Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program
Elements Need to Be Defined
Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program Elements Need to Be Defined

Inspector General of the Department of Defense, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4704

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<td>DASD PSO</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations</td>
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<td>DIB</td>
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MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

SUBJECT: Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program Elements Need to Be Defined
(Report No. DODIG-2013-019)

We are providing this report for review and comment. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations program officials administered the
Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program since its inception without a defined and
published program mission and goals, program strategy, or performance measures. As a
result, program officials did not have a sufficient basis for determining the program’s
effectiveness in partnering with 17 countries or its use of the $20.2 million provided to the
program as of 3rd Quarter FY 2012. We considered management comments on a draft of
this report when preparing the final report.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. We received
comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and
Stability Operations and the Director, Center for Civil-Military Relations, on
recommendations made in this report. The Deputy Assistant Secretary’s comments were
partially responsive because the comments did not indicate whether the planned
DoD Instruction would require security cooperation activities to coordinate their
DIB-related efforts. In addition, the comments did not include completion dates for the
agreed-upon actions. The Director agreed with the recommendations; however, his
comments were nonresponsive because he did not describe what actions he plans to take and
when he plans to complete them. We request that the Deputy Assistant Secretary and the
Director provide additional comments by December 10, 2012.

If possible, send a Microsoft Word (.doc) file and portable document format (.pdf) file
containing your comments. Portable document format (.pdf) copies of your comments must
have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to
accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. Comments provided on the draft
report must be marked and portion-marked, as appropriate, in accordance with DoD
Manual 5200.1. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send
them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at
(703) 604-8905 (DSN 664-8905).

Amy J. Frontz
Principal Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing
Results in Brief: Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program Elements Need to Be Defined

What We Did

Our objective was to determine the effectiveness of the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) Program process regarding identifying and sustaining the defense capabilities of its partner nations. We determined whether the DIRI Program published information was sufficient to define the program’s mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures and whether defense institution building policy or procedures existed. We also determined whether Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) program officials maintained sufficient DIRI Program documentation.

What We Found

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (DASD PSO) program officials administered the DIRI Program since its inception in 2009 without a defined and published program mission and goals, program strategy, or performance measures. Furthermore, CCMR program officials did not adequately implement procedures to establish a clear tracking process for DIRI Program engagements or document all DIRI Program efforts. Specifically, CCMR program officials did not prepare 24 event plans for the 175 DIRI Program engagements held through August 2009 and April 2012. In addition, 149 event plans and 173 engagement reports lacked approval. This occurred because the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not develop defense institution building policy to guide the DIRI Program or any other defense institution building-related efforts. Also, DASD PSO and CCMR program officials stated they wanted flexibility to execute the DIRI Program. As a result, DASD PSO program officials had an insufficient basis for determining the program’s effectiveness in partnering with 17 countries or of its use of the $20.2 million provided to the program as of 3rd Quarter FY 2012. Furthermore, without defined performance measures, DASD PSO and CCMR program officials could not account for the program’s results. Because CCMR program officials did not adequately implement tracking and documentation procedures, a complete record of what was accomplished during DIRI Program engagements and lessons-learned from those engagements were not easily accessible or disseminated. Lastly, the lack of defense institution building policy allowed overlapping missions in DoD’s defense institution building-related efforts. An emerging and growing program, DIRI needs written guidance to govern the program and define how it fits with other U.S. security cooperation and defense institution building efforts. In addition, corrective actions that officials take will help ensure the efficient use of the approximately $12 million requested for the DIRI Program in FY 2013.

What We Recommend

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should issue guidance that defines the DIRI Program’s mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures. He should also issue guidance that defines defense institution building roles and responsibilities and implement procedures that require the coordination of a defense institution building program’s mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures with other security cooperation activities. In addition, the Director, CCMR, should develop and implement procedures to document all individual DIRI Program efforts, provide evidence of review and approval of those documents, and establish a clear tracking method for each effort.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations and the Director, CCMR, agreed or partially agreed with the report recommendations, but not all their comments were responsive. We request comments in response to the final report by December 10, 2012, as indicated in the recommendation table on page ii.
# Recommendations Table

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Please provide comments by December 10, 2012.
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Introduction

Objectives
Our objective was to determine the effectiveness of the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) Program process regarding identifying and sustaining the defense capabilities of its partner nations. We determined whether the DIRI Program’s published information was sufficient to define the program’s mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures and whether defense institution building policy (DIB) or procedures existed. We also determined whether Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) program officials maintained sufficient DIRI Program documentation. See Appendix A for the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to building defense institution capacity, or DIB.

Background
According to the DoD Quadrennial Defense Review, February 1, 2010, one of DoD’s main priorities is to prevent and deter conflict. The Quadrennial Defense Review states that part of DoD’s strategy is to help build the capacity of partners to maintain and promote stability and that such an approach requires working closely with U.S. allies and partner nations to leverage existing alliances and create conditions to advance common interests. The DIRI Program is one of the ways DoD planned to accomplish this strategy.

Security Cooperation and DIB
In DoD Directive (DoDD) 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” October 24, 2008, DoD defines security cooperation as the activities it undertakes to encourage and enable international partners to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs that:

- build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities;
- develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and
- provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

DIB efforts are a subset of security cooperation. According to a 2011 DIB Conference report, DIB refers to the programs, structures, and processes used to develop effective, efficient, and accountable partner defense establishments, including defense ministries, general and joint staffs and commands, and the supporting institutions of the armed forces. DASD PSO program officials consider the DIRI Program to be a DIB program.
Other DIB Programs
Like the DIRI Program, several other DoD organizations and programs either have a DIB mission or conduct DIB-related initiatives as part of their security cooperation mission. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (DASD PSO) and CCMR program officials, those organizations and programs include the following: the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) Program, the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program, the six geographic Combatant Commands,1 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) regional offices,2 the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, and the five DoD Centers for Regional Security Studies (Regional Centers).3 See Appendix B for an organization chart that shows the relationships among these entities as well as which entities have management or oversight responsibility for specific DIB programs.

DIRI Program
According to DASD PSO program officials, the DIRI Program is a global institutional capacity-building program that supports partner nation Ministries of Defense (MoDs) and related institutions in their efforts to address capacity gaps in such key functions as:

- development of policy and strategy,
- ministerial organization,
- force development,
- budgets,
- human resources (including professional defense and military education),
- logistics,
- civil-military relationships, and
- interagency coordination.

According to the August 2011 DIRI Program organizational message, the DIRI Program seeks to enhance DoD capacity to conduct DIB with a balanced, centralized, expert, and efficient approach that includes deliberate outreach to security cooperation providers and decisionmakers. In addition, through periodic and sustained engagement with partner nations, the DIRI Program seeks to:

2 The USD(P) regional offices are made up of eight different DASD offices. Four Regional DASDs report to USD(P) through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs: DASD (Middle East), DASD (African Affairs), DASD (Europe and North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]), and DASD (Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia). Three Regional DASDs report to USD(P) through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs: DASD (East Asia), DASD (South and Southeast Asia), and DASD (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia). DASD (Western Hemisphere) reports to USD(P) through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs.
3 The five Regional Centers are: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies.
support partners, especially at the MoD and general or joint staff levels, in their effort to build and manage efficient, effective defense ministries and institutions; support stronger, high-level defense relations between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and partner MoDs; and support sustainment of gains achieved through other U.S. Government security cooperation investments.

