ABSENT AUTHORITY: FAILURE TO PLAN FUNDING AND COMMAND AUTHORITIES IN USAF SECURITY ASSISTANCE UNITS

by

Steven A. Marshall

March 2013

Thesis Advisor: James Russell
Second Reader: Thomas-Durrell Young

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ABSENT AUTHORITY: FAILURE TO PLAN FUNDING AND COMMAND AUTHORITIES IN USAF SECURITY ASSISTANCE UNITS

Steven A. Marshall
Major, United States Air Force
B.S., United States Air Force Academy

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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from the

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March 2013

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will look at the capability development of USAF BP/BPC units using current programs such as the 6th Special Operations Squadron, and detailed case studies of Farm Gate and the current Mobility Support Advisory Squadron. The focus is on both success and where the USAF falls short when developing BP/BPC capability. The thesis follows the planning process and initial assumptions of both Farm Gate and the MSAS with a breakdown of the two major planning oversights. First, the study will examine the lack of funding authority as a problem that needs correction at a Headquarters Air Force and legislative level by creating a globally applicable authority for building partnership. Second, the study will focus on problems with Command Authorities, specifically the unwillingness of AMC to transfer authority to the GCC. Finally, potential solutions and recommendations on all levels are proposed, from the unit to national-level policy. The paper reveals shortfalls in the planning process, but it also shows the extraordinary efforts of the Airmen involved in the squadrons. From Farm Gate to the MSAS, the ultimate success of these efforts has come on the backs of professionals who stand-up the squadrons.
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<td>ADVON</td>
<td>Advanced Echelon</td>
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<td>AED</td>
<td>Aviation Enterprise Development</td>
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<td>AETC</td>
<td>Air Education and Training Command</td>
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<td>ADAPT</td>
<td>Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team</td>
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<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>African Command</td>
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<td>AFSC</td>
<td>Air Force Specialty Code</td>
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<td>AFSOC</td>
<td>Air Force Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>AFSOUTH</td>
<td>Air Forces South</td>
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<td>AMC</td>
<td>Air Mobility Command</td>
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<td>AMS</td>
<td>Air Mobility System</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>Building Partnership</td>
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<td>BPC</td>
<td>Building Partner Capacity</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>CCTS</td>
<td>Combat Crew Training Squadron</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
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<td>CHOP</td>
<td>Change of Operational Control</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<td>CINC PAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Command</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>COCON</td>
<td>Combatant Control</td>
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<td>CONEMP</td>
<td>Concept of Employment</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>CSAF</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Air Force</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>ENJJPT</td>
<td>Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operational Capacity</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
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<td>GPF</td>
<td>General Purpose Force</td>
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<td>HAF</td>
<td>Headquarters Air Force</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IAAFA</td>
<td>Inter-American Air Forces Academy</td>
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<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<td>IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
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<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
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<td>JCA</td>
<td>Joint Capability Area</td>
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<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Joint Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Language Enabled Airman Program</td>
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<td>LiMA</td>
<td>Light Mobility Aircraft</td>
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<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command Vietnam</td>
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<td>MAS</td>
<td>Mobility Assistance Squadron</td>
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<td>MSAS</td>
<td>Mobility Support Advisory Squadron</td>
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<td>MX</td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
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<td>MSRP</td>
<td>Mission Strategic Resource Plan</td>
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<td>NAF</td>
<td>Numbered Air Force</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>NSAM</td>
<td>National Security Action Memorandum</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PACAF</td>
<td>Pacific Air Forces</td>
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PACOM  Pacific Command
PN    Partner Nation
POL   Petroleum Oil Lubricants
POM   Program Objective Memorandum
QDR   Quadrennial Defense Review
SA    Security Assistance
SC    Security Cooperation
SFA   Security Force Assistance
SOCOM Special Operations Command
SOF   Special Operations Forces
SOS   Special Operations Squadron
SOUTHCOM Southern Command
TACC  Tanker Airlift Control Center
TACON Tactical Control
TCP   Theater Campaign Plan
TRW   Training Wing
TSOC  Theater Special Operations Command
USG   United States Government
USAF  United States Air Force
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command
VNAF  Vietnamese Air Force
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Air Force (USAF) is uniquely equipped to assist developing partner nations improve their aviation enterprise. The benefits of assisting and advising partners are twofold. First, the U.S. increases the capacity of that partner to deal with crises without U.S. assistance. Second, working with the partner nation deepens relationships, and access for U.S. forces becomes easier in the future. For the USAF, access is important; runways and land from which to operate has enabled direct action around the world for decades. Historically, when the Air Force sees a need to increase their capabilities in this realm leadership perceives an urgent need for the capability and pushes development from the top down. Because of this urgent push from the top, the USAF develops units dedicated to the mission quickly. What problems does that rapid capability development cause? This thesis will examine the fielding of USAF units dedicated to Building Partnership and Building Partner Capacity (BP/BPC), focusing on the way in which the units were developed, as well as assumptions made, both stated and unstated, ultimately revealing the two key failures of those assumptions and the effect the planning failures had on the U.S. Air Force’s Building Partnership and Building Partner Capacity mission.

The most recent example of this capability development occurred in Air Mobility Command (AMC). In just over two years, the United States Air Force and AMC created two complete squadrons dedicated to the Building Partnership/Building Partner Capacity mission.¹ This is incredibly fast by today’s standards, and the speed reflects a confluence of global imperatives, intra- and inter-service power politics, and a historic ability of the USAF to create capability on demand. This development reflects a change in Department of Defense (DoD) policy on the Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission. Already seen in the Army and Marine Corps, the USAF is moving SFA to the General Purpose Force

¹ The USAF IW Tiger Team conducted its work in April 2009. The 571 MSAS stood up in May 2011.
Developing this capability in the GPF exposes an entirely new group of planners to the problems associated with BP/BPC and highlights the issues that arise when developing BP/BPC units.

In order to explore the problems often encountered by the Air Force when developing building partnership and building partner capacity capabilities, this thesis will first explain the BP/BPC mission, and then look at the current state of USAF SFA activity. Next, a historical case study from Vietnam and one of the first USAF SFA units, Farm Gate, will show that these problems are not new. Finally, the thesis will examine the evolution of the Mobility Support Advisory Squadron (MSAS) concept and current structure of the squadron. Once the basics and background are clear, the thesis briefly examines the twelve stated assumptions from AMC’s 2010 Concept of Employment (CONEMP) for the MSAS one at a time and judges them based on their validity in 2013. Finally, this work examines the two critical unstated assumptions concerning funding and Command Authority, comparing them to the reality of 2013. Only by looking at each of these assumptions, can one gain perspective on the relative success or failure of the Air Force BP/BPC capability. The USAF, when developing on the ground capabilities such as Farm Gate, the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), and the MSAS, tends to overlook funding requirements and potential associated restrictions, as well as ascertaining essential Command Authorities. This abdication of responsibility required the initial cadre of Airmen in the squadrons, acting at the tactical-level, to solve these national-level challenges as they stand up the squadrons. This is a failure of the USAF planning process, and results from a rush to field the capability, the complexity of both the Department of Defense and legislative process, and the inability of the DoD to articulate successfully a need for a global funding authority for Security Force Assistance in the General Purpose Force.

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A. IMPORTANCE

The Building Partner Capacity mission is a hot topic in the world of defense today. The concept is not a new one. The United States has been conducting similar missions throughout history. This effort increased in the Cold War, as the United States trained and equipped many foreign militaries in attempts to either stabilize a region or curry favor with allies and partners. More recently, with declining defense budgets, the strategic guidance for the Department of Defense includes specific language referring to BPC.

Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations…including those in Africa and Latin America …whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.3

The Air Force’s MSAS concept reflects emphasis on Africa and Latin America. With one squadron on the West Coast dedicated to support in Latin America, and another on the East Coast supporting Africa, it appears as though the Air Force has perfectly reflected the intent of the strategic guidance. What is unclear is how the USAF got here, which assumptions the leaders made concerning funding and Command Authorities, how the Airmen executing the mission will fund engagements long term, and who will ultimately control and be accountable for the teams in the field as they move from preparation to execution. Until recently, the training and advisory role has been confined to Special Operations and Air Education and Training Command. The funding streams for these operations originate from both Title 10 and Title 22; they are established and well known. As AMC took on the role and developed a new capability, there was no known authority for funding their operations. In addition, Lt. Col. Thomas Adkins, Commander of the 818 MSAS indicated in an interview with the author that with AMC is somewhat unwilling to relinquish operational control to the Geographic Combatant Commander, the Command Authority becomes confused and makes alignment of efforts

with the theater security plan more difficult. These problems are not unique to the MSAS; the Air Force experienced them each time it developed a new SFA squadron. A better understanding of the planners’ assumptions, both stated and unstated, which led to the development of the capability in its current form, combined with the historical precedent of SFA capability development, will better help determine if the method by which the Air Force fields Security Assistance forces is creating effective units, and what factors are commonly overlooked. This research is both descriptive and prescriptive. Not only will the conclusions provide recommended changes at many levels, but also examines the capability development process and shows how early designation of funding and designation of appropriate Command Authority can ease the work-load of initial cadre and create more effective units.

B. DEFINITIONS

Discussion of U.S. efforts to aid other nations with their security efforts introduces an entirely new lexicon. To confuse matters, there is no authoritative source to define these terms, and those who discuss the subject often misuse the terms. In order to clarify some of the verbiage used herein, some specification of terminology is needed. This section will first discuss common terms in U.S. efforts to aid foreign nations. In addition, a short discussion of both funding authority and Command Authorities will help the reader better understand the remainder of this thesis.

The United States classifies most of its efforts to aid foreign nations in their security efforts as Security Cooperation (SC). When discussing the nation the U.S. is dealing with, professionals often use the term Partner Nation (PN). Partner Nation is a blanket term used to describe any nation the United States is working with in a Security Cooperation environment. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) describes Security Cooperation in three ways on their website. First, the U.S. builds relationships that promote specified U.S. interests. Next, they are built to increase allied/friendly nations’ capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations. Finally, they provide U.S.
forces with peacetime and contingency access. One sub-category of SC that applies to this thesis is Security Assistance (SA) or Security Force Assistance. According to Joint Publication 32, SFA is, “DoD’s contribution to a unified action effort to support and augment the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions to facilitate the achievement of specific objectives shared by the U.S. Government (USG).” It then goes on to distinguish that the DoD assists those foreign security forces engaged in national defense, while other USG agencies help other ministries like interior and justice. DSCA’s website describes Security Assistance as, “a group of programs authorized by law, to provide defense articles and services in support of national policies and objectives.” Some examples of this are: International Military Education (IMET), where foreign national security professionals are educated in the United States; Foreign Military Sales (FMS), where the United States sells items to a foreign nation; Foreign Military Financing, “financing through grants or loans the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training;” and most important to this work, training, where PN security personnel are trained by U.S. forces. This training has traditionally been accomplished via the special operations forces under a program called Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Today however, based on experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is attempting to move some of that training mission to the General Purpose Force, which is simply the term that refers to the non-special operators.

When the General Purpose Force conducts SFA missions, they usually fall under one of two categories. Building Partnerships and Building Partner Capacity are closely related but very distinct missions. According to the Joint Staff, J-5, Building Partnerships is, “The ability to set the conditions for interaction with partner, competitor or adversary

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8 Ibid.
leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to influence their perception, will, behavior, and capabilities.”

In essence, it is learning to cooperate with a Partner Nation. Building Partner Capacity, is slightly different, and is described in a policy memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense as, “The ability to assist domestic and foreign partners and institutions with the development of their capabilities for mutual benefit and address U.S. national or shared global security interests.” This definition is derived from the Tier III Joint Capability Area (JCA) of “building the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions.” In the BP realm, the U.S. is actually looking to increase the capability of a partner nation. It is easy to see the connection between the two missions; when engaging in BPC, Building Partnership comes naturally.

