Director’s Corner

Stability Operations and Transition: Getting from Military to Political Success

The word “transition” continues to permeate today’s national security discussions—transition of governance-type activities from military to civilian authorities; transition from civilian to the host-nation authorities; or even the transition from a war to a peacetime military and national security posture. It is the last of these “transition” discussions that we explore in this publication as we look at the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and theorize what the QDR suggests regarding the future of the U.S. military in stability and peace operations.

There are many pundits and thought-leaders in various camps that can speculate what the QDR means for the future of military preparation and engagement in stability and peace operations throughout the world. Some of them suggest the QDR re-focuses the military on preparation to win the next “big war;” while others point out the QDR’s emphasis on military involvement in anticipated “nation-building” engagements well into our future. We suggest the QDR articulates the theme of “balance”—both the reset of our military forces to re-focus on traditional warfare, as well as the sustainment of the hard-earned skill sets surrounding “stability” gained by our military through experience and education over the past decade. (continued on page 2)

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What do you think? Do you have something to say? Something to add to our Event list?
During stability operations, the local population must have confidence in the integrity and accountability of their systems of justice and governance; thus, the next Bulletin will focus on Rule of Law.

Send your letter or articles for submission to PKSOI Publications Coordinator @ e-mail or through the “Contact Us” at the PKSOI Website no later than 15 September 2010 for our next Bulletin. Provide sufficient contact information. Bulletin Editor may make changes for format, length, and inappropriate content only and in coordination with original author.

There is no suspense for submissions related to our Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Topic List. You may send your manuscript directly to the Chief, Policy and Knowledge Management Division (PKM), PKSOI.

Contact us
If you are a “blogger” and would like to check out our blogs related to Peace and Stability Operations please visit our website and make comments. You may also visit our Book Review section where we feature comments by the author and topical Subject Matter Experts.

PKSOI Blogs Book Reviews
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Same as Report (SAR)
In other words, as we transition from a war environment to one of peace, we should expect that stability operations training and deployments will continue, not cease.

Speaking of transition, you note that PKSOI also experienced a recent transition. Last month, we said “farewell” to Colonel John Kardos, who ably served as our Director since 2008. We wish him well on his retirement after 31 years in the U.S. Army. As the new Director, I look forward to continuing the dialogue in these stability and peace topics so necessary to the understanding of the full spectrum of military operations. Meanwhile, look to some changes in this publication in time for our next fiscal year. I look forward to seeing you at any of our upcoming conferences and workshops for this fall.

COL Stephen T. Smith
Director, PKSOI

Civil Affairs and the QDR: Opportunity and Challenge

by LTC Jeff Calvert

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the associated planning process that it represents has reinforced the focus on Stability Operations (SO) as an integral and co-equal element of full spectrum operations. Of course, SO is not new, and neither is the role of Civil Affairs (CA) forces as subject-matter experts for key stability tasks. What is new is the more formal recognition of the significance of Stability Operations and the CA role in them, now with increased manpower to fulfill that role.

For Civil Affairs, this elevated role manifests in two directives included in the “Rebalancing the Force” section of the QDR as enhancements to the capabilities of the US Armed Forces. The first of these – “expand civil affairs capacity” – provides resources and potential, creates opportunity, and presents challenges. The second one - “increase counterinsurgency (COIN), stability operations (SO), and counterterrorism (CT) competency in general purpose forces (GPF)” – is an important implied task for CA that presents its own opportunities and challenges. Both deserve a closer look, because the manner in which the CA branch embraces both the opportunity and the challenges will set its path for years to come. In recent conflicts, CA has been seen both as an invaluable asset that can solve difficult problems and bring unique and critical expertise to the battlefield, and alternatively as a bumbling, rank-heavy monster that gets in the way and causes more problems than it solves. At this decisive moment, the stage is set for CA to solidify that first image, and to step forward as a clear leader in developing a generation of stability warriors.

Expand Civil Affairs Capacity

This is a clear and relatively simple directive, and it’s already underway. In response to a notoriously high operational tempo for CA Soldiers – the great majority of them in the Reserve Component (RC) – and a projected continuing high demand, the Army is dramatically expanding its CA force structure. Significantly, most of this growth is in the Active Component (AC). By 2015 the AC is to have 55 CA companies – a 243% increase – along with an expanded role in support of GPF.
One AC brigade (the 95th CA Brigade) will continue its current role of supporting Special Operations Forces (SOF) and theater security cooperation missions, but in a more robust fashion. It will have five 5-company battalions – one for each geographic combatant command. The other brigade (the 85th CA Brigade) will support GPF with five 6-company battalions. This new GPF-focused AC brigade provides a significant new capability – now an AC company will be able to deploy in direct support of a brigade combat team (BCT) and remain in that role through an entire rotation. Because of the small number of AC CA soldiers in the past- only mobilized RC units could provide that vital long-term support.

This AC growth, combined with the addition of 16 RC CA companies, is designed to meet the rotational needs of the GPF while allowing the mobilization rate for RC CA units to drop to near Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) standards. The implications of this for the CA branch are very positive and wide-ranging, from an enhanced ability to properly and fully support the force, to improved prospects for recruiting the brightest young soldiers and for retaining the experienced mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers where there are currently critical shortfalls.

The first challenge inherent in this expansion is to grow well – to get the right training programs in place and to make them adequate to the tasks at hand, to solve the problem of Manning functional specialist billets with true qualified functional specialists, to solve some of the quality control issues that have lead to those contradictory images of CA in the past, and to train and field a 21st century CA force that is ready to fill the expanded role it now has.

The other challenge is to resolve a number of internal debates that are ongoing in the CA community. These include questions about the proper balance and roles of AC and RC Civil Affairs, whether CA should reside in Special Operations Command (SOCOM) or Forces Command (FORSCOM); whether CA should be made organic to BCTs; the best way to develop regional, cultural, and language expertise; and whether CA should be an accessions branch. There are good arguments and strong feelings on both sides of most of these questions, and they are all important and worthy of consideration. Ideally there will be some consensus on most of them, but one way or another, the decisions must be made and the arguments put to rest for now so that the focus can shift outward, towards taking a real leadership role in the evolution of SO.

