Welcome again to the Director’s Corner and another edition of the PKSOI Bulletin. This quarter, we examine the issue of transition. This process is at the heart of success in any peacekeeping or stability operation, a necessary step to achieving the ultimate objectives of a military or humanitarian intervention.

Despite the critical importance of transition in achieving our national security objectives, thoughtful discussions on the topic continue to raise as many questions as they answer. What exactly is transition? Are there different types of transition? What constitutes proper metrics for measuring successful transition? A year ago, PKSOI hosted a ‘Transitions Workshop” with the declared intent to find common ground in this arena. After two and a half days, with military and civilian government representatives, academics, practitioners, and theorists locked in a room, all we managed to agree on were two distinctly different definitions of the word!

Most important among these questions are: transition to what and why? And when and how do we transition? Leaders at different levels often know what they want to do in a given set of circumstances. However, they often do not have a common vision or understanding of what we are ultimately trying to achieve and how their efforts nest horizontally and vertically with others to achieve our objectives. (continued on page 2)
Military commanders communicate their “Commander’s Intent” in an effort to visualize, describe, and direct their forces towards achievement of an “endstate”. We need something similar at the national level to give common direction and purpose to the application of our significant, but still limited, military and civilian resources from early planning through mission accomplishment.

Transition is typically very difficult because the world is a complex place with competing and nuanced state and non-state actor agendas which are founded on long histories, ambiguous relationships, cultural differences, and differing personal and group interests. Unless these can be reconciled or overcome, our structured security, diplomacy, and development programs will struggle.

Transition is a hot commodity. As this Bulletin goes to press, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives is operating in 11 different countries around the world. The issues associated with transition in Iraq and Afghanistan provide daily grist for editorialists and pundits. There is a virtual “transitions industry” of institutes, think-tanks, and private corporations, all busily working away on what they believe transition is — and not necessarily agreeing on any definitions, much less developing much needed templates, models, and processes.

Others are also taking a closer look at transition and what it entails. Noteworthy among recent efforts is the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) effort in Iraq to identify what transition mechanisms work between U.S. military and U.S. civilian transition, and from U.S. civilian management to host nation control. JCOA’s team of data collectors is currently in country as we draw down force levels and continue to handoff functions to the host nation in a variety of sectors. PKSOI is assisting with this effort, and looks forward to hosting another, hopefully more fruitful, transitions conference using the JCOA study as a touchstone in late 2010.

I hope you enjoy this edition of the Bulletin and look forward to your comments in the PKSOI SOLLIMS lessons learned website or in one of our blogs. As a community, we learn by considering what the larger community has to offer, so your comments and insights are essential to that dialogue. And if you have a particular perspective in regard to peacekeeping and stability operations, we are always seeking articles that add to the body of knowledge.

This is my last Director’s Corner as I prepare to retire after 31 years of Army service. My best wishes for success in your future endeavors with PKSOI and the rest of the peace and stability operations community. In the next Bulletin, you will hear from COL Steve Smith, my current Deputy and incoming PKSOI Director.

Thinking Strategically About Transition

by Rich Yarger

The aftermath of the Cold War posed unanticipated challenges to U.S. national security. In response the U.S. military adopted full spectrum operations in order to focus renewed attention on the importance of stability operations and the “…continuous, simultaneous, combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks…” inherent to the kaleidoscope of 21st century military missions.

Transition is a strategic issue of the first order. It is well past the time to take a closer look at the volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) that elevates transition to the strategic level of concern and the implications for U.S. strategy, planning, and operations.

You can only reduce the VUCA of transition if you first embrace it—you must comprehend what transition is, how to think strategically about it, and how it fits into strategy, planning, and tactics. While such understanding of transition is complicated by the lack of an appropriate definition and theoretical construct, the basis of both exists in a growing literature in conflict studies and state-building and the collective practical experience acquired over the past twenty years by the United Nations, sponsor states, and nongovernmental organizations. Transition can broadly be described as: (continued on next page)
A process or set of processes leading to a specific decision point in conditions and time that morally and legitimately justify the transfer of responsibility, authority, power (capabilities, resources and influence), and accountability for governmental responsibilities to aspiring host nation agencies and authorities from external and internal actors who have assumed host state functions of sovereignty through challenge, necessity, or practice. Transition’s moral and legitimacy qualities require manifestation of the host nation populace’s acceptance of the government in power, adherence to accepted international standards of good governance, and evidence of sufficient capacity to be successful. Transition occurs incrementally on multiple levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) over time, but success is ultimately defined by acceptable host nation sovereignty.

This description offers an encompassing definition for transition and the components of a theoretical framework. Success is defined as an acceptable host nation sovereignty: (1) a state government that is acceptable to its own population, implying internal legitimacy; (2) one that adheres to accepted international standards of good governance, implying external legitimacy; and (3) evidence of sufficient capacity, implying competence, organization, and infrastructure in governance, services, security, and economics. It suggests that moral, legal, cultural, and power contexts matter and accepts that multiple internal and external actors have usurped the state’s sovereignty for numerous and varied reasons, and in differing ways. It acknowledges that transition is a shared responsibility and collaborative act among the usurpers and an aspiring host nation government. It is small wonder that transition exhibits the strategic characteristics of VUCA.

Transitions are collaborative and interactive processes that occur between and among state and non-state actors and the host nation at all levels—tactical, operational, and strategic. Successful transition at the strategic level does not occur until transition at lower levels is sufficiently nested in volume (capacity), kind (capabilities), and quality (competence) in a national paradigm. This choreographed relationship among capacity, capabilities, and competence across levels and time builds resilience and manages expectations. In order to facilitate this nesting, the host nation’s national paradigm—narrative, identity, governance, rule of law, security, economic and fiscal infrastructure, physical infrastructure, and services—must provide an acceptable pattern, establish favorable conditions for individual and community success, support realistic expectations, and be self-sustaining. A national paradigm must consider local, national, and international perspectives in regard to governance as well as the cultural, social, and geographic realities in which the state exists—context matters! It must be mindful of the past, aware of immediate expectations, and accommodate the long-term—seeking a calculated balance that leads to a peaceful and prosperous stability. Processes and actions at lower levels must nest into the national paradigm, adhering to the pattern and contributing to the favorable conditions and self-sustainment—but the national paradigm must facilitate this nesting in vision, stimulus, and capacity in and over time. Consequently, leadership and shaping context are key components of any transition effort.

Since transition occurs incrementally on multiple levels and these levels are interdependent, the leadership of the host nation and supporting state(s) and organizations must shape the context for successful transition to occur. The purpose or goal that justifies a transition must be properly articulated and supported by a believable paradigm, hard accomplishments, and consistency in actions and values inherent to the paradigm by both host and supporting actors. In particular, leadership in the host nation and the key supporting state(s) must provide congruent strategic guidance for nesting transition goals and objectives across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. There must be strategic clarity from both about where the host nation is headed, why the supporting state is present and what they are doing, what the necessary conditions for transition are, and what reasonable expectations should result from a successful transition. Context shaping must be accomplished in such a manner that it accounts for or supplants the interests of the multiple state and non-state actors with their varied interests.

Transition at any level or in any area always involves the transfer of responsibility, authority, power (capabilities, resources, and influence), and accountability.
The better the transfer is integrated and negotiated at the various levels and among the various internal and external actors, the higher the probability of a successful transition. The more disparities produced among them—whether between an accepting agency and a transferring agency of the supporting and host states, among or within levels in either, between old and new elites, or with other state and non-state actors—the greater the difficulty and the less likelihood of success. Disparities in volume, kind, and quality at any level or among levels affect transition hierarchically and horizontally, and often exponentially as unmet expectations and apparent inequities materialize. Chance and malevolence can also disrupt transition on any sector and any level. In strategy and planning, transition must be viewed from the perspectives of cumulative, sequential, and simultaneous actions in order to create synergies and success, but also to take advantage of or mitigate unanticipated consequences.

