Domestic and Expeditionary Readiness in the Twenty-First Century: Maintaining an Operationalized Army National Guard

A Monograph
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Domestic and Expeditionary Readiness in the Twenty-First Century: Maintaining an Operationalized Army National Guard

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The Army National Guard formed the basis of America's expeditionary capability until the Congress approved maintaining a standing army following World War II. During the interim period, the Department of Defense classified the Army National Guard as a strategic reserve force. In 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive to change the Army National Guard to an operational force, effectively changing the strategy for how the Army incorporated the Army National Guard into the Total Force. This monograph examined the historical context for the establishment of the Army National Guard and used examples of how the operational environment influenced the integration of the Army National Guard as a component of the Total Force. The methodology included reviews of Congressional reports and testimony, journal articles, and other published works. The findings included the identification of disparities between strategic readiness requirements and operational readiness levels. Findings also included the identification of deficiencies in preparedness for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) within the Army National Guard and Department of Defense.
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Abstract

DOMESTIC AND EXPEDITIONARY READINESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: MAINTAINING AN OPERATIONALIZED ARMY NATIONAL GUARD by MAJ Franklin L. Jones, Kentucky Army National Guard, 50 pages.

The Army National Guard formed the basis of America’s expeditionary capability until the Congress approved maintaining a standing army following World War II. During the interim period, the Department of Defense classified the Army National Guard as a strategic reserve force. In 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive to change the Army National Guard to an operational force, effectively changing the strategy for how the Army incorporated the Army National Guard into the Total Force. This monograph examined the historical context for the establishment of the Army National Guard and used examples of how the operational environment influenced the integration of the Army National Guard as a component of the Total Force. The methodology included reviews of Congressional reports and testimony, journal articles, and other published works. The findings included the identification of disparities between strategic readiness requirements and operational readiness levels. The findings also included the identification of deficiencies in preparedness for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) within the Army National Guard and Department of Defense.
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Introduction

The legend of the Minuteman and his role in the America’s defense have been the hallmark of a force composed of men and women who served at a moment’s notice when called upon by their state or country. Although yesterday’s plow and musket have been replaced by the breadth of American ingenuity and an M-4 carbine, the same still holds true – no matter the disaster or threat, citizen-soldiers stand ready to answer that call. In today’s financially-constrained environment however, the challenges faced by the United States Army National Guard and the considerations for its future use are under critical scrutiny as America transitions into the first post-war period of the twenty-first century. A critical question sits restlessly on the minds of America’s most senior military leadership as the United States prepares to transition from combat operations in Afghanistan. What role will the Army National Guard play in the National Defense Strategy when the United States is not actively engaged in major combat operations? This monograph provides an analysis on how the Secretary of Defense’s decision to change the Reserve Component, specifically the Army National Guard, to an operational force may shape employment opportunities for the Army National Guard in a post-war environment.1

The decision to categorize the Army National Guard as an operational force influenced changes in equipping and training Army National Guard units for immediate use in an operational environment. The operational environment required unsustainable increases in deployment cycles for an under resourced Army National Guard previously not designed to serve as an operational force. Simultaneously, the Army focused efforts on transformation initiatives to “modularize, rebalance, and stabilize” the total force.2 The operational tempo for the Army National Guard and the exacerbated readiness that stemmed from tiered deployment models helped set the conditions for the Army National Guard to balance on the

1 Joint Publication 1-02 defined the Reserve Component as consisting of the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve.

brink of culmination.\textsuperscript{3} The Department of the Army introduced the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) as a system to accomplish two essential tasks: to facilitate transformation to modularity, and to stabilize the total force.\textsuperscript{4} While the ARFORGEN model stabilized the operational tempo for the Army National Guard in support of contingency operations, the lingering absence of a cohesive plan for integrating the Army National Guard as an operational force beyond current contingency operations continues to elude senior officials.\textsuperscript{5} As deployments in support of contingency operations continue to decline, senior leaders will have to make recommendations either for the future employment of the Army National Guard as an operational force or for reversion of the Army National Guard to America’s pre-9/11 strategic reserve. This monograph constructs an argument that favors maintaining the Army National Guard as an operational force in a post-war environment to support its use domestically and internationally. The research began with the study of the Army National Guard as a strategic reserve and identifying the inherent contingency planning considerations for the Departments of Defense and the Army. The research then transitioned to analyzing the influence of the “contemporary operating environment” and the operational requirements on decisions to change the Army National Guard to an operational force. Lastly, the synthesis of the information identified throughout the course of research led to recommendations for integrating the Army National Guard’s role as a member of the Department of Defense and maintaining the Army National Guard as an operational force in a post-war environment. The methodology for developing these arguments included reviews of reports from Congressional committees, commissions, testimonies, United States Code and other official reports from senior leaders as primary sources. Additional sources include other materials published through the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, as well as other Senior Service Colleges.


\textsuperscript{5} GAO,\textit{ Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges}, 18.
Research supports the perspective that senior leaders, both civilian and military, are committed to maintaining the Army National Guard as an operational force beyond today’s contingency-rich environment. Given this commitment, the challenge for senior leaders becomes identifying the most effective manner of maintaining the Army National Guard as an operational force in an environment transitioning out of contingency operations such as Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. The majority of related published works addressed many of the concerns and considerations on preventing a reversion of the Army National Guard to use as a strategic reserve. However, those works are limited, as they did not provide a viable summation of how to articulate a set of solutions for how to incorporate an operational Army National Guard force into a “non-contingency” environment.
The Evolution of the Army National Guard

The Army National Guard has been an integral part of the defense of the United States since 1636, and at its core has always been the “citizen-soldier.” The Massachusetts General Court ordered the establishment of the first Colonial militia on December 13, 1636 for use in the defense of British territories in Colonial America. Over the course of the decades to follow, each of the remaining colonies, with the exception of Pennsylvania, ordered a similar formation. Pennsylvania eventually approved the establishment of a State militia after the turn of the eighteenth century. The purpose of each of the militias was to provide a near-immediate armed response against Native American attacks on the colonies by mobilizing its able-bodied male citizens. The American Revolutionary War gave birth to the establishment of the first Continental Army, led by General George Washington. The Continental Army, augmented by volunteer regiments of the States’ militias, fought against regiments of the British Regular Army. Several weeks after the Peace of Paris and the end of hostilities between British soldiers and the Continental Army, the newly formed United States Congress moved to disband the Continental Army and return the United States to the protection of the States’ militia. This process set the conditions for how the United States continued to employ States’ militias and the United States Armed Forces through the 1940s. It also served as a basis for arguments in favor of incorporating the Army National Guard into the national defense strategy.

Before the United States maintained a permanent standing army, the States’ militias compromised most of America’s national defense response and much of the continuity required to support call-ups for

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7 Ibid., 5.
8 Ibid., 16.
9 The United States Congress enacted Title 10 United States Code in August 1956 to codify the Armed Forces of the United States. “Armed Forces” includes all active duty and reserves of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force with the exception of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. The United States Congress chose to codify the National Guard of the United States under a separate law: Title 32 United States Code. As it pertains to law, this monograph will refer to both the “Armed Forces” and the “National Guard” in their capacities pursuant to 10 U.S.C. or 32 U.S.C. respectively. Otherwise, this monograph will only refer to the Army and the Army National Guard.
mobilizations and conscription to Federal service.10 Because the United States Congress did not authorize a large, standing army and appropriate funds to support one, America’s “first responders” to national security threats were the volunteer regiments and divisions from the States’ militias. Members of the militias provided their own personal equipment, muskets, and clothing during periods of mobilizations, which created challenges in uniformity across the military. As the colonies mobilized their militias, the Federal government either maintained the expectation that the colonies would equally equip their regiments, to which most colonies chose to forego equipping their regiments entirely, or quickly abandoned their efforts to equip regiments due to the lack of military stores.11

The Militia Act of 1792 initially established the precedent for the official organization of States’ militia. According to the Act, each State, at its discretion, could organize a militia for service in defense of its territories and public interests. The President of the United States could, in response to invading forces or under the imminent threat thereof, call militias into Federal service for a period of not more than two years. The greatest challenge facing the Federal government employing militia regiments in the absence of a standing Army, however, was the fact that sponsoring States independently controlled each regiment. If Governors were opposed to releasing their volunteer regiments, the Federal government did not have the legal capacity to effect the decision. Additionally, the militia regiments were composed of unskilled light Infantry, and the absence of standardized training created challenges for integrating militias into regular Army formations.12 The political disparity between federalism and state sovereignty contributed as a factor leading to the American Civil War. During the Civil War, Congress passed the Militia Act of 1862, which authorized the President to call as many as 300,000 personnel serving as


