Multi-Organizational Collaborative Public Safety and Security Planning for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games

Seminar Presentation at Kangwon National University, Chuncheon, Republic of Korea 9 November 2012

Susan McIntyre, Knowledge Management, and Kate Kaminska, PhD, Operational Research Defence Research and Development Canada – Centre for Security Science, Ottawa, Ontario Canada K1A 0K2

Abstract

Security planning for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Games involved a complex series of interrelationships between federal, provincial, and municipal governments as well as with the Vancouver Organizing Committee and private sector partners. Situated on the coast of British Columbia, the Games venues were located in multiple jurisdictions and within a complex environment. Security operations required the collaboration of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Forces, local police services, Emergency Management British Columbia, and many other public safety and security organizations. In planning, these partners prepared for accidental, malicious or natural threats and risks, including terrorist acts, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive hazards, crowd safety issues, health-related events, critical infrastructure failure, and natural disasters.

An after event review initially set out to study five main critical issues for whole-of-government collaborative planning and operations: clarity of organizational mandates, information sharing practices, critical infrastructure protection, governance (or command and control) and knowledge transfer from previous or towards future similar events. During the review, other critical topics emerged, many of which have since been identified in similar multi-organizational studies. These included challenges and successes in areas such as: integrated planning and exercising; information sharing; full spectrum public safety and security planning; and the role of culture and personalities.

The security planning and operations experience provided a tremendous opportunity for Canadian organizations to build on existing plans, processes and relationships. More significantly, it brought the preparedness level of the country and awareness of multi-organizational cooperative postures to a higher level. This paper outlines factors which contributed to establishing those cooperative relationships for successful public safety and security preparedness.
Introduction: The Problem Space

There is an aphorism in the Olympic security community: "All Olympics are different. All Olympics are the same." Bellavita (2007)

In the lead-up to the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (V2010), it had become evident that the security environment had changed drastically since Canada had last hosted the Games in Calgary in 1988. North America was still feeling the security shift as a result of 9/11, the anthrax attacks, and the war in Afghanistan. Canadians and their public safety and security officials were also very aware, from experience, of the impact that natural phenomena such as severe fires and storms could have on communities and infrastructure. New risks had also emerged since the last Games in the form of cyber threats and aging critical infrastructure.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), with its mandated responsibility for the protection of Internationally Protected Persons\(^1\) and its role as the provincial police force in British Columbia and in many of the local municipalities, was assigned as the lead agency for security planning and operations for the Games. By 2007, the complexity of the task and the implications for federal, provincial, and municipal governments was becoming increasingly obvious. In the same year as the Olympics, Canada was also slated to host the Group of Eight (G8) meeting and many of the same federal departments and agencies would also be implicated in the security planning for that event. (This was to be further complicated later in the planning when the G20 meeting in Toronto was added to the timetable.) As a result, the Canadian federal government created the Office of the Coordinator for 2010 Olympics and G8 Security (OCS) to coordinate and support the federal efforts in security planning and operations for the events of 2010.

The creation of the OCS was premised on a whole-of-government approach which generally denotes "public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues. Approaches can be formal and informal. They can focus on policy development, program management and service delivery."\(^2\) This was not the first time for a Canadian whole-of-government approach to managing an event or addressing a complex problem; in fact, at the same time, there were coordinated efforts by many of the same players on Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan. This was, however, a unique situation in domestic security planning and operations, where the sheer numbers of partners and individuals had not been encountered previously.


While the focus of the OCS was on coordinating the federal community, the need for both it and the federal partners to collaborate with provincial, municipal and private sector partners was recognized from the beginning. While planning and operations of this magnitude posed great challenges for coordination across jurisdictions, it also presented great opportunities for Canada to elevate its public safety and security posture and readiness to a higher level.

The V2010 security planning and operations experience provided the opportunity to identify critical issues in federal, inter-agency coordination and to identify lessons and best practices that might be applied to future, similar events in Canada or elsewhere. The OCS Coordinator, Mr. Ward Elcock, engaged Defence Research and Development Canada – Centre for Security Science to conduct an after event review to examine the issues facing the collective planning, rather than individual partners who individually were responsible for their own lessons learned processes. The after event review process looked at the issues, relationships and dynamics at the “seams”, i.e., the interface between the federal departments and agencies and other governmental or non-governmental organizations as they pertained specifically to the V2010 security planning and operations. The process was designed based on a lessons learned approach and employed operational research methodologies.