Ultimately, the goal of any transition is a peaceful and prosperous stability within the host nation and in that state’s relationships within the international order. Provisional or interim governments may represent progress in transition but they are not a satisfactory political end state for the host nation or long term stability and progress. Properly pursued, transition minimizes corruption and dependency. It significantly enhances the probabilities of the success of the host nation in achieving a new and positive competitive stability in the emerging world order. Leadership within the host nation and the supporting nation must create and pursue national visions for the prosperity and stability for both states that are evident for both populations. For the U.S. military, the professional concern cannot end until any military mission success has been converted into lasting political success. Strategy and planning by the host nation and supporting state create a framework for properly integrated actions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels leading to this political success. While spoilers may seek other goals, they are out of step with history. Good strategic thinking on the part of the host nation and the United States confirms this.

Labor Nine of a Holistic Definition

by Jacki Chura-Beaver

Since the early 1990s, “stability operations” has been the phrase of choice to describe situations requiring peacekeeping, peacebuilding, security reform, and interim governments. Mechanisms for calibrating these operations have been devised, revised, and reintroduced through academic and practitioner writings throughout the past decade. Yet, one particular stabilization mechanism – transition – continues to elude scholars and policymakers. Highlighted as an important focal point for tactical, operational, and strategic plans, transition still has not been adequately defined or described to create clear and sustainable strategy and tasks. At no other time has understanding transition been more critical, especially given its stated significance for achieving success in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In 2009, the U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) hosted a two day conference with multinational partners to create a definition for transition. Two definitions were created by the end of the event, with one more widely accepted:

Transition is defined as both a multi-disciplinary process and points of change, in time, when conditions for stability are achieved in security, justice and reconciliation, infrastructure and economic development, humanitarian and social well-being, and governance and reconciliation, through the enabling and empowering of Host Nation Institutions, in order to facilitate enduring positive effects and improved quality of life for citizens.

While this definition provides a good foundation for understanding the importance of transition, the complex and multidimensional nature of the term is not solidified. In many respects, the definition of transition is fluid and highly dependent on the personal experience and vantage point of the individual or organization striving to use it. The extant literature on transition points to specific and important clues in further understanding the nature of transition, especially its static and dynamic characteristics. As such, this literature review seeks to cull the most salient transition lessons and concepts to better inform academics and practitioners on the uses and understandings of the term. The literature review serves as a baseline for developing a more comprehensive definition for understanding and implementing transition across organizational and functional lines.


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Numerous monographs, edited volumes, journal articles, think-tank reports, field expert thought pieces, conference and workshop proceedings, government documents, and after action reports were compiled and analyzed to create a working compendium of resources on transition concepts. In the process of analyzing these documents, several key themes emerged.

1. The definition of transition differs by use, especially between tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Transition is interpreted differently depending on the context and needs in an action arena. Most specifically, transition can be broken down into four key concepts: (1) Process; (2) Authority Transfer; (3) Phasing; and (4) End State. Each individual type of transition is specified according to the level of interpretation and the mandates of the organization to carry out specific tasks or actions associated with meeting stated goals.

2. Transition is often defined in academia by the contextual situation, drawing concrete distinctions between transitions according to history, culture, and the object of analysis. Analyzing transitions becomes a comparative problem because historical, contextual, and objective considerations do not form standard baselines for analysis among multiple cases. However, the level of institutional analysis used in each stabilization case study provides some indication of the type of transition being studied. Within the literature review, six specific transition situations were discovered: (1) War to Peace; (2) Power; (3) Societal; (4) Political-democratic; (5) Security; and (6) Economic. Many of these particular transition situations can overlap and morph to produce combinations of transitional situations, intertwining many of the characteristics in these key distinctions into a single process.

3. Several approaches exist to cope with issues surrounding transitional activities. Many actors in stability operations have developed concepts to increase their capacity and capabilities to deal with issues affecting transition. Five key approaches are identified to explain the behavior of stability actors: (1) Whole of Government; (2) Assist and Advise Functions; (3) Comprehensive Approach; (4) Counterinsurgency (COIN) Approach; (5) Developmental Approach. Each approach is unique in its definition of transition, organizational tasks emphasized, and overall analysis framework. However, each has a definitive definition of what transition is and how it should be implemented to achieve stability in fragile states.

4. Measurements and indicators developed to assess transition reflect the foci of individual stability actors, but no single tool measures the entire complexity of the concept. Several measurement tools are currently being used by actors to try to assess and evaluate transitional mechanisms in stabilizing states. Based on the evaluation of the compiled literature, it is evident that several constraints are inhibiting actors from fully embracing the concept of transition. Gaps in cross-sectional studies are apparent, as both academics and policymakers divide transition according to specific action areas or concepts further muddying the clarity and consistency of the term. Transition is both multidimensional and evolving, and exploring the linkages between action relationships would be helpful to more fully understand the concept, especially in addressing the interdependences between political, societal, security, and economic transitions. Furthermore, the thresholds and tipping points differentiating positive and negative transitions are not captured by the numerous tools available for practitioner use. Research and tools must focus more on sequencing and identifying potentialities in transitional activities, rather than basing tools and analysis on sheer organizational recognition. But most of all, a concrete and agreed upon definition must be built that encourages all actors to recognize transition’s many facets in order to foster greater collaboration and eventual success in transition activities – this review aims to achieve that purpose.

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**New! TRANSITIONS Workshop:** Issues, Challenges and Solutions 16-18 November 2010, Carlisle Barracks, PA

In the 21st Century, all states are vulnerable to instability and may need assistance from other states and organizations in order to recover from natural disasters, conflict or chronic societal problems. Such assistance ends as the host nation “transitions” back from a period of crisis to self-sufficiency and other actors transition out of their assumed roles and responsibilities. Such "transitions" invariably pose issues involving sovereignty, legitimacy, dependency and social reform. Managing transitions – at all levels - requires close cooperation between the host nation, other governments and militaries, and civil society. The ongoing military drawdown in Iraq and the transition from military to civilian primacy in that country is but one example of an on-going transition which affects the entire global neighborhood.

This conference offers an international forum to explore, examine and understand "transitions" as a crucial process during recovery from crisis and conflict. It is an opportunity for academics, civil society members, and government professionals to share ideas, learn and network. Those interested in attending or presenting papers at this conference should go to the PKSOI website @ http://pksoi.army.mil/ and click on contact us located on the middle of the first page.
Organizing for Success during Transitions

by Raymond Millen

Man appears to have a greater penchant for conflict than peace, devoting an abundance of attention to the study, preparation, and conduct of war. While the causes of war vary, history suggests that conflict escalation is far easier than de-escalation and resolution. In fact, a direct correlation exists between the level of conflict and the transition from war to peace. Devastating conflicts in particular result not only in substantial casualties and destruction but also shatter societies and governments in the process. Post-conflict states frequently suffer a period of fragility resulting in a psychological loss of vitality, hope, and self-confidence, which accompanies the political, social, and economic turmoil. Because this fragility exposes the state to subversion, political upheaval, and insurgency, the issue may become a major concern for the international community.

In response, the international community conceptualized Security Sector Reform (SSR) to assist in transition. In essence, SSR is “the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.” Even though SSR is intended as self-help for fragile states, the enterprise may include a number of external actors, working in concert, to generate critical government institutions. Accordingly, among the SSR partners, unity of effort is essential to “successfully incorporating all the instruments of power in a collaborative approach to stability operations.” To this end, SSR attains unity of effort through two conceptual approaches—Whole of Government and Comprehensive. The Whole of Government approach is a collaborative effort of the U.S. government bureaucracy, that is to say, the various departments and agencies integrating their efforts towards a common goal. The Comprehensive approach is a cooperative effort between the U.S. government bureaucracy and external partners—“intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities”—towards a common goal as well.

However, while SSR is conceptually sound, it lacks an organizational mechanism essential to achieving collaboration and cooperation. In view of the number of organizational bureaucracies involved in SSR, a process for integrating all viewpoints and achieving consensus is indispensable. A common misperception is the belief that common agreement on objectives automatically leads to unity of effort and purpose throughout. Ironically, dissenting views and resistance manifest from ways and means, not desired end-states. Fortunately, an organizational paradigm for policy formulation does exist, albeit ignored for decades—President Eisenhower’s National Security Council mechanism. In describing how SSR might organize for success, this article examines the rationale for organization, and the structural framework, including implications. This article is not a critique of existing SSR procedures; rather it focuses on initiatives to achieve greater integration and understanding of policy issues, more extensive consideration of issues, and greater attention to coordination and implementation of policy.