The time to meet these challenges and step firmly forward into that leadership role is now, because other branches and other services are certainly looking at the void and preparing to fill it. Driven by a shortage of qualified Army CA personnel and the mandatory 1-year dwell time between rotations, the Navy and Air Force have been augmenting CA units in Iraq, sometimes at rates of 40% or higher. Likewise, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan each have an 8 to 10-man CA element with 2-4 CA officers, but Navy and Air Force officers are commanding these critical and high profile teams. This accumulation of experience in the other services is not in itself a negative thing – as a joint force our goal is cooperation rather than competition – but the fact remains that this is and should be primarily an Army CA role. Augmentation may be necessary at the moment, but CA must reclaim that ground as its force grows. Perhaps AC CA officers should be commanding those Afghanistan PRTs, gaining a year of hands-on CA and Civil-Military Operations experience instead of commanding under-construction battalions at home.

Increase COIN, SO, and CT Competency and Capacity in GPF

This is a compelling directive that really gets at the heart of our struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the QDR verbiage that follows under this heading is disappointing. It mentions some force structure changes (converting heavy BCTs to Stryker configuration, adding a Navy riverine squadron), but it does not address the issue of improving GPF competency at all. This does not mean that the need is not there, and while this is arguably the most active topic of doctrinal focus and development in recent years, there is much more work to do. CA has a very important implied task here; that being to take a leadership role in that process. Specifically, CA must lead...
in developing the hard skills necessary for successful stability operations, must push to establish a pervasive "stability ethic" in the Army, and must evolve its own role as the Army becomes better at SO.

Leading Development of SO “hard skills”

Trained and experienced CA soldiers have as much per capita in-the-field experience with stability tasks as anyone in the Army. The high price paid for that experience and its relevance to the ongoing fight makes it imperative to capture the lessons learned and the insights gained. But it must go beyond just capture – those lessons must be collated and then distilled into both principles and particular techniques that are effective and trainable. Some of these will be specific to civil affairs operations or to very defined situations, but there will also be a broader set of stability skills that should become a basic part of every maneuver unit’s repertoire, and part of each soldier’s basic skill set. CA has a crucial role in developing these tactics, techniques, and procedures that can effectively translate emerging stability doctrine into executable tasks on the ground for GPF.

Establishing (and institutionalizing) a “Stability Ethic” in Soldiers

Even more fundamental and important than teaching specific stability skills is to find a way to make stability part of the basic thought processes of every soldier. This “stability ethic” must go beyond just teaching soldiers the Law of War and the current Rules of Engagement. It is about the tone and nature of every interaction they have with civilian elements in the area of operations, and it is about maintaining a basic attitude of respect for the indigenous population and institutions (IPI) in the face of the ambiguities that are always present in full spectrum operations. And the most difficult part – it must do this without subverting the soldiers’ skills, instincts and readiness to use deadly force as needed to accomplish the mission.

Anyone who has conducted civil-military operations in the field will recognize that success is as much about this stability ethic, this mindset and orientation, as it is about any particular set of technical skills or a functional specialty. It is tough to quantify, but it starts with a basic respect and compassion, and maybe a recognition that “there, but for the grace of God, go I”. It includes the knowledge that the vast majority of civilians have the potential to be on either side of the fight, and that most of them are really only interested in fulfilling their personal hierarchy of needs, getting through the conflict with their families intact and some trace of dignity retained.

They are potential friends as well as potential or actual enemies and their behavior will be determined to a large part by our actions and attitudes towards them.

Of course we know this, but our soldiers have to believe it and live it at the most basic level and in the most pressurized situations. We are mostly beyond the days when many maneuver commanders saw stability operations as a distraction, something they had to tolerate and tried to get through without incident so that they could get back to their “real” jobs. And our doctrine of full spectrum operations recognizes that there is a stability component to every operation, with implications for the success of every following stage and for the success of transition away from military involvement. But we are still far short of having a deeply ingrained and institutionalized stability ethic as part of the greater Warrior ethos of the American Soldier.

What does this stability ethic look like? The Army Values touch on it with the definitions of Respect (Treat people as they should be treated) and Integrity (Do what’s right, legally and morally), but by itself this is not quite direct or comprehensive enough. There is a good foundation for it presented in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Chapter 7 (Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency) includes a list of leadership tenants and a good discussion of ethics, and Appendix A (A Guide for Action) develops some of these themes into practical application. This could be a good place to start, because in reality, these ethical guidelines and principles are not only COIN principles, they are SO principles that could be refined, made more global, and established as an elemental part of soldier training.

Evolving the Role of CA: Coaching/Training/Mentoring

As Stability Operations becomes a GPF core competency, how does the traditional (and doctrinal) role of CA change? The answer is that it must evolve, that CA operators have to embrace the idea that in many situations, their greatest utility might be in leveraging their knowledge and skills by training and guiding the unit they support, in teaching rather than doing.

Field Artillery (FA) and fire support tasks provide a good analog for how CA can do this. FA is crucial to success on the battlefield, and it relies on highly specialized systems and skills, but every combat leader in the Army learns the basics of fire support planning and the call for fire. And not only do they drill this specific skill, but there is systemic reinforcement of the importance of fire support planning as part of maneuver planning.
The QDR lists four priority objectives for US defense strategy: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. Civil Affairs is addressed specifically in the “Rebalancing the Force” section of the report, which deals with force planning to achieve those Priority Objectives in six mission areas, one of which is “Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations”.