**Context**

The beautiful physical setting that Vancouver and Whistler provided for the V2010 Winter Games also presented a complex operational security environment. Located on the coast and just north of the US border, waterways were managed in various ways by multiple government agencies. The venues in the mountains were backed by miles of open and unsecured territory and, in the urban areas there were many municipalities which were implicated in hosting venues or backing up public safety and security personnel in other jurisdictions. In fact, police services across the country contributed thousands of personnel to support local forces during the Games. This context was further complicated by the involvement of federal departments and agencies, which are administered from Canada’s capital, Ottawa, thousands of miles to the east.

The security planning and operations process began in 2003 with the signing of a Multiparty Agreement between the federal government of Canada, the provincial government of British Columbia, the Vancouver Resort Municipality of Whistler, Canadian Olympic Committee, Canadian Paralympic Committee and the V2010 Bid Corporation Canada. With that agreement, the RCMP was tasked with establishing an integrated police planning group. The resulting Integrated Security Unit (ISU) included initial representation from the RCMP, the Canadian Forces, Vancouver Police Department and the West Vancouver Police
Department. This was eventually bolstered with the inclusion of Integrated Public Safety Unit with members from Emergency Management British Columbia, Public Safety Canada, Defence Research and Development Canada scientific advisors and other key players.

The original budgets for the cost of security planning and operations were based on the bid budget of $175 million CDN, which was to be split between the federal Canadian and provincial British Columbia governments. It soon became obvious that the true scope of security planning was underestimated and that the budget would have to be increased on the federal side to support its multiple roles. The final federal budget for this role was approximately $900 million CDN.

Heritage Canada was the federal department responsible for V2010 from a cultural and sporting event perspective. Initially, its planning structure had included the security aspect, but by 2007, when the magnitude of this task became obvious, the governance and execution was given to the RCMP, as a lead agency, and the OCS, as federal coordinator. Because the Canadian government is based on the Westminster model, which ensures that individual departments and agencies are solely accountable for their budgets and mandates, no one entity was “in charge” of all aspects of security planning and operations. This required a governance process based on consultation and consensus. Both Heritage Canada and the OCS created committee structures that engaged broadly across stakeholder groups to obtain the required cooperation and collective decisions.

For the security partners the operational mission had been articulated by the ISU as safe and secure games through an integrated security model and one which was understood to be “invisible,” i.e., the focus would be on keeping V2010 as an international sporting event, rather than a security event. The partners shared the ISU security vision of ensuring the best winter games ever as partners in safety, peace and celebration. Therefore, in retrospect, it seemed that the indicators for mission success included:

1. The existence of a safe and secure environment for the sporting events, celebrations, and participants;
2. Instilled confidence in Canada’s ability to safely host the V2010 Winter Games; and
3. The national capability to mobilize resources to protect and sustain.

If comments such as those written by Brian Williams, a prominent US journalist, are an indicator, the mission was a success. After he departed, Williams thanked Canada “for securing this massive event without choking security” (2010). Certainly the Games went off without any significant incidents and small episodes were managed effectively and efficiently without escalation.
After Event Review Methodology

Such apparent success does not come without significant planning and preparation. The after event review set out to determine which practices contributed to success and which actions in coordinated security planning could be improved in the future. It is important to note that the after event review was not an evaluation, which is a process that employs a professional body of knowledge and tends to assess mission success, financial management practices, value for money and other factors. The lessons learned approach is more concerned about analyzing actions and their cause and effects for organizational learning and improvement. A lesson is “learned” when change has been institutionalized. For this to occur, the following steps must transpire:

1. Actions and their effects are observed and data is collected;
2. Observations are analyzed to determine the basic causes, impacts and potential remedial actions;
3. Corrective actions or preferred practices are endorsed by change authorities;
4. Change recommendations are implemented and monitored;
5. Changes and their effectiveness are assessed and validated; and
6. The changes are disseminated through publication or other means. (JALLC, 2011)

The after event review was designed to ensure that the first stages of the lessons learned process were performed robustly enough to allow decision makers to rely on evidence-based conclusions for future decision making. In the initial scoping stage of the after event review process, it was determined that the key whole-of-government issues that had emerged during the planning phase were: command, control and communications (C3); mandate boundaries; knowledge transfer practices; critical infrastructure protection; and sensitive information sharing.