The Rationale for Organization

Since all SSR activities occur in the host country, so too must the organizational mechanism. Organization does not connote meetings as the central activity. Complex policy issues cannot be settled simply through a series of meetings, in which reform initiatives are identified and doled out for implementation. Policy issues need to undergo analytical rigor before they are ready for action. Without buy-in from the host country and international partners, implementation will suffer from misunderstandings, resistance, and selective compliance. Policy issues are rarely clear-cut and substantial disagreements are likely to arise. Whenever organizational structure, procedure, and process are given short shrift, national-level policy forums can become paralysed by bickering, personality conflicts, parochialism, dominating personalities, end run maneuvers, and throat cutting. Similarly, decision-makers might exercise poor judgment if partisan views, incomplete facts (both intentional and unintentional), pleas for exceptions, favoritism, and suppression of conflicting views dominate the forum.

President Dwight Eisenhower recognized the criticality of organization for managing enterprises involving large bureaucracies. Having served as Supreme Allied Commander in World War II and NATO, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, de facto Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and president for eight years, Eisenhower possessed profound experience and executive skills. Rejecting accusations that a reliance on organization stifled good ideas and initiatives, Eisenhower said that the purpose of organization is “to simplify, clarify, expedite, and coordinate; it is a bulwark against chaos, confusion, delay, and failure.” In one of his most trenchant passages, Eisenhower wrote:

Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent; even less can it, of itself, make the decisions which are required to trigger necessary action. On the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster. Organization makes more efficient the gathering and analysis of facts, and the arranging of the findings of experts in logical fashion. it is satisfactorily carried out.
Without proper organization, SSR initiatives, especially in countries experiencing an insurgency, have a higher probability of floundering or becoming counterproductive. Rarely are solutions to complex problems clear-cut and without severe consequences if ill-considered. Understandably, the exigencies of a situation demands some urgency, but the detrimental impact of poor policy decisions in the long term dictates that time be given to organizational structure. The old adage that haste makes waste is especially applicable to SSR.

The Structural Framework

The structural framework embodies a systemic approach for collating and integrating SSR issues for discussion, establishing a process for decision-making, and coordinating the implementation of policy decisions. Like the Eisenhower NSC mechanism, the structure should comprise a planning board, an SSR council, and an implementation board. The intent is to have issues staffed and integrated into written products for the SSR council to discuss in an orderly fashion. Once policy decisions are made, implementation requires monitoring, coordination and feedback.

The most important step is finding the right person to serve as the SSR council chairman. Ideally, someone with an executive background, such as a former chief executive, governor, or large city mayor, is desirable. As this matter is a political issue, requiring substantial authority, the U.S. president with UN agreement should provide the imprimatur to the appointment. Accordingly, the U.S. ambassador or the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) from the Department of State would prove most advantageous. The SSR council chairman should choose a special assistant to attend to the entire mechanism as well as chairing the planning board, managing the SSR council meetings, and monitoring the implementation board.

Planning Board

The planning board prepares written products for SSR council edification and consideration. Initially, the SSR council chairman (i.e., ambassador or USSC) and council members provide the planning board with the policy issues they want staffed for council consideration. Over time, ideas emanating from the planning board, implementation board, council discussions, or the field should be included.

The members of the planning board come from the departments, agencies, and organizations participating in SSR. They should have sufficient rank (06, GS-13, etc.) and authority to cull information from their parent bureaucracies as well as interact with their corresponding SSR council member. Additionally, a small staff (around twelve) supports the board for the drafting and editing of written products. Conceptually, the planning board should meet two to three times weekly in four-hour sessions.

The special assistant has the essential task of overseeing the production of the draft papers. The papers must be concise (no more than ten pages), articulate, and factual, integrating the various perspectives from the supporting bureaucracies. Issue topics must be narrow enough for the SSR council to focus on definitive policy decisions. If the topic is too broad, the special assistant should render it into smaller, more manageable topics for draft papers. Although the special assistant and the planning board examine, debates, and reconciles differences as much as possible, they should not paper over irreconcilable differences in order to create some sort of consensus. This leads to lowest common denominator products which deprive the council of all views and dilutes the substance. As a solution, the special assistant highlights the opposing views in the paper, aligning them in two columns for easy comparison.

The planning board prepares three to four draft papers for the weekly SSR council meeting, even though it may take several sessions before a paper is ready for the council. Hence, the special assistant works with the SSR council chairman in the development of a long-term agenda, depicting when the SSR council will address specific topics. While the process is on-going, planning board members (including the special assistant) meet frequently with their principal SSR council members to keep them apprised of the major issues as well as the divergences of opinion in each paper. The principal council members in turn provide guidance regarding the development of the paper or direct the member to reach back to the supporting bureaucracy for assistance. This process helps educate all SSR members regarding the various factors and implications affecting an issue. Hence, even if a member does not agree with the arguments expressed by other members, at least he/she understands the other viewpoints.

For ease of reading, draft papers need a uniform format. Generally, they should be organized into sections (e.g., general considerations or background, objectives, and courses of action). Financial appendices and germane supporting staff studies may also accompany the papers for in-depth information. The special assistant distributes the papers to the principal SSR council members a week in advance of the SSR council meeting to give them time to absorb the information and confer with their organizations if needed.

This preparation process provides multiple benefits. First, issues for discussion receive extensive input and staffing from the supporting departments, agencies, and organizations. Through this process, which Eisenhower’s special assistant Robert Cutler once described as the “acid bath” for refining papers, staff work yields good results. Cutler believed quality papers were the result of extensive debate and research within the planning staff: “Out of the grinding
of these minds comes a refinement of the raw material into valuable metal; out of the frank assertion of differing views, backed up by preparation that searches every nook and cranny, emerges a resolution that reasonable men can support. Differences of views which have developed at lower levels are not swept under the rug but exposed.” Second, the principal SSR council members, being incredibly busy, have little time for extensive study of each issue, and they would likely miss key points even if they tried. The planning board allows the council members to focus on other duties, while steadily educating them on the issues as the time nears for council consideration. In this manner, the planning board, supporting bureaucracies, and the SSR council are thoroughly knowledgeable on every aspect of each issue that comes before the council. Third, policy issues are brought forth in manageable packets for deliberation and decision. This obviates the risk of making hasty decisions in the guise of expediency, which subsequently may create greater problems. Finally, if a policy exhibits flaws during execution, the SSR council has a point of reference to adapt the policy.

SSR Council. Council membership should be kept small (12-15 members) in order to promote candid debate, to enhance camaraderie among members, and to reduce the chance of leaks to the press before a policy is ready for public consumption. Consequently, the media should not have access to meetings. At the direction of the SSR chairman, expert consultants and other officials may participate in select sessions, pertaining to their area of expertise. The council should meet once a week at the same day and time so as to permit members to reserve the space on their calendars. Naturally, if a principal member is absent, a deputy sits in. Sessions should last two to three hours, which should permit sufficient debate of policy papers.

Even though the SSR council chairman is in charge, the job of managing the meeting’s agenda is delegated to the special assistant, who is supported by an executive secretary to take notes of the meeting. Generally, it is a good idea to start each meeting with a situation update on the country, lasting around twenty minutes. Thereafter, the special assistant introduces each paper, highlighting the main points and the points of contention. At this point, council members debate their views openly in order for the chairman to hear all viewpoints and even join in the discussions.

The purpose of these discussions is to ensure all viewpoints are aired and weighed, with the implications of each issue duly considered. Thus, both majority and minority views are given sufficient consideration. Issues might be decided in one session or returned to the planning board for more staff work. The special assistant serves as moderator to prevent members from dominating the discussion or speaking too long. It might be of value to limit a member’s point to five minutes in order to permit others to speak. The end result is greater rapport among council members, greater candor in the exchange of views, and an increased capacity to address complex issues more effectively.

The authority, judgment, and political maneuver room of the chairman are subsequently enhanced by this mechanism. By making it a principle not to consider policy issues outside of the SSR council, the chairman obviates ex parte attempts to influence policy. Occasionally, the chairman may have an intimate meeting with only two or three council members because of the sensitivity of the subject, but secret sessions should be the exception rather the norm for policy decisions. The chairman need not make a policy decision in council. Often the chairman may need to consider all sides of an issue for a couple of days, perhaps conferring with other associates, before making a decision. Once made however, the decision must be drafted into a policy statement by the staff, distributed to the council members for comments which are considered by the SSR council chairman, and then approved as policy. The policy statement also designates a lead department, agency, or organization for implementation.