When funding BP/BPC missions, there is another lexicon with which one must be familiar. The basis of this lexicon is the term funding authority. Funding authority designates what regulation, U.S. Code, or portion of the budget designates dollars for a program. Specific laws or U.S. Code authorizes most programs, and another committee then Appropriates funds for that program. These laws establish the program’s defined purpose. Along with that defined purpose, the program must have a manager, reporting requirements, and associated activities. Activities are devices used by a specific program and are controlled by program managers with input from partner nations. Examples of activities are exercises, courses, workshops, and even transfer of hardware. Achievement of program goals must guide the activities. Some programs are authorized specifically and some fall under the umbrella of initiatives. Initiatives fund a collection of programs that all aid a set of related goals. An example of this is the Global Peace Operations Initiative, designed by the Bush administration, and renewed under President Obama to

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train foreign nations to execute peacekeeping missions. Various programs under this initiative have funded multiple training centers, transportation and logistics, and other exchanges.

In the case of the military, Title 10 authorizes most programs and activities. This section of the U.S. Code, written in 1956 and updated in 1986, designates the roles, missions, and organization of the armed forces. If the program or activity involves training or equipping U.S. military units Title 10 funds are typically used. Some Building Partnership missions still fall under this Title. An example is the Warsaw Initiative Fund, which is specifically designed with certain restrictions such as no purchase of equipment, to meet the constraints of Title 10. For most Security Cooperation activities, the goal is not to train and equip the U.S. forces, it is to train with the Partner Nation, thus increasing interoperability; in order to accomplish an activity targeted at the PN, Title 22 funds must be used. Title 22 generally relates to the State Department, and is titled, “Foreign Relations and Intercourse.” The DoD may also use Title 22 funds when assisting or advising foreign military and there are many established avenues for this use.

Congress does not write some programs into law, but they are the result of commander’s prerogative to utilize some of the DoD’s funds towards a certain goal. These types of programs, such as exercises funded by the Joint Staff, must still comply with the restrictions of Title 10 and Title 22. In addition, funds that are available for these programs and specific activities are limited so they must be well targeted towards an overall strategy. This targeting is generally the responsibility of the combatant commanders (COCOMs) and usually flows directly from country specific, regional, or global strategic guidance. DoD sources, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Guidance for Employment of the Force and Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs), are written to guide and support these objectives and serve as a reference

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for any planner. They also define Command Authorities within the regional commands for the execution of those plans. As the thesis continues to the sections related to problems and hypotheses, it is important to keep in mind that the strategic guidance is written to focus the TCP, and in turn the programs and activities, on the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) who execute command and control of most forces within their Area of Responsibility (AOR).

The GCC’s only control some of the forces within their AOR, and herein lies some of the problems discussed later in this work. Air Mobility Command is particularly used to treating their aircraft as “national assets.” Under this model, the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) at Scott AFB, Illinois prioritizes the missions based on a global need rather than regional interests.\(^\text{15}\) This model makes sense for low density, high demand aircraft such as tankers, and aircraft that move cargo between theaters like C-17s. Not only do these aircraft often traverse multiple AORs in a single day, they are equally useful in Central Command (CENTCOM) or Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). These AMC assets traditionally report directly to the TACC. Here AMC plans and controls the movements of over 100,000 sorties annually.\(^\text{16}\) By law, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has Combatant Command (COCOM) of Air Mobility assets. It is illegal for the combatant commander to transfer COCOM, which is the authority of a combatant commander to, “organize and employ, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.”\(^\text{17}\) Both Tactical Control (TACON) and Operational Control (OPCON) of these assets are executed directly through the TACC and the 18th Air Force at Scott. Operational Control includes the authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces. TACON is less than OPCON; TACON gives authority to move within an assigned


\(^\text{17}\) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Operations: Joint Pub 1 (Washington DC 2 May, 2007), XV.
theater in order to accomplish the mission. For AMC, the assigned theater is the globe. It is important to understand these terms when discussing the issues associated with developing a capability focused on security assistance.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

The problems associated with the Building Partnership mission are numerous. Dealing with foreign nations, confusing funding authorities, shifting national security policy, and Command Authorities crossing not only geographic regions, but also federal departments, makes planning and executing a BPC mission confusing at best. In looking at these problems, two become primary; determining proper funding authority and proper Command Authority are critical for legal execution of this important mission. Through interviews and personal discussions with members of the MSAS, leadership in the 6th SOS, and Senate staffers, it is clear that when the Air Force develops squadrons for BP/BPC missions, the funding and Command Authority issues are often left to the men and women in the squadron to solve as they move from formation to operations.

With each change in the Security Force Assistance mission, the funding authority issue has posed a challenge. By 2010, funding BPC had been an established process; the Special Operations Components and Air Education Command handled BPC in the past. Dr. Wray Johnson, a retired Air Force officer and one of the founding members of the 6th Special Operations Squadron, shared in an interview with the author on December 12, 2012 that after a stumbling start, the men of the 6th SOS worked with Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and found funding. They secured dedicated funding streams to execute their mission from both Title 22 and Title 10. In 2010, the Air Force, as one of the first services to integrate BPC into the General Purpose Force again moved quickly through the planning process and made many general statements and large assumptions about funding. While the initial concept of employment for the MSAS had many details about staffing and timelines for development, the section about funding was very short on

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18 Ibid.
details and stated that funding BPC was “complex.” In a personal e-mail with a subject matter expert, Mr. G. Hale Laughlin, Mr. Laughlin shared that securing funding for this new capability should have been one of the first steps, but while the Air Force provided an incredible capability, or supply, they failed properly to influence or account for the demand side of the equation. As the unit approached full operational capability, there was still confusion as to how they will legally execute. This is a problem for the men and women of the unit as well as the Air Force, whose leadership rushed to create a high demand capability without securing a means to fund that unit’s operations.

The same rush to field the squadrons that created funding issues also created issues of Command Authorities. Again, confusing Command Authorities is a trend for the USAF dating back to Vietnam. The men and women of Farm Gate provide a perfect example of when the USAF develops a SFA capability without clearly defining Command Authorities. Dr. Johnson shared in his interview that many of the same issues were faced by the men of the 6th SOS. These issues are evident again in the MSAS. While early CONEMPs dictated that the MSAS units would Change Operational control (CHOP) to the Geographic Combatant Commander when in execution, the most recent CONEMP states that the 18th Air Force, AMC’s Numbered Air Force (NAF), will retain Operational Control. The reasons for this change are not immediately apparent and pose problems on multiple levels. First, the lack of transfer of authority (TOA) prevents the GCC from fully controlling assets who are implementing the Theater Campaign Plan. Second, the lack of control ties back to the funding issue when stakeholders raise questions about funding the engagements. Finally, having multiple organizations involved creates problems planning for these engagements and coordination with other agencies involved in executing the TCP.


The Air Force accomplished a great deal in a small amount of time. In the 2010 CONEMP, the authors stated assumptions about the growth of Irregular Warfare and the presence of mobility forces in those Security Force Assistance activities. Left unstated were the largest assumptions. The Air Force assumed someone could find a funding source. In addition, the Air Force made the large assumption that AMC would be willing to CHOP units to the GCCs and that the GCCs would be willing to request and fund the engagements. These assumptions proved false until immediately before the MSAS units became operational, and left potential legal issues for the two squadrons executing the mission. In addition, the assumptions expose a weakness in the Air Force system. The Air Force developed a capability without proper budget or Command Authority consideration, and while the Air Force successfully created what appears to be an effective tool for building partner capacity, what the leadership failed to address is the demand side of the equation. Because the command authority lies with AMC, there is little accountability or engagement by the GCC; this limits demand. More focus on strategic communications and bringing in industry, partner nations, and other stakeholders such as Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress is required as soon as possible. The GCCs must demand the units, and the leadership in Washington must press Congress and the executive to utilize the 1207 funding authority properly and/or create new authorities to fund the MSAS and other GPF units like it. Until the funding authority for execution is determined, institutionalized, and streamlined, the units risk conflicting with Title 10 and Title 22 in an attempt to build partnership.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on this topic is thin. The reason for this dearth of knowledge is clear; Building Partnerships and Building Partner Capacity only became terms six years ago. While there is some history and scholarly work done on past iterations and the development of irregular warfare, the scholarly work on the most recent developments in the Air Force and the regularization of BPC is limited to some DoD publications, RAND

reports, and other theses. The literature review will break the body of work into three segments, historical work, RAND reports/DoD analysis, and other theses or dissertations.

In order to show the history of the air advisor mission, the thesis will look at the case of Farm Gate in Vietnam, where the confused Command Authority and questionable linkage to foreign policy shows the long history the Air Force has in this arena. Secondary sources available include “Relegated to the Backseat,” an article in Donald Stoker’s book, *Military Advising and Assistance*. The article details the Farm Gate experience from conception to execution, focusing on what the institution did right and wrong that led to the unit’s relative ineffectiveness at training their South Vietnamese students. Written by E. B. Westermann, “Relegated to the Backseat” does a great job showing the confusion in the minds of the individuals as to where the true authority lay. The issues are relevant because it shows the interaction amongst the Ambassador, the regional commander, and the command structure in Washington. The work does a great job integrating the official Air Force history, as well as interviews with men involved in the mission including General Cutis LeMay and Colonel Benjamin King, the unit commander.24 Our GPF forces executing BPC missions today feel the same tension that King and his men felt. In addition to the article examining the Farm Gate unit, John M. Newman’s book, *JFK and Vietnam* takes a closer look at the foreign policy aspect of the confusion on the ground in Vietnam and provides a window in to how the men and women in-country are often victims of national policy decisions and confusion at the highest level. This book looks at the dynamics of the White House and how the conception of the advisory mission on a national level. At the Air Force level, the official history of the Air Force, written by Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965*, provides insight to the organizational factors that led to the development of Farm Gate.25 While the official histories of the Air Force are written to various standards depending on the author, it is fortunate that his particular history is extremely detailed, not only offering facts, but often providing insight as to the

thinking of the individuals and analysis of the issues. The space dedicated to the Farm Gate unit and the associated issues is quite extensive, 20–30 pages, and is well written and researched.26

Finally, oral interviews of military leaders, military documents, foreign policy documents, and public statements by political leaders will provide the primary source grounding. The resources available for study are plentiful, as there are plenty of references for Foreign Policy in this period, most of which are available in digital form via the national security archive or the state department websites. In addition, the official Air Force histories and many personal interviews available from the Air Force history office provide insight. The various opinions and conflicting messages found in these resources paint a clear picture of disagreement between the civilian masters and military leadership compounded by a confused chain of command. Dr. Wray Johnson finds similar confusion in the formation of the 6th SOS, his article; “Whither Foreign Internal Defense?” provides some insight into those troubles. The article’s focus is not on the problems with planning, but it does tangentially address some of the issues.27 Augmented by an email exchange with Dr. Johnson, the insight provided by the 6th SOS and its development proved invaluable. The initial confusion about funding and to a lesser extent Command Authority affected the men on the ground, and bore a striking resemblance to today’s BPC missions.