12 Ibid., 22.
militia from the states to augment the Federal army.\textsuperscript{13} In response to the necessity for increasing military force pools, Congress passed the Enrollment Act in 1863, thereby establishing a system for a national draft.\textsuperscript{14} One of the most important Congressional Acts pertaining to the National Guard, the Military Act of 1903, set the conditions to alleviate that challenge.\textsuperscript{15}

The Military Act of 1903, commonly referred to as the “Dick Militia Act,” and named after U.S. Congressman Charles Dick of Ohio, codified the role of each States’ militia through a complete legislative overhaul and defined its subsequent responsibilities as prescribed under the authorities of the President of the United States and the United States Congress. The Act formally redesignated the States’ militias as the “National Guard” and set the precedent for what would become the basis for Title 32 United States Code (U.S.C.).\textsuperscript{16} Inclusive of the reform, the Dick Militia Act codified personnel and training responsibilities for each State and territory in addition to the equipping and funding responsibilities for the Federal government as it related to the National Guard. Prior to the Dick Militia Act, National Guardsmen literally served in a volunteer status. Congressional and the States’ Legislative appropriations did not compensate service members for their service, and, in fact, members were often required to pay dues to the unit and to purchase their own uniforms. Senator Dick’s Act changed those practices and added requirements for training and equipping National Guard units. It further required National Guard units to conduct “maneuvers” with the active Army and receive training assistance from Federal Soldiers.\textsuperscript{17} In all, the Dick Militia Act made each volunteer regiment dependent on Federal oversight and funding and, in turn, gave the Federal government the legal authority to direct the employment of each volunteer echelon.

\textsuperscript{13} Griffith, Jr., \textit{The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974}, 5.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 53.
\textsuperscript{16} Codifying regulations for the National Guard under United States Code established the basis, or positive statutory authority, for Federal funding and all programs related to manning, equipping and maintaining the Army (and later the Air) National Guard as a component of the military instrument of national power. 32 U.S.C. authorizes all program funding and appropriations related to the National Guard.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 53.
Prior to World War II, America’s military force was composed primarily of States’ militias. With the exception of a Navy, colonial apprehensions against a standing military prevented Congressional authorizations to fund appropriations to support a standing army, thus the resulting national defense strategies mustered Federal units into service and mobilized National Guard units to active duty in support of contingency operations as needed.\textsuperscript{18} America’s dependence on conscription created challenges for the Wilson administration as the United States pressed toward involvement during the First World War. Recruiting initiatives for Federal service were not producing an adequate source of soldiers, and commitments for National Guard units during a crisis along the Mexican border highlighted a need for change. As the United States entered World War I, Congress, therefore, passed the Selective Service Act of 1917. The national draft authorized under the Selective Service Act supplied 2,810,296 men to the Armed Forces, fulfilling sixty-seven percent of the force requirements for the military.\textsuperscript{19} The Selective Service Act solidified America’s dependency on conscription as a means to grow the total force rapidly in response to crises and contingencies.

Following the First World War, the Senate and House Military Affairs Committees held hearings on national defense proposals in 1919-20. Recommendations from General John Pershing’s planning staff proposed arguments for maintaining a small standing Army and a large militia of citizen-soldiers.\textsuperscript{20} The National Defense Act of 1920 emerged from the Congressional hearings and included comprehensive changes for the military. One of the most critical changes included in the Act established uniformity in training and professional standards across the military, including the Army National Guard.\textsuperscript{21} The National Defense Act of 1920 included legislation that authorized the War Department to plan for

\textsuperscript{18} Griffith, Jr., \textit{The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974}, 6.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{20} Kreidberg and Henry, \textit{Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212}, 378.
national defense and authorized the use of all military forces in the execution of defense plans.\textsuperscript{22} The Act also assigned mobilization responsibilities to both the Assistant Secretary of War and the Army Chief of Staff, specifically placing the responsibility for procurement with the Assistant Secretary of War and a means to facilitate readiness during the mobilization process.\textsuperscript{23} The War Department continued basing mobilization readiness on the availability of volunteer regiments, with conscription augmentees assessed under the selective service law.\textsuperscript{24}

Throughout the course of operations during World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt ordered more than 400,000 citizen-soldiers to active duty. President Harry Truman, likewise, approved the mobilization of another 1,000,000 citizen-soldiers to support operations in Korea.\textsuperscript{25} The Truman, and subsequently, the Eisenhower administration, however, recognized an important change in the security environment due to the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{26} With the adoption of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress established the Departments of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force in addition to other agencies deemed necessary for national security under the Eisenhower administration. This period marked a critical event in America’s military history, not because of the numbers of mobilized citizens, but because of the external security threats. Those security threats led to the Congressional decision to maintain appropriations to authorize and fund a standing Army. For the first time in American history, the United States maintained a large standing, and conscripted Army and as a result, the Army National Guard became less important in the American strategy on defense.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 380.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 383.
\textsuperscript{26} Griffith, Jr., \textit{The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974}, 9.
In 1956, the U.S. Congress passed an Act that established Title 32 U.S.C., entitled “National Guard,” as law, and continues to serve as the Congressional authorization for the U.S. National Guard and the Congressional appropriations for Federal funding. Title 32 U.S.C. distinguished critical differences in authorizations codified under Title 10 U.S.C. for America’s Armed Forces that made the National Guard unique in its capabilities for employment for domestic operations. Once law established statutory differences between the Army National Guard and the Army, it set the conditions for the Department of the Army to reduce the integration of Army National Guard units by focusing more on the Army in contingency planning. Simultaneously, the statutory differences established opportunities to employ the Army National Guard domestically under certain conditions instead of the Army. What the Army failed to consider during the course of contingency planning, however, was the significance of the Army National Guard with respect to military support for domestic emergencies and as an augmentation to the total force in support of contingencies with little or no prior notice. America had two distinctly different military forces available: the Active Component, composed of active duty personnel, and the Reserve Component, composed of part-time military personnel. America’s growing dependency on conscription continued as the basis for rapid force accelerations in support of expeditionary commitments.

Selective Service continued to fuel the force requirements for America’s involvement in Southeast Asia during the 1960s. President Lyndon Johnson directed the use of conscription to support the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) to sustain force strengths in Vietnam without the broad operational use of the Army National Guard. As the United States surged combat forces over the course of 1966, the Army received over 317,500 men inducted as draftees. General William C. Westmoreland commanded the military advisory team assigned to assist the South Vietnamese in combating regular forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and guerilla forces loyal to the

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29 Griffith, Jr., The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974, 10.

30 Ibid., 11.
As the assistance and “pacification” missions escalated to military conflict involving U.S. troops, General Westmoreland developed complicated strategic and operational plans to counter enemy operations south of the established Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) using limited means. Throughout the course of operations during the 1960s, however, President Johnson continued his objection of mobilizing the Army National Guard for operations in Vietnam.

At the conclusion of a National Security Council session in July 1965, President Johnson disapproved a call-up of the Army National Guard, which drastically affected General Westmoreland’s operational timetable. The Selective Service program and the resulting national draft stirred debate on the efficacy of the system and the equity by which draft boards identified men for Selective Service. The Johnson administration failed to recognize the dissonance between national security interests and the influence of public debate on politics. Considering the elements of the paradoxical trinity proposed by acclaimed Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz, the will of the people is a critical component of national will. Clausewitz proposed that the people must inherently possess the passions kindled in war. The Army National Guard maintained over 3,000 armories across the fifty-four states and territories of the United States, and for most U.S. citizens, the Army National Guard was the conduit linking military capabilities with national will and the will of the people. To ignore aspects of national will, which Clausewitz proposed as the people, the army, and the government, is to invite conflict within the context of national power and forfeit any opportunity to impose national will. President Johnson’s restriction set the conditions for a drastic reduction in the use of citizen-soldiers mobilized and deployed in support of operations in Southeast Asia, with only 37,000 Guard and Reserve members mobilized between 1962 and

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32 Ibid., 244.
35 Ibid., 89.
1975. The mobilization of the American people, literally in the sense of the broad mobilization of the Army National Guard and figuratively as it related to the will of the people, proved a strategic failure on the part of the Johnson administration.