The advantages of process and procedures in the SSR council are as follows: SSR council members are intimately familiar with the facts and implications surrounding an issue before discussion occurs; policy issues are provided to the SSR council in manageable portions so as to ensure they are thoroughly considered before they become policy; the system permits the SSR council to manage a heavy workload without becoming exhausted; the process enhances rapport among SSR council members, creating camaraderie and a greater exchange of views; the process ends with a definitive written decision, which diminishes misunderstandings; finally, the mechanism permits very busy officials to focus exclusively on well-staffed issues for a few hours per week, allowing them to devote the rest of their time to other duties.

Implementation Board

The implementation board is a misnomer in that it does not implement policy, but instead coordinates, assists, and tracks progress of policy implementation. Like the planning board, the implementation board is composed of SSR representatives of departments, agencies, and organizations. The special assistant may wish to attend the weekly meetings as an observer or to answer questions regarding policy intent. Because of the difficulty in the implementation of policies, the implementation board chairman should have extensive authority, perhaps one grade below the SSR council chairman.
Due to the fact that even the best written policies are subject to misinterpretation or confusion, the board clears up questions from the lead implementing agency. Sometimes, the board may need to refer a question to the SSR council chairman for consideration/clarification. Being a lead agency for implementation does not imply sole responsibility. In the majority of cases, the lead agency will need the supporting help from other departments, agencies, and organizations. The implementation board assists in that coordination (sometimes exercising its authority with non-cooperative organizations or individuals) and also ensures new policies do not conflict with existing policies. In the course of its duties, the implementation board may develop an idea or receive one from the field for planning board consideration. Finally, the implementation board provides a monthly written report to the SSR council on the progress of policy implementation including problems encountered and side effects.

The implementation board provides benefits which are not initially apparent. Rather than viewing the implementation board as intrusive, lead agencies will grow to trust and appreciate the assistance the board can provide them regarding their tasks. Too often, lead agencies are tasked to implement a policy with no authority to persuade other organizations assist. Moreover, questions over the policy decision and bureaucratic resistance create unnecessary turmoil for the implementing agency. The implementation board’s raison d’être is to help the agency towards success. Thus, the implementation board has a stake in the success of implementing policies.

Final Thoughts

Too often the idea of organization is associated with inflexibility, bureaucratic red tape, and unimaginative thinking. Inexperienced people often reject organizational structures in the whimsical pursuit of fresh ideas, decisive action, and unencumbered access to information. Unfortunately, informal systems most often result in ill-conceived policies, group think, severe infighting, selective-compliance, and misunderstandings. Because bureaucracy permits large organizations to function properly, attempting to ignore or marginalize it courts disaster and often results in illegal activities. Experienced senior executives often manage bureaucracy deftly, attaining unity of effort.

President Eisenhower recognized that his NSC mechanism was not perfect, admitting there was plenty of room for improvements.

Nevertheless, his organizational structure did create fully integrated products from the departments, agencies, and expert consultants. The process succeeded in educating administration officials on all facets of issues, permitting council members to debate issues for the purpose of reaching optimum solutions to complex problems.

The procedures permitted the president to reach decisions, fully aware of both minority and majority viewpoints. Furthermore, dominating personalities, close associates, and party politics did not have undue influence on the president’s decisions. Both the process and procedures enhanced the implementation of policy, permitting the government bureaucracy to request clarifications as well as submitting fresh ideas. Finally, the administration was able to track progress and eliminate conflicts with existing policies.

Because of the intricacies involved with SSR, an organizational mechanism is a requisite to minimize errors in judgment, expose potential flaws in initiatives, and reveal pernicious consequences from policies. Fragile democracies are usually not well organized. The mechanism could serve as a model for the host government to emulate, perhaps for its own national security council. Ultimately, the goal of SSR is to transition authority to the host government, so providing an organizational paradigm for decision-making could prove to be the most enduring gift from the international community.

1Department of the Army, Stability Operations: FM 3-07 (GPO: October 2008), 6-1.
2FM 3-07, 1-3.
3FM 3-07, 1-4, 1-5.
8Cutler was describing the end state of the U.S. National Security Council process, but left little doubt that the preparation of draft Policy Papers was integral to the whole. Robert Cutler, “The Development of the National Security Council,” Foreign Affairs, 34, No. 3 (April, 1956), 442.

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Transition in Relief Operations

by Colonel John Bessler

Recently, much good work was done in compiling lists of tasks for relief workers to accomplish and the standards towards which to strive. However, the reality is that each relief effort is unique in its scope and challenges. Commanders and planners have at their disposal the doctrine and guidelines described above, as well as the tools and resources of S/CRS and international relief organizations to consider while planning and conducting relief operations. But none of these provide specific metrics or tools to determine when or under what conditions to transition tactical and operational control to civil authorities during relief operations.

The Department of Defense (DoD) must become better prepared to execute support missions, for it is clear that relief operations are here to stay. Current doctrine provides a good conceptual basis for planning but fails to adequately address criteria for transferring control from the military to civilian government and NGOs. Likewise, the S/CRS and Sphere Project initiatives make important contributions to the understanding and conduct of relief operations but do not address military-civilian transition—i.e., an appropriate exit strategy for the military. Such transition guidance is sorely needed, but given the uniqueness of each situation a standard set of criteria may not apply. To that end, this article prefers three conceptual models by which commanders can define their own exit metrics. These three models are referred to as negotiated conditions, objective conditions, and requests for assistance/tracking capacity.

The negotiated conditions model can be described as the efforts of a military staff, very early in a crisis, to closely interact with civil officials as well as with civilian humanitarian effort representatives to determine a coordinated response to the crisis and to jointly determine the exit timeline and milestones. This may be the most recurrent model for anticipated disasters—such as hurricanes or typhoon landfalls. Enough lead time or prior planning must exist to ensure a rapid linkup between civilian officials with access to policy decision makers, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), USAID, and the supporting military. A good example of ‘negotiated conditions’ as a means for determining exit metrics would be the DoD response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992.

When the amount of destruction is unanticipated, very rapid, or the damage is of such a scope as to overwhelm the ability of civilian officials to cope, an objective conditions model may be a better option. Objective conditions are a known set of parameters by which a military staff tracks progress in a relief scenario where the disaster’s true magnitude and requirements are unknown or ambiguous. During relief planning, military staffs use predetermined metrics to monitor progress, shift effort, and gauge the relief effort’s progress. These predetermined criteria normally are modified to fit the particular situation and can change throughout the operation itself. Usually in situations where objective conditions are used, the military takes the lead until civilian authorities are better able to contribute meaningfully to the process. An excellent example of ‘objective conditions’ would be the coordination seen with Hurricane Katrina between the Federal government and the JTF HQ in 2005.

A request for assistance (RFA)/tracking capacity model is a third approach. It refers to a two-fold staff tracking mechanism. An RFA is a request for support or assistance. Requests can be for either a commodity, such as water or medical supplies, or for a service, such as transportation or medical evacuation. RFAs are normally made to the military relief operation’s representatives by a local official or relief organization. In this model, military planners and civilian representatives (such as from USAID or the Red Cross) jointly monitor how many RFAs are received, prioritized, and addressed across the various regions within a given area over time. As RFAs diminish in various areas, the military staff develops some applicable threshold metric that when exceeded allows the military effort to be shifted elsewhere or terminated. Tracking capacity is a metric tool which enables the on-site military commander to monitor the growing support capacity of other agencies that are providing assistance in the area of operations, such as NGOs, international governmental organizations (IGOs), as well as reconstituted local, state, and national agencies. The DoD’s response to the Bangladesh tsunami in early 2006 provides a great case study in tracking RFAs.

These non-doctrinal, ad-hoc models are examples for commanders to consider while assessing the uniqueness of their own mission’s situation and to develop meaningful, tailored criteria. They make use of what is known about relief operations without proposing arbitrary and inappropriate exit metrics.