As a result, the research team began with five preliminary questions:

Based on the strategic and operational experience gained from V2010:

1. What C3 structure is required for federal whole-of-government major event public safety and security planning and operations?
2. How do existing federal government mandates enable or hinder the whole-of-government public safety and security approach?
3. How has individual and organization learning occurred during the planning phase of V2010 and how has it been captured to improve effectiveness for future major events?
4. What mechanisms are required to assess and protect national, provincial and regional critical infrastructure during major events?

5. What mechanisms are required for the sharing of sensitive information between governments and organizations for major events planning and operations?

As the review progressed, these five research questions guided the following methodologies:

1. A review of documents from the planning period including post-exercise reports, planning documents and a review of the open literature;

2. Interviews with 41 key stakeholders who occupied positions at the strategic-operational interface during V2010 planning and operations, followed by analysis employing recognized qualitative research methods;

3. A Social Network Analysis of key individuals in planning and operations;

4. Three case studies which specifically examined situations where cooperation or collaboration across jurisdictions was important: critical infrastructure protection; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) preparedness and the Olympic Marine Operations Centre; and


The observations and results of the after event review revealed additional issues to the original five. These are discussed below.

**Observations and Findings**

During the course of the study, the following seven themes emerged:

1. The interface between security and consequence management;
2. Governance;
3. Mandates, roles and responsibilities;
4. Information sharing;
5. Criticality of exercises;
6. Integrated planning; and
7. Roles of culture and personality.

**Security/Consequence Management Interface**

The public safety model of prevent, protect, respond and recover is often illustrated as a linear spectrum with the incident located in the centre as illustrated in Figure 1 below.

³ For more detailed explanation of the methodology see McIntyre and Kaminska, 2011.

DRDC CSS SL 2012-010
Security practitioners planning for V2010, most often in the form of intelligence and law enforcement, were concerned about the “left of bang” which includes the prevention and detection of threats through intelligence gathering, community outreach, traffic and transportation management, physical and personal protection of venues and Internationally Protected Persons, accreditation, on-scene presence as deterrence to illegal or harmful activity and response to incidents.

Public safety practitioners plan for consequence management on the right side of the spectrum, which includes response, recovery and remediation. Although prevention and mitigation are of concern, they plan primarily for responding to emergencies, whether from accidental, natural, or malicious causes, and the longer term tasks of recovery and remediation. In Canada, this transition is complicated by constitutional realities: municipalities are at the front-line for response, with provinces responsible for consequence management in their own jurisdictions. Federal agencies can only assist upon request, once the level of response required is beyond the capabilities or resource-levels of the lower jurisdictions. This transition can be complicated at the interface.

During planning and operations, the transition associated with the security/safety interface manifested in a number of ways. Firstly, in situations where a major incident could be anticipated, the transition from pre-incident to consequence management can benefit from sensitive information sharing to assist the responses and recovery personnel. Operational and cultural factors can hinder this unless the agents have trusted relationships and protocols for information exchange in place. Secondly, the federal funding and exercise models were focused on security planning because of jurisdictional mandates. As a result, less attention was devoted to the planning of the aftermath.

**Governance**

The role of C3 had been identified as an issue early on. This term and specifically the abbreviated version of command and control (C2) are generally misunderstood in civilian
circles and have negative connotations. C2 is clearly defined by Alberts and Hayes (2006) as having the following characteristics: establishing intent; determining roles, responsibilities and relationships; establishing rules and constraints; allocating resources; and monitoring and assessing situations and progress. The review process employed the term “governance” rather than C3 or C2 to explore these issues, as it was more familiar to most of the organizations involved in the collaborative planning and operations.