♦ **Expand civil affairs capacity.** “Ineffective governance can create areas that terrorists and insurgents can exploit. Circumstances are ripe for violent ideologies to spread among a population when governments struggle to provide basic services, justice and security, or the conditions for economic opportunity. Civil affairs forces address these threats by serving as the vanguard of DoD’s support to U.S. government efforts to assist partner governments in the fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. Because of their linguistic and cultural skills, civil affairs personnel often serve as liaisons to reduce friction between our military forces and the civilian population. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed high demands on existing civil affairs forces, which were heavily concentrated in the Reserve Component. The Department has begun to readjust that balance. The FY 2010 budget invested in the first active duty civil affairs brigade to support general purpose forces. The Army will continue to increase civil affairs capacity organic to USSOCOM. The Department is also exploring ways to better integrate civil affairs functions with complementary stability operations activities, such as those of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Human Terrain Teams deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

♦ **Increase COIN, stability operations, and CT competency and capacity in general purpose forces.** “Our assessment of security trends points clearly to the conclusion that the future mix of missions facing U.S. forces will call for greater flexibility and agility to operate among diverse populations, with a wide range of partners, and in a variety of operating environments. By FY 2013 the Army will convert a heavy brigade combat team (BCT) to the Stryker configuration. As resources become available and future global demands become clearer, the Department may convert several more BCT’s. Our assessment of the future operating environment also suggests that increasing capacity for maritime operations in coastal and riverine environments will be appropriate. Therefore, beginning in FY 2011, the Navy will add a fourth riverine squadron to its force structure and will invest in service life extension programs for its coastal patrol craft.”

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Interagency Team-making — Lessons Learned From the “Surge” in Iraq,

by Mr. Howard Van Vranken

As we consider how to sharpen our focus on peace keeping and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, we naturally consider what lessons can be applied from a generally successful “surge” in Iraq. As a career State Department Foreign Service Officer who served as the Team Leader of an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in north Babil January, 2008 – January, 2009, I have reflected on some of the lessons learned in Iraq and provide some observations about our organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the various cultures of disparate agencies in stability operations in Iraq and identify areas of overlap and barriers to efficacy. Its intended audience is the senior level civil affairs practitioner.

Overview of the Mission and Environment

When I arrived in January, 2008, north Babil was the epitome of a conflict zone. The Iraqi Police and Army were still finding their feet and many of the local units lacked the confidence of the US Army, their civilian leadership, and the population. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Sunni insurgents were present and active, but their activities had curtailed significantly thanks in large part to the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program, our ‘surge’ troops, and years of counterinsurgency efforts. Shia insurgents, primarily the Jaish al Mahdi (JAM), were increasingly active and had successfully infiltrated local government and security services. The province was still reeling from the murder a month earlier of the Provincial Police Chief, GEN Qais Al Mamori, an able patriot and friend of the US intent on implementing non-sectarian rule of law in the province.

Our area of Iraq was about the size of Rhode Island, and COIN was in full swing. The three battalions of 4BCT/3ID were deeply and intimately engaged in a broad array of projects all with the common aim of alleviating the considerable and evident consequences of the conflict while building the capacity of the Iraqi government. Clearly, the emphasis was on helping Iraqis; CERP was generously used to help farmers, small businesses, schools, and clinics restore operations. The SOI program was well under way, with more than 5,000 paid participants.

Taking advantage of the disruption of insurgent activities, Civil Affairs Teams were working closely with local officials on priority projects, largely focused on health, education and essential services. Everyone complained about the lack of electricity; north Babil was one of the few places in Iraq that suffered periodic cholera outbreaks thanks to critical shortages of potable water. International efforts to rebuild infrastructure were restarting as USAID-funded programs rebuilt several schools with more construction planned for the worst affected areas. Internally displaced people, often refugees who had abandoned villages to live in small towns or cities 20 miles away, were anxious to return and rebuild.

Militarily, the brigade had cleared a final AQI stronghold in the Khidr, an agricultural village hugging the Euphrates. Several dozen fighters were killed and about as many were dispersed in a fight that killed one soldier. The area had been cleared only days before I arrived and it was one of the first places I visited. Escorting LTC Tim Newsome, Commander of the Cottonbalers (3/7 infantry battalion), we walked through a devastated village of bombarded out shops, houses, and mosques before meeting the local leader, Sheikh Jaffer. Speaking with Jaffer, I learned that Khidr was a largely Shia village in a region primarily populated by Sunnis. However, until about 2006, sectarian problems were unknown and people of both sects mixed openly and without hostility. Khidr included a small Shia shrine commemorating a beloved religious leader. Sunni fighters, chased out of Baghdad thanks to coalition military operations in 2006, had taken over the village, terrorized the Shia population, destroyed the shrine, and used the area as a base to conduct attacks on Sunnis and Shiias resident in nearby Iskandariya, Mahmoudiah, and Jurf al Sukr.
They pillaged explosives from the nearby remains of the Qaqa weapons complex.

Khidr was illustrative of the challenges confronting us in north Babil. The population was divided and sectarian wounds were deep and fresh. The Iraqi Army and Police did not exercise, consistent, effective control over the area. The humanitarian needs were staggering: housing, health care, potable water, and food were all in desperately short supply. The economy was in tatters and infrastructure had been destroyed or suffered from years of neglect. Importantly, several insurgent leaders had communicated their willingness to lay down their weapons in exchange for a position in the SOI.

The brigade was well-equipped to address the considerable challenge it confronted, both in terms of resources and leadership. While working in a tremendously dangerous atmosphere, the recently arrived soldiers of 4BCT enthusiastically sought opportunities to engage the population. I had expected Civil Affairs to be at near the bottom of a long list of operational priorities; in fact, it became evident in my first days with the brigade that Civil Affairs and EPRT work was a foremost concern of commanders, behind only the safety and wellbeing of troops. As the brigade commander, COL Tom James, introduced me to his senior leaders, I quickly understood the commitment to COIN exemplified by COL James and his deputy, LTC Roger Shuck.

What we lacked, however, was a clear master plan for moving forward. Stated simply, we had not thought about how we wanted the area to look in a year, two years, or how to get there. Our focus was almost exclusively on generating goodwill among civilians and disrupting those who would do us harm. We also lacked experience in Civil Affairs operations, beyond distributing humanitarian or relief supplies. Perhaps most importantly, we did not have well-established relationships with local leaders.

