Natives in Blue: The Employment of Armed Auxiliaries in the Philippines, 1899-1913

A Monograph
by
MAJ Mike Volpe
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 2012-002

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
The United States, upon ratifying the Treaty of Paris, extended its empire beyond North America. The Spanish-American War’s successful termination resulted in the acquisition of Puerto Rico, the West Indies, and Guam; the liberation of Cuba; and forced the sale of the Philippines to the United States. An insurrection in the Philippines (1899-1902), and several uprisings thereafter, delayed the transition from military to civilian governance and contributed to the creation and expansion of two native auxiliary forces: the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary. The former, organized and controlled by the Army, and the latter, controlled by the Governor-General of the Philippines, played prominent roles in the pacification of the archipelago. Recent scholarship reinforces the narrative that auxiliaries were used solely to fight a counterinsurgency. This portrayal obscures an understanding of their actual role. Today, the U.S. Army faces budgetary constraints that require the reduction of the force structure while still maintaining it ability to fight and win anywhere in the world. These challenges may require the U.S. Army to consider raising and employing native forces to achieve its tactical and operational objectives.
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Michael J. Volpe

Title of Monograph: Natives in Blue: The Employment of Armed Auxiliaries in the Philippines, 1899-1913

Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
Ricardo A. Herrera, PhD

__________________________________ Second Reader
Christopher LaNeve, COL, IN

__________________________________ Director,
Thomas C. Graves, COL, IN School of Advanced Military Studies

__________________________________ Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Graduate Degree Programs

Disclaimer: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, the US Army Command and General Staff College, the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
Abstract

The United States, upon ratifying the Treaty of Paris, extended its empire beyond North America. The Spanish-American War’s successful termination resulted in the acquisition of Puerto Rico, the West Indies, and Guam; the liberation of Cuba; and forced the sale of the Philippines to the United States. An insurrection in the Philippines (1899-1902), and several uprisings thereafter, delayed the transition from military to civilian governance and contributed to the creation and expansion of two native auxiliary forces: the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary. The former, organized and controlled by the Army, and the latter, controlled by the Governor-General of the Philippines, played prominent roles in the pacification of the archipelago. Recent scholarship reinforces the narrative that auxiliaries were used solely to fight a counterinsurgency. This portrayal obscures an understanding of their actual role. Today, the U.S. Army faces budgetary constraints that require the reduction of the force structure while still maintaining it ability to fight and win anywhere in the world. These challenges may require the U.S. Army to consider raising and employing native forces to achieve its tactical and operational objectives.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maps</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figures</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacification and the Native Auxiliary</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippine Scouts</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippine Constabulary</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawton’s Northern Campaign</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Auxiliaries</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawton’s Employment of Auxiliaries</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pulajan Unrest in Samar (1904-1907)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization – The Philippine Scout Battalions</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter’s Employment of Auxiliaries</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Battle of Bud Bagsak (1913)</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Auxiliaries for the Campaign</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pershing’s Employment of Auxiliaries</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A – Bullard’s Pacification</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maps

MAP 1: District Organization of the Philippine Constabulary 20

MAP 2: Advance on San Isidro (11-19 October 1899) 36

MAP 3: Advance on Cabanatuan (19 October – 5 November 1899) 37

MAP 4: First Leg of Batson’s Final Advance (6-12 November 1899) 40

MAP 5: Final Leg of Batson’s Final Advance (13-19 November 1899) 42

MAP 6: Security Force Distribution Prior to the Gandara Valley Massacres (June 1904) 46

MAP 7: Security Force Distribution Following the Gandara Valley Massacre (November 1904) 48

MAP 8: Security Force Distribution Following the Massacres at Oras and Delores (December 1904) 50

MAP 9: Force Distribution at the End of Allen’s Campaign (21 May 1905) 52

MAP 10: Four Military Districts of Samar (October 1905) 62

MAP 11: Shortly After the Magtaon Massacre (June 1906) 66

MAP 12: The Department of Mindanao 69

MAP 13: Location of U.S. Units in Vicinity of the Island of Jolo (June 1913) 76

MAP 14: Avenues of Approach Taken by Pershing’s Field Force (11 June 1913) 78
Figures

**FIGURE 1:** ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY 21

**FIGURE 2:** APPROXIMATED 8\(\text{th}\) CORPS TASK ORGANIZATION (28 OCTOBER 1899) 23

**FIGURE 3:** EVOLUTION OF THE MACABEBE SCOUTS 28

**FIGURE 4:** THE PHILIPPINE SCOUT BATTALION CIRCA 1905 54

**FIGURE 5:** PERSHING’S TASK ORGANIZATION AT BUD BAGSAK 73
# ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Aide-de-camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARWD</td>
<td>Annual Reports of the War Department prior to 1907, and War Department Annual Reports after 1907.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Department of the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Entry Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>8th Army Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR</td>
<td>Letters Received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS</td>
<td>Letters Sent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAB</td>
<td>Matthew A. Batson Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives in Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARA2</td>
<td>National Archives at College Park, Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRG</td>
<td>Philippine Revolutionary Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG</td>
<td>Records Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPC</td>
<td>Report of the Philippine Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYP</td>
<td>Samuel B.M. Young Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAHEC</td>
<td>United States Army Heritage and Education Center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

The Treaty of Paris, signed on 10 December 1898, formally concluded America’s “splendid little war.” The price of peace for the Kingdom of Spain was the loss of all her imperial possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The United States, however, extended its empire beyond North America. In one short eight-month war with Spain, it acquired Puerto Rico and Guam, liberated Cuba, and forced the sale of the Philippines to the United States. The responsibility of administering its accidental empire without any civil official on hand, without a plan to govern its new colonial possessions, and in the face of open rebellion proved impossible. The United States was forced to rely on the Army to oversee its new possessions until an orderly transition with an appointed civilian governing authority could be arranged. Ideally control is a precondition for the orderly transition of governing authority, a prerequisite often lacking in the early years of the American occupation, 1899-1913. During these years the U.S. Army used and came to increasingly rely on native auxiliaries for the pacification of the islands.

Formed as a practical response to the chaotic conditions the Army faced in the aftermath of the Spanish defeat in the Philippines, the native auxiliaries’ value was apparent from their inception. Their value can be easily overlooked when examining numbers alone; however, these formations allowed the Army to regain and maintain control of disaffected locales with a rapidity that could not be achieved by American soldiers alone. Through fits and starts the auxiliaries increased in both number and importance until finally they were formalized as permanent.

---


organizations. The Army’s leaders both endorsed and employed native auxiliaries because these formations provided them with greater operational depth and flexibility.

On 13 August 1898, the U.S. Army’s 8th Corps, numbering little more than 11,000 men, found itself besieged after having compelled the capitulation of Spanish forces at the first Battle of Manila. The Philippine Revolutionary Government (PRG), led by Emilio Aguinaldo, felt betrayed by its erstwhile ally when the U.S. Army barred the entry of Filipino forces into Manila. The PRG directed the Army of Liberation to surrounded Manila, and a standoff ensued. Eighth Corps, controlling little more than the ground it occupied, did little to expand its foothold. Major General Wesley Merritt, commander of the Philippine Expedition, stalled for time as he tried to establish U.S. claims of sovereignty through negotiation, while awaiting the arrival of additional forces. The almost six-month stalemate ended when hostilities erupted in the second Battle of Manila on the night of 4 February 1899. Over the course of the next fourteen years the United States conducted a series of operations designed to extend its control over the Philippine Archipelago and to pacify the population.

The unanticipated war in the Philippines; the subsequent need to establish order to prevent localized rebellions, riots, and brigandage in an island chain with eight million people; and the need to demonstrate its sovereignty in the face of foreign competitors required the maintenance of a large troop commitment by the United States. A combination of domestic political, international, and army administrative concerns limited the ability of the U.S. Army to

---

3 The Spanish-American War, and the Philippine Insurrection are the only time in American military history where the practice of using Roman numerals as a means of numbering U.S. Army Corps was not followed. Corps were either numbered using Arabic numerals or by spelling out the word (i.e. 8th Corps or Eighth Corps). This paper observes contemporary practices.


5 Ibid., 26-27, 34, 36.

6 Ibid., 42.
maintain a large enough garrison to satisfy most senior leaders in the Philippines. Domestic political concerns like fiscal restrictions (affecting both the equipping and end strength of the army), garrison requirements in other colonial possessions, coastal defense, patrol of its border with Mexico, and frontier policing requirements all vied for limited manpower. International diplomatic concerns like the Boxer Rebellion (1900-1901), the consequent commitment to the international military mission in China, and the second pacification in Cuba (1906) further restricted troop strength available for the Philippines. Finally, the requirement to rotate U.S. Army regiments, limited in duration to two-year overseas assignments, challenged the ability of military planners in Washington, D.C. to provide the minimum strength necessary to pacify overseas possessions. Increasing constraints required commanders in the 8th Corps, later designated the Philippine Division, to do more with less. Commanders addressed limitations in a number of innovative ways, which included co-opting and supporting local militias and police, contracting labor to free soldiers for field duty, and later raising units of native auxiliaries that were under the direct control of the U.S. Army or the Governor-General of the Philippines.

Two unique auxiliary forces would be created and later expanded in the Philippines: the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary. The former was an organization that was developed and controlled by the Army. The latter was established and controlled by the civilian Governor-General, but largely officered by personnel detached from the U.S. Army. Each organization achieved a measure of success that belied their limited numbers and contributed to the overall success of the United States in achieving its operational goals, and eventually its strategic goals, in the Philippines. There is, however, limited modern scholarship on either force. The few limited book length treatments of the history of either organization were written years
ago and primarily in memoirs. What limited treatments these organizations do receive tend to be in short academic or professional military publications, or are embedded into the larger narrative histories of the Philippine War and the Moro Wars that followed. These more recent treatments have tended to focus on the role played by Filipino auxiliaries in counterinsurgency (currently the preferred approach), or a in a limited narrative history (usually tactical or organizational) of these units. Little emphasis has been placed on examining the operational employment of auxiliaries, perhaps due to their limited numbers during the initial, and most researched, period of the war. Scholars have mainly focused on language and cultural knowledge, intelligence gathering, acclimatization, and geographic familiarity as contributions that native forces provided at the tactical level, but only rarely have they provided a glimpse at how Army employed its auxiliaries to meet operational objectives during a campaign. Instead the story of the auxiliary seems to be dominated by interest in the methodology of counterinsurgency, and how the natives supported these techniques.

The modern lens of counterinsurgency is often misapplied to conflicts occurring prior to the mid-twentieth century. U.S. Army operations in the Philippines are best comprehended when viewed through the lens of pacification, the contemporary American military methodology for stabilizing regions where violence moved well past normal lawlessness and approached open rebellion. Proper understanding of why operations were planned and executed as they were, and consequently how and why native units were employed, demands an appreciation of existing thinking on irregular warfare. Directed by this approach, the U.S. Army employment of the scouts and constabulary appears practical.

The decision maker’s level of responsibility or point of view often dictated how these units were employed. At the tactical level, commanders used auxiliary forces for missions as varied as those of their American counterparts. Native troops were not simply used for scouting missions or as intelligence gatherers as is often assumed; although they were used in both roles when necessary. Quite often they were used in a very conventional role, fulfilling missions that would be considered appropriate for U.S. infantry or cavalry units, despite unique characteristics that made them somewhat mismatched in both equipment and capability. The natives’ advantages of cultural, linguistic, and terrain familiarity, while potentially considerable, tended to fade as the distance from the soldiers’ home province or tribal group increased. The further he moved from the familiar, the more important his rifle became a measure of his usefulness. However the loss of familiarity was offset by other advantages.

By the close of the insurrection in 1902, operational level commanders began viewing these units as ideally suited to deal with the insurrection and later unrest. Compared to other U.S. Army units the scout’s rather restricted equipment allocations, minimal transportation and logistical support requirements, and size limitations made native units easier, thus quicker, to transfer between commands. American commanders were not blind to these relative advantages, and, quite practically, employed native auxiliaries with these capabilities in mind. For
commanders, these units offered a flexibility and depth to operations that had been otherwise lacking in this alien environment; allowing commanders to regain the initiative and over time control of the barrio, the municipality, the province, and the islands. The employment of these forces sped the transition of the populace from unrest, verging on near rebellion, to a state of stability and civil order, and thus governable.

**Pacification and the Native Auxiliary**

Scholars and military professionals tend to focus on the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by the U.S. Army to fight a counterinsurgency in the Philippines. However, framing a problem and analyzing the solutions employed by the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century U.S. Army through modern doctrinal constructs is problematic. Though there are often strong similarities in how officers of different eras choose to grapple with an enemy that employs guerilla or irregular means to achieve victory, employing current doctrinal frameworks may prevent the modern analyst from understanding how contemporary officers both viewed and approached the problem. Moreover, applying modern doctrine is often ahistorical and can lead to the misunderstanding of, or worse, undue criticism of, methods employed by the leadership to solve the tactical or operational problems it faced. Therefore, U.S. Army operations in the Philippines from 1899-1913 are best viewed from the framework of the more contemporary perspective of pacification.

Pacification is not a word one could find in either the doctrinal manuals, or in the many volumes of professional military journals in existence prior to or during the early American occupation. These tended to focus instead on preparing the U.S. Army for fighting a

---

8 Doctrinal reference is a bit of a misnomer. Until the 1903 Field Service Regulations were published the U.S. Army issued drill manuals as a method of instructing its soldiers and leaders on how to march and fight. It relied on officer education (both formal and informal) and professional military journals to disperse what today would be called doctrine. For interesting reading on this subject see Perry D.
conventional, modern war against European or European trained powers. American experience with irregular or guerilla warfare and the attendant pacification campaigns to eliminate the irregular bands and return to a stable period of peace was largely a product of its confrontations with native tribal groups from the colonial era through the Indian Wars’ culmination at Wounded Knee in 1890. It also experienced this kind of warfare as an adjunct to conventional conflicts like the American Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the American Civil War. Though the preponderance of U.S. Army experience had been the conduct of “savage” warfare, the period’s professional officers deemed irregular warfare less worthy of study than “civilized” warfare.9 Despite the limited examples of writings on irregular warfare and pacification during the first 135 years of its existence, there are several sources that prove instructive on contemporary views on pacification by the leadership of the U.S. Army in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century: the frontier experience, the occupation of the South during the Civil War and Reconstruction, the legal code, and a handful of published materials written by officers with extensive field experience. Regardless of the sources behind pacification policies, leadership was critical to its successful implementation.

The number of soldiers enlisted in the U.S. Army (including Regulars and State Volunteer Regiments) soared from an authorized strength 25,000 men on 21 April 1898 to over 275,000 in Regular and Volunteer Regiments at the conclusion of hostilities in August 1898.10 By

---


May 1899, even after the rapid demobilization of the State Volunteers that occurred upon termination of the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Army’s end strength had more than tripled in 18 months.\(^{11}\) With so many new and inexperienced officers and soldiers, the solid corps of leaders with experience on the frontier, occupation duty during the Civil War, and in the south during Reconstruction proved vital in successfully transitioning from a conventional battlefield to the hard work of pacifying an ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse population of roughly eight million inhabiting a collection of over 7,000 islands.\(^{12}\) These officers and non-commissioned officers brought with them a wealth of experiences in dealing with populations that verged from indifferent to openly hostile.

