In a December 2012 interview, Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki publicly admitted that his government has underestimated the danger posed by Tunisia’s Salafi-jihadis.\(^1\) Since the ousting of former President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011, Tunisia has witnessed a resurgence of Salafism, including a violent Salafi-jihadi stream. Although Tunisian authorities blame the increase in the number of jihadists primarily on regional dynamics toward religious conservatism as well as the former regime’s suppression of Islamists, it is evident that Tunisia has a domestic radicalization problem. Tunisian nationals were recently involved in a number of violent incidents in Tunisia and other countries in the region, with some having received training abroad, such as in the Libyan civil war.\(^2\) In late December 2012, Tunisian authorities even dismantled a terrorist cell linked to al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that was plotting acts of sabotage.\(^3\)

This article details recent violent incidents in Tunisia and also examines the factors behind the radicalization of some Muslims in the country.

---

\(^1\) In an interview with *The World Today*, President Marzouki said in reference to the recent Salafist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis: “We [the government] didn’t realise how dangerous and violent these Salafists could be.” For details, see Alan Philps, “Moncef Marzouki on Tunisia and the Struggles of Drafting a New Constitution,” *The World Today* 68:11 (2012).


**CTC Sentinel. Volume 6, Issue 1. January 2013**

**U.S. Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center, 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall, West Point, NY, 10996**

**Approved for public release; distribution unlimited**
History of Religiously-Motivated Violence in Tunisia

Throughout its more recent history, Tunisia has witnessed sporadic religiously-motivated attacks. On August 2, 1987, four bombs exploded in four hotels in Sousse and Monastir, injuring 13 people. An extremist cell called Islamic Jihad, which was subsequently dissolved, claimed responsibility. On February 17, 1991, three Islamists attacked the office of the government Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party in Bab Souika, leaving one security guard dead. The most prominent attack, however, was on April 11, 2002, when a young Tunisian linked to al-Qa’ida bombed the synagogue in Djerba in Tunisia’s south. The attack resulted in the deaths of 21 people, including 14 German tourists, five Tunisians, and two French citizens.

In 2003, as an immediate response to the Djerba attack, Ben Ali implemented a comprehensive set of anti-terrorism laws. Religiously-motivated incidents decreased in the subsequent years. Yet in 2006, a small group of five Tunisians and one Mauritanian, known as the Soldiers of Asad Bin al-Furhat (or the Suleiman Group), entered Tunisia from Algeria with six Kalashnikov rifles and several grenades. The Suleiman Group aimed to establish a nationwide jihadist movement to bring down the Ben Ali regime by force. Trained by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (which became AQIM in 2007), the group quickly recruited more members, numbering 40 at its height. Yet the government subsequently crushed the group in the town of Suleiman. Religiously-motivated attacks seemed under control from that point forward.

This changed with Tunisia’s revolution in 2011, which saw a resurgence of religious ultrarelativism, including Salafi-jihadism. Since the revolution, ultrarelativistic Muslims have obtained arms and clashed with security forces throughout the country. In May 2012, a police station as well as bars selling alcohol in the governorate of El Kef. In June, they firebombed several offices of Tunisia’s biggest trade union, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). That same month, an attack on an arts exhibition in La Marsa killed one, injured 65 policemen and led to the arrests of more than 160 people.

In September, violent Salafist mobs took to the streets to protest against an American film ridiculing the Prophet Muhammad and stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tunis and an American school—leaving three dead and causing the U.S. Embassy to recall its unessential staff from Tunis.

Moreover, two Tunisian Salafi-jihadists were arrested in October 2012 for their alleged involvement in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Libya that led to the death of its ambassador. One of the suspects, Ali Harzi, was released due to lack of evidence in January 2013, although authorities “strongly suspected” his involvement. He is, however, still facing charges for membership in a terrorist organization.

Most recently, on December 21, Tunisian authorities uncovered a terrorist cell affiliated with AQIM, leading to the arrests of 16 people, including three Libyans, while an additional 18 other cell members are still being pursued. The members of the group, known as the Militia of Uqba Ibn Nafaa in Tunisia, reportedly received training and weapons in Algeria and Libya. They sought to establish a Tunisian branch of AQIM to overthrow the government by force.

Radicalization in Tunisia

Certain territories in Tunisia have traditionally been more rebellious and religiously conservative than others. Tunisia’s south and interior, in particular, have found it difficult to deal with the modernization policies launched by the colonial and post-independence governments, whose leaders came from more privileged areas. The secular nature of the Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes were particularly alienating for Tunisia’s conservative Muslims. Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali originated from Tunisia’s coastal region, which enjoyed much higher government spending for development than Tunisia’s interior and south, resulting in a wide regional gap in prosperity and modernization.

Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s policies to limit the power of traditional religious establishments also alienated many conservative Muslims. For example, shortly after his ascent to power,
Bourguiba dismantled the Great Zaytouna Mosque and other Islamic institutions with their centuries-old traditions of teaching and scholarship. His willingness to break with many of Tunisia’s Islamic traditions, such as the fast, led many conservative Muslims to retreat further into religion. Consequently, Tunisia’s society became increasingly polarized between the secular elite and the more conservative broader public. This became particularly obvious when urbanization exposed many conservative Muslims to the lifestyle of the country’s secularists in the big cities.

The biggest opposition to the secular elite was the Islamist movement Jama’a Islamiyya (The Islamic Group), renamed as the Islamic Tendency Movement in 1981 and then Ennahda in 1989. Although this Islamist movement was only loosely connected to violence, enduring regime suppression and persecution contributed to the split of some of its members and the creation of more violent splinter groups.

Regime suppression culminated in 1991, when the Bab Souika affair provided the Ben Ali government with a pretext to crack down on the entire Islamist movement. The terms “Islamists” and “terrorists” even became interchangeable in many respects within regime circles. Yet the crackdown on Tunisia’s predominantly moderate Islamists only benefited the emergence of more radical interpretations of Islam in Tunisia—although this trend was also due to regional dynamics toward religious radicalism at the time. Ben Ali’s 2003 anti-terrorism laws, which resulted in the arbitrary imprisonment of hundreds of Islamists, some of whom were tortured, further deepened the resentment that many conservative Muslims held toward the regime.

**Resurgence of Salafism After the Revolution**

Yet it was only after the revolution in 2011 that Tunisia began to suffer from frequent small-scale religiously-motivated violence—this being despite the fact that the majority of ultraconservative Muslims in Tunisia belong to the “scientific Salafists” who reject the use of violence and focus on preaching a “pure” version of Islam. Most of the scientific Salafists are apolitical, but recently some have also decided to join the political game through the creation of the Salafist Reform Front Party, or Jabhat al-Islah. The ultraconservative Hizb-ut-Tahrir party—belonging to the international organization with the same name—was also recently licensed in Tunisia. Similar to the scientific Salafists, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has endorsed non-violence, although some of its leaders have in the past expressed more violent rhetoric. Both ultraconservative groups advocate the establishment of a caliphate, but Jabhat al-Islah favors a gradual national approach to achieve this goal, while Hizb-ut-Tahrir advocates an international Islamic revolution.

While a minority within a minority movement—the number of Salafists is generally estimated at 10,000 in a country of about 10.7 million—Tunisia’s Salafi-jihadis, who are prepared to adopt violence to achieve their goals, have colored the perception of the movement as a whole. Increasingly mixing with jihadists are regular criminals and economically disenchanted people, both of whom share blame for the recent outbreak of violent incidents in Tunisia.

The recent resurgence of Salafism is due to several factors. Most importantly, in 2011 many imprisoned leading Salafist militants charged under the former regime, such as Sayf Allah bin Hussayn (also known as Abu Iyadh), were released from prison. In addition, many exiled ultraconservative Muslims returned to Tunisia following the revolution, such as Shaykh Béchir Ben Hassan, a leader within Tunisia’s Salafist landscape who has been active in spreading ultraconservative Islam ever since his return to Tunisia. The increased religious liberties in Tunisia’s young democracy have also allowed ultraconservative religious scholars from abroad to come to the country to spread their beliefs.

---

20 Bourguiba famously appeared on television during Ramadan drinking a glass of orange juice and asking Tunisians to do the same.
22 The 1991 Bab Souika attack was executed by young members of the Ennahda movement, but attempts to link senior members to the attack or other incidents have failed.
23 For example, Islamic Jihad, which claimed responsibility for the hotel bombings in 1987, is a breakaway faction from the Islamic Tendency Movement.
24 These details came from the leaked U.S. Embassy cables published by Wikileaks. The cable in question was dated November 29, 2005.

26 For details, see Anne Wolf, “New Salafist Party: A Threat to Tunisia’s Democratic Transition?” Middle East Online, August 3, 2012.
There are a number of support facilities that facilitate the spread of Salafism in Tunisia. Mosques taken over by ultraconservatives remain important establishments to increase their influence, although the government has recently managed to retake some of them. According to Tunisian government estimates, radical clerics control from 100-500 mosques out of 5,000 in the country. Some individual imams have also encouraged violence while preaching, such as the imam of the prestigious Zaytouna Mosque who called for the deaths of the artists of the La Marsa arts exhibition before he was deposed by the government.

The Tunisian branch of the jihadist platform Ansar al-Shari’ā, founded by Abu Iyadh upon his release from prison, is another important means to organize and direct the Salafist movement. In May 2012, Ansar al-Shari’ā staged a mass rally in Kairouan attended by up to 5,000 Salafists. Ansar al-Shari’ā has also organized numerous campaigns against blasphemy and encouraged gender segregation. Significantly, the members of the AQIM cell dismantled in December 2012 were all active members of Ansar al-Shari’ā, although a direct organizational link between Ansar al-Shari’ā and AQIM cannot yet be proven.

In a climate of regional turmoil and the war in Syria, most of Tunisia’s Salafi-jihadis are still looking to other countries to wage jihad, with only small-scale organizational establishments and incidents on Tunisian ground. Recently, Syrian authorities revealed a list containing the identities of 108 foreign jihadist fighters—46 of whom were Tunisians. This indicates that Tunisia’s real challenge still lies ahead—namely, when such fighters return home, trained and potentially armed—increasing the likelihood for the medium- and long-term that Tunisia could become a staging ground for jihadist action. Tunisia’s south and mountainous areas provide a particular fertile ground for the creation of violent cells.

**Conclusion**

The future threat from Tunisia’s Salafi-jihadis depends on the regime’s response to religiously-motivated violence. Until now, the Ennahda government has stressed the need to engage in dialogue with Tunisia’s ultraconservative Muslims, while arguing that any kind of violence will not be tolerated. Ennahda senior members have repeatedly warned that excluding Salafists from society will only foster further radicalization.

Yet Ennahda’s dialogue-seeking approach has led the regime in many cases to turn a blind eye to small-scale Salafist violence. Only the most important Salafist incidents have evoked regime response: following the attack on the La Marsa arts exhibition, Ennahda senior members stated that Ben Ali’s anti-terrorism laws could be evoked to deal with such attacks. Moreover, the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis resulted in the imprisonment of 144 people, including two senior members of Ansar al-Shari’ā. While in prison, Salafists engaged in a hunger strike that caused the deaths of two members, including one leader.

Such developments only increased the animosity between Ennahda and ultraconservative Muslims, who view Ennahda as an ally of the West and un-Islamic. Despite that, Tunisia’s Salafi-jihadis are likely to continue to benefit from Ennahda’s “soft” approach toward their movement. This is all the more important given that Ennahda is likely to remain one of the most—if not the most—important player in Tunisian politics for years to come.

Anne Wolf is a graduate of Cambridge University specializing in North African affairs. She works in Tunisia as a journalist, researcher and political risk analyst.

31 In November 2012, Religious Affairs Minister Nourredine el-Khadmi stated that approximately 100 mosques are still controlled by the Salafists as compared to 500 earlier in the year. For details, see Antoine Lambrochini, “Tunisia Salafist Chief Calls for Calm, Warns of Explosion,” Agence France-Presse, November 2, 2012.
32 Ibid.
34 While only loosely interlinked, the Ansar al-Shari’ā branches in Tunisia and Libya are considered primarily responsible for the U.S. Embassy attacks in both countries. Less well known is that besides such violent activities, both Ansar al-Shari’ā branches are increasingly engaged in provisioning social services and organizing events, such as mass gatherings, campaigns against blasphemy and lectures of ultraconservative scholars, although Tunisia’s branch is far more active and geographically spread than Libya’s. For more details, see Aaron Zelin, “Maghribi’s Disciples in Libya and Tunisia,” The Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, November 14, 2012.
35 For details, see Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta, “The Emergence of Salafism in Tunisia,” Jadaliyya, August 17, 2012.
36 Ibid.
37 Joselyn.
39 Tunisian authorities have found it difficult to control the large desert areas in the south and the mountainous regions close to the border. Already the members of the Suleiman Group used Tunisia’s mountains to establish camps and to hold weapons training. Most recently, some suspects linked to the Militia of Uqba Ibn Nafia managed to escape to Jebel Chambi, Tunisia’s highest mountain.
41 For example, when a group of Salafists attacked protesters who expressed solidarity for the owner of Nasm TV, Nabil Karoui, no action was taken against the attackers. For details, see Roberta Lusardi, “Tunisia’s Islamists: Ennahda and the Salafis,” Middle East Policy Council, May 8, 2012.
42 “Tunisia Rioters to be Charged Under Anti-Terror Law,” Al-Arabiya, June 12, 2012.
45 “Tunisia Jails Salafist Leader in U.S. Embassy Attack for One Year.”
Jordan in the Balance: Evaluating Regime Stability

By Sean L. Yom

Protests regularly punctuate public life in Jordan, but the national riots that exploded in November 2012 over the rising cost of fuel seemed especially concerning. Coming after two years of continuous protests by opposition groups demanding economic and political reforms, telltale signs of rebellion—burning tires on highways, anti-regime chants in the streets, crowds attacking police stations—suggested the onset of revolution in the Hashemite kingdom.