1This article is a modified extraction of a part of a chapter by the author in a forthcoming anthology: John Bessler, “Chapter 6: Defining Criteria For Handover To Civilian Officials In Relief Operations” in Short Of General War: Perspectives On The Use Of Military Power in The 21st Century, ed. Harry R. Yanger (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010).
Humanitarian Assistance and Capacity Development: Unifying Efforts of DoD and the Civilian Community

by Commander Bruno Himmler, M.D.

During this time of significant domestic debate regarding health care reform, it is as also important to review how we look at reforming or improving other health care systems throughout the world. We are very aware of the significant needs that exist in many parts of the world. The NGO community and USAID have led the way in sponsoring developmental projects and relief efforts aimed at reducing human suffering. The military has also looked at achieving the same effects in areas plagued by conflict. Unfortunately, there has been no strategic goal established for engagements and many well meaning projects have led to merely wasting tax payer money. Since September 2001, the United States civilian agencies and military have taken on multiple responses often in uncoordinated efforts. Initial thoughts were that the military should not get involved in nation building or humanitarian assistance, but recent events have shown that there is a need for the military to learn how to do this better.

The military has been reviewing its successes and failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo and the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates has recognized the importance of nation building. Title XVI of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, which has almost identical language as NSPD-44 (National Security Presidential Directive) and DODI 3000.05 have both mandated the elevation of stability operations to a co-equal status with traditional offensive and defensive operations. From DODI 3000.05, the following reiterates this importance: **Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission** that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. (DODD 3000.05, 2005). The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 also specifically identifies that catastrophic health events can threaten national security (Laraby, P. R. et. al. 2009).

The military services are currently in the process of revising their doctrine to incorporate training and expertise for this new activity. They have gained excellent insight from the lessons learned regarding disaster relief responses (Indonesia, Peru, Pakistan). Some of these concepts can also apply regarding stability operations, but there are numerous distinct differences. Therefore, the military is actively seeking guidance and partnerships with civilian agencies such as USAID, Project Hope, Department of State, along with many others. The goal is to develop better understanding and strategic plans for the military that are complementary to what the civilian sector has already undertaken or will undertake once the security situation allows.

The US Military is looking to change its doctrine to allow for the changing environment we live in today. The military no longer deals with large state actors with conventional armies, and since the resolution of the cold war, it seems very unlikely that they will face such a conflict. Instead, our military needs to deal with non-state actors engaging in protracted guerrilla warfare. In order to succeed in this new era, we must provide the soldiers new weapons: those that lead to capacity development and host nation resiliency that ultimately develops legitimacy for the local government.

**Key Concepts regarding Capacity Development:**

A cohesive society is more resilient and can respond to internal and external stressors more effectively. Defining the key issues is an important initial step. **Vulnerability** is the pre-event, inherent characteristics or qualities of systems that create the potential for harm or differential ability to recover following an event (Cutter, et. al. 2008). Vulnerability is a function of the exposure (who or what is at risk) and the sensitivity of the system (the degree to which people and places can be harmed) (Cutter, et. al. 2008). The physical exposure, described by the characteristics of the initiating event (magnitude, duration, frequency, impact, rapidity of onset), defines the physical vulnerability of places (Cutter, et. al. 2008). The density of the built environment is another contributing factor to community vulnerability as there is more exposure and thus a greater potential for damage. The social vulnerability of communities is borne from inequalities, which affect access to resources and information, the ability to absorb the impacts of hazards and disasters without governmental interventions (Cutter, et. al. 2008).

**Resilience** refers to the ability of a human system to respond and recover. It includes those inherent conditions that allow the system to absorb impacts and cope with the event, as well as post event adaptive processes that facilitate the ability of the system to reorganize, change, and learn in response to the event (Cutter, et. al. 2008). Characteristics of resilient communities include:
Relevant hazards are recognized and understood (situational Awareness).

Communities at risk know when a hazard event is imminent (early detection).

Individuals at risk are safe from hazards in their homes and places of work (individual preparation).

Disaster-resilient communities experience minimum disruption to life and economy after a hazard event has passed. (Elasticity).

Cohesive communities with decentralization of social infrastructure.

Capacity Development in the Public Health Arena:

The most important issue when looking at interventions in the health sector is the development of an overall strategic plan. For many countries that have suffered through civil war or prolonged internal conflict, most of the public health infrastructure will be in disarray and the initial needs can be overwhelming. Often, there will be competing political emphasis that will shift focus from community public health issues to individual health care issues. Fortunately, there are excellent international guidelines that can help focus the attention and priorities for external interventions.

The first guidance is that of utilitarianism or the concept of the greatest good for the greatest number of people. This concept focuses on the fact that most countries undergoing or emerging from conflict will have limited resources available to address health care issues. Using this concept, efforts should focus on addressing issues that affect the most people with interventions that are the most economical. Often, the media will identify the plight of children with cancer or adults suffering from chronic diseases, but the necessary treatment is often expensive and seldom results in cures. Therefore, the focus should be related to long term public health concerns as identified in the WHO Millennium Developmental Goals.

The Millennium Developmental Goals provide a good starting point as to what the NGO and international agencies focus on for the developing world. These goals focus on the significant factors that are leading to preventable morbidity and mortality throughout the world (see below). It also focuses attention on the most vulnerable groups in a society, such as children, women, and the elderly (Bricknell & Gadd, 2007). If the US Military focuses on activities that address issues related to these goals, they will find transition of military programs to NGOs a much easier process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Target</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal 4</td>
<td>Reduce Child Mortality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goal 5</td>
<td>Improve Maternal Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goal 6</td>
<td>Combat HIV, Malaria and TB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goal 7</td>
<td>Ensure Environmental Sustainability</td>
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For successful sustained improvement in public health, adoption of the following core values by the host nation is critical:

- Right to health for all regardless of ability to pay.
- Equity of services regardless of race, religion, political affiliation.
- Good quality services - well managed, sensibly integrated, available, accessible, accountable, affordable and sustainable.
- Visible and transparent support systems - health information, communications, human resources, administration and finance.

For successful programs of development, another key concept includes early communication with the host nation. The best examples of successful sustainable development programs are those that were developed by-through-with the host nation. The host nation ministry of health may lack the necessary resources and training to establish clear priorities. The initial step thus would involve strategic SME guidance to help develop the country specific strategic priorities. USAID, WHO and others also have resources and expertise that can be called upon to assist in this endeavor.

Once a strategic plan is in place, the areas of significant need and those areas identified as gaps (needs with no identified host nation response or resource) can be elicited. Another key for success is the early involvement of NGOs and International Organizations (IOs) in the initial planning phase of a project. They can provide valuable guidance regarding implementation of programs, especially if they have been in the country for many years. Of equal importance is the concept of preserving the humanitarian space. The military’s primary mission during stability operations is restoring order and the advancement of US interests (Laraby, et.al. 2009). This does not follow the code of conduct for NGOs and they want to ensure that working with the military will not compromise their neutrality (Laraby, et.al. 2009).
However, when humanitarian needs arise in an area of armed conflict, neutrality may be impossible to adhere to, as seen recently in Afghanistan and Iraq (Gaydos & Luz, 1994).

Paradigm Shift:

Current military medical doctrine promotes the concept of MEDCAPS and VETCAPS to win the hearts and minds of the local populace. On the surface, this seems like a good idea, but viewed from a different angle, many of these engagements have been counter-productive and hampered long term capacity development, leading often to dependency on part of the host nation. We therefore need to shift the focus of effort from providing isolated care for chronic diseases to those efforts that would lead to increased ability of the host nation health care system to care for its people.

A primary role for the military is the mentoring and development of the host nation’s military force, or security sector reform. Most militaries have developed a separate health care system to meet the special needs for the uniform combatants. This can become problematic for a country that has undergone significant internal strife and has major civilian health sector deficits. Thus, development of any military health system for the security sector needs to be aligned with overall public health concepts (Bricknell & Thompson, 2007). Initially, development of the military health system may need to be limited to medic/first aid response training and delay the development of clinical and hospital systems until the civilian sector is fully operational.

Excellent examples of sustainable MEDCAPS involve using the host nation to determine the site for interventions and assimilating the local health workers into the engagement. Many health workers yearn to have American medical personnel come and provide training and education. Coordination is also important to ensure that training and education is conducted at the level that can be sustained. Often, medical devices that are utilized for training (i.e. defibrillators) are not found in the local region. Training must therefore include operation and maintenance of related equipment and using equipment that can be donated upon completion of training.

