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JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint and interagency environment.

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions:

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On the cover. Djiboutian Special Forces Captain Arayta Houmed Ebile (right), Djiboutian Special Forces unit commander, and U.S. Army Sergeant 1st Class Timothy Scally, Civil Affairs Team 4902 team sergeant, converse together during a language class held in Karabti San, Djibouti, 1 February 2012. The class is part of an ongoing program between soldiers from the Djiboutian Special Forces and Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, where participants learn and practice conversing in English, Afar and Somali. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Stephen Linch)
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Foreword

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) partnered with the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Chapter of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) in sponsoring the annual chapter essay contest. The first-place winner is recognized each year at the NDIA SO/LIC Symposium in mid-February and awarded a $1,000 cash prize. The runner-up receives $500.

The competition is open to resident and nonresident students attending Professional Military Education (PME) institutions and has produced outstanding works on special operations issues. These essays provide current insights on what our PME students see as priority national security issues affecting special operations.

Essay contestants can choose any topic related to special operations. Submissions include hard-hitting and relevant recommendations that many Special Operations Forces commanders throughout United States Special Operations Command find very useful. Some entries submitted are a synopsis of the larger research project required for graduation or an advanced degree, while others are written specifically for the essay contest. Regardless of approach, these essays add value to the individuals’ professional development, provide an outlet for expressing new ideas and points of view, and contribute to the special operations community as a whole.

JSOU is pleased to offer this selection of essays from the 2012 contest. The JSOU intent is that this compendium will benefit the reader professionally and encourage future PME students to enter the contest. Feedback is welcome, and your suggestions will be incorporated into future JSOU reports.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
JSOU President Dr. Brian Maher awards first place to Ms. Eva Shinagel, a Department of State U.S. foreign affairs officer, for the 2012 National Defense Industrial Association’s Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Chapter (NDIA SO/LIC) Essay Contest. Photo courtesy NDIA.
Hearts and Minds: Islam and Afghanistan’s Moral Center of Gravity

Eva Shinagel

Though shredded by 30 years of turmoil, a cultural and religious fabric of Islam and its defense remains central to rural Eastern Afghans’ lives—its moral center of gravity. For the Afghan government to be seen as legitimate, it needs to reflect and embody the Islamic values of its population. Coalition Force efforts to shore up the legitimacy of the government, through its supply of essential services and local security, have neglected to fully understand the basis of the critical public perceptions that remain.

Introduction

Amid counterinsurgency theory’s focus on protecting the population and providing essential services to demonstrate the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRoA) legitimacy, the international community and GIRoA have lost sight of a key element that drives and sustains Afghans’ rural populations’ hearts and minds. We—the Afghan elites of Kabul and the Coalition Forces—have assumed, through our Western, developed-nation lens, that if the government is functioning as we think a government should function (even in an Afghan-Good-Enough model), the population will perceive it as legitimate and support its activities and objectives to stabilize and secure Afghanistan. However, some of our assumptions are too secular or incorrect. Among them, we have not fully understood or addressed the core importance that religion plays in the lives of rural Afghans, especially in the Pashtun belt of Regional Command-East (RC-East) and Regional Command-South and Southwest (RC-S/RC-SW). As a result, we may have improved the

Ms. Eva Shinagel is a U.S. foreign affairs officer with the Department of State. She submitted this paper while attending the National War College, Washington, D.C., following two years serving in Regional Command-East, Afghanistan at the Provincial Reconstruction Team and brigade levels. The views expressed in this article are her own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State.
quality of peoples’ lives, but their hearts still view our objectives—and their government’s actions—with suspicion and distrust.

This research began with the hypothesis that religious leaders in rural Eastern Afghanistan represent a moral center of gravity, which, if swayed to support the government (or at least discourage passive support of the insurgency) could help to decrease the insurgency’s informal base of support and weaken their efforts. However the research indicated that it just wasn’t that straight a line. The Afghan religious community and the society as a whole are still determining the roles and responsibilities for religious leaders in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. Instead, I suggest that Islam (and its defense) is the moral center of gravity which sustains resistance of the government by a portion of the population. For the Afghan government to be seen as legitimate, it must be seen as reflecting and embodying the Islamic values of its population. This is not to say that GIRoA cannot also promote the values of modernity, but it must determine how to include and value a range of Islamic voices. So far, in the Pashtun areas, its success rate is low.

**Moral Center of Gravity**

While one could say the Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24, 2006) is all about identifying and targeting the adversary’s and a population’s “center of gravity,” the original edition uses the term less than 10 times. Instead, the term “moral center of gravity” provides a helpful simplicity for considering identity-focused, protracted popular wars such as Afghanistan.

Drawing on Clausewitz’s descriptions of “moral elements” and “will,” and clarifying that Clausewitz’s definition of “center of gravity” depends on the type of war being fought, Dr. Joseph Strange equates the public’s moral resistance with a moral center of gravity: “You can defeat an opponent’s army, destroy his industry, and occupy his land. But if the spirit of resistance still burns in the hearts of his people, you cannot claim to have won.” Along these lines, Dr. Strange characterizes moral resistance as “the will to fight and the ability to command the resources to fight.” I would amend this: the “will to fight” is not just action—through fighting per se. As the non-violent civil disobedience movements have demonstrated, the will to resist, the will to be neutral, and the will to be passive or noncompliant can be just as effective in demonstrating opposition. In the rural Afghan population, all forms of behavior are present.
When we examine Dr. Strange’s three categories of people that sustain moral resistance—a strong-willed leader, a ruling elite, or a strong-willed population—the rural, tradition-valuing Afghan population of RC-East most resembles the third: “A large grouping of people who share a common belief set that sets them in opposition to another state or grouping, and hold this belief sufficiently strongly to engage in, and sustain, conflict with the adversary.” In the case of rural Pashtun Afghanistan, the common ‘belief set’ is not the counterinsurgency-proposed Maslowian benchmarks of security or essential services. It is the influence of Islam as a faith in Afghanistan, and their adversary is anyone— institution or person, domestic or foreign—who threatens that belief set. Moral center of gravity thinking posits that while security, essential services, and responsive government may be valued or desired by a community, if those ‘public goods’ undermine or conflict with core values, the core values will win.

**The Role of Islam in Afghan Rural Society**

Islam shapes the warp and weft of Afghan lives. It is commonly estimated that 99 percent of the population is Muslim, roughly divided with 80 percent Sunni, 19 percent Shia, and 1 percent other. While its practice and level of piety vary throughout the country, the presence of the five pillars of Islam shapes the patterns and texture of thinking and action. This is especially true in Pashtun-dominated rural areas of RC-East and RC-S where the five-times daily prayers are a time to trade gossip in these extremely illiterate, media-deficient communities and where Jummah prayers (Friday prayers) include a sermon by the local mullah (religious leader). Religion has previously served as a basis for reinforcing the Afghan government’s efforts to rout foreign forces such as the British in the 19th century and to consolidate power as in the 1970s. The ulema shura (religious community) played the role of the “balancer” providing religious legitimacy to the ruler.

Afghanistan’s religious civil society historically served a number of community-based functions that were central to the functioning of people’s lives. Local mullahs were moral and spiritual guides conducting daily prayers, rites of passage, and their status and sustenance depended on their relationship to their local community. The mosque was the central institution of local life and served religious and social functions. Within this tradition and in Pashtun areas greatly influenced by Pashtunwali, collective decision-making by
jirga formed the basis of a representative system. Presided by tribal elders and community members of significance (including mullahs), dissenting voices could be raised, and the community would agree to abide by the decision of the group. The initial welcome of the Taliban in 1994 reflected a popular desire for order and greater morality following the violent political infighting among the Mujahadeen and the departure of the Soviet Union. The jihad against the Soviet Union was perceived as an honorable and justifiable effort against the godless infidel whose efforts were perceived as an effort to wipe out Islam. Following the politicization of Islam and religious leaders under the Taliban, trust of mullahs fell and the role of the national ulema shura decreased. 10

While polls have not specifically measured the role of Islam in people’s lives, some results can be taken as indicators of attitudes that grow from core beliefs about Islam. Recent polls show that the Islamic values of the Taliban still resonate with regional portions of the population—specifically in the South and East. A 2010 Asia Foundation poll showed that in Afghanistan’s rural east, a kind of passive support exists where 49 percent of Pashtuns interviewed expressed “sympathy” for the armed opposition groups with 31 percent of those respondents saying it is because the insurgents are Afghans and 26 percent because the insurgents are Muslims. 11 These were the highest “sympathy” ratings among all the ethnic groups in the study. Yet, among those sympathetic Pashtun, only 5 percent supported the insurgents’ opposition to the government indicating a sense of identity but not of goals.

Unfortunately, foreigners’ behaviors are viewed more negatively in the East and South and reinforce fear and distrust about our intentions toward their faith and their nation. In a 2010 International Council on Security and Development study focusing on the Pashtun south, 40 percent of the respondents believed that foreigners are in Afghanistan to destroy it, occupy it, or damage Islam; 72 percent viewed foreigners as disrespectful of Islamic religion and traditions; and 45 percent thought that young men join the insurgency because of the foreign presence in Afghanistan. 12 In a follow-up poll in May 2011, foreigners disrespect for Afghan traditions and culture increased to 91 percent. 13 In addition, even among college-aged men enrolled at Kabul University, the new Afghan elite who support their government and understand the goals of the international community, only 35 percent felt the U.S.
was justified in being in Afghanistan in the first place; a full 40 percent said no and 25 percent didn’t or wouldn’t answer. If the brightest of Afghans display widespread lack of knowledge about the reasons for our presence, it is not surprising that rural illiterate Afghans are making assumptions that our intention, fed by Taliban propaganda, is to attach and destroy Islam like the Soviets.