The next segment of literature is Rand reports and other official studies. While most of the Rand literature does not focus directly on the topic at hand, it does paint a picture of Air Force priorities. One must remember that while Rand is a separate Federally Funded Research and Development Center, the Air Force, through Project Air Force, gives Rand specific requirements in order to conduct research and analysis on their behalf. In the first report on the topic, Courses of Action for Enhancing U.S. Air Force “Irregular Warfare” Capabilities, the research team states that it was the result of a “quick-turn” request from the USAF for a study to assist U.S. Air Force leadership in choosing ways to enhance Air Force capabilities and capacities for irregular warfare

26 Ibid.
This report, along with all the Rand reports is well researched and well written. *Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries* is another Rand study, which is useful for the perspective it gives on operations conducted by other nations. This study looks at Australia, France, and the United Kingdom. There is consideration given to the Command Authorities as well as funding in these cases, and while not directly applicable to the research question, the problems and solutions in other countries certainly inform the discussion. In fact, one of the key questions that the study seeks to answer is, “What resources—funding, manpower, and equipment—does the ally employ for this mission?” The importance of funding is not lost on the Rand researchers. The next in a seemingly endless supply of Rand studies is, *International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces*. In this study Rand does a good job of explaining the process and the role of the USAF in security cooperation. This document provides a great foundation for the process as it stands today and will inform the background section of the thesis. The terminology is not complex and the issues are broken down from macro to micro, with case studies. The weakness of this report as it relates to this study is the lack of a GPF case. The reason is clear; Rand produced the report in 2009, before the move of Security cooperation to the GPF. The final Rand Study examined thus far is, *Integrating the Full Range of Security Cooperation Programs into Air Force Planning*. As indicated by the title, this work focuses on planning various security cooperation programs and carries the report through the assessment phase. It follows with a “vignette” that covers various aspects of security cooperation. There is a large hole in both the work and the vignette. Published in 2011, there is no mention of GPF aviation advisors except in the abbreviations section. In addition, the term “mobility” is only used two times in the entire document. This oversight implies that Rand did not consider the “full range” of

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activities when writing this study.\textsuperscript{31} Does that oversight reflect an attitude at Rand? After looking at the studies written by Rand, as directed by the AF, it appears that the mobility role in GPF security cooperation is not high on the list of Air Force priorities. The challenges faced by the units reflect this lack of focus.

The second part of defense department related studies is books on the subject. There are two primary works. First, \textit{Skin in the Game} is a book that has made it into many curricula and paints a very negative picture of the national security apparatus as an effective tool for security cooperation. The author, General Jeffery Marshall recommends wholesale changes to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, allowing it to coordinate efforts across departments and merge various funding authorities to gain efficiencies. These are interesting arguments and observations, but the critical piece of Marshall’s work for this study, is that he points out the inefficiency and problems associated with the Title 10, Title 22 laws as they relate to security cooperation.\textsuperscript{32} While this study will not look at potential changes to those laws or wholesale changes to defense institutions, it does acknowledge the fact that the current system is cumbersome and demands extra effort and creative solutions to fund and execute GPF security cooperation efforts. Another book is a 600-page analysis of the entire policy spectrum. Much of this relates to the security cooperation and engagement activities. Written as a PhD dissertation by Richard L. Kugler, \textit{Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era}, illuminates one critical aspect of the Air Force’s problem. The Air Force has provided the solution, or the supply side of the security cooperation equation, it must now inform and communicate the need for this critical tool. A key quote from the work: “Transformation thus is driven by both supply-side and demand-side dynamics...The complex challenge of matching new opportunities from the supply side to new imperatives from the demand side will define the multi-year agenda ahead.”\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31} Moroney, Jennifer D. P. et al., \textit{Integrating the Full Range of Security Cooperation Programs into Air Force Planning: An Analytic Primer} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011).


more analysis that can inform the discussion in Kugler’s work, but that statement is the root of the funding issue for the Air Force and the implementation of the MSAS.

The final section of literature on the topic is previous theses and academic work. The first of these is Can Air Mobility Command Meet New Building Partnership Capacity Objectives? by Colonel Konrad Klausner. In this work, Klausner takes one of the first looks at the MSAS specifically and asks some hard questions about the funding issues. Klausner states, “The mine field of funding lines and legalities may distract and delay initial BP activities and must be aggressively addressed by HQ AMC.”34 Klausner’s work is slightly outdated because it assumes the presence of Light Mobility Aircraft, originally part of the MSAS concept, but a victim of budget cuts. His commentary on the Title 10 and Title 22 issues along with the responsibilities of the various stakeholders from GCC to Headquarters Air Force (HAF) is very relevant.35 Where this work will differ from his is the focus on that financial aspect, and a tie to Command Authority, which Klausner leaves out. There are additional theses, specifically an MSAS related thesis from Major Joe Whittington. Major Whittington’s thesis sheds some light on the current assessment framework used by the MSAS and some proposed changes from Maj. Whittington, who worked with the MSAS. Maj. Whittington’s work is impressive, and proved useful in gathering background information. The thesis and contacts made through Maj. Whittington also show the USAF’s focus on developing an assessment framework before really establishing how the GCCs and the Air Force will use the units.36 While an assessment framework for BPC is an important element of any effort, and Maj. Whittington’s thesis goes a long way towards developing that framework, the pure number of studies and effort the Air Force is directing towards assessment before the base issues of command and funding authorities have been worked out is indicative of the trend in USAF Security Assistance.

The key to this study is the primary source documents and interviews. Because of this focus on the primary sources and the relatively young concept of Air Force General Purpose Force Security Cooperation activities, there is little relevant literature on the topic. The works mentioned previously represent a quorum of relevant literature. Together this literature provides a good framework, fills in some details, and points the way to excellent primary sources.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

The methodology used for this thesis is qualitative and uses two case studies, the modern day MSAS and the historical example of Farm Gate. These case studies are paired with a brief look at the 6th SOS and an overview of other current USAF BP/BPC efforts. The research involved in-depth interviews, observation, and small focus groups. The researchers considered the Delphi method as an option, but discarded it due to time constraints and the fact that the author considered polarized opinions of the potential group a barrier to consensus.37 The thesis bases conclusions on primary sources discovered in open source from the Department of Defense and interviews with key players from Farm Gate, the MSAS, the 6th SOS, and Congressional staffers. These interviews will provide critical insight into the processes and unpublished assumptions. Secondary sources mentioned previously will fill gaps in the primary documents and provide expert opinion. The bulk of the interviews were over the phone, although some discussions were held in person with the Airmen of the 571 MSAS at Travis Air Force Base. Their experience in standing up the unit has been invaluable. In addition, contacts at 12th Air Force, Air Mobility Command, and Headquarters Air Force provided insight from the Headquarters level as to the current direction and policy of the USAF. Some outside experts in Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) were on the IW Tiger Team, and gave a window to the decisions of the past as well as provided insight on current operations. The 12th Air Force Judge Advocate General’s office provided legal opinion on the status of the MSAS as it relates

to Title 10 vs. Title 22 authorities. Additionally, interviews with staff members on the Senate Appropriations Committee reveal the perspective of those who ultimately control the money the USAF should be securing for mission execution. Finally, the historical interviews with Farm Gate leadership are available from the Air Force Historical Office at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB). Classified interviews were used in redacted form to avoid unintentional release, and reviewed the full version to ensure accuracy of conclusions. Ultimately, it is both the historical and current interviews, along with the sources they provide, which drove the research.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis opens with an overview of the Air Force vision for Building Partner Capacity as reported by official Air Force publications, briefings, and official literature. This thesis will analyze the status of that vision based on current programs and initiatives. Within this section is a more in depth look at the 6th SOS and its development as a unit. Following the status and overview, the first case study, Farm Gate, will show what happens when the Air Force rushes units into the field without clear Command Authority. The historic aspect of this case gives perspective on the ultimate results of confusing Command Authorities, and how this confusion can limit effectiveness.

Following the historical case, the case of the MSAS will be looked at more carefully. This case is the most current and most effective at revealing where the USAF falls short when developing BP/BPC capability. The planning process and initial assumptions will be the focus of the first section followed by a breakdown of the two major oversights in this process. First, the study will examine the lack of funding authority as a legal problem that needs correction at a HAF level in securing funding in the annual budget. Second, the study will focus on problems associated with confusing and changing Command Authority and the issues associated with the unwillingness of Air Mobility Command to transfer Command Authority to the GCC. Finally, the thesis will propose potential solutions and recommendations for a way forward on all levels, from the unit to the national strategy. Not only does the conclusion reveal shortfalls in the

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38 Ojeda, “Background Paper.”
planning process, but it also shows the extraordinary efforts of the men and women involved in the stand-up of the squadrons. From Farm Gate to the MSAS, the ultimate success of these efforts has come on the backs of the men and women who are required to figure it out; in all cases, they have.
II. CURRENT STATE OF AMC ENGAGEMENT EFFORTS

The USAF...must broaden its scope to include partnerships for new situations and circumstances. This includes expanding the scope of the security cooperation focus to include building the security capabilities of at-risk and underdeveloped partner nations.

—2011 Air Force Global Partnership Strategy

The use of the word “expanding” in the quote above is indicative of the direction the USAF and Air Mobility Command is going with its engagement efforts. While the Air Force has cancelled some of the more ambitious programs due to budgetary constraints, the trend is clearly one of growth. Driving the massive growth of engagement efforts in the Air Force is a general expansion throughout the DoD. Beginning in 2006 the national guidance begins to include verbiage that indicates increasing emphasis on expanding BP/BPC efforts. In 2006, the DoD released a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report that stated the department must be, “prepared to grow a new team of leaders and operators, who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world…to further U.S. and partner interests through personal engagement, persuasion, and quiet influence—rather than through military force alone.”

This verbiage is a reaction to the change in thinking at the top levels of government, change that resulted from military difficulties with culture and engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Obama, in a the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), stated, “Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties…”

This is one of many national level documents and statements by senior administration officials which emphasizes the U.S. commitment to a BP/BPC strategy. Beyond the statements, the commitment of funding and the development of capabilities truly indicate national will behind the growth of

BP/BPC. The expansion and continuation of the Global Security Contingency Fund and other similar funds discussed later in the work is a key indicator that the change is more than just words.

The other factor triggering the development of new capabilities is the push to include more security cooperation, specifically building partnerships and building partner capacity, in the general purpose force. The DoD intends this expansion to take the pressure off the limited numbers of Special Operations Forces (SOF) who have been asked to do more with the growing role in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as around the world in the Global War on Terror.42 As the commander of SOCOM stated, “I’d like to see special operations get in the business of training foreign special operations forces a little bit more, and in the business of training new recruits in a foreign country how to march in straight lines and shoot on seven-meter ranges a little bit less.”43 Because SOCOM wants to focus on other SOF forces, and the DoD as a whole wants to expand, there is a need that must be filled; the GPF is the only answer.

In the Air Force, the response to the executive level push and the move to GPF security cooperation has been dramatic. This section will detail the vision for the Air Force engagement efforts and current programs. A broad look at the Air Force SFA activities allows the reader to see where the MSAS fits into the plan for AF engagement and why units specifically designed for SFA differ from many of the other programs. This broad look will give the reader a better appreciation for why the MSAS and other GPF units face unique challenges, and why planners must carefully consider each program or unit individually, rather than assuming it will operate like another established program or unit.

42 Livingston, Building Capacity, 33.
43 Ibid.
A. VISION

The key to understanding the USAF vision for its engagement activities is the term, “aviation enterprise development” (AED). When General Norton Schwartz chartered an irregular warfare tiger team charged with assessing the services current capabilities as they related to global realities, one of the key premises that the team operated under was that, “the security, stability, and economic development of a nation in the early 21st century are inextricably linked to its aviation resource capacity and capability.” The team drew a direct correlation between aviation capacity and economic and social development. The other implication is that nations with developed economies and social/governmental structures are more stable and less warlike. Not only is this conclusion supported by the democratic peace theory, the tangible evidence of this has been visible over the last two decades as conflicts unfolded in third world countries. The U.S. Government and the USAF resolved to encourage development of these nations aviation industry, thereby encouraging economic and social development.

In the 2011 global partnership strategy document, the USAF specifically states that it seeks to, “play a key role in enhancing a partner nation’s independent aviation enterprise development.” The strategy goes on to lay out ends, ways, and means. It is here that the Air Force lists many of its programs and initiatives currently underway. The next section will detail some of those programs as they relate to the issue at hand, painting a broad picture of Air Force programs, while highlighting what sets each program apart as evidence that each deserves unique planning, especially when dealing with funding.