During times of conflict, access to health care will be hampered and potential disruption to the public health infrastructure (water, sanitation, waste water treatment) can be anticipated. Even when staff and services are present, utilization levels will be low, reflecting community concerns regarding security and safety. When worried about safety, people tend to access only those services brought to them. Therefore, creation of extensive 24-hour mobile services will help continue to meet the public health needs and ensure delivery of care to IDP camps and local communities. Also needed are contingency plans to deal with lack of fuel, security and essential drugs that can affect mobile clinics in the peripheral districts during times of conflict.

Based on review of WHO, USAID and domestic research, another key area of focus needs to be on public health and health care systems. For effective impact to occur, the lowest common denominator needs to be the focus for intervention. Establishing diverse links to many resources helps build resiliency and redundancy is paramount for emergency services.

Given this guidance, the following would be the key areas for engagement (The Sphere Project 2004):

1. Development of wells or potable water collection systems and storage that can provide safe water for consumption at 10-15L/day/person.
2. Improving host nation Ministry of Health ability to procure and distribute medical supplies.
3. Improved access to primary health care: Accessibility of health services, going beyond just physical access, and including economic, social and cultural accessibility and acceptability.
4. Improved care for children less than 5 with focus on immunizations and nutritional support and ORT for acute watery diarrhea.
5. Efforts to mitigate endemic diseases with focus on TB, Malaria and HIV.

In order to track progress, we need to also ensure proper ability to measure success. Sustained improved access and quality of primary care can only be achieved through training and education of the host nation health care workers. We must avoid the temptation to provide the services directly, though it will be more efficient and focus on training the local health care workers to provide the same service. Mentoring is truly the main mechanism that improves local providers’ skill sets. Along with the local training, we need to engage at the ministerial level to ensure the government can and will support improved health care delivery; otherwise the providers will likely seek to relocate to a location where they can utilize their improved skill set for a better monetary reward.

Metrics for success:

Oversight of engagements is vital; and meaningful tracking of short and long term effects of such engagements will help ensure success. Current recommend indicators for overall health status of communities and nations are as follows (Skolnik, 2008):

1. Under 5 mortality rate
2. Endemic diseases rates
3. Alcohol and tobacco use rates.
5. % population with access to clean water.
6. % population with access to primary health care.
7. Local capacity for emergency provision of essential services during disasters.
8. Disaster preparedness management plan in place and exercised.

The next step once the strategic objectives have been established is developing the means to implement engagements that address the key areas. There is no specific template that can be utilized as implementation will be dependent on each situation. Overall, valid assessments need to be made and vetted through the local ministry of health which then prioritizes the list. Focus needs to be on developing programs that the local health teams will administer and programs that enhance their skill sets. We need to minimize our direct involvement and learn to become better mentors. Buy-in by the host nation will require their involvement during the earliest planning phases (Himmler, 2009).

**Conclusion:**

Finally, we need to establish guidelines for what “good enough” will be. This needs to be based on international standards promoted by the UN and WHO. The military will then be able to determine to what level of improved capacity we need to help the host nation achieve before disengaging. Hopefully, this will also provide an opportunity to create realistic timelines and budgets to achieve the desired end-state.

Wilensky has also provided seven excellent guidelines for military medical support of civilian programs during the Vietnam War (Wilensky, 2006). His principles are found in Table 1. It is important that all military health activities with civilian health agencies be consistent with the host nation’s national health strategy and contribute toward an end-state of the government meeting the needs of its people with locally obtainable resources (Bricknell & Gadd, 2007). Extrapolation of the valuable lessons learned from disaster response to sustainable stability operations is also important for future success. Implementation of the current guidelines presented by WHO should help shift the focus of interventions to those that truly lead to sustainable capacity development of fragile state’s public health system that ultimately can lead to improved security for the region.

**Table 1: Principles of Military Medical Engagement in Civilian Health Care Programmes.**

1. The value must be based on training the indigenous population to care for themselves.
2. Civilian care programmes are always a secondary mission to providing medical care for military forces.
3. Medical intelligence of disease prevalence obtained from caring for the local population is useful.
4. Supporting the development of the indigenous healthcare infrastructure must be determined by what the local population needs and is prepared and resourced to support.
5. Military medical care programmes for local civilians can be effective in advancing campaign objectives.
6. The objective must be to engender support for the local government, not foreign forces.
7. Military support to civilian aid programmes can only be effective if the civilian population has a need and such activities fit wider campaign objectives.

The above opinions are from the author and do not reflect official policy guidelines of PKSOI, US Army War College, US Army or Department of Health and Human Services.

**References**


Commander Bruno Himmler is a member of the active component of the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) and currently serves as the Health and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor for PKSOI at the U.S. Army War College.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the various cultures of disparate agencies in stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and identify areas of overlap and barriers to efficacy.

The ability to project power and policy by the United States government has undergone radical change and significant challenges since early 2001. Geographic distance and language barriers coupled with legacy agencies and workers deployed for long periods away from their normal environs have induced stress onto all parties. Changes in mission and political administrations have forced major and minor course corrections ‘on the fly’ which produced second and third order effects that negatively impacted operational efficacy. All these friction elements reduce the ability of the U.S. government to influence the shoring-up of fragile states through the projection of national power.

Projecting national power comes with direct and indirect costs. Not unlike a radio signal losing strength over distance and resistance, the elements of national power are subject to attenuation. To continue the analogy, signal strength requires periodic amplification to produce the desired effect on the receiver’s ear. Interagency stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan amplify and deliver the signal to the ‘ears’, in this case, the polity of both states. Boosting that signal is the goal.

The amplification and sharper reception of the elements of national power is the focus of this paper. NSPD-44 (Bush, George W.) defined the role of the U.S. Department of State in stability operations as:

…promote (ing) the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife (Bush, George W.).

(The Obama Administration has not rescinded NSPD-44. However, the State Department now refers to Title 16 of the National Defense Authorization Act for this same definition of its role in stability operations.)

The ‘signal strength’ of these four elements attenuates over distance, language barriers, geography, budget constraints, intention and perception. The challenge for the transmission of the signal is to not just overcome the phenomena of attenuation, but to achieve the desired effects. To do that, national power must ultimately be well received and completely understood.

The four elements of national power; diplomacy, information, military and economic, have all been employed in various ways. The two political and geographic recipients of U.S. national power projection in this study are Afghanistan and Iraq. While not entirely similar, the methods and, most importantly the agencies and people used to amplify the signal have organizational similarities that lend themselves to comparison. To view Thomas Kinton’s complete article click here.
Executive Summary

It is mandatory for NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to create a “bridging” organization (ACU) that will have a lasting presence in “Coordinating” ALL future activities and affairs relative to the many diverse elements and needs that comprise the complex Afghan Society and the Region. Without this Institution, the problems in Afghanistan and the larger Region will remain.

Third party motivations towards “profits” and other “self-serving” interests must be set aside and sole focus then directed towards solving the social and International aspects behind the present poverty, lack of “broad” education, health issues, unrest, and conflicts. Considerations must not be limited to the Afghan dimension alone. Regional problems do not recognize either borders or temporary solutions… The nations to the east are at the present having significant amounts of unrest that could shortly erupt into “mass migrations”. China and India will have over 4 billion people by 2035 according to competent authorities. Even now, it is clear that the immediate border nations are already deeply involved in Afghanistan’s problems. Under the best of conditions, singular solutions in Afghanistan would invite economic refugees… just as the United States has been and still is experiencing the problems in Mexico that are moving North… bringing both all the individual and social problems with them… in addition to the Mexican crime, drugs, kidnappings, and corruption.

A needed background to the approach is recognizing the concept of “Way-of-Life”. This means that preconceived notions of the “Western World” should be set aside in favor of those cultural strengths that have been proven over thousands of years. Patch-work approaches of local jobs in factories for export like post-WW II Japan, and now China, will only further the problems and not address the background causes.

To achieve this, NATO and others must become “servants” to the required broader approach so that all activities can be properly placed and coordinated within the context of achieving the defined agendas to be determined by the ACU. Additional considerations should include opening all borders in the region to accommodate the long heritage of traditions and movements.