Finally, the perception of widespread corruption by government officials from district to national levels undermines GIRoA’s legitimacy: 55 percent said corruption was a problem in their daily lives, 50 percent in their neighborhood, 56 percent with local authorities, 65 percent with their provincial government, and 76 percent thought it was a major problem for Afghanistan overall. These numbers have held steady since 2008. As a collectivist culture, individual success, even if acquired through indirect or corrupt means, can be acceptable and honorable if it is shared with others. This was often the explanation given by educated Afghan men to justify their belief that Nangarhar Governor Shirzai was a good governor—he was successful and he took care of his province’s people by giving away large sums of his “personal” wealth to the poor and self-funding programs. But corruption that serves the individual or a small group of people, or which interferes with daily life—these are greatly resented and through the lens of Islam, seen as dishonorable and un-Islamic behavior.

Today, though shredded by 30 years of turmoil, a cultural and religious fabric of Islam—and its defense—remains central to rural people’s lives. Honesty, knowledge, and humility are the highest ranked qualities for a mullah. When considered uncorrupt and trustworthy, they carry a moral authority and are frequently arbiters of disputes and sources of advice and information. Periodically, Afghan President Hamid Karzai meets with them to urge their public support of government policy in the hopes that they can influence the population. While many urban mullahs welcome this as their role, rural mullahs view it as an attempt at cooptation and complain that their opinions and views are never actually solicited; they are just told what to do. Rural mullahs in an Eastern area on the border of Pashtun influence (and with high Taliban presence) steer clear of politics and government altogether and focus on promoting Islamic principles, defending Islam, and encouraging Sharia law.
Where Can We Go From Here

In Afghanistan, because we have been so focused on shoring up the legitimacy of the government through its supply of essential services and local security, we have neglected to fully understand the perceptions that were developing. As Americans, our core values—our “faith”—is secular and grounded in beliefs of freedom, equality, and liberty. “Give me Liberty or give me Death” still resonates. As a secular society, we accept that our religious identities live adjacent to our secular ones, but it may be our very secular-ness which makes it difficult to step into the shoes of a rural Afghan and to understand why they distrust us, and by extension, the efforts of the Afghan government.

Separation of church and state is our understanding of the world. In Afghanistan, there is no such tradition, nor, in some areas, much of a desire to separate church from state. The current Afghan constitution affirms it is an Islamic republic, the state religion is Islam, and states: “In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.” In addition, the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence (one of four schools of Sharia law interpretation) is identified as a basis for court decisions. Thus when the predominantly Christian international community proposes its state’s structures (legal system reform, representative government, economic development, educational system, health care, et cetera), rural Afghans suspect that the imposition of our church is not far behind and is, in fact, our hidden agenda. They do not have the education and exposure to understand that the U.S. and the international community operates in a completely different paradigm of separate institutions as well as one of (generally) respectful diversity. Thus for most of our time in Afghanistan, we have committed an ultimate cultural faux pas of assuming that Afghans, as a whole, understand the meaning and intention behind the words we use. We have assumed that what we think and what we say is what they hear and what they understand and believe.

This slow recognition, often at the field level, has led to increased efforts to identify and use the right messengers for the message—messengers who would be trusted within the basis of Islamic values and can speak through the known and accepted means of communication. Three groups have been working to have this effect: the Afghan National Army (ANA), provincial level Afghan officials in collaboration with Muslim International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners, and select national ministries.
percent of respondents considered the ANA fair and honest with the Afghan people. In Laskar Gah, Helmand province, ANA officials have been working to reclaim Islam from the insurgency and directly engage the population. To counter Taliban propaganda that the ANA are godless, “fake” Muslims, at their new patrol base the ANA constructed a large mosque and sound the calls to prayer across the neighboring area. Their billboards highlight Koranic verses and public prayer groups, and the ANA commander has engaged local religious leaders to discuss the ANA’s adherence to Islam and encourages his company’s mullah to offer Koranic instruction in person and via the base radio station. In addition, a corps of “chaplains” known as hafiz is being recruited by the ANA to ensure that Islamic law is observed within the ranks and as mobile messengers to the population of the military’s Islamic faith.

In other areas where Muslim ISAF partners operate, their special authority of being an Arabic-reading Muslim brother (from a more developed country) assists outreach efforts. In Parwan province in partnership with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) unit, in Logar province in partnership with the Jordanian Defense Forces, and even in Bamyan province with the Malaysian Medical Team, shuras and discussions about the Koran have been held with these ISAF partner imams or officers. In Parwan and Logar, the provincial Directorates of Hajj and Religious Affairs (DoHRA), and often with financial contributions by the provincial governors who occasionally attend, organize the events. In both Parwan and Logar, the Muslim ISAF partners have organized at least one trip for local mullahs to travel to the UAE and Jordan to see how these countries function as multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies. Coalition Force presence is kept to an absolute minimum except for offers of mosque refurbishments and repairs, which are coordinated through the DoHRA.

A third example of supporting Islam’s central role in the lives of the population is a quiet ISAF effort to help the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs (MoHRA) to conduct a series of religious seminars to standardize religious teaching curriculum and which will include UAE-based seminars, of which one is dedicated for women participants. The ISAF Traditional Communication program provides a small team of advisors, led by an Army colonel, to embed with three potentially population-influencing ministries who for various reasons received no attention during the first eight years of the international presence in Afghanistan: MoHRA, Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs, and Ministry of Information and Culture which manages youth programs and issues.
Given Western unfamiliarity with Islam as a faith and as a culture in Afghanistan—as well as the fact that al-Qaeda and the Taliban have used Islam to justify their actions—for seven years, we approached the war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as a military operation where partnership with the people and GIRQoA were positive outcomes, but not the main effort. For a relationship-based culture, our transactional “carrot and stick” approach created opportunism among many Afghans but has not built as much trust. In contrast, these varied approaches by Afghans to reclaim Islam reassure the population about their government’s intentions.

Conclusion

In early 2009 Admiral Mullen asserted that “the population is the center of gravity” in Afghanistan. But learning to think like an insurgent, much less like a rural Pashtun farmer, is a challenge, especially when serving a U.S. leadership where results are measured in numbers and not in harder-to-measure and longer-to-assess changes in attitudes. While individual officers and noncommissioned officers from division to platoon levels understand local culture and issues, their core mission is as soldiers, their training for war making, and their institutional mindset is not suited to community organizing. Yes, we go to war with the Army we have, but we can and should do better. The U.S. military has led, planned, and implemented our national engagement in Afghanistan. Over the past two years, U.S. civilian agencies have stretched to join integrated civilian-military planning for stabilization operations. Overall, this effort has given military planners at all levels the non-military nuances they lack. This collaboration should continue off the battlefield through a permanent joint, interagency team composed of Department of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development military and civilian personnel who specialize in understanding the priorities and cultures of possible world hotspots where we have national interests. We should learn, adapt, and work to be better prepared.

The challenges the international community faces regarding others’ perception of our intentions regarding Islam are not limited to Afghanistan. As we seek to support “Arab Spring” activities in other tribally-based countries with limited histories of responsive government and varied factions of Islam, we will encounter them again. If we wish to have the effects that we seek, we need to develop a better understanding of the role that Islam plays in the lives of these populations—and to act and plan from that understanding.
Endnotes


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


6. The five pillars of Islam are (1) the creed (shahada), (2) daily prayers (salat), (3) fasting during Ramazan, (4) almsgiving (zakat), and (5) the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) at least once in a lifetime.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 23.


16. Conversations with USAID Deputy Field Program Officers (Locally Employed Staff), Forward Operating Base Shank, Logar Province, March 1, 2011.


21. Ibid.


26. The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2010, 42.


29. The author served in RC-East as the Brigade Senior Civilian Representative to Task Forces Wolverine (86th IBCT (MTN)) and Patriot (4th IBCT-10th MTN DIV) from July 2010-2011 and coordinated stability operations planning on governance and development with U.S. government civilian and military personnel, and with Coalition partners Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. In this capacity, she supervised provincial-level efforts in Parwan, Logar, Bamyan, and Wardak to engage Afghan religious leaders. From July 2009-2010, she met frequently with religious and civil society
leaders and elders in Kunar province as the Department of State Lead to PRT Kunar.


31. Ibid., 57.

The USSOCOM Trinity: Refining Special Operations Commitment to 21st Century Warfare

Major Dave Kenney

This essay examines the ramifications of the new Defense Strategic Guidance on the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and recommends means and methods to capitalize on current success. These recommendations offer the National Command Authority and the USSOCOM Commander a single-source global capability to prevent and deter large-scale contingencies by leveraging a whole-of-government approach through Special Operations Forces operating as the forward edge of American influence.

The Defense Strategic Guidance issued on 5 January 2012 changes the paradigm under which the American Military Establishment prepared to fight wars for the last 20 years. What follows is an examination of the ramifications of this change in regard to its impact on United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and suggestions for a means and method in fiscally-constrained environments to provide the United States of America with a global capability to prevent and deter large-scale contingencies through the transformative utilization of existing Special Operations Forces. By reinforcing success in USSOCOM’s own model for countering terrorism and replicating the efficacy of subordinate unified commands and Joint Task Forces, USSOCOM will remain the Tip of the Spear.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the underpinning of national defense planning was the ability to fight and win two Major Theater Wars nearly simultaneously. While the term Major Theater War was eventually refined to Major Theater Conflict, the overall understanding was that the American military

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would plan, train, and equip to conduct major combat operations on opposite sides of the globe at the same time. This was often termed the win-win or win-hold-win strategy. While the Pentagon’s ability to realistically execute this strategy was often debated inside and outside the beltway through contracting and expanding budgets, the basic notion held.