In 8\(^{th}\) Corps, Major General Elwell S. Otis and other experienced officers developed an early appreciation for the need to garner the support of the population if they were to succeed. Older officers fell back on their previous experiences as a sources of potential solutions, with both successful and unsuccessful procedures that could be adopted, altered, or avoided based on the situation. The Indian wars and U.S. Army attempts to integrate freed slaves during Reconstruction supplied potential methods for addressing cultural and ethnic tensions gripping the Philippines. Occupation of the South, from the Civil War through Reconstruction, offered them a recent example of the pacification of a hostile population. The sum total of these experiences gave American military leaders a menu of tools and techniques, both coercive and acceptable, which could be employed to attain a peaceful resolution to the unrest. Perhaps the most effective tool was the Lieber Code.

---


General Orders 100, *Instruction for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field*, was officially approved for wide distribution throughout the Union Army on 24 April 1863. Written by Francis Lieber, a Union officer and lawyer prior to the outbreak of war, General Orders 100 was written in an attempt to address resistance and the outbreak of guerilla warfare by southern partisans. The Lieber Code, influenced by the legal theories of enlightenment thinker Emerich Vattel, was an effort to provide a legal basis for the imposition of martial law. The document was considered a model of moderation and served to inform the population of the occupied South and soldiers, wearing blue or gray, of the expected standards of conduct by all parties. Soldiers and their leaders were proscribed from acts of violence and theft targeting the civilian population, thus moderating the violence in hopes of hastening the restoration of order and peace. Civilians that engaged in acts of rebellion (i.e. acting as guerillas or belligerents without a uniform, providing succor to the enemy, etc.) forfeited the protections provided by the law. In essence, it provided a legal framework for Union leaders that allowed for the coercive use of force to obtain compliance, while at the same time working to restrain the extremes of violence endemic to war. Studied at West Point after 1875, the Lieber Code influenced several generations of professional officers. Major General Otis, his subordinates, and their successors would all employ this code as the legal framework of their pacification of the *insurrectos*. Legal

---


14 Birtle, 13.


16 Birtle., 32-35.

17 Ibid., 35.
codes, while providing the framework within which the U.S. Army could operate, did little to describe how those operations were carried out.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Lee Bullard’s “Military Pacification,” written in 1910, was remarkable for broaching subject mater that was rarely addressed in existing professional publications. Bullard was a respected officer with experience in both the Western frontier and the Philippines, and a future general officer in the United States Army. Even more noteworthy, his treatise was influenced by personal experiences on both sides of the pacification divide – military and civilian. Bullard, an Alabamian, was born in 1861 and lived through Reconstruction until his appointment to the United States Military Academy in 1881. His consideration of pacification joined lessons learned from experience gained as a uniformed officer in recent operations, with his childhood recollections of occupation in the Reconstruction South. His essay, summarized in Appendix A, while reliant on personal experience was likely influenced by his interaction with other professionals as well; perhaps providing a common contemporary view held by many of his fellow officers. Histories, like those written by Brian McAllister Linn, as well as primary source documents readily available demonstrate Bullard’s writings were fairly consistent with U.S. Army operations conducted up to 1910. Despite some recommendations for changes to contemporary practice, such as his comment to avoid the “fad of education,” his work provides the reader with a fairly well developed framework for its conduct. Pacification at first glance seems very similar to modern doctrine on counterinsurgency; however the differences are worth examining.

Bullard’s pacification article reads like a laundry list of do’s and don’ts, and could have been written by an officer with experience in Iraq or Afghanistan. However, pacification and counterinsurgency have different focuses. Pacification was about governing. It was about resolving unrest and imposing peace and order. Pacification focused on putting population groups on good terms with each other and with the government through the employment of force and persuasion. Pacification concerned itself with establishing governance, in lieu of a local governing authority, in the aftermath or in the waning days of war. Conversely, counterinsurgency is a mission or task that is focused on defeating an insurgency. An insurgency, defined as “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority,” is concerned with supplanting the government with a, or as the, new political class. Counterinsurgency tries to use a whole of government approach, civil and military efforts, to defeat the insurgents and address core grievances in society. Counterinsurgency by its nature supports governance without governing; it works with, and in some cases for a local or regional governing authority. As such a counterinsurgency is focused on operating within the construct of an existing war, with no end in sight. During the years 1899-1913, only the Philippine Revolutionary Government could be classified as a true insurgency, with a goal of supplanting the United States as the internationally recognized governing authority. Pacification is therefore the proper framework with which to view the preponderance of operations in the Philippines.

Bullard’s “Military Pacification” has special relevance when considering the employment of native auxiliaries. He made a number of points relevant to the employment of native auxiliaries, themes explored further by the case studies provided herein. First he stated that

pacification required a judicious blend of persuasion and force. Next that soldiers were the most logical tool to implement pacification; that soldiers provided an implement imbued with discipline and obedience, and were capable of uniform action. Finally, he pointed out that frequent changes of troops and officers were detrimental to the overall effectiveness of pacification. Thus, native soldiers gave American leaders the ability to project force in the form of lethal and disciplined organizations that could apply it over longer time horizons than U.S. regiments. The native soldiers used most often by the U.S. Army were the Philippine Scouts.

**The Philippine Scouts**

Emilo Aguinaldo had been expecting them. In fact, he had been eagerly awaiting their arrival since receiving several dispatches two days earlier; written in the hand of, and on the stationary of one of his principle lieutenants, Brigadier General Urbano Lacuna. On 23 March 1901, Aguinaldo, the self-proclaimed President of the Philippine Revolutionary Government (PRG), spent his last moments of freedom being entertained by the stories of two men, Lazaro Segovia (a Spaniard who defected from the Army of Liberation to the U.S. Army) and Hilario Tal Placido (former major in the Revolutionary Army), that he believed to be leaders of a group of reinforcements that had captured five American’s on their march from Lacuna’s headquarters in the province of Nueva Ecija. On the signal of Segovia, a company of eighty-eight Macabebe Scouts, disguised as Filipino Guerillas, rapidly dispersed the fifty-man bodyguard outside of Aguinaldo’s headquarters in Palanan. Placido seized Aguinaldo while Segovia drew his pistol on seven members of Aguinaldo’s staff, and shot and wounded several in the ensuing melee. Segovia captured two and forced the remainder to flee. Brigadier General Fredrick Funston, architect of this plan, had finally ended the fourteen-month manhunt for Aguinaldo with the execution of one
of the most daring covert operations in the history of the U.S. Army. Aguinaldo’s capture made the Macabebe Scouts a household name; yet their relevance to the U.S. Army had been proven countless times in the twenty months since the recruitment the first company, and set the stage for the creation of the Philippine Scouts.

The Philippine Scouts were part of the regular Army establishment and were solely under the control of U.S. Army officers, although from 1903 to 1906 scout officers might find themselves under control and direction of the Philippine Constabulary. The Macabebe Scouts, were not the first native auxiliaries employed by U.S. forces in the Philippines, but they are arguably the most famous. First Lt. Matthew Batson, witnessed how rapidly and skillfully the Macabebe tribesmen of Pampanga Province in central Luzon negotiated the rivers and nipa swamps of the region on their native bancas, and submitted a proposal to raise an auxiliary force of Macabebe tribesmen that would be armed and organized as a company in the U.S. Army. Major General Otis approved Batson’s proposal and he was authorized to raise the first 108-man company of Macabebe Scouts on 10 September 1899. Recruits were accepted only if they had military experience fighting for the Spanish Army in order to reduce or negate the requirement to train them. They also needed to be able to speak multiple languages; namely English or Spanish, and Pampangan or Tagalog. Batson and his Macabebes were put to immediate use patrolling the rivers and nipa swamps of Pampanga. They proved their worth as guides, scouts, spies, and soldiers, driving insurgent forces and brigands out of terrain that American soldiers could not

20 Frederick Funston, Memories of Two Wars: Cuban and Philippine Experiences (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911), 419-422; Linn, The Philippine War, pgs 274-276.

21 Woolard, 8-11; Linn, The Philippine War, 128; Dennis Edward Flake, Loyal Macabebes: How the Americans Used the Macabebe Scouts in the Annexation of the Philippines (Angeles City, Philippines: Holy Angel University Press, 2009), 33.

22 Woolard, 12; Linn, The Philippine War, 128; Flake, 41; Richard L. Millett, Searching for Stability, 8.
effectively control, and they secured lines of communication threatened by those elements. This trial organization proved so successful that the formation was expanded.

In a little over one month the company was expanded into a five-company battalion. With Aguinaldo’s directive to transition from conventional to irregular warfare, the new demands of occupation and pacification forced the U.S. Army to disperse its forces throughout Luzon, the Visayas Islands, Mindanao, and the Sulu Archipelago in order to set the conditions for governance in America’s new imperial possession. With the collapse of the conventional Army of Liberation, and the flight of the PRG, Major General Otis looked to conduct mopping up operations. Otis sub-divided Luzon and the Visayan Islands into departments and sub-districts and appointed senior officers to oversee governance and to control forces assigned to the geographic commands. Soon, a mounting, and, in places, very effective insurgency forced the further dispersion of U.S. forces. By July of 1901, the U.S. Army had secured 502 posts throughout the Philippine Islands, an increase of 501 since August 1899.23

The strength of the U.S. Army in the Philippines peaked at 70,000 men in late 1900. The dispersion of limited combat power generated a constant stream of demands for more soldiers from subordinate commanders. As violence spiked in some regions and diminished in others the Military-Governor of the Philippines, seated in Manila, would shift forces to meet the requirements of the moment. The operational equivalent of conducting a shell game left much to be desired. The movement of units risked an increase in instability in relatively quiet areas in order to stem the slide toward chaos in contested locales. To meet tactical and operational demands, local commanders requested and were often granted permission to recruit units of

23 Woolard, 54.
native scouts, which were controlled by the regiments or other units that hired them. The successes garnered by commands that employed native units increased calls to expand recruitment from those without scouts. The authorized and unauthorized hiring of scouts rapidly increased the number of these organizations throughout Luzon and the Visayas Islands. Despite the perceived need for these units, their future was anything but secure since they were not recruited as soldiers. Instead, the scouts were hired as civilian employees of the quartermaster department, and therefore were maintained on short-term contracts and could be fired when no longer needed.

On 2 February 1901, the scouts’ tenuous footing changed with the passage of Senate Bill 4300, “An Act to Increase the Efficiency of the Permanent Military Establishment of the United States,” which affirmed the future place of the Philippine Scouts in the U.S. Army. The strength of the U.S. Army, following the elimination of the Volunteer Army, was expanded to a maximum of 100,000 officers and men. Further, the U.S. Army was authorized to recruit natives as scouts or as part of the Regular Army. The scouts could be organized in companies and troops, and at

24 Woolard, 60. Technically the scouts were civilians because no congressional authority existed to permit their utilization as soldiers. They were hired as an adjunct of the Volunteer Army’s Quartermaster Department, and the ability to hire them would terminate with the demobilization of the Volunteer army on 1 July, 1901, IAW the provisions of the act of 2 March 1898.

25 No documentation has been found on how the unauthorized scouts were paid. One possibility, though unlikely, is that officers paid for services out of pocket. A more likely scenario is that they were hired as laborers, and paid with quartermaster funds, but were armed and used as auxiliaries.

26 Woolard, 60.

27 Cosmas. The Volunteer Army was established under the Volunteer Act, 22 April 1898. The U.S. Army was trying to expand its end strength to the 100,000 men deemed necessary for the Spanish-American war and future defense requirements. The states’ guards and militias, and the congressmen that represented them, accused the Army of trying to monopolize the glory from the coming war. As part of the compromise to expand the army, it was limited to an end strength of 60,000. To make 40,000 additional men required for the war, volunteer regiments would be recruited from each state. Volunteer regiments were to be recruited for two years or the duration of the war, whichever was shorter.

28 There is no indication that the bill was written to allow for the enlistment of Filipino’s into existing American companies. The bills authors likely envisioned the creations of scout units, similar to
the discretion of the Army could be organized into units as large as battalions or squadrons, implying the potential for either mounted or dismounted service. A maximum of 12,000 men of the total authorized strength of the Army could be recruited from the Philippines.\textsuperscript{29}

The U.S. Army, however, never expanded its recruitment of scouts above roughly half the authorization.\textsuperscript{30} Over the next twelve years, the army implemented significant changes to Philippine Scout organization. Almost all scout formations from 1899-1913 were infantry or dismounted cavalry, with only a few exceptions. Initially the scouts were organized into 50 independent companies.\textsuperscript{31} The Army later added two Moro companies, recruited from different tribal groups, by 1909.\textsuperscript{32} By 1904, the army had begun consolidating scouts into battalions of four 108-man companies. This experiment proved successful and the process of consolidation was accelerated by War Department General Order 32, 28 February 1905, which ordered the consolidation of twenty-four additional companies into battalions and increasing to seven the total number of Philippine Scout battalions.\textsuperscript{33} Over time, the number of independent companies decreased, until 1910, when twelve battalions were organized and only four independent companies remained. Organizational differences between scouts and the constabulary were

\begin{flushright}
\textit{Indian Scout troops, for use with regiments serving in the Philippines, or in the creation of separate Philippine Scout organizations. The later is the course the U.S. Army chose to pursue.}
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{29} Woolard., 63.

\textsuperscript{30} A number of army officers were arguing for the expansion of the Philippine Scouts to the full authorization, creating an insular army. It seems likely that the reason the scouts were not expanded, despite the relative cost effectiveness when compared to their white counterparts, was due to concerns over trustworthiness. See William H. Johnston, “Philippine Infantry: A Plea for our Little Brown Brother,” \textit{Journal of the United States Infantry Association} 4 (May 1908): 861-874.

\textsuperscript{31} Woolard., 74.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 156. See endnote 61, same page. The author has not identified the date the two Moro Scout Companies were established; however they likely constituted prior 30 June 1909. Major General William P. Duvall, Commander, Philippine Division, mentions 52 companies of Philippine Scouts in his Annual Report.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 142.
important; however, the critical difference between the two organizations was in the role they would play in the pacification of the islands.

The Army employed the Philippine Scouts in manner similar to the way the Spanish employed the Gaurdia Civil.34 Each scout company was recruited from a single Filipino tribe in order to simplify language problems and prevent internal discipline issues arising from tribal animosities. Companies were never employed in the same area or province from which they were recruited, so as to completely cut Scouts off from local support networks and affiliations.35 By deploying the Scouts outside of their home regions, the army intended to prevent intelligence leaks, potential alignments with local political strongmen, and the potential for mutiny. In addition, this practice increased the dependence of scouts upon the army as their new support network and allowed the army to exploit tribal animosities. In the early years, they were regularly rotated to different provinces to prevent them from forming local attachments. The U.S. Army’s philosophy for recruitment and employment of native scouts differed from that employed by the Philippine Constabulary, an organization that belonged to the Governor-General of the Philippines.

**The Philippine Constabulary**

When Major General Arthur MacArthur relinquished his responsibilities as Military Governor of the Philippines in favor of designated civil authorities in 1901, the archipelago was far from pacified. Governor-General William H. Taft officially took control of the island chain on 4 July 1901, one month and one day after the arrival of the Second Philippine Commission.36 The

---

35 Woolard, 101.
decision to transition to civilian governance was driven by a combination of domestic political concerns and overly optimistic reporting by MacArthur’s predecessor Otis, rather than the actual state of affairs. The situation, still far from secure, caused an almost immediate rift between MacArthur and Taft. The former did not wish to subordinate himself to a civilian authority, the Philippine Commission, which first attacked and then moved to usurp his judicial, administrative, and now executive functions. The latter, an ambitious and well-connected politico, contemptuously viewed MacArthur, and other military authorities, as alarmists that tried to distort the situation in order to retain power over the archipelago. This disagreement, was not conducive to an amicable working relationship, with both instead seeming to jealously guard their own prerogatives.