As of 3rd Quarter FY 2012, the DIRI Program worked with 17 partner nations and received about $20.2 million in funding through FY 2010 and FY 2012. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) requested about $12 million in FY 2013 funding for the DIRI Program.

**DIRI Program Responsibilities**

On July 1, 2009, DASD PSO directed CCMR execute the DIRI Program. The DASD PSO stated that his office, in coordination with the USD(P) regional offices and geographic Combatant Commands, would provide policy guidance for and oversight of the DIRI Program. He also stated that DSCA would provide program and budget guidance for the DIRI Program.

**USD(P)**

USD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. USD(P) is also the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on security cooperation matters, and oversees the direction and administration of DoD-wide policy guidance for the execution of security assistance and security cooperation programs.

DASD PSO reports to USD(P) through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict. Part of DASD PSO’s responsibilities are to develop policy and to oversee the development of DoD capabilities to successfully conduct stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations from peace to conflict, with interagency and international partners, in support of national security objectives. In addition, DASD PSO provides oversight for the DIRI Program and, according to a DASD PSO program official, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict makes the final determination as to which partner nations are selected for the DIRI Program.

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4 Effective, efficient defense ministries and institutions are ones that are under civilian control, transparent, accountable, and adhere to the rule of law.
5 The DIRI Program received approximately $5.8 million in FY 2010, $6.5 million in FY 2011, and $7.9 million in FY 2012, for a total of about $20.2 million, as of June 2012.
DSCA

DSCA directs, administers, and provides overall policy guidance for the execution of DoD security cooperation programs. According to a DSCA program official, DSCA reports to USD(P) through the USD(P) Chief of Staff. According to DSCA program officials, DSCA is responsible for providing DIRI Program budget execution and transferring DIRI Program funding to CCMR through the Naval Postgraduate School and to federally funded research and development centers through the Washington Headquarters Service.

CCMR

CCMR was established in 1994 at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. It was originally established to assist newly emerging democracies in addressing the civil-military challenges of the post-Cold War world. Since its founding, CCMR’s mission evolved to include building partner capacity and improving interagency and international coordination and cooperation by addressing civil-military challenges. With regard to DIB initiatives, CCMR supports the DIRI Program as well as the WIF Program. According to DASD PSO program officials, CCMR executes the DIRI Program by assembling teams of subject-matter experts from the wider defense community, U.S. Government stakeholders, and partner-nation defense personnel. The team organized by CCMR works with the partner nation to design an implementation strategy for building capacity in that nation that also supports U.S. strategic goals.

Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control Program (MICP) Procedures,” July 29, 2010, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides a reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified an internal control weakness for the DIRI Program. Specifically, DASD PSO program officials did not define or publish program mission and goals, program strategy, or performance measures for the DIRI Program. This occurred because USD(P) did not develop DIB policy that would guide the DIRI Program, or any other DIB efforts. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in USD(P).
Finding. Necessary DIRI Program Elements Not Defined

DASD PSO program officials administered the DIRI Program since its inception in 2009 without a defined and published program mission and goals, program strategy, or performance measures. Furthermore, CCMR program officials did not adequately implement procedures to establish a clear tracking process for DIRI Program engagements or document all DIRI Program efforts. Specifically, CCMR program officials did not prepare 24 event plans for the 175 DIRI Program engagements held through August 2009 and April 2012. In addition, 149 event plans and 173 engagement reports lacked approval. This occurred because USD(P) did not develop DIB policy that would guide the DIRI Program or any other DIB efforts. Also, DASD PSO and CCMR program officials stated they wanted flexibility to execute the DIRI Program.

As a result, DASD PSO program officials had an insufficient basis on which to determine the program’s effectiveness in partnering with 17 countries or its use of the $20.2 million provided to the program as of 3rd Quarter FY 2012. Without defined and published performance measures, DASD PSO and CCMR program officials could not account for the program’s results. Because CCMR program officials did not adequately implement tracking and documentation procedures, a complete record of what was accomplished during DIRI Program engagements and lessons-learned from those engagements were not easily accessible or disseminated. Lastly, the lack of DIB policy allowed overlapping missions in DoD’s DIB-related efforts. Because DIRI is an emerging and growing program, it needs written guidance to govern the program and define how it fits with other U.S. security cooperation and DIB-related efforts. In addition, corrective actions taken will help ensure the efficient use of the approximately $12 million requested for the DIRI Program in FY 2013.

Elements Needed for Program Success

According to Federal guidance, such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,” November 1999, a program’s mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures should be defined to establish a framework and reasonably ensure its success. A program’s mission defines the program’s purpose. The program’s goals are the results or achievements the program directs its efforts toward. A program’s strategy identifies the processes and resources needed to achieve its goals. Lastly, performance measures are values or characteristics used to measure progress toward goals. Together, these elements provide a means for leadership to establish a unified program vision, provide guidance, and monitor program efforts. In addition, these elements identify ways to improve progress, reduce risks, and improve cost-effectiveness. According to DoDD 5132.03, security cooperation activities, like the DIRI Program, should be planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other integral DoD activities.
DIRI Program Lacked Mission and Goals, Program Strategy, and Performance Measures

DASD PSO program officials operated the DIRI Program since its inception in 2009 without defined and published program mission and goals, program strategy, or performance measures. DASD Program officials intended to use the WIF Program methodology for the DIRI Program; however, DASD PSO and CCMR Program officials found the methodology was not applicable to DIRI Program partner nations. Instead, DASD PSO officials issued two DIRI Program documents describing the program; however, the documents did not clearly define the program’s mission and goals, program strategy, or performance measures and were not disseminated to all security cooperation providers.

DIRI Program Methodology Evolved from the WIF Program

DASD PSO program officials intended to use the DIB process and methodology developed under the WIF Program\(^6\) for the DIRI Program; however, CCMR officials found the methodology was not applicable to DIRI Program partner nations. According to the Director, CCMR, the WIF Program used DIB guidelines developed by the NATO for use in Partnership for Peace\(^7\) countries. He stated Partnership for Peace countries participated in the WIF Program because they wanted to become part of NATO, and therefore, were willing to reform whichever parts of their MoD that NATO and the WIF Program deemed necessary to gain entry into NATO. A DASD PSO program official indicated that countries participating in the DIRI Program were not always willing to reform specific parts of their MoD. For this reason, the Director, CCMR, stated the WIF Program’s process and methodology would not work for the DIRI Program. However, the Director stated the WIF Program’s process of determining a partner nation’s MoD needs, developing a plan to fulfill those needs, and using subject-matter experts to do so was also the basic framework of the DIRI Program. Accordingly, DASD PSO program officials stated they adapted the WIF Program methodology for the DIRI Program.

DASD PSO Issued DIRI Program Memorandum and Organizational Message

DASD PSO officials issued a DIRI Program memorandum and an organizational message; however, those documents did not define the program’s strategy, mission and goals, or performance measures and were not disseminated to all security cooperation providers.