The Vanguard Brigade arrived about a month before me in Iraq. Their leaders—officers and NCOs—were focused professionals, most with experience in Iraq. They had learned hard lessons working with Iraqi counterparts during previous tours and were determined to apply those lessons in North Babil.

The mission was clear: we had to secure the population in order to give civilian rebuilding efforts an opportunity to gain momentum and return the population to normal activities. We had to build the capability of the local security forces and mentor their development in order for them to regain the confidence of the local population.

Any former insurgents willing to forego armed activities and return to civilian life would be welcomed back to their homes and watched carefully. Once the areas were secure, we had to expedite the restoration of essential services and convince the Iraqi government to direct resources to an area still widely considered an insurgent stronghold. Without the balance of security and civilian activities, we would end the ‘surge’ having failed: if we created security without building civilian activities, security would collapse upon our departure. Civilian activities conducted in an insecure environment were bound to fail as insurgents and gangsters terrorized the people.

**Mars and Venus: Building Effective US Civilian-Military Relations on the Battlefield**

Much has been written about differences between the corporate cultures of the uniformed military and diplomatic agencies (State, USAID, etc) and much of it is accurate. The military and civilians approach the same problems with identical goals from diametrically opposed viewpoints. That proved the case in north Babil, and we constantly worked to overcome these institutional hindrances. Among the most striking differences in approach were:

**Timeframe** – We joked that while the military thought of changes that could be made before the next daily Battle Update Brief to the division leadership, USAID thought about how its activities would impact the next generation of Iraqis! While an exaggeration, it nonetheless illustrated the significant gulf in focus between the civilian agencies and our military colleagues.

**Resources** – The military brings to the battlefield tremendous resources—primarily money and people. During my time in north Babil, we rarely considered how to curtail spending and almost never sought to economize for the sake of economy. That was a stark departure from my nearly two decades with the Department of State which had been a constant exercise in the sensitivity of cost; economy was an ever-present priority. While ePRT operations were less constrained thanks in large part to the Department of State’s Quick Response Fund, the instinctive reaction of State and USAID officers is to seek a cheaper, sustainable solution whenever possible. Whereas the military’s bottom line was accomplishment of the immediate objective, civilian leadership focused on expense, sustainability and transition. Both sides came to incorporate more balanced thinking, but it was a constant effort to curb our respective institutional predispositions.
In terms of people, the military enjoys a significant advantage in the breadth of expertise in its ranks. In addition to recognized specialists, including such seeming anomalies as lawyers, veterinarians, and police officers, the reserves include a richly diverse group of professionals able to apply their civilian expertise. Though sometimes not deployed as intelligently as we might expect, compared with the Army, the civilian agencies lack that depth of diversity and expertise. Simply stated, we are diplomats and administrators, with occasional experience in another field.

Planning – Among the most striking aspects of the brigade was the investment it made in developing plans and considering how to achieve the commander’s intent. When considering what to do and how to do it, the brigade’s deliberative planning process was a phenomenally powerful asset for decision makers. The time, energy and creativity invested in the process meant that we were rarely surprised and never at a loss for tactical flexibility. Coming from an agency where plans are developed in a process sometimes neglected and frequently ridiculed, I quickly came to recognize the value of the brigade’s planning.

**Accommodating Diverse Institutional Cultures**

Working together required accommodating each cultures’ strengths and taking into consideration our institutional needs and imperatives. For example, the Army places an understandable emphasis on unity of effort. In the 3ID, that was highlighted by the singing, every morning with enthusiasm, of the division’s song, “The Dog Face Soldier”. Each morning, before the update, the entire brigade leadership stood at attention and sang, with vigor, the fight song. While it seemed a bit strange at the beginning, I soon understood the value of participating in terms of unit cohesion. When I become known as the Dog Face Diplomat, I knew the ePRT had been accepted.

There were other ways to accommodate the military that I found my counterparts at other ePRTs did not employ, to their detriment. I made absolutely sure that whenever we were asked to participate in a briefing, meeting, presentation, or discussion, our people participated with enthusiasm, were prepared, and took it seriously. The brigade leadership soon recognized that they did not need to ask the ePRT for something twice; when we had issues of substance or style, we made sure to raise them in advance in an appropriately discreet fashion. That helped make the brigade look good, and assuaged any concerns from our Army colleagues that we were somehow not team players.

Looking out for the interests of our counterparts was a key element in building cohesion and confidence. In working with our Iraqi counterparts, we developed a system to reinforce each others messages and priorities. That helped the Iraqis understand our goals and assured that they could not play us off against each other. Whenever I briefed general officers about the work of the brigade or the ePRT, I always found someone to praise. If we had problems with someone, we never raised those issues outside the brigade. That helped build credibility with the leadership and facilitated good working relations. Occasionally it required us to stifle our concerns when we honestly disagreed with a course of action, but the sacrifice merited the achievement of team cohesion.

The Army tends to attack problems directly and with overwhelming force and action. Civilians on the ePRT, I found, tended to take a more considered approach, preferring to discuss issues in depth, often repeatedly in different forums before deciding whether we should act. Once we determined that action was merited, we spoke at length about how best to proceed. That kind of deliberative decision-making, characterized by consensus decisions, drove the brigade crazy at times. Our approach meant we measured several times before cutting the fabric.

Our military counterparts, however, appreciated that once we had decided on a way forward, we could move quickly to apply intelligent solutions to difficult problems. One team member in particular, USAID’s Michael Maxey, was a resource rainmaker able to expertly pull the levers of bureaucracy to deliver informed solutions to vexing problems. Several thousand refugees need to return to Khidr and rebuild their homes? Michael arranged for an Iraqi firm to distribute building supplies to the home sites. Need back-to-school supplies for schools? Ten thousand backpacks filled with paper, pencils and crayons were delivered to schools courtesy of Michael. Need specialist advice about resuscitating fish farms in the Euphrates valley, Michael arranged for an aquaculture expert to meet the farmers, prescribe a solution and distribute fingerlings to restore 600 family fish farms. Our civilians’ ability to effect positive, intelligent results was a key to establishing credibility between agencies.