As a civil official, Governor-General Taft had no legal standing in the military chain of command and thus could not command units of the United States Army. Though he might want the subordination of the army, at a minimum Taft needed its willing cooperation or collaboration to achieving his aims. The 20 July 1901 transition of twenty-three “pacified provinces” from military to civil government made cooperation crucial. The insurgents contested the control of some of these “pacified provinces,” while many others were plagued by widespread ladronism (or brigandage) with provincial and local governments unable to maintain law and order. Rather than attempt to cooperate with MacArthur, Taft issued Philippine Commission Act 175, 1 August 1901, authorizing the creation of a 5,000 man Insular Constabulary, a paramilitary police force controlled by the Governor-General. Unlike the Spanish Guardia Civil, this paramilitary force

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 217
40 Millet, Searching for Stability, 9.
was to be locally recruited. Its members had both tribal and familial ties to the indigenous population by design; the expectation was that these ties would serve as a source of intelligence, replace fear of the Gaurdia Civil with faith and confidence in the constabulary, and facilitate acceptance of American sovereignty through a sense of tribal and familial loyalty to the constables. The purpose of this corps as specified in Section One of the Act was to “better maintain peace, law and order in the various provinces of the Philippines Islands.”

The Philippine Constabulary was born.

Act Number 175 of the Philippine Commission established the organization of the Insular Constabulary at the highest levels and set provisions for the organization’s subunits. The highest position established was the Chief of the Constabulary, who, operating out of Manila, maintained close proximity to Governor-General. The chief was charged with maintaining the peace, law, and order of the islands by ensuring that “brigandage, insurrection, unlawful assemblies, and breaches of the peace and other violations of law are prevented or suppressed and the perpetrators of such offenses arrested.” He had the additional role of sending out inspectors to ensure the municipal police forces were effectively led and organized, and to report the findings to the Philippine Commission. The constabulary chief was to divide the provinces into four, later five, districts roughly equal in population (see Map 1). An Assistant Chief of Constabulary administered each district and commanded the assigned Constabulary forces. The Act allowed for the appointment of up to four inspectors per province, later holding military rank, and established a generic framework for organizing constabulary units. The constabulary was

---

42 Ibid., 4.
43 Ibid., 4-5.
eventually organized into companies; each with between forty-five and sixty men, with one or two companies assigned each province (see Figure 1).44

Map 1: District Organization of the Philippine Constabulary.45

On 8 August 1901, the Philippine Constabulary officially came into being when Captain Henry T. Allen, the commander of this new corps, issued his first General Order appointing its


45 Author created. This map is adapted from the one found in Hurley, Vic, *Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, 1901-1936*, (Salem, OR: Cerberus Books, 2011), 164.
first seventy-five officers. The problems faced by this new group of officers were those endemic to all new organizations: recruiting and training, creating the administrative apparatus, building or purchasing the infrastructure, and competing for limited resources with other organizations. Coupled with these challenges were the added difficulties of fighting insurgents and combating ladrones and bandits as they tried to build and expand a capable force. Recruited from within the community, the constables had tribal and familial ties to the people over whom they would be maintaining law and order. The locals were initially suspicious of this organization, associating it with Spain’s hated Guardia Civil. Over time the populace learned to trust the constabulary; a

---

46 Elarth., 13. Allen was among five active duty army officers that were seconded to the Philippine Constabulary. The remainder of the officers came from recently demobilized army officers and noncommissioned officers, active duty noncommissioned officers and soldiers whose enlistments had ended, and civilian volunteers.

47 Author created.
force manned by relatives or members of their own tribe who were loath to employ harsh methods and who were perceived to be acting according to the interests of the community. The constables served the insular government as a source of information and promoted local support that helped eliminate insurrection and ladronism. In effect, the constables became part of the infrastructure of control and collaboration. Over time their employment, often reinforced by companies of Philippine Scouts, completed the work of pacification and established law and order throughout the island chain. Their story however will remain largely outside the scope of this monograph, as the Constabulary was only controlled or employed by the Army when a major unrest called for the employment of Army forces.

**Lawton’s Northern Campaign**

The fall of 1899 found the U.S. Army 8th Corps, the command in charge of the expedition to the Philippines, in a precarious position. Originally charged with defeating the Spanish Army in Manila, it subsequently found itself besieged by the Army of Liberation, the military arm of PRG.\(^48\) The PRG demanded independence and objected to the purchase and annexation of the Philippines by the United States as outlined in the Treaty of Paris. It surrounded U.S. forces in Manila to maintain pressure on the U.S. Government and set conditions whereby it could achieve its aim through negotiation or force.\(^49\) The 8th Corps, from the capture of Manila on 13 August 1898 until the commencement of hostilities with the PRG, consolidated its positions in and around Manila while trying to negotiate a settlement that acknowledged U.S. government sovereignty over the Philippines.\(^50\) The unexpected commencement of the Second Battle of

---

\(^{48}\) Linn, *The Philippine War*, 40. The army besieging Manila numbered between 15,000 and 40,000 men.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 26-29.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 24-26.
Manila, on 4 February 1899, changed the operational context. The U.S. Army and the U.S. government negotiators eschewed negotiation and favored in its stead a decision by arms.

Figure 2: Approximated 8th Corps Task Organization.

The 8th Corps conducted a series of offensive operations up to and throughout the summer of 1899, when both weather and the end of volunteer enlistments severely curtailed military activities. The combined results of these offensive operations improved the U.S. position.

---

51 Ibid., 42.

52 War Department, Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, United States Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines, Military Governor, September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900); Linn, The Philippines War. An accurate task organization chart for 8th Corps is exceedingly difficult to produce, as numerous changes occurred over a relatively brief time span. This chart is an approximation based on the above-cited materials, and is likely missing several regiments, and brigade headquarters. More research needs to be done to firm up the task organization of 8th Corps herein estimated. As shown in this figure, companies G and H of the 37th U.S. Volunteer Regiment were retrained to conduct a light artillery mission. During this operation they supported Young’s Cavalry Brigade.
in a number of ways. First, they secured the water supply and slowly expanded the foothold around Manila, the Philippines’ largest port and 8th Corps’ base of operations. Second, it virtually split the Army of Liberation in two; a northern and a southern force that could not effectively coordinate their actions. Third, it forced Emilio Aguinaldo and the entire PRG to displace several times, which undermined the legitimacy and capability of the PRG, weakened Filipino morale and confidence in the cause of independence, and further eroded the ability of the PRG to coordinate the actions of its military arm. Finally, by mid-May 1899 8th Corps operations had established a front along the Santo Tomas-San Fernando- Candoba line, roughly forty miles north of Manila, giving the U.S. Army control, albeit contested, over the rail line extending from Manila to San Fernando. Despite constant attacks on its lines of communication, 8th Corps consolidated its gains throughout the summer and prepared to employ the rail line as the centerpiece of what was designed to be the knockout blow to the PRG.

Major General Otis, the 8th Corps commander, developed a simple plan. The U.S. would commence offensive operations in the fall, when weather conditions improved and subsequent to the scheduled arrival of replacement units. He planned an offensive consisting of three converging columns, a technique successfully and repeatedly employed against the Plains Indians, with the goal of “causing the capture or disintegration of Aguinaldo’s Army.” One element consisting of Major General Lawton’s 1st Division, was to attack up the Rio Grande de Pampanga first to San Isidro and then to the Lingayen Gulf, securing routes that gave access to the mountain passes along the east of the Central Luzon plain and prevent the escape of the both the Philippine forces and government. A second force consisting of Brigadier General Wheaton’s

53 Linn, The Philippine War, 110.
54 Brig. Gen S.B.M. Young’s Report to AG, DP and EAC, 6 January 1900, Report of Operations 24 June 1899 – 5 January 1900, Box 3 SYP, USAHEC.
brigade was directed to conduct an amphibious landing in the Dagupan, the northern terminus of the railroad, cutting off supplies from and the retreat route to the north along the coastal road. Finally, Major General MacArthur’s 2nd Division, Otis’ main effort, would initially fix the Army of Liberation, allowing the remaining two forces to maneuver into positions to surround the Filipino forces. With the PRG and Army of Liberation boxed in from the North and East, MacArthur would launch an attack north along the rail line toward Dagupan, on the Gulf of Lingayen, and complete the destruction of the PRG and Philippine forces in the north. With victory in the north achieved, Otis planned to send his forces to South Luzon to destroy remaining enemy field forces, thus ending organized resistance, and with it the war; setting the conditions for civil control of Luzon, and gradual expansion of control to the other major islands within the archipelago.55

The plan, though well conceived did have a number of potential friction points. The first lay squarely in the realm of control. All three forces would operate well outside of mutually supporting range. Limited communications infrastructure and technology made concerted actions between columns a difficult proposition under the best of conditions. Wire communication supplemented by dispatch riders provided the primary means of adjusting orders to subordinates or providing updated situation reports to higher headquarters. Commanders’ inability to exert control over widely dispersed forces made it critical that subordinate leaders understood their higher headquarters’ overall mission and intent (course of action) and these same subordinates understood their role within the framework of the larger operation. In essence, it required senior leaders to trust subordinates leaders use initiative to aggressively pursue operational objectives

55 Linn, *The Philippine War*, 139.
with the resources on hand; not unlike the modern concept of mission orders.56 Because of these limitations in communications, a failure on the part of a junior commander was often not identified or addressed until it was too late and the damage was done. Communication was not the only limiting factor; transportation or the lack thereof dictated the tempo of the entire offensive.

Excepting the single rail line, advances relied largely on poorly maintained, unimproved roads to move supplies. When able, the U.S. Army also tried employing river transport; however this method could be as much a limiting as an enabling factor dependent largely on the depth of the river, the availability of shallow draft vessels, and the course of the river. As the American offensive progressed, the Army’s tenuous supply lines, already vulnerable to enemy activity and weather conditions, threatened to collapse under the strain. In 1st Division, Major General Lawton and Brigadier General Young, already anticipating an offensive slowed by the weather and its effects on the trafficability of terrain, planned a campaign of alternating advances and pauses for consolidation and resupply, slowing the tempo even further.57

Finally, the 8th Corps had not received replacement units and its offensive fighting strength, never high enough to achieve the operational goals of its commander, would only decline until their arrival. With each mile that the Army marched north, attrition, logistical escort requirements, and guard details for key infrastructure would eat away at the strength of American units. All had potential to seriously affect the course of the impending offensive operations.

In the case of final friction point, the authorization allowing the employment of units of armed auxiliaries had an immediate positive impact on subsequent operations. Thousands were


57 Linn, The Philippine War, 142.
contracted or employed to perform support or logistical functions that freed troops for frontline service. Additionally, and perhaps more risky, auxiliary units were raised and armed to support combat operations against the Army of Liberation.\(^{58}\)

**Organization of the Auxiliaries**

Prior to this campaign U.S. forces had organized only limited numbers of auxiliaries; local police units were the only armed auxiliaries created prior to September 1899.\(^{59}\) Eighth Corps senior command concerns on the potential loyalty of local tribes, and fears that armed natives might be overly harsh with locals of different tribal groups, precluded support for auxiliary units until seven months after hostilities commenced. Perhaps the most striking example of the early, mass employment of auxiliaries by the U.S. Army in the Philippines was the service rendered by Batson’s Macabebe Scouts, and to lesser extent Lowe’s Scouts, during the offensive from October to December 1899.\(^{60}\) The Macabebe Scouts were first raised to support this particular campaign. The success of this organization at the tactical level, and their employment in support of operational objectives, led to the rapid expansion to a five-company battalion over the course of this campaign.

The campaign commenced with three companies of Macabebe Scouts, organized as a battalion, under the leadership of 1st Lieutenant. Matthew Batson.\(^{61}\) The first company was raised

---

\(^{58}\) Newspaper clip, unknown newspaper, Manila, dated 18 October 1899, Box 1 MAB, USAHEC. Clipping details concerns army officers had about the reliability and loyalty.

\(^{59}\) Linn, *The Philippine War*, 81 and 128 (Negrenese auxiliaries), 128 (Manila Native Police).

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 143. Lowe’s scouts, a company size organization, integrated American soldiers, and Tagalog tribesmen. It was a unique unit, that for purposes of this paper will largely be ignored due to its high proportion of American soldiers.

\(^{61}\) Matthew Batson has been variously given the ranks of 1st Lieutenant, Captain, and Major throughout the sources and source materials. Though he did hold each of these ranks over, during this campaign he was a 1st Lieutenant.
in Macabebe, Pampanga province, on 10 September 1899. The success of the first Macabebe Company led to the authorization for a second one within three weeks of raising the first, which was combined with the first to create a small battalion of scouts under the leadership of Batson.

![Figure 3: Evolution of the Macabebe Scouts.](image)

Prior to commencing the final northern offensive of the conventional phase of the war, the authorized strength of each Macabebe Company was raised to 128 men, and a third company was raised. C Company, Batson’s Macabebes was immediately detached for service with Major General MacArthur’s 2nd Division. MacArthur’s initial reservations about the trustworthiness of the natives were overcome by the practical need for soldiers, especially those demonstrating the skills and local knowledge possessed by the Macabebes. Two additional companies were

---

63 Author created.
authorized and raised during the course of the campaign; increasing to five the number of Macabebe companies. Of the five companies four were assigned to Lawton’s 1st Division; where they fulfilled a number combat and support roles. The combat roles were largely a result of Batson’s assignment to Brigadier General Samuel B. M. Young’s Cavalry Brigade, an assignment that proved the usefulness of the native scouts, and set the stage for the expansion and inclusion of native auxiliaries into the U.S. Army establishment.

**Lawton’s Employment of Auxiliaries**

The first employment of Batson’s Battalion of Macabebe Scouts occurred prior to the final northern offensive. The existence of an insurgent force in the nipa swamps of southwestern Balucan and southern Pampanga provinces provided a very real and credible threat to 8th Corps lines of communication extending from Manila to San Fernando. Throughout the summer, U.S. Army units tried to drive the insurgents from the harsh, baffling landscape. The PRG’s advantages of mobility and local knowledge could not be matched by the American forces; tying down numerous soldiers in an attempt to secure lines of communication. In answering this problem Batson’s Scouts soon proved their worth.