The creation of the OCS emerged as a significant benefit to governance. While the OCS was not responsible for command or control as defined by the factors in the above C2 definition, it was successful in coordinating them with the key players. The Coordinator, being a deputy minister level appointment in the Privy Council Office, had direct access to senior officials in the federal government such as the National Security Advisor, in Public Safety Canada, the RCMP and with his colleagues around the Deputy Minister table. The Coordinator and his small, but effective team with representatives from the main security departments carried a credibility that would not have been available had the OCS been situated elsewhere in the federal family. The OCS established new or leveraged existing cross-departmental committees at various levels which proved to be generally effective. Because of its unique position, the OCS was also able to liaise with provincial, international, the Vancouver Olympic Committee, and other organizations and did so from a position of influence, rather than authority.

**Mandates, Roles and Responsibilities**

One of the observed challenges to whole-of-government or cross-jurisdictional planning that emerged as a result of V2010 was associated with issues that spanned across mandate boundaries. While initially this seemed to suggest to observers that there may have been conflicting or overlapping mandates between organizations, analysis indicated that this was not the case. Rather, the issues stemmed from limited knowledge or understanding of mandates and occasionally conflicting interpretations of what the mandates were. For example, in a situation such as a CBRNE incident, the municipalities would be the first line of response. When the resources available to them were exhausted, federal assets could be applied, but only at the request of the provincial government. Federal departments and agencies and their staff involved in planning for such a scenario would require a clear understanding of how, when and in what situations they would be involved to ensure that they not overstep their bounds.

Other clarifications were necessary between partners with respect to jurisdictions over waterways and airspace during planning scenarios. The question of, “who’s in charge?” in this complex environment would actually depend on the particulars of an incident and jurisdiction. For example, in the urban domain, the local police forces were “in charge” but

---

4 The central agency reporting directly to the Prime Minister.
within the sporting venues, within these same jurisdictions, the RCMP were “in charge.” However, some situations would span the boundary between the two.

Information Sharing

Perhaps one of the most significant issues in planning for the event, and indeed similar cross-jurisdictional or whole-of-government efforts, was that of barriers to information sharing between organizations. While technological solutions have their own challenges and costs, the most significant barriers to good information flow tend to be cultural, organizational or systemic. For example, the principle of “the need-to-know” is critical in national security where classified or sensitive information can only be shared with security cleared personnel. Federal departments and agencies have access to information that cannot be shared with personnel from other levels of government or the private sector if they do not have the appropriate clearances, even when it might be determined that they might have a need to know.

There are other justifiable limitations to sharing of information between non-traditional partners. Foreign intelligence, for example, is given to the military expressly for military purposes with the proviso that it is not passed to non-military organizations. Similarly, law enforcement agencies are concerned with the admissibility of evidence and because of this, during operations, information shared with partners for situational awareness is not shared beyond the intended use. Only the RCMP in the ISU, for example, could report security information to the Government of Canada during the Games.

Criticality of Exercises

One of the consistently positive observations was the value of the Integrated Exercise Program and its role in building mutual understanding and preparedness. The program involved a three stage approach beginning with Exercise Bronze in 2008, a tabletop exercise for the sharing and development of plans and procedures within the ISU. It was followed up by Exercise Silver in February 2009, a functional exercise at the national level, i.e., all levels of government. Finally Exercise Gold was a full scale exercise held in November 2009. These broad exercises complemented individual organizational and additional ISU exercises but also leveraged existing exercise programs across the country.

The objectives of the Integrated Exercise Program were to practice, test and confirm the operational and C2 capabilities of all national players for the mitigation of risks, prevention of incidents, preparedness for response, and if necessary, recovery. In general, the exercises were considered highly valuable in driving cross-organization and individual learning. They helped to focus efforts and build understanding, trust, and respect. More importantly, the exercises helped the partners to develop an understanding of their respective mandates, roles and responsibilities. They assisted with contingency planning.
and improving information sharing, e.g., exercises led to the co-location of security and public safety officials in the operations centres.