The United States transitioned to an “all-volunteer” force at the end of the Vietnam conflict, which seemed to cement the Army National Guard into its role as a “strategic reserve.” The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs defined a strategic reserve as “an expansion force and a repository of forces needed for major combat operations.” The impetus behind limiting the use of Army National Guard forces in support of major combat operations, as opposed to expanding consideration to other contingencies, developed from America’s historical involvement in conflicts. The implication with categorizing the Army National Guard as a “strategic reserve” manifested a “break in case of emergency” mentality that placed the Army National Guard as the lowest funding priority for the Department of the Army. That adaptation of responsibilities for the reserve component, and the Army National Guard in particular, influenced equipment, training, and funding levels in ways that broadened the gap between active and reserve component readiness. By the end of 1981, the Army National Guard reported having less than fifty-two percent of the major equipment items required to perform its wartime mission.

General Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the Army, worked to stabilize the Army through the transition to an All-Volunteer Force following the Army’s transition out of operations in Vietnam. Much of what influenced Department of Defense policies and Army Doctrine were born from lessons learned following the Vietnam conflict. General Abrams served as General Westmoreland’s successor as the

37 Sumner, Jr., *On Strategy*, 34.
38 Ibid., 15.
Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), and inherited President Johnson’s restriction on mobilizing the Reserves for use in Southeast Asia. Much of the Abrams Doctrine codified his belief that favorable public support directly related to the incorporation and use of the Reserves in contingency operations.40 A number of initiatives created under General Abrams changed the force structure of the Army through a redistribution of critical functions to the Army National Guard.41 In an environment of limited economic resources and waning public support, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, as an extension of General Abrams’ initiatives, announced the implementation of the “Total Force Policy” wherein the Active and Reserve Components were directed to integrate as a unified military force.42 General Abrams faced the challenges of managing troop withdrawals from Vietnam, achieving end strength under the directive for an all-volunteer Army, modernization initiatives, and improving force readiness.43 The Total Force Policy relied on the Army National Guard as an augmentation force for the Armed Forces in lieu of issuing a national draft, as had been done to support force requirements for Vietnam and its preceding wars. The Total Force included the Army National Guard, composed of approximately 350,000 soldiers, containing over half of the Army’s combat forces and one-third of the Army’s support.44 General Abrams subsequently initiated the “Round Out” Program and designated mobilization plans for Army National Guard Brigades with Army Divisions as thirty three percent of the total force (two Army Brigades with one Army National Guard) in support of contingency operations.45 Although the Army National Guard gained resurgence in contingency planning initiatives, the Department of Defense plan limited Army National Guard employment to large-scale combat operations. As such, America’s employment for the Army National Guard focused on contingency

40 Ibid., 15.
42 Doubler and Listman Jr., The National Guard, 116.
43 Nielsen, An Army Transformed, 40.
44 GAO, Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined, 7.
operations. Accordingly, operational plans emerged during the Cold War and shortly thereafter without considerations for the non-traditional threats to national security that would drive operations in the twenty-first century. The negligence of officials in identifying the asymmetric threats to national security shaped operational assumptions that, in turn, created critical gaps in operational preparedness.

Through the 1980s and leading into Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the “Abrams Doctrine,” named after General Abrams, helped set the conditions for changes in the incorporation of the Reserve Component in planning and force projection. Department of Defense planning for military responses prior to September 11, 2001 revolved around national threats that stemmed from the potential for Soviet aggression in Europe. The Abrams Doctrine operated on a “tiered readiness” concept built on a series of pre-established priorities. Furthermore, the Army based the Abrams Doctrine solely on the premise that America’s adversary would project combat power using conventional means of warfare. The Army designed doctrine, professional military education, and unit “warfighting” exercises around the concept to defend Western Europe against a formidable, heavily armored invading force. In the event that hostilities erupted in Europe, the United States would rapidly deploy its ready forces into theater and push units in succession to build combat power over time. Reserve Component units, and the Army National Guard in particular, would follow late in order to allow ample time for the mobilization, training, and equipping processes to occur.

As had always been the case with America’s expectations for contingency operations, military planners based initiatives for contingencies on the idea that force projection efforts would occur over time. The idea that intelligence reports linked to state-sponsored combat power projections would provide ample warning for an imminent attack, and serve as the basis to initiative operational plans, proved limited in its scope. What contingency plans considered activities that were not state-sponsored? Over the course of time as state-sponsored militaries grew in numbers and capabilities, the complexities associated with command and control became more complicated. The advantage from America’s perspective of facing state-sponsored military power has been its ability to identify indicators that link activities through a vast intelligence network to predict military actions. Under the Abrams Doctrine, that advantage
provided the flexibility to build combat power through the tiered readiness concept. What the Abrams Doctrine did not take into consideration were the independent actors not sponsored by nation-states. The disadvantage for America’s perspective against a non-state sponsored threat is that threat’s ability to act and react much more rapidly and without notice. In that environment, a tiered-readiness concept does not meet the need to project combat power rapidly across multiple areas of operation to counter a complex and evolving threat. Unless the United States reverts to the implementation of a national draft to surge available forces for rapid deployment to conduct operations against an aggressor, the United States Congress and Department of Defense have to rely on maintaining a higher level of readiness in the Reserve Component and the Army National Guard in particular.

According to a 1995 report published by the U.S. General Accounting Office, high-priority Army National Guard Brigades identified as part of the “round out” concept failed to complete the mobilization and training process within the requisite sixty-day period during the Gulf War in 1990. As a result, none of the Army National Guard Brigades deployed to the Persian Gulf as members of their assigned active duty Divisions. The report cited training deficiencies as the major catalyst for poor performance and the elongated post-mobilization and pre-deployment training requirements. For example, Army National Guard units reporting to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California focused on critical individual and mission essential tasks, e.g. basic rifle marksmanship, and squad-level task proficiencies. Army leadership used the National Training Center to evaluate readiness for Army units through testing them at advanced, collective task levels. To be successful, units needed to report to the National Training Center proficiently trained in individual tasks essential to their mission requirements. The General

46 The emergence of violence and use of terrorism by non-state actors through the 1980s provided indicators of the potential threats to national security for the United States. Attacks by extremist groups, fueled by ideologies, included the assassination of Olympic athletes in Munich, attacks by Iranian extremists against an embassy in London, and airliner hijackings. In an operational environment becoming more asymmetric, United States Doctrine failed to consider a more responsive approach to support contingency operations.


Accounting Office also determined training proficiencies suffered due to inadequacies in funding and the unavailability of course seats in military occupational specialty (MOS) producing schools, and professional military education for noncommissioned officers, for Army National Guard personnel as an extension of the lower priorities afforded to the Army National Guard by Army policy.\footnote{Ibid., 25.}

A report published by the General Accounting Office illustrated the difficulties with “operationalizing” Army National Guard units mobilized to support Operation Desert Storm. Army National Guard units purchased commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) communications equipment that included cellular phones, satellite phones, and other non-secure communications devices to circumvent equipment deficiencies in order to maintain command and control in a combat environment.\footnote{GAO, Aspects of the Army’s Equipping Strategy Hamper Reserve Readiness, 25.} In a 2005 report published by the General Accounting Office, inadequacies stemming from a lack of basic skills training led to a decision by the Second Army to extend training for the 48th Brigade (Army National Guard) to ninety-one days, from the previously established thirty-day mobilization and deployment model.\footnote{The U.S. Congress redesignated the \textit{General Accounting Office (GAO)} as the \textit{Government Accountability Office} according to its website in 2004 in order to emphasize its responsibility to “ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people.” This monograph referred to GAO according to the name presented in the referenced source.} The Second Army leadership based the decision on the following inadequacies: noncommissioned and commissioned officers were not proficient in leadership and tactical skills; soldiers required extensive training in their primary military occupational specialties; and collective training proficiencies required fundamental improvement.\footnote{GAO, \textit{National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War}, 25-6.} The same assumptions held true for the 155th and 256th Brigades respectively, which affected the Army National Guard’s ability to provide “round out” Brigades in support of Operation Desert Storm.

