s to maintain proficiency.

While the foreign language program meets the needs of the Army, assignments need to coincide with a Soldier’s language proficiency.

It appears as though the army has no idea as to how to prioritize target languages. Additionally, Soldiers with language training are not guaranteed assignments in which they would utilize their target language. A Spanish-speaking soldier may end up with an assignment to a unit that deploys to an Arabic speaking location. Also, units do not make language training a priority. It only becomes a concern once a soldier has failed a language proficiency test.

I believe the training is available; however, it is very difficult to maintain due to the operational tempo in the past 11 years. Foreign language takes a substantial amount of time to maintain proficiency.

[The Defense Language Proficiency Test] DLPT 5 is a disaster; bonuses are clearly for the 09Ls, not the rest of us. Think of the money we’d save paying and screening civilians if we’d take the time to adequately train our soldiers in middle eastern and Asian languages. Yes, I get it...these languages take a long time. But haven’t we been at war for over 10 years? We could be reaping the rewards of having trained our own soldiers.

HUMINTers do not currently get training in a foreign language. Given current technology available to units and commanders, there is little reason to rely solely on DLI for language acquisition. All HUMINT professionals should have language capability that can be fostered through use of distance learning, partnerships with local colleges and universities, immersion and other blended learning techniques.

Needs to be longer; the mere “mark on the wall” of 2/2/2 is ridiculous - no collector can learn a language in the college setting of DLI, immersion is key. There is no time in the current army setting of language maintenance; hundreds of thousands of dollars and man-hours lost to teaching somebody a language just to let it fade away. Army G1 / anybody else has no track of who learned what language.

Five deployments to Iraq or SW Asia and I have never used my language. Units I have been assigned to do not have a command language program and language training frequently falls off the training schedule due to other training requirements.

Poor program management (admin/training) within FORSCOM units.
Although I am not a DLI graduate - the quality of the students is superb; however, all too often language training/reinforcement is relegated to the back seat for other “garrison” activities.

The Army has to determine if they want to bring back language dependency to the HUMINT field, if not then it will still be deficient in language needs for HUMINT. Currently we rely heavily upon interpreters to support operations. The other issue is different units have differing levels of emphasis on language maintenance and programs available.

Actual language training time and refresher training is extremely rare for HUMINT collectors. SIGINT collectors receive the greater emphasis on language training.

We need to get back to the way it was when we were required to maintain language proficiency. Language proficient Soldiers are able to function as interpreters as well.

Language proficiency is simply not a priority in the tactical Army.

The training is excellent. The application of the training is substandard.

Realistically HUMINT Soldiers are unable to obtain a native speaker status, which is needed if you were to ever think about doing either Interrogation or Source Operations in a language other than English.

As the data shows, the majority of responders considered the Army as not meeting it language objectives. Since being proficient in a foreign language is considered essential for HUMINT operations, the Army should review its current language program. According to this data, several factors seem to have caused a lack in language capability. First, the suspension of the language requirement reduced the HUMINT’s capability. Next, soldiers are not aligned with units where they are able to conduct operations in their target language. Finally, sustainment training is not properly managed throughout the Army.

3. On-Line Professional Forums

For this section, the on-line MI-Space professional forum was utilized. Within MI-Space, there is a subcategory, where members can discuss HUMINT specific topics. This forum is open to enlisted soldiers, warrant officers, officers, civilian contractors, retirees, and others in the IC. From this forum, the author pulled questions and comments that relate to thesis’s hypotheses.

In June of 2012, the question was asked: “Have “Interrogators” and “Source Handler” ever been separate MOSs? Should they be?” Individual comments on this thread can be read in entirety in Appendix A. Noteworthy comments suggest there is a bit of disagreement on whether or not MSO and interrogating have been separate. From the opinions in this poll, it appears as though the Army recognized a need for more MSO collectors around the Balkans conflict. The consensus is that counterintelligence agents
have historically conducted MSO, but the increase of demand led to interrogators participating as well.

The discussion here also debates the levels of MSO. It is suggested that an ASI is require before conducting MSO. However, category III MSO is a basic HUMINT task and is included in the critical task list (CTL) for all 35M/351M. The respondents suggest that the problem rests in the fact that there “is currently no jointly agreed upon task list for MSO Cat 3 therefore there can be no certification for MSO Cat 3.”

Advance courses which offer ASIs are needed to conduct categories I, II MSO. The author has provided rank and job position for the following abbreviated comments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CPT 35E/D</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Source handling used to be a primary function for CI. The large transition came after Interrogators los[t] the language requirement and became HUMINT, circa 2005. This was a result of requirement from OEF/OIF. As a result we have a large population of Interrogators, low population of CI, and continually pull CI out of our formations making us that much more vulnerable to the ever increasing trends of insider threat…</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CW2 351M</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>…the transition actually came after operations in Bosnia. 97Es were doing MSO before 9/11 ever happened. This transition had nothing to do with having/not having a language. 97Es had a skill set and a language and therefore it made sense for them to conduct MSO. The biggest difference between the MSO HUMINT and CI conduct is the focus, offensive vs. defensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS13 INSC OM</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Good answer... The biggest reason for the creation of the “big Army” HUMINT Soldier was to create a tactical HUMINT capability that was offensive in nature. Since the Balkans Crisis, the CI MOS has been a more defensive discipline when working tactically and could not fulfill both efficiently or effectively.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CPT 35E/D</strong></td>
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<td>Concur, the transition did begin after/during Bosnia/Balkans as I witnessed first-hand in 1998, but did not sky rocket in transition until later when the school house just pumped out quantity not quality of HUMINT over CI circa 2005. [Omitted] Overall, the Army has missed the mark, especially as this discussion clearly demonstrates the bias and division of CI vs. HUMINT. Although several of the comments later on paint a better light, the Marine Corps has it right with having experienced folks capable of doing both jobs. Furthermore, it’s not enough to say someone is trained in MSO can effectively perform the task. Hence the reason some areas have created a “probationary program”…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CW3 351M</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It isn’t possible to have a detailed discussion of this topic on an unclassified forum. The short answer to whether Interrogator and source handler have been separate MOSs is yes. In fact, “source handler” is presently an ASI for the MOS 35M. Elements of the source handling trade were first taught at the 10-level in 1999, if memory serves. As to whether they ought to be separate MOSs, that depends on what Army leaders expect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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151 Ibid.
35Ms to do. My personal opinion; leaders want interrogators, and THINK they want source handlers, but don’t really understand what being a source handler means or what the operations entail to be done correctly. So, I think they should be separate, and that source handling should remain out of the hands of conventional units. Again, just my opinion.

**CW4 351M**

It is slightly misleading to say that source handling is merely an ASI for 35M. So, for clarification, the Army considers SOC to be an advanced course in source handling thus there is an ASI for enlisted Soldiers who attend the training. Source handling as a function of HUMINT is currently integrated into the MOS and forms part of the critical task list for all skill levels. There is no ASI for Warrant Officers because all 351Ms are required possess the training certification.

**CW3 351M**

Not my intention to be misleading. I did focus on 35M vs. 351M, but you are of course correct that there is no ASI for the 351Ms, as a MSO CAT II certifying course is required for technical certification as a 351M.

For clarification, when I refer to source handling I assume we mean CAT II. I think that’s what most other folks mean as well. In any case, I will reference the message pertaining to the ASIs to make sure that I have my facts straight.

[See footnote 146]^{152}

Since the title of the ASI S1 is “Source Handler” I infer that one is not considered a source handler without the ASI, and that source handling is therefore directly associated with MSO CAT II. The Army appears to not consider MSO CAT III source handling for the purposes of this discussion. I know we include aspects of source handling as critical tasks, but we don’t certify the collectors as source handlers without attendance at the courses above [courses listed in footnotes], at which point they are granted an ASI.

The requirement to have a MSO CAT II certification prior to attendance at WOCS and WOBC has only recently been implemented and enforced. We still have a number of 351Ms who do not have such a certification, and a few (four that I am aware of) have attended a MSO CAT II certifying course and failed. What will happen to these Soldiers? Forced re-class? One last chance to pass?

**CW4 351M**

You bring up an interesting issue in regard to MSO Cat 2 and MOS Cat 3. There is currently no jointly agreed upon task list for MSO Cat 3 therefore there can be no certification for MSO Cat 3. That does not mean that those 35Ms who are trained to conduct MSO Cat 3 cannot be source handlers. It merely means that the community has yet to agree upon and publish a list of tasks that comprise such a skill set.

**CW3 351M**

Actually, I have a question based on the way you phrased this... If there is no agreed upon CAT III task list and no CAT III certification then how can anyone be trained to conduct CAT III MSO?

**CW4 351M**

There is no Joint standard but there is an Army MOS that requires training in MSO Cat 3. Therefore, lacking any benchmarks against which to assess training success, the closest we can come to a codified standard for the Army is whatever standard the [Critical Task / Site Selection Board] CTSSB decides comprises the basic requirements for the 35M 10 level Soldier. Is this the very best answer? Absolutely not, but the subject matter experts in the field converse every two or three years to determine what a 35M should be, know and do at each skill level so it’s not a bad answer either.

**CW3 351M**

I was at the last CTSSB with you, and discussing the reasons why certain tasks were, were not, or couldn’t be included in the 10-level [critical task list] CTL is too big a can of worms to get

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^{152} 1. ASI S1: soldiers must successfully complete one of DA G2 approved category II MSO certifying courses to be awarded ASI S1: A. Source operations course (SOC) B. Military counterintelligence collections course (MCC) C. Counterintelligence force protection source operations (CFSO) D. Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) CI/HUMINT course. 2. ASI V4: soldiers must successfully complete one of the category I MSO certifying courses: A. Advanced source operations course (ASOC) conducted B. Advanced military source operations course (AMSOC) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
into here. I observe, in addition to the lack of a task list for CAT III, a lack of uniform agreement as to what CAT III really is, operationally speaking. I think it would be super if we could have that discussion at the joint level.

I also observe confusion/confusion between operational categories and source categories (levels). Again, ‘twould be great to have something that definitively laid it all out. (Actually, I think it is spelled out pretty well in existing policy and doctrine, but since there is still disparity in interpretation I assume that it must not be as obvious as I think.)

GS13 INSC OM … Interrogators were once a separate MOS, but the HUMINT collector/source handler is a recent MOS to the “big Army.” Army CI was the tactical source handler for the Army until the Balkans. The mission was too big for CI to man and maintain CI operations. The solution was to bring interrogators into the fold, which eventually led to two HUMINT based MOSs with two different focuses: 35L being defensive in nature and 35M being more offensive. The reasons that brought the MOSs to this point have all been good in theory, but I agree with [CW3 / 351M]. Execution has proved it to be less than efficient. Source handling and interrogations would be better employed and more productive if they were separate, and in general support under the control of commands specifically trained and designed to use them…

RET. LTC 48E I believe that much of the reason that CI personnel were pressed into being the “tactical source handler” for Big Army was that they had the skills, but what the Army really needed was MSO/ [low level source operations] LLSO HUMINT assets. Of course they had none, so they used CI assets somewhat out of their field…

Additional discussions on the MI-Space forum are posed while students attended the 35M-Advanced Leadership Course (ALC) at Ft. Huachuca. Instructors ask general questions in regard to the MOS and HUMINT students are required respond. Some of the comments and names have been omitted. The demographic for responses to these questions are from SGT, SSG, and SFC, with the majority being SSG.

The first ALC question posed in June 2011 asked. “What would be the advantages/disadvantages of making the 35M MOS a 20 level and above only MOS?”

Fifty-one students responded to the question. The majority of responses said that the MOS would benefit if initial entry soldiers were not allowed to directly join the MOS. The advantages of making the MOS 20 level only include establishing a screening process and the likelihood that soldiers would be more mature. Although, not all responses are included here, the following comments offer a good summary. (Additional comments can be found in Appendix B.)

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Individual Comments

The 35M MOS is a very specialized MOS and requires Soldiers with specialized attributes. Some of those attributes are: alertness; patience; tact; credibility; objectivity; self-control; adaptability; perseverance; appearance; demeanor; and initiative. These attributes cannot be verified without evaluations and experience. Sub 20 level Soldiers have not been in long enough to be evaluated and determined to have the attributes mentioned above. Sub 20 level Soldiers have not proven that they can operate as a 35M so they should not be pulled into the MOS.