Lawton initially employed the scouts patrolling the same nipa swamps and rivers seemingly infested by the *insurrectos*. Operating out of Macabebe and Calumpit, the scouts scoured the dense swamps, first locating and later attacking enemy troop concentrations. By 26 September 1899, Batson now attached to Brigadier General Young’s Provisional Cavalry Brigade, part of Major General Lawton’s 1st Division, reported insurgents on left (east) bank of

---

64 Woolard, 12-13.
Rio Grande de Pampanga, and that he was sending out a company to Haganoy.\textsuperscript{65} The next day Batson led a force of 175 scouts in \textit{bancas} on an operation that ultimately drove insurgents to west, out of the swamps. The first engagement of this drive occurred on 28 September, in which his scouts captured Haganoy and Maraloa.\textsuperscript{66} Subsequent reconnaissance reported that the insurgents from Haganoy linked up with a larger force on Canayan Brook (likely in vicinity of Barangay Sapang Kawayan).\textsuperscript{67} Batson later attacked this enemy force on or about 5 October, securing the American lines of communication from that quarter, helping to set the conditions for the offensive to the north.\textsuperscript{68}

An old military adage is that the plan does not survive the first shot fired. Otis’s plan, did not even last that long. Filipino attacks against \textit{barrios} (neighborhoods) in Laguna and Cavite Provinces, both south of Manila, disrupted the timing and synchronization of the impending northern offensive.\textsuperscript{69} Otis ordered Major General Lawton, in conjunction with troops from Manila under Brigadier General Theodore Schwan, 8\textsuperscript{th} Corps Chief-of-Staff, to conduct a spoiling attack to push back the Filipino forces in Cavite.\textsuperscript{70} These attacks were to eliminate the immediate threats to Manila and allow enough breathing room to permit Otis to strip troops from the defense of Manila and its southern environments for use in the northern offensive.\textsuperscript{71} However, these attacks did not delay the start date for the offensive, which found most of Lawton’s troops scattered

\textsuperscript{65} 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenant Batson to Headquarters Provisional Brigade, 1\textsuperscript{st} Division, dated 27 September 1899, LS 50, RG 395 E 836 Register of Letters Sent SEP-DEC 1899 (1\textsuperscript{st} CAV BDE, 1\textsuperscript{st} DIV).
\textsuperscript{66} 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenant Batson handwritten entry, dated 26 September 1899, Box 2, MAB, USAHEC.
\textsuperscript{67} Brig. Gen S.B.M. Young’s Report to AG, DP and EAC, 6 January 1900, Appendix 6, Report of Operations 24 June 1899 – 5 January 1900, Box 3 SYP, USAHEC.
\textsuperscript{68} Telegram from 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenant Batson to Major Edwards, dated 4 October 1899, Box 1, MAB, USAHEC.
\textsuperscript{69} Linn, \textit{The Philippine War}, 142. Filipino insurgents from Cavite attacked the \textit{barrios} of Calamba and Los Baños, in Laguna Province; and the \textit{barrios} of Imus and Bacoor, in Cavite province.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 143.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 144.
between San Fernando and Manila. The Provisional Cavalry Brigade was the only force Lawton had in position to support the planned offensive.

Brigadier General Samuel B.M. Young embarked on the campaign under anything but favorable circumstances. His brigade was to advance over terrain principally characterized by impenetrable juggles, with the relatively few settled areas connected by unimproved roads and trails, and surrounded by rice paddies. Landscape so unsuitable for cavalry under ideal conditions was made far worse after being saturated with seventy inches of rain since the previous May; rice paddies were flooded and the few precious roads available for movement were likely to remain inundated.\textsuperscript{72} Any support from 1\textsuperscript{st} Division would take from days to weeks to arrive, and would compete for space with the brigade’s transport. The tyrannies of distance and weather set the conditions for decisions made on the employment of Batson’s scouts. Initially the Macabebes were employed to help alleviate the critical supply situation; however, as contact with the Army of Liberation increased so too did the demand for combat troops, changing their role for the remainder of the campaign.

The offensive commenced on 11 October, following weeks of reconnaissance and patrolling in the direction of Mexico and Santa Ana. Lawton’s plan, according to historian Brian Linn, anticipated the difficulties of the advance.\textsuperscript{73} He broke down the offensive into two distinct phases, an advance on San Isidro where he intended to take a tactical pause to repair the roads, bridges, and ferries needed to support his advance, and to amass supplies. Once Lawton had built


\textsuperscript{73} Linn, \textit{The Philippine War}, 142.
up enough supplies at San Isidro, he would order an advance north to cut off the Filipinos from the mountains in the east.  

Young was instructed to take San Isidro.

During the first phase of this operation Young’s brigade advanced from staging areas in San Fernando and Mexico. Within the first seven days Young’s brigade advanced through Santa Ana and Arayat to seize Cabiao. It was almost immediately apparent that supplying even one brigade had turned into a major effort; an effort upon which the successful continuation of the operation hinged. Batson’s small battalion, initially intended for a very limited role during the campaign, was situated well to the south near Calumpit and Macabebe early in the offensive. Its initial mission to defend American supply lines from enemy forces active in the swamps of Pampanga would soon change as they were brought north to free American soldiers by conducting a similar mission, one for which it was believed that their mobility and local knowledge uniquely suited them.

Enemy activity along Young’s vulnerable supply lines threatened to scatter his limited manpower prior to the achieving his first objective, San Isidro. The desire to free soldiers for the advance, first tied Batson’s operations to a supporting role from the Calumpit area, and later hastened the transfer of his command to the north. Batson’s new responsibilities were primarily to improve and secure American supply lines to Arayat, the location of the first operational pause in Young’s advance. On 9 October, the day prior to offensive operations, Lawton ordered Batson to move his Macabebes to the east bank of the Rio Grande to keep it clear for boats and supplies, and authorizing an accompanying detachment of engineers for the repair of roads and ferry construction. Days later, on 11 October, Batson was directed to proceed from Calumpit to

---

74 Ibid.
Candoba to hold the east bank of the River up to Arayat. From 12-16 October, the Macabebe’s were ordered support the Army engineers by guarding prisoners working to improving of the roads to, and building a ferry in vicinity of Arayat. Further, in one communiqué Lawton cautioned Young against breaking down his command “chasing small parties. Batson can look out for those you refer to (guerrilla bands) later on.” Each order demonstrated the intent to employ the Macabebes to a security mission, and allowed for the reduction of American troops assigned to that role. The implication that Batson’s Macabebes would be focused on improving and securing the lines of communication was clear, and would continue for some time as two companies of Macabebes, recruited later in the campaign, were tasked to secure San Antonio and San Isidro until relieved by American troops. The initial focus on supply lines improved speed at which American leaders were able to move both supplies and troops forward. Reasonably secure supply lines allowed Lawton to mass and project stronger, more capable American units; both are considerations tied to depth. However, their Macabebe’s security mission was tied to more than just the transportation infrastructure.

Batson’s Scouts provided direct security for boats carrying supplies upstream to Arayat. Between 4-11 October, Lawton ordered Batson to detail a number of scouts led by a native

---

76 AG Headquarters Provisional Brigade, 1st Division to 1st Lieutenant Batson, dated 15 October 1899, LS 291, RG 395 E 836 Register of Letters Sent SEP-DEC 1899 (1st CAV BDE, 1st DIV).
77 Brig. Gen S.B.M. Young’s Report to AG, DP and EAC, 6 January 1900, Appendix 6 and Appendix 7, Report of Operations 24 June 1899 – 5 January 1900, Box 3 SYP, USAHEC.
78 Woolard, 9.
79 War Department, Reports of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army in Seven Parts, part 5, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30,1900 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), 130.
sergeant and a corporal to guard cascoes. On 13 October, Batson was directed to send daily patrols of 50 scouts to Candaba to protect the cascoes and tugs bringing up supplies the last twelve miles to Arayat. These again were measures tied to freeing what were considered more reliable and lethal American units for employment in the impending attack towards San Isidro. Early in the campaign the intended role for the scouts rapidly changed, largely due to a lack of U.S. infantry. Necessity made the scouts employment in reconnaissance and offensive operations a more attractive, if somewhat risky, proposition. It was a fortuitous decision; one that improved the intelligence gathering capability, speed, and maneuverability, hence the flexibility, of the brigade.

The scouts fulfilled two distinct roles during the conduct of the offensive. First they conducted reconnaissance, providing information on the strength and whereabouts of enemy forces. Second, they provided a body of infantry capable of rapid movement over difficult terrain. Over the course of the next two months they would alternate between both tasks as they joined in three separate advances: San Isidro (18-19 October 1899), to Cabanatuan (27-31 October 1899), and the final offensive to Vigan (7 November – 6 December 1899).

The Macabebes’ first truly active roles immediately preceded the planned advance on San Isidro. The importance of this town, the provincial capital and third most populous urban center (pop. 9,500) of Nueva Ecija, was due to its commanding position within the provincial
transportation network.\textsuperscript{83} The town lay astride the province’s main highway, and adjacent to the Rio Grand de Pampanga, approximately twelve miles north of its confluence with the Chico River.\textsuperscript{84} The town’s capture would serve not only as a potential moral objective but also a crucial collection point for both men and supplies. In the days preceding the advance Batson’s scouts reconnoitered the enemy positions surrounding Cabiao, providing information on the identity and dispositions of the enemy force arrayed in its defense.\textsuperscript{85} This information would be put to good use in the planned attack.

Young’s plan of attack on 18 October entailed a direct attack against Cabiao by Captain John Ballance’s 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion, 22\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry, with both Castner’s and Batson’s scouts to secure the attacks flanks.\textsuperscript{86} The sources and contemporary reports differ on Batson’s assigned mission and the assessment of his success in achieving the initial objectives since Ballance’s battalion made a frontal assault virtually without support. Nonetheless, the Macabebes proved their willingness to support the American cause and their fighting ability. During the course of the morning they drove back entrenched defenders from either Libutad (Malibutad) or San Mateo, and then continued the attack to seize Cabiao to the northeast. At the cost of one killed, their aggressive attack drove the defenders northward toward San Isidro, killed or wounded thirty-four enemy soldiers, captured two officers and fifty-seven men, and forwarded reports of 400 enemy soldiers

\textsuperscript{83} War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, A Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, United States of American, with Maps, Charts, and Illustrations Also the Law of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands Passed by Congress and Approved by the President July 1, 1902 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 702.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 703.

\textsuperscript{85} ARWD, 1900, 126-127.

\textsuperscript{86} Marple, “The Philippine Scouts,” 74. First Lieutenant Joseph C. Castner, had assumed command of a Filipino-American unit of scouts contemporarily known as Lowe’s Scouts. It is often referred to in the literature as either Lowe’s scouts or Castner-Lowe’s Scouts. This scout unit was fairly unique in being the only Filipino-American unit raised. It was a 65-man unit that included 25 soldiers, 22 Tagalog scouts, and 18 cargadores.
at San Isidro. This action proved to be a template for their employment throughout the rest of the campaign.

Map 2: Advance on San Isidro, (11-19 October 1899).

The actions of the Macabebes during the northern campaign fell into one of three types of action: reconnaissance, advance or flank guard for the main body, or deliberate attack. Having just taken Cabiao, Young ordered the continuance of the attack against San Isidro for the next morning. Batson was subordinated to First Lieutenant Joseph C. Castner, Commander, Lowe’s Scouts; their mission attack along the west bank of the de Pampanga at Cabiao and through San Antonio toward Jaen, securing the western flank of the main advance. A mile-and-a-half north of

---

87 ARWD, 1900, 127; Copy of letter to U.S. Army AG from 1st Lieutenant Matthew Batson, dated 23 March 1900, Box 1, MAB, USAHEC. Letter was to request promotion to grade of Colonel of Volunteers, and to enlist a regiment of native auxiliaries.

88 Author created. This map was adapted from the “Map of Northern Luzon: Campaign of 1899” by 1st Lieutenant H.P. Howard, 3rd Cavalry Regiment ADC found in Box 3 SYP, USAHEC.
San Antonio, the Macabebes met and defeated a 200 man enemy force. They then continued their attack until directly across the river from San Isidro. After the Battle of San Isidro, the Macabebes were temporally employed to secure Young’s supply lines at San Isidro and San Antonio while Batson went south to recruit and equipment two more Macabebe companies. Batson’s scouts would not take part in any further fighting until his return.

Map 3: Advance on Cabanatuan (19 October -5 November 1899).89

Lawton’s next major offensive was planned to secure the city of Cabanatuan, 20 miles distant, which was rumored to contain two-dozen American and approximately 4,000 Spanish prisoners.90 The Macabebes missed the first day of the second advance. Arriving at San Isidro on 27 October, neither Batson nor his men contributed to the advance on Santa Rosa, but events conspired to give him an opportunity to participate in the advance to Cabanatuan. Young,

---

89 Author created. This map was adapted from the “Map of Northern Luzon: Campaign of 1899” by 1st Lieutenant H.P. Howard, 3rd Cavalry Regiment ADC found in Box 3 SYP, USAHEC.

compelled by poor road conditions and an inability to bring north both men and supplies necessary for the next planned advance, was forced to call a three-day halt to operations. Upon Batson’s arrival at San Isidro, Young ordered him north with half of his now four-company battalion. Batson reported to Young at Santa Rosa the next day. Early on the morning of 29 October, he led his Macabebes on the western flank of the column attacking Cabanatuan, his mission to cut off the retreat of enemy forces to the west resulting from the main attack. Batson crossed to the west side of the river and positioned three elements to intercept fleeing enemy forces: seventy-five men at Talapapa, fifty at the intersection of the Talavera and Aliaga Roads, and the remainder of his command just west of the Ferry at Cabanatuan. The day after Young took Cabanatuan, the Macabebes and two troops of the 4th Cavalry were placed under Lieutenant Colonel James Parker with the new mission of proceeding to Aliaga. After brushing aside a small outpost, they surprised a raw 200-man garrison and captured an enemy telegraph office, as the enemy fled the town without resistance. Over the next six days, Parker’s detachment established a defensive position in Aliaga and used it as a base from which to conduct reconnaissance patrols west of the Rio Grande de Pampanga. The Macabebes conducted a reconnaissance patrol to Licap on 1 November and received intelligence of a force of insurgents in the vicinity of Zaragosa and Carmin. The next day Batson went on a patrol to Zaragosa, which resulted in three successive skirmishes with enemy forces in vicinity of Zaragosa, Santo Domingo, and Carmin respectively. The skirmishes drew Parker out with reinforcements, and led to a daylong pursuit that dispersed enemy forces in the region and ended with a return to Aliaga. Excepting a minor skirmish in

91 Ibid., 145.
92 ARWD, 1900, 130; Telegram from Major General Lawton to Brigadier General Schwan, dated 18 October 1899, on page 41, of removed selection of pages from Reports of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army in Seven Parts, Box 1, MAB, USAHEC.
93 Ibid., 131-132.
which the Macabebes repulsed a small enemy force coming from Licap, the remaining time spent at Aliaga was uneventful until Batson was recalled to Cabanatuan on 5 November. The situation had changed once again.

MacArthur sent word of Aguinaldo’s planned retreat. This report was supported by information supplied by some of the Spanish prisoners Young had just released. With Wheaton’s force stuck in Manila due to unfavorable maritime conditions, it appeared that Otis’s slowly closing trap would miss its part of its intended target. The situation spurred both Lawton and Young to undertake one final risky advance designed to capture Aguinaldo and potentially end the war.

The difficulty of the advance, having advanced roughly thirty-five miles in the twenty-one days since departing from Santa Rosa on the 12 October had worked to temper the audacity leaders from Otis on down. Lawton, initially inclined to advance no further than Talavera and Aliaga until he could concentrate his command and amass the supplies needed to continue, agreed to a bold plan to advance to Tayug, and cut off the retreat of Aguinaldo. Young’s plan was to reduce his supply train to minimal essentials, cut his supply lines, and sustain his command with a combination of forage and the limited supplies they could carry. To assure both speed and his ability to sustain his force he recommended reducing his combat power to a small mobile force composed of largely of his most mobile units: Batson’s Macabebe Battalion, Ballance’s battalion...