**Integrated Planning**

The levels of planning capability and capacity by the various organizations differed across the partners. It was common to hear the adage that the Canadian Forces planned, planned and then planned some more. Law enforcement agencies, on the other hand, have a more tactical approach to preparation, as they traditionally tend to focus on daily operations. Other organizations used V2010 as the opportunity to hone existing plans or develop new ones. In preparation for a large event such as the V2010 Winter Games, the question was asked, what was the optimal timeframe for planning? Observations indicated that detailed planning was intensified in the last two years leading up to the event.

Planning in this environment was also very complex, involving interdependencies between all levels of governments. All the partners wanted to be at the table, although there was a much smaller group of key organizations who had to drive the planning. This is also where differences in decision making models appeared; law enforcement agencies, for example, tend to have a distributed decision making model and those at the table had the authority to make decisions on behalf of their organization. In contrast, some federal departments and agencies are very centralized in decision-making and required their representatives to return to seek approval before committing to actions or resources.

Security planning for V2010 took an iterative approach as the Games neared. In this unique situation, the exercises tended to drive planning, which is not the normative situation: generally exercises are designed to confirm plans. The exercises, which provided great learning opportunities, served to make plans more robust. In general, there is often a tendency to exercise “the known” in order to demonstrate success; however organizations tend to benefit more from exercising “the unknown” and pushing their limits.

**Roles of Culture and Personality**

One of the most interesting aspects of the observations was how the difference in organizational cultures impacted the ability of participants to collaborate. Tight cultures exhibit homogeneity and have a single, strong identity. These types of organizational cultures tend to have explicit norms, standards, and stratified roles. Generally, individual self-interest is subordinated for the group. This is observed in the RCMP, which has a rich history and pride and in the Canadian Forces, which has a strong ethos and structure. Loose cultures, on the other hand are heterogeneous, flexible, individualistic, with few status or role distinctions. They tend to depend on voluntary individual actions and a commitment to the overall well-being of society, rather than to the institution itself. (Okros, 2009)
Even within “tight” cultures, there can be differences between operating and decision-making models. For example in the police culture the first on scene is in charge, independent of rank, whereas in the military culture, command is determined by rank. Similarly, there are differences between civilian (loose) and military (tight) actors in terms of terminology and protocols. A simple example would be the term, “battle rhythm” which came to be replaced by “operational rhythm” as more meaningful for all parties in a domestic security situation. The role of personality in inter-organizational relationships was also identified as a factor in successful operations in which personnel could impact the cooperation between partners based on their personal skills and attributes.

**Social Network Analysis**

A social network analysis of the main subjects and a snowball sample (i.e., secondary sample based on the information provided by the first sample) provided additional data. For the purposes of this discussion, the analysis indicated that the OCS was the most connected node in the network and that it represented the key intermediaries bridging the gap between safety and security officials. The OCS also had the closest relationship to the three main organizations in the planning and operations of the Games: the ISU, VANOC and Integrated Public Safety unit. This data indicated that the OCS provided an effective governance role for whole-of-government and inter-organizational coordination.

**Case Studies**

The three case studies provided some potential indicators of success in multi-jurisdictional security planning and operations. CBRNE preparedness is a complex, interconnected, and very technical task, even without the added pressures of a large sporting event. V2010 provided the opportunity to pull together the multiple CBRNE actors to collectively practice across jurisdictions and build capability. One of the best practices, which was developed through V2010, was the creation of “Science Town,” a deployed cluster of mobile laboratories that were available to support on-site detection and response capabilities.

Critical infrastructure protection is always a multi-faceted problem because the asset “owners” are from all levels of government and private industry, and across many sectors (e.g., power, banking telecommunications, etc.). The success factor in managing the challenges associated with critical infrastructure protection was to take a risk assessment approach to protect high-risk assets rather than deploying resources across the board as a blanket protection, as had been done by the Canadian Forces in at the Summer Games in 1972. The approach also involved groups of critical infrastructure holders working together to assess criticality and to share information. Scientific support was provided to the ISU and the Integrated Public Safety unit to provide analysis to support decision makers leading up
to and during the Games. The value of this support was so evident that once the Games were over, the province initiated a project to continue the risk-based approach to critical infrastructure protection.