**The Importance of Personnel and Training**

While our confidence rarely waned, we learned several lessons concerning personnel and training. First, there is no substitute for experience, and very few people have experience with stabilization operations. We hired ‘experts’ with exhaustive resumes who proved incapable of operating without whatever support infrastructure they had enjoyed elsewhere.
In some cases, our team members—civilian and military—could not exercise the flexibility necessary to pivot operations as dictated by developing circumstances. It is telling that about one quarter of our team did not complete their tour in Iraq. Those who succeeded shared a commitment to our mission. They also exhibited the ability to work effectively with a diverse and wide range of colleagues and interlocutors under tremendously stressful conditions. Interpersonal skills were among the most valuable assets of our team members and building a cohesive unit was a constant challenge.

Ideally, civilians would train closely with the military units with whom they work. In reality, that is rarely possible. As a result, close communication is necessary to overcome gaps in expectations and experience. Training for civilians should focus on operational issues. Our greatest asset was in knowing how to access civilian resources to address needs and issues we found locally. Those on our team who could pull the bureaucratic levers with our agencies in order to deliver tangible results were the most valuable members of the organization. It seemed that developing close relations with Iraqis and assessing their needs were somewhat less difficult, surprisingly, than getting our own civilian agencies to move quickly.

**Lessons for the Future**

So, what lessons did we learn and how can they be applied to current and future operations? While some of these are ideals, and others are difficult to implement, taken as a whole they constitute some lessons we should apply to future deployments.

**Team Building counts**—While it might benefit unit cohesion for PRTs and brigades to calibrate their tours, the most important goal is to build a unified approach. We did that in North Babil by sharing ideas, keeping communications up and down open, and focusing on professional and team development. When I was tasked by the Embassy with providing a quarterly assessment of progress in our area, I included the entire team and the brigade’s leadership in the process, soliciting their views and incorporating their ideas. When we established work plans and priorities, the results reflected the consensus of good ideas generated by our team. Because about half our members were uniformed military, we were well integrated into the brigade.

**Think Long-Term, but Act Today**—This seems obvious, but despite the crushing, immediate demands, civilian leaders should always think about the intermediate and long-term impact of their actions.

However, because the window for facilitating change is small and elusive, we must act today to begin change. When we have the opportunity to initiate a project that will improve a community, we must act quickly and intelligently.

**Communication**—Living on a FOB, there is no reason or way to avoid communicating constantly with our military counterparts. Likewise, talking to local officials and community leaders is the surest way to build relationships and trust. Making others look good—whether that means a battalion commander or a local school principal—is the best way to assure the mission will be a success.

**Hire Local Employees**—In Babil, we were hamstrung because the EPRT did not employ Iraqis knowledgeable about the local area. In retrospect, I should have hired local Iraqi engineers, bureaucrats or community organizers to help us plan and execute projects, but more importantly to provide deeper context about our civilian Iraqi partners.

**Use USAID contractors**—USAID typically hires contractors with tremendous expertise who enjoy a much greater ability to move on the battlefield. One tactic we used was to employ those USAID contractors extensively to provide assessments and execute projects. I was surprised to learn that my counterparts at PRT’s elsewhere frequently did not even know the contractors existed. In most cases, USAID contractors have more experience on the ground than anyone in the brigade or PRT; that was certainly the case with RTI, the primary contractor for USAID’s Local Government Program. Likewise, the Iraqi and third country nationals working under USAID’s Community Stabilization Program was able to quickly deploy resources to communities to rebuild schools, roads and clinics. They also engaged local leaders and populations to generate support for their programs. Coupled with the SOI program, the work of these contractors was the most important factor in our ability to restore normalcy to North Babil.

**Engage Local Officials and Community Leaders**—In North Babil, there were several unfortunate legacy projects that illustrated the importance of coordinating with local leaders and officials. In several instances, the USG had constructed beautiful facilities—a school and a clinic—without engaging sufficiently with the appropriate government officials. As a result, the ministry refused to assign staff or budget for operations and, more than a year after construction was completed, the facilities were used as storage or offices. In most cases, local officials know how to deal with their own bureaucracies to coordinate projects and avoid building the wrong facility in the wrong place.
Give Them All the Credit—Frequently, local leaders are very timid about building open relationships with US leaders largely for fear of alienating their populations. The best remedy is to provide tangible inducements demonstrating the value of working with the US. In many cases, US military and civilians can provide resources that solve long-standing problems. When we restore electricity or water to a neighborhood, for example, those local leaders who can claim credit for that improvement will instantly become our friends. Amazingly, those who seemed never to have time for us would eagerly seek our help after we demonstrated the ability to improve the lives of their constituents and enabled them to claim credit for the improvements.

Enjoy the Experience—Though difficult, for most civilians the experience of peacekeeping and stabilization operations are exhilarating, interesting and fun.

Howard Van Vranken is a career U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Officer who served as Team Leader of the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in North Babil, Iraq, January, 2008 – January, 2009. Currently the recipient of a Una Chapman Cox Fellowship, Mr. Van Vranken will shortly complete an academic year at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He will return to Iraq with the Department of State following a year of Farsi language training.

1COL Rickey Rife, Defense is From Mars, State is from Venus – Improving Communications and Promoting National Security, US Army War College, 1998

MIA in QDR: A Unifying Vision for U.S. Land Forces

by Nate Freier

Introduction

The post-9/11 period has witnessed a marked improvement in corporate defense perceptions about the utility of U.S. land forces. Although they have sacrificed a great deal in the field, the Iraq and Afghan wars have been good to the Army, Marine Corps (USMC), and Special Operations Forces (SOF) from a defense policy perspective. With counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT), stability operations (SO), and security force assistance (SFA) currently dominating the defense agenda, even passive observers recognize the near-term value of land power.

Today, land forces are central to solving the United States’ most pressing near-term national security challenges. Consequently, the land combat function has benefited from steadily rising stock prices within the Department of Defense (DoD).