Through the decades following World War II, the United States only identified threats requiring military responses by their capabilities to project conventional military power. After the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1989 and the end of combat operations in support of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the United States shifted its priorities for the Department of Defense with mandates to reduce its force structure across the components. According to the National Military Strategy published in 1992, the strategic focus shifted from deterrence against a conventional state-sponsored power to “a more diverse, flexible strategy,” focused on regional instability.\textsuperscript{53} The rationale supporting the decision for downsizing U.S. military forces came from an expectation that no immediate military threat existed against the United States.

Immediately following Operation Desert Storm, personnel numbers for the U.S. Army were in excess of 732,000 soldiers. At the end of the twentieth century, the Army maintained an end-strength of 482,000 Soldiers, having reduced its strength by thirty five percent.\textsuperscript{54} This reduction in force set the conditions to create a critical gap between the total number of forces required and the number of forces available to sustain the high operational tempo in support of a major contingency operation. With the unidentified threat of an unconventional, non-state sponsored actor, the United States Army did not have the combat power required to respond with adequate military force. The Armed Forces were not prepared to sustain operations independent of the Army National Guard, and the Abrams Doctrine of the Cold War was insufficient at effectively transitioning Army National Guard units under Title 10 U.S.C. to the levels for personnel, equipment, and training required to support contingency operations.


\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 75.
The Army National Guard in the Contemporary Operating Environment

The United States Congress provided a very specific definition for “contingency operations” under Title 10 U.S.C. § 101, paragraph 13. According to statute, contingency operation refers to a military action that:

“is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12304a, 12305, or 12406 of this title, chapter 15 of this title, or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.”

The authority set forth by the Congress limited military operations to only those operations conducted against enemies of the United States or an opposing military force. It also limited operations to those requiring declarations of war or declared national emergencies, as described in Table 1. Since Congress granted the authority under Title 10 U.S.C., it further restricted participation of the Army National Guard by adding a requirement for mobilization from Title 32 U.S.C. to Title 10 U.S.C. An exception to the rule was adopted under 32 U.S.C. § 904 whereby members of the National Guard may be ordered to active Federal service in support of homeland defense duties and limited the service to 180 days, and gave Governors and the Secretary of Defense the authority to extend the period of service an additional ninety days if warranted. This limitation continues to impact employment opportunities for the Army National Guard in support of operations that are not classified as a contingency operation as defined by the United States Congress.

Maintaining the Army National Guard as an operational force relies heavily on operating in support of contingencies defined under United States Code. Operations in support of the protracted Global War of Terror set the conditions for the Army National Guard’s inclusion as an operational force.

The requirements for a military response, in support of U.S. operations against terrorism in 2001, and the U.S. transition to operations in Iraq in 2003, compelled the Secretary of Defense to redefine employment of the Reserve Component, specifically the Army National Guard. Being able to maintain a high level of readiness in an uncertain environment full of unpredictable global threats is instrumental in America’s national defense strategy. How can the United States meet its operational challenges?

The challenge with moving beyond the Global War on Terror is the continued integration of the Army National Guard as an operational force when there are no existing contingency operations to support. In keeping with the statutory definition of “contingency operations,” the Army National Guard is dependent on a declaration of war or national emergency to stay “operational.” With the growing emergence of international partnerships and circumstances that require military assistance and liaison, opportunities still exist for employing the Army National Guard as an operational force. By default, operations not characterized under 10 U.S.C. § 101 as a contingency operation become “non-contingency.”57 Those operations may encompass traditional military operations other than war that include peacemaking, peacekeeping missions or other less traditional responses that employ military capabilities in training, liaison, or assistance roles. In either case, the United States Congress may have to codify changes to the United States Code that incorporate considerations for employment of the Army National Guard in support of “non-contingency” operations outside the context of homeland security duty as aforementioned.

In order to develop an understanding of how America can potentially employ the Army National Guard in support of non-contingency operations, one must first develop an understanding of the complexities associated with the “operational environment.” An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the

57 U.S. Code does not define “non-contingency” operations. There are no other doctrinal definitions to support the term, so operations that do not meet the definition codified under 10 U.S.C. § 101 become “non-contingency.”
decisions of the commander.\textsuperscript{58} Nested within that environment is a myriad of complexities that contribute factors that inevitably influence military operations within the operational environment. Influences on the operational environment include globalization, population growth, inadequate resources, climate change, inadequate governance, and the spread of lethal weapons.\textsuperscript{59} In an environment that drives independent and non-state actors beyond the constraints of nation-states, the Department of Defense has to shift toward the development of contingency planning considerations beyond conventional opposition.

As the Cold War ended, the United States experienced a “proliferation of theories” through the 1990s regarding the likely characteristics of enemies of the state.\textsuperscript{60} The absence of an identifiable conventional threat sparked a “strategic pause,” wherein American involvement internationally and the projection of military power declined in priority.\textsuperscript{61} What defined the “contemporary operating environment” through the 1990s, however, were deployments in rapid succession for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1991, U.S. involvement in Somalia in 1992-93, intervention in Haiti in 1994, and peacemaking/peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo at the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{62} The failure in the strategic pause, where policy makers failed to make the critical connection, resulted from the failure to recognize the rapid development of extremism and state-sponsored terrorism – namely the “asymmetric” threat.\textsuperscript{63}

As the nature of the operating environment evolved, the composition of the Army National Guard, and its integration as a member of America’s expeditionary force during periods of contingency operations or other threats to national security, has changed drastically over the course of the last century.


\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 8.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 10.
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard comprised America’s “strategic reserve,” focusing on the active component as an operational projection of force. After a Congressional authorization formally established a large standing army under Title 10 U.S.C. following World War II, the use of the Army National Guard as an operational force visibly diminished. United States Code provided three types of authorizations for the President or Congress to mobilize reserve forces, which included the Army National Guard, in support of Federal missions. The authorizations listed in Table 1 allowed for the mobilization of reserve forces under Title 10 U.S.C. based on the provisions outlined.

Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 U.S.C. 12301(a)</td>
<td>Declared by Congress:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Full Mobilization”</td>
<td>In time of war or national emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No limit on number of soldiers called to active duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For duration of war plus 6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 U.S.C. 12302</td>
<td>Declared by the President:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Partial Mobilization”</td>
<td>In time of national emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No more than 1,000,000 reservists can be on active duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No more than 24 consecutive months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 U.S.C. 12304</td>
<td>Declared by the President:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Presidential Reserve Call-up”</td>
<td>To Augment the active duty force for operational missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No more than 200,000 reservists can be on active duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No more than 270 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Historical examples of each were the declaration from Congress after the attack at Pearl Harbor for a full mobilization, and the declaration from the President for a partial mobilization following the attacks on September 11, 2001. The priorities for staffing, equipping, and training military forces in the United States focused on the Army, and classified the Army National Guard as a part of the “strategic reserves.” The Department of Defense defined “strategic reserves” through action and consequence

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during the last two decades of the twentieth century as opposed to codifying it in policy or doctrine. In a 2007 deposition to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR), Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum gave a summation of the historically defined “strategic reserve.”

“The National Guard was one weekend a month, and it was going in the last innings of World War III. And we were going to under-equip it deliberately; we were going to under-resource it deliberately; we were going to under-man it deliberately; and we weren’t going to train it too terribly well either, because we didn’t take it seriously. It was just supposed to be a deterrent force against the Soviet Union.”

The disparities between the Army and the Army National Guard set the conditions for the challenges identified during the Global War on Terror when the United States opened a second theater of operations in Iraq, thereby exceeding the Army’s capability to sustain conventional force projection requirements beyond its capacity. Army doctrine and policies relating to the Army National Guard failed to transition from Cold War philosophies, which continued to drive the decision-making process for operational priorities. Following the 1991 Gulf War, Army officials continued to equip the Army National Guard at less-than wartime readiness levels with the expectation that the Army National Guard could simply catch up with the Army should major combat operations occur.