---


96 Linn, The Philippine War, 147.
of infantry, three troops of 3rd Cavalry, and the light battery of the 37th U.S. Volunteer Infantry. The plan was daring, exceptionally risky, and almost worked.

Map 4: First Leg of Batson’s Final Advance (6-12 November 1899).

On 7 November, Young embarked on an advance that would cover 257 miles and culminate with the capture of Vigan on 6 December. The Macabebe battalion, now consolidated and with a strength of 400 men, comprised over one fourth of Young’s available force. It transitioned from supporting roles on the periphery of the main effort to a force for employment in its own right. The Macabebes, now in the lead of the main column, provided both a steady stream of information and security for the main effort. Screening ahead they often

---

97 Ibid.
98 Author created. This map was adapted from the “Map of Northern Luzon: Campaign of 1899” by 1st Lieutenant H.P. Howard, 3rd Cavalry Regiment ADC found in Box 3 SYP, USAHEC.
secured towns prior to their occupation by the main body of the column. The Macabebes, marched through Talavera and arrived at San Jose on 8 November after both towns had been cleared by a separate but linked operation conducted by Lieutenant Colonel E.M. Hayes, commander, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. There, the Macabebes captured the personal effects of Philippine General first name Llanara, which one author contends included Aguinaldo’s orders detailing the withdraw of the Army of Liberation to the San Nicolas Pass. The Macabebes took part in two separate engagements during the course of this final advance. The first occurred at Humingan, on 11 November, where the Macabebes, under Young and Lieutenant Colonel Wessels and well ahead of a column of cavalry, dispersed a force of 200 enemy soldiers and passed the cavalry forward to allow it to continue the attack towards Tayug and San Quentin. By the 16th, Young had managed to cut off Aguinaldo’s retreat to the east; however the north still lay open. Young hazarded the dispersal of his small, exhausted brigade into a wide net; projecting it well beyond the limits imposed by Lawton in an attempt to capture Aguinaldo.

The Macabebes’ final engagement at Aringay, in La Union Province, on 19 November, occurred as part of Young’s final desperate push to capture at Aguinaldo before he could make his escape to the north. Batson’s Macabebes once again spearheaded the advance as they ran into an entrenched enemy rear guard, determined to block American transit along the coastal road north of the Aringay River. Batson conducted a frontal attacked with his battalion of Macabebes, crossing the river under heavy fire, succeeded in driving the enemy rear guard from its entrenchments, and facilitated the rapid occupation of the towns of Aringay and Baoang that

---


Batson, his foot shattered by enemy fire, and his Macabebes, exhausted after covering 167 miles in thirteen days, played their last offensive role in this campaign.

Map 5: Final Leg of Batson’s Last Advance (13-19 November 1899).

Batson’s Macabebes started the campaign as an experimental formation of suspect loyalty and capabilities. Major General Otis, the corps commander, was unsure if this organization would fight against the Army of Liberation, or turn its newly issued arms against American soldiers. They were assigned a mission on the periphery, where success would be beneficial and failure would create a situation no worse than already existed. Tasked with a mission to silence guerrillas attacking U.S. supply lines from the nipa swamps of Pampanga, close

---


103 Author created. This map was adapted from the “Map of Northern Luzon: Campaign of 1899” by 1st Lieutenant H.P. Howard, 3rd Cavalry Regiment ADC found in Box 3 SYP, USAHEC.
to their tribal home, they succeeded in rapidly driving the enemy from the region. The tangible benefits of securing American supply were the potential increase in logistical throughput and the freeing of units from security missions in the 8th Corps’s rear for front line service. The intangible benefits were certainly an increase in operational flexibility and operational depth. More units available provide commanders with an increased number of tactical and operational options. Additionally, the increase in available units, the greater throughput of supply, and the improved dependability of the supply distribution increased the depth to which 8th Corps could project its forces. Over the course of the campaign, leaders within 1st Division demonstrated a willingness to increase the scouts’ levels of responsibility in the form of missions assigned, as Batson’s men proved themselves a loyal, aggressive, extremely mobile, and capable force. The steady transition within 1st Division from securing supply lines, to reconnaissance and flank security missions, to advanced guard and direct combat missions show an increasing reliance on these native soldiers. Brigadier General Young’s selection of Batson’s Scouts over other American units when reorganizing his reduced brigade for the pursuit of Aguinaldo demonstrates this trend. It also displays this cavalry officer’s appreciation for the capabilities that this native force provided him in the difficult terrain of central Luzon; namely flexibility and operational depth. The Macabebes demonstrated that native auxiliaries could be relied upon by the U.S. Army, their performance on Samar would cement the native auxiliary units as both a fixture of and the future of the insular army.

The Pulajan Unrest in Samar (1904-1907)

The Island of Samar, and to a lesser extent the supporting operation in neighboring Leyte, was the only U.S. Army campaign during the early period of occupation where one can examine the mass employment of native auxiliaries. It is one of only two army operations in which the majority of troops employed were native Filipinos, making it distinct from earlier army
pacification efforts. In Samar the army would face the Pulajans, a loose collection of groups
described as “possessing the military sophistication of the Luzon guerillas, and the primitive
fierceness of their Muslim neighbors.”\footnote{Reynaldo P. San Gabriel et al., \textit{The Constabulary Story} (Camp Crane, Quezon City, Philippines: Public Information Office, 1982), 127.} They fought across a virtually trackless landscape
dominated by steep mountains, dense jungle, and raging rivers. It was the interior of the island,
where seventy-five percent of the population lived, from which the Pulajans materialized,
pillaged and laid waste to communities, and into which they vanished.\footnote{Elarth, 62.} Samar aptly
demonstrated that native troops provided the U.S. Army increased operational depth and
flexibility when conducting operations. Indeed, the scouts helped the army to come to grips with
and end a long campaign against an aggressive and elusive foe who fought for no discernable
political goal.

The Pulajan movement’s political aims were unclear, and, as it left behind no written
records, it remains shrouded in mystery. However, enough has been written about the movement
from the American perspective that the Pulajan background and motives can be reckoned with
some accuracy. Pulajans were an amalgamation of brigands, intractable guerillas, and sectarian
Dios Dios that refused to yield when General Vincente Lukban surrendered his revolutionary
red (pula) clothing, typically pants, these warriors continued to resist in small bands from Samar’s
mountainous interior.\footnote{Ibid., 47.} Religion and economic grievances served as impetuses for unity, and
over the next two years the strength of these groups grew.

\textsuperscript{104} Reynaldo P. San Gabriel et al., \textit{The Constabulary Story} (Camp Crane, Quezon City, Philippines: Public Information Office, 1982), 127.
\textsuperscript{105} Elarth, 62.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 47.
Dios Dios was the dominant religion in the hinterlands of Samar. Though not all leaders of the Pulajan movement were tied to it, many influential leaders were and it served as a potent force behind the revolt. Dios Dios’s blending of Christian teachings with traditional Visayan animism proved a powerful means of compelling social organization, obedience, and collective action by the country-dwellers. Pablo Bulan, known as Papa (Pope) Pablo, was the belief’s most influential priest. He and other spiritual leaders, many of who fulfilled the roles of military chieftains, served to bolster the fanatical courage of the movement’s warriors by promising reincarnation if they died in battle and invulnerability to warriors by providing them with magical amulets called, anting-antings. These leaders helped encourage recruitment, and may have even helped to unify smaller bands into larger and more potent forces. Movements of this nature rarely take shape without an enemy, an adversary against which powerful and persuasive local leaders can stoke actual or perceived grievances until they explode into violent action.

The grievances of the people can be linked primarily to economics and a sense of fair play. The island’s major export was hemp, important for the production of nautical and agricultural cordage. These plants were grown by farmers in the interior of the island and taken to market in the coastal towns. The merchants and officials of these coastal towns often conspired to keep prices low to make their hemp markets more attractive for foreign buyers and maximize their profits. This manipulation of the market worked to the benefit of the merchants and the economies of the coastal communities. It benefited little the poor farmer, who felt continually cheated; a feeling that festered over time and create a divide between the coastal communities and those of the interior. It led to an explosion of violence that took years to quell.

---

The written histories and available primary source documents point to two possible start dates for the problems. The Army pinpointed the start of the uprising to 21 July 1904, with the outbreak of hostilities and the burning of several villages in the Gandara Valley by a band of

---

110 Author created. This map is adapted from source maps in RG 395, NARA2; web searches on Google Earth (earth.google.com), Google maps (maps.google.com), and Mapcarta (mapcarta.com); and detailed reading of primary source materials. Though many source maps were used, the two most referenced were: War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, “Map Sheet No. 5, Eastern Visayan Islands,” in *Roads in the Philippine Islands* (Manila: Bureau of Public Works, 1914), located in RG 395 (Philippine Division before 1915), NARA2; “Philippine Islands” by John Bach, RG 395, NARA2, written on the map is note “Reorganization of Courts of First Instance.” All future references will be to RG 395, NARA2.
Pulajans group under Colonel Enrique Dagojob.\textsuperscript{111} Several histories of the Philippine Constabulary seem to imply that the Samar campaign of 1901-02 was incomplete, that the Army quit the island and left Capt. Amos D. Haskell and his small, outgunned detachment of constables to complete the pacification of an island overrun with outlaw bands.\textsuperscript{112} Both arguments are supportable by the available evidence. The Constabulary histories detail a series of skirmishes, major and minor, that begin shortly after the U.S. Army ended its campaign and transferred the majority of troops from the island in 1902. However, the Pulajans did not have the strength, organization, and capability to contest U.S. control of the island until the middle of 1904, the year when the Philippine Constabulary finally recognized that there was a problem too large for it to handle without assistance.

Dagojob, already considered the most capable military chief of the Pulajan movement, garnered even greater prestige from his attacks in the Gandara Valley. Captain Amos D. Haskell, of the Philippine Constabulary, was charged with mopping up the remaining outlaw bands in the interior of and establish law an order on Samar in the aftermath of the Army’s large scale withdraw from the island.\textsuperscript{113} Haskell, reinforced by an additional company of the Constabulary from Cebu, kept Samar in some semblance of control for a period of two years. By 1904, the Constabulary posts at Catamaran, Borogan, Calbiga, Catbalogan, and Balangiga were too dispersed and too undermanned to control the island.\textsuperscript{114} The burning of villages in Gandara, and the subsequent defeat of the relief force that the Constabulary sent in response, demonstrated that

\textsuperscript{111} Elarth, 63.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 60.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 61.
Map 7: Security Force Distribution Following the Gandara Valley Massacre (November 1904). Roughly 300 constables were not enough to maintain control of the island. Brigadier General Allen, the Chief of the Constabulary was alarmed at developments. Soon Colonel Wallace C. Taylor, Assistant Chief of the Constabulary and the 3rd District Commander, arrived to take personal command, followed shortly thereafter by reinforcements of both Constabulary and Scout

115 Author created. This map is adapted from source maps in RG 395, NARA2. See note 110.
116 Elarth, 63.
companies. As more forces arrived he paired Scouts and Constabulary companies in an expanding network of outposts, and began actively patrolling these newly reoccupied areas with small detachments. The increased, though small scale, offensive activity met with mixed success.

During the next six months, small scale successes and reverses typified the fighting, with neither side gaining the upper hand until two bold Pulajan attacks seriously threatened the position of the insular government. The slaughter of the two small garrisons at Oras and Delores, in the months of November 1904 and December 1904 respectively, and the capture of over sixty rifles with large supplies of ammunition shocked those in leadership. On 15 December 1904, two days after the second massacre, Brigadier General Henry T. Allen, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, arrived in Samar and took personal command of the campaign. Allen brought in additional reinforcements increasing the number of constables to 845 officers and men by May 1905. He also changed the tactical methods employed so unsuccessfully by the Constabulary. He forbade the use of small patrols. Instead he stripped garrisons to a minimum to form multiple large patrols that could be continuously maintained in the field; however, these large formations proved unable to surprise the Pulajans whose intelligence network and more nimble formations allowed them to evade Allen’s men at will. The U.S Army and the Philippine Scouts were not absent during the escalation, and provided considerable support for the Philippine Constabulary.

117 Ibid.
118 Elarth, 64-65.
119 Ibid., 63.
Following Brigadier General Smith’s 1901-02 campaigns, the island, then considered pacified, was returned to the control of the insular government. The Philippine Division

---

120 Author created. This map is adapted from source maps in RG 395, NARA2. See note 110.

121 The transfer of Samar from military to civil authorities only occurred when an Island or province was deemed pacified. President Roosevelt may have been a factor in the rapid transition of Samar, as he was eager to declare and end to the insurrection, a declaration he made on 4 July 1902. The first Samar campaign had terminated the previous April.
gradually reduced troop commitments as other pacification or strategic manning requirements supplanted Samar in importance.\textsuperscript{122} However, the Army did not completely abandon the island, maintaining roughly 1400 troops on the island by 30 June 1904.\textsuperscript{123} The 14\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment stationed at Camp Connell, Calbayog, Western Samar; and the 39\textsuperscript{th} Company of Philippine Scouts at Camp Hartsborne, Laoang, Northern Samar, constituted the island’s garrison. As the conditions in Samar deteriorated, Governor-General Luke Edward Wright requested increasing amounts of assistance from the U.S. Army.\textsuperscript{124} The Army complied with the request. By the close of December 1904 the Philippine Division increased the available forces in Samar by a battalion of infantry from the 12\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment, and roughly six companies of scouts.\textsuperscript{125} American soldiers of the 12\textsuperscript{th} and 14\textsuperscript{th} infantry regiments were distributed among the towns Llorente, Oras, Taft, Tarangunan, and Bulao in the disaffected coastal regions to free the constables and scouts for active field service under the direction of the civil government.\textsuperscript{126} American soldiers were to act only as a supporting element to garrison and safeguard these coastal communities from incursions by the Pulajans, protect loyal natives, and provide the confidence and security needed by the inhabitants to rebuild and resume their normal lives. The subordination of the army, and its relegation to a support role ended in May 1905. After five additional months of futile campaigning Allen determined that, despite their best efforts, the constabulary were not trained,

\textsuperscript{122} The Philippine Division replaced the 8\textsuperscript{th} Corps as the principle American headquarters in the Philippine when the U.S. Army reorganized in the aftermath of the Philippine Insurrection.

\textsuperscript{123} War Department, \textit{Reports of Division and Department Commanders, vol. 3, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1904} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 231.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{125} War Department, \textit{Reports of Division and Department Commanders, vol. 3, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1905} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905), 286. Report states that the Constabulary was reinforced by 700 Philippine Scouts in the aggregate, effectively seven companies of scouts including the 39\textsuperscript{th} Company P.S. out of Camp Hartsborne, Laoang.

\textsuperscript{126} RPC, 1905, 4.
organized, or equipped to handle large uprisings. The attempts to mass constables on Samar, at the expense of other regions and provinces, to end the rebellion was putting undue strain on the entire constabulary and threatened adverse cascading effects Philippines. On 21 May 1905, Allen telegraphed the Governor-General and recommended that control of the East and Northeast

Map 9: Force Distribution at the End of Allen’s Campaign (21 May 1905).127

127 Author created. This map is adapted from source maps in RG 395, NARA2. See note 110.
128 RPC, 1905, 30, 91.
Coast of Samar be ceded to the Philippine Division. With the decision to transfer control of a sizable portion of the island to the Army a decisive turn had been made. The Philippine Scouts would perform the lion’s share of the work.