B. CURRENT PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES

The Global Partnership Strategy lists 87 means that the USAF is currently using in its partnership strategy. The document states that the list is not exhaustive, but that it is a cross section of the available means. The Air Force divided those means into 11

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44 United States Air Force, Tiger Team, ii.
45 Ibid.
46 Donely and Schwartz, Global Partnership Strategy, 19.
categories, from Global Force Posture to Humanitarian Initiatives.\textsuperscript{47} For the purposes of this study, three have been selected, Partner Air Force Engagements, Education and Training, and U.S. Security Cooperation Personnel. Each of these means have ties to the selected case studies and the missions advisors are performing.

The first category, Partner Air Force Engagements, encompasses the mission of both the MSAS and Farm Gate. In this category, we also find the mission of Foreign Internal Defense. The Farm Gate case study falls in this category and the current operations of a squadron known as the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) fit here as well. SOCOM created the 6th, based at Hurlburt Field, Florida, in the early 90’s as a combat aviation advisory unit. Its mission, according to the unit’s fact sheet, is, “to assess, train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment and force integration.”\textsuperscript{48} The key to this unit is the fact that they will actually assist a partner nation’s unit in employing their capability. This is much like the role of Farm Gate in Vietnam. The aviation advisors of the 6th are trained to fly the aircraft of the partner nation, and much like the Farm Gate crews discussed later, they actually fly with and instruct the PN on the operation of those aircraft to include flying with the PN aviators on operations like counter-narcotics or counter-insurgency missions.\textsuperscript{49}

These operations, and the current national security environment with the ongoing war on terror, allow the use of some funding streams previously unavailable. One such funding stream is the 1208 funding authority, from section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. Special operations forces have used this funding to provide support to foreign forces engaged in military operations supported by U.S. SOF to combat terrorism. As the war on terror winds down, the changes in funding authorities will necessitate a shuffling of how the special operations forces fund activities. Being in special operations command entitles the 6th to

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\item Ibid., 29–34.
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authorities such as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) funding which are unique in Title 10 in that they authorize the training of foreign forces. Congress, in a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report noted SOCOMs preference for work with foreign nations, also known as the “indirect approach” to SOF.\textsuperscript{50} It is a dynamic time for the 6th SOS with funding and roles changing.

While the 6th has gone through a host of changes since its inception in the early 1990s, it is instructive for the purposes of this thesis to take into account the funding and Command Authority issues associated with the stand-up of the squadron. According to Dr. Johnson stated that the Air Force funded the first 20 personnel “out of hide” when SOCOM refused to request money for the squadron. Lt. Col. Marvin Pugmire, in his Army War College thesis, “Unconventional Airman: Present and Future Roles and Missions For 6th SOS Combat Aviation Advisors,” referred to this as a, “rush to stand up a capability despite a funding dearth.”\textsuperscript{51} This rush to field before funding is a trend for the USAF.

Dr. Johnson, in an interview, discussed the problems first encountered with chain of command issues. Dr. Johnson recalls that the squadron went from an idea in 1991 to a squadron in 1994. This rapid development, and the problems associated with it, highlight again the issues with funding and command that arise when capabilities are pushed to the field. With respect to command and control, Dr. Johnson indicated the issue was very contentious. According to Dr. Johnson in an E-mail to the author, “It was not worked out beforehand but was generally understood to be the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) and the Theater Commander (then CINC, now COCOM). There was some discussion about the relationship between the unit and the U.S. ambassador in each country in which the unit would operate, but the Goldwater-Nichols Act made it clear to us that the chain of command (OPCON as well as TACON) would be through the TSOC to the Theater CINC. In short, the CINC would have OPCON and the TSOC would have


TACON.” He also mentions that the men of the unit took it upon themselves to work hand-in-hand with the country team and the Ambassador, but that they were not answerable to that Ambassador. This relationship makes sense, and allowing the COCOM to take OPCON of the unit while in country is the standard for SOCOM today, despite the low-density, high-demand of these units.

In the development of the 6th SOS, another contentious issue was the funding. Dr. Johnson, as one of the planners who helped develop the unit, talked at length about the funding issue. According to Dr. Johnson, the planners knew they were going to be finding a variety of sources for funding, and he mentioned Title 22 and counter-drug authorities and funding specifically. He relates multiple occasions where it was up to the men of the unit to find funding such as the LATAM COOP, counter-drug funds et cetera, while “brokering” other units to participate in their activities. This hands-on approach proved useful when SOCOM actually cut funding for the unit one year. Until the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) commander finally supported the initiative with his own funds, the unit was very ad-hoc. This was by design. Dr. Johnson stated in his e-mail that his only desire was for the Air Force to, “stay out of the way.” He intentionally avoided the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process to enable the rapid development. Despite the problems encountered with the rush to field the capability, the men of the 6th SOS managed to make it work. The rush to field a capability is mirrored both in Farm Gate and in the MSAS. The associated problems with funding and command and control are not new.

Other means discussed in the “Partner Air Force Engagements” category are smaller programs like conferences, visits, and engagement talks. Any means focused on improving communication and military interoperability between the U.S. and partner nations fall in this category. Smaller programs like this do not suffer from the same command and control and funding authority issues because they do not put forces on the ground in large numbers or involve training foreign forces. For this reason, they either receive Title 10 funding or have a specific budget line item. One unique aspect of this

52 Donely and Schwartz, Global Partnership Strategy, 32.
category is the involvement of the National Guard. Many nations have state partnerships in which they maintain an ongoing relationship with National Guard units in a specific state. Many at SAF/IA and on the Air Staff envisage the National Guard partnerships as a way to maintain continuity with nations who value personal relationships. The members of the partner nation will see the same faces repeatedly as they are involved in multiple engagements. This is especially true in Africa and some Latin American nations where personal trust trumps everything when building a relationship.53

The next category of means is “Education and Training.” The USAF educates and trains more than 11,800 members of partner Air Forces each year. The training and education includes language-training, medical, command and control, security, maintenance, developmental and professional military education, and even flying training courses. It includes established programs like Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT), which has been training fighter pilots at Shepard AFB since 1981 with funding taken from NATO nations.54 Another of the older programs, the Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA) was founded in the 1940s and has existed in one form or another since that time. With a mission statement of, “Fostering enduring Inter-American engagement through education and training,” the school trains men and women from most air forces in the Western Hemisphere. The academy is currently located at Lackland AFB, Texas, and the Academy is growing rapidly with the USAF’s focus on the BP/BPC mission. From its earliest graduating classes of 60, the school is now producing more than 800 students annually.55

Funding and command and control for programs such as IAFFA or ENJJPT are established by international agreement, and involve funds from many nations. The U.S. portion of the budget is pulled from Title 10 funds because U.S. forces are being trained. In addition, the maintenance of the facilities is allowable under Title 10. Command and

54 Donely and Schwartz, Global Partnership Strategy, 29.
control, while subject to negotiation between participating nations is also usually relatively simple, with the U.S. occupying the key leadership positions and partner nations filling lower level leadership roles. This hierarchy is based on location of the program and relative financial input.\textsuperscript{56} Again, while these programs are related to the hands-on BP/BPC mission of the MSAS and Farm Gate, they avoid the issues associated with developing a capability designed to engage with partner nations’ forces in the GCC’s area of responsibility.

The final category the thesis will highlight is U.S. Security Cooperation Personnel. This category plays a role in that it is the foundation of all U.S. security cooperation efforts. The document acknowledges this: “The proper development and utilization of USAF Airmen through a combination of education, training, and duty opportunities is foundational to our ongoing SC efforts.”\textsuperscript{57} The introduction of this section concludes with a key statement, “all aspects of the training pipeline need to be synchronized to ensure a steady educational development process that provides individuals with the required SC skills prior to reporting to the duty assignments.”

Programs and activities in this category include attaché, the Air Advisor Academy, and newer programs like Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP). The Air Advisor Academy is a new program designed specifically to train the airman tasked to be advisors in the GPF. The unit, which stood up in the summer of 2012 at Joint Basie McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst under the command of the 37th Training Wing (TRW) at Lackland, is developing tactics techniques and procedures for air advisors, providing standardized training, and is the first step in creating an air advisor. The mission of the Air Advisor Academy is, “to provide a rigorous, relevant, and flexible continuum of education and training to Airmen, so they are capable of applying their aviation expertise to assess, train, educate, advise, and assist partners in the development and application of their aviation resources to meet their national security needs, in support of U.S. National


\textsuperscript{57} Donely and Schwartz, \textit{Global Partnership Strategy}, 30.
Security Strategy objectives.”58 This effort to integrate training is indicative of the USAF’s emphasis on developing the capability and leveraging trained Airmen when doing so. In the case of all of these efforts, funding is secured through traditional Title 10 sources and requires little planning outside of the normal channels, making them much less complicated to plan and develop.

C. STATUS OF THE EFFORTS

Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), General Norton Schwartz said, “We listen. We Evaluate. We adapt.”59 The USAF is certainly adapting. In his comments to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, General Jerry P. Martinez highlighted that quote by the CSAF as representative of the Air Force attitude towards irregular warfare. 60 He points to changes as evidence of emphasis. While change in itself is not evidence of emphasis, the movement of money into new programs certainly shows emphasis in the military. It is in the movement of money that we find mixed messages. While there has been increased funding and development of new programs like LEAP, Air Advisor Academy, and the MSAS, the expensive programs that would have put U.S. Airmen in the cockpit with foreign partners have been cancelled. The Light Mobility Aircraft, still very much a part of the Air Force’s plan less than two years ago, has been cancelled.61 In addition, discussion of a light fixed wing attack platform such as the Super Tucano or AT-6 have also been delayed or discarded.62 Both of these aircraft would have been used in association with units like the 6th SOS or MSAS as the USAF took partners who were...

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60 House Committee on Armed Services, Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capabilities, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 3 November, 2011, 6.


62 Ibid., 158.
ready into the next phase of development. Lack of funding for these more ambitious programs has been cut due to budget and questions of role.

One way to ease these budget fights would be a more universal funding stream for BP/BPC. Lt. Col. Peter A. Garretson, HQ USAF, Division Chief, Irregular Warfare Strategy Plans and Policy, in an interview conducted by the author, stated that the USAF needs to take a systematic look at funding and organization in order to better direct efforts. According to Lt. Col Garretson, “What we need is a globally applicable, multi-year interagency function authority to conduct non-lethal Assess-Train-Advise-(small Equip, small Assist) for Aviation Enterprise Development that would allow us to have agility and do multi-year planning—and for that authority to accept funding from other sources (Counter Terrorism (CT), Counterdrug, etc…like a Military Interdepartmental Service Request (MIPR) or a Working Capital Fund).” Garretson goes on to explain that there are still questions to be answered in the structure of the USAF global SFA apparatus including, “What are the habitual relationships between the MSAS and…other units of execution that could be coordinated?,” as well as, “To what extent are MSAS involved in the creation of multi-decade plans for partner Aviation Enterprise Development?” It has proven difficult for the USAF to allocate money to big projects, and provide solutions or answers to Garretson’s questions.