The Olympic Marine Operations Centre was comprised of local, provincial, and national police forces, representatives from the Canadian and US militaries, Transport Canada, Canada Border Services Agency, and the Canadian and US Coast Guards. This operations centre was able to develop a high level of integration through a deliberate and progressive integrated planning approach. By way of a Steering Committee, a targeted exercise program, a common operating picture and standard operating procedures, it was able to address many of the overall challenges encountered in this type of joint effort. The partners, initially led by Transport Canada, engaged early and developed close interaction and communication between stakeholders and emerged as a truly collaborative best-practice example.

Lessons Identified

To be successful in a major or any event, you must go from partnership to relationship.

Senior RCMP Officer

What then were the key experiences and identified lessons that could be extrapolated to provide guidance for similar and future planning of similar multi-organizational endeavours? To facilitate linkages across multiple partners, with different mandates and roles, some of the main lessons follow.

Common Mission and Intent: Commonality and clarity of purpose is relatively easy to achieve when planning an international sporting event with international implications because people want to be involved. The mission should be clearly defined early in the planning stages and performing a mission analysis, including development of measures of success, is beneficial as it provides guidance to mission partners.

Integrated Planning: Integrated planning is absolutely essential for the success of security and safety operations. Mutual goals can best be achieved through an integrated planning process in which partners are co-located. The proximity builds trusted relationships and facilitates mutual understanding. The agencies with the prime responsibility and access to resources must lead the planning efforts, but should involve the advice and guidance of partners with the most planning knowledge and experience. A common planning framework should be developed in time to begin detailed planning approximately two years in advance. In a complex environment, such as for the Games, iterative planning will occur and should be anticipated.
Coordinating Governance Body: It is neither practical nor constitutionally possible for a single entity to be responsible for all aspects of security and safety planning and operations. The Canadian experience demonstrated that the creation of a Coordinator’s Office, with the proper skill set and representation at the federal level went a long way to ensure that federal partners worked successfully together. The OCS model was one in which leadership was demonstrated through influence, coordination, mediation, and advocacy, but it also provided a challenge function from its central location. The OCS model ensured that operations remained firmly with the responsible authorities but, was available to resolve issues between the partners where required. It is recommended that such an office is established early in the planning process and that it is given clear roles and responsibilities, which are communicated to all partners.

Develop a Mutual Understanding of Mandates, Roles and Responsibilities: Over the planning period, and as planning intensifies towards the event, personnel assigned to operations will increase and continuous education as to the respective mandates of the partners will be required. Documenting and widely circulating the respective roles and responsibilities helps to keep the mandates clear in the minds of the participants. Planning a conference for this purpose early in the planning stages can assist in alleviating any potential confusion later on. A series of focused, escalating tabletop exercises were particularly useful during V2010, in that they demonstrated, using simulated situations, where roles and responsibilities might clash and helped to establish appropriate boundaries and protocols. These also went a long way towards ensuring that all systems and processes were aligned before the actual event.

Establish Trusted Environments for Information Sharing through Co-Location: Moving from a “need-to-know” to a “need-to-share” environment means more than demanding a change in mind set or having the right technology systems in place. Time and again, experience indicates that it is shared experience that builds trusted relationships. Co-location of staff from multiple organizations, such as in operations centres, was particularly effective when coordinated through engaged planning and deliberate exercises to test the relationships and protocols. It was demonstrated that once these relationships were established, there was a willingness to share sensitive information and to develop protocols to share information during operations, within the requirements of security clearances.

Embedded Staff: One of the most effective ways of facilitating trusted relationships was by embedding staff in planning and operation cells prior to the event. In this way, relationships were developed prior to the event and there was a sense of trust when required. Embedded staff are different from liaison officers in that they bring the experience and knowledge from their parent organizations and actually report to the organization in which they are embedded. This ensures that the C2 structure remains intact while providing advice that can link organizations together in times of crisis.
**Multi-organizational Working Groups:** Co-location and embedding staff was not always necessary or possible. In these cases, inter-organizational committees and multi-organizational working groups were necessary. One successful example of this was the Government Partners Public Affairs Group led by Public Safety Canada, which met regularly through teleconference to ensure that all partners, at all levels of government kept the communications lines open to ensure that public messaging about security and safety was consistent.