**Organization – The Philippine Scout Battalions.**

Unlike the situation in the first case study, the Philippine Division had been working with native auxiliaries for over six years. With the majority of the archipelago’s provinces under the control of the Philippine Commission and violence, with a few bloody exceptions, far diminished; the Army started to disentangle itself from the business of pacification in regions under the Commission’s control. As the Philippine Commission took on more responsibility for law and order in the islands, the Philippine Division’s focus shifted to concerns for building a mobile force for the overall defense of America’s new colony in Asia. Excepting the Army’s continual administration of the Moros of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, its leadership viewed the role they played in insular security as one supporting the Governor-General. The regular army was a moral force whose mere presence could dissuade armed rebellion; yet a force ideally positioned to deal with insurrection, invasion, or public disorders that swelled beyond the capabilities of the Constabulary. To fulfill its role the Philippine Division began a process called aggregation, the consolidation of its dispersed company-sized outposts into larger regimental or battalion-sized garrison sites. Aside from increased mobility, the consolidation of troops would allow for the reduction of maintenance costs associated with isolated outposts, permit mass instruction and training of troops, and facilitate the maintenance of discipline. Aggregation would influence the evolution of the Philippine Scouts as well.

---

129 Ibid., 5.
130 ARWD, 1904, 237.
The Constabulary officer charged with control of Samar largely dictated the scouts’ organization and role from the initial outbreak of violence until a large portion of the island was relinquished to the Philippine Division in May 1905. The Army’s seeming lack of control over its own auxiliary formation was due to the 30 January 1903 passage of Act 1744, Title 14, a piece of legislation that allowed the placement of companies of Philippine Scouts under the command of officers serving as the chief or assistant chiefs of the Philippine Constabulary. The cash-strapped insular government had lobbied for and successfully secured the passage of this act as a means to augment or increase the size of forces at its disposal by using native units paid and sustained by the Army. All the Governor-General had to do was ask for or request augmentation by scout companies, and the division commander was obligated to support him. This act provided the legal means by which the Philippine Constabulary could rapidly mass enough force to effectively end minor rebellions or outbreaks of lawlessness, without the need to cede control to

---

131 Author Created.

the Army. The scout companies were used to man constabulary outposts, freeing constables to mass on an affected area; sometimes being employed to strengthen or reinforce constabulary patrols. In Samar, the Constabulary’s transfer of over half the island to the Army placed the scouts at the forefront of the pacification effort, an effort in which a new scout formation was employed.

Organizing the Philippine Scouts into battalions was an idea extant almost from their inception, and support for it varied with the personal preferences of each division commander. Support for the collection of scouts into larger formations first gained attention with the impressive demonstration of the “Provisional” Battalion of Philippine Scouts at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition of the 1904 World’s Fair, in St. Louis. On 28 February 1905, War Department General Order 32 re-designated the “Provisional” Battalion as the 1st Battalion Philippine Scouts and ordered that an additional six four-company battalions be organized. Soon thereafter an eighth battalion was also formed. All told, a total of thirty-two of fifty scout companies were combined into battalions, and four of these Philippine Scout Battalions were employed in the pacification of Samar.

**Carter’s Employment of Auxiliaries**

Brigadier General William H. Carter, Commander of the Department of Visayas, having received the necessary authority to act in the subjugation of the Pulajans threat, rapidly set about assuming control of the army’s new area of operations. His task was daunting. Life on the island had been severely dislocated. A large displaced population had abandoned its homes and communities through force or fear. Villages had been attacked and burned. Residents of these communities had been killed, terrorized, robbed, and in some cases relocated to provide forced

---

133 ARWD, 1905, 259.
labor for the Pulajans. Economic activity was stagnant since trade with the interior was disrupted. Additionally, the Pulajans’ success earned them support and additional recruits from the island’s interior, increasing both the size and capabilities of the force Carter’s men would face.

Carter understood the enemy his men faced. The Pulajans had a fairly sophisticated military organization. They had a well-organized intelligence network that provided that allowed them to track the movement of U.S. forces as they moved throughout the island, allowing them to attack or avoid contact based on a determination of relative advantage. The Pulajans’ aggressive use of mass, indifference to casualties, and creative employment of terrain offset their comparative lack of firepower on more than one occasion. Their typical tactic, upon receiving information on the location of an American patrol, was to move to a position along its direction of travel and set up an ambush. Pulajan leaders placed their few riflemen in a position from which to engage the front of the U.S. column, and conceal their bolomen in the tall cogon grass on one or both sides of the trail. Upon siting the head of the column, the riflemen engaged American forces by fire, stopping the column and forcing them to deploy to develop the situation. As the U.S. forces oriented themselves against the rifle fire the bolomen rushed the formation from concealed positions on one or both flanks, minimizing time spent receiving American fire, and rapidly closing to within reach of their deadly bolos. Following either victory or defeat the Pulajans would eventually withdraw to the mountainous interior, a source of security, supply, and recruits. Offensive operations were necessary to defeat the Pulajans, however small patrols proved vulnerable to defeat and large ones ineffective.

Carter did have some key advantages on which he could build. He had roughly 1700 soldiers and 700 scouts already positioned in Samar with more on the way. Thus far the regulars had fulfilled the dual function of protecting the population and supporting operations in the interior. Regular army units were garrisoning bases in a number of coastal population centers and had successfully defended them from the Pulajans for nearly a year. In doing so they kept open
key ports, easily supplied by sea, which could effectively support operations into the interior. However, with few roads, his operations were limited in both scope and duration by the amount of supplies that the regulars or their cagadores, or porters, could carry. Often patrols were limited to five to ten days to defeat the Pulajans he needed to do more than just patrol or hunt down the bands and hope to defeat them in battle, he needed to extend his reach beyond these coastal enclaves, and deny them the sanctuary of the interior. A new operational approach was required to fighting so elusive and enemy in such forbidding terrain.

To extend his reach Carter decided to reoccupy a number of formerly abandoned bases, the majority of which were sited along inland rivers. The manning of upcountry posts served a number of functions. It provided the army with secure bases from which supplies could be stockpiled or stored and allowed for the maintenance of larger bodies of troops further from the coast. It extended the inland reach of the division’s patrols, bringing areas formerly out of the Army’s reach within its sphere of influence. It provided security for new communities, which opened up opportunities for the return of displaced villagers; and increased the depth of the security zone for population centers closer to the coast. The Philippine Scouts were a key to this new approach.

Carter employed his troops in a fairly novel approach. He ordered his subordinates to immediately send a number of strong detachments into the field. He directed that each company-sized detachment be composed of half a company of American and half a company of native troops, roughly fifty of each. He further specified that when a column or detachment returned from the field commanders were to immediately dispatch another, maintaining continuous patrolling in his assigned zone.134 The Philippine Scouts were now set to play a prominent role in

134 Ibid., 263.
every future mission, from minor patrol to full-scale operation, for the remainder of the campaign.

Carter never provided a rationale for the blending of the patrols, though it is likely due to one of three reasons. He may have ordered it as a way to mitigate potential failure owing to an inherent lack of faith in the capabilities of the native soldiers, although under the circumstances this reason seems an unlikely or a minor factor at best. It is possible that he sought to employ native expertise of language and culture with each column. Though this reasoning is harder to discount, and was perhaps a contributing factor, it also seems unlikely as the primary motivation for Carter’s directive. As cited earlier, the army employed scouts far from their tribal or provincial homelands to leverage fear due to tribal animosities, and to avoid the conflicts of interest that would invariably occur when tribal or familial sympathies were involved. As such, the further one removed these regionally or tribally recruited companies of native soldiers from their traditional homes, the less adept they were in facilitating an understanding of the environment. A more likely explanation for the blending of native and American soldiery was simple practicality. May 1905 found the Department of Visayas in the process of conducting a number of administrative moves; the 12th and 14th Infantry Regiments, at the end of their two-year tours, were in the process of being replaced by the 8th and 21st Infantry Regiments respectively. Sending newly arrived, non-acclimated American units on patrols into the bush was unlikely to make an immediate impact, as these formations spent months acquiring the requisite knowledge to effectively combat the Pulajans. The blending of these formations served to provide each detachment or patrol with native soldiers with experience fighting Pulajans over the same terrain, while the American soldiers provided an immediate injection of additional strength and a significant improvement in firepower over the Philippine Constabulary. Regardless of the reasoning, Carter’s methods realized immediate and dramatic results.
On 4 June 1905, in a stroke of incredibly good fortune, one of the Army’s combined detachments located and struck the headquarters section of the Pulajan movement’s most prominent military leader Colonel Enrique Dagojob. Three days prior a combined eighty man detachment from Company E, 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry and the 38th Company Philippine Scouts, accompanied by an constabulary officer and 120 cagadores, departed from Catubig upon receiving intelligence of the whereabouts of Dagojob’s headquarters. The attack achieved complete surprise and struck home shortly after first light. In the ensuing twenty-five minute firefight, the combined force killed Dagojob, three of his principle lieutenants, and ninety-four of his men. The remainder of his estimated 400 men dispersed into the jungle. The after-effects of this skirmish were more far reaching than could have been anticipated.

Dagojob’s band, the largest and most powerful among the Pulajans, fell apart. Some elements struck off on their own as smaller armed bands that would continue their attacks. Surprisingly, several thousand simply surrendered; many of the Army’s erstwhile enemies simply reported to American outposts, which were forced to establish temporary camps to house them until they could safely be returned to their former villages. Village populations saw an increase as villagers who had fled their homes through fear of Pulajan violence, started to return almost immediately after the fight, demonstrating a change in the perception of relative security. By the end of June the frequency of contact with the enemy, as well as the level of violence, in the North and East of Samar had diminished. The U.S. Army had wrestled the initiative from the Pulajans, and would never again relinquish it.

135 ARWD, 1905, 263 and 288-289; Hurley, 238.
137 Hurley, 243.
138 ARWD, 1905, 292.
The Army did not remain idle after its coup. It continued to build its forces as it expanded its control over increasing expanses of Samar’s interior. After a series of repulses in the north and east, the enemy bands started to shift their strength into the southwest of the island. By the end of July 1905, Major General Leonard Wood, Commander of the Philippine Division, reported that the campaign had been “pushed with such vigor that the remaining outlaws were broken up into very small bands.”

Station commanders from army garrisons around the island reported that 4,795 people, including 300 known Pulajan soldiers, had surrendered themselves in order to return to their villages. They estimated an additional one to three thousand more actually returned to their villages. The situation was much improved; however, the majority of Pulajan leaders were still at large and at the head of armed bands. The Army needed to maintain station and continue operations to complete the destruction of the Pulajans and prevent the recovery and resurgence of the threat as had happened after the 1902 campaign.

Carter started his campaign in Samar with sixteen companies of infantry and seven to eight companies of Philippine Scouts. While welcome, these forces were nowhere near enough to bring to heel the smaller and more mobile bands of Pulajans. The only other force on the island, the over eight hundred officers and men of the Philippine Constabulary, were under the orders of the island’s civil governor, George Curry. Their numbers were soon to diminish; with the U.S. Army charged with maintaining security over a majority of the island, Brigadier General Allen rapidly dispersed constabulary companies to deal with threats on other islands. By 15 June 1905, the once powerful constabulary force had been reduced to eight officers and 219 constables.

---


140 Ibid., 258.

141 RPC, 1905, 46-7.
concentrated primarily on five posts. To counter-balance this reduction in overall force, Carter coordinated for, received, and sent reinforcements to Samar. The Philippine Division sent its lightest and most mobile soldiers, Philippine Scouts. From May 1905-July 1906 nine additional scout companies were transferred to Samar, doubling the number of scouts, and placing seventeen of the Army’s fifty scout companies on the Island. The scouts demonstrated the operational flexibility these light, relatively unencumbered units provided to Division and Department Commanders; providing operational commanders the ability to address security concerns while continuing the aggregation American regiments to meet the requirements for the strategic defense of the Islands. On Samar the scouts were put to good use.

The arriving reinforcements were rapidly incorporated to reinforce and extend the operational depth of the outpost network. Carter could not effectively control increasingly complex operations so geographically dispersed across such difficult terrain. Decentralization was the only means of effectively grappling with the threat posed by the Pulajans, and decentralization required the division of Samar into a number of sub-districts and the distribution of a number of subordinate headquarters to control and synchronize operations within and among them. The Philippine Scouts, newly reorganized into battalion-sized organizations, were ideally suited to provide this kind of control and integration. By October 1905, four districts were established by the Department of Visayas: Oras, Borogan, Catubig, and Gandara. The 6th, 1st, and 8th Battalions of Philippine Scouts assumed responsibility for the first three districts. The

---

142 Ibid.
143 1st Lieutenant J. L. Dewitt, acting Military Secretary to Department of Visayas, to Major F.S. Hutton, Commander, 6th Battalion Philippine Scout, dated 23 October 1905, LR 6, RG 395 E 2710 Register of Letters Received October 1905 – October 1906, Department of Visayas, NARA. This letter is directed to Maj. Hutton as commander of 6th P.S. Battalion and the commander of the Oras District. It also mentions Maj. Johnston, commander of the 1st P.S. Scout Battalion, and the commander of the Borogan District. See General Orders 1, dated 15 October 1905, RG 395 E 2713 General Orders, Special Orders, Memos, and Circulars (October 1905 – June 1907), Department of Visayas, NARA; where Maj. Hutton assumes
Map 10: Four Military Districts of Samar (October 1905).\textsuperscript{144} boundaries of the district were not well defined, but they can be roughly estimated on municipal boundaries as in map 10, although they were not designed to be so.\textsuperscript{145} The borders were not command of the Oras District. See also RG 395 E 3073 Records of U.S. Army Overseas Commands, 1899-1942, Division of the Philippines, NARA, the returns from March – April 1906 specify the movement of 8th P.S. Battalion to Camp Hartsborne. Though 8th P.S. Scout Battalion was not in place in October 1905, the district had been created.

\textsuperscript{144} Author created. This map is adapted from source maps in RG 395, NARA2. See note 110.
sacrosanct, merely serving as a focus for operational planning and likely a means of establishing command relationships with local populations, nor did they preclude pursuit of a Pulajan group into another district. These loose, flexible district boundaries, when aligned with a very permissive pursuit policy, allowed for aggressive offensive operations that were perfectly tailored to combat the irregular warfare favored by the Pulajans.

Operations on Samar from May 1905 until June 1906 can be characterized as dispersed, continuous, company-level and below patrolling operations. Even a cursory review of the monthly post returns during this period, which provided an encapsulation of the outpost’s strength and a synopsis of the previous month’s operations, supports this assertion. U.S. Army intelligence collection and operations often focused on tracking down and eliminating key enemy leaders. Each Pulajan leader tracked down and eliminated diminished the threat. Without their leaders all sense of direction and unity evaporated, the bands dispersed, and the soldiers and any supporters or impressed labor returned to their villages. The killing or capturing of their enemies leaders was not the only means by which the U.S. Army could successfully strike at the Pulajans.

The Army’s maintenance and extension of its outpost line served to undermine sources of Pulajan power. As the Army incrementally increased its inland reach, these outposts served as a

---

145 1st Lieutenant J. L. Dewitt, acting Military Secretary to Department of Visayas, to Major F.S. Hutton, Commander, 6th Battalion Philippine Scout, dated 23 October 1905, LR 6, RG 395 E 2710 Register of Letters Received October 1905 – October 1906, Department of Visayas, NARA.