An advantage to this concept would be Soldiers entering into the skill set would “normally” be more mature, responsible and adaptive to the requirements needed to become a successful HUMINT collector. Most entry level Soldiers coming into the Army are recent high school graduates and do not hold the appropriate life experience or maturity to deal with people during HUMINT operations…

A 20 level soldier (or above) should already have that Army experience behind them. Most 10 level soldiers lack the basic understanding of the military necessary to function individually within the HUMINT Community…

While restricting the 35M MOS to a 20 level or higher MOS would be a step in the right direction, what we ultimately need is thorough screening process. The 10 course has an excellent capability to accomplish this screening process; however it has been misused during recent years due to the greater demand for quantity over quality. What we need to do as a whole is uphold a high and solid standard without compromise.

For the 35M MOS to progress and not become just another over-filled MOS, we do need an appropriate screening system, which assesses the potential HUMINTer’s intelligence, common sense, social skills, and maturity. As stated, our MOS should focus on quality. I would rather have a team of two or three solid performers than six bodies that lack the requisite skills to perform as a 35M… I agree we need to maintain a high standard for this job, and I encourage an appropriate screening for individuals wanting to enter this MOS.

The HUMINT field is definitely a specialized MOS, which requires, in addition to those attributes mentioned…, a large amount of both maturity and life experience. Those who have been in the field long enough have likely met those battlefield commanders and Platoon Leaders who have been burned in the past by poor HUMINT Collection Team Leaders, etc…. due to their lack of maturity, inability to properly communicate, and a lack of overall professionalism. Unfortunately, these expectations when it comes to HUMINT have become the norm rather than the rare exception, damaging our overall credibility in battlefield operations and forcing us to work that much harder in order to prove our mission capabilities…

The 35M MOS requires a certain level of expertise, maturity, and responsibility in order to accomplish whatever mission is assigned to you.

In 2010, the question was posed: “Do you believe separating the 35M MOS into two separate tracks, one for MSO and one for Interrogations, would improve the overall quality of all 35M’s?” This question addresses this thesis’s main argument. There were 55 comments that have been included in their entirety in Appendix C. Of the comments, 23 individuals argue that separating interrogation from Source operations is

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beneficial. Seventeen argued that it word hurt the MOS more than improve it. The remaining comments were either on the fence or neutral on the issue.

The principle arguments on why the MOS should not be split focused on a couple of themes. First, was that advanced interrogation courses are not available. Therefore, individual who tracked into interrogation would have limited training opportunities. The Army would need to create advanced interrogation courses before splitting the job field. The Second argument is the shortage of personnel. By splitting the MOS, the pool of qualified collectors is reduced. Lastly, the Army would lose well-rounded soldiers who are able to perform both activities.

This thesis argues that the MOS be split. In Chapter IV, the author will give possible solutions on how to separate the MOS into tracks, while mitigating the concerns of those opposed to this idea. The comments below are divided into Pro and Con of separating the MOS.

**Individual Comments**

**Pro - Separating the MOS**

| I believe the MOS should have two separate tracks. One track focusing on MSO and one interrogation. I believe for the MSO side of the track there should be certain requirements. Rank and age should be just some of the requirements for conducting MSO operations. It should not be an entry-level position. I believe by emplacing this requirement alone, the overall quality of the MOS will increase. I have no issues with an interrogator being an entry level position. I also believe that at after a certain amount of experience and meeting the requirements for the MSO track, you should be afforded the opportunity to make a decision to stay as an interrogator or move on to being a collector. This will allow for individuals to grow in the MOS (improving the quality) and have control of your own career path. Separating the two (by MSO and interrogations) would permit/ focus the training for those specific skill sets i.e. source handling and detainee/ interrogation operations. Also, the SH/ interrogator role would be clearly defined (for the collector’s respective unit) so that a CDR would better understand his/ her 35M asset capabilities. Correct me if I am wrong here, but my understanding of previous discussions in our circle of colleagues has not been to physically split the 35M MOS. The way it has been discussed before is to establish two tracks within the 35M and 351M MOS’s for interrogations and MSO. Whether we agree or disagree with the concept it has unofficially been happening over the last 8-10 years. Many of my colleagues already pursue positions specifically focused on their preferred area within the MOS. The intent is to decide whether or not to formally establish career paths within the MOS in order to better support both areas within HUMINT. The area of training emphasis brought…is a valid one that has and is being discussed. What having formal career tracks should allow for is the establishment of more advanced training with regard to interrogations for those HUMINT collectors who prefer to follow an interrogation track and hopefully mirror the training pillars offered for MSO. While there are not different categories of interrogation operations such as MSO I-III there should be advancing levels of interrogation training. Just as … mentioned, the Senior Interrogator course is more of a management course. From discussions I have had with my peers there is a desire to establish and incorporate advanced interrogation training into the interrogator track should one be established. |
Overall, having HUMINT collectors tracked as MSO or interrogator will help the career managers better determine future assignments and ensure that these soldiers, NCO’s, and Warrants hit the appropriate educational and assignment “wickets” for advancement and proper utilization.

That is a great idea. Allowing a track split at the 30 level would allow the Army to focus its higher trained (and hopefully retained) assets on specific mission sets. God knows we have plenty of 30 level personnel, why not use this “dwell” time to ensure that these personnel are able to take the courses needed to become true experts in their track, whether MSO or Interrogations? I’d love to see the CTSSB approve split tracks based in choice/experience that allows … our collectors [to become experts].

The simple fact of the matter is that specialization is productive; it is the reason the entire Warrant Officer Corps exists.
I would actually take it a step further, though. Once an MSO-specific MOS was created, structure it similar to 35L, requiring an application and screening process.

There are a lot of arguments predicated on the concept that splitting the MOS into interrogation ops and MSO degrades HUMINT because it denies a Soldier the ability to reach their full potential. I pose this question: where besides the -10 level course are the two disciplines integrated? No where! True, some principles and methodologies apply across the spectrum, but these are two distinct skill sets. Likely many of us have seen the 35M with only interrogation experience enter his/her first source meet and attempt to interrogate the source. Inversely, many of us have likely seen the 35M with only MSO experience enter his/her first interrogation and be run into the ground by the detainee “trying to establish rapport.”
I concede that a well-rounded collector CAN and SHOULD be able to do both. But artificially imposing this diversification in the quest for a well-rounded Soldier is what actually degrades capability. If the Soldier is capable and demonstrates talent or exceptional performance in one skill set, but is forced to divide his/her attention and effort in maintaining proficiency in both compels that Soldier to do so at expense of the one in which they truly excel.

Splitting the MOS contains many implied tasks, not least of which is differentiating missions. While this is not a simple task, it begs the question, is it worth the effort? Again, many arguments here have been presented founded on the concept of quality over quantity. Allowing a Soldier to dedicate their training life-cycle to one of the two skill-sets (vice both), and giving them experience in one (vice both) results in a net gain in quality

I believe courses should be developed to compliment the interrogation side of the house before separation can occur. We have courses that focus on MSO certifying collectors to conduct MSO operations in the current theaters but none that really focus on interrogations. I know the 10 level course focuses on interrogations and commanders seem to think that this is enough. There is a little known advanced interrogation school but this course focuses on collectors who have already conducted interrogation operations whereas SOC is a practical necessity to conduct effective operations in the current conflicts. I believe that before a “Split” of the 35M MOS is undertaken we should at least develop a certifying program for interrogations, much like the MSO side of the house.

Just spent the past 30 minutes catching up on this issue. Here are a couple issues to consider. First, until the late 90’s, the interrogator course was an 8-week long Order of Battle interrogation course with no MSO component. CI did all the source ops. Second, as you all know, a -10 AIT graduate is unqualified by the DOD and ARMY MSO policies to operate anything but CAT 3 MSO without the special O-5 waiver. Basically, he’s unqualified to do MSO by the basic course. I believe ours is the only MOS where the basic course does NOT qualify you do your job. SOC/ASOC/FTC’s required to do any MSO of value in the DOD’s eyes. The O-5 waiver is a stop gap measure intended to keep the MSO collectors engaged until they can get the required and expected advanced MSO training. I fully expect that waiver option to go away once DA assesses there are enough SOC/ASOC grads to sustain the mission. Keeping the training combined provides greater flexibility to the unit to swap collectors around between HCTs and interrogation jobs, depending on the situation day by day. I completely agree that there needs to be an interrogation career track with additional formal training in interrogation besides Reid, LSI/SCAN, and the British course, which I’ve only heard of and don’t know any actual graduates of. There is an initiative at [Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center] DCHC/DIA to develop a follow-on interrogation course. I would recommend that someone at USAIC/HT-JCOE set up a tiger team to draft a proposed POI for a journeyman/advanced interrogation series of courses. They’ll have to be short, no more than 4 to 5
weeks, though, if they intend to attract collectors from the divisions. Alternately, they could be tied to [NCO and WO evaluation systems], but that would involve buy-in from DA G1. All those PME schools are detached from promotion now, so there’s really no incentive to go to WLC/PLDC/BNCO as they’ve all devolved into administrative block checks versus real leadership training--but that’s a different topic altogether. In the meanwhile, I’d recommend that the units look for individual augmentee assignment options in response to [requests for forces] RFFs to get their interrogators pushed out to units that are doing effective interrogations, that is, places other than the [detention facility in Parwan] DFIP/ [Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center] JIDC-type places

Con - Separating the MOS

I do not think it would be helpful to split 35M into two separate MOS’s. Source and detainee operations go hand in hand. There really is not enough significant differences between the two to warrant separation. The procedures for assessing, questioning, analyzing information, and report writing are all basically the same... whether or not the individual is physically controlled by U.S. forces. If our interrogations were more law enforcement-oriented, and our reason for interrogating detainees was to pressure them to confess, then it might be useful to separate the two. But the end goal of MI interrogation/ MSO is the same... to exploit information of intelligence value, and to use a series or approaches in order to make that happen.

In every job, I believe it is necessary to have at least two separate job tracks in order to avoid stagnation. After working interrogations for six months straight, I know I was personally exhausted... physically and mentally. I needed a break to stay fresh and avoid getting into a rut. For me, that break was MSO. After doing that for six months, in turn, I was eager to get back to interrogations, and I found myself a better interrogator, not just because I was rested, but also because developing my MSO skillset actually improved my ability to “break” sources.

I don’t think splitting the MOS would do any good, for two reasons. One is that it would be easy for the MOS to become lopsided -- not enough MSO or not enough interrogators. Given our current manning, this might not be an immediate problem, but I could see it being a problem down the road. The second reason is that there’s very little training out there specifically for interrogators. At least, I can’t think of much. The Reid course, I suppose. Kinesics and LSI-SCAN are useful HUMINT classes. But what do we have that is really advanced training for interrogators? Another way of saying this is, if someone wanted to be highly trained and proficient, why would they choose to be an Army interrogator? What would your training path look like? The 10 course and then... what? Senior interrogator -- which is a management course, not an advanced interrogation course. DSDC/Strat D? Not an interrogation course -- closer to MSO, I would think. The British course? I don’t know anyone who has actually gone to it, but that could be a start.

If we’re going to separate the MOS, we need to have a comparable training path for the people who go to each path. Right now we don’t.

I feel that splitting the MOS would hinder more than help. In this profession there is no way of knowing who we will be called on to support or what our supported unit may run into while on mission. If the MOS were split how could we possibly ensure those individuals assigned for interrogations would end up in a DHA, or JIDC and even if those were hard slots, there isn’t enough for an even split of the MOS. In order to maintain an even spread of the MOS some people slated for interrogation would still have to conduct MSO eventually and vice versa. The major problem being that MSO and interrogation are perishable skills. I believe the entire MOS needs to continue to work in and train on all facets of the job to mitigate this degradation of skill sets.

I do not believe that separating 35M into two different tracks would be beneficial to HUMINT Operations. This can cause multi problems and not alleviate the problem which already exists. One of the problems that could be caused by this course of action would be a lack of personnel available for future missions. The problem which exists now is the level of maturity and competence of the HUMINT Collector that we are finding in the Army.

With this approach to HUMINT Operations, you would have separate tracks for soldiers to follow allowing the individual soldier to focus on one aspect of collection allowing them to better hone their skills. The underlying problem that HUMINT as a whole would face after this would be manning. As it stands now
there is a tremendous manning issue in the Army for the 35M field. This is part of the reason so many new collectors have been pushed out of the schoolhouse. After talking with 10 level instructors’ students standards for operating in the field have dropped due to the Army needing numbers. We will run into the same problem, maybe not now; but, later down the road it is inevitable. With two tracks we will have over manning in one and not enough in the other.