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\(^6\) The WIF Program is a U.S. program that DoD manages to improve Partnership for Peace countries interoperability and integration with NATO and build their defense institutions or advance their defense reform.

\(^7\) The Partnership for Peace is a program of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO. It allows partners to build an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation.
DASD PSO Issued DIIR Program Memorandum

On July 1, 2009, DASD PSO issued a memorandum to DSCA, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Global Center for Security Cooperation regarding the implementation of the DIIR Program in FY 2010. In the memorandum, DASD PSO stated that CCMR was the most appropriate institution to execute the DIIR Program. He directed that his office, in coordination with USD(P) regional offices and geographic Combatant Commands, would provide policy guidance for and oversight of the DIIR Program and that DSCA would provide program and budget guidance for the DIIR Program. The memorandum did not define the DIIR Program’s strategy, mission and goals, or performance measures, aside from establishing which office would implement the DIIR Program and who would provide policy and budget guidance. In addition, the memorandum was not addressed to anyone other than DIIR Program officials.

DIIR Program Organizational Message Issued Two Years After Program Initiation

On August 2, 2011, more than 2 years after the start of the DIIR Program, DASD PSO program officials issued an organizational message through the Automated Message Handling System that described the DIIR Program’s intent, roles, and process. Specifically, the message described the general process used by the DIIR Program to build capacity in partner nations, but it did not describe how the DIIR Program related to or differed from existing DIB-related efforts. In addition, the message did not establish the DIIR Program’s strategy or any performance measures.

According to a DASD PSO program official, his office issued the message for informational purposes and as a way to advertise the DIIR Program. However, the message was available only to DoD personnel who had access to the Automated Message Handling System, and the message contained instructions to recipients to forward it to additional recipients for informational purposes. However, such additional recipients, such as personnel at two of the Regional Centers, might not have ever received the message. In addition, the message listed DASD PSO program officials as points of contact to answer questions and provide details on the DIIR Program. A DASD PSO program official listed as a specific point of contact told us he had not received any feedback regarding the message as of May 2012. As USD(P) officials continue to grow the DIIR Program, they need to ensure it has a sound foundation and framework that

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8 In a January 2, 2009, memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs directed that DSCA implement the FY 2009 DIIR Program Pilot through the Global Center for Security Cooperation. Although the DASD PSO’s memorandum was addressed to the Global Center for Security Cooperation, according to a DASD PSO program official, the Global Center was not involved in the DIIR Program after it completed the DIIR Program Pilot.

9 The Automated Message Handling System is a web-based user interface that provides message profiling and retrospective search capabilities. It uses message content, addressing information, and content of attachments to route incoming messages to the correct user.

10 According to a DASD PSO program official, DASD PSO briefed representatives from the Department of State, the Regional Centers, and the Senate Armed Services Committee on the DIIR Program before August 2011.
includes defined and published mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures and that those program elements are coordinated with other security cooperation providers to ensure no duplication of DIB efforts.

**Procedures Needed to Consistently Document DIRI Program Efforts**

CCMR program officials did not adequately implement procedures to establish a clear tracking process for DIRI Program engagements or document all DIRI Program efforts. Specifically, a CCMR program official stated in March 2012 CCMR began tracking whether engagements were held. In addition, although CCMR program officials made an effort to document DIRI Program engagements, the documentation available for 175 DIRI Program engagements held through August 2009 and April 2012 was incomplete and disorganized. Documentation accessibility is a control activity that can help program management ensure its program meets its objectives. The DIRI Program documentation we reviewed was neither clearly labeled nor contained in a central location so as to be easily accessible. The Director, CCMR, stated that CCMR program officials were undertaking an effort to create a centralized website for DIB lessons learned so those lessons can be shared with the broader DoD community.

For 24 of the 175 DIRI Program engagements, CCMR program officials did not prepare an event plan. An event plan should document the engagement’s objectives, methodology, and performance measures. A documented event plan would provide a basis to measure the DIRI Program’s effectiveness in achieving partner-nation and U.S. strategic objectives. Further, 149 event plans and 173 engagement reports lacked approval dates and signatures. Because CCMR program officials did not adequately implement tracking and documentation procedures, a complete record of what was accomplished during DIRI Program engagements and lessons-learned from those engagements were not easily accessible or disseminated. CCMR program officials should establish procedures to consistently document individual DIRI Program efforts, provide evidence of review and approval of those documents, and establish a tracking method for each effort to provide effective program management and oversight of the program.

**USD(P) Did Not Develop DIB Policy**

USD(P) did not develop DIB policy that would guide the DIRI Program or any other DIB effort’s mission and goals, program strategy, or performance measures. As a result, DIB program managers, geographic Combatant Commanders, the Regional Center Directors, and other DIB officials did not have written guidance that governed their DIB efforts or

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See Appendix C for more information on the types of DIRI Program documents prepared for each engagement as well as specific details on what documentation was missing for the 175 DIRI Program engagements we reviewed.
required they develop policy and procedures to manage their DIB efforts. For the DIRI Program, a CCMR program official stated that CCMR program officials relied mainly on verbal and informal written guidance from DASD PSO program officials to execute the program. Although verbal and informal written guidance may be useful, they are not sufficient to create or to sustain strong, well-founded programs.

**DIRI Program Officials Wanted Flexibility**

DASD PSO and CCMR program officials stated they wanted flexibility in executing the DIRI Program with partner nations. The DIRI Program Manager at CCMR stated that when the DIRI Program began, DIRI Program policy would have restricted its execution because program officials did not yet know what the best approach would be. She also stated she received verbal and informal written direction from DASD PSO program officials frequently, despite not having written, official DIRI Program policy. Having official policy would help define the DIRI Program’s role in DIB as well as how the DIRI Program fits in with other security cooperation programs. In addition, a DASD PSO program official stated he agreed that the DIRI Program needs policy and if written appropriately, the policy would still give them the flexibility the DIRI Program needs.

**DIRI Program Challenges and Overlapping Mission Requirements**

The lack of defined policies to govern the DIRI Program as well as DoD’s DIB-related efforts caused programmatic challenges. Specifically, DASD PSO program officials had an insufficient basis on which to determine the effectiveness of the program or account for the program’s results. Also, the lack of DIB policy allowed overlapping missions in DoD’s DIB-related efforts.

**DASD PSO Had Insufficient Basis on Which to Determine Effectiveness of DIRI Program or Account for Program Results**

DASD PSO program officials had an insufficient basis on which to determine the effectiveness of the program in partnering with 17 partner nations or its use of approximately $20.2 million provided to the program as of 3rd Quarter FY 2012 because the DIRI Program lacked a defined and published mission and goals, strategy, and performance measures. The DIRI Program Manager at CCMR stated she prepared annual reports titled, “DIRI Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary,” for DSCA in FY 2010 and 2011. Although those reports described the DIRI Program’s accomplishments in FY 2010 and 2011, the reports did not describe the performance measures that were used to assess the program’s effectiveness. For example, the FY 2010 report stated that one of the DIRI Program’s accomplishments was the program encouraged partner-nation commitment and ownership of DIRI Program projects, which was illustrated by a Minister of Defense routinely holding meetings with CCMR Program officials at the end of each engagement. Even though this may provide an example of partner-nation commitment, DASD PSO program officials did not define performance measures as evaluation criteria for determining program effectiveness or success in this area. As previously stated, a program’s mission defines the program’s purpose. Its goals are the results or achievements the program directs its efforts toward. Its strategy
identifies the processes and resources needed to achieve its goals. Its performance measures are values or characteristics used to measure progress toward goals. USD(P) was responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on the effectiveness of security cooperation efforts like the DIRI Program. Without defining these critical program elements, DASD PSO program officials did not have a sufficient basis on which to evaluate the DIRI Program’s effectiveness and could not account for its success or lack thereof.