Applying the most modern technologies in their most advanced forms for Infrastructure and education now have the potential to achieve what modern armies and past conflicts could not. Computer and Information Superhighway technologies allow the continuance of diversity in natural “Cultural Settings” for the specific benefits of each of those cultures. To read Mr. Ghafoory’s complete article click here.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of PKSOI, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the Afghan or U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Balancing Haiti’s Future in Transition: The Strategic Reset
by LTC Tony Johnson

Before 12 January 2010, the Haitian Government and MINUSTAH were on track to conduct parliamentary elections on 28 February 2010 and the presidential election in November 2010. The late Mr. Hedi Annabi, Chief of the United Nations Stabilization mission to Haiti, is quoted saying these inspiring words just days before his untimely death on 12 January 2010:

‘Haiti is today at a turning point in its history, We saw the hope of a new departure emerge on the horizon in 2009. It is now up to the Haitians, and only the Haitians, to transform this hope into reality by working together in the greater interests of their country…Success would allow the country to enter a virtuous circle where stability and development are mutually reinforcing.’

Haiti’s stabilization horizon and glide paths to success were on track for a new departure. For example, the assistance of the Haitian National Police complemented by the superb intelligence gathering of the Joint Military Analysis Center (JMAC), significantly contributed to the highly successful joint cordon and search operations conducted throughout Haiti’s areas of responsibilities, (AOR). The military forces implemented a tough new offensive strategy called “Pacification,” similar to a program used in Vietnam, against armed gangs in both Cite Soleil and Martissant from 2007 to 2009. As a result, a 78 percent decrease in kidnappings in 2009 marked a relevant turning point in criminal activities compared to the rise in kidnappings in 2007 and 2008.

The stabilization horizon and glide paths to Haiti’s success gained new life on 13 October 2009 when the United Nations Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Haiti Mission for one year, allowing more time to adjust the military force in order to better meet the requirements on the ground. Security Council Resolution 9766 designates a multi-dimensional mission to enforce a secure and stable environment; to protect human rights; and to promote fair and equitable political process. Acting under Chapter VII, MINUSTAH’s objectives were to:

♦ Support the constitutional and political process;
♦ Maintain a secure and stable environment;
♦ Assist the transitional government in monitoring and reforming the Haitian National Police (HNP);
♦ Assist the HNP with the DDR programs to counter all armed groups;
♦ Provide logistical support and security during the elections;
♦ Promote and protect human rights; and
♦ Assist with the development of a border management program.

On July 26, 2009, LTC Anthony (Tony) Johnson participated in MINUSTAH’s Joint Civic Outreach Program for the “Peligre Orphanage” in Mirebalais, Haiti along with the Philippine Contingent and Nepalese Contingent in support of about 150 orphans. As a result, hot meals and assorted beverages were provided to the orphans for lunch. Later in the afternoon, about 80 orphans were provided medical treatment by Nepalese Medical Detachment’s Level-I clinic. Finally, the orphan’s displayed their gratitude and appreciation by singing the Haitian National Anthem prior to our departure.
The trigger point for successful elections and the adjustment of forces to better meet the requirements on the ground derived from two MINUSTAH objectives. There were to assist with the development of a border management program and to provide logistical support and security during the elections.

During Haiti’s electoral process in early 2009, the limited military forces at some of the polling places led to widespread voter fraud and corruption. In October 2009, MINUSTAH implemented its Reconfiguration Phase to permanently shift Spanish speaking forces to crossing points on the border of the Dominican Republic in order to deter drug traffickers and illegal immigration. In addition, MINUSTAH strategically placed forces at all of the polling stations throughout Haiti during the parliamentary elections and presidential election. The strategic impacts of these initiatives were clearly magnified when MINUSTAH conducted all its activities in close cooperation and coordination with relevant Haitian authorities at the national, municipal and local levels.

The recent earthquake in Haiti lasted about 5 seconds, but it overturned three years of tactical, operational and strategic achievements. The Haitians must work as a team with their international partners to rebuild Haiti with incorruptible government leaders who promote education and an effective transparent government in the 21st century and beyond.

LTC Tony Johnson served as the Former Chief of Military Operations Center and Deputy Chief, U3, MINUSTAH and is currently the Director of Law Enforcement for The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.
INTRODUCTION

“As iron sharpens iron, so one man sharpens another.” Proverbs 27:17

I have found a piece of literature that could fundamentally change the mindset of individuals assigned as advisors in counterinsurgency, stability, reconstruction, and development. That book is, Two Ears of Corn: A Guide to People-Centered Agricultural Improvement, by Roland Bunch, World Neighbors*, 1982.

REVIEW

You may be thinking, “How can an old book about agriculture development help me as a counterinsurgent?”

Although written for folks doing agricultural development, discerning readers will recognize the timeless principles of advising that cut across all lines of effort to include security, governance, and economic development. If agriculture development is your lane, then the theme of this book is an added bonus.

Like “population-centric” counterinsurgency theory, this book is about “people-centered” improvement. The author emphasizes that lasting impact comes from understanding the local people and the things that are important to them.

In today’s contemporary operating environment many of us have or will find ourselves serving as advisors to foreign security forces, host nation governments and local civil society or private institutions. I’ve personally served as a senior military advisor in Afghanistan as well as a governance, economic and agriculture development advisor on a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq. In all cases the training I received did little to prepare me for my role as an advisor. My training included shoot, move, communicate, and medicate, but nothing specifically on how to advise or what I like to call, the “Art of Advising.” The art of advising is something that if not done properly can lead to frustration, wasted resources, lost time, and ultimately mission failure. Had I read this book in advance, my outlook and approach as an advisor would have been significantly different, and the results of my efforts would likely have been more effective.

To read the complete review click here.
USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives – Innovation in Development

by Sven Lindholm

The end of the Cold War precipitated a period of time, still ongoing, of local conflicts brought on by historic ethnic tensions, nationalist movements, and long-simmering tribal and religious hostilities. In many regions still, today, the threats to peace are increasingly complex. Unaddressed, threats to stability and peace pose significant challenges to longer-term development. In recognition of this concept, in 1994, the USAID created the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI).

Since that inception over 15 years ago, OTI has grown from a small experimental office which managed a mere $10 million in program funds in two countries to an office only slightly larger, now managing over $200 million in program funds in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Colombia, Haiti, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, and Venezuela. In addition, the OTI has two new programs in initial stages of design and implementation.

Regardless of program size, what we do is closely aligned with—and stems from—our mission, vision and definition of success. From its beginning, the basic words of our mission statement guide OTI’s work: support US foreign policy objectives; help local partners; seize critical windows of opportunity; provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs.

OTI provides the U.S. government with a unique tool that can be deployed when other traditional mechanisms of long-term development or short-term humanitarian assistance might not be appropriate or effective. Our programs target the triggers of conflict and, when tentative peace has been reached, support continued stability, recovery and reconstruction.

As the Congressional Research Service wrote in a 2009 report, “In its 15 years in operation, OTI has served … as a laboratory within USAID to try innovative approached to development.”

Criteria for Engagement

Although OTI has a global focus, we make careful recommendations to our senior leaders for our interventions based on four key criteria for engagement:

- Is the country important to U.S. national interests?
- Is there a window of opportunity?
- Can OTI’s involvement significantly increase the chances of success?
- Is the operating environment sufficiently stable?

Of these criteria, the window of opportunity is the most difficult to define in that OTI’s mission is essentially guided by both the local political environment and the ability to apply useful assistance in a short-term period. OTI programming is designed to capitalize on these windows, which can be defined as brief, critical junctures in a nation’s history in which the actions of citizens and public servants can lead directly to either peaceful political development and stability or backsliding into further conflict and crisis.

Once in a country, OTI programming seeks to bolster progress, build public confidence, and diminish the likelihood of a return to conflict by identifying the critical issues that could determine the direction of a transition. OTI assists the nations’ leadership—public and civil society—to find creative ways to preserve political space and advance positive change in the midst of political transitions. OTI identifies and supports key actors and critical processes, hitting on issues that positively influence the transition and funding activities that spark or reinforce required change.

These themes are reflected in its programs. Examples abound, and include: combating violence against women through local civil society groups in Darfur; weakening insurgency by employing tens of thousands of people in Iraq; helping traditionally excluded indigenous communities participate in electoral processes in Bolivia; and combining humanitarian relief with ethnic reconciliation in Sri Lanka.