The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) departs from the two-decade old strategy by describing essentially a win-spoil strategy in which the American military will plan, train, and equip to meet one major regional conflict while reserving the ability to “deny the objectives of or [impose] unacceptable costs on an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.”

The DSG is meant to be a “blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020, providing a set of precepts that will help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force over subsequent program and budget cycles…” Couched in terms of fiscal responsibility, the document calls for a military that is “smaller and leaner… agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced.” In a nutshell, the National Command Authority expects the Department of Defense to do more with less, reduce costs, and maintain readiness.

**Ramifications for USSOCOM**

No direct mention of Special Operations Forces is made in the DSG. Indeed, the term Special Operations is never used in the document. However, a close reading of the nine-page document determines that much of the tenets of Special Operations nest well inside the new strategy. The flexibility, agility, and diffuse operations suggested as a goal for the military, writ large, are fundamentals upon which Special Operations are based. Additionally, experience gained from a decade of global operations may put Special Operations at the forefront of the transformative change directed in the DSG.

The preceding decade has seen a continual expansion of USSOCOM from its legislated U.S. Code Title 10 authorities and responsibilities to new and increasingly broad responsibilities. The 2004 Unified Command Plan designation of USSOCOM as the Department of Defense (DOD) lead for synchronizing operations against global terrorist networks was followed by the 2008 designation as DOD proponent for Security Force Assistance and most recently by nomination as DOD lead for countering threat financing. These additional and growing responsibilities represent an increasingly unique position for USSOCOM as a unified command.

Additionally, the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance puts a priority on fiscal stewardship while calling for a smaller “military [that] is agile, flexible and ready for the full range of contingencies.” The document also emphasizes “the need for a globally
networked approach to deterrence and warfare.” 6 Remarks by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey at the Atlantic Council on 9 December 2011 may have foreshadowed the changes in the newest DSG. As reported by Inside the Army’s Sebastian Sprenger, “Dempsey delivered his thoughts in the form of a question. ‘SOCOM is currently a functional command. Should we consider that SOCOM is the global combatant command, and most everybody else [is in support]?’” 7

Whether the DSG opens the door for the current administration to designate USSOCOM as a global combatant command, rather than a functional Unified Command is open for debate, however the concept is not new. First proposed by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld shortly after the 9/11 terror attacks, USSOCOM as a global combatant commander met with resistance inside and outside of Special Operations. 8 In a culture organized around strategic preparation based on the National Security Act of 1947, amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, any efforts to deploy forces outside the purview of geographic combatant commanders, questions their efficacy in handling 21st century threats.

Given a changing strategic military posture and the ever-broadening responsibilities, this paper moves beyond the debate as to whether USSOCOM should become a Global Combatant Commander for Special Operations and examines how it could meet that demand within the constraints and opportunities afforded by the new Defense Strategic Guidance.

Globalization and economic technology-transfer has proffered the rise of transnational non-state and sub-state actors. Criminal organizations such as narco-trafficking syndicates and violent extremist organizations increasingly cross regional areas of responsibility and, in some cases, purposely exploit the inherent seams of the Unified Command Plan. This premise is described in Joint doctrine in some detail: “Globalization and emerging technologies will allow small groups to use asymmetric approaches to include criminal activity, terrorism, or armed aggression on a transnational scale with relative ease and with little cost.” 9

The DSG, in characterizing this “Challenging Global Security Environment,” describes the general policy for countering these threats:

For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active approach to countering these threats by monitoring the activities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary. 10
Accepting the contemporary success in employment of counterterrorism forces, the author proposes the creation of two additional functional subordinate unified (sub-unified) commands which replicate the model. Further recommendations include functional Joint Task Forces created to provide a cradle-to-grave, mission-oriented command structure leveraged against specific problem sets. Also advanced here is the establishment of Pan-Agency Special Staffs at almost every operational level of USSOCOM to plan, advise, and resource complementing capabilities and to integrate as required the whole-of-government approach into Special Operations.

**The Trinity**

When authorized by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called sub-unified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. – Joint Publication 1, pg. xii

Referring to this, the Trinity and depicted in Figure 1, this proposal represents a trio of subordinate unified (sub-unified) commands organized and determined by functional area and mission set to synchronize and execute the full spectrum of special operations missions on a global scale. Applying a very successful model developed for global execution of authorities, USSOCOM would create two additional sub-unified commands: a Strategic Development Special Operations Command (STRATDEVSOC) and a Special Activities Command (SACOM) and also execute missions within the Direct Action Special Operations Command (DASOC).

STRATDEVSOC works with and through partner nations to build military capacity and capability, conducts humanitarian aid, and assists civil development. These functions go beyond the traditional mission of Foreign Internal Defense and now Security Force Assistance, to provide a long-term planning staff focused on indirect methods of countering extremism through investment and development. The bulk of USSOCOM’s efforts in the near term would be under this command: deterring and preventing future threats, countering influence and extremist propaganda by building global relationships on American values and interests. This is where USSOCOM, as global purveyors of American interests, seeks to fight ideas with ideas.

STRATDEVSOC is also responsible for Special Operations support to the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, incorporating the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) as operational headquarters for current operations. Through
the synchronization of joint combined exchange training, counter narcotics training, joint advisory teams and select deployments of forward headquarters, persistent engagement becomes a reality—not just a talking point. Operationalizing the TSOCs under one unified command provides the ability to synchronize events, prioritize efforts, and allocate resources across areas of responsibility.

Special Activities Command (SACOM) unifies all SOF efforts in Network Development and Illumination and provides a standing headquarters for Unconventional Warfare (UW) (Figure 2 on the following page depicts proposed lines of effort for all three sub-unified commands). This capability ensures specific UW plans are tied directly to the National Security Strategy and are available as stand-alone, fully-developed options or as components to conventional plans. The command is also focused on network illumination, defined here as identifying all pertinent components of organizations or entities posing threats to the United States. Network development is the ability to ‘see’ beyond the horizon into denied locations and organizations by building networks of human and technical infrastructure. Additionally, SACOM becomes the coordination point within USSOCOM for countering threat finance. Traditional functions and programs that fill intelligence gaps when other means are not available are also incorporated into SACOM.

Direct Action Special Operations Command is focused on fixing and finishing threats to the United States and its interests. Associated mission sets for DASOC include
counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and counter proliferation. Much of the structural foundations and employment models found throughout this article currently exist and would continue in the construct of DASOC. The methodology for generating Joint Task Forces and globally employing Special Operations Forces has been proven feasible under current counterterrorism authorities.

Each of these three distinct organizations, when directed, will stand up a specialized, mission oriented Joint Task Force (JTF) to conduct activities against a specified target. These Task Forces are filled primarily within USSOCOM units and represent a ‘cradle-to-grave’ project mentality.

Mission-Oriented Joint Task Forces

A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the SecDef, a Combatant Commander (CCDR), a subordinate unified Commander (CDR), or an existing JTF CDR. A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. – Joint Publication 1, pg. xvii
Unique within this proposal, is the notion of cradle-to-grave, mission-oriented Joint Task Forces as the primary means of employing Special Operations Forces. Under this premise, and when authorized or directed, the sub-unified commander designates a JTF commander, and primary and special staffs are fielded by USSOCOM units and the interagency. The new JTF analyzes its mission and requests tailored force packages to meet its objectives. For example, a notional JTF-AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) tasked with network illumination may use resources from 3rd, 7th, and 10th Special Forces Groups, in addition to civil affairs and U.S. Navy SEALS, to illuminate the network’s command structure in North Africa, its narco-trafficking connections in South America, and its fundraising operations in Europe.

This task organization allows forces to be employed against a problem set rather than to a geographic area. Any number of units can now be deployed to a region with their activities de-conflicted by mission, not geographic areas of operation. Operationalized JTFs rely heavily on assigned liaison personnel to de-conflict authorized activities with regional stakeholders including geographic combatant commanders, country teams and, when necessary, the host nation or coalition partners.

The JTF is variable by size and scope based on the phases and authorities it is operating under. For instance, a JTF created for UW against a specific country would be relatively small during planning and while building infrastructure; however, the JTF would grow according to its needs if given the directive to execute its plan.

For long-term missions, the JTF creates its own playbook, coordinated at the USSOCOM headquarters with the Service Component Special Operations Commands, ensuring that once units are assigned to the JTF, those units regularly return for subsequent missions and deployments. Through this means, experience and expertise are developed and continually improved upon at the lowest operational level. Relationships and local knowledge are not reinvented with every deployment when a new unit assumes a mission from its predecessor. Such a process may lead to a shorter overall mission for the JTF and creates a more stable deployment cycle, easing burdens on the home-front.

The Pan-Agency Special Staff

Success of this model is predicated on the incorporation of a whole-of-government approach to problem solving. First, however, the author would like to take formal umbrage with the term “interagency” which is currently en vogue. The term, at its roots, denotes working between agencies, clearly indicating that the agencies hold equal and sometimes competing stakes in any given scenario. The author here will suggest
the term ‘pan-agency’ as better representative of coalition problem-solving capable of leveraging all assets of participating agencies for a common goal. Pan-Agency will be used henceforth to describe a synchronized, whole-of-government approach.