Jordan plays a vital geopolitical role for the United States and its allies. It is a peace partner to Israel, provides neighboring oil-rich Iraq and Saudi Arabia with a military buffer, and serves as a natural barrier against Syrian and Iranian interests. There is no question that regime collapse in Amman would unleash strategic volatility. Although Jordan’s King Abdullah II has not reacted masterfully to the past two years of opposition, his autocratic monarchy will most likely retain power.

This article provides context on Jordan’s current troubles, outlines the factors that have made this crisis particularly unstable, and finally establishes the five reasons why the regime will likely survive.

Background

The “Jordanian Spring” began in late December 2010, when a confluence of political factors—another hollow parliamentary election, another ineffectual prime minister—converged upon a public already suffering from declining employment opportunities and rising living costs. Drawing inspiration from demonstrators in Tunisia and Egypt, opposition forces quickly mobilized to launch protests against a stale autocratic system they saw as rife with corruption, closed to public participation, and commanded by a recalcitrant king.1

Among the first protesters were the powerful Islamist movement headlined by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic Action Front party, the professional syndicates and labor unions, and liberal youth activists like the March 24 Group, whose tech-savvy approach compensated for their lack of civic manpower.2 By the fall, however, new opposition organizations from civil society had coalesced as well. Among them were the National Reform Front, a coalition of disgruntled political elites and social entrepreneurs, and more surprisingly tribal youth activists in the rural northern and southern governorates, who broke from the traditionally loyal stance of their elders to mount their own rallies for reform.

These forces have mounted a significant campaign of contentious politics—demonstrations, marches, occupations, boycotts, and sit-ins—resulting in more than 7,000 protest events during the past two years.3 For a soft authoritarian kingdom that ended martial law in 1989 and prides itself on moderation and tolerance, such persistent strife has been troubling. The U.S. government has followed these events with caution, and initiated significant overtures, such as special visits by high-ranking officials or more recently the deployment of U.S. troops, to boost the regime’s confidence.4

Rebellious Signs

Forecasters of revolution argue that today’s atmosphere of opposition breaks from conventional protests in Jordan in several ways.5 First, the royal family no longer enjoys insulation from critique. Despite the threat of arrest due to lèse majesté laws and suffocating security statutes, activists have criticized King Abdullah and Queen Rania for their perceived aloofness, spending habits, and resistance to reform.6 Such practices would have caused regime crackdowns in the martial law era, when Abdullah’s father, King Hussein, ruled. Today, however, rumors about royal corruption or jokes about the king’s poor Arabic are fodder in public discussion. Indeed, some protesters compare Abdullah with other deposed dictators, such as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Mu’ammar Qadhafi of Libya, in a poignant reminder to the palace that change must come now.7

Second, although public protests have long been cherished by Jordan’s urban civil society, palace observers have been surprised at the spread of dissent into rural East Bank tribal communities long assumed to be bastions of monarchical loyalty. Bedouin and settled tribes supported the Hashemite family when they arrived in the 1920s.8 Yet mass Palestinian migration changed Jordan’s demography due to the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967, rendering the East Bank tribes a minority. After the 1970 Black September civil war, anti-Palestinian bias saturated state institutions and the military.9 In this context, the fact that the youngest generation of East Bank Jordanians has marched to demand reforms reveals that economic and political frustrations have boiled over into the regime’s social bedrock.10

Third, the reform concessions granted by King Abdullah have not satisfied opposition constituencies. The palace has executed several classic strategies of shuffling and liberalization in hopes of appeasing the public. For instance, it frequently sacked its prime ministers in

3 “We Have No Other Choice—Ensour,” Jordan Times, November 15, 2012.

8 For more on the colonial origins of tribal support for the Hashemite monarchy, see Mary Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
response to popular frustration, with five having held the premiership since 2010 alone, and also created new laws that nominally expanded the boundaries of political freedom, such as revising the constitution.11 Yet oppositionists are seasoned enough to recognize “Many public grievances are grounded in economic concerns that the cash-strapped government cannot resolve, such as the nearly 25% unemployment rate, the removal of subsidies on fuel and electricity, and stubborn inequality between rich and poor.”

such shallow reforms.12 Moreover, many public grievances are grounded in economic concerns that the cash-strapped government cannot resolve, such as the nearly 25% unemployment rate, the removal of subsidies on fuel and electricity, and stubborn inequality between rich and poor.13

With parliamentary elections scheduled for January 23, 2013, these signs point to continued turbulence. After all, it was the November 2010 contest that helped spark the Jordanian Spring, as electoral laws are engineered to produce conservative and quarreling parliaments that pose little resistance to royal fiat.14 Distrust of the palace and parliament motivates many protesters, and some analysts might be tempted to fear the worst if the Islamists and other opposition forces follow through with their promise to boycott the upcoming elections, and then organize more street protests to decry the legislative body that results.

The boycott remains in full effect. When the Electoral Commission presented the final list of the 820 publicly registered candidates running for parliament in late December 2012, absent from it were the names of Islamists and other familiar opposition faces.15

Resilience and Survival
Yet for all these troubles, Jordan is little closer to revolution than prior to the Arab Spring. Five factors suggest that while social churn and political burn may claim the next few parliaments or appointed governments, the authoritarian backbone of the kingdom—the Hashemite monarchy—will remain in power.

First, Jordan’s security forces are robustly capable of stamping out any opposition that becomes extremely militant or directly attacks regime institutions. The Interior Ministry controls not just the civil police, but also the darak, or specialized riot police that have proven far more effective in containing crowds.16 Beyond them is the army, under direct command of the kingship. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, the Jordanian army has deployed violence on domestic soil to protect the palace before; it emerged bloodied and victorious during the 1970 civil war, and its tanks restored order when more violent fuel price riots erupted in April 1989 and August 1996. There are no signs the army will refuse to deploy once again if protests rage out of control. The military is a highly professionalized force with a powerful institutional culture of hierarchical obedience, organizational unity, and monarchical loyalty—a holdover of its imperial creation by the British, as well as early experiences defending the crown during the turbulent era of Arab nationalism.17 While a robust coercive apparatus alone does not guarantee regime survival, it can make the task of opposition far more difficult, as in Syria, where a raging civil war costing some 60,000 lives has yet to depose Bashar al-Assad.18

Second, the actual number of protesters has not reached anywhere close to a critical mass. A few thousand demonstrators in a capital of two million is not enough to create a revolution, and most of the protests during the past two years have attracted just a few hundred participants—most being eager members of the organizing group, not the average middle-class urban citizen whose preferences have been the quintessential swing vote in more revolutionary Arab countries. What

“Most protests have been loud but not violent. Even in the November riots, only a handful of public institutions suffered direct attack.”

made Egypt’s Tahrir Square bulge with opposition was not when longstanding youth groups and other dissenting organizations mobilized diehard supporters; they had organized protests and demonstrations for years, with little effect. The tipping point came when citizens with no preexisting affiliation with any opposition group decided to join them.

Third, most protests have been loud but not violent. Even in the November riots, only a handful of public institutions suffered direct attack. In more typical episodes, ardent oppositionists march, demonstrate, and shout—but refrain

14 Even though the parliament has little legislative ability, electoral laws are still biased against opposition forces in two ways. First, electoral districts are heavily gerrymandered, and methodically favor rural districts populated by nominally loyal tribal communities over historically contentious urban neighborhoods where the Palestinian-dominated Islamist movement operates. Second, citizens may cast just one vote in their district, even if there are multiple seats. In practice, this privileges wealthy, conservative, independent candidates who can provide patronage in return for votes, and so they have more incentive once elected to fight over access to state resources rather than broader economic and political issues.
from throwing stones, assaulting police officers, and escalating confrontations into direct violence. To date, only a few citizens have been killed due to the protest wave since December 2010, an impressive figure spanning more than 7,000 demonstrations, rallies, and marches. There are two reasons for this. The first is the worsening violence in Syria. Wary of emulating the conflict there on domestic soil, and with many sharing close family ties across the border, many Jordanians self-moderate when confronting the police at protests, refusing to escalate confrontations into violence. The second reason is that inversely, the regime has deliberately chosen to tolerate opposition activism rather than squash it outright, whereas the use of violence and repression has had the effect of radicalizing and hardening dissent in other Arab contexts.

Fourth, there is no coordinated nationwide opposition movement. Even in fragmented Libya, disparate militias and provincial councils managed to uneasily cooperate under the aegis of a transitional command during the civil war against the Qadhafi regime. Yet in Jordan, dividing lines have become the regime’s blessing in disguise, as longstanding mistrust over identity and religion continue to stymie opposition activists. For instance, Palestinian leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood and youth activists from East Bank tribes may both despise royal corruption, but they will likely never march against the regime in any large-scale and unified way.

Fifth, oppositionists desire different types of reform. The most common demand articulated by opposition groups—seen on placards, published on websites, discussed in everyday discourse—is to end the rampant corruption linking prominent officials, including elites close to the palace, with questionable business investments and privatization deals. Beyond the corruption issue, however, is a serious divergence of political goals. Islamists demand an immediate transition to democracy through constitutional monarchism, whereas tribal activists desire economic concessions in the form of jobs and development prior to any large-scale political change. Youth activists desire more transparency and accountability from the government, but give few policy suggestions to sustain these generalities while also remaining wary of the Islamist agenda.

Conclusion
The fuel price riots that rocked November should raise Western attention, but not because Jordan teeters on the brink of collapse. The demonstrations expose two paradoxical perspectives, namely the continuing inability of an autocratic regime to satisfy the reform demands from below, as well as the continuing inability of social opposition to overcome internal differences and confront the regime. The question is thus not whether the monarchy will maintain power, but rather how it will do so—through continued neglect and increased repression, or through the eventual implementation of economic and political reform that can gradually satiate the many sectors of protest in the Hashemite kingdom.

Dr. Sean L. Yom is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Temple University, and specializes in political development and regime stability in the Middle East. He travels regularly to Jordan.

Boko Haram’s International Connections
By Jacob Zenn

Since carrying out its first attack under Abubakar Shekau’s leadership in September 2010, Boko Haram has unleashed a wave of violence in northern Nigeria, mostly targeted against government personnel and security officers, Muslim politicians and traditional Muslim religious leaders, and Christians. Although the insurgency began as a local movement in northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State, since August 2011 there have been increasing signs of international collaboration between Boko Haram and militants outside Nigerian territory, such as in Borno State’s border region, northern Mali, the Sahel, Somalia and other countries in the Muslim world. As a result of these international connections, Boko Haram, which in 2009 was known as a “machete-wielding mob,” has now matched—and even exceeded—the capabilities of some al-Qa’ida affiliates, while also incorporating al-Qa’ida ideology into the locally driven motives for the insurgency in northern Nigeria.

This article examines Boko Haram’s international connections and their impact on the insurgency in northern Nigeria.

Boko Haram in Mali
In November 2012, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) captured Menaka in Mali’s Gao region from the secular Tuareg-led militia, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). An MNLA spokesman said that MUJAO, AQIM and Boko Haram prevented the...
local population from leaving the city so that they could be used as human shields. Several sources corroborate the spokesman’s claim that Boko Haram fighters are present in Mali.

First, news reports from Mali said that 100 Boko Haram militants reinforced MUJAO’s positions in the battle for Gao and that Boko Haram helped MUJAO raid the Algerian consulate in Gao and kidnap the vice-consul, who was executed by MUJAO on September 2, 2012, and that Boko Haram supported

“Military officials from Niger said that Boko Haram militants are transiting Niger en route to Mali on a daily basis.”

MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Eddine in their January 8, 2013, attack on Kona, central Mopti region. Second, displaced persons from Gao, including a former parliamentarian, said that Boko Haram is training at MUJAO-run camps. Third, military officials from Niger said that Boko Haram militants are transiting Niger en route to Mali on a daily basis. Fourth, a MUJAO commander said in an interview with a Beninese journalist for Radio France Internationale that Boko Haram members were arriving in Gao en masse. Fifth, U.S. Africa Command General Carter Ham, who in January 2012 said Boko Haram has links to AQIM and al-Shabab, said in November that

Boko Haram militants train in camps in northern Mali and most likely receive financing and explosives from AQIM. In addition, the U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, Nigerian minister of foreign affairs, Nigerien foreign minister, Malian foreign minister and Algerian minister for Maghreb and African affairs report that Boko Haram and AQIM are coordinating operations in northern Mali.

A Boko Haram video released on November 29, 2012, suggested that Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau may be one of the Boko Haram militants in northern Mali. The video emerged only one month after a Nigerian media source reported that Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan discussed Shekau coordinating attacks in northern Nigeria from northern Mali during the president’s October 17 visit to Niamey and October 19 visit to Bamako. In contrast to Shekau’s first five video statements of 2012, the November 29 video is the first to show Shekau not seated in a room wearing traditional Islamic dress, but wearing green camouflage military fatigues and training in a desert with heavily armed and veiled militants. He did not speak in Hausa, the predominant language of northern Nigeria, but spoke entirely in Arabic, and he praised the “brothers and shaykhs in the Islamic Maghreb” and “soldiers of the Islamic State of Mali.”

The video was also not disseminated via You Tube like the previous five videos, but posted on a jihadist online forum. In the video, Shekau appealed to al-Qa‘ida by paying homage to “martyred” leaders such as Usama bin Ladin, Abu Yahya al-Libi and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. He recited five of the ten suras in the Qur’an that are most commonly quoted by al-

“Niger’s vast desert provides an ideal training ground and refuge for Boko Haram, while the Mandara Mountains along the Nigeria-Cameroon border, where state authority is weak and smuggling is pervasive, provides an ideal supply route, hideout and staging ground.”

Even if Shekau is not in Mali, it is unlikely that he is still in Nigeria. In contrast to Mali’s and Niger’s vast desert regions, where AQIM has hosted training camps since the mid-2000s that Boko Haram members have attended, northeastern Nigeria’s desert is not known to have terrorist training camps and is not particularly remote or uninhabited. Shekau and the other militants would have also placed themselves at unprecedented risk to train in broad daylight, as seen on the

8 Ibid.


11 In addition to the November 29, 2012, video, Boko Haram released Abubakar Shekau’s video statements on January 10, January 26, April 12, August 4 and September 30, 2012.