**Integrated Exercises:** Successful operations would not have been possible without exercises, including those executed by individual departments and agencies and, most importantly, those involving all partners. These exercises were critical for establishing an understanding of respective partner roles and responsibilities, for C2 arrangements during crises, as well as for building trusted relationships. The exercise scenarios involved threats and risks across the spectrum, from malicious intent to natural disasters. It is essential to exercise across the full event spectrum and to include scenarios that exercise the transition from security operations to consequence management. A large-scale exercise program which involves progressively complex scenarios requires advanced planning and therefore should begin well in advance of the event. A minimum of 18 months is required to plan a large full-scale exercise and the effort often requires large teams for design and logistics. Where cross-organizational exercising is a normal business process, the execution will be easier. Of importance is: the need to exercise to failure, rather than to success; to exercise all levels to ensure transition of decision-making from the tactical, on-scene to the strategic levels; and to exercise the transitions between security response and consequence management.

**Seek Boundary Spanning Personnel:** In multi-organizational planning, there is a need to anticipate and recognize organizational cultural differences which could impact relationships and cooperation. By default, collaborative decision making model is required. It is therefore important to seek personnel who are capable of recognizing these cultural differences and are able to adapt accordingly. Ideal candidates possess credible subject expertise, while being flexible in approach and skilled at developing relationships with other organizations’ personnel. Selection of staff based on these criteria, rather than simply as representatives of their own agencies will go a long way to creating cooperative relationships.

**Knowledge Transfer:** Of the five critical issues first identified in the after event process, lessons were identified for four: C2 (or governance), mandate boundaries, information sharing and critical infrastructure protection. The one exception was the issue of how organizational learning could occur and be applied to future events, an advantage that the V2010 planners did not have from past Olympics in Canada. The partners expressed concern about how knowledge could be captured and available, but most conducted lessons learned
processes, recording them for posterity and making recommendations for organizational change to build upon the levels of preparedness achieved during the V2010 Games. One significant example was the creation of a Major Events Planning Framework by the RCMP which began by capturing planning information that could be reused for other major events.

Conclusions: Advice for Future Games Planners

Meta-organizational and inter-governmental planning, such as for a large international sporting event, is a complex undertaking that has large organizational cultural overtones. There are traditional and cultural boundaries between public safety and security sectors and between civilian, para-military organizations and the military that cannot be ignored. The Canadian experience with the V2010 Winter Games suggests that success is dependent upon integrating governance, planning and exercises to build mutual trust and understanding among key players. Building a collaborative environment also requires a clearly shared mission and boundary-spanning personnel that are able to bridge organizational cultures and adapt to the complex challenges.

The security planning and preparations for the V2010 Winter Games provided Canada with a tremendous opportunity to develop a collaborative approach, building upon the existing strengths of the partners. By February 2010, the country was at the zenith of its preparedness and Canada had reached a new level of resiliency. This new state of readiness and the collaborative relationships that were created have helped the public safety and security partners to recognize the strength in collaboration and to sustain their collective knowledge from a level not possible prior to 2007.

References


DRDC CSS SL 2012-010


Security planning for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Games involved a complex series of interrelationships between federal, provincial, and municipal governments as well as with the Vancouver Organizing Committee and private sector partners. Situated on the coast of British Columbia, the Games venues were located in multiple jurisdictions and within a complex environment. Security operations required the collaboration of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Forces, local police services, Emergency Management British Columbia, and many other public safety and security organizations. In planning, these partners prepared for accidental, malicious or natural threats and risks, including terrorist acts, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive hazards, crowd safety issues, health-related events, critical infrastructure failure, and natural disasters.

An after event review initially set out to study five main critical issues for whole-of-government collaborative planning and operations: clarity of organizational mandates, information sharing practices, critical infrastructure protection, governance (or command and control) and knowledge transfer from previous or towards future similar events. During the review, other critical topics emerged, many of which have since been identified in similar multi-organizational studies. These included challenges and successes in areas such as: integrated planning and exercising; information sharing; full spectrum public safety and security planning; and the role of culture and personalities.