The current era of land force ascendance has witnessed significant changes in mission. For example, land force competency in irregular warfighting has risen substantially while service competency for high-intensity traditional conflict has atrophied. The Army, USMC, and, to some extent, SOF, have radically adjusted their operational worldview to account for previously under-valued “irregular” missions like CT, COIN, SO, etc. The Army now openly acknowledges in its capstone doctrine that stability and civil support are core army missions, alongside more conventional offensive and defensive operations. For its part, the USMC — while often decrying the loss of some of its expeditionary capability — has become increasingly comfortable operating in force ashore for extended periods. Both the Army and USMC have also accepted new responsibilities in SFA.

SOF, too, has witnessed significant change in focus and operating principles. “Direct action” (DA) SOF forces — long accustomed to operating autonomously — have learned to operate in close proximity to and in close coordination with large conventional ground forces sharing the same battlespace. Army SOF specifically — an organization whose pre-9/11 sine qua non was largely foreign internal defense (FID) and SFA — now, by necessity, is more accustomed to serial
employment in DA. And, in recent years, the scale of DA and SFA requirements necessitated that Army SOF cede many of its traditional FID and SFA responsibilities to general purpose ground forces (GPF). This has resulted in a number of “in stride” GPF innovations like the Army’s new Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AAB) and the Marine Corps’ Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SCMAGTF).3

Whether or not any of this amounts to a bellwether for the future of land operations remains a hotly debated issue across defense-interested communities. Some traditionalists see unacceptably high-risk in these trends; whereas less traditional military thinkers argue that contemporary strategic conditions necessitate a new, more unconventional focus for land forces, leaving many aspects of the next generation traditional warfight to the Air Force and Navy.

Some influential thought leaders see recent irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as concrete demonstrations of the utility of robust (if not less traditionally-oriented) land forces. Still others see the uneven history and raw cost of Iraq and Afghanistan as data points militating against future large-scale U.S. interventions. The author argues that future land interventions are unavoidable. But, the circumstances under which they occur, the operating concepts employed in their execution, and the objectives pursued throughout their course may be substantially different than those that shape current warfight.

In brief, U.S. land forces are now more the principal instruments for defeating foreign disorder than tools employed to counter unfavorable military balances or tip the scales in favor of a counterinsurgent partner government. Limited “opposed stabilization” will be their defining future mission. As a result, the operating concepts employed by land forces will often require near equal weighting and simultaneous execution of the doctrinal conceptions of offense, defense, and stability operations in campaigns designed to pursue modest objectives.

**Back to the Future?**

Today, the wide-ranging costs associated with large-scale armed interventions are more obvious than they were a decade ago. Indeed, the post-9/11 surge in interest in SFA may be one attempt by the defense establishment to lower the future demand signal for large-scale, U.S.-led, land-based interventions. If the United States raises the fighting capacity of others, in theory, it will have to shoulder less of the warfighting burden itself.

Recent policymaking history indicates that the current era of land force ascendency is vulnerable to reversal. A quick survey the recent past indicates, for example, that land force utility was under intense scrutiny at the beginning of the last decade. The first Bush defense review (QDR 01), for example, adopted threat narratives that devalued land-based operations and large standing land forces. Recall this occurred at the same time that clear evidence indicated land-based threats were becoming more “unconventional.”

Though the 1990’s opened with a large conventional warfight in the Middle East, the decade was dominated by extended U.S. engagements in lower intensity land operations in the Horn of Africa and the Balkans. Through the 1990’s, it became increasingly clear that land-centric challenges like civil conflict, intrastate war, and terrorism would be more prominent in land force planning than would large-scale conventional conflict. Until 9/11, however, these irregular conflicts were not deemed consequential enough by defense officials to warrant their elevation to the position of prominence they enjoy today in defense strategy and planning. Nor, were land forces adjusted in any meaningful way to account for these new demands.

Given the human, material, and fiscal costs of the first decade of “persistent conflict,” corporate-level defense perceptions about land force utility are vulnerable to sudden change. In the end, DoD’s views on the value of land forces (or any other warfighting function for that matter) relies on prevailing threat assessments and high-level national security cost-benefit calculations. These cost-benefit concerns may increasingly dominate the strategic conversation. And, as discretionary defense resources ultimately plateau or decline, the efficacy of large standing land forces will become an important topic of discussion.

To read or download the complete article click here.

Nathan Freier joined PKSOI as a Visiting Research Professor in August 2008. He is also a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He joined CSIS in April of 2008 after a 20-year career as a field artillery officer and strategist in the United States Army.
The Army is abuzz with the concepts surrounding counterinsurgency (COIN), stability operations and other irregular warfare as the United States contends with a complex international environment. The following will examine these concepts doctrinally and then suggest another way to look at them. Doctrine is simply a mental model that the military uses to organize and understand its environment and its activities, and then to build a shared understanding of those among service members. The value of a particular mental model—in this case, a doctrine—is not really whether it is right or wrong, but whether it is useful; useful in aiding understanding and in prompting an appropriate institutional response to the environment. An alternative mental model is not necessarily a contradiction of doctrine; it may be merely another useful way of looking at things.

Summary of Doctrine

Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations, the Army’s capstone doctrinal publication, organizes the environment the Army faces in large part by the intensity of violence found in it. The spectrum of conflict—stable peace, unstable peace, insurgency, and general war—is a mental model for describing this environment. Operational themes describe “the character of the dominant major operation being conducted at any time,”[i] and “correspond broadly” to ranges within the spectrum of conflict. FM 3-0 identifies operational themes as Peacetime Military Engagement, Limited Intervention, Peace Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Major Combat Operations. Under each operational theme, the Army has grouped examples of “joint military operations” that have common characteristics to aid doctrinal development. Graphic depictions of this summary can be found in FM 3-0, pages 2-4 and 2-5.[ii] The following will focus on irregular warfare. Of the joint military operations that fall under irregular warfare—foreign internal defense, support to insurgency, counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and unconventional warfare—only counterinsurgency is likely to require a large commitment of “general purpose” U.S. forces. Army doctrine specifies that all operational themes and all joint military operations may be addressed by a variety of activities that provide great flexibility to military commanders. These are termed “full spectrum operations,” and are a balance of four types of operations—offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support—conducted together in order to reach desired endstates. The balance among these types of operations varies according to the environment, by operational theme, and indeed, by the individual situation within an area of operations.