Prior to the Global War on Terror, the “strategic reserve” construct incorporated Reserve Component units into contingency operations on a slow, progressive projection of combat power into a foreign theater of war against a peer adversary in a force-on-force conventional war. The Department of Defense based Reserve Component projections on a slow “mobilize – train – deploy” model that required several weeks to train Army National Guard units to Armed Forces standards before deploying them into a theater of operations. As a result, most contingency planning efforts deliberately avoided the inclusion

65 Lieutenant General Blum referred to the composition, equipping and training priorities for the U.S. Army National Guard as a “strategic reserve” based on how the Department of Defense directed funding, manning, equipping and training for the National Guard in previous years.


of Army National Guard units for employment considerations. For operations less than “total war,” the Army National Guard ultimately took a position of non-priority as America’s “strategic reserve.”68 The Army maintained the “tiered-resource strategy,” focusing on equipping active duty forces as a higher priority. As such, the Army assumed operational risk with respect to Army National Guard units and under-resourced the Army National Guard, expecting the availability of time to resource units for contingency operations. The Government Accountability Office used the 30th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) from the North Carolina Army National Guard as an example to illustrate this point. The 30th BCT received orders to mobilize in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004. The Brigade reported shortages in night vision equipment, sixty percent in total, leaving a deficiency of 5,272 sets that the Army National Guard had to transfer in from other units to equip the 30th BCT for its deployment requirements.69

America’s response to the synchronized attacks against U.S. infrastructure on September 11, 2001 propelled both the Active and Reserve Components of America’s military strength into an initial theater of operations in Afghanistan, followed by another theater of operations in Iraq. Operational requirements for forces within the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility pushed Army National Guard forces beyond a sustainable threshold, due to the repetitiveness of subsequent deployments over the course of short “dwell” periods for returning veterans.70 With active combat operations across two theaters, the Secretary of Defense decided to change the National Guard’s role in America’s defense from “strategic” to “operational.” Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1200.17, released on October 29, 2008 defined the Reserve Component (RC) as an operational force. It stated:

68 GAO, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges, 6-7.
69 Ibid., 7.

Dwell time consisted of the amount of accumulated time soldiers spend at home station between operational deployments. If, for example, a soldier returned from deployment in March 2011 and deployed again in March 2013, that soldier received twenty-four months of dwell time.
“The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.”

Under the aforementioned tiered-readiness system, the Department of Defense considered the Army National Guard as a strategic reserve. The Cold War model that followed the Army National Guard into the 1990s anticipated the deployment of Army National Guard units to expand the operational capacity of Army forces in the advent of war, with extended periods for training and equipping units post-mobilization. Contingency operations following the attacks on September 11, 2001 completely changed the operational expectations of the Army National Guard. According to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published by the Secretary of Defense, the expeditionary requirement for the U.S. Armed Forces on “any given day” was nearly 360,000 men and women serving in approximately 130 countries across the globe. The Secretary of Defense published the Quadrennial Defense Review Report following the release of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in 2005, with a heavy emphasis on “operationalizing” the National Defense Strategy, as the NDS served as the strategic foundation for the QDR. The sustained operational requirements for forces in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom exceeded the Army’s ability to manage force requirements from the personnel pool of approximately 351,000 soldiers. The Army tasked the Army National Guard to augment the operational force requirement by sustaining thirty-eight percent of the force on average. The Secretary of Defense

74 Ibid., 19.
75 Army National Guard Directorate, G5, Implementing the Army Force Generation Model in the Army National Guard, 3.
highlighted the necessity of “operationalizing” the Reserve Component to give combatant commanders more immediate access to the Total Force, thereby creating a shift in policy from the previously acceptable periods of long post-mobilization training and equipping. In essence, the Army needed to develop a process by which to improve operational readiness and a sustainable model to incorporate Army National Guard units into the Army operational force to meet the high operational demand for forces.

The Department of the Army, therefore, released its Army Posture Statement in 2005 as an execution matrix for The Army Plan. The Army Posture Statement essentially outlined the Army’s implied operational tasks as components of the twenty-first century security environment. The Army identified four overarching, interrelated strategies for meeting the operational demands of combatant commanders in support of National Security and Defense Strategies: provide relevant and ready land power, train and equip soldiers and grow adaptive leaders, sustain as all-volunteer force, and provide infrastructure and support to enable the force. In the statement, Army leadership described the twenty-first century environment as “an era of uncertainty and unpredictability.” In recognizing the tensions that existed between current and future demands, the Army developed a model for sustaining the force through two key concepts: Modularity, and Army Force Generation. Under Modularity, the Army restructured from a division-based force to a force that was brigade-based. The Modularity concept increased operational readiness by physically increasing the total number of brigades (referred to as Brigade Combat Teams) across the Army and Army National Guard, which directly affected the force sustainment model known as Army Force Generation.

77 Department of the Army, *2005 Posture Statement*, i.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., ii.

The Army expanded the capabilities within Brigades to support the “Brigade Combat Team” concept. Prior to Modularity, Brigades depended upon Divisions for combat support and combat service support functions (i.e. engineering, medical, logistics, etc.). Brigade Combat Teams under the Modularity construct could deploy autonomously from the Division with sustainment and support functions resident within the Brigade Combat Team.
The Army defined the Army Force Generation model (ARFORGEN), as “a rotational readiness model to provide strategic flexibility to meet security requirements for a continuous presence of deployed forces.” The ARFORGEN model provided a balanced approach to sustaining force projection requirements using a cyclical methodology. ARFORGEN consisted of three “force pools:” Reset, Train/Ready, and Available, and subjugated units to timelines based on their statuses. Army National Guard units entered the Reset force pool following redeployment to home station and performed reconstitution activities that included family and soldier reintegration, changes of command, behavioral health, medical and dental readiness assessments, professional military education, and limited individual training tasks. Upon transition to the Train/Ready force pool, Army National Guard units increased individual task training and incorporated collective task training in order to meet established readiness goals as identified in the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS), and were available for mobilization as required. Army National Guard units in the Available force pool were at the highest state of readiness and were identified as either Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) or a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF). Army National Guard units identified as DEF units were allocated by the Secretary of Defense to an operational mission and subsequently deployed to serve in a theater of operations. Units not identified as DEF units remained in the Available pool as CEF units with the potential for rapidly deploying as a “surge force” unit. Active Army units cycled through ARFORGEN based on a three-year schedule, two years at home station following each one-year deployment, while Army National Guard units cycled based on a five-year schedule, giving Army National Guard units four years at home station between operational deployments.

81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 3-4.
83 Ibid., 6.
84 Department of the Army, *2005 Posture Statement*, ii.
The increased operational requirements created in the dichotomy between the civil support and combatant responsibilities of the Army National Guard critically affected readiness, specifically in personnel and responsiveness. In the Army’s 2006 Posture Statement, the Army outlined its global force requirements, which consisted of approximately 245,000 soldiers serving in 120 countries. The Army National Guard provided approximately 72,000 soldiers in 2006 as a part of the overall force, equating to twenty-nine percent of the Army’s global force package. Simultaneously, Army National Guard units performed several missions in a domestic capacity, identified as a mission requirement in the Department of Defense’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. The Office of the Secretary of Defense worked with the Department of the Army and the National Guard Bureau to identify deploying Army National Guard units prior to ARFORGEN, but mandates issued by combatant commanders on the operational readiness of underequipped deploying units created greater shortfalls for non-deploying units. Stabilization for Army National Guard personnel and predictability for equipment readiness across the Army National Guard proved critical in the Army National Guard’s ability to perform its dual role missions.

With ARFORGEN, predictability for Army National Guard units enabled National Guard Bureau officials to manage personnel and equipment resourcing for Army National Guard units based on force pool management. As opposed to maintaining a short-term, reactive posture, the Army National Guard expanded its approach, through ARFORGEN, to a long-term, methodical posture. In the greater context of the total force, ARFORGEN provided a means to balance expeditionary force requirements with sustainment, modernization, and transformation requirements domestically. The change in the deployment model for the Army National Guard supported a directive published in the 2006 Quadrennial

85 Department of the Army, 2006 Posture Statement, 4.
86 Ibid.
88 GAO, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges, 13.
89 Department of the Army, 2006 Posture Statement, 6.
Defense Review Report for an operationalized Reserve Component to support the immediate needs of the joint force for current or future operations.90

The Army National Guard used a “mobilize-train-deploy” approach to maintaining readiness prior to the adoption of the Army Force Generation model and the transition to an operational force. Under this construct, unit members performed thirty-nine training days per year in their occupational specialties.91 Upon mobilization to support contingency operations under the partial mobilization clause in Title 10 U.S.C. § 12302, Army National Guard units reported to mobilization stations for training for a period of up to 180 days before deploying for the remainder of the twenty-four months authorized under Title 10 U.S.C. § 12302.92 Over the course of the 180-day post-mobilization period, soldiers received training in the individual and collective tasks necessary to perform their missions. In the 2005 Army Posture Statement, Army officials sought to improve the Army National Guard’s abilities across the force to deploy rapidly as an expeditionary force in order to support global operations.93 In order to accomplish that, Army officials reorganized the training model for the Army National Guard to reduce the post-mobilization training time requirements from 180 days to less than thirty days.