**Overlapping Missions Require DIB Policy Clarification**

The lack of DIB policy allowed overlapping missions in DoD’s DIB-related efforts, such as the DIRI Program. Specifically, the commands and offices charged with DIB-related missions did not have defined DIB roles and responsibilities. DASD PSO and CCMR program officials stated that working with some of the Regional Centers was difficult because some considered the DIRI Program mission to be their responsibility. The missions of the Regional Centers seemed to be similar to the DIRI Program mission defined in the DIRI Program’s August 2011 organizational message. For example, the mission of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies stated it would:

> Develop and present academic programs tailored for the requirements of Latin American and Caribbean states that stimulate both civilian and military thinking about defense policy and civil-military relations, and provide an understanding of defense decision making and resource management in a democratic society. The Center [will] seek to improve civilian expertise in national defense and military matters, strengthen civil-military relations, and foster inter-governmental understanding and cooperation in democratic states in the Western Hemisphere by conducting a multifaceted academic program. [emphasis added]

According to the DIRI Program August 2011 organizational message, the DIRI Program:

> supports partner ministries of defense and related institutions in their efforts to address capacity gaps in key functions such as development of policy and strategy, ministerial organization, force development, budgets, human resources (including professional defense and military education), logistics, and civil-military relationships, and interagency coordination. [emphasis added]

The excerpts show that both the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and the DIRI Program were charged with developing civil-military relations and increasing understanding about defense policy and decision-making. The memorandum that established the FY 2009 DIRI Program Pilot states that the funds expended for the pilot should be consistent with the mission and authority of the Regional Centers. As another example, the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies is a DoD program that, like the DIRI Program, conducts DIB-related efforts in the interest of furthering U.S. strategic objectives.

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12 The DIRI Program had its own funding line as of FY 2010.
Without DIB policy that distinguished the DIB roles of the DIRI Program and the Regional Centers or any other office or command conducting DIB-related efforts, a potential for duplication and inefficiency existed. As shown in the organization chart in Appendix B, multiple organizations with different chains of command performed DIB-related efforts. To improve efficiency in DoD’s DIB-related efforts, USD(P) needs to issue guidance that defines DIB roles and responsibilities and implement procedures that require the coordination of DIB program’s mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures with other security cooperation activities.

**Program Officials Taking Steps to Improve Both DIB and DIRI Program Structures**

DASD PSO and CCMR program officials began taking steps to improve both the DIB and DIRI Program structures. Specifically, a DASD PSO program official stated that at his direction, CCMR program officials began drafting a DoD Instruction that establishes DIB policy and assigns DIB roles and responsibilities in DoD. According to a DASD PSO program official, the Instruction was expected to be issued in 2nd Quarter FY 2013. In addition, DASD PSO program officials planned to draft a DIB implementation strategy and guidance. Although the drafting of the Instruction and planned drafting of the implementation strategy and guidance were important first steps, the DIRI Program still needs a defined and published program mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures, so DoD can ensure the effectiveness of the program.

In addition, according to DASD PSO and CCMR program officials, CCMR program officials were establishing a DIRI Program strategy and planning team who would be responsible for recommending the DIB areas on which to focus in each partner nation, capturing DIRI Program lessons-learned, and conducting assessments of each DIRI Program initiative every 12 to 18 months. Adding a strategy and planning team should bring more structure to the DIRI Program process; however, the team’s roles and responsibilities must also be included in DIRI Program procedures.

**Conclusion**

The creation of the DIRI Program is an important component of DoD’s strategy to build the security capacity of partner nations. However, without defined and published mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures, DASD PSO program officials did not have a framework from which to determine the effectiveness of the program or attest to its success or lack thereof. In addition, without a policy that defines DoD’s DIB mission and roles and responsibilities and the procedures to implement that policy, DoD had no assurance that DIB-related efforts were distinct and properly coordinated to ensure no duplication of effort occurred. Because DIRI is an emerging and growing program, it needs written guidance to govern the program and define how it fits with
other U.S. security cooperation and DIB-related efforts. Corrective actions taken will help ensure efficient use of the approximately $12 million requested for the DIRI Program in FY 2013.

Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

A summary of the comments from the DASD PSO and the Director, CCMR, on the finding follow, along with our response. The complete text of the DASD PSO and the Director’s comments can be found in the Management Comments section at the end of the report.

Comments on the DIRI Program Mission, Goals, and Strategy

The DASD PSO stated that the DIRI Program’s mission, goals, and strategy were clearly articulated, and because of this fact, his office was able to respond to the higher than estimated demand for the program. He stated that his office used the following to disseminate DIRI Program information: the August 2011 organizational message or cable, the DIB conference, follow-on workshops showcasing the DIRI Program, a widely used fact sheet, and briefing slides. The DASD PSO agreed that the distribution of this information should always be as broad as possible.

Our Response

We disagree that the DIRI Program’s mission, goals, and strategy were clearly articulated. The DIRI Program memorandum and organizational message issued by DASD PSO officials did not define the program’s mission, goals, or strategy and were not disseminated to all security cooperation providers. Although the documents described by the DASD PSO disseminated DIRI Program information, they did not clearly define the program's mission and goals, program strategy, or performance measures and were not disseminated to all security cooperation providers.

Comments on DIRI Program Performance Measures

The DASD PSO agreed that performance measures need to be developed for the DIRI Program now that it has reached its current level of maturity. However, he stated that the report overlooks the program’s process of establishing strategic objectives for the program’s work in a partner nation, developing milestones to meet those objectives, and regularly evaluating progress toward those objectives through meetings, conference calls, and sharing engagement reports with program stakeholders.

Our Response

We disagree that performance measures are necessary only once a program has reached a certain level of maturity. Program success is difficult to determine without defined performance measures. Even though DIRI Program officials may have developed strategic goals for a particular partner nation or a particular engagement, program officials did not have metrics to determine whether those strategic goals were met. Lastly, DIRI Program officials received approximately $20.2 million for 175 partner nation engagements in 17 partner nations. In the current fiscal environment, program
officials need to account for program results through defined performance measures so that both the taxpayers and Congress have assurance that those funds were efficiently and effectively spent.