These strategic questions remain unanswered despite years of executing security force assistance. Large unanswered questions reflect not only the rapidly changing face of SFA across the whole of government and the difficulty in making large-scale changes, but also a culture within the Air Force that has historically been able to rapidly develop a new capability. This rapid development relies on very capable front-line leaders and Airmen to handle the execution, while the top level of leadership fails to account for big picture items like force structure, funding authorities, and command structure. The programs already discussed are all tactical successes, performing their missions exceptionally well. Some, like the IAAFA are experiencing growing pains after years of establishment as the Air Force expands its SFA mission. Others, like the 6th SOS dealt with issues related to a rapid capability development. The rest of the work will look at two case studies where the Air Force did just that, fielded a very capable force relying on
the strength of will of both the first commanders and the confidence that issues would eventually work themselves out. The Farm Gate unit, while experiencing tactical success and executing many successful missions, was, as an advisory unit, a failure. The fate of the MSAS, having just reached FOC, remains to be determined. The pure uncertainty of the unit’s fate is indicative of the problems it currently faces.
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III. CASE STUDY: FARM GATE

The Air Force has been in the business of security force assistance for decades. During a speech to Congress in May 1961, the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy stated, “The main burden of local defense against local attack, subversion, insurrection or guerrilla warfare must of necessity rest with local forces.” Despite the stated policy of allowing locals to bear the burden of combat, one month earlier the President had requested the development of counter-guerrilla forces. That directive would lead to the rapid development of an Air Advisor unit known as Farm Gate. In December 1961, those same men, deployed by the President to train the Vietnamese, would be flying combat missions against the Viet Cong in Southeast Asia. This unit continued to fly in combat for years under the name Farm Gate, Ranch Hand, and Mule Train. U.S. forces often conducted flights with South Vietnamese pilots to give the appearance of training, but according to many, the true mission was combat. Much of the confusion stems from a convoluted chain of command, incomplete and conflicting information on reporting, and the rapidly evolving situation on the ground. Unfortunately for the United States, military advisory activity in Southeast Asia during the early 1960’s is a clear case of the U.S. military attempting to help an ally in South Vietnam without clear foreign policy guidance or a clear chain of command. A rush to develop the unit, pushed from the top by men like General Curtis LeMay, led to inadequate planning for

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64 McGeorge Bundy, NSAM-2, February 3, 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library website, accessed August 17, 2012, [http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/B3leMaWRSkOnvMDbjd00Cw.aspx](http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/B3leMaWRSkOnvMDbjd00Cw.aspx).


66 The units were often collectively referred to as Jungle Jim.

67 Curtis LeMay, USAF Oral History Interview on June 8, 1972, USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.
how the unit would report and to whom the unit answered. The confusion and lack of control by the commanders in South East Asia led to the United States entering the war in Vietnam earlier than intended.

A. CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Much like the development of the Air Force’s GPF security assistance units, the United States developed special operators and counter-guerilla forces of the 60’s quickly with impetus from the top. Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)-2, which ordered development of counter-guerrilla forces, and in a trend that would become apparent throughout Kennedy’s presidency, Kennedy chose unconventional means to accomplish political objectives.68 Aware of the President’s desires, General Curtis LeMay formed Special Air War Command. As opposed to the popular image of LeMay as a bomber-only General, he did recognize the need to support Third World governments in their struggles. Not only did LeMay think this would help the United States win wars, he also saw it as leverage to prevent the Army from taking over the small-war mission with their rapidly developing helicopter force.69 By creating a capability for use in small wars, the U.S. Air Force was expanding their utility to the nation. Not only was LeMay looking to provide the strategic capability of the bomber, he was attempting to ensure that the Air Force was involved in the small wars of the future. Securing a role in the evolving world of security assistance is one obvious motivation for the Air Force developing its General Purpose Force for BPC missions. With the 2006 NSS full of references to partner nations and the DoDI 5100.01 making building partnership a core function, it was up to the services to decide how to execute that function.70 The Air Force moved quickly to develop the BP/BPC capability in 2010, just as they had in 1961.

69 LeMay, interview.
The first action LeMay took in his quest for small-war relevance was to create the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS). The Air Force based the 4400th at Eglin Field, Florida in April 1961 and gave it the code name, “Jungle Jim.” When LeMay testified to Congress, he stated that the purpose was, “counter-insurgency and unconventional and psychological warfare operations.” This unconventional unit was given World War II era aircraft, eight T-28s, eight B-26s, and 16 C-47s. The aircraft, while dated, were perfect for the technology level of the third world and effective at utilizing the smaller, more austere airfields found in smaller nations. This is the model seen in the 6th SOS today, and was the plan for the Light Mobility Aircraft (LiMA) and light fixed-wing attack platform the USAF has shown interest in during recent years.

The confusion began when the CCTS deployed. The President specified the mission as training; General LeMay had other ideas. In a statement to Colonel Benjamin G. King, the unit’s first commander, General LeMay stated that the role was, “to conduct combat operations…anywhere in the world, and to be a responsive force, either overtly or covertly, to support United States policy.” The Chief of Staff made it clear that King was to answer to him, and all decisions would be in accordance with LeMay’s wishes. This was King’s first and most important chain of command, a line directly from King to the Chief of Staff.

In October, the United States focused more on the development of the Vietnamese military and with NSAM-104, Kenney ordered, “Subject to agreement with the Government of Viet Nam which is now being sought, introduce the Air Force “Jungle Jim” squadron into Viet Nam for the initial purpose of training Vietnamese forces.” With that, and without really waiting for an agreement, the 4400th CCTS deployed to

74 Benjamin King, USAF Oral History Interview, September 4, 1969, Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Historical Research Agency.
South East Asia, ostensibly to train the South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency thereby aiding them in combatting the communist forces. LeMay was sure combat was the primary role. In fact, he stated that they went, “to fight right from the start.”

### B. EXECUTION

President Kennedy deployed the 4400th to serve under the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) as a training mission and “not for combat at the present time.” The MAAG served as Farm Gate’s second chain of command. When King and other officers first went to Vietnam, they also met with the Commander in Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) and the MAAG commander. During this trip, they selected airfields and discussed the role of the unit; the meeting with CINCPAC the mission of training the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) was never mentioned. Instead, the men discussed the ability of the unit to conduct counterinsurgency with the aircraft available. In the meeting with the MAAG, the men discussed only the training mission. King and LeMay enabled this confusion because both maintained the private notion that the unit, now known by the code name Farm Gate, was secretly there for combat.

Compounding the confusion were the other players in country. In receiving targets, King recalls getting targets from LeMay, Pacific Command (PACOM), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Ambassador, and the Vietnamese. Multiple military authorities claimed to have operational control over the Farm Gate unit. CINCPAC, MAAG, and General LeMay himself were all giving instructions directly to Col. King. These instructions were often conflicting, and the result was that Col. King was often acting in conflict with one of his superior’s wishes. King was ultimately under the impression that he worked for General LeMay, which was probably a smart decision but not the legal one. LeMay had formed the unit, but after formation, his role

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76 LeMay, interview.
78 King, interview.
79 LeMay interview.
80 Futrell, *Official History*. 82.
should have been minimal. If the mission was truly training, the chain of command should have been with MAAG, but they were the most out of touch with Col. King’s true thoughts. MAAG’s focus was training; Col King, under the direction of General LeMay, had a combat focus.81 The final chain of command, through PACOM, was in agreement with LeMay. A message dated 6 December 1961 from the Vice Commander in Chief of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), General Moorman, described the Farm Gate mission as a, “covert operation,” using the “training function as a cover.”

This is obviously an extreme example of how a confusing chain of command can create issues, but today’s general purpose force SFA units face similar situations when “in-country.” From Dr. Johnson’s description of his initial efforts in the 6th SOS, to the men of the MSAS today, command and control often lays outside the area in which the units are operating. For the 6th, it is possible that their efforts could morph into something like the experience of Farm Gate without proper guidance. For the MSAS, it is more difficult to imagine a shooting war, but the possibilities of working at odds with the TCP or the wishes of the COCOM are there when AMC is running command and control from Scott AFB rather than COCOM HQ.

The Americans in Vietnam also had to deal directly with the wishes of the President. He emphasized his policy on 22 November in NSAM-111. He stated that U. S. was limited to advisors and minimal manning “as required.”82 The NSAM also specified that the military would reorganize as required to support the changing commitment. This was all contingent on the mass mobilization of South Vietnam, which Diem was in no position to accomplish politically at the time.83 The clarification of policy in NSAM-111 which made advisory activity contingent on South Vietnamese action yet to be accomplished left the Farm Gate squadron committed to an action completely unsupported by national security policy. Because the military establishment was still entrenched in the idea of the importance of the mission, and the “foot in the door” that the Farm Gate men represented, the leadership did not remove the unit; all discussion

81 King, interview.
82 McBundy, NSAM-111.
83 Newman, JFK, 147.
centered on the specifics of employment. Air Force leadership’s failure to establish a chain of command hindered establishment of a mission statement. The absence of that mission statement caused dissention amongst the military and confusion on the ground for the Farm Gate leadership.

The discussion and confusion centered on whether there must be a coincidental training requirement. The men and of Farm Gate felt that the combat role suffered when putting a VNAF pilot in the rear seat due to airsickness issues and the difficulty in scheduling. General Lyman Lemnitzer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), settled the dispute when he issued a directive on the afternoon of 26 December. The message directed the Farm Gate crews to fly with South Vietnamese in the rear seat at all times. This directive ended overt independent American air operations for months and refocused the unit on the mission of Security Force Assistance.

The fact that King and the Farm Gate crews received and acknowledged this order is amazing due to the disjointed policy coming out of Washington. On 22 November, the JCS had recommended the creation of a separate command that would fall under CINCPAC. After some discussion, the solution was to dual-hat the MAAG chief as commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam. At that point, General McGarr, the chief of MAAG assumed Operational Control of the Farm Gate unit’s training mission, bringing it under the command of a regional commander. In an acknowledgement of the actual job Farm Gate was performing, Admiral Felt separated the control of Farm Gate’s still existing operational role and gave that to a newly formed 2d ADVON, commanded by Brigadier General Rollen Anthis. The 2d was another regional command established without consultation with the Ambassador, showing a sharp break in the policy between DoD and State. Farm Gate, in large part because of lack of planning, was caught in the middle.

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84 Westermann, Backseat, 129.
85 Futrell, Official History, 85.
86 Newman, JFK, 149–150.
Ambassador Nolting found it “incomprehensible” that the DoD would form a new command without consultation. After learning of the issue, Admiral Felt advised General Anthis to avoid the establishment of a new headquarters. Anthis did get the go ahead to conduct with the Vietnamese a, “sustained offensive, defense, and reconnaissance air operations aimed at the destruction or neutralization of Viet Cong forces…within the borders of South Vietnam.”87 The Thirteenth Air Force, with the concurrence of PACAF also instructed Anthis to, “Set the pattern for Vietnamese Air Force operations.”88 According to the official Air Force history, Anthis was the de facto commander of a tactical air force in Vietnam in November 1961. This is in direct opposition to the stated intent of the President of the United States as specified in NSAM-111 and counter to the direction provided by the Ambassador and country teams.89 Acting counter to presidential directives is a serious risk when chains of command are not established early, when units operate under commands not tied to regional combatant commanders who have the best knowledge of the TCP, and when dealing with indigenous forces. All of these are factors the USAF has dealt with in its SFA forces.

Throughout the early months of 1962, under the guidance of the 2d ADVON and Secretary of defense McNamara, the mission of Farm Gate evolved. The addition of Mule Train in January of 1962, a contingent of transport aircraft, and slow evolution of Ranch Hand, the much-maligned aerial spray unit, expanded U.S. operations exponentially. While the emphasis in Washington was still on training the RVNAF, the numbers tell a different story. The primary training aircraft, the T-28 flew 1794 sorties in the period from January to November 1962. Of those nearly 1800 flights, only 205 were training sorties.90 Clearly, in the contest between the Washington policy of training and Curtis LeMay’s vision of combat, LeMay was much more accurate.

87 Futrell, Official History. 96.
88 Ibid.
89 McBundy, NSAM-111.
90 Westermann, Backseat, 141.
C. FALLOUT AND CONCLUSIONS

It was not until 1962 that the USAF clarified the chain of command for Farm Gate, and it was only because of a complete reorganization of the region’s command structure. In January 1962, the President issued NSAM-124 and formalized a group designed to integrate and regularize special operations in the countries of Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand. While this was a bit out of order following NSAM-111, it was more a recognition of the fact that the mission in Vietnam was growing. The military took an additional step in February of 1962 with the creation of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) as the natural evolution of the 2d Advance Echelon (ADVON). MACV’s original placement was under the command of CINCPAC, and was supposed to encompass all of the military activities in Vietnam reporting to the JCS through CINCPAC.91 This disturbed the Ambassador and led to much consternation in Washington.92 While the Ambassador was legitimately worried that about the militarization of the effort in Vietnam, it was a clear signal of the administration’s push to allow the military more control, and a direct result of McNamara taking responsibility. The ultimate effect of the creation of MACV was the regularization of operations in Vietnam and the expansion of the Farm Gate mission under a now clear chain of command.