13 In September 2012, a long-time Boko Haram member and employee in Nigeria’s immigration service confessed to having trained in assassinations and special operations with 15 other militants, some of whom were Nigerian security officers. See “Nigerian Officials Held for ‘Boko Haram Links’,” al-Jazeera, September 30, 2012.
video, in Nigeria only days after Abuja announced a $320,000 reward for information leading to Shekau’s capture and lesser rewards for 18 Boko Haram Shura Committee members.14

Boko Haram militants could have joined the insurgency in northern Mali in alliance with MUJAO and AQIM, and Abubakar Shekau and his commanders may have found refuge in northern Mali or Niger to escape the Nigerian security forces crackdown on Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria. The crackdown led to the capture or killing of more than 10 commanders since September 2012, as well as Shekau’s spokesman, one of his wives and his daughter.15 Shekau and other commanders are likely coming into greater contact with AQIM and therefore attempting to steer Boko Haram’s ideology closer to al-Qa’ida.

**Borno’s Border Region**

While some Boko Haram members have come from the parts of Niger, Chad and Cameroon that border Borno State and where the three main languages of Borno—Hausa, Kanuri and Arabic—are spoken, few members are reported to have come from outside of those three countries or Nigeria.16 According to one of Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf’s relatives, 40% of Boko Haram’s funding comes from outside of Nigeria, and as many as one-third of its members fled Nigeria following major clashes with the government in July 2009.17

The architect of those clashes was a Nigerien, Abubakar Kilakam. While Kilakam was arrested and deported to Niger, several other Nigerien Boko Haram leaders are still in Nigeria, including Ali Jalingo, who masterminded bombings in Borno State and escaped an attempt to capture him in Bune State on January 7, 2013.18 Other Boko Haram leaders are reportedly still hiding in Diffa, Niger, and Boko Haram cells were uncovered in Zinder, Niger in September 2012 and Diffa in December 2011 and February 2012.19 Similarly, in 2012, Boko Haram members have been reported in several primarily Baggara Arabic-speaking cities of Far North Province, Cameroon, including Fotokol, Kousseri, Mora and the border town of Banki-Amchide, where on December 19, 2012, Cameroononian security forces arrested 31 suspected Boko Haram members, including two Nigeries, and confirmed that a Boko Haram logistics network facilitates “trans-border operations” and that Boko Haram uses the border area to “regroup after attacks in Nigeria, preparing for the next attacks.”20 Cameroon’s similar characteristics to Nigeria, such as a relatively poor majority Muslim north, which has seen trade reduced because of Boko Haram attacks on border markets and stricter border monitoring, and a wealthier majority Christian south, also make it an ideal recruiting ground for the group.21

In terms of geography, Niger’s vast desert provides an ideal training ground and refuge for Boko Haram, while the Mandara Mountains along the Nigeria-Cameroon border, where state authority is weak and smuggling is pervasive, provides an ideal supply route, hideout and staging ground. The recent upsurge in Boko Haram attacks in rural towns at the foothills of the Mandara Mountains in Adamawa State, where in 2004 Muhammad Yusuf’s followers had their first major battles with the Nigerian security forces, support the claims made by high-level Nigerian and Cameroonian officials that Boko Haram is operating from bases in Cameroon.22 Some of these reports and Nigerian analysts say that Ali Jalingo is Nigerian. Nigeria placed a $60,000 reward for information leading to Ali Jalingo’s capture in November 2012.19 “Niger Police Arrest 5 Suspected Boko Haram Members,” Vanguard, September 27, 2012; “Diffa Traders Hit by Border Closure,” IRIN, February 20, 2012.


17 These militants fled after a four-day battle with Nigerian security forces in northeastern Nigeria in July 2009, in which more than 20 security officers and as many as 1,000 Boko Haram members were killed, including founder Muhammad Yusuf. See “Suspects Charged in Nigeria Bombing,” al-Jazeera, December 25, 2011. Some of these fighters followed the sermons of Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf or viewed Boko Haram propaganda CDs and DVDs, which were available in border markets until the Nigerien and Cameroonian authorities enforced a ban on them in early 2012. See “Two Boko Haram Suspects Arrested,” ThisDayLive, February 18, 2012.

18 “Terror Suspect Escapes Arrest in Bune,” Leadership, January 7, 2013. Jalingo is the capital of Taraba State in Nigeria. Although it is not uncommon in northern Nigeria to assume one’s geographic origin as a surname, news
attacks include: a December 13, 2012, burning of a police station in Madagali, five miles from the border; a December 28 night raid on a prison, customs office, education administration complex and Divisional Police Headquarters in Maiha, three miles from the border, which killed 21 people, and a separate attack on Fufure, five miles from the border with Niger. As reports of Boko Haram in Niger and Cameroon have shown, the border region still serves similar purposes for Boko Haram as it did in 2003.

Boko Haram Diplomacy in Saudi Arabia and Senegal
Boko Haram appears to have a “diplomatic” presence in Saudi Arabia, in addition to other militant connections. In August 2012, a Boko Haram faction led by Abu Muhammad negotiated in Mecca with a Nigerian government team led by National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki and advised by General Muhammed Shuwa. President Jonathan has rejected new talks with this faction, however, on the grounds that “there can be no dialogue” with Boko Haram because it is “faceless.” 24 Abu Muhammad’s proposed negotiating team included, among others, the Cameroonian Mamman Nur, who lost a power struggle with Shekau to lead what became the main Boko Haram faction after Muhammad Yusuf’s death in July 2009. 25 Therefore, Abu Muhammad’s claim to represent Shekau’s faction is likely false, and Shekau’s spokesman called Abu Muhammad a “fake” in August 2012. 26

Boko Haram also has a deeper history of involvement in Saudi Arabia: Muhammad Yusuf found refuge in Saudi Arabia to escape a Nigerian security forces crackdown in 2004; Boko Haram has reportedly received funding with the help of AQIM from organizations in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia; and Boko Haram’s spokesman claimed that Boko Haram leaders met with al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia during the lesser hajj (umra) in August 2011. 27 More recently, the leader of a Boko Haram cell that was responsible for the November 25, 2012, attack on a church inside a military barracks in Jaji, Kaduna, was in Saudi Arabia during the months prior to the attack. 28

Boko Haram may also have had dialogue with the Nigerian government in Senegal, where in August 2012 the imam of the Grand Mosque in Bignona, southern Senegal, claimed that Boko Haram was recruiting local youths. 29 In December 2012, Nigerian media reported that President Jonathan’s adviser and minister of Niger Delta affairs, Godsday Orubwebe, held secret negotiations with Boko Haram commanders in Senegal arranged by the Malian and Senegalese secret services. 30 Based on Orubwebe’s credentials as the “author” of the government’s arms-for-amnesty peace program with Niger Delta militants in 2009, he may have discussed the release of Boko Haram members from prison and “compensation” for the destruction of villages, causing millions of dollars of damages and preventing the security forces from tracking down its members.”

Boko Haram systematicalilly destroyed hundreds of telecom towers, causing millions of dollars of damages and preventing the security forces from tracking down its members.”
Impact on Northern Nigeria
Emulating the Taliban

Boko Haram has long drawn inspiration from the Taliban and was called the “Nigerian Taliban” by outsiders from 2003 until 2009. Some Boko Haram members have reportedly trained in Afghanistan, and in northern Nigeria Boko Haram appears to have adopted tactics similar to the Taliban. As for example, in the second half of 2012, Boko Haram systematically destroyed hundreds of telecom towers, causing millions of dollars of damages and preventing the security forces from tracking down its members; used text messages to coerce government officials against obstructing Boko Haram operations and warned civilians against cooperating with the government; extorted “taxes” from merchants with the threat of death to the family members of anyone who does not pay; and employed complex Haqqani-style attacks with multiple suicide bombers. President Jonathan said suicide bombings were “completely alien” to Nigeria after Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives in his undergarments on a Detroit-bound airliner on behalf of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2009. On June 16, 2011, however, one day after Boko Haram warned that its members arrived from Somalia “where they received real training on warfare,” Boko Haram carried out its first suicide car bombing at the Federal Police Headquarters in Abuja, and then in August 2011 the Somali-trained Mamman Nur masterminded another suicide car bombing at the UN Headquarters in Abuja.

As a sign of Boko Haram’s desire to hold territory, the group has also planted flags with its logo in its desired future capital of Damaturu, Yobe State, and mobilized 500 supporters in the streets of Damaturu in December 2011 as a show of force after the commissioner of police said there were no Boko Haram members in the state.

Weapons Procurement

Boko Haram has procured weapons from abroad, which was described as a “worrisome development” by the Nigerian chief superintendent of police in August 2012. Such weapons include rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) with a 900-meter range for attacking hardened targets from long distances and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for ambushing military and police convoys. There is also concern that Boko Haram could use Libyans-made man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to shoot down commercial airlines flying into Niger, Chad and Nigeria—a tactic employed in 2002 by an al-Qa`ida-linked Somali terrorist cell on a Mombasa-borne Israeli El Al airlines flight. The threat of a Boko Haram attack on aviation prompted Nigeria to place all airports in the country on 24-hour security surveillance during the Christmas holiday in December 2012. The weapons in Boko Haram’s “upgrade” often enter the country through illegal or unmanned border crossings and sometimes with the collaboration of immigration officials. Boko Haram attacks on border posts, such as a 50-man attack at Gamboru-Ngala on the Nigerian side of the border with Cameroon on December 2, 2012, are often intended as a diversion to smuggle weapons through other border areas.

As seen in Shekau’s November 29 video statement, interaction with Islamist militias has likely caused a shift in Shekau’s messaging, which now resembles al-Qa`ida’s.”

Libyan-made man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to shoot down commercial airlines flying into Niger, Chad and Nigeria—a tactic employed in 2002 by an al-Qa`ida-linked Somali terrorist cell on a Mombasa-borne Israeli El Al airlines flight. The threat of a Boko Haram attack on aviation prompted Nigeria to place all airports in the country on 24-hour security surveillance during the Christmas holiday in December 2012. The weapons in Boko Haram’s “upgrade” often enter the country through illegal or unmanned border crossings and sometimes with the collaboration of immigration officials. Boko Haram attacks on border posts, such as a 50-man attack at Gamboru-Ngala on the Nigerian side of the border with Cameroon on December 2, 2012, are often intended as a diversion to smuggle weapons through other border areas.

32 Before 2009, Muhammad Yusuf’s followers were often called the “Nigerian Taliban,” but they had no formal connection to the Taliban in Afghanistan. They did, however, admire the Taliban, Mullah Omar and Usama bin Ladin. See “Boko Haram Trained in Algeria, Afghanistan,” ThisDay, September 1, 2011; “Nigerian Trained in Afghanistan,” BBC, September 2, 2009. The Nigerian chief of defense staff also affirmed at a presentation at King’s College, London, on November 21, 2012, that some Boko Haram members have trained in Afghanistan.

36 In September 2011, the chief of army staff said, “Involvement of foreigners in Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in Nigeria is certain. It is definite that the group receives training and possibly funding from some foreign elements…This is evident from the type of weapons we have captured from them, from the type of communication equipment we have captured from them and from the expertise they have displayed in the preparation of improvised explosive devices. These are pointers to the fact that there is foreign involvement in the terrorism going on in Nigeria.” See Yusuf Alli and Gbade Ogunwale, “Boko Haram Gets Foreign Backing,” The Nation, September 28, 2011; Toyosi Ogunseye, “Terrorists in Mass Importation of Rocket Launchers,” Punch NG, August 5, 2012.
Target Selection

Boko Haram’s target selection has also been influenced by its interaction with militants abroad. The Cameroonian Mamman Nur, who is wanted by Interpol and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for masterminding the August 26, 2011, bombing of the UN Headquarters in Abuja, reportedly fled to Chad and then traveled to Somalia to receive explosives training from al-Shabab before returning to Nigeria in the weeks before the attack. The UN attack remains the only time Boko Haram has targeted an international institution and was similar to al-Qa’ida’s attack on the UN building in Baghdad in 2003 and AQIM’s attack on the UN building in Algiers in 2007.

In 2012, the group also showed a new focus on foreigners. A British and Italian hostage were killed in Sokoto in March; a German hostage was killed in Kano in June; a French hostage was kidnapped in Katsina in December; and a number of Chinese and Indians were killed in Borno in late 2012.

Transnational Ideology

As seen in Shekau’s November 29 video statement, interaction with Islamist militias has likely caused a shift in Shekau’s messaging, which now resembles al-Qa’ida’s. The Boko Haram faction Ansaru has also embraced an ideology similar to MUJAO as well as the primary tactic of MUJAO and AQIM: kidnapping foreigners. Ansaru was placed on the UK Proscribed Terror List on November 23, 2012, for kidnapping and killing a British and Italian hostage in March 2012 while operating under the name “al-Qa’ida in the Lands Beyond the Sahel.” On December 24, 2012, Ansaru also claimed the kidnapping of a French engineer in Katsina 30 miles from the Nigerien border and said it would continue attacking the French government and French citizens until France ends its ban on the Islamic veil and its “major role in the planned attack on the Islamic state in northern Mali,” which is virtually the same warning that MUJAO’s and AQIM’s leaders have issued to France. According to the United Kingdom, Ansaru is “anti-Western” and “broadly aligned” to al-Qa’ida, while in its own words Ansaru says it wants to restore the “dignity of Usman dan Fodio.”

Similarly, MUJAO proclaimed at the time of its founding in December 2011 that it wants to spread jihad in West Africa and that its members are “ideological descendants” of Usman dan Fodio. MUJAO and Boko Haram have also both threatened to attack the West when their capabilities enable them to do so.

Conclusion

At a time when even al-Qa’ida is questioning its own brand, militant groups need not have formal affiliation with al-Qa’ida to have an international agenda. Boko Haram’s connections to militants in northern Mali, the Sahel and elsewhere in the Muslim world enable it to receive and provide support to other Islamist militias. As a result, Boko Haram will be capable of surviving outside of its main base of operations in Borno State if the Nigerian security forces drive out key leaders from Nigeria such as Abubakar Shekau. Moreover, Boko Haram has been able to draw on al-Qa’ida’s ideology and take advantage of anti-government and anti-Western sentiment in northern Nigeria to justify its existence and recruit new members from Nigeria and Borno’s border region.