USSOCOM, in restructuring to meet global authority for Special Operations, would establish a Pan-Agency Special Staff (PASS), integrated with its traditional general staff. Comprised of assigned representatives from Department-level U.S. Government Agencies, this PASS contributes to mission analysis and resource requirements at the highest levels. A tailored PASS also accompanies each primary staff for the three sub-unified commands, but is not limited to Department-level agencies. For example, one might expect to see STRATDEVSOC PASS representatives from Department of State (DOS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The PASS differs from the doctrinal Joint interagency Coordination Group in the function and role of its membership. The PASS offers a direct planning component to USSOCOM and sub-unified commanders, with limited tasking authority and coordination responsibility to their parent agency. Particularly nuanced, this aspect requires either the Commander-in-Chief to exercise his Chief Executive role or the Congress to permanently legislate Pan-Agency cooperation in the same tradition as ‘jointness’ was codified under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act.

The PASS at each sub-unified command helps tailor the resource package for the JTFs and provides synchronization with each agency’s ongoing engagement strategies. Under this construct, one could expect to see USDA and USAID personnel accompany a civil affairs team on joint combined exchange training to Angola; or providing DEA augmentation for Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas conducting counter narcotics trafficking training in South America.

The 2005 report Beyond Goldwater-Nichols by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, recommended “national security agencies develop a national security career path that would give career professionals incentives to seek out interagency experience, education, and training.” The multi-level PASS described here provide the beginnings of such a career path. This facet of the plan helps also to expand the Nunn-Biden Initiative to create rapidly deployable civilian capabilities.

Though defined in Joint Publication 1, unified action is rarely is leveraged to maximum capacity. A PASS inherently functions as doctrinal unified action purports. Unified action includes a wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with other government agencies [OGAs], intergovernmental organizations [IGOs], and coordination with nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] and the private
sector) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or JTFs to achieve unity of effort.13

Reconciling the Guidance

The Defense Strategic Guidance provides a framework for analyzing the recommendations above and measuring the degree to which these recommendations would meet the intent of the National Command Authority (NCA). A cautionary note: while this methodology is meant as a cursory examination of the proposal, it is understood that strategic guidance often changes rapidly as administrations attempt to translate unique ideas to policy objectives.

In a fiscally-constrained budgetary environment, a globally synchronized Strategic Development Special Operations Command aids the economy-of-force tenets laid out in the DSG by prioritizing efforts and resources within USSOCOM across all areas of responsibility. “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”14 Additionally, the DSG describes the future of counterterrorism as being characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance. This equal reliance on the indirect approach of security force assistance and traditional direct action justifies the elevation of the former to par with the latter within USSOCOM.

Further, in moving away from a strategy of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously, the DSG’s new strategy of win-spoil justifies a robust unconventional warfare capability. “Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of – or imposing unacceptable costs on – an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.”15 A standing Special Activities Command with an Unconventional Warfare (UW) focus, provides the NCA with an unprecedented capability to meet the intent and guidance of the DSG. Synchronized utilization of standing networks, sabotage, and demonstrative air strikes in coordination with cyber attack by sister components, could blunt aggression with ‘unacceptable costs.’

Justification for a Direct Action Special Operation Command already exists; however, the DSG places reinforcing emphasis on counter-proliferation and counterterrorism.

From a budgetary perspective, the employment of tailored force-packages through mission-oriented Joint Task Forces is critical to maintaining American foreign policy objectives with minimum cost. Increasing individual knowledge and expertise to
create true culturally-attuned, locally-savvy subject matter experts reduces the overall inefficiencies and costs associated with ad hoc deployments.

The President’s position in the opening letter of the DSG that “Meeting these challenges cannot be the work of the military alone” is a strong message to the Department of Defense and all U.S. Government agencies that interoperability, cooperation, and mutual support of all the tools of American power is the touchstone of future foreign policy. USSOCOM accomplishes this with the creation of the Pan-Agency Special Staffs described above.

Redefining organizations based on mission types will refocus specialization. The preceding recommendations focused on operational structure and methods. As a byproduct, forces not engaged in operational activity remain at home station under purview of respective Service Component Special Operations Command. Focus for these units is training and equipping with the knowledge that specialization is more important than generalization, in order to hone the core competencies of each unique unit within USSOCOM. Flexibility is not having a toolbox full of different sized adjustable wrenches; flexibility is having a box full of specialized tools designed for specific jobs.

Conclusion

The assumption that USSOCOM will inevitably be designated as a Global Combatant Commander for Special Operations is not a light one. Some readers may choose to ignore the recommendations of this article on the basis that this postulation is beyond the scope of current evidence. The intent is not to pass judgment on professional opinions or personal feeling but to accept the examination of future scenarios as critical to preparedness should they occur.

Furthermore, many may disagree with the fundamental structural changes recommended. Oft-cited counter points discuss a bi-lateral separation within USSOCOM of direct and indirect action capabilities. However, such a delineated structure does not adequately address the differences between overt and clandestine activities. For example, Foreign Internal Defense is often referred to as ‘the other side of the coin’ from UW. While the act of training a host nation soldier or a guerrilla is essentially the same, the logistics, planning, and support to each activity are grossly different.

This essay sought to outline a structure and methodology by which the United States Special Operations Command could capitalize on expanded authorities and responsibilities. The most recent Defense Strategic Guidance was used to justify and measure the amount to which such changes would benefit the nation and the military
in a fiscally-constrained environment. The recommendations contained herein require further research and a feasibility assessment must be conducted before implementation of any point proposed. Nonetheless, these recommendations offer the National Command Authority and the USSOCOM Commander a single-source global capability to prevent and deter large scale contingencies by leveraging a whole-of-government approach through Special Operations Forces operating as the forward edge of American influence. Building capacity and capability in friendly nation forces; developing influence and infrastructure in under-governed regions; limiting belligerent nation ability to project threats while countering terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation—in short, honing the edge of the Tip of the Spear.

**Endnotes**


3. Defense Strategic Guidance, January 2012: Secretary Panetta Executive Summary.


13. Joint Publication 1, Executive Summary, x.


Targeting the Will of the Insurgent in order to Manipulate the Breakpoint of an Insurgency

Major Chuck Ergenbright

An insurgency is composed of the collective will of its members. An insurgent’s will is composed of certain definable variables. These variables are subject to adjustment where a breakpoint is achieved and action ensues. Insurgent breakpoint can be defined as a decision point where action outweighs inaction. This essay argues that through a process of effectively targeting the will of insurgents, their breakpoint can be manipulated. Furthermore, the breakpoint for the insurgency as a whole is merely an aggregate of collective breakpoints reached by the majority of the populace. Therefore, manipulation of the collective breakpoint can be accomplished by applying the same principles. Also explored in this essay is the reciprocal of this equation, where the incumbent state government also reaches its breakpoint.

Insurgencies develop at their core from a universal and chief cause of revolutionary feelings: the desire of one man to feel equal to another. When societal values and expectations of the populace are balanced, the incumbent government enjoys a high level of natural control where insurgencies are irrelevant. However, when men’s ideological conceptions are not mirrored by the actions and ideology of their government, separation between the government and populace manifests and revolutionary feelings simmer; the boiling point is called an insurgency. If the government does not possess enough natural or artificial control to dominate the contested political space, insurgencies develop and grow. While an insurgency can be mitigated or reduced to the

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degree the government can impose control, this application of control never eliminates insurgencies—it only suppresses them. This suppression, in turn, legitimizes and facilitates insurgency growth by solidifying populace will against the government.

Insurgent wars are won by battles of will. An individual’s will comprises his motivations and level of conviction he possesses to fulfill his motivations. The delicate balance of calculated risk and anticipated reward among both opponents in an insurgent war must be analyzed and meticulously manipulated in order to understand and affect insurgent growth. Insurgencies are composed of politically disaffected individuals. Therefore, insurgencies are aggregates of individual wills aimed at overthrowing incumbent state governments. Aptly, a counterinsurgent campaign should focus on affecting insurgent will, not at the capacity of the insurgency. In order to accomplish this, the will of the individual insurgent must first be targeted and affected; the collective will of the insurgency will follow.

Certain individuals are motivated to act despite perceived threat in order to join the insurgency. Other individuals within the same contested political space are motivated by the perceived threat not to join the insurgency. An individual’s breakpoint is the point at which that individual decides action outweighs inaction despite the perceived threat the state is capable of imposing. Achievement of this breakpoint depends on certain variables. These variables can be adjusted in order to manipulate the breakpoint to an unattainable position for an individual contemplating insurgency. These variables can also be adjusted for an individual who is currently a member of the insurgency, causing him to cease his insurgent activity. An aggregate breakpoint can also be assigned to the insurgency as a whole. This is the point where the insurgency will either recede or cease to gain enough support to overthrow the incumbent government, depending on which phase of growth it is in.