The men of Farm Gate felt the pain of an ill-defined chain of command and regional policy. The lesson learned over the first months of Farm Gate was that a failure to plan and establish a clear chain of command caused confusion for the men on the ground, conflict between state and the DoD, and ultimately, according to the definitive study on Farm Gate, a lack of effectiveness in both the training and combat missions.93 This lesson is especially poignant today as the U.S. struggles to define regional policy via country-plans, TCPs and other documents without a clear direction from the top. The units on the ground struggle with ill-defined chains of command, and answer to everyone from the Ambassador to the GCC. Air Mobility Command has created more issues for

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91 Newman, JFK, 173.
92 Ibid, 184–185.
93 Westermann, Backseat, 61.
the MSAS, just as LeMay did for Farm Gate by attempting to retain some level of control from afar. Had LeMay allowed the men in country to exercise their legitimate authority, the men of the CCTS and other units like it would have been integrated into the training mission and perhaps been more effective. The men and woman of the MSAS will not be starting a war, but lack of accountability can cause other very real problems for GCCs trying to execute a country plan.
IV. CASE STUDY: MOBILITY SUPPORT ADVISORY SQUADRONS

This thesis dedicates the most extensive case study to the Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons at Travis and McGuire Air Force Base. Not only do these squadrons present the most current iteration of the USAF’s attempt at developing a BP/BPC capability, but the planning process was very transparent; the various versions of their concept of employment reveal how the squadrons have evolved from Tiger Team to fully operational. After the Tiger Team completed its work, the “Institutionalizing Building Partnerships into Contingency Response Forces” CONEMP formally gave the BPC mission to the Air Mobility command.\textsuperscript{94} AMC was quick to formalize the requirement in the first “Air Mobility System Building Partnerships” CONEMP. The CONEMP led directly to the creation of the MSAS and it is from this CONEMP that this thesis will pull assumptions, both stated and unstated in order to reveal the successes and failures of the planning process.\textsuperscript{95} This case study reveals that from the troops on the ground to the staff levels, individuals agree that the funding problem was left to the squadrons to figure out. In addition, some, like Lt. Col. Tom Adkins, agree that the Command Authority is “currently confusing and could be argued to be in the wrong place”, with the 18th AF, and that OPCON should be given to the Combatant Commander. These feelings are reminiscent of Farm Gate and the experiences of the 6th SOS, showing that the USAF continues to plan BP/BPC capabilities without fully considering the funding or Command Authority issues.

The motivation behind the MSAS is a simple one. The aviation industry and requirement for aviation capacity is important not only in first world nations, but in developing nations as well. According to the CONEMP, “The MSAS is a deployable organization established to conduct BP at PN locations where air mobility operational


\textsuperscript{95} Air Mobility Command, \textit{Concept of Employment: 2010}, 11.
support is non-existent or insufficient.” This means that the MSAS will deploy to help partner nations increase their base operations functions such as Command and Control (C2), air operations, communications, aerial port, and aircraft maintenance. These functions set the conditions for a successful aviation enterprise. In the original concept, the MSAS would set the conditions for another squadron, the Mobility Assistance Squadron (MAS) to come and work with the PN on actual operations using the Light Mobility Aircraft. The LiMA has since fallen victim to budget cuts and an ill-defined mission. Despite the death of LiMA, the MSAS is alive and well, currently executing missions throughout the SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM Areas of Operations. Lt. Colonel Griess explained, in his interview, that the squadrons work on the base-operations functions of the aviation infrastructure, often advising maintainers on PN aircraft and local issues with fuels and communications. This builds the basis for other organizations, such as the 6th SOS or law enforcement agencies, to assist with foreign internal defense or counter-narcotic operations. It is important to note that the units accomplish coordination with no formal guidance or requirements. This ad hoc set-up works quite well in SOUTHCOM with the current personnel, but hinges on the ingenuity and motivation of individuals in key positions at the squadrons and at AFSOUTH, the Air Force component of Southern Command. In AFRICOM, the unit from McGuire (818th MSAS) is operating very differently, sending in small teams to engage with Partner Nations on specific functions one at a time. This builds on the methods in place prior to the development of the MSAS, with the MSAS simply providing the new pool of resources. These operations developed based on the assumptions included in the 2010 CONEMP.

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96 Air Mobility Command, Concept of Employment: 2010, 11.
97 Ibid.
99 Adkins, ATA presentation.
A. STATED ASSUMPTIONS

This section will look briefly at the 12 stated assumptions in the 2010 CONEMP giving insight to the planner’s outlook when developing the capability. The first of the assumptions listed is: “The importance of BP and the need for coordination of its related activities will increase throughout the USAF and interagency.”\(^{100}\) While this seems intuitive, the assumption deserves closer attention. What will change in the world to make the importance of BP increase? The United States has been engaged in some form of nation building and engaging with partner nations since the Spanish-American War. A 2009-Rand report entitled, “International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces” points to three factors. First, the rise of non-state, trans-national actors requires the assistance of multiple nations to combat the threat. Second, in an era of declining defense budgets, the use of capable allies is a “force multiplier.” Finally, because the world is no longer bi-polar, the location and nature of future threats is more difficult to predict. This unpredictability requires the use of many allies as a “hedge” against an unknown threat.\(^{101}\) Another, unmentioned factor is the growing importance of international organizations and international approval. Because recent administrations, and much of the world, sees the blessing of the U.N. or other regional security network such as the African Union or Arab League as another source of approval for U.S. military action, having partner nations within those regional security networks provides access and leverage when defending U.S. interests abroad.

Executing those missions abroad hinges on the second part of the first assumption: “the importance of…coordination…will increase.” Because the interagency process is complex and the types of funding authority are increasing, as the quantity of engagements increase, the need for coordination will also rise. At the squadron level, the first assumption is valid. The requirement for BPC will be increasing for the near future, not only because of leaderships focus, but also because of a changing international environment.

\(^{100}\) Air Mobility Command, Concept of Employment: 2010, 14.

\(^{101}\) Moroney et al. International Cooperation, 5.
This changing environment, according to the CONEMP, drives the second assumption: “International need to engage the USAF in BP-related activities will increase.”\(^\text{102}\) When looking at this assumption it seems to be a re-statement of the first assumption, but is simply looking at the same fact from the vantage point of the prospective partner nations. The same reduced budgets and trans-national actors combine with the rapid development of potential battle-space drive the need of U.S. partners. For the 571 MSAS at Travis AFB this need is already apparent in Honduras where the squadron has been executing their proof of concept mission. Lt. Col. Griess explained that much of the territory in Honduras is inaccessible by road, creating vast swaths only reachable by aircraft. The resources of narco-trafficers make this territory a potential safe zone if the Hondurans cannot harness aviation as a national capability. The United States, through DoD, Department of State (DoS), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can provide this expertise, but without the infrastructure and basic aviation knowledge, the effort will fail. The USAF is the global subject-matter expert, and therefore when Honduras and other nations in its position want a partner, there is no better choice. Clearly, the second assumption concerning the USAF’s role is accurate. Both of these first assumptions speak to the pressure felt by USAF leadership to develop a capability quickly in order to fill the growing need for BP/BPC.

The ability to balance this need for Air Force assistance with other options drives the third assumption, “The USAF will increasingly rely on domestic industry, and PNs to conduct BP in aviation areas traditionally dominated by the USAF.”\(^\text{103}\) This assumption points out the rise of contractors across the security spectrum. A phenomena as old as time, mercenaries and contractors have supported militaries for years. According to P.W. Singer, who wrote *Corporate Warriors*, a book on the rise of the paramilitary contractor, the United States has seen a rise in private security contractors from one in 50 members of the DoD during the first Gulf War, to greater than one in ten today.\(^\text{104}\) According to the Congressional Research Service, in 2008, there were over 160,000 private security

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103 Air Mobility Command, *Concept of Employment:*, 2010, 14.
contractors in Iraq alone. For a period of 3 months, there were more contractors than troops.\textsuperscript{105} One of the conclusions and recommendations in the Rand Report mentioned earlier is to employ a private contractor to execute Building Partnership engagements under the oversight of Air Force officers. They also point out the French already use this model.\textsuperscript{106} Outsourcing security is an on-going practice in the U.S. government, and with declining numbers, the environment will force the Air Force to utilize not only private institutions, but also trained partner nations to help leverage institutional expertise. The third assumption is correct, based on recent history and current conditions, but conflicts somewhat with the development of the MSAS. The MSAS is a purely active duty force; there are no contractors or even industry partners working with the squadrons.

The next assumption is complicated, because one must look at both words and actions. The CONEMP assumes, “Improving BP proficiency is a USAF priority.”\textsuperscript{107} It is clear by the words, publications, and speeches from the top to the bottom of the DoD that the Air Force and other services are prioritizing BPC. Additionally, implementation of programs such as the Political Affairs-Strategist, and Regional Affairs Specialist as separate Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs), creation of the Language Enabled Airman Program to leverage Airman’s existing language capability, the Inter-American Air Force Academy, and the reorganization of the various Contingency Response Wings under the newly created Expeditionary Center show the focus the Air Force has placed on developing this capability.\textsuperscript{108} The MSAS is the ultimate expression of this focus and dedication to the creation of BP proficiency. As this work will examine later, the commitment of funding to these initiatives is the true measure of change. Despite challenges to funding the General Purpose Force BP/BPC forces, the Air Force has committed to the concept as an institution internally.


\textsuperscript{106} Moroney, \textit{Cooperation with Partner Air Forces}, 5.


\textsuperscript{108} The author is the beneficiary of some of these programs.
The next assumption drives the internal reorganization to GPF Security Force Assistance: “Air mobility is critical to success in BP.”\textsuperscript{109} In Africa Command and SOUTHCOM, nations where the BP/BPC mission is being executed the most; much of the territory is inaccessible by road. In addition, Griess shared that the threats mentioned earlier utilize this relatively ungoverned space to operate with impunity. Enabling the host nations to operate safely and effectively in this area is a proven partnership builder. The CONEMP lists 18 areas in which the air mobility enterprise can help a partner nation; everything from airdrop to weather services. The breadth and depth of experience that a concerted mobility effort can provide not only enables the partner nation to develop its own capability, it enables the United States to safely operate its aircraft within that partner nation by creating a safe global network of aviation support. This support enables not only the partner nation, but also the USAF’s global reach.

The weakness of this assumption is that it is difficult to point to a successful air mobility building partner capacity mission in which the U.S. eventually reaped the benefits long term. The efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are ongoing, as is the development of the Strategic Airlift Wing at Papa, Hungary in support of NATO.\textsuperscript{110} The RANCH HAND efforts in Vietnam yielded no long-term gain, and many other efforts were simply too small to be effective indicators.\textsuperscript{111} The MSAS as a concept is new ground, so how critical it will be is yet to be determined. Based on the comprehensive nature of the effort, it is a good assumption that helping partners build mobility capacity is a critical aspect of success in BP/BPC until proven incorrect.

Simply by the nature of the organization, the sixth assumption is a safe one: “AMC must be prepared to engage in BP operations globally.”\textsuperscript{112} The Rand study, “Integrating the Full Range of Security Cooperation Programs into Air Force Planning: An Analytic Primer,” lists conventional capacity building activities which were on-going


\textsuperscript{111} Futrell, \textit{Official History}, 65.

as of 2009; there were 56 nations on 6 continents listed as conducting aviation related capacity building activities. This stat alone validates the assumption.\textsuperscript{113} This data can be rolled into the next assumption that, “AMC will be involved in persistent BP operations.”\textsuperscript{114} Our current experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Columbia show that persistent engagement is not an anomaly. While many engagements involve brief exercises or one-time educational opportunities, the large operations require time and continued effort to have a significant impact on the partner nation’s capacity. When one looks at the timeline for MSAS activities, the timeline is years, not months.\textsuperscript{115} This timeline will be important when looking at funding activities. Transient authorities and funding tied to a specific operation may not be available for the duration of an MSA; the timeline demands other authorities discussed later in the work.