**Comments on Coordination with Other Security Cooperation Programs**

The DASD PSO provided general comments on the difference between the DIRI Program and the Regional Centers as well as the coordination between and among security cooperation programs. Specifically, he stated that the Regional Centers covered a broader range of topics than the DIRI Program and offered academic programs that introduced countries to a range of defense concepts. He also stated that the DIRI Program provided persistent, periodic contact to cover topics more broadly. The DASD PSO stated that the DIRI Program and the Regional Centers actively collaborated to avoid duplication and engaged in complementary activities with a partner nation when the right conditions existed. Finally, he stated that the DIRI Program’s relationship and outreach to other security cooperation activities are addressed through a number of ways like the Global Center for Security Cooperation’s consortium, periodic telephone conferences or meetings with other programs, and coordination with the appropriate U.S. Embassy country team, among other means.

**Our Response**

We agree that the Regional Centers and the DIRI Program used different DIB methods. However, CCMR program personnel identified challenges in working with some of the Regional Centers because the Regional Centers believed that the DIRI Program’s mission to build the institutional capacity of partner nations was part of their mission. In addition, DSCA program personnel stated that the absence of formal policy resulted in friction among the DIB programs. As stated in the finding, without DIB policy that distinguished the DIB roles of the DIRI Program and the Regional Centers or any other office or command conducting DIB-related efforts, a potential for duplication and inefficiency existed.

**Comments on DIRI Program Officials Wanting Flexibility**

The Director, CCMR, provided general comments regarding DIRI Program guidance provided by DASD PSO program officials and the flexibility needed by DIRI Program officials at the outset of the program. Specifically, he stated that DASD PSO provided well-defined program policy to the DIRI Program Manager. He also stated that if detailed implementation guidance based on the WIF Program had been issued, CCMR program officials would not have been able to meet its mandate of developing a DIB approach that was suitable for countries that are not part of the Partnership for Peace.

**Our Response**

As previously stated, the informal verbal and written guidance provided by DASD PSO program officials to guide the DIRI Program to date was not sufficient to define the program’s mission and goals, strategy, or performance measures. As we previously discussed in the finding, we understand that while DASD PSO program officials intended
to use the DIB process and methodology developed under the WIF Program for the DIRI Program, that DIB process and methodology was not applicable to DIRI Program partner nations for the reasons stated by the Director.

**Comments on Tracking Engagements**

The Director, CCMR, stated that CCMR program officials tracked engagements for fiscal and programmatic purposes since it assumed management of the program from the Global Center for Security Cooperation in FY 2010.

**Our Response**

CCMR program officials could not provide a complete list of DIRI Program engagements and according to a CCMR program official, did not begin formally tracking whether DIRI Program engagements occurred until March 2012. With regard to the DIRI Program budget, according to a DSCA official, CCMR program officials could not reconcile their costs, and as a result, the program’s spending reports did not identify the specific amounts spent for contractors, travel, or lodging. In addition, a CCMR program official responsible for tracking program funding stated that she did not track costs by engagement, but that CCMR took actions in FY 2012 to begin tracking costs by engagement at the request of DSCA.

**Comments on DIRI Program Documentation**

The Director, CCMR, provided general comments on DIRI Program engagement documentation as well as the documentation of lessons learned. Specifically, he stated that engagement reports existed for all 175 DIRI Program engagements, and therefore, a complete record of the program’s accomplishments existed. He also stated that only 14 engagements lacked event plans. Lastly, he stated that no formal procedure required the approval of engagement reports or event plans; therefore, that approval was not a relevant measure of their program management.

With regard to the documentation of lessons learned, the Director stated that the DIRI Program has a central repository for program documentation that captures lessons learned from individual engagements. However, the Director stated that changes in how program documentation was stored and the rotation of program personnel resulted in some gaps in the historic documentation kept in that central repository. He stated that those gaps are being addressed as a result of our audit. He also stated that CCMR program officials were undertaking an effort to create a more formal collection of DIB lessons learned to share them with the broader DoD community through a centralized website.

**Our Response**

We agree that a record of the program’s accomplishments exist as CCMR program officials provided engagement reports for 174 of the 175 engagements that we reviewed. We revised the report to reflect the Director’s comments. As stated in the finding and shown in Appendix B, we found that engagement reports existed for 174 engagements, but that 24 engagements lacked event plans. With regard to the DIRI Program’s central documentation repository, we acknowledge that the DIRI Program has a shared document
file in which program documentation can be loaded. However, 73 additional documents provided by the DIRI Program Manager at CCMR were not stored in this location. As stated in Appendix A, DIRI Program personnel took over 4 months to locate and provide that documentation. Therefore, we disagree that the central repository was always used as it was intended. Without a central repository of program documentation, program personnel would experience difficulties learning from one another’s successes or failures. We commend CCMR program personnel’s effort to create a more formal collection of DIB lessons learned to share them with the broader DoD community, and we revised the finding to reflect this effort.

Lastly, the DIRI Program Manager provided us with a DIRI Reporting Timeline, which she stated served as the program’s operating procedures. The Reporting Timeline indicated that the DIRI Program Chief of Staff was to approve program documentation. However, we generally could not find proof of such approval of DIRI Program documentation. In fact, we found that sometimes CCMR program personnel provided multiple versions of each document, and it was not possible to determine which documents were the final, approved versions. Documentation accessibility is a control activity that can help program management ensure its program meets its objectives. Program personnel or other interested parties with access to the program documentation would not be able to determine whether a document was the final, approved version and rely upon that document without evidence of review and approval.

Comments on Overlapping Mission Requirements

The Director, CCMR, stated that the parameters defined in the memorandum that established the FY 2009 DIRI Program Pilot no longer applied to the DIRI Program once the DASD PSO transferred its management to CCMR. He explained that the DIRI Program cannot operate in accordance with the Regional Centers’ mission and authority because it is funded with Title 10, Operations and Maintenance funding. Furthermore, he stated that the DIRI Program is prohibited from engaging in education and training. The Director explained that the DIRI Program’s mission is to engage in a sustained fashion with partner nation personnel to facilitate concrete changes in the way that ministry operates. By contrast, he stated the Regional Centers fund educational programs.

Our Response

We recognize that the funding provided for the FY 2009 DIRI Program pilot was different from the funding CCMR received to execute the current DIRI Program. We also recognize that the means of conducting DIB is distinct for each program. However, aspects of the DIB mission can overlap across security cooperation activities, and without defined DIB roles and responsibilities and procedures that require coordination among security cooperation activities, the potential for duplication and inefficiency exist.
Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

1. We recommend the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy issue guidance that:

   a. Defines the Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program’s mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures.

   b. Defines defense institution building roles and responsibilities.

   c. Implements procedures that require the coordination of the defense institution building program’s mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures with other security cooperation activities.

DASD PSO Comments

The DASD PSO partially agreed with Recommendations 1.a and 1.b. He stated that his office, CCMR, and DSCA were working on a DoD Instruction for DIB that will address the matters addressed by both of these recommendations. He agreed that DIRI Program performance measures were not fully developed and stated that the program was now mature and needed performance measures over the next year. The DASD PSO stated that when the performance measures are completed, his office will work with DSCA to publish those measures as guidance to CCMR and distribute them to Combatant Commands, USD(P) regional offices, and U.S. Embassy country teams.