Targeting the will of an Insurgency

All insurgencies start small and, at the onset of confrontation, are inferior to their incumbent state opponent in size, strength, and organization. Although the state may appear insurmountable and the insurgent force may appear very small, a notable battlefield advantage for either side does not exist at the beginning of a conflict. Both insurgencies and state forces begin conflicts with sizable disadvantages. What the insurgency lacks in size and strength,
it compensates for with intelligence and knowledge of people and terrain. Likewise, what the state force lacks in intelligence and knowledge of people and terrain, it compensates for with technology, size, and strength. Therefore, all things being relatively equal at the onset of conflict, the force that is able to overcome their beginning disadvantage first wins the conflict.³

Members of well-organized insurgencies know they can only achieve victory and realize their goals if their opponent’s political capability to wage war is destroyed. Thus, all insurgency efforts are focused squarely at the opponent’s will to wage war. Through a process of embedding with the populace and extending the conflict timeline through persistent attacks, the insurgency adversely affects an opponent’s political approval of the conflict.⁴ This results in decreased will of the state force to continue the conflict. Conversely, all efforts of the state military force are usually focused at the insurgents’ ability to wage war, clinging to the presumption that military superiority prevails in war.⁵ State force strategy is usually focused on gaining information about the enemy’s identity and location in order to destroy him.⁶ However, this strategy creates an impossible paradox for a state military force; until the insurgency can be separated from the populace, the rate at which insurgents are killed never exceeds the rate at which they are produced. This reality of insurgent warfare becomes ever apparent in the elongation of America’s current war against insurgent forces in Afghanistan, where American military forces directly target the warfighting capability of the insurgency. The result is a growing insurgency despite state force efforts. This fundamental flaw in state force counterinsurgency strategy was highlighted by Henry Kissinger when he stated, “The guerilla wins if he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win.”⁷ Therefore, in order to break an insurgency, it is the will of the insurgent to fight that must be appropriately targeted and destroyed, not his capability to fight. This is the only strategic focus capable of creating and exploiting space between populace and insurgency.⁸

**Defining the Breakpoint**

In counterinsurgent campaigns, where the populace is key terrain, successful manipulation and influence of the populace is the only metric by which victory can be measured.⁹ Usually through a series of circumstances, where large portions of the populace lose confidence in the state’s ability to provide for basic needs or no longer identifies with the state’s ideology, a political space
becomes contested. In this environment, these circumstances or ideological discrepancies become so great that individuals are compelled to act. In most cases, this decision to act resulted from a cost versus benefit analysis conducted by the individual. When the individual concludes that the expected cost of acting against the state is relatively low and the expected benefit of supporting the insurgency is relatively high, the individual is compelled to act against the state. Likewise, individuals are also likely to act against the state when the expected cost of inaction is relatively high. An individual’s motivation in this type of situation has to be overwhelming. Indeed, individuals entering into this situation have achieved their breakpoint. While an insurgent’s breakpoint is defined as the decision point where action outweighs inaction despite perceived threat, the breakpoint is further expressed in the following formula:

\[ BP(x) = A(EB - EC) - I(EB - EC) > PT \]

\[ BP(x): \text{Breakpoint is a function of} \]

\[ A: \text{Action} \]

\[ I: \text{Inaction} \]

\[ EB: \text{Expected Benefit} \]

\[ EC: \text{Expected Cost} \]

\[ PT: \text{Perceived Threat} \]

A breakpoint has only been achieved when an individual’s situation has eroded to the point where action outweighs inaction despite the cost associated with the perceived threat.

As individuals become disaffected and mount a rebellion, they must grow and organize their ranks if they are to become an effective insurgency. Since insurgencies are born of the populace, they are always embedded and must grow from within the populace in order to overthrow the incumbent state. As individuals reach their breakpoint and choose to act against the state, they recruit others who have also reached their breakpoint. However, each additional insurgency member is gained through an individual breakpoint; a point where each person decides which organization is more legitimate—the state or the insurgency—and acts accordingly.

**Locating the Breakpoint**

Insurgencies are built around their members. Therefore, in order to target the will of an insurgency, the will of its members must be the primary target. Within a disputed political space people are influenced and, to some degree,
controlled by the relationship of societal equilibrium and political control. Equilibrium and control are proportionate where greater levels of societal equilibrium result in less need for political control. Likewise, less social equilibrium results in greater need for political control. Maintaining societal equilibrium is determined by the government’s ability to mirror ideological expectations and satisfy basic needs of its populace. Societal equilibrium is challenged and political control diminished when governments are unable to effectively satisfy basic physiological and security needs of its populace. Within contested political spaces, where individual ideologies are not mirrored by their societal organization and leadership, and where basic physiological needs are not met, revolutionary feelings will circulate throughout the populace. When insurgencies form and are able to convince the populace that the insurgency is the most capable party to meet these needs, they are able to promote populace ascension toward a more fulfilling life through the promotion and validation of the insurgency’s ideology.

Individual situations will erode to the point where action outweighs inaction despite the cost associated with the perceived threat. Slowly, individuals will reach their breakpoint and rebel. These individuals will also recruit other individuals who have reached their breakpoint. As the rebellion intensifies and grows into an insurgency and a formidable force capable of overthrowing the incumbent government, the speed at which individuals join the insurgency increases dramatically. This is explained by the Pauli Exclusion Principle which states that no two objects can occupy the same space at the same time. While the proper context for this principle is physics as it explains why two electrons are incapable of occupying the same space at the same time, it is the most concise principle to explain actions within a political space. Within a contested political space, more insurgency supporters equates to fewer state supporters, thereby decreasing the state’s political control resulting in less perceived threat for supporting the insurgency.

This pattern of insurgent growth is best explained by the Insurgent Growth Chart on the following page. In this chart, Zone 1 demonstrates an environment that negatively influences insurgent growth until the pattern of growth reaches the breakpoint. In this zone, the perceived threat of acting against the state is high while the relative benefit to supporting the insurgency is low. This explains the slow initial growth of an insurgency toward the breakpoint. The breakpoint is that point reached along the insurgency pattern of growth that, once attained, equates to a perceived threat of acting against the state that
is no longer higher than the expected benefit of supporting the insurgency. After the breakpoint, Zone 2 demonstrates an unstable environment that positively influences insurgent growth until the pattern of growth reaches its threshold. Within this zone, insurgent growth displaces the state’s political control to the point where expected benefit for supporting the insurgency is greater than the perceived threat which the state is capable of imposing. \(^{12}\)

In comparison, the breakpoint for the state is the same point. However, the State Support Curve is the reciprocal of the Insurgent Growth Curve. As the insurgent pattern of growth increases toward the breakpoint, state support begins to decrease. Once state support has dropped below the breakpoint, the insurgent growth curve momentum will act to further reduce state support. This concept is illustrated in the Insurgent Growth Chart compared to the State Support Curve. Unfortunately, a predictive quantitative value cannot be assigned to the breakpoint. Any attempt to assign a percentage value to the population in support of the insurgency which corresponds to the breakpoint would be inaccurate. The breakpoint can only be measured by qualitative means where insurgency support becomes positively unbalanced, encouraging insurgent growth as state support becomes negatively unbalanced, discouraging state support.
Manipulating the Breakpoint

The will of the insurgency can only be effectively defeated through a deliberate application of immediate deterrence at the individual level in order to manipulate the breakpoint. As citizens approach their breakpoint and contemplate joining the insurgency, the state may be preserved by adjusting variables within the breakpoint formula in order to impose a tolerable threshold of insurgent growth. Since the breakpoint of an insurgency is the sum of individual insurgent decisions, where the value of action when compared to inaction is either greater or lesser than the perceived threat, by increasing the perceived threat imposed by the state and decreasing expected benefit of insurgency support, this equation can favor the state. Breakpoint manipulation can be accomplished with two principle adjustments. First, current and potential insurgent ability to meet basic needs of the populace must be discredited. Second, perceived threat for acting against the state must increase to a level greater than the expected benefit of insurgency support. This adjustment will not only increase Zone 1 of Insurgent Growth, but in keeping with the Pauli Exclusion Principle, it will also decrease Zone 2. This manipulation will not delete the breakpoint, nor convert the small populace percentage that will never abandon the insurgency. However, these adjustments move the breakpoint to the right, increase state control, and decrease insurgency growth threshold. Thus, the breakpoint becomes unattainable for the insurgency.
Variable Adjustments:

Breakpoint manipulation is the result of variable adjustment within the breakpoint formula. By assigning values ranging from one to five for each of the respective variables, one being the lowest and five being the highest, breakpoint manipulation becomes apparent. Hardcore insurgent breakpoint variables most likely incorporate the highest value of five for action, the expected benefit of conducting the act, and the expected cost of inaction. The same hardcore insurgent also represents low values of one for expected cost of conducting the act, inaction, and the expected benefit of inaction. To this individual, perceived threat is irrelevant. This assertion is demonstrated by assigning a moderate level of perceived threat, and comparing the resulting inequality. For this individual, antigovernment action clearly outweighs the perceived state threat.

However, for most citizens contemplating insurgency, breakpoint formulas look quite different. For an individual leaning slightly toward joining the insurgency, values of three to action, expected benefit of conducting the act, and expected cost of inaction are appropriate. Values of two for cost of conducting the

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**Hardcore Insurgent Breakpoint Formula:**

\[ BP(x) = A(EB - EC) - I(EB - EC) > PT \]

\[ BP(x) = 5(5 - 1) - 1(1 - 5) > 3 \]

\[ BP(x) = 20 + 4 > 3 \]

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**Potential Insurgent Breakpoint Formula:**

\[ BP(x) = A(EB - EC) - I(EB - EC) > PT \]

\[ BP(x) = 3(3 - 2) - 2(2 - 3) > 3 \]

\[ BP(x) = 3 + 2 > 3 \]
act, inaction, and the expected benefit of inaction are appropriate. Maintaining moderate levels of perceived threat, this breakpoint formula demonstrates that the expected benefit and expected cost is much closer for this individual than for the hardcore insurgent.