146 RG 395 E 3073 Records of U.S. Army Overseas Commands, 1989-1942, NARA. This records group holds the post returns for all the relevant outposts established in the Philippines during the period of American sovereignty. Each post return provides information on the units, unit strength, casualties, and a summary of the activities conducted by the posts garrison. The study used records from Camp Bean (March – April 1907), Camp Borogan (September 1905 – June 1907), Camp Connell, Gandara (May – September 1905, and March 1906 – February 1907), Camp Llorent (September 1905 – June 1907), Camp Hartsborne (February - April 1905, and March – June 1907), Camp Hayt (October 1905 – November 1907), Camp Mutiong (November 1906 – November 1907), Camp Palapang (July – September 1905). There are far more records available that was sampled for the purposes of this study, and a complete survey of these records would likely yield a more complete history of U.S. Army activities on Samar from 1904 -1907.
base for the continuous work of patrolling, primarily by Philippine Scouts, which deprived their adversaries of both sanctuary and support. The Pulajans could no longer rely on mountain fastness in the interior of the island as a source of security and freedom of movement. American patrols uncovered once secure hidden fields and stockpiled supplies critical to the maintenance of their field forces. Constant active patrolling kept the Pulajan bands reacting. They were unable to rest or reorganize. Recruiting and replenishing losses proved more difficult for organizations that seemed like they were on the run, presenting a serious perceptual problem that had moral effects on Pulajans and would-be supporters. After June 1905, the Pulajans realized few victories that could support a narrative in which they had the upper hand. Engagements resulted in high casualties without demonstrating the ability to overpower even small U.S. formations. The combined effects of Carter’s operational methods rapidly realized significant progress.

The conditions on Samar were so improved that American infantry companies were repositioned. In September 1905 six companies of infantry returned to their former stations from outposts on the north and east of the island.147 October 1905 was so quiet that three more companies were removed, and in November one more was removed as well.148 By January 1906, the Philippine Scout battalions had extended their reach deep into the interior of the island and only three Pulajan bands were estimated to remain.149 Carter believed that peace was near at hand, as did the civil governor of Samar.

Starting in January 1906, George Curry, Samar’s provincial governor, coordinated with the Colonel John W. Bubb, commander of the 21st Infantry Regiment and the new commander of the Department of Visayas to replace the scout garrison at Magtaon with a unit of constables. He

---

147 ARWD, 1906, 259.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
requested that scouts’ patrols near the village cease, and set about trying to encourage these last few remaining bands to surrender. He opened negotiations with Otoy, leader of one of the remaining three bands and soon a date was selected for the bands’ surrender and oath of allegiance. The surrender was a ploy. On 24 March 1906, Otoy’s band of 180 soldiers with eighteen guns entered the village and proceeded to attack the constables who were unprepared to receive them. In beating back the attack, the fifty-one man garrison suffered twenty-three killed, thirteen wounded, and lost twenty guns, and nearly resulted in the death of Governor Curry.\textsuperscript{150} Two detachments of scouts arrived on within the next forty-eight hours to provide relief. The relative peace was shattered, as the reverse suffered at the hands of the Pulajans resulted in two months of attacks, raids, and encounters.

The reaction of the U.S. Army was to reinforce the island with additional troops. Patrolling continued until 19 May, when Bubb, now a Brigadier General, ordered a general movement of all troops and constabulary, excepting those garrisoning Camp Connell. His intent was to locate and destroy the remaining Pulajan bands with these simultaneous, though uncoordinated, patrols.\textsuperscript{151} The results were unremarkable, and on 22 June 1906, the Governor General of the Philippines submitted a formal request to use the Army to put an end to disorder and lawlessness in Samar.\textsuperscript{152}

The Army extended its control over the reminder of Samar. Colonel Frederick A. Smith, commanding the 8th Infantry Regiment, was placed in command of operations on Samar.\textsuperscript{153} The forces at his disposal included the aforementioned seventeen scout companies, and several

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 210, 260.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 261.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 210.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 210-211.
infantry companies. Brigadier General Bubb coordinated with Governor Curry to divide the
country into seven districts. The Army’s existing four districts were given numerical
designations, and the remainder of the island was divided into three additional numbered districts.

---

154 Author created. This map is adapted from source maps in RG 395, NARA2. See note 110.
155 ARWD, 1906, 211.
156 Ibid., 210-211.
Each district was placed under the control of an officer with a force deemed sufficient to hunt down the enemy bands in his district. The Army continued the aggressive patrolling practices used with such success earlier in the campaign.

The campaign wore down the enemy through a campaign of sheer exhaustion. Instructions to district commanders were to focus their operations on preventing the enemy from gathering in large numbers, keeping them moving, finding and destroying their supplies and sources of subsistence, and driving them from their mountain retreats into the valleys where they could be more easily destroyed.\textsuperscript{157} Essentially the army targeted Pulajan logistical infrastructure and eliminate their offensive capabilities. By January 1907, the entire garrison of Samar had been reduced to ten companies. On 23 July 1907, James Francis Smith, Governor General of the Philippines, informed the commander of the Philippine Division that he no longer required the services of the Army on Samar and requested that it cease operations.\textsuperscript{158} In its last months on campaign it forced the surrender of 1200 more Pulajans; only Otoy’s band, estimated to have between twenty and forty men with twenty-five guns, remained at large.\textsuperscript{159} The Philippine Scouts, more than any other organization, provided teeth to the operational approach endorsed by Brig. Gen Carter and his successors.

The scouts, unlike other U.S. Army units limited to a two-year rotation to the Philippines, proved the one constant on Island of Samar. Many units had been on the island for over a year. Six companies, among them the 18\textsuperscript{th}, 35\textsuperscript{th}, 36\textsuperscript{th}, and 37\textsuperscript{th}, arrived as reinforcements shortly after violence erupted in the Gandara Valley in June 1904. The 39\textsuperscript{th} Company of Philippine Scouts had

\textsuperscript{157} War Department, \textit{Reports of Division and Department Commanders, vol. 3, War Department, U.S.A. Annual Reports, 1907} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1907), 265-266.

\textsuperscript{158} War Department, \textit{Reports of Division and Department Commanders, vol. 3, War Department Annual Reports, 1908} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908), 256.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 268.
been on Samar for years. Rather than having to regularly rotate and acclimatize large units to a new operating environment, commanders had a repository of knowledge and experience that could be rapidly exploited by commanders at all levels. These light organizations, with less organizational equipment and with smaller logistical requirements exhibited greater operational mobility than comparably sized American units. Movement whether inter- or intra-island could be effected more rapidly. The rapidity with which the scouts were moved to the disaffected region of Samar demonstrated an appreciation for the operational flexibility these units provided. The successful employment of scouts in establishing and maintaining outposts progressively deeper into Samar’s interior from which to conduct offensive patrolling extended the operational depth at which commanders could project their power. Their final operational employment would demonstrate on a much smaller scale the same traits that made native auxiliaries so advantageous.

**The Battle of Bud Bagsak (1913)**

On 20 August 1899, a little over six months after the start of the Philippine Insurrection, Brigadier General John C. Bates negotiated an agreement with the Moro leadership of the Sulu Archipelago, an island chain extending from the southwest corner of the Philippines. Major General Otis sent Brigadier General Bates to secure American sovereignty over the islands. He had been under the mistaken impression that Spain controlled the Sulu Archipelago and the island of Mindanao, and feared that other powers might attempt to lay claim to these islands while the 8th Corps was occupied in the North. The agreement essentially exchanged a lax acknowledgement of American sovereignty by the Moros for an annual indemnity to certain key leaders. This agreement maintained the peace at little cost in manpower and money to the United

---


68
States; but the peace did not last long. On 2 May 1902, at the Battle of Bayan, the first battle in a sporadic eleven-year conflict with the inhabitants of what became known as Moroland.161

Map 12: The Department of Mindanao.162

The Moros were the Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Traditionally the Sultan of Sulu, a man capable of tracing his lineage back to the prophet Mohammed, was at the apex of Moro society. The Sultan, though he was still a wealthy and religiously significant figure, no longer had the political or military power to impose his will. The power of the Sultan had been on the wane for several generations, the datus increasing their power at his expense. The Datus, politically and militarily powerful local chieftains, that ruled territories as small as villages or as large as islands; they were the real power brokers in Moroland. They The Moros belonged to a hierarchical, almost feudal society. A traditionalist

161 Fulton, 1.
162 Author created. This map is adapted from Hurley, 164.
people who adhered to the dictates of sharia law, a legal code that allowed both polygamy and the ownership of slaves, the populace viewed any legal codes that tried to supersede sharia as a threat to their customs and their faith. The post Civil War United States could not tolerate either slavery or polygamy for long. Other problems included poverty, disease, attacks on soldiers, theft of army property, raiding and lawlessness sponsored local datus, and a refusal to be taxed. As their troubles north of Mindanao subsided, American civil and military leaders began progressively expanding the control they tried to impose in the Moro areas.

The official establishment of the Moro province by the Philippine Commission, on 1 June 1903, was the U.S. Government’s second effort to increase control. This focus brought with it the implementation of a number of unwelcome progressive ideas, along with attempts to impose laws consistent with American mores. While these policies proved both popular and successful in the north, American attempts to assimilate and modernize the Moros were perceived as attempts to subvert Islamic teachings and as a way of striking at datu power. These American programs repeatedly served as a rallying cry for any datu wishing to flout U.S. sovereignty. The move for increased control marked the true beginning of this period of intermittent warfare that comprised the ill-named Moro Wars.

The security threats in the Moro regions were primarily composed of brigandage, ambushes, small level raids leveled primarily at their Christian neighbors or wealthy coastal communities, and on occasion piracy. This lower level warfare was an acceptable means of increasing prestige, honor, and power, as well as being a rapid method of increasing one’s treasure, goods, or slaves. The Philippine Division was obligated to protect its new insular communities from these depredations and over time with the enforcement of the U.S. legal code.

Progressive ideas like the imposition of democratic institutions, public education (including the education of women), free market capitalism, taxation, monogamy, and the abolition of slavery were deemed threats to the Moro culture, Islam, and the traditional power structure.
The typical result was that the currently assigned Military Governor of the Department of Mindanao, or one of his subordinates, demanded that the offending datu(s) cease this activity and comply with U.S. laws. Compliance, however, was often met by refusal and armed resistance. The Army then organized a small force to compel compliance at sword point. As the column marched into the territory controlled by the local datu, Moros attacked its columns in small ambushes and with sniping. As the column approached closer to the datu’s seat of power it might face increasing resistance by larger bodies of warriors defending entrenchments or fortified outposts. Outclassed in both discipline and firepower, these fierce warriors would retreat to the cotta, a sophisticated fortification made of earth, brick, and bamboo. These castle-like structures included primitive muzzle-loading cannon and loopholes for defensive small arms fire where the Moros usually conducted their last stand. The column would typically use artillery and machinegun fire to reduce the structure, waiting until return fire had significantly diminished to order a general assault. The infantry would eliminate all resistance, which, due to a cultural aversion to surrender, usually entailed the killing every able-bodied man including the offending datu. The death of the noncompliant datu(s) ended the campaign, which were characteristically short, sharp, and, for the Moros, quite bloody affairs. The demonstration of American power, usually stifled large-scale resistance and held down unrest for a time. The operations conducted during the Lake Lanao campaigns (1901), the Battle of Bud Dajo (1906), and the second Battle of Bud Dajo (1911) were all fairly consistent with this type of activity. Brigadier General John J. Pershing’s assignment as the Military Governor of the Department of Mindanao set in motion the final confrontation between the U.S. Army and the Moros, and was the last time the U.S. Army would employ its native auxiliaries in pacification efforts.
Unrest started to flare up in 1910. The Moros, frustrated by the latest attempts at the imposition of foreign values, started attacking soldiers and constables. The targets were often the officers of these organizations. The attackers, or *juramentados*, were religiously motivated individuals or small groups, determined to trade their lives in suicide attacks. *Juramentados* were not affiliated to, nor could they be traced back to any leader or group. Brigadier General Pershing, unable to prevent attacks by conventional means, and without the ability to target an offending group or leader, issued a disarmament order on 8 September 1911. General Order No. 24 banned the ownership of firearms or other deadly weapons, including traditional native edged weapons with which the Moros were so deadly proficient. Unless issued a permit to carry a weapon all Moros were to turn in their weapons prior to 1 December 1911 or see them confiscated after that date. Pershing had arranged for the U.S. government to pay for all weapons turned in prior to the given deadline. After the prescribed date Pershing’s troops and Constabulary forces assigned to Moro communities, would begin confiscating weapons. The Moros chose to resist.

**Organization of the Auxiliaries for the Campaign**

Despite the consolidation of most scout companies into tribally aligned battalions by the close of the Samar campaigns, the U.S. Army’s last operational employment of the scouts would not avail itself of these new organizations. It would instead rely upon companies of Philippine Scouts. Pershing’s campaign required both speed and secrecy, and limited him to forces in the

---

164 San Gabriel, 166.
165 Ibid., 168.
167 Feuer, 229.
168 Ibid.
immediate vicinity of Jolo. Pershing built an ad hoc force of three columns, composed of seven companies of Philippine Scouts, one company of the 8th U.S. Infantry Regiment, and a detachment from of the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment. All told, the force numbered no more than 1,200 men. The force Pershing task-organized proved adequate to meet operational needs. Despite the campaign’s short duration it once again demonstrated that the scouts provided the commander with options for the flexible employment of combat power, and an ability to employ those forces to attack the enemy’s depth.

Figure 5: Pershing’s Task Organization at Bud Bagsak.

Feuer, 232; Fulton, 427. Sources vary as to the overall size of the field force employed to isolate and later assault Bud Bagsak; further sources also vary as to the size and unit designation of the force from the 8th Cavalry regiment. Robert Fulton, whose treatment of the Moro campaign is the most thorough to date, states that only the demolitions squad accompanied the field force. This detachment employed the latest in infantry weaponry, the hand grenade, and was kept in reserve with the 21st Philippine Scouts.

Author created.
Pershing’s Employment of Auxiliaries

The Moros’ first attempt at resisting American demands for disarmament was made only three-and-a-half months after Pershing’s decree, at a cotta on mount Bud Dajo. Pershing, not wishing a repeat of the 1906 Battle of Bud Dajo, and the resultant killing of large numbers of innocent women and children, decided to court patience in resolving the situation. After the Moros rebuffed Pershing’s attempts at negotiation, he ordered the mountain surrounded and then assaulted by a force comprised of a mix of U.S. Army, Philippine Scout, and Constabulary units. On 26 December 1911, at what came to be known as the Second Battle of Bud Dajo, the Moros led by Datu Jailani, largely surrendered following an eight day siege and two-days of relatively light fighting. After Bud Dajo disarmament progressed with little violence, and by the end of the 1912, excepting only a few areas on Jolo, it was largely complete.