43 “Gunmen Kill Chinese Worker in Northern Nigeria,” Energy Daily, October 8, 2012. The article also noted that, “In July, suspected members of Boko Haram attacked a factory in Maiduguri, killing two Indian nationals and stealing about $600 in cash. Separately, the high-profile kidnappings and subsequent deaths of British, Italian and German nationals earlier this year was blamed on Islamist extremists.”
44 Ansaru is the abbreviated name for Jama`at Ansar Islam and was similar to al-Qa`ida’s attack on the UN building in Baghdad in 2003 and AQIM’s attack on the UN building in Algiers in 2007.
45 Ansaru broke from Boko Haram after the January 20, 2012, attacks in Kano, which killed more than 30 innocent civilians, mostly Muslims. One of Ansaru’s leaders is believed to be Khalid al-Barnawy, who trained with AQIM in Algeria in the mid-2000s and participated in kidnapping operations in Niger. Al-Barnawy was one of three Boko Haram members that the United States designated as a “foreign terrorist,” along with Abubakar Shekau and Adam Kambar, in July 2012. Kambar was killed by Nigerian security forces in Kano in November 2012, while Shekau and al-Barnawy remain at large.
47 In the 19th century, Usman dan Fodio conquered Sokoto and most of northern Nigeria and influenced other jihads in the areas of West Africa where Boko Haram is present today, such as northern Cameroon, northern Nigerian, Niger, northern Mali and Senegal. See Philip D. Curtin, “Jihad in West Africa: Early Phases and Inter-Relations in Mauritania and Senegal,” Journal of African History 12:1 (1971): pp. 11-24.
48 MUJAO emerged for the first time in December 2011, when it claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of three European aid workers from a Saharawi refugee camp in Algeria in October 2011. It cited as inspiration historical militant leaders in the region, including Usman dan Fodio and El Haji Omar Tell.
49 MUJAO military leader Oumar Ould Hamaha said in December 2012 that, “If they don’t come here, one day we will attack [the West]. If we cannot do this in our time, our sons and the next generation will attack the West.” Similarly, in May 2010, one of Boko Haram’s members said in an interview with Agence France-Presse, “We will carry out our operations anywhere in the world if we can have the chance. The United States is the number one target for its oppression and aggression against Muslim nations, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan and its blind support to Israel in its killings of our Palestinian brethren. We will launch fierce attacks than Iraqi or Afghan mujahidin against our enemies throughout the world, particularly the United States, if the chance avails itself...but for now our attention is focused on Nigeria, which is our starting point.” See Sudarsan Raghavan and Edward Cody, “Mali Presents Risky Battleground for Neighbouring Nations and Western Allies,” Independent, December 9, 2012; Aminu Abubakar, “Nigerian Islamic Sect Threaten to Widen Attacks,” Agence France-Presse, March 29, 2010.
As evidenced by the collapse of the Malian state when Tuareg fighters based in Libya returned to “Azawad” after the fall of the Mu’ammar Qaddafi regime, the transfer of Boko Haram fighters from Nigeria to other countries in the Sahel does not bode well for the region. It means Nigeria’s problem will become another country’s problem, such as Mali, Cameroon or Niger, or smaller countries like Guinea, Burkina Faso and Senegal. Like northern Nigeria, these countries have majority Muslim populations, artificial borders, ethnic conflicts, insufficient educational and career opportunities for youths and fragile democratic institutions, and they have all witnessed Islamist militant infiltration in their countries and their countrypeople traveling to northern Mali to join the Islamist militias in 2012. Although the ethnic groups in some of these countries differ from northern Nigeria, Boko Haram and Ansaru have the potential to inspire other “Boko Harms” in West Africa with their ideologies that fault the secular government, democracy and the West for their troubles and hark back to a time when Usman dan Fodio and the Islamic caliphate brought “glory” and “dignity” to the Muslims of the region.

Jacob Zenn is an analyst of African and Eurasian Affairs for The Jamestown Foundation and author of the Occasional Report entitled “Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram: The Prize in al-Qaeda’s Africa Strategy,” published by The Jamestown Foundation in November 2012. In 2012, he conducted field research in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon on the socioeconomic factors behind the Boko Haram insurgency. Mr. Zenn earned a J.D. from Georgetown Law, where he was a Global Law Scholar, and a graduate degree in International Affairs from the Johns Hopkins SAIS Center for Chinese-American Studies in Nanjing, China. He has spoken at international conferences on Boko Haram and is frequently interviewed by international media.

Countering Islamist Radicalization in Germany

By Dorle Helmuth

In May 2012, German Salafists protested in the streets of Bonn and Solingen. The protests, which began after the Pro Nordrhein-Westfalen (Pro-NRW) citizens’ movement displayed pictures of the Prophet Muhammad, left 29 police officers injured, and resulted in the arrests of 108 Salafists.¹ The clashes between police and Salafists were unprecedented in Germany.

Concern over violent Salafists in Germany has featured prominently in domestic intelligence assessments since 2010.² According to the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV), violent Salafists are increasingly seeking to launch terrorist attacks in Germany, a country which after 9/11 mainly served as a logistics hub for foreign battlefields. In light of recent Salafist-inspired plots,³ this article provides details on the country’s general approach to counterradicalization, and identifies some of the problems with coordinating counterradicalization programs at the federal level. It also offers insight on specific outreach and trust-building initiatives between the German authorities and the Salafist community.

The German Approach to Countering Salafi-Jihadi Activities

In contrast to the United Kingdom’s prior approach, representatives of the German state generally refuse to work with Islamist groups. Counterradicalization initiatives in Germany have been directed against all forms of radical Islamism, including both political and violent Salafists. Politicians and security services emphasize the need to distinguish between political Salafists—the majority of Salafist structures in Germany that mostly reject violence—and a small jihadist minority advocating violence in pursuit of Salafist goals.⁴ Government officials also warn that these boundaries can be blurred as both violent and non-violent Salafists share the same ideological foundation. In other words, political da’wa (missionary) activities used to recruit followers and gain influence may serve as a dangerous breeding ground for violent Salafist radicalization.⁵ In one example, the man who killed two U.S. troops at Frankfurt airport in March 2011—the first deadly jihadist terrorist attack on German soil—had established ties with radical Salafists through Facebook contacts and online media sharing sites like DawaFFM.⁶

Yet in contrast to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark, all of which initiated concerted counterradicalization programs in response to the terrorist attacks in Spain and the United Kingdom and the Prophet Muhammad cartoon riots in 2004 and 2005, Germany got off to a later start

¹ Florian Flade and Martin Lutz, “Das unheimliche Netz der Salafisten,” Die Welt, June 6, 2012; Charles Hawley, “Salafists and Right-Wing Populists Battle in Bonn,” Spiegel Online, July 5, 2012. The far-right Pro NRW party is only active in North Rhine Westphalia and registered 2,100 members in 2011. The Pro NRW had collected some 400 drawings as part of a cartoon contest designed to critique Islam and display the “winning” and most provocative pictures in front of mosques and other Muslim venues. The cartoon contest, scheduled ahead of state elections in North Rhine Westphalia in the hopes that it would boost the Pro NRW’s votes, was initially canceled by state authorities but subsequently re-authorized by the courts. Major German Muslim organizations, such as the Central Council of Muslims, condemned the subsequent violence. In October 2012, a district court in Bonn found one of the Salafist protesters, a Turkish citizen born and raised in Germany, guilty of seriously injuring two policemen, sentencing him to six years in prison. Due to the severity of his jail term, the man will likely be deported to Turkey before the end of his sentence. See “Salafist für Messerangriff auf Polizisten verurteilt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 20, 2012. ² “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2011,” Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, June 2012. The report distinguishes between Salafists, al-Qa’ida and franchises, and regional jihadist groups. ³ For further information, see also Saajan M. Gohel, “Germany Increasingly a Center for Terrorism in Europe,” CTC Sentinel 4:8 (2011). ⁴ The BfV estimates that Germany is home to some 3,800 Salafists. About 150 of them are considered violent. Critics note the numbers of Salafists residing in Germany could be as high as 10,000. See “Koran Study,” Economist, April 21, 2012. ⁵ See, for example, Hunert Gude, Saud Mekhemmet, and Christoph Scheuermann, “The Missionary Zeal of Germany’s Salafists,” Spiegel Online, April 24, 2012. ⁶ Matthias Barsch, Matthias Gebauer and Yassin Musharbash, “The Radical Islamist Roots of the Frankfurt Attack,” Spiegel Online, March 3, 2011.
and also still does not have a national counterradicalization strategy.\(^7\) Apart from an increasingly dynamic Salafist scene, critics note that a national strategy is all the more necessary in view of Germany’s unique federal structure.\(^8\) Due to various restraints on federal executive power, Germany’s 16 states, and their respective 16 interior ministries and domestic intelligence offices—should be in charge of phone help lines and awareness programs or whether programs to exit extremist circles constitute a viable option. The state of Hamburg provides tangible assistance in the form of apartment rentals, vocational training, and job placement services to those who are looking to leave extremist circles. In some states, awareness outreach may only entail Muslim communities whereas in others they also include public schools, sports clubs, or state agencies (such as immigration services and prisons).\(^11\) Berlin’s intelligence service uses theological arguments to counter extremist interpretations of the Qur’an, while other states will not engage in any theological debates.\(^12\) In Brandenburg, the intelligence service in 2010 began convening “regional security dialogues” to educate the public on Islamist radicalization and extremism.\(^13\) Other states got an early start: “Contact scouts” of the Hamburg police started meeting with imams as early as 2001 and have cultivated their network since.\(^14\)

In view of this patchwork of state initiatives, the interior ministries of the 16 states have attempted to facilitate the nationwide coordination of counterradicalization programs and policies. Islamist extremism and, more recently, its Salafist tenets feature prominently on the agenda of the so-called Interior Minister Conference, which periodically brings together the interior ministers of all 16 states and the federal government.\(^15\) Coordination, however, remains politicized. For example, the Chemnitz declaration of 2009, stressing the need for exit programs, was only supported by the conservative-governed states.\(^16\) At the most recent June 2012 meeting, conservative interior ministers called for Muslims to take a greater stance against violent Salafists.\(^17\) Federal and state governments are also working together as part of a BMI-led working group called the “prevention of Islamist extremism and terrorism.”\(^18\)

Representing state and federal security services at the more tactical level, the Joint Counterterrorism Center (Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum, GTAZ) added a new working group dealing exclusively with counterradicalization in December 2009. It is specifically tasked with amassing federal and state counterradicalization initiatives, sharing experiences and best practices, and developing new policies.\(^19\) Mostly serving as an exchange forum, it is the closest the law enforcement and domestic intelligence services of the federal government and the 16 states have come to coordinating their various counterradicalization programs.\(^20\)

**Dialogue and Trust-Building Initiatives**

German authorities have reached out to Muslim organizations and communities as part of various dialogue and trust-building initiatives. Some of these initiatives include:

**The Prevention and Cooperation Clearing Point**

To provide a comprehensive overview of past, ongoing, as well as future local projects involving state and Muslim institutions across Germany, the Prevention and Cooperation Clearing Point (Clearingstelle Präventionskooperation, CLS) was established in March 2008 at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF). There are many examples of cooperative or educational projects.\(^21\)

---

7 On national counterradicalization strategies in other European countries, see James Brandon and Lorenzo Vidino, “European Experiences in Counterradicalization,” *CTC Sentinel* 5:6 (2012).

8 See, for example, Uwe Schünemann, “Die dschihadistische Herausforderung,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 18, 2010.

9 To eradicate centralized Nazi structures for all time, the Constitutional Council in 1948 combined executive power-sharing with the territorial fragmentation of powers to the Länder.


15 States take turns in presiding over the conference. While the IMK-meetings are also attended by the federal interior minister, he lacks veto power.


20 In November 2012, the BFV and the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) further announced the creation of the Joint Counter Extremism and Terrorism Center (Gemeinsames Extremismus und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum). The GETZ will focus on the analysis of and information-sharing on foreign, left- and right-wing versions of extremism and terrorism, as well as espionage and proliferation.

21 For a list of 72 sample projects, see “Clearingstelle:
Members of the police coach soccer clubs and offer bicycle training courses in Muslim and high-immigration neighborhoods. Law enforcement units seek to improve their intercultural communication skills in Berlin, Stuttgart, and Essen. In Düsseldorf, Muslim associations and police jointly developed a framework for “dialogue, peace and integration.” The Recklinghausen police have identified Muslim leaders who can assist them in crisis situations. The CLS also maintains a public database of some 300 contacts representing Muslim communities and the German state. Anyone with an idea for a new project can access the database to contact relevant parties, and ask the CLS for support. A closer look at the inventory of 300 names in the database, however, shows that more than 70% represent state agencies, suggesting that the network—which is supposed to expand further—is in particular need of additional Muslim contacts.

Supporting Vulnerable Individuals: Nationwide Phone Hotlines
Since July 2010, the BfV has been running the nationwide HATIF phone hotline, designed to help individuals break with their violent jihadist environment. HATIF is the Arabic word for phone and the German acronym stands for “leaving terrorism and Islamist fanaticism.” Apart from individual consultations, exit program support may include filing paperwork with other bureaucracies, protecting against threats from relatives and supporters of the jihadist scene, schooling or vocational training placements, and housing and financial aid. It is not clear how many people, if any, have taken advantage of the program. Various states have voiced considerable criticism over whether domestic intelligence services, whose mandates focus on intelligence collection, should or can play a role with regard to these exit programs.

In light of these reservations, it is important to note that the BAMF began offering a second crisis hotline, called Counseling Center Radicalization (Beratungsstelle Radikalisierung), in January 2012. Similar to the HATIF service run by the BfV, this help line encourages family members, friends, relatives, and teachers to come forward about friends or relatives who have recently become radicalized. Perhaps not coincidentally, this was one of the first projects resulting from the new BMI-led Security Partnership Initiative between state and Muslim institutions created in June 2011.