The major problem that is in the 35M field which makes me assume the reason for the question being posed in the first place is some soldiers are good at interrogations and some soldiers are good at MOS. Why can’t a soldier just be a good collector? I believe that soldiers can be good collectors but with interrogations and with MOS the soldier has to have a personality and characteristic traits that are not taught but gained through life experience. How can we as Non Commissioned Officers expect an 18 year old soldier straight out of high school to have the opportunity to gain these traits? There needs to be 35M recruiting teams. We need to “identify” collectors. That is what MSOH’s [military source handler] do in the first place, identify people. Separating the field is only forming an excuse to be substandard.

Now to play devil’s advocate; I do think that we should make a career path once you reach senior Non Commissioned Officer by separating into fields of expertise. This would be a beneficial alternative to creating an entirely separate track for the 10 level soldiers. This will allow collectors that have focused on certain aspects of HUMINT throughout their carriers to be better managers in the realm that they have operated in.

No! All separating the MOS would do is create problems. Within HUMINT there are already specializations, interrogations and MSO. Specifically assigning individuals to those task by MOS and not by ability would destroy both operations. There are several HUMINTers that are exceptional at conducting MSO, but are completely lacking at interrogations and vice versa. Though this is an issue for HUMINT, it is manageable because HUMINTers can be moved from position to position depending on their strengths, however it is practically impossible to determine where a HUMINTers talents lie before they are engaged in operations. By separating the MOS, you would limit HUMINTers to their MOS instead of their talents drastically reducing the effectiveness of both operations.

Implications

This chapter illustrates that Army HUMINT is currently not meeting the nation’s needs. Although, the HUMINT Corps has gained invaluable experience during the Global War on Terror, professionals from many different backgrounds and experiences still encounter similar and reoccurring issues. HUMINT professionals advocate that there is a general lack of skill, due to training deficiencies in numerous areas crucial to HUMINT collection. Collectors often lack language ability, cultural knowledge, analytical and writing ability, and maturity to be successful.

Throughout the intelligence community, there is an understanding that the Nation need a greater HUMINT capacity. This means growth not only in the number of collectors but also evolution in the types of operations they are able to carry out. The Army has recognized that the role of HUMINT is changing and has begun to modify its
doctrine and training to attempt to meet this need. While the Army has some experienced
and talented collectors, not all of its HUMINTers are up to par.

In Chapter IV, based on the information obtained, the author concludes that the
Army’s HUMINT structure and training are in need of reform. The author proposes that
if the Army restructures the HUMINT MOS and modifies the training, it could mitigate
many of the challenges identified in this research.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSION

1. Does U.S. Army HUMINT Doctrine Achieve its Objectives? What Have Iraq and Afghanistan Taught Us?

Based on the data from the previous chapters the answer to this thesis’s primary research question is, “No, the Army is not meeting its HUMINT Objectives.” However, we have learned from experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. As pointed out earlier the Army, as well as the entire IC, agree that the nation needs a large HUMINT capability. The Army reacted to this need by increasing the number of soldiers trained in HUMINT operations. Unfortunately, this was not without consequences. First, the Army increased numbers without taking into consideration that the tasks HUMINT collectors would be conducting has changed. Collectors trained primarily in interrogation operations but more frequently performed military source operations downrange. Second, quantity took precedence over quality and many unskilled collectors were allowed to enter the MOS. Lastly, confusing and controversial interrogation guidance has necessitated that the nation revamp its policies, this monumental effort has attempted to repair damage of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Nevertheless, the Army should ensure that only highly skilled and professionally trained soldiers interrogate.

The Army has made a measurable effort to improve HUMINT over the last 12 years. It rewrote the Army Field Manual guiding HUMINT activities, it established HT-JCOE training center and has increased the size of its force. Because of this, the Army currently has many well-trained and experienced HUMINT collectors. As the Army transitions out of Afghanistan and downsizes its forces it should continue to professionalize the HUMINT Corps.

Recognizing deficiencies of Iraq and Afghanistan the Army continues to make adjustments to its current HUMINT policy. Recent improvements include an increase in the required security clearance level, an increase of the minimum ST score, and a required score of 95 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB). Unfortunately, despite these efforts, there remain shortfalls in the MOS. Issues with experience,
maturity, competency, and cultural and language knowledge persist. The likelihood that these already implemented measures will be sufficient for future operations is doubtful.

Obsolete 10 level training and counterproductive doctrine impede on the changes that are required to address these shortfalls. The rapid pace of which HUMINT has grown, both in size and responsibility has necessitated a revision in training, standards, and policy. The author suggests that implementing the following recommendations; the Army would likely improve the HUMINT MOS and further professionalize the corps.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are a combination of initiatives the Army has already begun implementing, as well as, proposals for restructuring the Army HUMINT MOS and allowing HUMINT collectors to supplement the national HUMINT enterprise. The author contends that the Army can build and maintain quality HUMINT collectors by:

- Increase the MOS’s entrance requirements, by mimicking other intelligence field’s qualification requirements
- Regionally aligning soldiers, based on individual language and cultural knowledge.
- Restructuring the MOS, by creating an entry level HUMINT analyst position; and making separate interrogation and source operations tracks at the NCO level.
- Integrate Experienced Collectors into National Agencies.

1. Increasing Entrance Requirements to the MOS

To increase the quality of soldiers entering the MOS, the Army must raise the MOS enlistment standards to ensure the selection of the best-qualified recruits. These changes should mirror requirements for other intelligence disciplines such as 35P, Cryptologic Linguist, 35F Intelligence Analyst and the 35L counterintelligence MOS. The Army should raise the ASVAB qualifying scores for HUMINT collectors from the
current 95 ST score to 105, to match that of an intelligence analyst. In addition, the MOS should require a Top-Secret clearance and GT score of 110 or higher, like requirement of the 35P. Moreover, the 35M specialty should also require an accession assessment comparable to the 35L. Scores and assessment should not be waiverable.

Fortunately, the Army has already begun the increase enlistment standards for the HUMINT MOS. As of October of 2012, the Army has required all HUMINTers entering the MOS to be eligible for a Top-Secret clearance. Before this date, collectors only needed a secret clearance. This change, however, does not require a soldier to pass a counterintelligence scope polygraph (CSP) as the 35P MOS does. The CSP requirement should be extended to HUMINT collectors as well. A higher security level clearance would ensure greater cooperation between all Army intelligence disciplines; sister services; and allows Army HUMINT collectors to support other national agencies like DCS.

In June 2012, a U.S. Recruiting Command message announced that all new the 35M MOS applicants must score a 95 on the DLAB. This requirement will ensure all new HUMINTers will possess an aptitude to learn a foreign language. As for the soldiers that enlisted without a DLAB, they should be required to take the DLAB before attending language training. If these soldiers fail to get the minimum score, they should become HUMINT analyst and not collectors.

As suggested earlier in this thesis, the Army should develop an accession assessment. HUMINT soldiers should possess a minimum set of characteristics to be eligible join the MOS. Currently, Army counterintelligence soldiers undergo a restrictive interview before consideration for the MOS. According to DA Pamphlet 600-8, procedure 3-33,

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155 The required ST score has changed over the years. On March 1, 2013, five different scores were advertised; about.com lists the required score as 95, goarmy.com lists the score as 101, army-portal.com has the ST score at 91, and atrrs.army.mil show the required score as 95 prior to January 2, 2002 and 92 after.


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active duty CI applicants need to pass an assessment interview. Experienced CI personal assess applicants suitability for the MOS. The interview includes questions regarding the following:

1. Motivation and reasons for applying for MOS 97B, poise, mental alertness, sincerity, ability to think quickly, ability of oral expression, personality, and maturity.

2. The qualities and attitudes listed below are desirable and particularly sought by MI: (a) Neatness (clean-shaven, shoes polished, brass polished, clothing clean and pressed, hair combed, and neat and clean fingernails). (b) Posture…(c) Stature and physique… (d) Physiognomy (no outstanding characteristics to … cause…stand[ing] out in a crowd). (e) Demeanor (straightforward, looks directly at the interviewer when speaking, calm, poised, at ease, self-confident, courteous, respectful, pleasing, …animated, interested, voice quality… no unpleasant qualities or unusual characteristics which may cause easy identification or undue notice to the extent that it would be detrimental to the soldier’s MI duties).

3. Educational requirements. (a) Attended accredited schools or received proper tutoring or self-instruction comparable to formal education requirements. (b) Received passing grades in most subjects, especially in English, history, and political science courses. (c) Worked toward definite goal. (d) Intends to use his education to further career. (e) Expresses intention of completing or improving his education. (f) Has retained a fair amount of what he learned in school. (g) Has the ability to write correctly, using good grammar, and spelling. (h) Speaks English correctly.

4. Development. (a) Current events (well informed on current events, interested in national affairs, possesses ability to reason and form conclusions relative to world affairs). (b) Personal (has common sense, is quick to grasp a situation and quick to change his thoughts to new trends or changes in situation under discussions).

5. Moral. (Has definite ideas of right and wrong in personal and public life; has religious or moral ideals; has sense of personal responsibility; has religious and racial tolerance).

Using an assessment tool, the Army would avoid recruiting substandard HUMINTers. Problems with inadequate interpersonal skills, weak writing abilities, and

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158 Ibid.
immaturity would be less frequent than in the past. In combination with stricter ASVAB scores, required DLAB score, and a higher clearance level requirement, the Army could further professionalize the HUMINT Corps.

The Army must hold its intelligence soldiers to the highest standard. As MG Flynn stated: “leaders must put time and energy into selecting the best, most extroverted and hungriest [HUMINTers] to serve…”159

2. Regionally Alignment of Soldiers

On April 19, 2012, General Raymond Odierno and the Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, signed the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), which provides guidance on adapting an Army program to meet the needs of DoD.160 In this document, and publically, the Army announced its plans to regionally align brigades with the six Geographic Combatant Commands.161 Regionally aligning brigades will allow soldiers to develop the language and cultural expertise that were lacking during GWOT. This is a long overdue step, particularly in the intelligence field. As this may be less imperative for some MOSs, such as administrative support jobs, it is extremely vital for HUMINT personnel. By regionally aligning HUMINTers, the Army will create SMEs in the language and culture of their target countries that are more effective when performing the mission.

In the past, soldiers relocated far too often. A soldier working in Korea today can be assigned to CENTCOM tomorrow. The language and cultural knowledge gained during one assignment does not remain valid in the soldier’s new environment. The soldier has to start at ground zero to learn about his new area of operations (AO). This often creates an apathetic attitude toward learning the new AO among soldiers.

159 Flynn and Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” 5.
It is understandable that the relocation every 3-year methodology could create well-rounded soldiers with a multitude of different experience. Some even say that if a soldier is in a single position too long the quality of their work may decrease. Soldiers become complacent and have minimum job satisfaction. While these are valid arguments, the benefits of having soldiers specialize in a single region significantly outweigh the disadvantages.

For example, Army has already had success with regionally aligning soldiers, just consider special operations forces and the Foreign Area Officer programs. Both of these programs strive to ensure that soldiers have specialized knowledge of the history, religions, cultures, geography, politics, military, and economy of a foreign region. To accomplish this, these soldiers receive language training, often live, and operate in the region of interest. The conventional Army needs to adopt similar practices. Although aligning the brigades may take several years, Army HUMINT should immediately assess soldier’s language abilities and cultural familiarity and correspondingly assign its soldiers to regional commands.

Regionally aligning HUMINT soldiers would be a step toward solving the language and cultural knowledge problem within the MOS. Many soldiers are currently assigned to units in which they are unable to use or get training in. Ideally, after regionally assignment, HUMINT platoons would consist of soldiers all trained in the same language. With this being the case, sustainment of the language is far more likely. Not only would soldiers be able to communicate in a target language, but also it would be easier to facilitate and track language training.

Sustainment of language proficiency is currently largely up to the individual soldier, occasionally soldiers can be sent to refresher training at DLI or the Partnership Language Training Center (PLTC). Funding and class slot availability often hinder prevent soldiers from attending. Mobile Training Teams are also available, but since HUMINT platoons often consist of soldiers who know several languages, there is not a large enough concentration of one language to justify the cost. Often units that have large concentrations of linguists have resident language instructors or sustainment training available for soldiers. This is much more prevalent at strategic assignments that support
agencies like the National Security Agency. However, with regional assignment units would be able to offer language training to a large number of soldiers at the same time regardless of MOS.