On January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued guidance in a memorandum that changed the mobilization policies for the Reserve Component that immediately affected the Army National Guard. The change in policy limited the involuntary mobilization to a total of twelve months, excluding considerations for individual training requirements prior to deployment and post-deployment

90 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 76.

91 Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) are individual skill designators used throughout the Army. Soldiers are assigned skill set requirements based on their unit of assignment according to the unit’s Table of Organization and Equipment. For example, towed or self-propelled howitzer Field Artillery units primarily consist of soldiers awarded the 13B MOS (cannon crewmember). The Army trained soldiers awarded the 13B MOS to perform all individual and crew tasks associated with the care and operation of their particular howitzer, or cannon. All Army units are composed of soldiers awarded occupational skills particular to the duties and responsibilities inherent in the performance of mission-related tasks.


93 Department of the Army, 2005 Posture Statement, 6.
leave. With the limitations imposed by the Secretary of Defense and the need for a stabilized expeditionary force, the Army reorganized the “mobilize-train-deploy” model for the Army National Guard to a “train-mobilize-deploy” construct. Nested within the ARFORGEN model, training days for Army National Guard units increased over a four-year period prior to mobilization from 180 days to 232 days. During the year prior to mobilization, Army National Guard units received up to 109 days of training, which was over sixty percent of what Army National Guard units were accustomed to receiving over a four-year period under the previous training model. This change in the training model for Army National Guard units incorporated a gradual increase in readiness through the Reset and Train/Ready force pools in both individual and collective task proficiencies, thus reducing the requirements for post-mobilization training.

The potential exists for a resurgence of the twentieth century model wherein popular thought pushes the Army National Guard back into its “emergency” case, and out of America’s operational force composition. As a component of the total Army structure, the Army National Guard consists of approximately 350,000 soldiers and comprises more than half of the Army’s ground combat forces (maneuver, fires, and effects), and one-third of its support forces (e.g., military police, transportation, etc.). Army leaders accepted considerable operational risk in its capability to respond effectively to conventional threats by under-resourcing much of its inherent composition. The Army National Guard throughout the latter half of the twentieth century suffered from antiquated equipment often on the verge of obsolescence during peacetime, which transitioned to critical deficiencies in training and readiness during mobilization for war. In 1991, for example, Army National Guard units reported approximately

95 GAO, Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces, 10.
96 GAO, Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives, 6.
$8.9 billion in shortages of equipment necessary to conduct their combat missions. These equipment shortages included AH-64 attack helicopters, armored personnel carriers, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT), and tactical forklifts.

According to testimony given before the Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, the Government Accountability Office reported that the Army provided most of the Army National Guard combat arms units with sixty-five to seventy-nine percent of their equipment required for their wartime missions prescribed under the Table of Organization and Equipment. As a result, efforts to order Army National Guard units to active Federal service prior to and during the initial phases of the Global War on Terror not only required fundamental investments in training, but also required complete equipment fielding initiatives to make National Guard units compatible with their active duty counterparts. These operational inadequacies resulted from Army National Guard-related issues identified following Operation Desert Storm, but not fully addressed prior to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. A 2006 report published by the General Accounting Office illustrated the difficulties with “operationalizing” Army National Guard units mobilized to support Operation Desert Storm. In order to equip Army National Guard units to a deployable level, the National Guard Bureau directed transfers of equipment from non-deploying units to those ordered to active duty. The trend illustrated in Table 2 captured the decrease in the operational readiness of non-deploying Army National Guard units over time that resulted from equipment transfer requirements directed by the National Guard Bureau to meet the high readiness requirements for deploying Army National Guard units. These transfers further exacerbated Army National Guard readiness, reducing the mission essential equipment levels of non-deployed units to thirty-four percent.

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98 Ibid., 20.
99 GAO, *Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined*, 4.
100 Ibid.
The findings from the reports published by the General Accounting Office show corollary evidence that maintaining an effective operational force requires consistent investments in training and personnel development with respect to the Army National Guard before major combat operations ensue. Integration between active duty Army and Army National Guard units directly affects force readiness, and the lack of integration perpetuates critical inadequacies in military capabilities as an instrument of national power. The Government Accountability Office determined that the Departments of Defense and the Army lacked adequate levels of Congressional funding to modernize the Army National Guard under the modular Brigade Combat Team construct. The Army reported requirements for an additional $11.7 billion, and the absence of a detailed plan for equipping the remaining active and Army National Guard units through force modernization.\textsuperscript{102} Given the current fiscally-constrained environment, the Army’s leadership has critical decisions to make that may carry strategic implications to total force readiness. Will the United States hold its advancements in equipping and training the Army National Guard, or will the United States allow the National Guard to sink back into the abyss of becoming a strategic reserve again? Given an unpredictable environment riddled with unconventional and complex threats that span

\textsuperscript{101} GAO, \textit{Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges}, 9.

\textsuperscript{102} GAO, \textit{Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives}, 23.
the globe and a resource-constrained national budget rocked by a slowly recovering economy, how can the United States maintain the Army National Guard as an operational force?
The Army National Guard in the Twenty-first Century

While Armed Forces are domestically restricted under the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385) for example, the National Guard may be employed by either of two means through Gubernatorial or Presidential authorizations in support of domestic law and order requirements. The means most responsive to Governors, “state active duty,” is a non-Federal status wherein the impacted State pays members of the Army National Guard as an extension of State human resources. Soldiers serving on state active duty may operate in a myriad of capacities, including the augmentation of law enforcement. Presidential authority may grant the second status, active duty for operational support (ADOS) under Title 32 U.S.C. for more serious and often catastrophic natural disasters.103 In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security in conjunction with the Department of Defense orchestrated a combined military response in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1979 established the basis for civil support provided by the Departments of Defense and Army. The Act authorized the suite of Federal assistance capacities to areas officially declared under states of emergency by the President, limiting the Armed Forces to assistance with the distribution of water, food, ice, shelter in addition to critical lifesaving support, e.g., search-and-rescue.104 In anticipation of the hurricane’s landfall, the Department of Defense alerted active duty forces in preparation to provide aviation, medical, and engineering support. Approximately 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 Federal military personnel deployed to Louisiana to support relief efforts there.105 Under the conditions of Defense Support of Civil Authorities, which was later codified in DoD Directive 3025.18 in December 2010, Federal military personnel were restricted to providing only extensive lifesaving and sustaining support, with the exception of circumstances “necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or

103 James A. Wombwell, Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), 18.
104 Ibid., 19.
mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions.”106 Army National Guard soldiers volunteered to deploy to Louisiana, initially under the auspices of state active duty and transitioned to Federal status under Title 32 U.S.C. to augment peace enforcement and stability by augmenting local law enforcement agencies. Together, the Army and Army National Guard worked in tandem to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities in the wake of a catastrophic natural disaster. While the Posse Comitatus Act limited the soldiers serving with the Army under Title 10 U.S.C. with respect to their abilities to augment local civil authorities, the Army National Guard provided critical augmentation to law enforcement to re-stabilize areas destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. Under the 2004 National Defense Act, Congress amended Title 32 U.S.C. to allow National Guard commissioned officers to retain their state commissions after mobilization to active duty.107 That change allowed National Guard officers to retain unity of command at the operational level for domestic operations for soldiers performing missions under Title 10 U.S.C. and Title 32 U.S.C, in addition to those serving on state active duty. These differences and the unique ability for the National Guard to support domestic operations serve as a basic construct for maintaining the Army National Guard as an operational force in support of non-contingency operations.