The German Islam Conference
Since Germany’s 17 interior ministries refuse to work with Islamist groups, they have instead opted to create a permanent forum between moderate Muslim institutions and the German state. The periodical meetings of the DIK are attended by five Muslim organizations, representatives from federal, state, and local governments, and individuals. Designed to improve Muslim integration in Germany, the conference was first initiated in 2006 and continued by the second Angela Merkel coalition government in 2009, albeit with a slightly different composition and more “actionable” agenda. For example, the second conference included more local representatives from cities and municipalities but excluded one of the four major German Muslim organizations: the Central Council of Muslims in Germany. This group declined to participate, citing the lack of clear conference objectives, insufficient Muslim representation, as well as the sideling of discussion topics such as hostility toward Islam in Germany.

“German officials fear that an additional 185 extremists might either have obtained or still seek paramilitary training.”

The Security Partnership Initiative
DIK’s agenda is broad and only deals with radicalization prevention as one of many topics. In addition, discussions center on instituting Islamic religion classes in public schools, the education and training of imams, German society and values, and “Islamophobia.” To ensure a sufficient focus on counterradicalization, the BMI created the “Security Partnership Initiative – Together with Muslims for Security” (Initiative Sicherheitspartnerschaft - Gemeinsam mit Muslimen für Sicherheit) in June 2011, an alliance between various federal and state security services and six Muslim organizations. In contrast to the DIK, it is not a permanent institution, and its membership can change depending on the nature of the project at hand. Its exclusive focus is to prevent Islamist violence with the help


22 For example, in 2011 the CLS was responsible for coordinating 45 projects with a combined yearly budget of one million euros. See Martin Lutz, “Sicherheitspakt mit Muslimen,” Die Welt, June 25, 2011. The CLS further helps educate security services, provides experts for dialogue events, and distributes information.


26 The Deutsche Islam Konferenz is located at www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de. The five organizations include: Alevi Community in Germany, Islamic Community of the Bosnians in Germany, Association of Islamic Cultural Centers, Central Council of the Moroccans in Germany, and the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs. In addition, the secular association of Turkish migrants, the Turkish Community of Germany, has joined the conference. Similar arrangements also exist at the state level, as exemplified by the Berlin “Islam Forum.” See “Islamismus: Prävention und Deradikalisation,” Senatorsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport, Berliner Verfassungsschutz, November 22, 2010; “Wir ver-

suchen, die Name überall einzubeziehen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 2, 2011.


28 For details, see www.initiative-sicherheitspartnerschaft.de/SPS/DE/Startseite/startseite-node.html.
of Muslim communities. Community involvement is considered instrumental as community members are often the first to notice radicalization signs and are also better equipped to counter these trends by means of their religious and cultural expertise. The working group “trust” is afforded a key role as part of the initiative. It is much smaller in size, bringing together only a few select security services, in addition to the Central Council of Muslims in Germany and the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs. While trust building initiatives are generally drawn up behind closed doors, one of the group’s best known projects involves the recent creation of the Counseling Center Radicalization at the BAMF.

Security partnership membership, however, has declined significantly. Four of the six participating Muslim associations quit the Security Partnership Initiative in late August 2012 over a controversy involving the “Missing” poster campaign.29 The posters, intended for Muslim neighborhoods in Berlin, Hamburg and Bonn, tell the fictional story of parents who have lost their children to religious fanatics and terrorist groups. They are designed to encourage those with similar experiences to call the BAMF counterterrorism hotline. Opposed to the campaign, Muslim organizations complained that their feedback and critiques were not heard due to the unilateral agenda-setting and decision-making of Interior Ministry officials. The latter responded that their feedback was not only invited but that the posters were approved by the six Muslim associations before going public.30 As of January 2013, the Security Partnership Initiative lists the Alevi Community in Germany as their only Muslim partner.

Keeping a Close Watch: Raids, Bans, and Deportations
The assumed connection between political Salafist organizations and Salafist-inspired radicalization has also led to the closure of several community centers and mosques since 2001. Moreover, in mid-June 2012, the first Salafist association, Millatu Ibrahim, was proscribed after authorities raided 80 Salafist meeting places in seven different states simultaneously. According to the BMI, Millatu Ibrahim called on Muslims to actively fight Germany’s constitutional order, praised the violent May 2012 clashes in Solingen and Bonn in various online videos, and encouraged additional violent acts.31 In response to the ban, Millatu Ibrahim leader Denis Cuspert declared Germany a battle zone and called for jihad on German soil.32

“Even though Germany does not have a tradition of issuing security strategies, a strategic framework would not only be useful to boost coordination, but it would also help ensure that the best counterradicalization practices can be identified, cultivated, and shared across local and state borders.”

In June, the BMI also initiated proscription proceedings for DawatFFM, an online sharing site for Salafist videos and literature—of both political and violent nature—and networking.33 In addition, the BMI is spearheading an effort to prohibit The True Religion (Die Wahre Religion), an internet platform seeking to “expand da’wa activities in Germany” by means of information media, workshops and seminars.34

The 16 states have initiated deportations of foreign Salafist extremists whenever possible. They have also confiscated passports, or required regular checks with the police, to prevent German citizens suspected of violent Salafist tendencies from leaving for foreign terrorist camps.35 According to the BfV, at least 70 individuals “with a German connection”36 have trained in Islamist terrorist camps since the early 1990s. German officials fear that an additional 185 extremists might either have obtained or still seek paramilitary training.

The Road Ahead
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of Germany’s various local, state, and federal counterradicalization measures and initiatives because many of them have only been operational for a few years.

29 The four organizations include the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs, the Association of Islamic Culture Centers, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, and the Islamic Community of the Bosnians in Germany. See “Muslimische Verbände wenden sich von Friedrich ab,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, August, 31, 2012.
33 Frank Jansen, “Krieg Im heiligen,” Der Tagesspiegel, July 1, 2012.
35 Wehner; Gude et al.; “Terrorverdächtiger reiste ungehindert aus,” Der Tagesspiegel, September 14, 2011.
36 Individuals with a German connection are those who have lived or are currently residing in Germany, German citizens with migratory backgrounds, and Muslim converts. See “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2011,” p. 197.
years. Yet Germany’s federal structure surely complicates coordination of and information-sharing on counterradicalization programs. It is not clear in how far the GTAZ forum is sufficient in providing for a coordinated approach among security services. The forum also does not account for non-GTAZ agencies/programs involved in counterradicalization efforts. These are supposed to be tracked by the BAMF-led CLS, which is looking to better coordinate and network activities involving state and non-state actors, including Muslim communities and mosques. Nevertheless, it is also not clear how and why listed CLS projects were or are successful, or in how far Germany’s Muslims are represented by the Muslim contacts in the CLS database.

While the overall abundance of projects is laudable, Germany still does not have a national strategy that addresses counterradicalization efforts. Even though Germany does not have a tradition of issuing security strategies, a strategic framework would not only be useful to boost coordination, but it would also help ensure that the best counterradicalization practices can be identified, cultivated, and shared across local and state borders.

Dr. Dorle Hellmuth is Assistant Professor of Politics at The Catholic University of America. At CUA, she teaches courses on European Politics, Homeland Security, Counterterrorism, Transatlantic Security, and Comparative Politics. She is a fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) at Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Hellmuth also held an appointment as a research fellow at the National War College/National Defense University for more than five years.

Algerian Foreign Policy in the Context of the Arab Spring

By Anouar Boukhars

THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL context in North Africa and the Sahel has created difficult questions for the Algerian regime. The burst of democracy and revolutionary instability have challenged the doctrines, principles and practices that drove the foreign policy choices of the government since independence in 1962. As a result, Algeria’s old foreign policy paradigm that stressed the sanctity of the sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs has collided with the emerging pattern of international humanitarian intervention. Many in the Arab street, for example, saw the Algerian government’s hostility toward foreign intervention in Libya as a travesty. Since the onset of the Arab revolts in early 2011, Algerian state action has widely been viewed as driven by a desire to forestall or contain democratic contagion at its borders.1

At first glance, fears of democratic diffusion into Algerian territory seem to have conditioned Algeria’s position toward the Arab Spring. In reality, however, this is not the decisive factor in explaining Algerian foreign policy. If one examines Algeria’s geostrategic considerations and foreign policy outlook, then the regime’s calculus begins to look less mischievous. This article argues that the regime’s attitude to the Arab uprisings was largely shaped by domestic considerations, security policy and geostrategic imperatives. Algerian leaders were concerned about the potential disintegrative effects of the breakdown phase of authoritarian structures in neighboring countries on Algeria’s internal stability as well as on its status in the regional balance of power. The article also aims to show how Algeria’s position reflects the growing disconnect between its long-standing strategic posture and a fast-changing regional order that runs counter to the ideals and principles that it champions. Absolutist conceptions of sovereignty and inflexible opposition to interventionism even in cases of severe humanitarian crises might lead to a possible banalization of the guiding principles of Algerian foreign policy. Most importantly, Algeria might forgo the opportunity to be a relevant actor in managing the multiple crises in its immediate neighborhood—such as the developing situation in Mali—and shaping the ongoing debate about the international legal constraints on the “responsibility to protect.”

How the country adjusts to these changing realities will have regional implications. Algeria’s power attributes place it in a unique position to influence events. The country boasts the largest defense budget on the African continent ($10.3 billion in 2012), strong military power projection capabilities (due to its large fleet of aircraft) and recognized counterterrorism expertise. It also serves as a founding member and leader in several regional and global counterterrorism forums.

The Doctrine That Lost its Way

Since it gained independence in 1962, Algeria promoted an international architecture that defended the sovereignty of states and the right to decolonization.2 It became a strong voice of African and Arab revolutionaries and a leading proponent of the rights of the developing world, rejecting the Cold War rigid bipolar structure and mobilizing support in multilateral forums for its agenda of self-determination, inviolability of borders, non-interference in domestic affairs and sovereignty equality.3 In a well-received speech before the UN General Assembly in April 1974, Algerian guerrilla-turned-statesman Houari Boumedienne called for the creation of a new world order where the rights of the underprivileged are protected. The old order, he said, consecrated the impoverishment of the Third World and perpetuated global inequalities.

Boumedienne’s ambitions to build international support for his vision of a cooperative, equitable and just world order soon hit a roadblock. The eruption of the Western Sahara conflict in late 1975 set Algeria against Morocco, dividing the global south into supporters and detractors of war with your neighbor,” wrote Algerian scholar Akram Belkaid. The death of Boumedienne in 1978 did not end the stand-off between North Africa’s major two rivals, but it reduced Algeria’s ambitions to build a single-voiced powerful bloc capable of fighting for the creation of an international egalitarian political and economic order.

Under the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid from 1979-1992, Algeria’s foreign policy continued to be based on the same ideological principles of self-determination, freedom from external control, and its own special brand of socialism, but several factors contributed to an attenuated commitment to revolutionary idealism in its international relations. The end of the colonial era in Africa, the resistance of the industrialized West to the economic reforms defended by Algeria and the inherent instability of its own economic model led to a shift in the country’s foreign policy orientation. The economic and political constraints that Algeria began to face in the mid-1980s accelerated the country’s diminished global aspirations and refocused its diplomacy on its immediate neighborhood.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the descent of Algeria into a bloody civil war in 1992-1999 presented a series of new challenges for Algerian foreign policy. The regime did not have the money or the time to focus on world affairs. The country was faced with near financial bankruptcy in 1994 and it confronted a violent Islamist insurgency from 1992-1999.

The primary objective of Algerian foreign policy in the 1990s was to prevent the isolation of the country and any outside interference in its own internal conflict. The military regime sought international acquiescence for its decision in January 1992 to abort the electoral process and rob the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) of victory in the second round of parliamentary elections. More importantly, it fought to prevent the international community from focusing on the excesses of the struggle against armed Islamist groups. The foreign policy machinery was geared toward convincing the West and the Arab world that there was only a military solution to Algeria’s civil strife.

The election of the former foreign minister of Houari Boumedienne, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to the presidency in April 1999 reinvigorated Algerian foreign policy. Bouteflika was determined to restore Algeria’s battered image. The gradual return of peace to the country and an improving economic outlook facilitated his task. Bouteflika then embarked on reclaiming Algeria’s leadership role on the African continent, evident by its involvement in brokering a peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000, the creation of a cabinet position dealing solely with Africa, and the formation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001. The dramatic changes in the international geopolitical landscape caused by the 9/11 attacks on the United States strengthened Algeria’s geopolitical ambitions. The perception

---

4 For a short and excellent overview of the conflict, see Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate (Boulder and London: Lynne Riene, 2008).
5 Morocco bases its claim to the Western Sahara on several factors: 1) historical ties between Moroccan sovereigns and the tribes of the Western Sahara, as clearly stated by the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legal status of the territory; 2) juridical and colonial records denoting Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed territory before the Spanish conquest in 1884; 3) similarity in status of the Spanish Western Sahara and nearby Moroccan southern provinces, also occupied by Spain; 4) domestic public consensus on Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara; 5) threat to Morocco’s internal stability and security that a weak, non-viable independent Western Sahara state might pose. For an in-depth analysis of Morocco’s stance, see Abdelraham Maghraoui, “Ambiguities of Sovereignty: Morocco, The Hague and the Western Sahara Dispute,” Mediterranean Politics, Spring 2003.
6 President Bendjedid, for example, began the process of normalizing relations with France and the United States, which he visited in 1983 and 1985 respectively. The reopening of borders with Morocco in 1983 and the resolution of territorial conflicts with Niger, Mali, and Mauritania in 1981, and Tunisia in 1983, attested to this desire to establish constructive relations with its neighbors, especially Morocco. See Akram Belkaid, “La diplomatie algérienne à la recherche de son âge d’or,” Politique étrangère 2 (2009).
8 The creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (which included Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania and Morocco) during the summit of Marrakech (February 15-17, 1989) represented the culmination of this reorientation of Algerian foreign policy. See ibid.
10 Belkaid.
11 This strategy was quite successful. In the economic and financial realm, Western governments, especially France, and international financial institutions lined up to support ailing state finances through financial aid and investments in the oil and gas sector. It is estimated that between late 1993 and early 1995, state coffers were propped up by at least $15 billion, thanks to debt rescheduling and international loans. Politically, by the mid-1990s Algeria was integrated into a number of multilateral forums without having to demonstrate a minimum level of respect for human rights. See Cavatorta.
12 Since its creation in March 2001, Abdelkader Messaheb has occupied the position of delegate minister for African affairs, later expanded to include Magrebi affairs.
of Algeria by the international community changed dramatically. Long perceived as a major producer of violent extremism and a human rights violator, the country became a victim of Islamist terrorism and a key actor in the global fight against international terrorism. The proliferation of violent extremist groups in Algeria’s southern hinterland boosted Bouteflika’s push to make Algeria the linchpin in international counterterrorism efforts in the trans-Sahara region.13

The Foreign Policy Disconnect
Bouteflika brought a dose of pragmatism to Algeria’s foreign policy, skillfully engineering a strategic rapprochement with the United States and expanding defense and economic trade beyond the country’s old partners. Algeria’s participation in NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue in 2000 marked an important step in this regard. This signaled a shift toward pragmatism, however, did not result in any major changes to the country’s guiding ideological imperatives. For example, Algeria’s perception of self-determination remains unchanged, as is demonstrated by its continuing refusal to compromise on the Western Sahara dispute. Despite the indifference of the Algerian public to this conflict,14 the growing number of countries that have severed their relations with the Polisario,15 and the support of most Arab states and the major world powers for a consensual political solution, Algeria hopes for a referendum that leads to the independence of the Western Sahara similar to East Timor. Algerian diplomacy is still driven by the same objectives that guided its approach to the conflict since its eruption in late 1975: using every diplomatic tool to protect. The multilateral humanitarian intervention in Libya and greater Western engagement in Syria and Mali have brought into focus the major challenges facing Algerian foreign policy. The non-interference policy has limited the strategic options of Algeria to deal with the tensions in its immediate neighborhood.