Populace class distinction within contested political space is crucial to effective targeting of insurgent will. Within any contested political space, three populace classes exist: hardcore insurgents, potential insurgents, and hardcore state loyalists. The two reciprocal groups of hardcore insurgents and hardcore state loyalist cannot be influenced by variable adjustment. Therefore, population control efforts should focus on variable adjustment within the populace class possessing the greatest potential for influence. Without support from the larger, undecided portion of the population, both the hardcore insurgent and the state loyalist classes are marginalized. As demonstrated by the *Insurgency Growth Chart*, an insurgency must grow to win. Insurgencies are not grown of all hardcore insurgents. Each potential insurgent is gained through an individual breakpoint illustrated in the *Potential Insurgent Breakpoint Formula*. By slightly increasing perceived threat, the causal effects on other variables manipulate the breakpoint to an unattainable position. If the state were not capable of increasing perceived threat, other measures capable of influencing expected benefit and cost of action and inaction could also result in breakpoint manipulation. Therefore, when targeting the will of an insurgent, the apparent conclusion drawn from these concepts and illustrations would be to focus efforts of variable adjustment on the potential insurgent.

**Operations**

Placing this concept into operation requires a fundamental change in organization and focus. A campaign in which the will of the potential insurgent is targeted requires focus on individual insurgents and measures success in terms of population control. Malcolm Gladwell’s book, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference*, references effective marketing techniques that influence targeted populations in order to manipulate their behavior. Gladwell’s concept of weighting individuals has significant relevance to manipulating the breakpoint of insurgyencies. He separates members of
a given populace into three groups: Connectors, Mavens and Salesmen. Connectors are defined as people who are able to connect people within a given population; Salesmen are defined as individuals who are able to make someone else accept their point of view. Connectors and Salesmen seek other people and therefore, by definition, are easy to find. However, the group with the highest potential yield concerning breakpoint manipulation through variable adjustment is the group capable of validating and imparting knowledge. Gladwell defines this group as the Mavens, people who are loved and respected by their friends and acquaintances for their accumulated knowledge. Mavens are difficult to locate because they are not always identified by positions of importance, wealth, or distinction. Mavens are revered for their opinion and reputation for accurate, accumulated knowledge. Therefore, when attempting to control a given population, certain individuals do matter more than others. Salesmen will sell and Connectors will connect people to the message delivered by Mavens. Within a contested political space, variable adjustments can be further refined to affect potential insurgents who are also Mavens. These efforts should also be focused at the lowest level at which people live within the contested political space.

Conclusion

Insurgent wars are indeed won by battles of will. Targeting the will of insurgencies through manipulation of insurgent breakpoints by adjusting variables within the breakpoint formula of potential insurgent Mavens is the most efficient means to achieve a counterinsurgency campaign victory. The Power of Context states that an epidemic can be tipped by manipulating minor environmental aspects. This principle is demonstrated by the minor breakpoint variable adjustments required to influence the potential insurgent. When refining a counterinsurgency strategy to focus on adjusting variables of potential insurgent Mavens, a group effect will foster an environment where an epidemic can spread. In this case, the desired epidemic is increasing space between the insurgency and the populace. When these efforts are refined and systematically focused at the will of individual insurgents, the group effect will promote spread of the desired outcome within the village, from village to village, and ultimately throughout the entire country, thereby effectively manipulating the breakpoint of the insurgency.
Endnotes

12. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
Unity of Effort in the New World Dynamic: Success through Shared Vision

Major Curtis M. Snider

In a transitional period that features a rapidly shifting political landscape both domestically and abroad, American security remains a top priority due the continuing threat of extremism and global terror. To achieve policy objectives all elements of national power must be applied in concert, fusing the capabilities of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces as well as the broad array of interagency resources.

The New World Dynamic

The conclusion of combat operations in Iraq marked the beginning of a significant evolution in American foreign policy. Coupled with the impending reduction of combat forces in Afghanistan the gradual conclusion of the major expeditionary efforts in the War on Terror marks a transition to a New World Dynamic. America and her allies must continue to secure their nations, interests, and economies against the threats of the 21st century. Global terror, extremist non-state actors, and adversarial nations will continue to drive U.S. foreign policy, but the means of addressing these challenges will require informed policy highlighted by collaborative execution to achieve policy objectives. In the New World Dynamic, the American military and other instruments of national power that comprise the Interagency will be faced with challenging new requirements that will demand synergy at all levels. Integrated effort, shared vision, and collaborative execution of these various elements will be the hallmark of America’s success or failure in the New World Dynamic.

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The New World Dynamic will demand that the military and Interagency conduct operations in a manner that directly supports long-term foreign policy objectives. Conflict, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and other types of operations will be tied to building and maintaining relationships with other nations and linked to other instruments of national power that are applied to each situation to achieve the overall goals of American foreign policy. Additionally, many of these operations will focus on multi-national partnerships and seek to achieve incremental success through the long-term development of the capabilities of partner nations. The National Military Strategy (NMS) for 2011 recognizes this inevitability and clearly articulates this new focus and new criteria for success:

We must continue to support and facilitate whole-of-nation approaches to countering extremism that seek and sustain regional partnerships with responsible states to erode terrorists’ support and sources of legitimacy. Military power complements economic development, governance, and rule of law—the true bedrocks of counterterrorism efforts. In the long run, violent ideologies are ultimately discredited and defeated when a secure population chooses to reject extremism and violence in favor of more peaceful pursuits.¹

By identifying the need for military efforts to compliment other aspects of foreign policy efforts the NMS and Joint Chiefs have illuminated a core institutional obstacle that the military will have to overcome in the New Dynamic Environment. The American military is historically uncomfortable with limited conflict. “The U.S. military has throughout its history sought to close with and destroy the enemy at the earliest opportunity.”² The New World Dynamic precludes such unilateral and decisive action and will force both Special Operations Forces (SOF) and General Purpose Forces (GPF) to operate in support of limited objectives despite an organizational culture that is “uncomfortable with wars fought for limited political aims.”³ The dramatic and successful adaptation by both SOF and GPF elements during the decade of expeditionary, irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that at an operational and tactical level, such adaptation is possible under the proper conditions. At the strategic level, this vision is already in action, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly articulating this vision in the 2011 NMS: “…the changing security environment requires the Joint Force to deepen security relationships with our allies and create opportunities for partnerships with new and diverse groups of actors.”⁴
This new dynamic is expressed both in terms of partnership with America’s allies and in an emerging culture of collaboration between the agents of the various elements of national power. In the 2011 National Security Strategy for Counterterrorism the directive for partnership with allies as well as the cooperative efforts of the various agencies executing foreign policy is clearly articulated:

U.S. [counterterrorism] efforts require a multidepartmental and multinational effort that goes beyond traditional intelligence, military, and law enforcement functions. We are engaged in a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that harnesses every tool of American power—military, civilian, and the power of our values—together with the concerted efforts of allies, partners, and multilateral institutions. These efforts must also be complemented by broader capabilities, such as diplomacy, development, strategic communications, and the power of the private sector. 5

For SOF, GPF, and interagency elements to optimally contribute in the collaborative efforts of the New World Dynamic, each element will be challenged to expand their efforts to understand and compliment concurrent missions of various agencies and actors. The continuing threat of global terrorism will remain a primary concern that dictates the foreign policy priorities for the United States in volatile regions that provide potential safe haven for extremists. Military operations will be a vital component of successful policy but will require nuanced coordination to ensure optimal results. Each of the three components will be challenged to integrate their operations to best contribute to build and maintain partnerships, expand influence, and support diplomatic and economic initiatives focused on building capacity and capability in the allies identified as key contributors to deterring terror.

Special Operations Forces in the New World Dynamic
Special Operations elements are suited to the requirements in the collective effort of achieving policy objectives. While SOF elements have frequently been employed in short duration, high-intensity, direct-action operations, many of these elements can be enabled to achieve incremental success over long duration partnerships characterized by persistent engagement. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) maintains the capability for precision strikes in support of national objectives with units that remain poised to
impose American capabilities against emerging threats, while other distinct units can set about the gradual process of achieving policy objectives through Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions, multi-national training events, and building and enhancing long-term relationships between individuals, leaders, and units. U.S. Army Special Forces detachments conduct numerous exchange training missions with partner nations every year, building combat capacity while strengthening ties between allies. Additionally, these FID missions also provide ground truth assessments as to the capabilities, intentions, and perceptions of a given nation or target population. These overt missions are conducted in coordination with the State Department and should be leveraged to even greater ends in the New World Dynamic.

Persistent engagement by SOF elements can provide a multitude of benefits to the overarching intent of empowering allies to deter terror. These operations can iteratively build on previously conducted training to develop a cache of institutional knowledge in allied militaries that would otherwise not have access to expertise or training resources. Additionally, FID missions establish a way to fulfill commitments made through other agencies or venues. Such training and advisory efforts can become a venue for foreign aid and military sales to ensure the appropriate employment and integration of military assistance that provides technology to allied nations. These efforts culminate when the host nation, facing a threat that is also detrimental to U.S. national interests, requests assistance from America. Today in the Malian struggle against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Ugandan efforts to defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army these conditions are emerging or are close to being met. While the shifting political landscape and diplomatic considerations may preclude SOF elements from leading their partners into battle, persistent engagement will give the host nation the tools to be successful, and may involve SOF supervising the planning process and providing critical insight to allied leaders to enhance their successes. All this can be achieved in a manner consistent with considerations for minimal military involvement that would otherwise degrade the legitimacy of other diplomatic efforts and satisfy domestic concerns of continued large scale, expeditionary military commitments to conflicts or regions that from some perspectives have only oblique connections to American security interests.

For SOF to successfully contribute in the New World Dynamic, persistent engagement operations must be conducted in a manner that reflects the environment. In many cases persistent engagement requires continuity not
currently present in SOF missions. Such training missions are often viewed as finite with limited continuity from one to the next; often the coordination with interagency efforts is to coordinate the engagement itself and ensure the administrative aspects of entering a foreign nation are satisfied. In the New World Dynamic, the incremental development of partnered nations’ military capacity must transition from discrete engagements to a cyclical process.