The Army National Guard, under Title 32 U.S.C., is the Department of Defense’s most immediate response force in response to domestic emergencies and other domestic support capacities. Examples of the Army National Guard serving in domestic capacities have included providing security at Department of Defense installations in support of Operation Noble Eagle, as well as security operations during Presidential inaugurations, high profile sporting events like Super Bowls and the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta. Domestic use of the Army National Guard also immediately followed catastrophic natural disasters like Hurricanes Andrew, Katrina, and Rita, as well as civil disturbances like the riots following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the verdict in Los Angeles

106 Ibid., 12.
following the criminal trial against police officials in the Rodney King case. Qualified to provide a myriad of responses to support domestic operations, the Army National Guard can augment a host of requirements that span from law enforcement support to providing life-essential capabilities. The challenge facing Army National Guard officials, however, is the absence of effective planning and integration. The Government Accountability Office released a report in 2005 that highlighted critical deficiencies affecting the Army National Guard as a component of the Department of Defense business model. The report, identifying the Department of Defense as a “high-performing organization,” suggested that the Department of Defense must “reexamine their business models to ensure that their structures and investment strategies enable them to meet external changes in their operational environments effectively and efficiently.”

As of June 2004, one year after ground operations in Iraq began, the Army National Guard supported contingency operation Iraqi Freedom and other domestic security missions with the deployment of over half of its authorized 350,000 personnel force. That operational tempo continued through the increase of personnel supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom, with the Army National Guard providing one-third of the force requirements in theater.

The aforementioned report published by the Government Accountability Office highlighting the changes needed in the Department of Defense’s business model referenced changes in the DoD investment strategies. As mentioned earlier, Army National Guard units reported readiness levels for equipment at Operational readiness for non-deployed Army National Guard units as sixty-five to seventy-nine percent of the numbers required to perform their wartime mission. The Department of the Army, and by extension the Department of Defense, chose to accept operational risk as a part of its investment strategy and equipped the Army National Guard at less than its required level of readiness. In order to meet the operational demands of combatant commanders, equipment deficiencies forced the Army

110 GAO, *Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined*, 10.
National Guard to exacerbate the readiness levels of non-deploying units in order to satisfy operational readiness for deploying units. To complicate matters, estimates given in 2005 suggest that the Army National Guard transferred items to the Army valued at over $1.2 billion, identified by the Department of the Army as “stay behind equipment” in Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{111} On April 7, 2005, the Department of Defense published a Department of Defense Instruction directing the Department of the Army to implement an equipment replacement plan for the Army National Guard equipment transferred to fill Army shortages.\textsuperscript{112} While DoD Directive 1225.6 required the Department of the Army to develop a replacement plan for Army National Guard equipment transferred in support of Army operations, the Army never facilitated a replacement process for the equipment identified as “stay behind.”\textsuperscript{113}

The Government Accountability Office presented recommendations for the Department of Defense to perform an exhaustive analysis on the capabilities inherent to the Army National Guard, specifically to discern its capabilities to perform Defense Support of Civil Authorities while simultaneously supporting contingency operations.\textsuperscript{114} The Department of Defense failed to complete the analysis, leaving an assumption in place that the Army National Guard could perform its domestic support requirements with its personnel and equipment available for its wartime mission.\textsuperscript{115} The Department of the Army equipped the Army National Guard at less than seventy-five percent of its required equipment, and through operational requirements exacerbated Army National Guard readiness to less than thirty-five percent of its equipment requirements. How, then, is the Army National Guard able to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities as mandated in the Department of Defense’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support?

\textsuperscript{111} GAO, \textit{Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges}, 10.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} GAO, \textit{Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined}, 11.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
In 2005, the Department of Defense released its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Specific to the National Defense Strategy’s requirement for the development and sustainment of operational capabilities within the context of civil support, the Department of Defense identified four critical objectives. The Department of Defense’s strategic themes included intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, information sharing, joint operational capabilities for homeland defense, and interagency and intergovernmental coordination. The strategy introduced Defense Support of Civil Authorities as a “tiered” system of responses, with law enforcement augmentation as a Tier 1 response followed by Army National Guard augmentation in Tier 2. Hurricane Katrina challenged the Defense Support of Civil Authorities construct shortly thereafter when it devastated the coastal plain along Louisiana and Mississippi. While the Department of Defense strategy included joint operational capabilities in addition to interagency and intergovernmental coordination, the aggregate Federal response outlined by the National Response Plan failed to conform to its intended execution.

The failures identified during the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina indicated the need for detailed coordination and the establishment of a deliberate integration process that codified the relationship defining interagency and intergovernmental coordination. The Department of Defense established an effective system for evaluating readiness that, if adapted for Defense Support of Civil Authorities, could remedy many of the operational deficiencies identified in the DoD response to Hurricane Katrina. Under the authority of Title 10 U.S.C. § 117, the Secretary of Defense established a detailed system for reporting readiness that measured capabilities across personnel, training, equipment, maintenance, and other areas that evaluated readiness across the force. The metrics evaluated by the

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117 Ibid., 27.
system focused only on those capabilities necessary to perform wartime missions, however, and did not take into consideration the capabilities necessary to support domestic operations. Army Regulation 220-1 established the basic concepts and business rules for the Army’s unit status reporting requirements as a component of the Department of Defense’s reporting system. The regulation identified mission essential task capabilities assessments as the most important aspect of the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Mission essential task assessments required commanders to analyze their units’ abilities to perform tasks essential to their warfighting function. Part of the design of the system required commanders to evaluate task capabilities based on whether or not the unit was capable of performing the task as opposed to a measure of proficiency. Regardless of the unit’s demonstrated proficiency at a given task, the system required commanders to include considerations for resource constraints or deficiencies that affected the capability to perform the given tasks. Commanders typically performed these evaluations through complex and often integrated and combined training exercises designed to simulate the operational environment for the performance of warfighting functions.

The DRRS consolidated reporting the Secretary of Defense needed to confer determinations of military readiness levels for reporting to Congress on a regular basis. Ultimately, the DRRS provided the Department of Defense with a reliable tool for assessing the readiness of military units in performing their wartime missions.

Comparatively, no such system existed to evaluate the capability for the Department of Defense to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities. The Department of Defense identified interagency and intergovernmental coordination as a key objective within the context of civil support. Unlike the customary practice of integrating joint defense capabilities and evaluating them through the aforementioned Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System, no Federal agencies have taken the lead on organizing a hierarchy and establishing roles and responsibilities for interagency and

\[\text{120} \text{ Ibid., 11.}\]
\[\text{121} \text{ Ibid.}\]
intergovernmental responses to domestic catastrophes. The Department of Defense needed to establish guidelines for command hierarchy, identifying structures for supporting and supported commands for Defense Support for Civil Authorities. As outlined by the 2006 report from the Government Accountability Office, the Department of Defense conducted no large-scale preparedness exercises to elicit the same lessons learned as generated through military training exercise process, leaving the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support vulnerable for failure as an effective operational construct.

The Army National Guard served as the leading response for the Department of Defense’s responsibility to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities. In 2001, the Army National Guard responded to 365 domestic requirements for Defense Support of Civil Authorities in disasters that included hurricanes, tornados, floods, fires, and the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11. The requirements in fiscal year 2001 alone equated to approximately 236,000 personnel days, expanded to over 645,000 personnel days the following fiscal year, and declined to a still-substantial 433,000 during fiscal year 2003. As a component of the United States Army, the Army National Guard served as a critical element in the military’s capability to support civil authorities. If operational art was the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time,

122 Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02 defined supported commanders as “[t]he commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required.” Joint Publication 1-02 also defined Supporting commands as “[a] commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander.”