The Army understands offensive and defensive operations very well. These are inherent and timeless parts of warfighting, and the Army has given them great doctrinal attention over its history. Stability operations, generally conducted overseas, and civil support operations, generally conducted domestically, on the other hand, have received relatively little doctrinal attention until Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000-05 made stability operations a “core U. S. military mission” with a “priority comparable to combat operations.”

To read Adam Shilling’s complete Perspective Click here
MARO
Mass Atrocity Response Operations:
A MILITARY PLANNING HANDBOOK
Primary Authors: Sarah Sewall, Dwight Raymond, Sally Chin

The Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Project seeks to enable the United States and the international community to stop genocide and mass atrocity as part of a broader integrated strategy by explaining key relevant military concepts and planning considerations. The MARO Project is based on the insight that the failure to act in the face of mass killings of civilians is not simply a function of political will or legal authority; the failure also reflects a lack of thinking about how military forces might respond. States and regional and international organizations must better understand and prepare for the unique operational and moral challenges that military forces would face in a MARO.

A MARO describes a contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants. The term MARO is not yet enshrined in military doctrine—but it should be.
From Aug 31 to Sep 01 2010, PKSOI and Rutgers University are hosting a conference entitled, "New Armies From Old: Integrating Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars," in the Bradley Auditorium, Upton Hall, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Bringing together academics and practitioners from around the world, the conference examines the problems associated with integrating former warring factions into a new national army. With expert panelists relating their observations and study from various conflicts in Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Philippines, the conference shall illuminate the challenges associated with building new armies out of the old remnants.
PKSOI Launches YouTube Channel in Conjunction with New Subject Matter Expert Video Interview Series

To give more information to the outside world on the who, what, when, where and why of PKSOI a Subject Matter Expert Interview series of videos has been launched on its website and new YouTube page. All interviewees are staff members of PKSOI, called upon to talk about their expertise. Topics range from Afghanistan, peacekeeping, deployments, and policing to the Army War College.

Rich Smyth was the first of the series, as he was recently reassigned from PKSOI to NATO in Afghanistan as the director of policy. His interview talks about his long experience in Afghanistan, his time teaching at the Army War College and what he has done in his time at PKSOI.

His video and others can be viewed on PKSOI’s YouTube Channel at http://www.youtube.com/USArmyPKSOI

PKSOI Internship Program Expands

by Carolyn Hall

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) welcomed 13 students from a variety of universities last month, doubling the size of its program from last year.

The program has expanded exponentially from only five students last year to its current size of 13 largely due to the work of Colonel Lorelei Coplen, Policy, Knowledge Management Division Chief, and Karen Finkenbinder PKSOI’s Research and Publication Analyst also affectionately known as the “Intern Wrangler.” This year about thirty students applied to the program. Currently interns can apply directly with a resume and cover letter or be recommended to the program. Students in the program come from a variety of universities and areas of study.

The program aims to treat interns as full-fledged members of the organization, letting them participate in staff meetings and organization events. Each is paired with a member of the PKSOI staff and assigned a real world project based on their area of study.

“The only way an intern is brought on is if there is a project for them,” explains Finkenbinder. (Continued on next page)
“One of the benefits of the program is that we have had interns work on projects that would not have been completed otherwise,” she adds.

PKSOI has had interns come back to work full-time, like Jackie Chura-Beaver, who was a summer intern last year and returned in September as a research assistant upon graduating from The University of Pittsburgh with a masters degree in Public and International Affairs.

“The internship has really helped in my development as a strategic thinker and future military officer, thinking beyond just the tactical level and thinking more about it from a national security and world perspective,” says Tomo Takaki, International Relations major and ROTC cadet at Tufts University.

To date Tufts is the largest source of interns, all of whom are members of the student organization, Alliance Linking Leaders in Education and the Services (ALLIES). The program provides a forum for undergraduate students to discuss current civil-military issues through a variety of initiatives involving chapters from the service academies and civilian institutions. Last year, three of PKSOI’s interns came from the program leading PKSOI to establish a formal relationship with the institution last November.

“Because of the nature of the ALLIES program, PKSOI is a natural fit because of what we do,” says COL Coplen.

Above: PKSOI interns and ROTC Cadets, Tomo Takaki and Edward Chao
Vijay Saraswat, previously active duty in the U.S. Marine Corp, now a junior at Tufts University comments on his experience, “I was on the ground working at the tactical level and now I have gotten the chance to work at the strategic level with subject matter experts that have taught me a lot.”

“So far, the most rewarding part of the internship has been the networking and talking with all of the officers and subject matter experts to gain insight about how government agencies work,” comments Carolyn Pruitt, a sophomore at Tufts.

Working at PKSOI has also given the interns exposure to The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and The State Department. Beth Paige, from USAID, and Richard Smyth, from The State Department gave briefings on their respective organizations to the interns to broaden their knowledge of other government organizations.

Working at PKSOI has also given the interns exposure to The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and The State Department. Beth Paige, from USAID, and Richard Smyth, from The State Department gave briefings on their respective organizations to the interns to broaden their knowledge of other government organizations.

The interns took a day trip to Washington, D.C. to tour the Pentagon and received a briefing on the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), an organization under USAID.

“Having background knowledge going into our trip to D.C. from Beth Paige really helped to better understand the organizations and presentations we were given,” says Caitlin Fitzpatrick, International Business and Economics major at Appalachian State University.

Finkenbinder says she has already received five applications for the upcoming fall season, and she hasn’t even posted the listing yet.