The DASD PSO, also partially agreed with Recommendation 1.c. He stated that DIB activities were already coordinated by the Global Center for Security Cooperation’s consortium, calendar, and periodic reports. He stated that direct coordination occurs between and among DIB-related programs. He reiterated that his office, CCMR, and DSCA program officials are working on a DoD Instruction for DIB that will fully address coordination challenges when it is issued.

Our Response

Although the DASD PSO partially agreed with the recommendations, we consider his comments only partially responsive. While the DASD PSO intends to issue a DoD Instruction, his comments were unclear as to whether the Instruction will require security cooperation activities to coordinate their DIB-related efforts. We request that the DASD PSO provide comments to the final report to specifically address how the DoD Instruction will address coordination challenges. The DASD PSO should also indicate when he plans to issue the DoD Instruction.

2. We recommend the Director, Center for Civil-Military Relations, develop and implement procedures to document all individual Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program efforts, provide evidence of review and approval of those documents, and establish a clear tracking method for each effort.
**CCMR Comments**

The Director, CCMR, agreed with the recommendation with comment. The Director stated that procedures that require the documentation of program efforts, with the exception of some event plans, already existed and were fully implemented. He stated that procedures are being developed to require the review of program documents by appropriate program authorities and those documents will be saved as Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) files. Lastly, the Director stated that DIRI program officials were already tracking each DIRI Program engagement.

**Our Response**

Although the Director, CCMR, agreed with the recommendation, we consider his comments to be nonresponsive because CCMR program personnel have not fully established and implemented procedures that require all DIRI Program efforts be documented and stored in a central location. As detailed by the finding and our responses to the Director’s comments on the finding, not all of the program documentation we reviewed was stored in a central location. As previously discussed, DIRI Program personnel took over 4 months to locate and provide all of the program documentation we requested. Therefore, we disagree that the central repository was always used as it was intended. We also disagree that CCMR program personnel tracked what DIRI Program engagements occurred as they could not provide a list of the DIRI Program engagements that occurred since the inception of the program.

We request that the Director provide additional comments to the final report specifying the procedures he plans to implement to ensure all DIRI Program efforts are documented and maintained in a central location. The Director should also specify when he plans to implement those procedures.
Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 through September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Our objective was to determine the effectiveness of the DIRI process regarding identifying and sustaining defense capabilities of its partner nations. Specifically, we were to determine whether the DIRI process effectively supports partner nations through country coordination, requirements determination, and program management. As detailed by the finding, DASD PSO program officials had an insufficient basis on which to determine the program’s effectiveness. As such, we determined whether the DIRI Program published information was sufficient to define the program’s mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures and whether defense institution building policy or procedures existed. We also determined whether CCMR program officials maintained sufficient DIRI Program documentation.

During our audit, we reviewed the GAO, “Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,” November 1999, and DoD Instruction 5025.01, “DoD Directives Program,” October 28, 2007 (updated as of July 1, 2010), to determine what constitutes policy. We also reviewed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5721.01E, “The Defense Message System and Associated Legacy Message Processing Systems,” August 13, 2010, to determine the capabilities and limitations of the system used to send the DIRI Program August 2011 organizational message.

We interviewed 15 personnel associated with the DIRI Program at the DASD PSO, DSCA, and CCMR to determine whether any DIRI Program or DIB policy or procedures existed. None of those 15 personnel identified sufficient policy or procedures that governed the DIRI Program or described its mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures.

We created a list of 175 DIRI Program engagements conducted with 17 partner nations through August 2009 and April 2012 using DIRI Program documentation provided by CCMR program officials. According to a CCMR program official, CCMR did not begin to track whether planned DIRI Program engagements occurred until March 2012. As such, we cannot attest to the completeness of the list of engagements. We reviewed the CCMR DIRI Program documentation for those 175 DIRI Program engagements to determine whether CCMR program officials maintained sufficient documentation. The documentation we reviewed included event plans, engagement reports, implementation strategies, and country information papers. We verified whether the documentation existed, as required by DASD PSO and CCMR program officials, and whether it was dated and approved. We initially requested all DIRI Program engagement documentation during our site visit to CCMR in April 2012. However, at that time, CCMR program
officials could provide only a portion of that documentation. CCMR program officials provided more documentation through May and September 2012 as they located it.


**Use of Computer-Processed Data**
We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

**Prior Coverage**
During the last 5 years, GAO and DoDIG have issued four reports related to DIB. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at [http://www.gao.gov/](http://www.gao.gov/). Unrestricted DoDIG reports can be accessed at [http://www.dodig.mil/](http://www.dodig.mil/).

**GAO**


**DoDIG**
Appendix B. DIB Entities

Figure B on the following page illustrates some of the DoD entities involved in DIB efforts, the chains of command those entities report to, and what responsibilities those entities have for DoD’s formal DIB programs. As evidenced by Figure B, DoD has several entities who conduct DIB efforts and those entities report through different chains of command. We relied on testimonial evidence provided by DASD PSO program officials to determine how the DIB programs were managed because USD(P) had not established DIB policy that defined roles and responsibilities. See Appendix A for more information on how we created Figure B.

In Figure B, programs illustrated by green boxes represent those identified by DASD PSO program officials as DIB programs. The blue boxes represent the entities involved in DIB-related efforts. The DIB-related efforts included building partner nations’ defense institution capacity. A solid black line identifies the chain of command or program management authority. A dotted line identifies policy oversight for a particular DIB program. A dashed line identifies budget execution and resource management for that DIB program or entity. The half circle with a line going through it indicates separate lines of authority. For instance, see the line that goes from DSCA to CCMR breaks or “jumps” through the line that goes from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict to DASD PSO. This indicates DSCA does not have command authority over DASD PSO.
Figure B. Several Entities Involved in Defense Institution Building Across DoD

Secretary of Defense

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

U.S. Pacific Command
U.S. European Command
U.S. Central Command
U.S. Southern Command
U.S. Africa Command

Secretary of the Navy

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Chief of Naval Operations

National Defense University

American University

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Naval Postgraduate School

ACRONYMS
ASD SO/LIC Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/ Low-Intensity Conflict
DASD PSO Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations
DIB Defense Institution Building
DIILS Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
DIBPs Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Management
DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency
MoDA Ministry of Defense Advisors
USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
WIF Warsaw Initiative Fund

Key
Program management/ command authority
Regional Centers
USD(P) Regional Offices
Geographic Combatant Commands
Involved in Defense Institution Building-Related Efforts
Defense Institution Building Programs
Provide policy oversight
Budget execution/ resource management
Separate lines of authority

1 As stated in the report, DSCA reports to the USD(P) Chief of Staff.
2 According to the DASD PSO, his office provided program management for the MoDA Program. However, according to a DASD PSO official, his office planned to delegate program management responsibilities to DSCA’s Centers Management Office in FY 2013.
3 DASD PSO officials provided overall program management for the WIF Program. According to a CCMR program official, CCMR managed DIB-related WIF activities, while the geographic Combatant Commands managed combined exercises and military-to-military activities. For this chart, we are only referring to the WIF DIB component, so we did not depict the geographic Combatant Command’s WIF program management.
Appendix C. DIRI Program Documentation

The DIRI Program used different types of documentation to plan, execute, and report on DIRI Program partner nation engagements. While conducting our audit, we determined whether CCMR program officials prepared an implementation strategy to guide the program’s efforts for each partner nation, and whether they consistently prepared event plans and reports for each engagement.