Regional alignment would allow units to track a soldier’s language proficiency throughout a soldier’s career. This would make oversight of command language programs more efficient. From the soldier’s perspective, it would seem that commanders cared and are vested in language sustainment. As pointed out in Chapter III, soldier often feel that language maintenance is not a priority for the Army.

3. Restructuring the HUMINT MOS

As opinions from this research suggest, HUMINTers often lack the skills required to be successful in the MOS. Soldiers arriving fresh from training are ill prepared for the missions in foreign countries. Although, these soldiers often develop into quality collectors over several years, they should not be expected to straight out of AIT.

One way to take advantage of the lessons learned from GWOT is by embracing the author’s recommendation of restructuring the HUMINT MOS. Combining Army initiatives and a new MOS configuration would improve the problems identified in this thesis.

Since the role of HUMINT has changed, and interrogation training and policy is increasingly controversial, the Army should revise its current approach. Interrogation should no longer be the primary skill taught at the 35M course. Instead, Interrogation, as well as MSO training, should be reserved for Army Sergeants that have proven to possess the required maturity, knowledge, and professionalism.

As an analyst, soldiers should perform HUMINT non-collector tasks, such as analysis, report writing quality & control, DOMEX, biometrics, source deconfliction and validation, OSINT research, and other tasks described in FM 2-22.3. In a non-collector role, they can become intimately familiar with the HUMINT structure, intelligence requirements, automation, and operations planning. HUMINT analysts would work alongside experienced collectors at every echelon, learning valuable information of the
systems, tools, methods, and resources available. A HUMINT “analyst-first” methodology will allow soldiers to grow into becoming collectors while developing skills and reducing shortcomings experienced during GWOT.

As one Army Sergeant stated “Maybe we should have more focus on MSO for the HUMINT collector. I think there’s still a widespread perception that 35M is an interrogator -- maybe we should get away from that. 35M should be a collector first, and interrogation being one small skillset in a broader array of capabilities. I think our primary focus should be MSO anyway. Maybe we should make 35M primarily MSO and make advanced interrogation training an ASI. Provided we can GET advanced interrogation training, which as we’ve discussed may not be available.”

Both of these skills should require advanced specialized training and additional skill identifiers; comparable to the current system with MSO categories I and II. Training should be reserved for only experienced collectors who have demonstrated an aptitude to be successful.

The first step in restructuring the MOS, would be changing the initial entry MOS to a HUMINT analyst. Initial entry soldiers should be trained as HUMINT analysts with limited or no collection responsibilities. 10 level training should concentrate on duties such as research and analysis, understanding intelligence requirements, reporting cycle; quality report writing, automation, and other HUMINT related tasks. The concepts of collection tasks, such as de briefing, liaising, screening, interrogation, and MSO, should only be introduced during AIT. Soldiers should not focus on questioning and collecting techniques. In a non-collector role, HUMINTers would develop an understanding on how HUMINT works and how it fits into the larger intelligence collection effort. New soldiers should be eased into the MOS by essentially working as apprentice collectors, while gaining knowledge, maturity, and experience.

An experienced Army Sergeant supports the argument for analyst with his statement, “I agree wholeheartedly that entry-level troops are not usually a good fit for MSO- but neither do I feel that they’re right for interrogations either. Both require a high level of maturity, and some of the attitudes I have seen some of the young kids bring to interrogation operations are

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162 HUMINT & CI, Human Intelligence, MI-Space, “Do You Believe Separating the 35M MOS Into Two Separate Tracks,” Appendix C.
ridiculous and require a lot of fixing before they’re useful interrogators. That is time that we have, but that could be put to much better use if we didn’t have to deal with it as much/at all.

Maybe if we did what the Marines do, and have troops be analysts or something first? That would hopefully give them a better understanding of how intelligence works as a whole, and that could only help them in the long run. The things my analysts taught me when I was the new guy are invaluable to me now, and it would have been nice to know them from the start.”

HUMINT analysts should be able to track themselves into a collection role of their choosing. After an initial enlistment, HUMINT analysts could decide to remain as a HUMINT analyst or be trained in interrogation or source operations. Both of these tracks should require language and cultural training in a target region. Soldiers would work for the majority of their careers. MSO collectors would attend the Source Operations Course and interrogators would attend an equivalent course. Both tracks could then be assigned according to their ASI and LIC codes. Senior soldiers in the MSO track should be afforded the opportunity to be assigned to the DCS after receiving appropriate training. Below is a possible graphical representation of the new structure. Advanced courses such as the Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course and Strategic Debriefing Course are not included but should be a requirement before a DIA assignment.

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163 HUMINT & CI, Human Intelligence, MI-Space, “Do You Believe Separating the 35M MOS Into Two Separate Tracks,” Appendix C.
a. **Advanced Individual Training Modifications (10 Level)**

The second step in restructuring the MOS is to modify initial entry training. Module B (Interrogation Operations) and Module C (Human Source Contact Operations) of the current system should be shortened to 2 weeks of general familiarization of interrogation and MSO operations. The final field training exercise should focus on analytical tasks, automation, reporting, source validation and deconfliction, and answering intelligence requirements.

This thesis implies that HUMINTers often lack the skills required to properly perform HUMINT. Soldiers arriving fresh from training are ill prepared for real-world missions. Junior HUMINTers, lacking age and maturity, often do not understand their role in broader intelligence collection effort and should not be collectors. Although these soldiers often develop into quality collectors, they should not be expected to do this
unaided. The Army should recognize that HUMINTers often work in locations that have little direct supervision; with this, they get little guidance. While veteran collectors are able to succeed at the mission, junior soldiers are not.

b. Interrogation Training (20 Level)

The third step in restructuring the MOS is to develop an advanced interrogation course. This should start by turning over all Army interrogation certification to HT-JCOE. As noted earlier, HT-JCOE already has the Joint Interrogation Certification Course that certifies sister service personnel, DoD civilians, and Army counterintelligence personnel to conduct interrogations. HT-JCOE could expand the course to include HUMINT analysts who choose the interrogation track. Resembling other HT-JCOE courses, this interrogation course should be highly selective in choosing its candidates and the course should be highly demanding allowing only the most qualified interrogators to pass.

Chapter III pointed out that there are very few advanced interrogations courses. It is imperative that the Army expands interrogation training. Another option to increase training opportunities is to take the interrogation portion of current AIT training course, expand it, and make this the primary interrogation certification for Army interrogators. HT-JCOE should control this course as well, and it should be the equivalent to SOC for interrogators. In this case, the Joint Interrogation course could act as an equivalent to DATC/ASOC.

Furthermore, the DoD should establish an additional skill identifier (ASI) for certified interrogators, regardless of military service or DoD civilian. This way, in times of conflict, there will be a large pool of DoD-wide interrogators to draw from, instead of relying solely on young Army interrogators. Being able to pull interrogators from all services would alleviate the problem with shortage of personnel.

Creating an exclusive and demanding interrogation course could be a path toward removing the blemish of Abu Ghraib. Current military operations require fewer interrogators; these interrogators need to be of the highest caliber.
4. **Including Experienced Collectors into National Agencies**

Implementing the recommendations of this thesis will improve Army HUMINT collector’s skills. But nevertheless, the Army ought to capitalize on employing the numerous quality collectors developed during GWOT. The Army already possesses a wealth of knowledge from experienced collectors. These experienced, strong collectors are valuable assets to the National HUMINT collection effort and should be put in a position of increased responsibility. By placing knowledgeable and qualified HUMINTers within agencies like the Defense Clandestine Service, the Army can maintain quality collectors and “Grow Army HUMINT” as the 2012 Posture statement suggests.

This thesis highlights recommended changes to the current training and operational doctrine of human intelligence soldiers. It lays out clear guidance on professionalizing the corps. Utilizing the acquired skills of collectors and allowing for further development of those talents, creating regional experts, with language proficiency, who are able to conduct HUMINT operations at the tactical and national level. Human intelligence is essential to the security and defense of this nation. These adjustments to the current HUMINT corps are paramount in resolving the issues identified during GWOT. With the recommendations offered here, the US Army HUMINTers will have the experience and knowledge to remain active in fighting global threats, against any adversary in any operational environment and will lead the nation into 2020.
## APPENDIX A

### A. HAVE “INTERROGATORS” AND “SOURCE HANDLER” EVER BEEN SEPARATE MOSS? SHOULD THEY BE?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>MOS/Course</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RET. LTC</td>
<td>48E</td>
<td>When I was a lieutenant many many years ago “interrogators” (MOS 96C actually) focused exclusively on POW type interrogations. That was before the unification of Defense HUMINT and the Army still had HUMINT. There was a separate MOS (definitely for officers, 36B, maybe for warrants also) called “Area Intelligence” or something like that which included some of the skills we associate with source handling today. This was a very small community and most people who went into these fields stayed in them without rotating back to “regular” Army assignments. These assets were strictly strategic; it was not until the Balkans conflicts that the Army (and DoD in general) began to see the value of applying these types of resources to tactical level operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ret. SFC</td>
<td>97E</td>
<td>… you’ve really dated yourself with bringing up 96C. We'll start discussing training at Holabird next... “These assets were strictly strategic; it was not until the Balkans conflicts that the Army (and DoD in general) began to see the value of applying these types of resources to tactical level operations.” I would qualify that as “Big Army” began to see the light at that time. The SF groups, and SOF in general, recognized the value of low level source ops long before the Balkans, and HUMINT enlisted soldiers within the Group MIDs were often trained and sometimes employed in this mission. But, to the original question, “source handler” has never been a separate MOS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>35E/D</td>
<td>Source handling used to be a primary function for CI. The large transition came after Interrogators lost the language requirement and became HUMINT, circa 2005. This was a result of requirement from OEF/OIF. As a result we have a large population of Interrogators, low population of CI, and continually pull CI out of our formations making us that much more vulnerable to the ever increasing trends of insider threat. We probably won’t see a dramatic shift back until 35M has a language requirement again; then 35M personnel will likely reclass to 35L to fill those shortages (which should happen) or they will get out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW2</td>
<td>351M</td>
<td>…the transition actually came after operations in Bosnia. 97Es were doing MSO before 9/11 ever happened. This transition had nothing to do with having/not having a language. 97Es had a skill set and a language and therefore it made sense for them to conduct MSO. The biggest difference between the MSO HUMINT and CI conduct is the focus, offensive vs. defensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS13</td>
<td>INSCOM</td>
<td>Good answer... The biggest reason for the creation of the “big Army” HUMINT Soldier was to create a tactical HUMINT capability that was offensive in nature. Since the Balkans Crisis, the CI MOS has been a more defensive discipline when working tactically and could not fulfill both efficiently or effectively.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concur, the transition did begin after/during Bosnia/Balkans as I witnessed first-hand in 1998, but did not sky rocket in transition until later when the school house just pumped out quantity not quality of HUMINT over CI circa 2005. [omitted] Overall the Army has missed the mark, especially as this discussion clearly demonstrates the bias and division of CI vs. HUMINT. Although several of the comments later on paint a better light, the Marine Corps has it right with having experienced folks capable of doing both jobs. Furthermore, it’s not enough to say someone is trained in MSO can effectively perform the task. Hence the reason some areas have created a “probationary program” …

It isn’t possible to have a detailed discussion of this topic on an unclassified forum. The short answer to whether Interrogator and source handler have been separate MOSs is yes. In fact, “source handler” is presently an ASI for the MOS 35M. Elements of the source handling trade were first taught at the 10-level in 1999, if memory serves. As to whether they ought to be separate MOSs, that depends on what Army leaders expect 35Ms to do. My personal opinion; leaders want interrogators, and THINK they want source handlers, but don’t really understand what being a source handler means or what the operations entail to be done correctly. So, I think they should be separate, and that source handling should remain out of the hands of conventional units. Again, just my opinion.