The crisis in Mali is a stark reminder that a shift toward a more pragmatic approach to the imperative of non-intervention is crucial for Algeria to be part of the solution.

The crisis in Mali is a stark reminder that a shift toward a more pragmatic approach to the imperative of non-intervention is crucial for Algeria to be part of the solution. Algeria’s caution against rushed military intervention is warranted as is its emphasis on dialogue and negotiations with Tuareg rebels, including the Islamist militant group Ansar Eddine.16 If diplomacy fails, however, brandishing rhetoric of non-intervention becomes unsustainable, especially if a well-planned and well-resourced African-led military effort to dislodge violent extremist groups aligned with al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has the sanction of the UN Security Council and consent of the authorities in Bamako.

The non-interference principle has deepened Algeria’s trust deficit in the region and worsened its public image. Hewing to principled positions at a time of unprecedented democratic upheavals has earned Algeria the reputation of being a supporter of rogue regimes. According to Algerian former diplomat Abdelaziz Rahabi, the regime is struggling to position itself in the new architecture of international relations because it has not yet taken stock that the world is changing. This problem of adaptation does not apply to foreign policy alone, but it affects the way the whole country is governed as well.19

Domestic Considerations
Algeria’s opposition toward foreign intervention stems largely from principle. Yet in the case of Libya and Syria, it also reflects the Algerian regime’s own nervousness about the creation of another potentially dangerous precedent for Western imposed regime change in the Arab world. Algerian leaders fear that the practice of humanitarian intervention constitutes a slippery slope of more foreign interference as the effects of democratic expectations and popular protests in the Arab world continue to unfold.20 This feeling of unease and insecurity has only grown with the momentous political changes that have engulfed Tunisia and especially Egypt where Islamists outmaneuvered the old guard generals. The Algerian regime saw in the fall of two neighboring

13 It is important to note that it was Algeria’s successes in driving violent militant groups out of Algeria and into Sahel-Saharan areas that created a terrorist problem for fragile states like Mali. By 2003, several Algerian Islamist militants put down their arms as part of two amnesty initiatives launched by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, while the rest were successfully hunted down by Algerian security forces or forced to flee Algerian territory into northern Mali.

14 According to Algerian journalist Kamel Daoud, the Algerian public knows of the Western Sahara conflict through the lens of regime-controlled television and print media. Yet few Algerians understand why they support this “cause.” See Kamel Daoud, “Comment les Algériens voient le reste du monde,” Slate Afrique, July 24, 2012.

15 Belkaid.

16 Even in the case of Kosovo, Algeria refused to support the NATO air campaign in 1999 to save Muslim Kosovars from ethnic massacres by Serbs. When faced with respect for the principle of territorial integrity and Muslim solidarity, Algeria chose the former. See Abde-nour Benantar, “La démocratisation des États arabes redéfinira le dialogue de sécurité en Méditerranée,” Notes Internationals 29 (2011).

17 Ibid. Even in the case of Kosovo, Algeria refused to support the NATO air campaign in 1999 to save Muslim Kosovars from ethnic massacres by Serbs. When faced with respect for the principle of territorial integrity and Muslim solidarity, Algeria chose the former. See Abde-nour Benantar, “La démocratisation des États arabes redéfinira le dialogue de sécurité en Méditerranée,” Notes Internationals 29 (2011).

18 Ansar Eddine is one of three groups that now control northern Mali. The other two groups are the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).


20 Personal interview, Algerian journalist, Algiers, Algeria, June 18, 2012.
secular dictatorships a grave prelude to the Islamization of both societies, undermining their own national security as well as that of their surroundings.\textsuperscript{21}

Many government officials have made the case publicly that revolutionary change will destabilize the Middle East, spreading chaos and fueling the flames of Islamist extremism.\textsuperscript{22} Some have even portrayed the Arab uprisings as a scheme orchestrated by outside powers to reshape the political order of North Africa.\textsuperscript{23} A common refrain heard in

“The Algerian regime saw in the fall of two neighboring secular dictatorships a grave prelude to the Islamization of both societies, undermining their own national security as well as that of their surroundings.”

Algeria is that Western powers and their Gulf allies, especially Qatar, are the main driving force behind the revolutions. In a speech he delivered on April 14, 2012, President Bouteflika warned that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside. “The Algerian people, like all peoples who lived under domination, learned that no foreign party, however democratic and developed, will bring them development and democracy,” Bouteflika said. “What is happening today under the guise of democracy and respect for human rights remains subject to debate. Because democracy like development can’t be given as a gift or imported.”\textsuperscript{24} Keen observers of Algeria, however, believe that the regime is playing the nationalist card to temper Algerians’ disgruntlement with their social conditions during a difficult leadership transition.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Strategic Imperatives: The Case of Libya}

For critics of Algeria, the country’s obstructionism was especially alarming during the Libyan conflict where the regime refused to condemn the Mu’amar Qadhafi regime. The Libyan opposition openly accused the Algerian government of militarily supporting the Libyan dictator.\textsuperscript{26} Algeria’s position toward the conflict became more perplexing when it initially refused to recognize the Libyan Transitional Council (NTC) after the death of Qadhafi and the collapse of his regime. It took Algeria six days after the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly on September 16, 2011, to give Libya’s seat to the NTC to finally come to terms with the new reality.\textsuperscript{27} This made the regime look increasingly anachronistic, obstructionist, and inimical to democratic change. This latter explanation of Algeria’s behavior toward the Libyan conflict is, however, unsatisfying. There is no doubt that the fear of democratic diffusion helped shape the Algerian regime’s negative attitude to the Arab Spring. Yet this is not the only factor.

In the case of the Libyan conflict, the regime’s decision was mainly informed by strategic and security imperatives. First, it believed that the humanitarain calculus behind the intervention was disingenuous and feared the dangerous precedent that the enforcement of

\textsuperscript{25} The uncertainty over the succession of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who is expected to retire when his third term ends in 2014, is a cause of concern as it creates a political vacuum and amplifies popular dissatisfaction. The powerful security services are also expecting their own leadership transition. The DRS all-powerful and long-serving chief, General Mohamed Mediene, is in his 70s, and Army Chief of Staff Gaid Salah is 80-years-old. The outcome of these transitions would have ramifications for the pace of institutional change and the direction of economic reforms. See Lamine Chihi, “Algeria Awaits Change After 50 Years Under Ruling Party,” Reuters, October 16, 2012.

\textsuperscript{26} “Our only response to Algeria is: stop supporting Kadhafi and stop helping him terrorise and kill innocent civilians and our loved ones,” said Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, the then vice president of Libya’s National Transitional Council. See “Libyan Rebels Warn Algeria: ‘Stop Backing Kadafi,’” Agence France-Presse, July 10, 2011.

\textsuperscript{27} “Libyan Leader Begins State Visit to Algeria,” Agence France-Presse, April 15, 2012.

the doctrine of the “responsibility to protect” against the depredations of authoritarian regimes sets.\textsuperscript{28} Second, the regime was concerned about the effects of regime change on the Western Sahara conflict and the balance of power in the region.\textsuperscript{29} Algeria sees France, which played a major role in the NATO intervention, and its regional allies, namely Morocco, as the biggest hurdle in its quest for regional dominance.\textsuperscript{30} If Libya joins the pro-Morocco axis, it would counterbalance Algeria’s power and neutralize its ambitions to dominate North Africa and the Sahel.

Most importantly, Algeria feared that an external intervention in Libya would reawaken the old ghosts of ethno-tribal demands for sovereign identity, demands already boosted by the Arab Spring promises of self-determination.\textsuperscript{31} The Algerian government was convinced that the overthrow of the Libyan autocrat would trigger a devastating chain of events, unleashing a wave of refugees, arms proliferation, and most worryingly the return of seasoned Tuareg fighters into their countries of origin.\textsuperscript{32} The
second and third challenges were seen as the most explosive as they had the potential to empower transnational terrorist and criminal groups, exacerbate secessionist tendencies and reignite simmering insurgencies. The proliferation of micro-states in Algeria’s immediate neighborhood is detrimental to the country’s interests and security. Despite their expressions of attachment within Libya and halt their flow into neighboring countries has aggravated the militarization of a region full of internal dissident movements and prone to intrastate conflict.

The problem for Algeria, however, is that given its status as the region’s military power and self-proclaimed role as power-broker, its neighbors and the international community are looking to it to assume the role of regional stabilizer. Inability or unwillingness to effectively perform such a role damages its credibility and reputation. Thus far, however, Algerian foreign policy seems torn between the country’s desire to be recognized as a regional leader on security, and its reluctance or inability to use its significant capabilities to maintain stability in its backyard and help restore peace when conflict does break out.

Conclusion
Algerian foreign policy has faced formidable challenges since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. Its uncompromising position against outside interference even in cases of humanitarian emergencies put the country out of step with Arab public opinion. As a result, its image in the region suffered greatly, leading some in Algeria to call for an immediate course correction. In a context of geopolitical fluidity and emergence of new ambitious and competitive actors such as Qatar, Algerian leaders are worried that a hard-line policy of non-intervention risks marginalizing Algeria and excluding it from international deliberations on how best to manage the myriad instabilities on its borders and in the rest of the region.

These concerns have recently contributed to a slight shift in Algeria’s stance. The country still opposes any outside interference in Syria, but it has softened its opposition to an international intervention in northern Mali. Its response to the sudden French military action on January 11, 2013, against advancing Islamist militants into the center of Mali is instructive in this regard. The intervention of foreign forces (French, Senegalese, and Nigerian) is a Malian sovereign decision, as it was done in response to a plea by the government of Mali, said Amar Belani, the spokesman of Algeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

To shed its reputation of perceived obstructionism and hostility to the Arab Spring, Algerian leaders now affirm their support for the legitimate democratic aspirations of the Arab people. It is still too early to determine whether these changes represent an evolution toward a more pragmatic foreign policy approach. The only conclusion that is certain is that an absolutist policy of non-intervention will become unsustainable unless adapted to a concept that advances Algerian security policy and national interests.

Dr. Anouar Boukhars is a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East program. He is an assistant professor of international relations at McDaniel College in Westminster, Maryland and the author of Politics in Morocco: Executive Monarchy and Enlightened Authoritarianism (Routledge 2010).

“Algerian foreign policy seems torn between the country’s desire to be recognized as a regional leader on security, and its reluctance or inability to use its significant capabilities to maintain stability in its backyard and help restore peace when conflict does break out.”

to Algeria, an independent Tuareg state might be a powerful inspiration for the country’s own Tuaregs in the south. It might also spark a revival in Berber activism, even if Berber nationalism remains less threatening to the territorial integrity of the state.

Subsequent events vindicated Algeria’s assessment of the risks. The devastating shock of the Libyan war directly led to the explosion of festering historical grievances in northern Mali. Although the disintegration of Mali is the product of local, national, and international factors that are inexorably intertwined, it was the Libyan war that transformed the simmering insurgency in the north into a full-fledged armed rebellion. The failure of NATO to control the weapons fighters are the offspring of Tuareg who had migrated to Libya during the 1984 drought or fled the Malian government’s repression during the 1963 rebellion.

In the last few years, the Algerian government has launched an ambitious program of economic development in southern Algeria.
A Profile of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Leader Malik Ishaq

By Daud Khattak

In 2012, Pakistan suffered a significant increase in attacks against its minority Shi'a Muslim population. The incidents occurred in Quetta in Baluchistan Province, as well as in Kurram Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Gilgit-Baltistan, Karachi, Rawalpindi and other areas around the country. In most of the incidents, militants lined up civilians, checked their identities, and then executed those suspected of being Shi'a. Other attacks involved improvised explosive device (IED) or suicide bomb attacks on Shi'a worship places, congregations and mourning processions. The attacks continued into 2013. On January 10, for example, militants targeted Shi'a Muslims at a snooker club in Quetta, killing 86 people.1

The group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) claimed responsibility for the majority of attacks. LJ is an anti-Shi'a sectarian militant group that was formed in 1996 by a group of men from the sectarian organization Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the latter of which emerged in 1985 following the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.2

Although LJ conceals its leadership structure, one of the top leaders in the group is Malik Ishaq.3 This article profiles Malik Ishaq as well as his role in LJ. It also discusses the present status of LJ and how the Pakistani state has failed to eliminate the group.