Developing the capacity of other nations without sacrificing the capacity of the United States is the basis of assumption number nine, which reads more inspirational than an assumption for planning or a concept for employment: “AMC is designing its force structure to be “hybrid,” flexible and adaptive, expanding its non-conventional means without sacrificing its traditional war fighting competence.”\textsuperscript{116} This statement is tough to prove, but one can assume that with the modest force changes and the addition of only the MSASs and other minor changes to the AF force structure that any impact on the traditional war-fighter will be minimal. One must remember that taking experienced officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) out of the system, especially in undermanned career fields like Airfield Operations, does negatively affect readiness across the board. The MSAS are each authorized seven of these NCOs.\textsuperscript{117} Executing the traditional mission does become harder with fewer people in the traditional roles. Despite appearing to place minimal strain on the force, the two squadrons do strain some career fields.

\textsuperscript{113} Moroney, Jennifer D. P. et al. Integrating the Full Range, 44.
\textsuperscript{114} Air Mobility Command. Concept of Employment: 2010, 14.
\textsuperscript{115} Air Mobility Command. Air Mobility System Building Partnerships Concept of Employment: 2012 (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, 2012), 5; (see also Figure 1, page 25)
\textsuperscript{116} Air Mobility Command, Concept of Employment: 2010, 14.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
The next two are also simple assumptions. First, the CONEMP states, “BP challenges will require tailored and scalable air mobility solutions while supporting and enabling PNs.” The document goes on to say, “BP will require country-specific assessments of PN’s air mobility capability and capacity.” Both of these say that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to BP/BPC engagements. The variety and capabilities of each nation are different, and will require tailored solutions and levels of effort in order to achieve results going forward. What is more important to examine is who makes the decision about how to tailor the solution. In the current arrangement, the MSAS sends a team to assess the requirements of the partner nation in concert with the country team. The “country specific assessments” drive the “tailored and scalable air mobility solutions.” This sequence is logical and natural; it should produce the correct results. If, however, the decisions are made by a third party not familiar with the country or region, the results could be reduced. This is one disadvantage of having OPCON at Scott AFB. With no country desks or regional specialists, the staff at Air Mobility Command is ill-equipped to make decisions about the actions of a team in country. These assumptions support giving OPCON to the GCC.

Conducting any step of the process requires trained personnel. The 11th assumption is, “BP will require trained Air Mobility Airmen to advise PN air components.” While Rand suggested that there is the potential for contractors led by an Air Force officer, a set-up like that does not maximize the partnership building opportunity. Having only one or two uniforms on the ground in a partner nation limits the amount of relationships built and reduces the trust in the U.S. military when compared to a team of U.S. service members. Following a 2005 earthquake in Pakistan: “A spring 2006 Global Attitudes survey found that the vast majority of Pakistanis were aware of American relief efforts—85% said they had heard about post-earthquake aid—and views of the U.S. improved modestly, with 27% of Pakistanis giving the U.S. a positive rating.

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118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
up from 23% the previous year. An American engaging with locals and helping where possible improves attitudes. While the long-term impact is still worthy of study, it is safe to assume that having a uniform on the ground helps improve the attitude of the locals and builds trust.

The final assumption deserves discussion only in that it implies a need, but fails to direct action later: “C2 capabilities to plan, execute, and access operations are essential to success in BP.” This statement simply implies that there must be an apparatus in place to manage all aspects of the BPC mission. The CONEMP, in section 3.1, states that instructions for Command and Control are located in the Air Mobility Command Instruction (AMCI) 10–202 series. Upon further inspection, there is no reference to either the MSAS or building partner capacity. This implies that the Air Force is treating the MSAS as it treats each of its units, as a platform. This thesis will discuss the implications of this and relationship to C2 in detail later. This final assumption, although true, brings into focus some requirements that may be lacking.

B. UNSTATED ASSUMPTION 1: FUNDING AUTHORITIES

With direction from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the USAF developed a capability designed to build partnership and build partner capacity. The previously mentioned assumptions were relatively simple and dealt with the international environment as it relates to BP/BPC. What appears to be missing is a proper analysis of the funding and sourcing for the MSAS mission. Consider the BP/BPC mission as a supply and demand equation. The Air Force trained and equipped the MSAS, providing the supply, but there must be a demand for the capability and funding for execution. In most cases, the Air Force builds a capability, pays for training and equipping that

121 Air Mobility Command, Concept of Employment: 2010, 14.
capability via Title 10 Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. When the capability is needed, other Title 10 money funds execution, either through Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funds in a wartime environment, or through other established Title 10 funding sources during peacetime. This cannot be the case for building partnership missions. Because there are specific rules for employment of Title 10 funding, which precludes use on training or equipping foreign nations, the traditional methods of funding USAF capabilities or platforms do not apply. The Air Force needs to plan not only the training and equipping of the unit, but define the funding required for execution. It is not the responsibility of the USAF to secure the funding directly from the DoD Comptroller, but ensuring the demand from GCCs and the ability of the GCC to secure the funding is essential. Without the demand, there is no reason to create the capability.

In the CONEMP, the authors showed that little thought had gone into funding authority for execution:

“The authority and appropriations for military forces to perform BP and BPC varies by PN, the type of activities being performed and the forces involved, the missions being performed, the yearly defense appropriations acts, and other variables. Given this complex array of authorities, GCC and component planners should seek Financial Management and legal coordination early to ensure legal and fiscal authority exists to execute the BP or BPC missions.”

While completely true, this paragraph simply states that it is complex to fund these engagement activities and that funding should be assured prior to execution; it reads as more of a warning than a concept of employment. The lack of specifics is primarily because the funding responsibility falls not on the capability provider, AMC, but on the GCC or other requesting authority. The joint force, through the service components, funds missions through the GCC’s. While GCCs receive some O&M for their own

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125 Air Mobility Command, Concept of Employment: 2010, 14.
purposes, Title 10 O&M is not an option for engagement. In the past, there have been established methods of funding aviation engagement activities like the 6th SOS. With the expansion of the GPF security assistance mission, there have been new sources of funding added. In particular, Section 1206 of the Defense Authorization Act, known as the Global Contingency Fund is designed to be used by either the special operations forces or the GPF when conducting security assistance, and provides the DoD and DoS a way of combining funding to utilize the manpower of the GPF in security assistance.126

There is concern on the Congressional level that the Defense Department is not using the fund correctly and that the DoD has not specifically defined the roles of both the SOF and the GPF when utilizing this funding and conducting security assistance. In accordance with the House Armed Services report on H.R. 4310, the 2013 Defense Authorization Act, the Comptroller is required to submit, within 180 days, a report that details the methods by which the DoD proposes to delineate the roles of both SOF and GPF when conducting SA.127 In a telephone interview with Mr. Andy Vanlandingham, a long-time Senate staffer, on December 20, 2012, he noted the going concern is that the “bureaucracy of the DoD and DoS makes prioritizing and requesting funds from 1206 or 1207 authorities a very cumbersome process.” Vanlandingham stated that that in any given meeting concerning the funding, the Senate would send 3–5 people and the DoD and DoS would each send 15, each person with a different stake in the process. In many cases, the list of priorities from DoS and DoD were completely different. This complex bureaucratic process to secure funding, with the complex nature of the rules governing use of funding, prevents implementation.

At the squadron level, the complexity becomes apparent. Interviews with both the Travis and McGuire squadron commanders reveal similar issues, but vastly different solutions and specific challenges. For the Travis unit, dedicated to SOUTHCOM, Griess

127 Livingston, Building the Capacity of Partner States, 56.
stated that the demand signal is strong, and the unit has a full schedule and the ability to put large teams into any one of many countries. The challenge is finding specific authorities to allow the engagement. For the 818th out of Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, Lt. Col. Thomas Adkins explains that the culture in Africa in a driving factor for the GCC’s preferred method of engagement to utilize small teams of two to four individuals. While there have been established Title 22 authorities for this type of activity via programs like Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT), the challenge has been integrating the MSAS into the program. In addition, selling the MSAS as a viable capability has been more of a challenge for the 818th due to less history of large scale engagement efforts in Africa like Latin America and South America have seen, e.g. Project Colombia.128 After speaking with the leadership of the two squadrons, it is hard to see them as part of the same capability because of the vastly different challenges and operating environments. What quickly becomes clear is that lack of established funding authorities has increased the challenges of both squadrons exponentially. What also becomes apparent is that lack of planning forced them to develop ways to execute their missions, train their Airmen, and engage in their area of responsibility, often without guidance or support from AMC or the GCC. This lack of guidance, and failure to identify funding led to potential repercussions.

At the GCC level, the 12th AF (AFSOUTH) Judge Advocate General (JAG) has voiced his opinion in a bullet background paper that points out the unit was potentially in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Action Act during an early engagement.129 In his interview, Griess described a recent engagement activity, defined by the unit as a “proof of concept” mission, the 571 MSAS from Travis engaged with the Honduran Air Force. Considered by all to be a successful mission, the Air Force provided some measurable improvement to the Honduran Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) practices,

128 Adkins, Airlift Tanker Presentation.
129 Ojeda, “Bullet Background Paper.”
Maintenance (MX) procedures, and C2. When reporting the success of the mission, the unit was careful to phrase all impact to the Hondurans as ancillary to the training of the MSAS members. The JAG noticed the parsing of words, and his assessment is that the semantics do not change the fact that the MSAS is using Title 10 money to train foreign military, despite the mission requirement of the MSAS to “train the trainers.” While the MSAS may have skirted the law in development, they reached FOC in December 2012, and the use of Title 10 money became tougher to justify. The authors of the CONEMP left the burden of finding authorities to the men and women of the squadron and current staff at the various commands. Both squadrons have found different authorities that work for them, but the solution is not the same for both units. The complicated nature of the funding authorities assured lack of planning. Despite multiple Tiger Team recommendations that dealt with funding, including, “Align efforts to streamline legal authorities to accomplish BP missions with OSD and Joint Staff initiatives.” the Air Force has failed to accomplish this, and the MSAS continues to cobble together authorities for individual engagements. In addition, the Tiger Team noted on numerous occasions that desk officers and others who went to work in staff positions responsible for engagement had little to no training on funding authorities. This lack of training limits support from above and adds to the pressure on the units to find their own funding. The cumulative effect is increased responsibility on the men and women of the MSAS.