Securing a long-term commitment to specific goals for the target nation can optimize this process. Currently Special Forces units are selected and execute such multi-lateral missions with the event itself as the end goal. In the New World Dynamic, these events must become the means for enabling partnered nations and to do so will require an increased commitment to continuity in these engagement efforts. Given proper resourcing and direction USSOCOM elements have the capability to conduct iterative developmental Security Force Assistance (SFA) and FID missions. Ideally these missions would occur with a partner force that is selected for its potential and is suitable for long-term development. Support from interagency elements that have concurrent interests in the region and commitment from all levels of USSOCOM leadership can ensure unity of effort and continuity over time to achieve long term success. The benefits of these events build far beyond the benefits of a simple training event. Appropriately analyzed, such an event can inform intelligence collection requirements, monitor progress, build capacity, and build relationships for both U.S. Special Forces elements and diplomatic efforts. Additionally, in the New World Dynamic, this kind of commitment signals to allies and adversaries alike that the United States is committed to supporting her allies and denying adversaries from establishing influence in contentious regions and emerging nations.

To further consider the impact SOF can have in the long-term development of our allies, consider the Flintlock Exercise in the nation of Mali. An important ally in the War on Terror, Mali is the focus of international efforts to defeat and deter AQIM in the Trans-Sahara region of Western Africa.

Flintlock, conducted by Special Operations Command Africa’s Joint Special Operations Task Force - Trans Sahara, is a joint multinational exercise to improve information sharing at the operational and tactical levels across the Saharan region while fostering increased collaboration and coordination. It is focused on military interoperability and capacity-building for U.S. and European partner nations and select units in Northern and Western Africa.6
The Flintlock Exercise incorporates partnered nations from Africa and North Atlantic Treaty Organization SOF in an annual effort to demonstrate commitment of Western powers to the development of the Malian and Western African security. The partnerships that are formed and strengthened over this month-long event are indicative of the New World Dynamic.

**General Purpose Forces: Adaptability to Prevent, Shape and Win**

Despite the apparent conclusion to the expeditionary phase of the War on Terror, the New World Dynamic holds a myriad of challenges and opportunities for GPF. The role of GPF in defending American interests and ensuring security remains a vital component of national defense policy. The recently released defense priorities lists 10 primary missions for the U.S. Armed Forces that include counterterrorism and irregular warfare as well as conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations. The broad and inclusive list demonstrates that GPF will be required to conduct a variety of tasks in a multitude of environments, all of which will be in support of policy objectives of the long-term goals in the New World Dynamic. While these priorities show a shift away from conventional maneuver warfare where GPF elements excel, there is reason to be encouraged by the ability of GPF to conduct these non-standard operations to meet the demands of the New World Dynamic. First, at the operational and tactical level a decade of irregular conflict has developed a seasoned and experienced force that has the combat capability and nuanced understanding of irregular warfare that has never before existed in a conventional military. The adaptability, flexibility, and often the courage and restraint of GPF warfighters have been the hallmark of America’s successes in Iraq and Afghanistan. This professional force is being shaped to meet the emerging challenges of the New World Dynamic by strategic leadership that has embraced the challenges of future operations and is issuing guidance to ensure appropriate execution. General Odierno, the Chief of Staff of the Army now identifies the new priorities for the U.S. Army as prevent, shape, and win.

This “prevent, shape, win” construct captures the Army’s unique role as part of the joint force, and rests upon the capabilities, depth, and vast experience resident within our Army. As we, the Army, continue to adapt to future strategic challenges, including resource constraints, we must ensure sufficient attention to each role.
The commitment to leveraging military power as a shaping tool in support of a larger vision for the New World Dynamic is embodied by General Odierno’s comments. The commitment to contributing to national defense through methods that are not associated with the fire and maneuver paradigm of large scale conventional war demonstrates that the American military is adapting at the strategic level in a manner that disproves the barrage of critiques that claim GPF is ill-suited for the New World Dynamic. This line of thinking contends that:

America’s strategic culture and way of war are hostile to politically messy wars and to most military operations other than war. Counterinsurgency and imperial policing operations demand forbearance, personnel continuity, foreign language skills, cross-cultural understanding, historical knowledge, minimal employment of force, and robust interagency involvement and cooperation. None of those are virtues of American statecraft and warmaking. Americans view war as a suspension of politics; they want to believe that the politics of war will somehow sort themselves out once military victory is achieved.  

This style of assessment, popular during the period that saw the American military adapt to the requirements of irregular warfare, is gradually losing validity as GPF elements strive to meet emerging requirements that are appropriate to the challenges of the New World Dynamic. Certainly, a transition such as this will be gradual but by embracing the challenge at the strategic level and employing the skills and experience of a combat hardened force the potential contribution of GPF is significant and relevant to American security.

The Interagency: Ensuring Unity of Effort in the New World Dynamic

The interagency is perhaps the most integral portion of American foreign policy in the New World Dynamic. The success or failure of a variety of initiatives will rely on the ability of various government agencies to coordinate the efforts and manage the requirements of specific missions. The ability to understand the priorities of various agencies and military efforts will become the hallmark of successful collaboration in the New World Dynamic. The interagency stands as the gatekeeper of success in this new environment and the degree to which various agencies can adapt to collective efforts that may
feature military participation will determine the long-term development of American allies.

As the lines blur between war and peace, and between military involvement and diplomacy, the role of the interagency becomes vital. The various elements that comprise the national-level intelligence collection, economic policy, and diplomacy would be well served to adapt the adage of Carl von Clausewitz, who summarized war as “simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.” In the New World Dynamic that will feature limited conflict, this distinction becomes even more complex as military operations, partnerships, and use of force are policy tools to achieve ends that are removed from the military means. Clausewitz continued, “Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa.”

While American military strength may not be applied wholly to war in the New World Dynamic, it is clear that the ability to place military operations of all types into appropriate context will ensure their optimal efficiency. The interagency is the enabler that can exponentially add or detract from the gains of military operations conducted in support of national-level objectives. To be successful both the military and interagency will be required to become fully invested in each other’s efforts, understand the priorities of the decision makers at all levels, and find means to support the other’s ends. This synergy will become the cornerstone of integrated foreign policy in an era where no one organization can independently influence a region, situation, or population as successfully as efforts made by the whole-of-government approach.

Endnotes


Snider: Unity of Effort in the New World Dynamic


Dual Use Special Operation Force

Major Thomas K. Sarrouf

The holistic approach as presented in the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) strategy of 2010 lays the foundation for transformation of the force, yet does not dictate how it should be accomplished. This broad and flexible strategy ensures that Special Operations Forces (SOF) possess “the capabilities, capacities and authorities to meet the enduring challenges of the future global environment.”¹ This paper proposes that in order to more effectively meet the USSOCOM vision of a force that meets the challenges of the future global environment, specific SOF must be empowered with the additional authority of Federal Law Enforcement Agents granted in U.S. Code Title 18.

Introduction

At no time in U.S. military history has the strategic utility of Special Operations Forces (SOF) been more credible than it is today. It would have been unimaginable a decade ago to foresee that SOF would be utilized as the strategic lead in operations as demonstrated during the invasion of Afghanistan, or in the multiple operations since 9/11.

SOF contributions in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere have won the day with U.S. policymakers on their strategic utility;² however, the SOF imperatives state that we must “ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations.”³ Yesterday’s accomplishments do not necessarily ensure the future legitimacy and credibility of SOF in the face of a changing global environment. SOF must be the chameleon, able to change to meet the challenges of emerging environments.

Background

To more adequately frame the context of this paper’s proposal, it is important to define the future strategic environment and the challenges within it. At the
same time, it is important to understand the identified gaps in U.S. strategic capability, which leads to the discussion of how USSOCOM and its forces can support the strategies implemented by the geographic Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and U.S. ambassadors. Additionally, it is important to place into context the specific authorities under U.S. Code Title 18 granted to SOF and sanctioned by presidential executive order, attorney general guidelines, and U.S. statute. Much as with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this expanded authority would provide SOF with “the unique ability to address [limited] national security and [transnational criminal] threats that are increasingly intertwined and shift between the use of intelligence tools such as surveillance and recruiting sources and law enforcement tools of arrest and prosecution.”

Although the application of this concept can be expanded across the spectrum of conflict, the scope of this paper is limited to specific lines of effort executed by USSOCOM subcomponent forces, those of counterterrorism (CT) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

First, the strategic assessment of the future environment as stated in the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and down to the USSOCOM strategy is commonly referred to as a complex, irregular, or hybrid environment. This irregular arena is where the threat comes less from traditional state-on-state conflict but instead is posed by non-state actors, state-sponsored actors, and transnational violent extremist organizations. This new environment is a “complex convergence of crime, migration, extremism, and competition for resources,” which is characterized as conflict between peoples versus states. It is important to note that in addition to the Department of Defense, other governmental agencies have identified the irregular environment as the place where the nexus between organized crime and violent extremist organizations collide. These mutually supporting entities garner support for their organizations by activities such as human trafficking, narcotics sales, arms dealings, money laundering, and counterfeiting. This hybrid paradigm is codified in the Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual, which states, “in some cases, insurgent networks and criminal networks become indistinguishable.”

Second, one must understand that many of these irregular and hybrid threats cannot be defeated by military capabilities alone, but rather through the whole-of-government approach in which primacy “needs to shift resources and emphasis towards policing, law enforcement and internal security.” Additionally it should be noted that most countries’ internal security forces
are a hybrid of law enforcement and military combined with intelligence capabilities. These forces are based on models similar to the Italian *carabineri* or French *gendarmerie*, and there is no U.S. model equivalent that crosses the spectrum of capabilities in this light.