Not my intention to be misleading. I did focus on 35M vs. 351M, but you are of course correct that there is no ASI for the 351Ms, as a MSO CAT II certifying course is required for technical certification as a 351M. For clarification, when I refer to source handling I assume we mean CAT II. I think that’s what most other folks mean as well. In any case, I will reference the message pertaining to the ASIs to make sure that I have my facts straight. [See footnote 146][164]

Since the title of the ASI S1 is “Source Handler” I infer that one is not considered a source handler without the ASI, and that source handling is therefore directly associated with MSO CAT II. The Army appears to not consider MSO CAT III source handling for the purposes of this discussion. I know we include aspects of source handling as critical tasks, but we don’t certify the collectors as source handlers without attendance at the courses above [courses listed in footnotes], at which point they are granted an ASI. The requirement to have a MSO CAT II certification prior to attendance at WOCS and WOBC has only recently been implemented and enforced. We still have a number of 351Ms who do not have such a certification, and a few (four that I am aware of) have attended a MSO CAT II certifying course and failed. What will happen to these Soldiers? Forced re-class? One last chance to pass?

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1. ASI S1: soldiers must successfully complete one of DA G2 approved category II MSO certifying courses to be awarded ASI S1: A. Source operations course (SOC) B. Military counterintelligence collections course (MCC) C. Counterintelligence force protection source operations (CFSO) D. Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) CI/HUMINT course. 2. ASI V4: soldiers must successfully complete one of the category 1 MSO certifying courses: A. Advanced source operations course (ASOC) conducted B. Advanced military source operations course (AMSOC) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
| CW4 351M | You bring up an interesting issue in regard to MSO Cat 2 and MOS Cat 3. There is currently no jointly agreed upon task list for MSO Cat 3 therefore there can be no certification for MSO Cat 3. That does not mean that those 35Ms who are trained to conduct MSO Cat 3 cannot be source handlers. It merely means that the community has yet to agree upon and publish a list of tasks that comprise such a skill set. |
| CW3 351M | Actually, I have a question based on the way you phrased this... If there is no agreed upon CAT III task list and no CAT III certification then how can anyone be trained to conduct CAT III MSO? |
| CW4 351M | There is no Joint standard but there is an Army MOS that requires training in MSO Cat 3. Therefore, lacking any other benchmarks against which to assess training success, the closest we can come to a codified standard for the Army is whatever standard the CTSSB decides comprises the basic requirements for the 35M 10 level Soldier. Is this the very best answer? Absolutely not, but the subject matter experts in the field convene every two or three years to determine what a 35M should be, know and do at each skill level so it’s not a bad answer either. |
| CW3 351M | I was at the last CTSSB with you, and discussing the reasons why certain tasks were, were not, or couldn’t be included in the 10-level [critical task list] CTL is too big a can of worms to get into here. I observe, in addition to the lack of a task list for CAT III, a lack of uniform agreement as to what CAT III really is, operationally speaking. I think it would be super if we could have that discussion at the joint level. I also observe confusion/confusion between operational categories and source categories (levels). Again, ‘twould be great to have something that definitively laid it all out. (Actually, I think it is spelled out pretty well in existing policy and doctrine, but since there is still disparity in interpretation I assume that it must not be as obvious as I think.) |
| GS13 INSCOM | [CW3/351M and CW2 351M] have provided answers closest to my knowledge on the subject. Interrogators were once a separate MOS, but the HUMINT collector/source handler is a recent MOS to the “big Army.” Army CI was the tactical source handler for the Army until the Balkans. The mission was too big for CI to man and maintain CI operations. The solution was to bring interrogators into the fold, which eventually lead to two HUMINT based MOSs with two different focuses; 35L being defensive in nature and 35M being more offensive. The reasons that brought the MOSs to this point have all been good in theory, but I agree with [CW3 / 351M]. Execution has proved it to be less than efficient. Source handling and interrogations would be better employed and more productive if they were separate, and in general support under the control of commands specifically trained and designed to use them. You should look into getting a copy of the book titled “In the Shadow of the Sphinx.” Although it is a history of Army CI, it provides extensive details on how Army HUMINT evolved since WWII; HUMINT started as a function of CI. Kind of backwards since CI is based on HUMINT methods...you would think the Army started with HUMINT then moved to CI. However, CI was created first in 1917 to battle the German saboteurs of WWI who were causing havoc in our shipyards. |
| RET. LTC 48E | I believe that much of the reason that CI personnel were pressed into being the “tactical source handler” for Big Army was that they had the skills, but what the Army really needed was MSO/LLSO HUMINT assets. Of course they had none, so they used CI assets somewhat out of their field. Good point about CI being the original discipline, at least for the Army. Back in the day (and I’ve already dated myself by referring to MOS 96C), the Army largely got interrogators by reclassing soldiers who washed out of 97B school. Now it is a discipline of its own, which helps both fields. |
| SPC 35M | As far as a history of the MOS I’m not too sure, but once upon a time there were 97Cs. The 97C’s job was basically MSO. Their 10-level course was about a yearlong at Fort Holabird (closed back in the early 70s). Their 10 course consisted everything done at SOC now and then some. Upon graduation they were able perform level 2 MSO. The MOS was shut down as an indirect and belated result of the Church and Pike Commissions by Stansfield Turner, the DCI under Carter, giving the MSO mission to the DIA which, as we now know, left the Army woefully unprepared for the challenges of the 90s and the GWOT. I hope that helps. |
APPENDIX B

A. WHAT WOULD BE THE ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF MAKING THE 35M MOS A 20 LEVEL AND ABOVE ONLY MOS?

- Tue, Jun 21, 2011 4:54 PM—Plain and simple there needs to be a screening process. As a 20 level MOS you are producing more army savvy personnel but you may still be lacking those that are able to conduct the MOS. I’ve seen E-6’s come out of the school that couldn’t write a report to save their life and 10 level soldiers who could collect far better than reclass counterparts of the same 35M experience. This has been a hot topic in the office and while making 35M a 20 level MOS would assist with having more responsible/military savvy collectors it wouldn’t help with those that can barely pass the 10 level course. Another interesting idea I’ve heard is instead of a 20 level MOS either making it to where a soldier can’t become a 35M until they are in their second term or having an initial screening at MEPS for those interested in becoming a 35M. All the ideas could help but in reality the school should be what it was before I even got there. Some people just weren’t built to do this MOS.

- Mon, Jun 20, 2011 8:49 PM—I think we have plenty of 10 level soldiers that have a lot of maturity, some are even college graduates with masters degrees and life experience. As long as we NCO’s take the time to coach, mentor, and train our 10 level soldiers, they will gain the necessary army experience to be successful 35M’s. Their failures rest on our shoulders as NCO’s. Now there are the exceptions, if we do our job and identify them, do the necessary paperwork, we can get the sub-standard soldiers either re-classed or chaptered.

- Mon, Jun 20, 2011 8:43 PM—I feel the disadvantage to making the 35M MOS a 20 level and above MOS would be the shrinking of the work force. Sure, some 10 level soldiers lack the discipline and life experience, but it is our job as NCO’s to coach, mentor, and train them to be proficient. I have had some great 10 level soldiers, and they have accepted the responsibilities placed on them, and been very successful Doing MSO overseas. I say keep the 10 level soldiers.

- Mon, Jun 20, 2011 8:10 PM—I have worked with many soldiers who are strong HUMINT collectors and many who weak HUMINT collectors, 10 level, 20 level and 30 level. There are many issues that effect this. While I believe there is a lack of maturity and inter-personnel skills, I believe discipline is the larger problem with the 10 level students. I believe there needs to be an accession process for 10 level students. One, Drill Sergeants must be reinstated into AIT, where they must instill discipline and basic military bearing. Second, the language requirement must reinstated with a standard of 2+/2+, this will weed out many who lack the discipline this MOS requires.

Also, another main issue comes from the lack of understanding on the part of the command/units of the HUMINT soldiers. Many units do not realize the amount of time for training that is required for HUMINT collectors. Many HUMINT collectors are given time consuming details. Sergeants Time training should be mandatory 2 to 3 times a week and a standard HUMINT round robin training established, IOT improve/maintain basic HUMINT skills. However, this acquiring this time will not happen if the S2X and OMT are not strong advocates of HUMINT training to the command. Overall with the amount of individuals who have reclassified, the overall experience level of our MOS in general is low to moderate. I concur that changes should be made at the 10 level, but also starting from the top down.

- Mon, Jun 20, 2011 10:10 AM—I agree with your opinion on the disadvantages. Though in order to prevent that the MOS would have to implent a means of interveiwing and weeding out those who are not capable of performning at this MOS even with the added maturity.
• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 10:06 AM — The main advantage of having the MOS become a 20 level only is that it would provide a better base of maturity for the MOS. Those individuals who have not yet grown out of the high school mindset have no place in this job field. Our job depends on a person’s ability to interact and connect with people. Maturity is key to that job.

• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:57 AM — A good advantage to making the 35M MOS a 20 level and above MOS would be that fact that we would have a more mature workforce of NCOs with army experience. The problem, though, is that you’ll have a workforce of reclasses (I’m a reclass) that come into the MOS with no experience in it.

• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:50 AM — Quite simply, there just has to be a better screening process, or any screening process in place to determine that the 10 level soldier is ready to be a M. Not all 10 level Soldiers are 18-21, thus you could be cutting some serious talent from a mature 25 year old SPC just now coming into the military. Additionally, I just returned from a deployment with a 22 year old SPC that was 21 when he joined right in as a M, he was writing CONOPS for LTs and CPTs mid way through the deployment and wrecking shop as a source operator. I think closing the MOS totally to 10 level is just mirroring that Army all-round knee-jerk decision making process. HOOOOOOO-AH!

• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:48 AM — There are both disadvantages and advantages to making 35M as 20 level MOS. The level of maturity and military experience is a large part of training effective HUMINT collectors. By taking experienced NCOs from other areas of the Army, the MI corps would become a more professional organization. A disadvantage would be having soldiers coming into the MOS with bad habits. While privates have their own bad habits, they are easier to break than prior service soldiers.

• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:45 AM — There is no doubt that we need to find a better way to screen Soldiers becoming 35Ms. Although I believe that limiting access to only 20 level soldiers is a step in the right direction, it is not the complete answer. We need to have a high set standard that is not open to interpretation. I think a more stringent screening process in general is necessary.

• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:16 AM — I totally agree. Retaining these new 35Ms will be a huge problem. Other MOS require a re-enlistment of up to 6 years to be in there field. Of course, this is mostly because the training is up to a year long for these MOSs but that would ensure that the Army gets the most out of these new 35Ms. I’m pretty sure though that if we improve the quality of 35Ms in the Army we won’t be losing as much as we are now.

• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:12 AM — I believe that there both advantages and disadvantages to making 35M a 20 level or higher MOS. There has been a lot of discussion about the maturity level of entry-level soldiers in this MOS. While I think it’s fair to say, we have a new generation of Soldiers entering the service. Many of them are not socially capable of carrying on an acceptable conversation with someone senior to them, let alone being able to conduct themselves with an air of confidence that shows they have maturity and experience. There are some, but those are outnumbered by the ones who need to be and are capable of being groomed in this field. It also wouldn’t be fair to those who get a later start on their military career, who have the experience and maturity that this field needs, but are only afforded the rank of being a new Soldier. Another thing that needs to be taken into consideration is how this would affect promotions. As NCO’s advance, there has got to be a qualified group of individuals to fill those lower skill level positions. It’s hard to tell right now if the pros outweigh the con’s, but I think there’s legitimate argument for both the advantages and disadvantages.

• Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:08 AM — I think the main advantage of making the 35M MOS a 20 level MOS would be the maturity level of soldiers who are in the MOS. Many 10 level soldiers lack the social/life skills needed to interact with people, or they enter the MOS not knowing what this MOS entails. I believe an assessment and selection process is needed, similar to the 35L.
process. However, if making the 35M MOS a 20 level MOS only is not possible, the army could reinstate the language requirement. I believe this would filter out 10 level students who do not have the required dedication or willingness to learn about another culture and interact with foreign nationals.

- Mon, Jun 20, 2011 9:03 AM—There are multiple advantages to making the MOS 20 level and above but I believe it’s only a step in the right direction. Soldiers looking to become a 35M should go through a screening process at all levels. This is directly inline with the Marines selection process as well as the selection process of other countries. Brand new soldiers lack the discipline, experience and skill sets to effectively do the job. Soldiers who reclassify into the job are not prepared for what the job entails. HUMINT is a different beast than most jobs have to deal with. Using other effective 35Ms to train and accept new 35Ms will improve the quality of 35Ms tremendously.