Implementation Strategies

The DIRI Program Manager at CCMR and a CCMR program official stated an implementation strategy should identify how CCMR program officials planned to achieve the mutual objectives of the U.S. and its partner nation. Also, according to the DIRI Program Manager at CCMR, the implementation strategy generally should be prepared after the first few engagements with a partner nation. During our review, we found CCMR program officials did not consistently prepare implementation strategies by the third engagement. Sometimes, they did not prepare one at all, or the implementation strategy was not dated, so we could not determine whether it was prepared in a timely manner.

Event Plans and Engagement Reports

According to the DIRI Reporting Timeline, before an engagement with a partner nation, CCMR program officials would prepare an event plan, which should identify the engagement’s objectives and deliverables. After the engagement was complete, CCMR program officials were supposed to prepare a 1- to 2-page engagement report, which detailed that engagement’s activities and accomplishments.* We found CCMR program officials did not consistently prepare event plans for all 175 DIRI Program engagements held in 17 partner nations. We also found CCMR program officials generally did not include an approval date and signature on event plans or engagement reports. See Table C for the results of our analysis.

In Table C, a cell shaded in green means that CCMR program officials prepared event plans or engagement reports for all of the engagements held in that partner nation. Cells shaded in yellow represent partner nations for which CCMR program officials prepared event plans or engagement reports for at least half of the engagements held. Cells shaded in red represent partner nations for which CCMR program officials prepared event plans or engagement reports for fewer than half of the engagements held. With regard to the Dated and Approved columns, if CCMR program officials did not have an event plan or engagement report for a particular engagement as illustrated by the Documented columns, we did not count that missing event plan or engagement report again in the Dated and Approved column.

* According to a CCMR program official, DIRI Program country information papers were an important supplement to the engagement reports. She stated a country information paper provided a “big picture” perspective on the country projects, the overarching strategic objectives the projects contribute to, the specific project objectives, and key milestones and accomplishments.
### Table C. CCMR Program Officials Did Not Consistently Prepare Engagement Documentation

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<th>Partner Nation</th>
<th>Total PartnerNation Engagements</th>
<th>Number of Engagements Without</th>
<th>Event Plan</th>
<th>Engagement Report</th>
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<td>Documented</td>
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</tbody>
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Note: We assigned a generic letter of the alphabet to each partner nation for anonymity.

*Partner nation F had an event plan that was approved but not dated. Partner nations D and G each had an approved engagement report that was not dated.

Source: CCMR
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT AND SOUTHWEST ASIA OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to Draft Audit Report, "Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program Elements Need to Be Defined" (Project No. D2012-000092.000)

This memorandum responds to your request for review and comment on the findings and recommendations contained in the subject report. Overall, this report will be very useful as my office, in tandem with CCMR and DSCA, seeks to strengthen the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) program in furtherance of our Department's security cooperation goals with foreign partners. In this regard, several observations are worth highlighting on the report's findings and recommendations, and here below I will address those directly pertaining to the work of my DIRI team in our office for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (ODASD/PSO).

As the report indicates, the DIRI program is still in its early phases. Launched in the second quarter of 2010, DIRI's overarching goal is to assist partners' defense ministries in strengthening their institutional competencies in key functional areas such as planning, programming, budgeting, logistics and personnel management. The program's strategy is to utilize the expertise of leading American subject matter experts within a strategically-targeted, efficiently-managed program that helps key partners on mutually-agreed capacity-building priorities.

Demand for the program has been higher than we initially estimated - currently nineteen countries in addition to the (nine) partners that already receive support under the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) - resulting in a rapid response tempo for our program staff at CCMR, DSCA and this office. We have been able to respond to that demand because DIRI's mission, goals, and strategy are in fact clearly articulated, utilizing a range of notable and established methods: a cable that describes DIRI and its processes available through the Department's automated message handling system (AMHS); a Defense Institution Building conference and follow-on workshops that showcased DIRI and that was attended by an extensive community of interest; a fact sheet that has been widely used; and briefing slides for a wide range of audiences. We agree that distribution of this information should always be targeted as broadly as possible.

We agree that performance measures for DIRI are yet to be fully developed, and we believe that the program is now sufficiently mature to necessitate this step. That said, the report's statement that officials could not account for program results overlooks the current process of...
establishing strategic objectives for DIRI’s work in a country, developing milestones to meet these objectives, and regularly evaluating progress toward these milestones and objectives through teleconferences, conference calls and the sharing of event reports with stakeholders including but not limited to: OSD/PSO, CCMR, OSD regional offices, Joint Staff, Combattant Commands and U.S. Embassy Country Teams.

The Regional Centers offer academic programs with courses of one to five days that introduce countries to a range of defense concepts. Regional Centers cover a broader range of topics than DIRI, while the latter provides a persistent, periodic mid-to-mid contact to more broadly cover specific topics. DIRI’s ability to collaborate to duplicate and engage in complementary activities with a partner country when the right conditions exist.

As we and partner offices work to meet a strong demand for DIRI, I’d like to stress that the program’s relationship and outreach to other security cooperation activities are addressed in a number of ways. The most notable means include joining the Global Center for Security Cooperation’s consortium; regular exchanges with other program areas that address activities with a partner country; periodic telephone conferences or meetings with programs, as needed; and using the U.S. Embassy country team in a partner country for more specific and immediate coordination and synchronization.

To summarize, the audit report’s central conclusions and our responses are as follows:

**Recommendation 1a and 1b, Page 12, states:**
“We recommend the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy issue guidance that: (a) Defines the Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program’s mission and goals, strategy, and performance measures. (b) Defines defense institution building roles and responsibilities.

**PSO Response 1a and 1b:**
Partially concurs. ODASA (PSO), CCMR, and DSCA are working on a Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) for defense institution building that will address these matters when it is issued. We agree that performance measures for DIRI are yet to be fully developed, and we believe that the program is now sufficiently mature to accomplish this step over the next year. When completed, we will work with DSCA to publish these measures as guidance to CCMR and distribute them to Combattant Commands, OSD Policy regional offices, and embassy country teams.

**Recommendation 1c, Page 12, states:**
“Implements procedures that require the coordination of the defense institution building program’s mission and goals, program strategy, and performance measures with other security cooperation activities.”

**PSO Response 1c:**
Partially concur. Defense institution building activities are already coordinated through several means: the Global Center for Security Cooperation (GCSC) facilitates
coordination through the consortium, calendar, and periodic reports; direct coordination occurs between and among DIB-related programs, both at the program management level, and with the help of country teams in partner countries. As noted above, ODASD (PSO), CCMR, and DSCA are working on a Department of Defense Instruction (DDI) for defense institution building that will fully address coordination challenges when it is issued.

Again, we appreciate this opportunity to comment on your report.

James A. Schear
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations.
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT AND SOUTHWEST ASIA OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to Draft Audit Report, “Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program Elements Need to Be Defined” (Project No. D2012-D0001A-0092.000)

This memorandum responds to the findings and recommendations of the subject report that pertain directly to the Director of the Center for Civil-Military Relations. We appreciate the opportunity to respond.