Early History of Malik Ishaq
Malik Ishaq was born in 1959 to a middle class family in Rahim Yar Khan town in Pakistan’s Punjab Province.4 Although southern Punjab suffers from widespread poverty, Ishaq’s family owned a cloth shop as well as a small piece of land.5

Ishaq joined the SSP in 1988 after meeting Maulana Jhangvi in 1989. Ishaq formally joined the SSP that same year and began anti-Shi'a activities. Ishaq's close aide said that he was regularly reading religious literature and books authored by religious scholars. He used to cite references from this literature during his talks and discussions on matters relating to Shi'a-Sunni differences.5

From the SSP to LJ
As the SSP evolved, it began to play a more overt role in national politics and eventually became a political party. With the SSP's growing interest in national politics, it was not able to engage in the same level of violence. This angered some members of the group who wanted to escalate violent activities against Shi'a in Pakistan. These differences escalated after the assassination of SSP chief Maulana Jhangvi by suspected Shi'a insurgents in 1990.9

These differences eventually led to the creation of LJ in 1996. In that year, a number of SSP members founded LJ, including Muhammad Ajmal (also known as Akram Lahori), Riaz Basra and Malik Ishaq.10 The organization was named after slain SSP leader Maulana Jhangvi.

Shortly after Ishaq's release from prison, for example, there was an unprecedented rise in LJ attacks on Shi'a throughout Pakistan.”

Initially, Riaz Basra, who also fought in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban and is alleged to have run a training camp for LJ militants in Sarobi district of Kabul,11 was the leader of the newly-formed group. Police killed Basra, however, in May 2002, and Akram Lahori became the new leader.12 Yet authorities soon apprehended Lahori as well, and he has been imprisoned since June 2002.

Since this time, the leadership structure of LJ has not been clear. Yet it is widely known that Ishaq, who was released from prison in July 2011 after being jailed in 1997, now plays an important role in the group.13 Shortly after Ishaq’s release, he was reintegrated into the SSP, which was created in 1985, served under the founder of the anti-Shi'a SSP. The SSP, which was created in 1985, served the purpose of combating the growing influence of the Iranian Revolution on both Sunni and Shi’a in Pakistan—often through the use of violence.7

After meeting Maulana Jhangvi in 1989, Ishaq formally joined the SSP that same year and began anti-Shi’a activities. Ishaq's close aide said that he was regularly reading religious literature and books authored by religious scholars. He used to cite references from this literature during his talks and discussions on matters relating to Shi’a-Sunni differences.5

The SSP would combat armed Shi’a groups as well. For example, Sipah-i-Muhammad (SM) was an armed wing of the Shi’a group Tehrik Ni-faz-e-Fiqa Jafria (TNFJ). After SSP chief Maulana Azam Tariq was elected to Pakistan’s National Assembly in 1990 and 1993 and to the Punjab Assembly in 1997, the SSP had to rely on LJ for attacks against Shi’a.11 This allowed the SSP to deny it had a role in violence.12 Nevertheless, Pakistan’s government eventually banned the SSP in 2002 for its role in militancy.

Similar to other children of his age, Ishaq quit school after the sixth grade, and joined his father’s cloth business. Ishaq did not attend a madrasa (religious seminary) for a formal religious education, but his close associates said he was influenced by the radical cleric Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of the anti-Shi’a SSP.6 The SSP, which was created in 1985, served the purpose of combating the growing influence of the Iranian Revolution on both Sunni and Shi’a in Pakistan—often through the use of violence.7

The organization was named after slain SSP leader Maulana Jhangvi. Despite their differences, the two organizations remained linked. The formation of LJ was also meant to create a military wing for the SSP along the lines of their Shi’a rivals, who were using Sipah-i-Muhammad (SM) as the armed wing of the Shi’a political party, Tehrik Ni-faz-e-Fiqa Jafria (TNFJ). After SSP chief Maulana Azam Tariq was elected to Pakistan’s National Assembly in 1990 and 1993 and to the Punjab Assembly in 1997, the SSP had to rely on LJ for attacks against Shi’a.11 This allowed the SSP to deny it had a role in violence.12 Nevertheless, Pakistan’s government eventually banned the SSP in 2002 for its role in militancy.

Since this time, the leadership structure of LJ has not been clear. Yet it is widely known that Ishaq, who was released from prison in July 2011 after being jailed in 1997, now plays an important role in the group.13 Shortly after Ishaq’s release, he was reintegrated into the SSP, which was created in 1985, served under the founder of the anti-Shi’a SSP. The SSP, which was created in 1985, served the purpose of combating the growing influence of the Iranian Revolution on both Sunni and Shi’a in Pakistan—often through the use of violence.7

The organization was named after slain SSP leader Maulana Jhangvi. Despite their differences, the two organizations remained linked. The formation of LJ was also meant to create a military wing for the SSP along the lines of their Shi’a rivals, who were using Sipah-i-Muhammad (SM) as the armed wing of the Shi’a political party, Tehrik Ni-faz-e-Fiqa Jafria (TNFJ). After SSP chief Maulana Azam Tariq was elected to Pakistan’s National Assembly in 1990 and 1993 and to the Punjab Assembly in 1997, the SSP had to rely on LJ for attacks against Shi’a.11 This allowed the SSP to deny it had a role in violence.12 Nevertheless, Pakistan’s government eventually banned the SSP in 2002 for its role in militancy.

Initially, Riaz Basra, who also fought in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban and is alleged to have run a training camp for LJ militants in Sarobi district of Kabul,11 was the leader of the newly-formed group. Police killed Basra, however, in May 2002, and Akram Lahori became the new leader.12 Yet authorities soon apprehended Lahori as well, and he has been imprisoned since June 2002.

Since this time, the leadership structure of LJ has not been clear. Yet it is widely known that Ishaq, who was released from prison in July 2011 after being jailed in 1997, now plays an important role in the group.13 Shortly after Ishaq’s release, he was reintegrated into the SSP, which was created in 1985, served under the founder of the anti-Shi’a SSP. The SSP, which was created in 1985, served the purpose of combating the growing influence of the Iranian Revolution on both Sunni and Shi’a in Pakistan—often through the use of violence.7

3 See, for example, “Pakistan Arrests Banned LeJ Leader Malik Ishaq,” Dawn, August 30, 2012.
5 Personal interview, Rabia Mahmood, journalist, Express Tribune, December 26, 2012.
6 Ibid. The journalist quoted Ishaq's close aide, Attaullah.
9 “Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Terrorist Group of Pakistan,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, undated.
12 Jamal, “A Profile of Pakistan’s Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.”
14 Ibid.
15 “The Release of Malik Ishaq,” Express Tribune, July 15,
release from prison, for example, there was an unprecedented rise in LJ attacks on Shi’a throughout Pakistan.

**Malik Ishaq’s Suspected Role in LJ**

Ishaq has long been accused of playing a role in militancy. In 1997, Pakistani authorities arrested him on charges of murder, death threats and intimidation. Authorities allege that he masterminded the notorious attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in 2009 from his prison cell. In that attack, a group of gunmen fired on the bus carrying Sri Lankan cricketers, injuring six of them. Six Pakistani policemen and two civilians were killed. According to multiple press reports, Ishaq himself admitted in October 1997 that he was involved in the killings of 102 people.

Despite the many charges and accusations, authorities released Ishaq from prison in July 2011 due to lack of evidence. As stated in the *Express Tribune*, “Malik Ishaq’s counsel declared that his client had been imprisoned for over 12 years and that the prosecution had failed to produce any cogent evidence which could implicate him in any of the 44 cases of culpable homicide for which he was accused, out of which he had been acquitted in 34.”

Upon his release, Ishaq’s first statement to his Kalashnikov-wielding supporters was that “we are ready to lay down lives for the honor of the companions of the Holy Prophet.” His statement was immediately interpreted as a threat to the Shi’a and a morale boost for his LJ activists. Later in the year, Ishaq was present at anti-U.S. rallies and public meetings of the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC).

Soon after his release, there was a notable rise in attacks on Shi’a in several Pakistani cities attributed to LJ. In these attacks, a new tactic was employed: stopping passenger buses carrying members of the Shi’a sect, and killing all those identified as Shi’a. In September 2011, for example, militants stopped a bus carrying Shi’a pilgrims in Baluchistan Province, and proceeded to kill 26 passengers who were identified as Shi’a pilgrims. LJ claimed responsibility. Then, in August 2012, suspected LJ militants forced 25 Shi’a out of a bus in Gilgit-Baltistan and executed them. According to police, the militants first checked each passenger’s identification papers, killing those identified as Shi’a. These are just two recent examples of a string of sectarian killings against Shi’a.

For many analysts, it is not a coincidence that this rise in attacks came after Ishaq, the founding member of LJ, achieved freedom.

**Weak Government Response**

Pakistan’s government has been criticized for its failure to punish militant leaders such as Malik Ishaq. The government already has a history of supporting anti-Shi’a outfits, or at least turning a blind eye to their activities. According to Arif Jamal, “For Pakistan, Malik Ishaq is a good Taliban as his group does not carry out attacks on the Pakistani military and is ready to carry forward the military’s national and regional agenda.” This is in contrast to militants from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who target Pakistani state interests. Many argue that Pakistan chooses to concentrate its resources on the various anti-state groups, such as the TTP, rather than create new enemies in LJ or, for example, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba.

The courts have been criticized for inaction as well, although the judges, lawyers and their families involved in the cases against prominent militant leaders often face death threats. Indeed, many of the witnesses and their relatives in cases against Ishaq were found murdered. Ishaq’s reach extends far. The Punjab government,

“There are increasing signs that the TTP, LJ and al-Qaeda have collaborated to target both the Pakistani government as well as Shi’a in Pakistan. Eventually Pakistan will be forced to address LJ’s escalating violence.”

for example, is accused of providing financial support to Ishaq’s family during the years he was in jail, with the apparent purpose to ensure peace in the province.

Nevertheless, there are increasing signs that the TTP, LJ and al-Qaeda have collaborated to target both the Pakistani government as well as Shi’a in Pakistan. Eventually Pakistan will be forced to address LJ’s escalating violence.

**Conclusion**

Pakistan’s government has a history of collaborating with militant groups that share its interests. Besides the obvious case of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and the Kashmir conflict, Pakistan also reportedly supported the SSP and LJ in the 1980s to weaken Shi’a Muslims who might sympathize with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Yet in most of these instances of state complicity with militant groups, Pakistan eventually lost control over the relationship.
A clear example is the case of Malik Ishaq and LJ. When the number of LJ armed activists was in the hundreds, the threat was limited and the relationship could be controlled. Yet now that thousands of radicalized youth have joined or support LJ, the relationship is no longer manageable. The January 10 attack on Hazara Shi’i in Quetta that killed 86 people underscores this problem.

Apart from the support of state intelligence agencies for the militant outfits, the courts equally failed to award punishments to the militant leaders. Malik Ishaq was charged in nearly 200 criminal cases, but the frightened judges used to welcome him honorably in court, and even offered him “tea and cookies.”

As the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan draws nearer, and the Taliban’s attacks on sensitive Pakistani military installations continue to increase, the people’s trust in the state and its security agencies is eroding, and the country’s dozens of militant outfits are bringing instability to dangerous new levels.

Daud Khattak is Senior Editor with RFE/RL’s Mashaal Radio in Prague, Czech Republic. Besides working in Afghanistan as Editor at Pajhwok Afghan News from 2005-2008, he worked with Pakistani English newspapers covering the situation in KP and FATA. In 2010, his paper on the situation in Swat, “The Battle for Pakistan: Swat Valley,” was published by the New America Foundation.

Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity

November 1, 2012 (UNITED STATES): A U.S. court sentenced Rezwan Ferdaus to 17 years in prison for plotting to use remote-controlled model planes to bomb the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol building in Washington, D.C. Ferdaus is a U.S. citizen of Bangladeshi descent. – AP, November 2

November 2, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threatened Pakistan’s largest political party in Karachi, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). The TTP called the MQM the “apostate tyrants of Karachi.” The MQM has been publicly critical of the Taliban especially since the shooting of 15-year-old schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai by Taliban militants. – Dawn, November 2

November 3, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber targeted the regional head of a government-allied militia in Buner District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing the leader as well as five other people. – AP, November 3

November 3, 2012 (BURKINA FASO): Representatives of Ansar Eddine, an Islamist militant group in control of northern Mali, arrived in Burkina Faso for mediation talks with President Blaise Compaore. Ansar Eddine is one of three Islamist groups that control northern Mali; the other two are al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa. – AP, November 3

November 3, 2012 (SOMALIA): Two suicide bombers targeted the Village restaurant and café near Mogadishu’s Soobe intersection, killing at least one person. The restaurant is frequented by government officials and members of the Somali diaspora. – GaroweOnline, November 3

November 4, 2012 (KENYA): Suspected militants threw a grenade into a church located in a police compound in Garissa, killing one policeman. Garissa is close to Kenya’s border with Somalia. – BBC, November 3

November 5, 2012 (GLOBAL): The United Nations added the Haqqani network to its Taliban sanctions list. The United States also recently designated the Haqqani network as a global terrorist group. – BBC, November 5

November 5, 2012 (SYRIA): A suicide bomber killed a number of Syrian soldiers at a checkpoint in Hama Province. Syria’s state-run news agency said that the bomber killed 50 soldiers. The bomber was a member of Jabhat al-Nusra, a Salafi-jihadi group. – CNN, November 5

November 5, 2012 (NIGERIA): Nigeria’s national security adviser warned that there is “increasing cooperation between the Boko Haram group in Nigeria and established terror groups operating in the Sahel.” – AFP, November 5


November 6, 2012 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber drove an explosives-laden vehicle into a group of Iraqi soldiers outside an army base in Taji, 12 miles north of Baghdad, killing approximately 31 people. – Reuters, November 6