- Mon, Jun 20, 2011 7:50 AM—For the 35M MOS to progress and not become just another over-filled MOS, we do need an appropriate screening system which assesses the potential HUMINTer’s intelligence, common sense, social skills, and maturity. As...stated, our MOS should focus on quality. I would rather have a team of two or three solid performers than six bodies who lack the requisite skills to perform as a 35M. At the 35M10 course, there is a recent upshift in quality and maturity (overall) of students, from what I have seen during my tenure instructing. This could be a sign of things to come, or it could just be a rare occasion. Either way, I agree we need to maintain a high standard for this job, and I encourage an appropriate screening for individuals wanting to enter this MOS.

- Mon, Jun 20, 2011 7:39 AM—It is true that the 35M MOS requires a skill not common among the “Millenial Generation.” This skill is interpersonal communication, and if a 35M Soldier does not possess this skill, they will suffer and create a negative reflection on our MOS. On the contrary, I have seen MOS-T reclass NCO’s who were not capable of succeeding in this job either, so mandating a 20-level or higher Soldier to join may not address the issue. An interview assessing the individual’s ability to communicate and think on their feet would be the best method of identifying those who show the traits necessary to succeed in this job. From my experience, a reclass NCO performs better as a HUMINTer because they understand rank structure and the ins and outs of the military. They also recognize what is of value, information-wise-- more so than 10-level Soldiers.

- Sun, Jun 19, 2011 11:11 PM—"I agree that society is creating worse people that are entering the Army. It seems and though Mommy and Daddy are disciplining their kids anymore and it is starting to reflect on the Army. However, the Army is beginning to create an environment that mirrors this lack of discipline as well. Standards in Basic Training, IET, and Permanent Party are constantly being lowered to accommodate these “new world” Soldiers. By raising the entrance level of the 35M MOS to 20, it will reduce the chances that low quality Soldiers will make it into the MOS and raise the standards/quality of the 35M Profession.”

Despite the cultural shift from older generations’ personal contact to online interaction in today’s younger generation the basic human creature has not changed. A self-motivated Soldier will always be the shiny pebble so to speak. We can bemoan the younger Soldiers’ lack of experience, ability, charisma or anything else we want, but in doing so we forget that once we ourselves were a previous leader’s a** pain.

It is our job to mold the incoming generation. Part of our job is to identify their short comings. Our main focus needs to remain on training and mentoring young Soldiers until they become the asset we all consider ourselves to be.

Naturally I wish our MOS were more selective, or it were easier to flush out the dead weight.

Lacking that mechanism today I try to focus on rigidly enforcing standards of excellence so the strong prevail and weak refuse to re-enlist. It may not be a perfect solution, but it is the best I have.
Sun, Jun 19, 2011 11:06 PM—I agree that expertise, maturity and responsibility are all inherent traits required for success in the 35M MOS, and any other meaningful job in life. Where does that experience come from? I find many of my peers complaining about the lack of experience among 10 level soldiers, but that is what they equate to, inexperienced soldiers requiring NCO guidance. I think we should focus more on training the force prior to totally removing privates from our ranks, because some of us find them to be an “inconvenience”. We all started as inexperienced in this MOS, the difference our leadership, for better or worse, trained us to what they thought right was. Based on the comments I have been reading I have to assume that several of the posters on this forum wouldn’t have been in this MOS either. I repeatedly hear complaints about MOS transfers into our MOS and their lack of experience, but then read numerous posts advocating the very thing that many here despise. I think it is just a little too hypocritical. I am not trying to single anyone out in particular, but I feel these views are shared by many in this forum who refuse to do a self-audit of themselves and their experience (or lack of) prior to placing the brunt of the blame on the lower-enlisted.

Sun, Jun 19, 2011 10:45 PM—I agree … on this one. Although the idea is promising to have an MOS that consists of only 20 level and above, I believe that it would bring more harm than good. The majority of 35M’s that I have worked with have been at the 10 level. I have seen them face trials and tribulations, but in the end the majority adapt and overcome to do things well beyond their skill level. Now these same 10 levels are bringing their unique experiences to the NCO ranks and are continually contributing at the higher echelons in superb fashion. Maybe my experience is unique, but it is exactly that, my experience. I have seen outstanding NCO HUMINTers too. Primarily though I have seen ten level 35M’s consistently achieve and excel ahead of 20 and 30 level 35M’s that I have worked with outside of our unit, as well as many contractors. I think the idea brings a maturity factor to the mix, but that same factor can be found in and IET soldier as well. It’s like anything else, you just have to pick the right one. I think a selection process would be more applicable, but at the same time it would greatly depend on the leadership sitting on the selection board. I also think with the proper motivation to perform that more often than not soldiers will surprise you. I work in an environment where standards aren’t lowered for all to meet, rather those who fail to meet the standards are released. I believe a similar process should be applied not only to this MOS, but the Army as whole.
A. DO YOU BELIEVE SEPARATING THE 35M MOS INTO TWO SEPARATE TRACKS, ONE FOR MSO AND ONE FOR INTERROGATIONS, WOULD IMPROVE THE OVERALL QUALITY OF ALL 35M’S?

I don’t think splitting the MOS would do any good, for two reasons. One is that it would be easy for the MOS to become lopsided -- not enough MSO or not enough interrogators. Given our current manning, this might not be an immediate problem, but I could see it being a problem down the road. The second reason is that there’s very little training out there specifically for interrogators. At least, I can’t think of much. The Reid course, I suppose. Kinesics and LSI-SCAN are useful HUMINT classes. But what do we have that is really advanced training for interrogators? Another way of saying this is, if someone wanted to be highly trained and proficient, why would they choose to be an Army interrogator? What would your training path look like? The 10 course and then... what? Senior interrogator -- which is a management course, not an advanced interrogation course. DSDC/Strat D? Not an interrogation course -- closer to MSO, I would think. The British course? I don’t know anyone who has actually gone to it, but that could be a start.

If we’re going to separate the MOS, we need to have a comparable training path for the people who go to each path. Right now we don’t.

Correct me if I am wrong here, but my understanding of previous discussions in our circle of colleagues has not been to physically split the 35M MOS. The way it has been discussed before is to establish two tracks within the 35M and 351M MOS’s for interrogations and MSO. Whether we agree or disagree with the concept it has unofficially been happening over the last 8-10 years. Many of my colleagues already pursue positions specifically focused on their preferred area within the MOS. The intent is to decide whether or not to formally establish career paths within the MOS in order to better support both areas within HUMINT. The area of training emphasis brought up by SSG Rushing is a valid one that has and is being discussed. What having formal career tracks should allow for is the establishment of more advanced training with regard to interrogations for those HUMINT collectors who prefer to follow an interrogation track and hopefully mirror the training pillars offered for MSO.

While there are not different categories of interrogation operations such as MSO I-III there should be advancing levels of interrogation training. Just as SSG Rushing mentioned, the Senior Interrogator course is more of a management course. From discussions I have had with my peers there is a desire to establish and incorporate advanced interrogation training into the interrogator track should one be established. Overall, having HUMINT collectors tracked as MSO or interrogator will help the career managers better determine future assignments and ensure that these soldiers, NCO’s, and Warrants hit the appropriate educational and assignment “wickets” for advancement and proper utilization.

I thought the intent was to have an ASI for folks who complete additional training. Good point about advanced interrogation training, I believe DIA has developed something; possibly currently done by a contractor.

I agree to an extent, but how are we to know where their talents lie when they enlist into the MOS?

I believe that the army should separate the track at the 30 level based on experience within the MOS. The main reason I believe the army should separate at the 30 level is because the fact is, we need experienced people doing their job. What happens when you have a SSG with 2 deployments experience as 35M doing only MSO and he gets moved to a JIDC. You have now seriously degraded the capability and disregarded an experienced NCO that could do more damage to the enemy by staying in the MSO side. Its same way the army spends an ungodly amount to send a soldier to DLI for Arabic and then stations them in Korea. There is supposed to be concurrent training to keep individuals trained on both subjects but it does not happen enough and why would a unit train on interrogations when there is an upcoming deployment where they will be conducting MSO.

This solution does present many problems in itself and many issues that would have to be worked out.
I agree, also if you split the MOS you have the potential for not having the right piece for the mission. When the MOS is combined as it is now you have a Soldier who can perform two different missions. Unfortunately the Army had to lower standards and we have sub-par people coming into the MOS from a GT/ST score point of view, but it is our job as NCOs to make sure those Soldiers who need that extra help get the training the deserve to succeed at the mission.

While I agree with [the] point of training issues, I think the issue has to deal more with the question of “what are we going to do with the Interrogation-tracked collectors who are stuck in BfSBs and BCTs that don’t have access to a DHA, BIF, or JIDC?” They would have to resort to conducting MSO anyways as an operational requirement. To effectively run this strategy, we would have to ensure that there were plenty of positions out there to interrogate. If we look at the Field Interrogation aspect of it, they would still be out conducting MSO until the opportunity to do a FI presented itself.

Training is simple. A POI for an ASI/SQI course is developed, manned and taught. However, finding enough interrogation jobs for 35M Interrogation-tracked soldiers is far more difficult. Besides, when would the track take place? In Aviation Warrant MOSs - let’s take 153D (UH-60 Blackhawk Pilot), once you are a CW2, you have a few choices: Track Safety, Standards, TACOPS, or stay untracked and risk falling behind your peers.

Where would tracking fall into the 35M scheme. It shouldn’t happen at the 10-level course. It should happen after soldiers have had enough time to conduct both operations and become proficient and evaluated at one or the other. That is the point, correct? To ensure we have the best qualified collectors conducting MSO, and the best qualified Interrogators conducting Interrogations?

There are too many variables that have to line up just right to pull off tracking the 35M MOS. None of which I can see as feasible right now except for MSO. I made a post in HUMINT TRAINING that [alludes] to the fact that we need more training opportunities in microexpressions, etc. While the Reid Course is a good course, it focuses on the law enforcement aspect of a forced confession. What about a tactical application of both Interrogation and MSO using microexpressions and kinesics? I believe, like SSG Rushing said, Advanced Interrogation training and heavy psych training would be needed for an Interrogation track. I just don’t see any of it happening fast. As for the quality of 35Ms as a result of tracking, I don’t think it will make a bit of difference. I would assume, knowing the Army, they would try to track soldiers in the initial stages in the 10-level course, meaning that there isn’t a judge of the correct track a soldier should take. With current manning needs for 10-level 35Ms and TRADOCs willingness to already put unqualified and unfit 35Ms into the field, it would be a recipe for disaster. If tracking were to happen at the 20-level, then additional courseware would fit the bill and it could be feasible.

I wouldn’t look for this to become a reality in this decade. We are too kinetic right now to be able to sit back and evaluate what is going on. We have been in Iraq and Afghanistan too long to try to jostle the foundation we sit on. If this idea became more than a conception, then it may work in a future conflict where units could hit the ground running at the “Y” and make an impact. Right now, though, we need to work with what we have and keep pushing for stricter adhesion to the standards to ensure we get the right people to fill the right slots.

I agree with you about having to work with what we have right now, but are we ever going to be stable again where we can just sit back and figure things out. I don’t see that in the future of this country. We have to constantly improve everything and grow from experiences and lessons learned. It is a very complicated decision that would require monumental work to make it right.

You do raise a good point with the BfSB structure. That would be one of the most difficult things to change if a change were to occur. Do you send a HCT team out there with an “Interrogator” who may only conduct 3 to 4 field interrogations in a year? Or do you leave an HCT with None and have no capability of a field interrogation. There are so many factors to consider.

We need quality soldiers and quality over quantity. If this track would become a reality then we would only be shooting ourselves in the foot. I like your outlook on the situation; it is a waste of limited resources and way too many variables. As it is in our field “It Depends”.

I agree that perhaps the MOS should, not necessarily split, but close attention should to paid to the experience of the soldiers at the 10 and 20 level and ensure that soldiers are placed in opposing roles. If a soldier deploys in support of a MSO mission all attempts must be made to ensure the soldier is placed in an interrogation position on the next rotation. Providing this rotation at lower levels will eliminate your
stated concern. Unfortunately, as with everything else, mission dictates. So this opposing roles, although in my opinion ideal, is far from realized or in some cases even possible.