FINDINGS.

With respect to the report’s findings regarding CCMR’s management of the DIRI Program, we provide the following specific responses:

Tracking Engagements (Findings, p. 5; p. 8)
The report notes that CCMR did not begin to track whether engagements were held until March 2012, and, as a result, draws the overall conclusion that “CCMR program officials did not adequately implement procedures to establish a clear tracking process for DIRI program engagements.”

Disagree. CCMR has tracked engagements for fiscal and programmatic purposes since it assumed management of the program from the Global Center for Security Cooperation in FY10.

Documenting Engagement Accomplishments (Findings, p. 5)
The report finds that “Because CCMR program officials did not adequately implement tracking and documentation procedures, a complete record of what was accomplished during DIRI Program engagements … did not exist.”

Disagree. As the IG report indicates, Engagement Reports were filed for the 175 engagements held. Therefore, there is no basis for the assertion that there was not “a complete record of what was accomplished during DIRI Program engagements.”

• The detailed Engagement Reports provide background on the project (including previous accomplishments); describe trip purpose/objectives; provide a narrative of the engagement; list deliverables and outcomes; and highlight next steps.
They also include Annexes that capture the key products -- e.g., diagnoses of institutional shortcomings; draft policy documents; analyses of key management issues; re-crafted ministry procedures -- produced by the Partner Nation working group.

Documenting Lessons Learned (Findings, p. 8)
The report notes that “The DIRI Program Manager at CCMR stated there were no plans to establish a central location for DIRI program historic files containing lessons-learned.”

Disagree. DIRI has a central repository for Engagement Reports and other program documents, including internal after-action reporting documents that capture lessons learned from individual engagements. The DIRI PM did downplay the importance of lessons learned as stated in “historic files” (i.e., those garnered after a single event) in favor of lessons learned by systematically reflecting on patterns across engagements and by reviewing the effectiveness of program processes. (The emphasis of the DIRI program to date has been on converting these “lessons observed” into “lessons learned” by revising program procedures appropriately.)

In addition, we are currently undertaking the creation of a more formal collection of good practices/lessons learned for defense institution building in order to share them with the broader DoD community through a centralized website and defense institution building (DIB) training and education opportunities.

Procedures Needed to Consistently Document DIRI Program Efforts (Findings, p. 8)
The report indicates that “…although CCMR program officials made an effort to document DIRI program engagements, the documentation available for the 175 DIRI Program engagements held between August 2009 and April 2012 was incomplete and disorganized.” The report notes 24 of 175 Event Plans were missing and that 149 (of 151) event plans and 173 (of 175) engagement reports lacked indications of formal approval.

Partially agree. Changes in the platforms for these repositories and rotation of program personnel have resulted in some gaps in the historic documentation residing there. This is being addressed as a result of the IG audit so that a complete historical record will always be available. However, our count indicates that only 14 of 175 Event Plans were missing. Additionally, since there was no formal procedure required or established for documenting the approval of reports and event plans, this statistic is not a relevant measure of current program management.

DIRI Program Officials Wanted Flexibility (Findings, p. 9)
The report notes that “The DIRI Program Manager at CCMR stated they wanted flexibility in executing the DIRI Program with partner nations. The DIRI Program Manager at CCMR stated that when the DIRI Program began, DIRI Program policy would have restricted its execution because program officials did not yet know what the best approach would be.”
Disagree. This portion of the text does not represent the CCMR’s understanding of the substance and context of this discussion:

- The DIRI PM had well-defined program policy from OSD-PSO to guide program development from the beginning. As the report notes later in the same paragraph, the type of broad programmatic guidelines provided in formal program policy documents would still give DIRI the flexibility needed to determine what the best program approach should be.

- The comment on flexibility was made in the context of a discussion about the challenges DIRI program management faced early on in developing an approach to defense institution building that would be appropriate for the wide range of countries and different regional contexts in which DIRI would be working. This challenge was illustrated by highlighting the differences between conducting DIB in Partnership for Peace countries -- the only region of the world where the U.S. government had significant experience in DIB -- and in other regions. If detailed implementation guidance had been issued to DIRI based on the methodology used by the WIF-DIB program, DIRI would have been unable to carry out its mandate to devise an approach for DIB suitable for the rest of the world.

Overlapping Mission Requirements (Findings, p. 9,11)
The report notes: “...the memorandum that established the FY 2009 DIRI Program Pilot stated that the funds expended for the pilot should be consistent with the mission and authority of the Regional Centers” (p. 11).

Disagree. This section of the report inaccurately describes the mission and authorities attached to DIRI funding by stating that the parameters defined in DIRI’s foundational memo continue to apply to the program. This is not the case. Since the program’s transfer to CCMR in FY2010, DIRI has been funded with Title 10 O&M funds, which do not require -- or even allow -- DIRI to operate in accord with “the mission and authority of the Regional Centers.”

- DIRI’s Title 10 funds are for military-military (including Ministry of Defense) exchanges; DIRI is prohibited from engaging in education or training. Instead, DIRI’s mission is to engage in a sustained fashion with Partner Nation personnel to facilitate concrete changes in the way that ministry and related institutions perform their core functions of organizing, training, equipping and sustaining the armed forces.
- Regional Center monies, in contrast, fund educational programs. As the report notes, the CHDS mission is to: “Develop and present academic programs tailored for the requirements of Latin American and Caribbean states...” (p. 11).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 2. “We recommend the Director, Center for Civil-Military Relations, develop and implement procedures to document all individual Defense Institution Reform

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Initiative Program efforts, provide evidence of review and approval of those documents, and establish a clear tracking method for each effort.”

Our response will address each clause of this recommendation separately:

* develop and implement procedures to document all individual Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program efforts;

Agree. As noted in our response to the Findings above, procedures were already developed to document program efforts and -- with the partial (and very limited) exception of some Event Plans -- these have been fully implemented. Two central locations exist for program procedures and documents -- an internal share drive accessible to the administrative team and a password-protected website accessible by all other DIRI personnel. This dual system facilitates data security, granted the sensitivity of some material as well as the information security and classification conventions of DIRI’s partners and interlocutors, as well as technological issues of accessibility and security that can arise especially with users working overseas.

* provide evidence of review and approval of those documents;

Agree. Procedures are being developed to review program documents by appropriate program authorities, and documents will be saved as .pdf files to record formally this process.

* establish a clear tracking method for each effort.

Agree. As noted above, DIRI program officials were already tracking each DIRI program event. The existing seven-step DIRI Reporting Timeline (updated in 2011 and currently being revised) serves as the basis for standardizing engagement-related communications between project teams and DIRI program officials at CCMR and OSD-PSO. Templates for each of these documents are centrally available to country project leads, including spaces for deliverables (event plan and trip report), outcomes (trip report), and next steps (trip report). Lessons observed/learned and measures of effectiveness are captured in an internal document with a much more limited distribution in the interest of candid assessment.

Again, we appreciate this opportunity to comment on your report.

Richard D. Hoffman
Director
Center for Civil-Military Relations