Two gaps identified in the USSOCOM strategy are how to address the ability to have greater “strategic reach”\(^{12}\) into areas across the globe where irregular threats originate, and the way in which SOF becomes the “strategic bridge”\(^{13}\) between instruments of national power directed toward a single political objective.

**Discussion**

Theater security cooperation plans that involve building partner capacity are not new concepts, and military-to-military training conducted as FID has been one of the core missions of SOF and in particular the U.S. Army Special Forces for many years.\(^{14}\) These FID activities directly support the regional COCOMs’ theater security cooperation plans through the request of ambassadors and host nations. FID activities have been expanded to the training of host nation law enforcement and internal security forces by U.S. military as needed throughout the years. Contemporary examples are illustrated by U.S. Army Special Forces training local police in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, there are legal restrictions to the activities they can teach, limited by Title 10 authority. These limitations include only training foreign police in paramilitary and counterterrorism activities, not in investigation and intelligence gathering, which is the responsibility of Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Intelligence Agencies.

Granting additional Title 18 authorities to specific SOF components while simultaneously operating with Title 10 authorities will provide USSOCOM, COCOMs, and ambassadors with a greater degree of options under their direct control to build partner capacity beyond the limits of paramilitary and counterterrorism skills. An example of this is the “Avghani Model”\(^{15}\) which illustrates SOF with expanded capability, but without true authority. In 2005, a National Guard Special Forces, Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) conducted a classic FID mission in Iraq, combat training and advising an Iraqi Infantry battalion. While operating within the battle space of the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) under the command of Colonel H.R. McMasters, the ODA on its own initiative identified a gap in the strategy for training Iraqi Police. The ODA leadership identified an operational plan that
was doomed to fail, and based on their civilian law enforcement experience constructed a training plan that was implemented by the ACR and later on, the theater.

The skills the ODA taught the police consisted of basic investigation, intelligence, small unit tactics, and joint military law enforcement operations in a counterinsurgency environment. Although approved by theater commanders, the ODA did not possess the true legal authorities; however, they were successful in proving the theoretical concept of SOF with expanded authority. DOJ did not have the capability to work in a non-permissive environment in this case. SOF’s ability to work in that environment with skills that no other element possessed validates scholar Colin Gray’s theory that “Special Operations lie beyond the routine tasks of war, [and] represent operations that regular forces cannot perform.”

This paper does not promote that SOF take the place of the federal law enforcement agencies that, in conjunction with State Department (DOS) programs are charged with the responsibility of training host nation partner internal security and law enforcement. However, there is validity to the statement that “special operations are uniquely suited to perform such services on interim basis until a situation permits civilian law enforcement and police to execute these core functions.” The concept of “expeditionary law enforcement” would be a more permanent and complementary solution to SOF with expanded authority.

If the expansion of authorities allows SOF to train host nations’ partners in investigative techniques and human intelligence collection while at the same time allowing SOF to be active members of terrorism and criminal investigations having a nexus to the United States, these expanded duties would be mission or situation specific and long term investigations would be passed to the appropriate governmental agencies.

This concept would also be an economy of force option to the regional COCOM and ambassadors by balancing limited human capital that have distinct capabilities in a resource-restrained environment. The coordination between the COCOM’s assets and DOS-coordinated activities with DOJ entities overseas can be utilized more efficiently because SOF could be dual-hatted under their Title 18 authorities. This would be similar to the United States Coast Guard, which holds both Title 10 armed forces authority and Title 14 law enforcement authority under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Just as the Navy utilizes the Coast Guard and its Title 14
authority as a “catalyst”\textsuperscript{20} with expanded options and reach-back to other instruments of national power within DOJ, SOF with extended authority could be a catalyst under direct control of the ambassador or COCOM for leverage of other governmental assets only when those assets are truly needed, freeing up valuable DOJ and DHS law enforcement assets operating out of U.S. embassies. An example of this concept is the foreseeable troop reduction in Afghanistan, where total U.S. personnel in country will be limited by host nation or congressional regulation. With a defined number of combined U.S. personnel in country, the ambassador would arguably have two capabilities for every one person where both SOF and law enforcement are needed for partner capacity building or counterterrorism activities.

The logical question that arises is how would SOF gain the capabilities of federal law enforcement agents? These law enforcement capabilities already exist within the SOF community in the two National Guard Special Forces Groups. A recent RAND study on enhancing the contributions of National Guard Special Forces revealed that among the civilian skill sets that were possessed by National Guard Special Forces, law enforcement/security professions were the largest portion of the force, at an estimated ratio of 3:1. Based on extrapolated estimates from the personnel participating in the survey, the estimated number of National Guard Special Forces personnel with a law enforcement skill set is 1,040.\textsuperscript{21} This number represents a greatly under- or non-utilized asset available to USSOCOM, the force provider to the COCOM, and their theater security cooperation plans.

Recognizing the strategic utility of highly trained and capable dual-use SOF does not preclude the fact that significant policy review and/or policy-making and amendments would need to be conducted to actually utilize SOF in this manner. Additionally, the RAND study does not differentiate between SOF personnel who have local, state, or federal law enforcement experience. Nonetheless, this enhanced option for USSOCOM and its Army subordinate forces is best summarized by Lieutenant General John Mulholland: “Army SOF provides strategic bridging and consistently looks to link other U.S. Government capabilities, inherent in the joint service and interagency communities while working to develop or enable indigenous security solutions.”\textsuperscript{22} “This statement is the epitome of the USSOCOM “3D Warrior Concept,” where SOF is in the convergence of development, diplomacy, and defense.\textsuperscript{23}

Extending the strategic reach of the COCOM is another avenue in which dual-use SOF can be utilized. With dual authority, SOF can be deployed
to sensitive partner countries that do not want U.S. Title 10 forces within their boundaries, but will allow internal security force trainers and rule-of-law professionals. Under the lead of DOS or DOJ, dual-use SOF personnel utilizing Title 18 authority can conduct overt partner capacity building while providing the COCOM clandestine or covert options to conduct unilateral counterterrorism operations under Title 10. These activities could include, but are not limited to, unconventional warfare, operational preparation of the environment, and intelligence collection. The access and placement of SOF afforded by the utilization of Title 18 authorities could place SOF in a better tactical position to conduct kinetic strikes if the need arises or to conduct apprehension and take custody of persons of interest from foreign law enforcement agencies.

The opposite situation can be of benefit to USSOCOM as well, in which SOF conducts partner capacity building of law enforcement or internal security forces without the direct joint interagency cooperation of DOJ, DHS, or Treasury Department law enforcement agencies. SOF can conduct security assessments and identify material support cells and organized criminal threats to U.S. interests. Upon identification, SOF can work preliminary investigative procedures that have been deemed appropriate for judicial prosecution. SOF elements would provide evidentiary material that would be passed to a specified U.S. law enforcement agency working through the embassy and maintain chain of custody requirements from the point of origin, through investigation, and onward for use in a court of law.

**Counterargument**

Many would argue that expanding SOF authority to include Title 18 federal law enforcement powers are an unnecessary and redundant use of legal authorities that are outside the USSOCOM’s scope and purpose. Expanded authority exercised through USSOCOM does not have the proper legal expertise and backing of permanent DOJ staff to ensure the oversight of SOF personnel operating in this capacity. Another valid argument is that federal law enforcement consisting of the Drug Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, DHS Law Enforcement Agencies, and the U.S. Marshal Service have increased their programs abroad to build partner nation capacity.

Contrary to the belief that federal law enforcement possess adequate personnel and resources to “assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt and prosecute terrorists,” the United States Government Accountability Office
has identified federal law enforcement agencies as lacking the funding, directives, resources, and personnel to carry out their missions abroad.\textsuperscript{25}

SOF personnel with dual-use authority can be used as a force multiplier to free DOJ assets. Under the guidance of law enforcement attachés (legates) working from the embassies, the legate can advise and assist with reach-back ability to their parent organization. SOF in this case would have a limited scope and purpose to their law enforcement authority, and this would provide the oversight needed for the COCOM.\textsuperscript{26}

**Conclusion**

In an increasingly complex security environment, USSOCOM must look for innovative approaches to ensure that its forces have the capabilities, capacities, and authorities necessary to meet the future challenges of the global environment.\textsuperscript{27} The strategic utility of SOF has been recognized by all; it is now time to ensure its legitimacy and credibility into the future. A concept that utilizes a highly capable force with dual uses, one providing SOF better access and placement globally and maintaining both a strategic defense in depth and offensive tactical flexibility abroad, is just the approach we should consider when faced with a changing and irregular environment. Precedence has already been set by the U.S. Coast Guard. It is now time to codify a land-centric capability for USSOCOM that can operate in both the military and law enforcement environments.

**Endnotes**


5. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is one of five core missions of all service component special operation forces as defined in doctrine by USSOCOM. The context of this paper refers to Army service doctrine, denoting Army Special Forces and a land-centric concept of FID.


7. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 2.
19. The United States Coast Guard is the nation’s leading maritime law enforcement agency and has broad, multi-faceted jurisdictional authority. The specific statutory authority for the Coast Guard Law Enforcement mission is given in 14 USC 2, “The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable laws on, under and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/.
22. Mullholand, Countering Irregular Threats, p. 72.
23. USSOCOM, Strategy 2010, p. 4.

25. Ibid., 17.

26. Special Agent Christopher Peet (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston, MA), interview by the author, 9 September 2011.

27. USSOCOM, Strategy 2010, introduction.
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