[HUMINTers] should be slotted for opposite positions to be a well-rounded HUMINTER. But as we all know, the Army will pick the best and most experienced soldier for the job each time. Meaning, you end up stuck working the same position multiple deployments. If we concentrated on pre-deployment training for those soldiers without the experience we wouldn’t have to rely on the same people doing the same job each time they deploy.

I disagree at some level we all become managers of soldiers. The SSG that gets transferred to a JIDC is expected to be a more manager of soldiers than an integration expert. He/She should know integration but it is not necessary for him/her to be the SME. That is why we have warrant officers.

That is a great idea. Allowing a track split at the 30 level would allow the Army to focus its higher trained (and hopefully retained) assets on specific mission sets. God knows we have plenty of 30 level personnel, why not use this “dwell” time to ensure that these personnel are able to take the courses needed to become true experts in their track, whether MSO or Interrogations? I’d love to see the CTSSB approve split tracks based in choice/experience that allows us to expertify (ya I made that up, you’re welcome) our collectors.

I feel that splitting the MOS would hinder more than help. In this profession there is no way of knowing who we will be called on to support or what our supported unit may run into while on mission. If the MOS were split how could we possibly ensure those individuals assigned for interrogations would end up in a DHA, or JIDC and even if those were hard slots, there isn’t enough for an even split of the MOS. In order to maintain an even spread of the MOS some people slated for interrogation would still have to conduct MSO eventually and vice versa. The major problem being that MSO and interrogation are perishable skills. I believe the entire MOS needs to continue to work in and train on all facets of the job to mitigate this degradation of skill sets.

Agreed. I’ve never had a problem with a well-rounded soldier. It’s the ones who are only good at one thing that have the most problems.

I completely agree. Keeping us all under the same MOS and providing the entire MOS the training to become proficient in all roles that are required is the most logical track.

The simple fact of the matter is that specialization is productive; it is the reason the entire Warrant Officer Corps exists. I would actually take it a step further, though. Once an MSO-specific MOS was created, structure it similar to 35L, requiring an application and screening process.

No, I believe the responsibility for improving the overall quality of all 35M’s rests on the shoulders of the senior 35M’s in each unit. I have worked at a platoon level as a team leader, OMT NCOIC, and a HUMINT platoon sergeant and it was my job to give that ground Commander a detailed capabilities brief and ensure that Commander had the best idea of how to best utilize all of his/her 35M’s for the given mission. Some missions require an interrogation team and some require MSO. I say this because, in my experiences as a 35M, the main issue at hand has always been whether to use the 35M’s as interrogators or for MSO or both. If the Commanders on the ground are educated and well informed of the capabilities of their Soldiers (35M’s) then it eliminates the confusion. Besides, in order to be a well-rounded HUMINT collector you must have a background in both interrogations and MSO. So, once again, I think it would be a waste of time and resources to split the MOS into two separate tracks. I feel it would be like splitting up an infantry squad to make two separate squads. Neither would be as effective as the original...

I do not believe that separating 35M into two different tracks would be beneficial to HUMINT Operations. This can cause multi problems and not alleviate the problem which already exists. One of the problems that could be caused by this course of action would be a lack of personnel available for future missions. The problem which exists now is the level of maturity and competence of the HUMINT Collector that we are finding in the Army.
With this approach to HUMINT Operations, you would have separate tracks for soldiers to follow allowing the individual soldier to focus on one aspect of collection allowing them to better hone their skills. The underlying problem that HUMINT as a whole would face after this would be manning. As it stands now there is a tremendous manning issue in the Army for the 35M field. This is part of the reason so many new collectors have been pushed out of the school house. After talking with 10 level instructors’ students standards for operating in the field have dropped due to the Army needing numbers. We will run into the same problem, maybe not now; but, later down the road it is inevitable. With two tracks we will have over manning in one and not enough in the other.

The major problem that is in the 35M field which makes me assume the reason for the question being posed in the first place is some soldiers are good at interrogations and some soldiers are good at MOS. Why can’t a soldier just be a good collector? I believe that soldiers can be good collectors but with interrogations and with MOS the soldier has to have a personality and characteristic traits that are not taught but gained through life experience. How can we as Non Commissioned Officers expect an 18 year old soldier straight out of high school to have the opportunity to gain these traits? There needs to be 35M recruiting teams. We need to “identify” collectors. That is what MSOH’s do in the first place, identify people. Separating the field is only forming an excuse to be substandard.

Now to play devil’s advocate; I do think that we should make a carrier path once you reach senior Non Commissioned Officer by separating into fields of expertise. This would be a beneficial alternative to creating an entirely separate track for the 10 level soldiers. This will allow collectors that have focused on certain aspects of HUMINT throughout their carriers to be better managers in the realm that they have operated in.

A developing soldier needs to have well rounded experiences to fully realize their capability. If you never get the chance to work in one field or the other then you will have no idea what your true potential is. Also, bringing someone over to the other operation gives a new perspective on the operation. Interrogations and MSO have very different perspectives. Changing out personnel from one side to the other will give a fresh view on the operations and will help develop new techniques that would have otherwise been missed.

At a senior position, there is an obvious benefit to having someone with a great experience in the type of operation they are managing. However, if you do end up on a track at the 30 or 40 level, then what? When the mission changes, you end up having shortages when you should be able to draw from the whole pool. Separating the two disciplines will create more problems than it solves in the long run.

The real issue is that some people have a preference for one “track” or the other. What many people forget is that the qualities of a good collector are the same no matter what the mission.

There are a lot of arguments predicated on the concept that splitting the MOS into interrogation ops and MSO degrades HUMINT because it denies a Soldier the ability to reach their full potential. I pose this question: where besides the -10 level course are the two disciplines integrated? No where! True, some principles and methodologies apply across the spectrum, but these are two distinct skill sets. Likely, many of us have seen the 35M with only interrogation experience enter his/her first source meet and attempt to interrogate the source. Inversely, many of us have likely seen the 35M with only MSO experience enter his/her first interrogation and be run into the ground by the detainee “trying to establish rapport.”

I concede that a well-rounded collector CAN and SHOULD be able to do both. But artificially imposing this diversification in the quest for a well-rounded Soldier is what actually degrades capability. If the Soldier is capable and demonstrates talent or exceptional performance in one skill set, but is forced to divide his/her attention and effort in maintaining proficiency in both compels that Soldier to do so at expense of the one in which they truly excel.

Splitting the MOS contains many implied tasks, not least of which is differentiating missions. While this is not a simple task, it begs the question, is it worth the effort? Again, many arguments here have been presented founded on the concept of quality over quantity. Allowing a Soldier to dedicate their training life-cycle to one of the two skill-sets (vice both), and giving them experience in one (vice both) results in a net gain in quality.
Maybe we should have more focus on MSO for the HUMINT collector. I think there’s still a widespread perception that 35M is an interrogator -- maybe we should get away from that. 35M should be a collector first, and interrogation being one small skillset in a broader array of capabilities. I think our primary focus should be MSO anyway. Maybe we should make 35M primarily MSO and make advanced interrogation training an ASI. Provided we can GET advanced interrogation training, which as we’ve discussed may not be available.

Great comments! Definitely spot on. I know that here in Afghanistan, the majority of our HUMINT personnel working in the DFIP in Bagram are perfectly content to be conducting interrogations in that brand-new, massive facility. The vast majority of them have little to no desire to head out and conduct source meets in support of MSO. Fortunately for them many of my peers and colleagues are the ones conducting the MSO which makes them perfectly happy on a professional level. I say, show me the individual who is an ideal interrogator and master MSOH all in one package. I daresay a very, very few people are qualified enough and comfortable enough to claim mastery of and expertise in both interrogations and MSO. This is all personality driven and lets face the facts folks...most talented MSOH’s aren’t all that fond of spending much time, if any, in a facility. The same is true conversely as well where that magical interrogator who can mentally crush a detainees willpower doesn’t usually care too much for running around planning and executing an SDR on the way to a VPU at a site they have been casing for the last couple of weeks to conduct a 90 minute meeting. Just because someone is breaking detainees left and right to find OBL doesn’t mean that same individual has the same personality or even desire to work as a friend and colleague with a LN, develop, recruit, train, and run him or her. Everyone keeps talking about quality over quantity which is all well and good since it provides a venue to complain about how TRADOC is screwing the FORSCOM units. If you truly want to affect change then help make decisions that will have a lasting impact upon our chosen profession. Look at it this way, if the entire MOS is mapped out WRT educational and assignment milestones what better way to work toward improving the quality of our personnel. If that SNCO position at BDE/DIV/Corps is coded for an ASI assigned through ASOC or a Master Interrogator Course how much easier is it then to get the training? Personally, I would like to see the vast majority of our 20 Level and higher positions coded for specific ASI’s just for that reason.

That being said, you cannot reasonably expect me to believe that any NCO/SNCO assigned as an NCOIC at an FDS, DHA, or higher would be overly thrilled at having a soldier, NCO, WO who can run sources up and down the Hindu Kush mountains but has very little real-world interrogation experience. In fact, I don’t recall once in this forum any MSOH’s complaining that their numbers or quality of personnel would suffer or afraid that an interrogator might show up as their new MSOH soldier. As far as I can tell, we are primarily hearing from interrogation-focused leaders here. I agree that every M needs to have the baseline of training in both areas as well as the OJT at the units, by the time that soldier is promoted to SSG they will very likely have a very good idea which type of operations they feel stronger at and more qualified in. It is human nature and we should utilize a person’s strengths and motivation. Maybe NCO’s need to motivate their soldiers about interrogations more heavily than MSO. I will tell you that very shortly, the interrogations here in Afghanistan will be primarily conducted by Afghans in the facilities just as it transitioned in Iraq. The funny thing is that MSO’s will continue and likely increase significantly due to Op-Tempo.

The bottom line is that TRADOC and HT-JCOE need to listen to the requests from the field for more advanced interrogation specific training so that our interrogators will have that same level of academic training available as the MSOH’s have.

I disagree with splitting the MOS. I think you would lose some cohesion between the interrogators and the MSO teams. Small example- It would become territorial when it comes to field interrogations. If the MSO team can’t conduct them, then what are we supposed to do? Bring an interrogator along with us? It’s better to just improve the training and possibly create an ASI like…stated.

I agree with [the] point that splitting the MOS would result in a duplication of effort. If HCT’s were unable to conduct interrogation, time and resources would be wasted getting an interrogator out of the DHA to do a field interrogation on a raid. Not to mention the fact that then the DHA would be short an interrogator. Keep one MOS!!!
I believe courses should be developed to complement the interrogation side of the house before separation can occur. We have courses that focus on MSO certifying collectors to conduct MSO operations in the current theaters but none that really focus on interrogations. I know the 10 level course focuses on interrogations and commanders seem to think that this is enough. There is a little known advanced interrogation school but this course focuses on collectors who have already conducted interrogation operations whereas SOC is a practical necessity to conduct effective operations in the current conflicts. I believe that before a “Split” of the 35M MOS is undertaken we should at least develop a certifying program for interrogations, much like the MSO side of the house.

I believe the MOS should have two separate tracks. One track focusing on MSO and one interrogation. I believe for the MSO side of the track there should be certain requirements. Rank and age should be just some of the requirements for conducting MSO operations. It should not be an entry-level position. I believe by emplacing this requirement alone, the overall quality of the MOS will increase.

I have no issues with an interrogator being an entry level position. I also believe that at after a certain amount of experience and meeting the requirements for the MSO track, you should be afforded the opportunity to make a decision to stay as an interrogator or move on to being a collector. This will allow for individuals to grow in the MOS (improving the quality) and have control of your own career path.

I agree... As a SGT/SSG or 20/30 level, you should be afforded the opportunity to make a decision to stay as an interrogator or move on to being a collector.

Giving the individual the opportunity to branch out how they want is a great idea- but given operational needs, not everyone gets what they want, and how do we decide who those people are? Just food for thought.

I agree wholeheartedly that entry-level troops are not usually a good fit for MSO- but neither do I feel that they’re right for interrogations either. Both require a high level of maturity, and some of the attitudes I have seen some of the young kids bring to interrogation operations are ridiculous and require a lot of fixing before they’re useful interrogators. That is time that we have, but that could be put to much better use if we didn’t have to deal with it as much/at all.

Maybe if we did what the Marines do, and have troops be analysts or something first? That would hopefully give them a better understanding of how intelligence works as a whole, and that could only help them in the long run. The things my analysts taught me when I was the new guy are invaluable to me now, and it would have been nice to know them from the start.