C. UNSTATED ASSUMPTION 2: COMMAND AUTHORITIES

Complicating the life of Airmen in the MSAS is confusing Command Authorities. In the original CONEMP, the MSAS was to transfer Command Authority to the Geographic Combatant Commander. This “CHOP” is the way a unit operating within a GCC usually operates, with one key exception; the Air Mobility Command considers most of its assets “national assets.” In the national asset model, the ability to move

130 Ibid.
platforms, like air refueling aircraft and strategic airlift platforms, from GCC to GCC helps AMC prioritize and allocate resources amongst various regions. Moving men and materiel between regions as required by the “customers;” in this case, AMC maintains important flexibility. With the exception of a few airlift and tanker aircraft permanently assigned to PACOM and European Command (EUCOM), as well as some airlift temporarily CHOPed to CENTCOM, there are no GCC owned AMC assets. Even at PACOM Air Force bases like Kadena Air Base, there is an AMC control center alongside the PACOM base operations to assist these AMC assets as they traverse the globe.\textsuperscript{133} The IW Tiger Team noted, “AMC is organized primarily for conventional warfare— major movements to main ports with hub-and-spoke distribution to forward locations.”\textsuperscript{134} When the planners created the CONEMP for the MSAS, they assumed that AMC would abandon the national asset model in favor of a more traditional TOA, thus avoiding many confusing command and control issues. As the unit reached initial operating capacity, and received their orders, they learned they would not be CHOPing to the GCC, but would still fall under AMC, and 18th AF control. In an e-mail to the author, a subject matter expert at AMC, Mr. Deo Lachman, agreed that Air Mobility Command based the decision to retain C2 on the national asset model used on aircraft. Because the MSAS units are “scarce resources” and the Air Force integrated the squadrons within the Contingency Response Groups (CRGs), also controlled by AMC, it made sense to manage them the same way.\textsuperscript{135} Retaining command and control of the MSAS while in country has the potential to create confusion and multiple sources of direction for the men and women on the ground executing the advisory mission. The confusion created by operating under the control of an entity not designed for regional control has been experienced before; it degrades unity of effort, creates lack of accountability, and runs the risk of straying from regional and national policy due to lack of guidance.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The author is a former AMC pilot, having flown mobility aircraft in both AMC and PACAF.
\item USAF, \textit{Tiger Team Results}, 7.
\item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The historical precedent lies in Farm Gate. No one questioned Farm Gate’s effectiveness at the time. Perhaps this was due to the lack of a defined mission, or maybe the inability of anyone to take actual responsibility for success or failure prevented an assessment. With orders coming from three sources, the Commander, Colonel King, could have done nearly anything without repercussion. If something went wrong, there was no authority (other than perhaps General LeMay) to be held accountable. In addition, no oversight guided the actions of the unit towards national or regional policy. This failure to attach the unit to a coherent regional policy produced results that echo today in the disjointed efforts at foreign assistance. The Theater Campaign Plan is supposed to unite the military efforts under one plan in coordination with the efforts of the State Department.\textsuperscript{136} The inability of the GCC to obtain Command and Control over all units operating within his region is a clear disadvantage to the execution of that TCP.

In the most recent iteration of the CONEMP, the “assessment phase” emphasizes working with the other entities on the ground, stating, “The team should also review the DoS (U.S. Embassy) Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP) for the PN. What are the GCC and air component/NAF goals, objectives, end state for the PN? What capabilities does the PN have? What are the gaps the PN should fill? What is the required level of U.S. assistance/training/advising? Initial assessments should focus on PN’s ability to employ the Air Mobility System (AMS) to achieve national strategic goal.”\textsuperscript{137} This is the correct focus, but if the GCC requested the capability, there should already be direction provided on the regional and national level objectives. Below is the notional timeline from the 2012 CONEMP.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{137} Air Mobility Command, \textit{Concept of Employment: 2012}, 4.
\end{itemize}
What is missing in today’s reality is that the GCCs are not requesting, nor are they securing funds. This leaves AMC with no real incentive to CHOP to GCC control, and it leaves no one accountable if the mission fails. The creators of the timeline do not show the “review phase” where a Partner Nation completes an exercise or inspection the advisors measure them against previous performance. The unit conducts the review and forwards to the AFSOUTH staff and AMC, but there is no formal process defined for any higher-level review. A lack of higher review compounds the lack of accountability. With AMC responsible for the unit, and the GCC responsible for results, there is a dichotomy of responsibility. Much like the AFSOUTH JAG, most of the critiques offered will be “For information only” because there is no one to fire if the engagement goes

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138 Ibid.
139 Air Mobility Command, Concept of Employment: 2010, 16.
wrong. At the end of the day, personal responsibility by a flag officer is required for mission success. The MSAS does not have that individual responsibility. A Transfer of Authority to the GCC could place that responsibility where it belongs, with the command executing the Theater Campaign Plan and responsible for the relationship with Partner Nations in that AOR.
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V. SOLUTIONS

“We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully—not because we are naïve about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.”

—President Barak Obama\textsuperscript{140}

President Obama’s 2013 inaugural address provides the preference of the nation for conflict resolution; this preference extends to the military as well. At first glance, the Air Force seems to suffer from a poor planning when developing squadrons specifically designed to build partnership or build partner capacity. This has been evidenced through Farm Gate, the 6th SOS, and the Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons. The Air Force has repeatedly ignored funding issues and delayed decisions about command and control until the unit is in the field. While this has created problems for the men and women in the units in the form of confusion and extra work, the lack of planning has generally resulted in units flexible enough to find unique funding, and with the notable exception of Farm Gate, units that ultimately report to correct authorities.

A. ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS

The first major issue the USAF continually fails to adequately plan is the ultimate Command Authority for its BP/BPC units. As far back as Farm Gate, the confusion caused by this issue left men like Colonel King reporting to many masters from the geographic commander to the chief of staff. E.B. Westermann, in his article “Relegated to the Backseat,” exposed the results of this mixed message, ineffective training and a resultant poor performance from the Vietnamese Air Force.\textsuperscript{141} As the 6th SOS stood-up, Dr. Johnson, in his e-mail, discussed how various commands embraced or distanced themselves from the concept. Ultimately, when the unit became operational, Dr. Johnson says he “told everyone what they were doing,” in order to avoid conflict. Dr. Johnson involved everyone from USSOCOM to AFSOC to the Embassy. While this worked for

\textsuperscript{140}Barak Obama, Inaugural Address (Washington, DC, January 2013).

\textsuperscript{141}Westermann, \textit{Backseat}, 62.
reporting, the planning process had not defined ultimate authority for TACON. Dr. Johnson states that it was “understood” that the unit would be under the OPCON of the GCC and TACON would be with the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). The Goldwater-Nichols act, clarified the relationship with the Embassy since Farm Gate, but confusion still existed. Finally, today’s MSAS concept has changed from Transfer of Authority to the GCC to maintaining control at Scott. Experts at AMC like Mr. Deo Lachman agreed with the author; the rationalization for this is the same national asset model that the command uses for its aircraft. The men and women in the MSAS are, like those in the 6th and Farm Gate before them, making it work. They report to AMC and work closely with the GCC. With the GCC driving the demand, it creates some extra work. As the current Director of Operations at the 571st MSAS, Lt. Col. Gabriel Griess explained, “there are some really smart people at AFSOUTH who do a lot of our planning for us and coordinate with other assets like the 6th.” The units execute this planning ad hoc because the lack of authority in the GCC fails to institutionalize the process and separates accountability for the TCP and units performing the missions.

The solution to this problem is clear, from the planning process through full operational capacity; the USAF must plan hereafter to TOA BP/BPC units to the GCC. This Operational Control by the GCC creates buy-in on all levels and fully integrates the units into the TCP. TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command do not have the same structural elements as USSOCOM, but both commands are global and support not only national objectives, but integrate on a daily basis into GCCs and support theater campaign plan objectives. The MSAS is a specialized capability that deserves the full attention and control of theater commander in which they execute their mission. While the concept seems to be working at the outset, the work required by the 818th to integrate his men into programs such as ADAPT show the detachment from GCCs at the beginning. In addition, the vastly different methods of employing the MSAS capability in SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM show that the units require theater expertise in employment. Just as the results of Farm Gate and the testimony of Dr. Johnson regarding the 6th SOS have shown, the MSAS and future BP/BPC capabilities need to TOA in order to maximize effectiveness.
The second apparent failure of planning BP/BPC capability limiting units’ effectiveness is the lack of designated funding authority from the moment of stand-up. While Farm Gate suffered no such issues due to the direct involvement of General LeMay, the 6th SOS was constantly under threat of funding loss. The first iteration of the MSAS concept of employment stated that the variety and sources of funding for BP/BPC is “complex” and that great consideration should be given to funding each engagement. While this is certainly the case, those who developed the capability abdicated their responsibility to give guidance on what funding was available. The planners left it to the leadership of the new squadron. As little as three months before reaching FOC, the members of the 571st MSAS were happy to have “found” GPOI and 1206 options for funding. These options were there from the beginning, but planners left it to Airmen in the squadron to learn the resources available in federal code.

It works. Despite the challenges, the units, especially the 6th SOS, and more recently the Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons have been able to utilize their capability with great impact. As individuals buy-in to the concept and push the message at headquarters and GCC staffs, those staffs address the problems on increasingly higher levels. What is truly needed, as mentioned in an interview by Lt. Col. Peter Garretson, Division Chief, Irregular Warfare Strategy Plans and Policy, is a, “globally applicable, multi-year interagency function authority to conduct non-lethal Assess-Train-Advise-(small Equip, small Assist) for Aviation Enterprise Development that would allow us to have agility and do multi-year planning—and for that authority to accept funding from other sources (CT, Counterdrug, etc…like MIPR or a Working Capital Fund).” Garretson describes his office as the advocate for the MSAS at the Headquarters Air Force level. It is clear that there has been some progress built by the leadership of the MSAS and their advocates, but Garretson points to systemic flaws that makes obtaining funding difficult. There is no fund dedicated to the mission of SFA by General Purpose Forces.

Senate staffers agree with Garretson’s perspective. Mr. Andy Vanlandingham, a long-time staffer on the Senate Appropriations committee recalls briefings on 1207

142 Air Mobility Command, Concept of Employment: 2010, 16.
143 The author witnessed this on a visit to the 571st in July, 2012.
funding that involved 30 or more members of DoD and DoS where each department had different ideas for the use of the money. The current system is cumbersome and full of bureaucracy. The Air Force, if it plans to continue the lead role in Aviation Enterprise Development, must develop a strategy to mold legislation that creates a globally applicable fund like Garretson describes. A fund like this would benefit all of the services and each service should accept the change. The problem, as described by Vanlandingham, is the protection of “rice bowls.” The units who currently execute SFA like Special Operations and those operating under GPOI have a desire to maintain the status-quo. Because creation of a general fund would require reduction or elimination of other authorities, organizations operating under those funds resist changes. While this resistance is a challenge, of the dozens of individuals on all levels interviewed for this thesis, each spoke only of the benefits of such a fund.

B. CONCLUSION

As the United States shifts emphasis from defeating enemies on the battlefield to preventing wars through engagement, the Air Force will develop more Building Partnership and Building Partner Capacity capabilities. In order to utilize these new capabilities correctly there are a complex set of legal conditions and funding authorities that that the GCC and the Air Force must plan and execute in concert. The Air Force, responsible for the supply side of the Security Assistance equation, did an outstanding job training and equipping the Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons, Farm Gate, and other units like the 6th SOS in a short amount of time. In each case, they failed to plan important pieces of the capability adequately. Planners left either funding or command and control out of the capability development in each case. This failure to plan has left much of the work to the men and women on the squadron level, who are seeking out funding authorities and scheduling engagements themselves rather than relying on the staff elements who are usually assigned to these roles. These men and women have performed admirably. From Farm Gate to the MSAS, the leaders of these squadrons have found a way to get the mission done.
C. FURTHER RESEARCH

This research has been limited by time available in the course of study and institutional review requirements for interviews of subjects. A proper Delphi study focusing on the planning process of BP/BPC capabilities within both the USAF and other services would likely expose deeper causes of the failure to plan funding authorities and reasons for changes in Command Authority. Such research would require time and interviews of senior leadership of all services involved in the planning process. In addition, a more extensive study focusing solely on the Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons and the planning process used to create these squadrons using a Delphi method, may support conclusions found herein.

Historical research on the effects of the Farm Gate unit from the perspective of the Vietnamese would provide more insight as to the success of the U.S. BP/BPC efforts. While Westermann’s work does a great job of looking at the effects from an American perspective, a work that incorporated his look with interviews of Vietnamese trainees and leaders would truly be comprehensive. In addition, an in-depth historical look at the development of the 6th SOS with interviews of many of those responsible for developing the squadron, including key leaders such as General McPeak should be accomplished soon before the age and time clouds memories.

These historic works can provide the case studies and education for future Air Force staffers as the trend towards partnership continues. As the countries of Latin America and Africa continue to develop aviation enterprise, it is critical to engage with them in this development. Both technical assistance and the personal connections made while advising nations not only aids in access for mobility assets in peacetime and combat assets when needed, but also creates a framework for other governmental and military connections. This framework should be controlled and directed by the Geographic Combatant Commanders, and funded through a universal General Purpose Force SFA funding authority.
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