On Jolo the largest pocket of resistance remaining was centered in Taglibi, in the Lati ward. The Lati tribe was estimated to have over 300 rifles and numerous edged weapons. Civil government agents sent to Taglibi were repeatedly spurned and on 12 January 1913, Datu Amil, leader of the resistance movement, sent a response to “tell the soldiers to come and fight.” On 23 January 1913, Colonel Eben Swift, commander of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, sent a column included both Philippine Scouts and Constabulary to Datu Sahip’s cotta, near Taglibi. Datu Amil was believed to be there. After soliciting the surrender of the small fortress and being rebuffed, it was assaulted twice and taken with heavy casualties. The response to the attack was almost immediately. Days later eight juramentados attacked Camp Severs, also near

---

171 Fulton, 419.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
Taglibi, killing one and wounding five. Attacks could be dealt with fairly easily, but one response caused quite a bit of consternation for Pershing. Between six and ten thousand natives; men, women, and children fled to and fortified an extinct volcano called Bud Bagsak.  

The Lati tribe, occupying a central position that composed of roughly one twelfth of the island’s landmass, refused to surrender their weapons. The relocation of the bulk of the tribe to Bud Bagsak put Pershing in a quandary. The specter of the original Battle of Bud Dajo was never far from his thoughts. Pershing, concerned about large casualties among women and children, tried negotiation instead of arms. The Moros, needing to plant before it was too late in the season were brought to the table. An agreement was reached in March 1913, in which the U.S. Army would pull out of the Lati ward and the Moros would lay down their arms and return home. The U.S. Army left the district as promised; the Moros never intended to follow through.

After the March agreement all Lati women, children, and most of the men had relocated to the villages. The constabulary soon confiscated the arms of those that had returned to the villages. By May, only a small group of militants entrenched on Bud Bagsak remained armed and Datu Amil made it clear that they would not disarm. Pershing, like many army leaders, was haunted by the specter of Bud Dajo. He believed that any U.S. Army move against Bud Bagsak would trigger the mass flight of the Lati to the mountain cottas, as they had previously

---

175 Ibid.  
176 Fulton, 424-425; Feuer, 229.  
177 Arnold, 230.  
178 Fulton, 424.  
179 Feuer, 229.  
180 Fulton, 426.  
181 Ibid., 426-7.
done, virtually guaranteeing high casualties among women and children in any assault, unless he could somehow prevent their flight by concealing his advance. Pershing planned just such an approach.

Map 13: Location of U.S. Units in Vicinity of the Island of Jolo (June 1913).  

Pershing, without a direct means of minimizing civilian casualties while coming to grips with Datu Amil’s men on Bad Bagsak, employed deception to enable an approach. On 5 June, Pershing called off all field operations and reconnaissance patrols in the Islands of the Sulu Archipelago.  

On 9 June, dispatched a cable to all commands, and disclosed to the Moros, that he was leaving to visit his family near Lake Lanao.  

Pershing left Jolo that evening on the transport Wright. The story he planted masked his true destinations. After Wright left the island it changed course to pick up two companies of Philippine Scouts, the 51st Company on Basilan.
Island on 9 June 1913 and the 52nd Company from Siasi at noon on 10 June 1913. At 2000 hours Wright returned to Jolo. Pershing sent his aide Lieutenant Lawton Collins with orders for Jolo’s Garrison commander, while additional transport was being collected in the harbor. Collins soon tracked down his quarry. The garrison commander was at his residence entertaining his officers and their wives. The attack would commence the next day.

That night Pershing, with his officers and men assembled, divided his force into three. He ordered M Company, 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, and a hospital corps detachment to join the 51st and 52nd Moro Companies of Philippine Scouts aboard Wright. The 21st, 28th, and 40th Companies of Philippine Scouts and two mountain gun batteries were ordered aboard the shipping recently collected in preparation for an amphibious landing at Bun Bun. Prior to departing at 1 a.m., 11 June 1913, Pershing dispatched two columns to march east on a moonless, rain-drenched night. One column, led by Lieutenant John Sayles, was composed of a fifty man cavalry troop, pack trains, and a mountain gun to link-up with the amphibious element at Bun Bun roughly 25-miles to the east. At 0530, Sayles’ column linked up with the amphibious force that landed unopposed at Bun Bun two hours prior. Captain Patrick Moylan led a column composed of the 24th and 31st Companies of Philippines Scouts, and a mountain gun detachment on a twenty-mile march along mountain trails to arrive in position south of Bad Bugsak, at 0715. The force at Bun Bun, was organized into two columns for the final three-and-a-half

---

185 Fulton, 427; Feuer, 229.
186 Feuer, 231.
187 Feuer, 231.
188 Feuer, 231. The source states the rank as Lieutenant, but does not specify whether he was a First or Second Lieutenant.
189 Feuer, 231; Fulton, 427.
190 Feuer, 231.
mile march from the north. One, under Major George C. Shaw, composed of a mountain gun detachment, the 40th Company of Philippine Scouts, and Company M of the 8th Infantry Regiment, attacked and seized cotta Langunsuan, on the northern approach to Bud Bagsak, at roughly the same time that Moylan’s column approached from the south. Shaw attack sealed ensured that Bud Bagsak was sealed off with no civilians able to get in and no warriors leaving.

Map 14: Avenues of Approach Taken by Pershing’s Field Force (11 June 1913).

Pershing’s plan was inspired. He organized and arrayed his forces to attack his enemy in depth. Through guile Pershing had stolen a march on his enemy, and in doing so segregated the warriors from women and children. His forces, all capable of rapid movement over land and clearly capable of amphibious operations provided him with flexible options for the application of

---

191 Ibid.
192 Author created. This map was adapted from “Map of Sulu Archipelago,” by Philippine Department of Public Works, dated June 30, 1917, RG 395 (Philippine Division before 1915), NARA2.
combat power. Ultimately Pershing’s sequencing of tactical actions allowed him resolve the issue as he saw fit. Pershing’s reduction of the five cottas that comprised the defenses at Bud Bagsak took five-days to complete, and resulted in 200-300 Moro dead. It ended the last major resistance to U.S. government control in the Philippines and marked the last occasion in which the U.S. Army and their Philippine Scouts would be employed in pacification.

Conclusion

The Treaty of Paris set in motion a series of events that led to a mass employment of native auxiliaries in ways that diverged from American the frontier experience. Despite the inferences the name scout might convey, commanders more often employed them in direct combat roles alongside U.S. Army or Philippine Constabulary units than as intelligence gathers. Even the Constabulary themselves were more often employed in a more offensive capacity than in a policing function. The employment of these auxiliaries in these roles was in response to practical necessities caused by rapid demobilization at the close of the war.

Beyond simply ending the war, the peace treaty held power symbolic meaning for the American public. It informed the expectation that their husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers would soon return home after a job well done. The trouble in the Philippines, while an unanticipated and emergent situation, was not a problem that concerned the state volunteers know as the “boys of 98,” their families, or the politicians representing them. The volunteers signed up to fight the Spain, and with Spain now vanquished they expected to return home. The longer the delay and the more casualties mounted in the Far East, the more political pressure would limit and potential curtail operations. Military leaders were rightly concerned with potentially detrimental effects to their ability to establish American sovereignty over its newly won prize. The American creation of native auxiliary forces and their mass employment in the Philippines helped to alleviate some of those pressures, and sped the process of pacification.
This treatment of native auxiliaries has examined three case studies that encapsulate the entire early period of the American occupation of the Philippines. The years 1899-1913 saw the large-scale resistance to American rule decline and finally collapse. By 1913, the civil government of the Philippines was able to maintain law and order without the U.S. Army’s assistance, which would henceforth focus on training, discipline, and the defense of the Philippines from foreign powers. These three case studies examine instances of the mass employment of native auxiliaries at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of this time period. Each of them demonstrates several common themes: that natives were used relatively interchangeably with U.S. Army infantry and cavalry units, that native auxiliaries’ mobility increased the operational depth at which the enemy could be attacked, and that native provided commanders with increased tactical and operational flexibility. The first theme is a precondition for the realization of the operational depth and flexibility.

Scouts did relatively little scouting, and the constables were employed in what can be better described as small scale offensive patrolling. Army leaders employed these units, when available, to offset manpower shortages. By the end of the fall campaign Batson’s Macabebes, though they were employed to conduct reconnaissance patrols throughout, were employed as very mobile light infantry, being assigned to attack objectives in their own right. In Samar, Philippine Scout companies garrisoned outposts and conducted offensive patrolling operations, no different than any other U.S. infantry unit. Further, the new battalion organizations were employed to exercise command and control over entire districts. In Jolo, the scouts were employed as the mainstay of a force that surrounded and then assaulted a network of mutually supporting fortifications. Interchangeability to some extent allowed for flexibility at tactical, operational, and strategic levels of planning.

Flexibility at the tactical was important, but it proved critical for operational level leaders at the Philippines. Batson’s rapid movement allowed Major General Lawton and Brigadier
General Young to maneuver around the flanks of the and rear of enemy defensive positions and launch attacks deep behind enemy front lines, forcing a general retreat of the Army of Liberation, and almost capturing Aguinaldo. The case study on Samar demonstrates other factors that had implications for flexibility at both the operational and strategic level. The ability to maintain scouts on station longer than U.S. Army units also allowed commanders to maintain pressure on the enemy and maintain operational tempo free from the implications of redeployment rotation schedules. Scouts also freed U.S. Army units for defense of the islands. In Jolo, after U.S. Army units had been pulled for aggregation at larger, strategically important posts, the scouts provided the majority of the troops available for use. Their knowledge of local terrain facilitated and mobility created options that would have been unavailable to Brigadier General Pershing had he waited to bring in a larger contingent of U.S. soldiers. Their light equipage, mobility, and long term service in the Philippines created options for commanders; they also increased their commanders’ reach.\textsuperscript{193}

Operational depth had a decisive impact that increased the tempo at which campaign objectives could be achieved. The operational depth provided by scouts was more than mere distance on a map. During Lawton’s campaign, the recruitment of Macabebe’s resulted in a solid bond between the U.S. Army and the tribe created by the ties between individual scouts and their family members and tribesmen. This secured the loyalty of the population of a significant region in the province of Pampanga that lay astride U.S. Army lines of communication between the front lines and Manila. In Samar, scout battalions were employed to extend American control of from the costal garrisons progressively deeper into the interior of the island. In Jolo, the scouts were launched along two separate avenues of approach, covering over 20-miles in hours of limited

\textsuperscript{193} American regiments were limited to two-year tours in the Philippines, whereas the Philippine Scouts never left, and were rotated to new stations every four years.
visibility to surround Bud Bagsak, preventing the flight of civilians to the fortified mountain, and setting the conditions for the assault. Auxiliary formations allowed imposition of control over the Philippines far faster than could have been achieved by American soldiers alone.

During these years the U.S. Army increased its reliance on native auxiliaries. The maintenance of a large troop commitment for an extended period was politically impossible. The budget, the Army’s end strength, domestic mission requirements, and international strategic concerns all vied with the Philippines for limited manpower. U.S. regiments’ limitations to two-year overseas rotations proved to be a further constraint for military planners. Native auxiliaries alleviated some of these administrative and strength concerns. They provided U.S. Army theater and operational commanders with an inexpensive source of readily available manpower that they controlled, a force that could be employed against trouble spots over much longer time horizons than the more limited rotations of U.S. Army units allowed. Their utility in American pacification efforts is beyond dispute, however, a definitive history of the operational employment of native auxiliaries has yet to be written and more research still needs to be done. These issues were not unique to the early 20th Century, and are a perpetual concern of military planners.

Today, the U.S. Army faces budgetary constraints that require the reduction of the force structure while still maintaining its ability to fight and win America’s wars. In light of recent killings of American soldiers at the hands of U.S. trained Afghan soldiers, native auxiliaries under control of American leaders may be a more viable alternative. The native scouts, modeled after their Filipino forbearers, might prove to be a more practical approach, providing an expedient, cost-effective alternative to meet theater or operational requirements in the future. Certainly it is worth additional study.
APPENDIX A – Bullard’s Pacification

Definition: All means short of actual war, used by the dominating power in the operation of bringing back to a state of peace and order the inhabitants of a district lately in hostilities.
- Not conquest, though in the last stage of conquest
- Judicious mixture of force and persuasion
- Involves the putting of people on good terms with the pacifying power, and other population groups.

Soldiers is the most Logical tool to implement Pacification, because:
- Unlike battle, regularly ends the work of war
- Requires discipline, obedience, and uniform action
- Unpopular among locals, requires force – soldiers are best used to execute
- Regular Army and Officers will do the hard work; volunteers will rapidly muster out
- Consent of the governed
- Freedom of public discussion/liberty of thought
- Inferiority of those under pacification

Incidents to be expected during pacification (will cause problems for pacifying authorities):
- Criticism or opposition of friends
- Money and graft scandals
- Obstructiveness of people under pacification
- Secret societies

Questions arising during pacification (critical parts of lives of pacified peoples, Must be handled without blundering):
- Should news papers be suppressed?
- Should religious customs or institution be interfered with? (Know and prevent offense of religious sensibilities of the country)
- Should possession of arms, badges, or uniforms be authorized?

Means and aids (tools of the pacifying authority):
- Study. Knowledge of the people is essential
- Sympathy. Be sympathetic to plight of people and their feeling of humiliation felt by the populace.
- Patience
- Knowledge of language and dialects.
- Medicine. Use medicine and medical infrastructure to alleviate the suffering of the population and to garner support.
- Forceful means.
  - Punitive expeditions
  - Provost Courts
  - Military commissions
  - Courts Martial
  - Reconcentration

Avoid:
- Too much gentleness, too little force
- Assumption that all peoples have genius/desire for self government.
- Employing passionate measures
- The fail of education
- Sudden radical change of laws or customs
- Underestimation of popular power of poetry and sentiment
- Frequent changes of troops and officers

Effects of Pacification:
- Makes population secretive, evasive, and lying toward dominating power
- Pacification unifies and nationalizes a people.

---

Glossary

Banca – Canoe-like boats capable of carrying between four and six men with their weapons and rations or a smaller number with a small amount of cargo.

Barrio. Neighborhood.

Campaign. A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (ADRP 1-02).

Cargadores. Native Filipino, or in some cases ethnic Chinese, Porters that carried cargo or supplies on their backs. In Samar they were part of every patrol or column.

Cascoe. A two-masted boat, larger than banca, and capable of carrying cargo.

Cotta. A sophisticated fortification made of earth, brick, and bamboo. These defensive works could vary in size from small outposts to large castle-like structures that could hold several hundred men.

Counterinsurgency (COIN). Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (JP 1-02)

Datu. A politically and militarily powerful local chieftain that ruled a territory as small as village or as large as island. That had powers that could be likened to those of a feudal lord.

Depth. The extension of operations in space, time, and purpose. (ADP 3-0)

Flexibility. The versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations. (ADP 3-0)

Insurgency. The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.

Juramentados. Religiously motivated individuals or small groups, determined to trade their lives in suicide attacks.

Ladrones. Bands of brigands or bandits, sometimes organized and controlled by a influential or powerful local leader. They were a criminal element that caused significant unrest and on occasion terrorized local inhabitants.

Mission Command. The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. (JP 1-02)

Mission Type Order. An order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. An order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (JP 1-02)

Operation. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1-02)
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS AND DOCUMENTS

Department of the Army. *Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02 Operational Terms and Military Symbols*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 2012.


War Department. Annual Reports of the War Department, 1899-1900, and 1904-1908.


U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA.

Matthew A. Batson Papers.

Samuel B.M. Young Papers.

US GOVERNMENT RECORDS GROUPS, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, WASHINGTON DC.


PRIMARY SOURCES


**SECONDARY SOURCES**


THESES and DISSERTATIONS


JOURNAL ARTICLES