The security planning and operations experience provided a tremendous opportunity for Canadian organizations to build on existing plans, processes and relationships. More significantly, it brought the preparedness level of the country and awareness of multi-organizational cooperative postures to a higher level. This paper outlines factors which contributed to establishing those cooperative relationships for successful public safety and security preparedness.
14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.) Whole-of-Government Planning; Security and Safety Planning; MECSS; Vancouver 2010 Winter Games
Security planning for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Games involved a complex series of interrelationships between
federal, provincial, and municipal governments as well as with the Vancouver Organizing Committee and private sector partners. Situated on the coast of British Columbia, the Games venues were located in multiple jurisdictions and within a complex environment. Security operations required the collaboration of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Forces, local police services, Emergency Management British Columbia, and many other public safety and security organizations. In planning, these partners prepared for accidental, malicious or natural threats and risks, including terrorist acts, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive hazards, crowd safety issues, health-related events, critical infrastructure failure, and natural disasters.

An after event review initially set out to study five main critical issues for whole-of-government collaborative planning and operations: clarity of organizational mandates, information sharing practices, critical infrastructure protection, governance (or command and control) and knowledge transfer from previous or towards future similar events. During the review, other critical topics emerged, many of which have since been identified in similar multi-organizational studies. These included challenges and successes in areas such as: integrated planning and exercising; information sharing; full spectrum public safety and security planning; and the role of culture and personalities.

The security planning and operations experience provided a tremendous opportunity for Canadian organizations to build on existing plans, processes and relationships. More significantly, it brought the preparedness level of the country and awareness of multi-organizational cooperative postures to a higher level. This paper outlines factors which contributed to establishing those cooperative relationships for successful public safety and security preparedness.

La planification de la sécurité pour les Jeux d’hiver de 2010 à Vancouver a demandé de nombreuses relations d’interdépendance complexes entre les gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux et municipaux, ainsi qu’avec le Comité d’organisation des Jeux de Vancouver et les partenaires du secteur privé. Situés sur la côte de la Colombie-Britannique, les sites des Jeux étaient positionnés dans de nombreuses juridictions et dans un environnement complexe. Alors, les opérations de sécurité ont nécessité la collaboration de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, des Forces canadiennes, des services de police locaux, de la Gestion des urgences de la Colombie-Britannique et de plusieurs autres organisations locales de sûreté et de sécurité publique. Dans le cadre de la planification, ces partenaires se sont préparés en vue de tous risques et menaces accidentelles, malveillantes ou naturelles, y compris : les actes terroristes, les dangers chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques, nucléaires ou explosifs, les questions de sûreté du public, les problèmes liés à la santé, la défaillance d’une infrastructure critique et les catastrophes naturelles.

Une analyse après événement prévoyait au départ l’étude de cinq grands enjeux essentiels pour les opérations et la planification collaborative à la grandeur du gouvernement : la clarté des mandats organisationnels, les pratiques visant l’échange d’information, la protection des infrastructures essentielles, la gouvernance (ou commandement et contrôle) et le transfert des connaissances à partir d’événements semblables passés ou en fonction d’événements futurs. Pendant l’analyse, d’autres sujets importants ont fait surface et bon nombre d’entre eux ont été relevés dans des études multiorganisationnelles similaires. Parmi ces sujets, on retrouve les difficultés et réussites liées aux domaines suivants : la planification intégrée et sa mise en œuvre; l’échange d’information; la planification de l’ensemble du spectre de la sûreté et de la sécurité; et le rôle de la culture et des personnalités.

L’expérience des opérations et de la planification de la sécurité a fourni une immense possibilité aux organisations canadiennes de s’appuyer sur des plans, des processus et des relations déjà en place. Mais surtout, cette expérience a permis d’élèver le niveau de préparation du pays et le niveau de sensibilisation aux positions de collaboration multiorganisationnelle. Le présent document énumère les facteurs qui ont contribué à l’établissement des relations de collaboration pour une préparation efficace en matière de sûreté et de sécurité.
14. **KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS** (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

Whole-of-Government Planning; Security and Safety Planning; MECSS; Vancouver 2010 Winter Games