I agree with you the rank and age should be a requirement for MSO. That would help out on a lot of the issues we are having today. Too many younger inexperienced people are there are out trying to do MSO and just not being in the right mindset.

I do not think it would be helpful to split 35M into two separate MOS’s. Source and detainee operations go hand in hand. There really is not enough significant differences between the two to warrant separation. The procedures for assessing, questioning, analyzing information, and report writing are all basically the same... whether or not the individual is physically controlled by U.S. forces. If our interrogations were more law enforcement-oriented, and our reason for interrogating detainees was to pressure them to confess, then it might be useful to separate the two. But the end goal of MI interrogation/ MSO is the same... to exploit information of intelligence value, and to use a series or approaches in order to make that happen.

In every job, I believe it is necessary to have at least two separate job tracks in order to avoid stagnation. After working interrogations for six months straight, I know I was personally exhausted... physically and mentally. I needed a break to stay fresh and avoid getting into a rut. For me, that break was MSO. After doing that for six months, in turn, I was eager to get back to interrogations, and I found myself a better interrogator, not just because I was rested, but also because developing my MSO skillset actually improved my ability to “break” sources.

No, I believe that a soldier is capable to conduct both skills. There are units where soldiers are conducting both duties and have no problems doing it. If the goal is to get better quality, we have to start training our soldiers with that same mentality.

I don’t believe that separating the MOS in two would improve the soldier. I believe that soldier should take the time to improve themselves. Units need to set aside money and time for them to attend MOS schools. Just like they do for a 35N/P or those with languages. Instead of sending a 35M to the field as
soon as they get out of the 10 level course. For example, when I graduated AIT in June of 04, my first duty assignment was 41D. I went to an FTX in July, where I set up and broke down tents. Then we went to NTC in Oct and deployed in Nov. In the six months, of wasted time for me as a then 97E, I had no MOS training other than the schoolhouse. So, in response to this question. Don’t separate the MOS, train soldiers sufficiently in the MOS. Send the soldier to SOC, Reid course, Kinesics, G2X, ASOC, etc.

Speaking of training, I think, there needs to be a renewed focus on language for 35M. Language capability for a 35M is a huge bonus, both for interrogators and collectors, and I think it was a mistake for our MOS to get away from it. Though I guess that’s a different discussion. I agree, to a degree. There’s a lot of self-improvement and self-direction that needs to go on, but units really need to take an interest in the professional development of their HUMINTers.

I am a firm believer in re-instating the language requirement for 35M. If anything, it will assist entry-level soldiers in building maturity while they are learning their language at DLI or within an immersion course...

While they may not come out great linguists, they will grasp a better understanding of the language, the Army, and themselves. We can all agree that competency and maturity are all great traits in a collector. These will be bred from the additional training entry level 35Ms receive prior to arriving at their unit and to school. It should be a must for 30 level soldiers in the interim. Since we deal with interpreter management, etc. at the team level, the understanding of the language would go a long way to assisting in determining deceptive or otherwise counterproductive interpreters. Spot on guys.

I don’t think that the MOS should be split, however I feel that units need to focus on getting everyone into the MOS schools that they need while in garrison, instead of simply wasting our time with random CTT training and weapons cleaning. Our MOS schools will help the new AIT soldiers as well as your seasoned 35M. I agree… need quality of soldiers over quantity. The Soldiers I see coming out of the schoolhouse, are not ready for MSO or interrogations. If anything I think there should be a set age limit for this MOS. Say 21 perhaps.

I agree. Since units do not take place in a draft to get the soldiers they want, the only thing the NCOs in that unit can do is effectively train the soldiers. Sending soldiers TDY when available, and having a developed training plan is key. The responsibility for us as NCOs is to develop the soldiers to be the best they can through effective training.

This is already happening- and it kind of works. What happens though, when someone gets ‘typecast’ into a particular role (as I think it happens now) and doesn’t care for which side they’ve been pushed to? That’s one argument I have against the idea overall, that it’s one more thing that might dissuade troops from sticking around. Overall quality is not only a function of how specialized people are in this field. Quality has a lot to do with standards. Speaking with instructors and senior intel officers that I know personally has left me with a bad taste in my mouth about the rapid expansion of the MOS over the years. Standards were relaxed to an unacceptable level, in their opinions, and now they are having a hard time getting new troops to step up and take ownership of their work- I am not sure whether this is a maturity issue or what, but it seems fairly consistent from what I’ve been hearing.

Only training and mentorship will improve the quality of 35M’s, and this could be accomplished via specialization. On the other hand, why can’t we train 35M’s to maintain a flexible skillset like we have now, and train it to standard?

Separating the two (by MSO and interrogations) would permit/ focus the training for those specific skill sets ie? source handling and detainee/ interrogation operations. Also, the SH/ interrogator role would be clearly defined (for the collector’s respective unit) so that a CDR would better understand his/ her 35M asset capabilities.

I cannot see how it would help to separate the 35M MOS. if we separate the MOS, MSO soldiers could not conduct field integrations. That would seriously hamper the efforts of the battlefield commander. In addition, the skill of the integrator and MSO are similar when it comes to dealing with people. Finally, area specialization is naturally achieved. Soldiers are separated into teams at their first unit and generally stay in that team’s area of specialization.
The quality is driven by the needs of the Army. The Army will lower standards to fill those needs and separating the MOS will not accomplish anything except have two MOSs with lower standards and now you make the Soldier less dynamic for the battlefield. Eventually quality will go up once the downsizing begins, until then we have to train these lower quality Soldiers to the best of our ability to prepare them for their missions. The advantage of having two skills sets for the MOS gives commanders a Soldier that can adapt to the mission at hand. If you separate the MOS you have to plan for switching out Soldiers if you mission changes for example. I am sure that can be a pain if a commander needs a field interrogation but his Soldier can only do MSO.

A) I believe eventually we should split it, as for now though we should wait some time and continue to let the MOS settle we are going through this Roller Coaster constantly with everyone getting out and becoming contractors. My main reason for the split is while you have descent amount of 35M’s that can do all aspects of the job, you also have way to many that are only good at one or the other.

B) I also agree with the training we would need to lay out more advanced courses for Interrogators.

Just spent the past 30 minutes catching up on this issue. Here are a couple issues to consider. First, until the late 90’s, the interrogator course was an 8-week long Order of Battle interrogation course with no MSO component. CI did all the source ops. Second, as you all know, a -10 AIT graduate is unqualified by the DOD and ARMY MSO policies to operate anything but CAT 3 MSO without the special O-5 waiver. Basically, he’s unqualified to do MSO by the basic course. I believe ours is the only MOS where the basic course does NOT qualify you do your job. SOC/ASOC/FTC’s required to do any MSO of value in the DOD’s eyes. The O-5 waiver is a stop gap measure intended to keep the MSO collectors engaged until they can get the required and expected advanced MSO training. I fully expect that waiver option to go away once DA assesses there are enough SOC/ASOC grads to sustain the mission. Keeping the training combined provides greater flexibility to the unit to swap collectors around between HCTs and interrogation jobs, depending on the situation day by day. I completely agree that there needs to be an interrogation career track with additional formal training in interrogation besides Reid, LSI/SCAN, and the British course, which I’ve only heard of and don’t know any actual graduates of. There is an initiative at DCHC/DIA to develop a follow-on interrogation course. I would recommend that someone at USAIC/HT-JCOE set up a tiger team to draft a proposed POI for a journeyman/advanced interrogation series of courses. They’ll have to be short, no more than 4 to 5 weeks, though, if they intend to attract collectors from the divisions. Alternately, they could be tied to NCOES/WOES, but that would involve buy-in from DA G1. All those PME schools are detached from promotion now, so there’s really no incentive to go to WLC/PLDC/BNCOC as they’ve all devolved into administrative block checks versus real leadership training--but that’s a different topic altogether. In the meanwhile, I’d recommend that the units look for individual augmentee assignment options in response to RFFs to get their interrogators pushed out to units that are doing effective interrogations, that is, places other than the DFIP/JIDC-type places

I think that recruiting people actually qualified to be a 35M would improve the quality of 35Ms. Since the recruiting surge and lowering of standards for entry, the overall quality of 35Ms has been substandard. Reducing the amount of responsibility is only encouraging soldiers that they can do less and still succeed.

Yes, if it is done properly. For example, if first two years of the enlistment is MSO and strictly just that. Next two just interrogation. Once that is accomplished, maybe have a unit that can combine both of the experiences.

I think it would be a good idea. It gives the collector a specific duty. Instead of going downrange and doing six months of interrogations and six months of source operations. Reason being is because it takes so much time to develop a source. When they take you off of one mission on to an interrogation and have no time to plan and prep it creates piss poor collection on both sides.

No. How would we choose who would do what? I’m imagining that the responses below that say yes are from people who hate doing interrogations. The real problem is that for a job as important and sensitive as interrogations or MSO, there should be a selection process. But as long as the Army just plans to throw people at the problem, what’s the point? If mediocrity is the end result, it might as well be a fair one.
I believe that it should be broken up to two different tracks. When a new soldier enters into the MOS they should be given the Interrogation portion of the mission until they have reached the rank of E-5. Then they will be given the option to continue with the Interrogation aspect of the MOS or go to school to learn how to conduct MSO ops. This will help weed out the individuals who do not have the maturity or the ability to conduct source operations.

No! All separating the MOS would do is create problems. Within HUMINT there are already specializations, interrogations and MSO. Specifically assigning individuals to those task by MOS and not by ability would destroy both operations. There are several HUMINTers that are exceptional at conducting MSO, but are completely lacking at interrogations and vice versa. Though this is an issue for HUMINT, it is manageable because HUMINTers can be moved from position to position depending on their strengths, however it is practically impossible to determine where a HUMINTers talents lie before they are engaged in operations. By separating the MOS, you would limit HUMINTers to their MOS instead of their talents drastically reducing the effectiveness of both operations.

During my last deployment, I saw HCT’s who were overwhelmed due to the collapsing/combining of the battle space. Most HCT’s were picking up 12 to 15 extra sources from outgoing HCT’s. I am not saying this to show that collectors cannot do their mission. As an OMT I saw HCT’s conducting two to three source meets a day plus going on supporting mission of their perspective Battalions. In addition conduct liaison meets during KLE engagements, support screenings, debriefings, and walk-ins due to loss to civilian contracting teams. As everyone on this platform knows that after all the aforementioned MSO activities collector has to conduct future operational analysis and not to mention all the previous operation reports.

I think it’s a mistake. The division would make manning much more difficult and TRADOC isn’t ready for the restructuring that would be necessary. Not to mention that while there are many courses for furthering MSO skills, there are virtually none for interrogation operations.

It’s actually a fairly simple process as far as manning and assignments go. A soldier cannot be assigned to the 75th without an ASI of V for airborne ranger. A soldier is not assigned to an airborne unit with jump status without an ASI of P for basic parachutist. Debriefing billets require the ASI from DSDC etc. etc. Therefore, it is actually a simple process that HRC has used for decades in assigning the correct personnel to the appropriate billets.

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I feel the need to reiterate that my conversations with my colleagues have centered around the creation of two INTERNAL tracks for the “M” MOS and has not focused on the creation of a completely separate MOS. This would allow NCO’s at a certain level whether that’s at the 10, 20, or 30 level and WO’s to choose a specific career path to follow - Interrogator or MSO. All of the concerns regarding interrogation training are very valid and have been a topic of significant discussion at upper levels.

As far as the individual who mentioned switching to MSO to “take a break” from interrogations - I don’t know what to say other than I find that a sad statement because when conducted properly, MSO is a very labor intensive and stressful line of work just like interrogations.

I think the best statement on here is that not every interrogator is an MSOH - I would also add that is true in reverse as well.

The bottom line is that this concept has the potential to significantly improve military education and career management for a great number of Soldiers if planned and implemented correctly. Junior Soldiers and NCO’s may not see the potential there because your input into personal assignments is fairly limited whereas SNCO’s, WO’s, and O’s have a lot more influence in their own personal assignments. So essentially many of us can, to a great extent, determine what type of billet we are going to fill whether it’s for interrogations, MSO, or management and oversight of both.

I think we can all agree that the most significant take-away from this discussion would be to increase the availability of advanced interrogation training. I think we would see those course fill up rather quickly and it wouldn’t be with very many SOC, ASOC, or FTC graduates.
LIST OF REFERENCES


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California