124 GAO, Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, 2.
space, and purpose, Defense Support of Civil Authorities as an operational construct arranges military support capabilities in time, space, and purpose to achieve the objectives of civil authorities.125

Interagency and intergovernmental coordination were critical attributes of the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support for the Department of Defense. The ability to coordinate capabilities seamlessly across entities determined the level of integrated capabilities, e.g. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; information sharing; and joint operational capabilities for homeland defense in response to domestic emergencies. Disaster plans and domestic response training exercises, however, were insufficient at delineating the military capabilities necessary to support civil authorities during catastrophic events.126 Furthermore, the functional plan responsible for addressing the Department of Defense support response did not address the spectrum of military support requirements civil authorities may request across the fifteen National Response Plan emergency support functions.127

Although the Department of Defense identified the Army National Guard as Tier 2 responses for support to civil authorities, the Army National Guard continued to trail behind in Department of Defense initiatives to modernize and equip the Army National Guard for the shift in the contemporary strategy. The responsiveness of the Army National Guard and the operational readiness requirements imposed by combatant commanders in support of contingency operations created an exacerbated deficiency in the Army National Guard’s ability to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities.128 The disparity created between operational planning initiatives that identified the Army National Guard as a responsive force for domestic and contingency operations, and the negligence to fully resource the Army National Guard set the conditions for critical risks to future operations. In essence, the Department of Defense failed to plan contingencies for circumstances that warranted the simultaneous incorporation of the Army National


127 Ibid.

128 GAO, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges, 9.
Guard as both an operational force in support of contingency operations and as response for Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

Considering Defense Support of Civil Authorities as an operational construct and all of its inherent deficiencies, the Department of Defense must develop an operational approach to establish an overarching system for resourcing, integrating, training, and evaluating military capabilities in support of domestic operations. The absence of a system designed to evaluate an integrated military response and the capacity to perform support requirements led to response inadequacies in military response efforts during operations following Hurricane Katrina. Deficiencies in military readiness and the assumption that Army National Guard units could perform tasks supporting civil authorities with wartime equipment levels led to a broadening gap in the Army National Guard’s ability to provide support.\textsuperscript{129} Finally, the lack of large-scale exercises designed to integrate and test Defense Support of Civil Authorities during catastrophic natural disasters led to a catastrophic failure of sorts with respect to the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support for the Department of Defense. For the Army National Guard, preparedness to lead military support operations for domestic responses was ambiguous. The Department of Defense did not adequately define the role of the Army National Guard in the scope of Defense Support of Civil Authorities; and the Department of Defense did not adequately develop a system for evaluating standards to measure preparedness.\textsuperscript{130} If the Department of Defense plans to integrate an effective strategy for domestic operations, the same level of care and detail required for defining roles, responsibilities, and priorities as it pertains to contingency operations must apply to domestic operations.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 11.

\textsuperscript{130} GAO, \textit{Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions}, 20.
Conclusions and Recommendations

The Army National Guard’s history within the context of the United States of America represented the essence of American ingenuity and responsiveness. Throughout the development of the American position on the global stage, the responsiveness of its citizenship and the ingenuity to overcome challenges in the operational environment solidified the Army National Guard as the bedrock of American military power. This monograph studied the history of the Army National Guard to develop the context by which to analyze capabilities inherent to the designed intent, prescribed and codified under United States Code, for the Army National Guard as a component of the total Army force. The analysis of the historical integration process for the Army National Guard, both in the context of deployments in support of contingency operations, and within the context of Defense Support of Civil Authorities, developed an understanding of the strengths and shortcomings for the use of the Army National Guard as an operational force. The synthesis therein provided affirmation for maintaining the Army National Guard as an operational force, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, in a post-war environment.

By design, the Army National Guard conducted two distinctly different missions: augmentation of the Total Force to support combatant commands internationally, and domestic support to civil authorities for homeland defense and natural disasters. As illustrated previously, both missions rely heavily on the readiness of the Army National Guard, and its ability to respond with little or short notice. Considering the Army National Guard’s mission to augment the Total Force in support of contingency operations, the Department of the Army must set priorities for staffing and equipping the Army National Guard on par with the active Army. The aforementioned strategy for fielding initiatives prioritized by where Army and Army National Guard units fell in the tiered-readiness model tied the Total Force to a gradual projection of military power over a protracted operational timeline. The tiered-readiness model for prioritizing personnel authorizations and equipment fielding initiatives had a detrimental impact on the Army National Guard’s ability to perform responsively. As illustrated in the discussion surrounding the contemporary operational environment, the Total Force must maintain a readiness posture that supports responsiveness in an unpredictable environment. The examples herein codify an understanding
that the contemporary operational environment applies to both domestic and expeditionary missions, wherein components of the Total Force often receive very little or no notice for operational deployments. Based on the capabilities inherent in the Army and the limited capacity for sustainment during prolonged conflict, the ability for rapidly integrating the Army National Guard as a force multiplier is paramount.

Within the context of the Army National Guard’s domestic mission, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support developed by the Department of Defense centers around the Army National Guard’s ability to project operationally for Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Inadequate levels of readiness for Army National Guard units resulting from decisions to assume operational risk with Guard adversely affected the Guard’s ability to perform its domestic missions. Strategically, the Department of Defense based the use of the Army National Guard within the construct of homeland defense and civil support on its ability to respond using its warfighting equipment and personnel. Limitations existed in the Army’s polity for integrating decisions to resource the Army National Guard for the full scope of its responsibilities. While the Army’s integration of the Army National Guard focused on performance within the construct of augmentation for contingency operations, the constraints manifested through personnel and equipment policies affecting the Army National Guard directly affected the Army National Guard’s mission to support civil authorities.

Changes in the operational environment and the strategic context that drove contingency operations after September 11, 2001 exposed critical discrepancies between antiquated doctrine and outdated polity grounded in conventional thought, and the asymmetric threats posed by non-state actors. The complexities in the operational environment that influenced how the Army maintained its operational requirements pulled heavily on the Army National Guard. Suffering from the effects of tiered-readiness model, the Army National Guard was not in a position to maintain itself as an operational force. The decision made by the Secretary of Defense in 2007 to change the Reserve Component, and specifically the Army National Guard, from a strategic reserve to an operational force established the basis for modernizing strategy for the Total Force. The challenge for Army officials is effectively identifying how to maintain the Army National Guard as an operational force as contingency operations continue to
decline. The existing constraints, as discussed throughout the analysis of the contemporary operational environment, include fiscal constraints and Congressional mandates to reduce the size of the Total Force. Considering the overdue need for change and transformation, the methodology for research used herein identified ways in which an operationalized Army National Guard stays relevant, given the existing constraints, in a post-war operational environment.

As outlined previously, the Army National Guard played a critical role in the domestic and expeditionary responses within the national instrument of military power. The unique nature of the Army National Guard’s dual-role responsibilities prescribed by its missions is essential to planning and prioritization efforts within the Department of Defense. As identified in the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the Army National Guard is an essential element in the Defense Support of Civil Authorities mission. Additionally, the unpredictability of the twenty-first century threat requires the Army National Guard to deploy as an integrated and responsive expeditionary component of the Total Force. In order to accomplish those tasks, policy and doctrine must emphasize including operationalizing of the Army National Guard.

The Department of Defense must adopt the responsibility of influencing efforts to resolve deficiencies between strategy and policy at the national level that constrain the use of an operational Army National Guard outside the scope of contingency operations. As identified previously through the study of Army National Guard employment for Defense Support of Civil Authorities, use of the Army National Guard was constrained by statutory limitations prescribed by Congress in United States Code. Constraints included statutory restrictions for employing Army National Guard units under Title 32, U.S.C. for domestic support. As discussed, United States Code prohibited the involuntary mobilization of Army National Guard units for domestic support. Other deficiencies included the absence of a formalized process to conduct “warfighter” exercises within the context of Defense Support of Civil Authorities to develop viable courses of action to establish roles and responsibilities for interagency and intergovernmental coordination.
The Department of the Army must work to change its policies for resourcing the Army National Guard in a manner that supports maintaining the Army National Guard as an integrated component of the Total Force, while preserving the Army National Guard’s responsibilities within Department of Defense strategy. Doctrine and the policies that drive Army Doctrine must maintain an operationalized Army National Guard in order to stay responsive to the twenty-first century operational environment. In a resource-constrained environment that depends on an All-Volunteer Army, symmetry across the force becomes essential to the “relevant and ready” force referenced in the Army Posture Statement. In order to accomplish that, the Army must consistently incorporate the Army National Guard as an equal partner as it continues to move through Army Transformation.

Senior leadership in both the Departments of Defense and the Army emphasized the importance of an operationalized Army National Guard as identified in the National Defense Strategy and the Army Plan. While leaders at both echelons have worked to decrease the discrepancies constraining the use of the Army National Guard as an operational force in the first decade of the twenty-first century, additional challenge continue to prohibit the evolution of the Army National Guard as an operational force in a post-war environment. The asymmetry that defines the twenty-first century security environment and its inherent unpredictability requires an integrated force capable of building operational capacity with little or no notice. The same unpredictability found in the twenty-first century security environment resides in the challenges inherent in catastrophic natural disasters and domestic emergencies. Maintaining the Army National Guard as an operational force in a post-war environment solidifies America’s capability to respond militarily in any environment, to any disaster, in support of any national emergency or threat.
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