November 7, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber on foot targeted the vehicle of a senior police investigator in Peshawar, killing him and his colleagues. The explosion killed at least six people. – AFP, November 7

November 7, 2012 (YEMEN): Gunmen on a motorbike assassinated a Yemeni intelligence officer in Sana’a. “Officials say at least 55 military, intelligence and police officers have been killed in Yemen since mid-2011, with most of the assassinations focusing on individuals working..."
in counterterrorism operations,” according to the Associated Press. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula is suspected of being behind the assassination campaign. – AFP, November 7

November 7, 2012 (SOMALIA): A car bomb exploded outside Mogadishu’s Federal Parliament building, killing one officer. – GaroweOnline, November 7

November 8, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A Pakistani Taliban suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden truck into one of the entrances of the Pakistan Rangers headquarters in Karachi’s North Nazimabad area, killing at least three soldiers. – Dawn, November 8; BBC, November 8

November 8, 2012 (YEMEN): A suspected U.S. drone killed three suspected members of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula near Sana’a. – al-Jazira, November 9

November 12, 2012 (UNITED KINGDOM): A UK court ruled that Abu Qatada, an alleged al-Qa’ida operative, could not be deported from the United Kingdom to Jordan to face terrorism charges. The judges said that they were not convinced he would face a fair trial in Jordan. He was allowed to return to his home in London. – CBS News, November 12

November 14, 2012 (GLOBAL): U.S. General Carter Ham, the head of U.S. Africa Command, warned that al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) “will become stronger and they will gain capability to export violence throughout a broader region than Africa and certainly the high potential to export violence into Europe and to the USA” if the group is not stopped. – AFP, November 14

November 14, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban militants shot to death two Afghan men who worked as interpreters for NATO troops in Logar Province. – AFP, November 14

November 14, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Pakistan said that it released at least seven senior Afghan Taliban prisoners as part of peace negotiations in neighboring Afghanistan. – New York Times, November 14

November 16, 2012 (UNITED STATES): Adis Medunjanin, a Bosnian-born U.S. citizen, was sentenced to life in prison for his role in plotting a suicide bomb attack on New York City subways in 2009. – Reuters, November 16

November 16, 2012 (UNITED STATES): The Federal Bureau of Investigation added Radullan Sahiron, an Abu Sayyaf Group leader, to its list of most wanted terrorists. The FBI also added Omar Hammami, an American member of Somalia’s al-Shabab, to the list. – Philippine Star, November 16

November 16, 2012 (YEMEN): A suicide bomber linked to al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula killed three people inside the headquarters of government-allied militias in Abyan Province. – Reuters, November 16

November 19, 2012 (UNITED STATES): U.S. authorities charged four Los Angeles area men who were allegedly on their way to Afghanistan to train with the Taliban and al-Qa’ida. The men were also allegedly plotting to kill U.S. soldiers and bomb government installations. Authorities discovered the men due to jihadist social media postings. According to CNN, “The three exposed their connection to each other and their radical leanings explicitly on Facebook for over a year. And one of them detailed his intentions to participate in jihad in an online chat with an FBI employee.” – CNN, November 20

November 19, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A female suicide bomber wearing a burqa targeted Qazi Husain Ahmad, the former chief of Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan, in Mohmand Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Qazi Ahmad escaped unharmed, however. – AP, November 19

November 21, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber targeted a Shi’a Muslim procession and killed at least 13 people in Rawalpindi. The attack occurred only hours after two other bomb blasts killed at least three people near a Shi’a gathering in Karachi. – The News International, November 21; Reuters, November 21

November 22, 2012 (PAKISTAN): The Pakistani Taliban promised to attack India to avenge the death of Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, a Pakistani man who was executed by India on November 21 for his role in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. – CNN, November 22

November 23, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber detonated explosives near a NATO-run training base in the capital of Wardak Province, killing three people. – AFP, November 23

November 23, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle near a joint Afghan-NATO border post in Torkham in Nangarhar Province, injuring five Afghan security guards. – AFP, November 23

November 24, 2012 (MOROCCO): Authorities in Morocco announced that they broke up a cell training youths to fight in Mali. – Reuters, November 24

November 25, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A bomb ripped through a Shi’a Muslim procession in Dera Ismail Khan, killing at least six people. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility. – AP, November 25

November 25, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber killed two Afghan guards outside a NATO-run military compound in the main diplomatic area of Kabul. Guards shot to death a second suicide bomber before he could detonate his explosives. – NBC News, November 21

November 25, 2012 (NIGERIA): Two suicide bombers attacked a church in a barracks in Kaduna State, killing at least 11 people. Authorities suspect that the Boko Haram group was responsible. – Reuters, November 25

November 26, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A bomb was discovered under the vehicle of well-known television anchor Hamid Mir. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the failed assassination, saying that Mir was “promoting secular forces.” – AP, November 27
November 27, 2012 (IRAQ): Three separate bomb attacks in predominately Shi’a Muslim areas of Baghdad killed at least 19 people. – BBC, November 27

November 28, 2012 (YEMEN): Gunmen assassinated a Saudi diplomat and his bodyguard in Sana’a. Authorities suspect that al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula was responsible, although the group later denied involvement. The gunmen were wearing army uniforms. – Voice of America, November 28; Yemen Post, December 2

November 29, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber attempted to assassinate Mullah Nazir, a prominent pro-government, anti-U.S. Taliban commander. Mullah Nazir was injured in the attack, which occurred in South Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. – Dawn, November 29

November 29, 2012 (NIGERIA): Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau released a new video, expressing solidarity with global jihadists. He saluted fighters from the “Islamic state in Mali,” as well as those in Somalia, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and Palestine. – AFP, November 29

November 30, 2012 (YEMEN): Yemen’s Interior Ministry announced the arrest of Suleiman Hassan Mohammed Murshed Awad (also known as Abu Osama al-Abi) in Zinjibar, Abyan Province. He was described as an al-Qa’ida leader and one of the country’s most wanted fugitives. – AP, December 1

December 1, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated explosives near a police headquarters in Uruzgan Province, killing two children and a civilian. – RFE/RL, December 1

December 1, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suspected U.S. drone killed a Yemeni al-Qa’ida-linked fighter in South Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The man was identified as Abdul Rehman al-Zaman Yemeni. – Dawn, December 1

December 2, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Multiple Taliban suicide bombers attacked a joint U.S.-Afghan airbase in Jalalabad, killing four Afghan soldiers and two civilians. According to Afghan authorities, nine suicide attackers were involved. NATO said that the militants failed to penetrate the airbase. According to the BBC, “Afghan officials said the first four attackers had arrived in explosive-laden cars and targeted different entrances to the airfield early on Sunday. Others who had followed on foot battled security guards.” – BBC, December 2

December 2, 2012 (NIGERIA): Suspected Boko Haram group members killed 10 Christians in Chibok, Borno State. – al-Jazira, December 3

December 3, 2012 (GLOBAL): U.S. General Carter Ham, the head of U.S. Africa Command, said that there are “clear indications of collaboration amongst” al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram. He said that the United States has seen evidence that Nigeria’s Boko Haram “is receiving financial support, some training, probably some explosives from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, in a relationship that goes both ways.” – Bloomberg, December 3

December 4, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle attacked a checkpoint outside a police station in Bannu District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, wounding six people. – AFP, December 4

December 5, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Two suicide bombers in an explosives-laden vehicle attacked the Zarai Noor Camp in Wana, South Waziristan Agency, killing at least three Pakistani soldiers. – CNN, December 5; Voice of America, December 5

December 6, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber attempted to assassinate Afghan Intelligence Chief Asadullah Khalid in Kabul. Khalid survived the attack, but sustained injuries to his abdomen and chest. Authorities said that the bomber posed as a Taliban peace messenger, detonating his explosives vest near Khalid. The Afghan Taliban quickly took responsibility. – Bloomberg, December 6

December 6, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suspected U.S. drone killed a senior al-Qa’ida leader in North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The leader was identified as Khaled bin Abdel Rahman al-Hussainan (also known as Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti). – Voice of America, December 8; AP, December 9

December 9, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Afghan and coalition forces rescued Dr. Dilip Joseph, an American physician who was kidnapped by the Taliban, in eastern Afghanistan. During the raid, at least six people were killed, including a member of a U.S. Navy SEAL team. – New York Times, December 9

December 9, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suspected U.S. drone killed a senior al-Qa’ida commander and three others in North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The commander was identified as Mohammad Ahmed Alansooro. – Reuters, December 9

December 10, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Gunmen shot to death a female official in charge of the women’s affairs department for eastern Laghman Province. According to the Associated Press, the woman, Najia Sediqi, had taken the job after her predecessor was killed in a bomb attack in July 2012. – AP, December 10

December 10, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A roadside bomb killed the police chief for Nimroz Province as he was traveling home from neighboring Herat Province. – AP, December 10

December 10, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Four Taliban suicide bombers attacked a police station in Bannu District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing at least eight police and civilians. – Reuters, December 10

December 10, 2012 (SYRIA): The U.S. State Department designated Jabhat al-Nusra, a Salafi-jihadi rebel group in Syria, as a foreign terrorist organization linked to al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). The State Department essentially identified the group as a wing of AQI. – CNN, December 11; Christian Science Monitor, December 10
December 11, 2012 (UNITED STATES): A U.S. court sentenced Shaker Masri to almost 10 years in prison for plotting to attend a militant training camp in Somalia with the hopes of becoming a suicide bomber for al-Qa`ida and al-Shabab. Masri, a Chicago man, was born in Alabama. – AP, December 11

December 12, 2012 (IRAQ): A suspected al-Qa`ida detainee attempted to blow himself up inside a prison cell in Baghdad. The explosion wounded the man, along with six others. Iraqi authorities were trying to determine how the detainee acquired an explosives belt. – AP, December 12

December 13, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked a NATO base in Kandahar, killing a U.S. soldier and two civilians. The Taliban claimed responsibility. – AFP, December 13

December 14, 2012 (YEMEN): Yemeni airstrikes killed two militants in Abyan Province. – AAP, December 15

December 15, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Militants attacked a military base attached to Bacha Khan International Airport in Peshawar, killing at least three civilians. The militants fired rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons at the airport. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility. – Washington Post, December 15

December 16, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): France announced that officials from the Afghan government, the Taliban movement and other factions would soon meet near Paris to discuss the future of Afghanistan. – Reuters, December 16

December 17, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber attacked a U.S. contracting company’s compound in Kabul, killing two Afghan civilians. The Taliban claimed responsibility. – Reuters, December 17

December 17, 2012 (SOMALIA): Al-Shabab released a new statement saying that American al-Shabab member Abu Mansur al-Amriki had been kicked out of the group. The al-Shabab statement called al-Amriki’s past videos “childish petulance.” Al-Shabab also said that the group’s goals would not be tarnished by the “superficial allegations, frivolous ramblings and whimsical desires of those who wish to enhance their image at the price of jihad and the mujahideen.” Earlier in 2012, al-Amriki had criticized al-Shabab in a number of video statements. – CNN, December 17

December 20, 2012 (MALI): The UN Security Council authorized military action to retake northern Mali from the control of al-Qa’ida-linked militants. The resolution, however, demanded that the plan must entail both military and political solutions to help reunify the country. – AP, December 20

December 20, 2012 (NIGERIA): A group of approximately 30 militants kidnapped a French engineer in Katsina State. French President Francois Hollande suggested that the militants probably belonged to al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb or an allied group. – BBC, December 21

December 21, 2012 (YEMEN): Gunmen kidnapped two Finns and one Austrian in Sana’a. According to Agence France-Presse, “The three are an Austrian man and a Finnish man, both students of Arabic, and a Finnish woman who arrived recently in Yemen.” Authorities suspect that the gunmen belonged to al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula. – AFP, December 22

December 21, 2012 (PAKISTAN): An explosion killed Taliban commander Maulvi Abbas in South Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Two other people were killed as well, including one of the commander’s sons. There was no claim of responsibility. – RFE/RL, December 21

December 21, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen stopped a bus in Baluchistan Province. According to the identification of the passengers, and then executed three men. Two other male passengers, who were kidnapped by the militants, were later found dead. – RFE/RL, December 21

December 21, 2012 (TUNISIA): Authorities in Tunisia announced that they arrested 16 members of an al-Qa’ida-linked cell in the country. – Bloomberg, December 22

December 22, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber killed a Pakistani politician at a rally for the Awami National Party in Peshawar. The politician, Bashir Balour, was a provincial cabinet minister. The blast killed at least seven other people. – al-Jazeera, December 22

December 23, 2012 (IRAQ): Iraqi authorities arrested 66 members of the Islamic State of Iraq in Karbala Province. An Iraqi security source said that the men were planning attacks against Shi’a Muslims. – UPI, December 24

December 24, 2012 (YEMEN): A suspected U.S. drone killed two al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula militants in Ra’da, Bayda Province. Three other militants were critically injured. – AP, December 24

December 26, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated explosives outside Camp Chapman, a major U.S. military base in Khost Province. An Afghan guard and two Afghan civilians were killed. The Taliban claimed responsibility. – AP, December 26

December 28, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Hakimullah Mehsud said that his militia is willing to negotiate with authorities, but they will not disarm. “We believe in dialogue but it should not be frivolous,” he said. “Asking us to lay down arms is a joke.” In the video, Hakimullah Mehsud is seen sitting next to his deputy, Wali-ur-Rehman. – Reuters, December 28

December 28, 2012 (YEMEN): A suspected U.S. drone killed two suspected militants belonging to al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula in Hadramawt Province. – Reuters, December 28

December 29, 2012 (YEMEN): Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) placed bounties worth tens of thousands of dollars to anyone who kills the U.S. ambassador to Yemen or an American soldier in the country. AQAP said the offer was valid for six months. – New York Times, December 30
December 30, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Authorities found the bodies of 21 tribal policemen who were previously kidnapped by the Taliban near Peshawar. The men, who were discovered tied up and blindfolded, had all been executed. – Guardian, December 30

December 30, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle rammed into a bus carrying Shi’a Muslim pilgrims in Baluchistan Province, killing 19 people. – Guardian, December 30