Tailoring programs to local context

A key component of successful programming recognizes that, which there may be some commonalities to consider, each intervention is different and each demands a tailored program. Success is how rapidly—and how well—country programs respond to both U.S. foreign policy imperatives and to the local political developments. It also depends on the ability to adapt in these dynamic situations; to evolve program designs, plans and approaches; and keep pace in fluid environments—all of which includes positive changes in public attitudes, perceptions or behaviors.

Continued on next page
The following are two examples of OTI programming that was adapted to support rapid response in transition, reconstruction, and stabilization environments.

In 2007, Kenya’s contested election threatened the stability of that country. With international and regional influence and support, the disputing parties signed a peace agreement and formed a political coalition. However, despite this tenuous agreement, the situation remained tense. Burnt Forest, in Kenyan’s Rift Valley, was a locus of extreme violence. The main marketplace was destroyed and largely abandoned because of lingering animosities between the town’s two primary ethnic groups. Following the violence, the groups set up markets in separate areas, furthering perceptions of separation and misunderstandings. In this environment, OTI provided for a local group, the Rural Women’s Peace Link (RWPL), to conduct community dialogue and reconciliation meetings, where eventually it was agreed that the central market should be rebuilt. Subsequently, the Burnt Forest Town Council signed an agreement to manage the market in partnership with the RWPL and promote reconciliation and peace activities. The market has been operating for nearly a year, and patronized by the all of the town’s inhabitants, regardless of political or ethnic affiliation.

In another example, OTI programming has supported public forums and national media in Lebanon that provided opportunities for hundreds of youth to speak directly to politicians and tell their leaders, contemporaries, and the public at large about the issues that affect them. Through six televised debates, youth questioned their leaders about emigration, extremism, Palestinian-Lebanese relations, and other issues. They also shared openly with their legislators their own opinions about what the lawmakers should be doing to improve the country. By speaking out about issues that affect them, the youth who took part in these activities say they now sense that they can hold their leaders accountable in a democratic manner. The two efforts have also increased the visibility of youth organizations.

As OTI is designed to act quickly and respond, we provide to USAID—and to the United States’ government—additional approaches and flexible tools as part of “smart power” in that smartpower is receiving more attention and funding. In support of this purpose, USAID’s new Administrator, Dr. Rajiv Shah, highlighted OTI in recent testimony as example to follow in contracting and execute U.S. foreign policy objectives.

In conclusion, fifteen years after its creation, OTI remains a relatively small office within USAID, using a very small portion of the entire USAID budget. Yet it plays a crucial role in meeting foreign policy objectives in critical countries experiencing a cessation from conflict and political transition.

OTI has helped hundreds of thousands of people engage in individual efforts, community action, and national movements to bring about positive change and increase their chances for a stable and peaceful future.

For more on USAID’s Office on Transition Initiatives, please visit [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov) Keyword: OTI

**LESSONS IN TRANSITION PROGRAMMING: 1994–2009**

- Coordination within USAID and with other U.S. Government agencies is critical to success.
- A country’s own political will for transition is key; OTI interventions cannot create it or substitute for its absence.
- Working in dynamic political environments requires equally dynamic and adaptive performance management processes.
- In countries prone to ethnic violence, programs often must be tailored to local realities and target specific regions outside capital cities, where conflicted communities are more frequent and central governments have less control.
- Support “action research” and don’t commit rigidly to a single strategic course. Constantly re-visit initial assumptions, re-evaluate program objectives, and re-target when necessary.
- Look beyond the “usual suspects” for local partnerships, including spontaneous groups of active citizen that can be more energized and effective.
- Seize windows of opportunity to support local actors to advance democracy and peace, but recognize that creative initiatives are made more effective through sustained effort and support.
- Empower field personnel to make on-the-spot program decisions, which enables quick, responsive, and relevant interventions at the local or regional level, but also demands logical, defensible strategic rationales for proposed actions.
- Funding flexibility and staff deployment readiness are essential for quick program startups.
- Top-down approaches to democracy and peace are inherently fragile. Support for enlightened leadership must be complemented by grassroots efforts to build stakeholders among the general population.
- The process is as important as the product. Every project is an opportunity to put democratic principles into practice and achieve positive change in public perceptions about a country’s political transition.
- Assume a “venture capitalist” approach where appropriate by starting small, taking risks, and growing good ideas. Building synergy across activities and regions can produce catalytic results.
Making Data ‘searchable and discoverable’

This article is the second in a series that describes PKSOI’s SOLLIMS // http://www.pksoi.org functions and capabilities. In this article we will look at data categorization / data sharing using tailorable, functional metatags.

SOLLIMS provides a comprehensive set of STABOPS-related content identifiers (metatags) that allows the user to better categorize O&R content and products submitted for the Knowledge Library. These metatags include both administrative identifiers -- e.g. user's Unit/ Agency, an Operation/Event identifier, an Operation/Event Type identifier; an Exercise or Experiment title field; as well as specific P&SO related metatags - e.g. STABOPS Sectors (security sector reform, humanitarian/ social well being ...), SSTRO Special Focus (mass atrocities / genocide, public health ...). These identifiers/metatags become searchable content that is permanently associated with the O&R/document -- similar to assigning keywords to a document or webpage.

For the various subsites within SOLLIMS -- called 'tiers' (PACOM, INSC), their metatags are further tailored to be mission and organization specific while still being related to P&SO activity. SOLLIMS also allows users to associate their O&R content with tasks from DoD’s Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and tasks from the US Agency for International Development's (USAID) Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix (ETM).

These tags/identifiers can subsequently be used as search criteria by all users to locate information most pertinent to their ‘knowledge management’ needs – and then consolidate this information into a report using the SOLLIMS Report Builder function. This report can then be introduced into the user’s social network for more global awareness. For example, at the Master Tier level, using the ‘SEARCH O&Rs’ function, we selected as the only search criteria the STABOPS Sectors meta-tag “Transition / Transformation”; selecting only those O&Rs we determined were most pertinent, we created the “Transition/Transformation Lessons Summary.” (CLICK HERE to view) This summary was then provided to the USAWC Faculty to review for application within the USAWC Resident and Distance Learning curricula. Some of the O&R titles included in this report – (click on title to view O&R)

- Retention of Critical Capabilities during Transition
- Improving Local Ownership of the Development Process
- Fixing Fragile States
- State Resilience as an Effective End Goal for Stability Operations
- Economic Growth in Post-Conflict

***NOTE: You need a SOLLIMS account to view this information.

Using metatags can significantly help you and other SOLLIMS users rapidly find information they need – the right information!!! As you contribute your personal observations, insights, and lessons as part of the growing SOLLIMS STABOPS knowledge base, use the metatags provided to categorize your input; if there are metatags you believe should be added – send us an email using the FEEDBACK link – we are always happy to hear from our users.

SOLLIMS Configuration Management – Update

In this section of the Bulletin we will announce new functionalities that have been added to SOLLIMS since the last Bulletin and list new functionalities that we expect to implement during the next 90 days:
STABOPS DIRECTORY – This is a US OSD/Joint Staff sponsored initiative the intended purpose of which is to provide the STABOPS community, both civilian and military, with a place to go to find those organizations and agencies with a major STABOPS function as part of their mission; and to describe these STABOPS related functions. Phase 1 is ongoing with a focus on military units and commands – to include multi-national military elements; Phase 2 will begin later in CY10 and focus on cataloging civilian agencies/organizations (NGOs, IOs) – both US-based and international.

Tier 1 Management - the following Tier 1 workspaces have been added:

- ISAF (Sponsor: PKSOI/COMISAF)
- Talisman Sabre 11 (Sponsor: PACOM/PACFLT)
- PEASCORP (Sponsor: PKSOI)
- JFCOM J9 (Sponsor: JFCOM J9)

Projected Software / Site Development –

- Site cleanup / elimination of unused fields
- Enhanced Site Search (by Tier)
- Export to MS Access™ / enhanced Report Builder

Coming next quarter: “TOO MUCH INFORMATION .... The Left Menu Items”

Thanks for being part of the SOLLIMS Community of Action !!!

Mr. Dan French  SOLLIMS Administrator

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