For more information on the internship program visit http://pksoi.army.mil

PKSOI’s Foreign Service Officer Takes Assignment with NATO in Afghanistan

by Carolyn Holl

Many personnel at the U.S. Army War College use the opportunity to study, work, reflect, and relax, after decades of service – mostly overseas. But for one expert at the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), the experience pushed him to further use his expertise in service of his country – as he leaves the U.S. Army War College to become the Director of Policy and Strategy for NATO in Afghanistan.

Mr. Rich Smyth arrived at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), as a Department of State Foreign Service Officer (FSO), bringing with him over nine years experience working in the Afghanistan and Pakistan border areas. During his four years at the college, he taught courses on a variety of subjects ranging from Afghanistan and Asia to what he claims to be his most popular class - "Drugs and Thugs and Non State Threats to National Security".

After his first two years teaching at the college Smyth was appointed as the resident Political Advisor for the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), housed at Carlisle Barracks, an organization made up of Army officers, civilian researchers and strategic planners who assist the Army in mastering stability and peace operations at the strategic and operational levels.

In 2009, Smyth and Colonel Michael Anderson, a strategic planning specialist with PKSOI, were sent to Afghanistan for 45 days to provide subject matter expertise on stability operations and civil military integration of planning the stand up of a new three star command. For Smyth this was another opportunity for him to put his experience in Afghanistan to good use. His expertise was quickly noticed by many of the four star generals in country and Smyth began participating in meetings with General McChrystal, the former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

“Rich brought a deep background and expertise on Afghan culture and history that was instrumental to standing up the new command and its ability to understand the environment in which it would operate,” noted COL Anderson. “He has always liberally shared his knowledge and experience with the PKSOI staff and USAWC students.”

Smyth’s overseas experience began when he volunteered for the Peace Corps in 1973 in Afghanistan; two weeks after his arrival in country, a coup overthrew the late King.
This unique experience helped him find his calling to represent the United States abroad and in 1979 he was commissioned as a United States Foreign Service Officer. He returned to Afghanistan just in time for two coups, the Soviet invasion, and the beginning of the anti-Soviet jihad.

Throughout his career Smyth has worked stability, humanitarian relief, reconstruction and economic development operations in numerous locations such as Sri Lanka during the country’s long civil war and again in Afghanistan during the Afghan civil war and the rise of the Taliban.

Smyth will continue to expand on the experiences and expertise gained at USAWC and PKSOI to assist the U.S. Department of State as the NATO Director of Policy and Strategy in Afghanistan. There, he will help British Diplomat, Ambassador, and NATO Senior Civilian Representative of Afghanistan, Marc Sidwell, work on long term policy and strategy for the country.

Smyth believes that PKSOI will stay strong and continue to prominently grow noting that, “Everyone in the army is interested in this and PKSOI has established itself as a leader in the subject and I fully expect that things are going to be getting much busier in PKSOI rather than less after I am gone.” “His long affiliation with the foreign service and opportunities to develop regional experience in depth has been valuable to me as I consider how the military works with other U.S. government agencies in furthering other U.S. interests.” comments COL Lorelei Coplen, a colleague of Smyth.

Smyth himself echoed similar sentiments when reflecting on his working relationships at PKSOI.

“What I enjoyed most about working at PKSOI was the intellectual give and take with individuals that are committed to advance American interest through the efficient and effective application of smart power.” comments Smyth on his experience with PKSOI.

Smyth would like to leave behind some advice that he says he learned from his daughter, “Stay fierce. Stay fierce in adherence to your ideals. Stay fierce in your dedication to your job and stay fierce in the passion that you bring to whatever it is that you do.”
What's New with SOLLIMS?

The Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) is both a structured database containing observations, insights and lessons, as well as a Knowledge Management system with a robust collection of peace and stability operations references, handbooks, guides and assessment tools. What follows is a short description of new capabilities already added for FY10, due out for this year and the major enhances for next year. Come and join us as a member of the SOLLIMS Community of Action!!

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FY 10:

♦ **Report Builder**: you can now select the format you want your reports to be generated in – either PDF or MS Word™; giving you great versatility in developing a final format for your SOLLIMS reports. *(COMPLETE)*

Note the new option/select interface.

♦ **Site Search**: this function allows you to search across all Tiers, in all repositories – not just O&Rs as before. The capability to add content from the Site Search to Binders and the Report Builder are included with this functionality. *(COMPLETE)*

♦ **Export to JLLIS / MS Excel™**: this allows users to either work offline to develop their own reports and content or to export O&Rs to a JLLIS environment.

♦ **BLOG Links**: we are going to build links to the many excellent blogs in the PKSOI website as well as other blogs across the stability ops online community

♦ **Civ-Mil Training Vignettes**: an example already exists; we are working with the Joint Staff J-7 to develop a Tier 1 / Tier 2 structure that contains several training vignettes with supporting documentation. These vignette will then be available for Interagency practitioners as well as the military community deploying to Afghanistan and/or Iraq.

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What’s up for FY11?

♦ **SOLLIMS LITE**: to better support our users who are deployed to remote, austere areas, we are developing a low bandwidth version of SOLLIMS. Users will be presented the option to go to the most appropriate version to meet their situation. Content submitted from both versions will be included for any search.

♦ **Voice enabled text entry**: this capability will allow users to simply click in any text entry block and then dictate content. The voice-to-text converter creates the text entry without the need to type. Combined with the SOLLIMS LITE initiative, we can best support all remote user ops. *(Especially useful for all you iPad™ early adopters!)*

♦ **Enhanced Report Builder**: we will be providing not only several new report “templates” that represent more closely business, government agency, and academia’s standard reports, but also the ability to generate user defined reports.

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Coming Soon – the SOLLIMS Lessons Learned “Sampler” – an online reference that contains lessons captured in SOLLIMS with a specific focus. Vol 1, Issue 1 will focus on Protection of Civilians during Conflict Operations. We will include lessons from the Haiti disaster as well as some insights from the US Army’s 95th CA Bde. You got to be a member to get the goods! Register for a SOLLIMS account at: [http://www.pksoi.org](http://www.pksoi.org)