It’s Not New: Historical U.S. Army Security Forces Assistance Efforts

A Monograph
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It’s Not New: Historical U.S. Army Security Forces Assistance Efforts

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The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy emphasized that the U.S. would use security sector assistance to build the capacity of at-risk nations and reduce the appeal of violent extremism and assist in resolving the world’s armed conflicts. The 2010 Department of Defense Quadrennial Review responded by announcing that it will strengthen and institutionalize the U.S. military’s general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance in order to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives. The use of general purpose military forces in a security force assistance role is not a new concept for the U.S. military, it conducted similar operations in Greece from 1947-1950, Iran from 1957-1960, and Vietnam from 1950-1964. This monograph found that the use of advisors to advise and assist, equip, organize, and train indigenous security forces as well as rebuilding or building infrastructure in Greece and Iran was an efficient way to achieve U.S. national strategic objectives. In Vietnam, advisors conducted the same tasks but were unable to achieve U.S. national security objectives. The intent of this research is not to make specific recommendations for current U.S. advisory missions but, rather, to point out those actions taken in Greece, Iran, and Vietnam indicate that advisory efforts can be an efficient means to achieve national security objectives. Direct parallels between the cases presented and that of Afghanistan and Iraq are topics of further research.
Title of Monograph: It’s Not New: Historical U.S. Army Security Forces Assistance Efforts

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Abstract

IT’S NOT NEW: HISTORICAL U.S. ARMY SECURITY FORCES ASSISTANCE EFFORTS
by MAJ James D. Scrogin, United States Army, 71 pages

The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy emphasized that the U.S. would use security sector assistance to build the capacity of at-risk nations and reduce the appeal of violent extremism and assist in resolving the world’s armed conflicts. The 2010 Department of Defense Quadrennial Review responded by announcing that it will strengthen and institutionalize the U.S. military’s general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance in order to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives. The use of general purpose military forces in a security force assistance role is not a new concept for the U.S. military, it conducted similar operations in Greece from 1947-1950, Iran from 1957-1960, and Vietnam from 1950-1964. This monograph found that the use of advisors to advise and assist, equip, organize, and train indigenous security forces as well as rebuilding or building infrastructure in Greece and Iran was an efficient way to achieve U.S. national strategic objectives. In Vietnam, advisors conducted the same tasks but were unable to achieve U.S. national security objectives. The intent of this research is not to make specific recommendations for current U.S. advisory missions but, rather, to point out those actions taken in Greece, Iran, and Vietnam indicate that advisory efforts can be an efficient means to achieve national security objectives. Direct parallels between the cases presented and that of Afghanistan and Iraq are topics of further research.
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Introduction

Over the past ten years, the U.S. military has been involved in an intensive effort to rebuild and train the security forces of Afghanistan and Iraq. On August 18, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Order Number 22 that officially mandated the creation of the New Iraqi Army, and associated security forces.¹ This order, along with simultaneous efforts in Afghanistan to rebuild that country’s security forces, introduced a new generation of non-Special Forces qualified U.S. Army officers to the concept of advising indigenous security forces. Many of these company grade and junior field grade officers, whose training had focused on Full Dimension Operations as advocated in Field Manual 100-5 dated June 1993 and the more recent Full Spectrum Operations presented in Field Manual 3-0 of June 2001, had never experienced this concept before. For many, their advising experience was like reinventing the wheel. This should not have been the case, since advising indigenous security forces was something that general-

¹Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 22: Creation of New Iraqi Army (Baghdad, 2003).
purpose forces of the U.S. military had done in the past. Advising indigenous security forces was actually business as usual.

The scope of American participation in security force assistance expanded significantly after World War II when President Truman formed the first overseas security assistance organizations. What followed was an explosion of organizations called Military Advising and Assistance Groups or MAAGs.² The U.S. established MAAGs in countries such as Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, among others. By 1965, there were MAAGs in over 65 countries.³ This trend continued and in early 1985, there were MAAGs or their equivalent in over 50 countries.⁴ However, by 1989 U.S. military security force assistance support had

devolved to 38 security assistance teams deployed to 14 countries.\textsuperscript{5} In the next decade, the focus of security assistance changed to training, and while the number of training teams and number of personnel deployed actually increased from 1989-1999 to 273 teams consisting of 62 personnel it was still a dramatic decrease from the 11,596 advisors working as part of Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MAC-V) in 1968.\textsuperscript{6}

The military personnel tasked to rebuild the Iraqi and Afghan armies in 2001 and 2003 were familiar with the security force assistance environment of the 1990s. Their frame of reference was small numbers of trainers, typically Special Forces, in small teams working with indigenous security forces. In short, the problem was that these officers lacked the familiarity with advise and assist assignments as well as the experience that previous generations of officers had gathered through advisory or assistance missions that for them was just business as usual.


The purpose of this study is to explore past advising efforts of the U.S. military and determine how those efforts were successful. As this study demonstrates advisors as part of a security force assistance program in support of security sector reform are an efficient means to achieve U.S. strategic aims.

The significance of the study is clear: U.S. Army advising and assist efforts will not end with the completion of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Advising indigenous security forces has been an enduring task of the U.S. military for the last 60 years, is not just a byproduct of combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, and will continue to be a necessary mission. As the thesis of this study suggests, the use of U.S. military advisors to advise and assist indigenous security forces units and institutions, organize units and institutions, train indigenous security forces units, equip indigenous security forces, and rebuild or build infrastructure for indigenous security forces, is an efficient way to achieve U.S. national security objectives.

Why security sector reform? In a 2007 meeting on improving the United Nations effectiveness in security sector reform the Security Council stressed, “That reforming the security
sector in post-conflict environments is critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, expanding legitimate State authority and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict.” The U.S. and other nations believe that the path to create that stable world order comes through security sector reform. In 2009 the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and Agency for International Development (USAID) issued a joint document on security sector reform that states “security sector reform can help achieve the U.S. 2006 National Security Strategy goal of having U.S. statecraft help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.” The United Kingdom approved a security sector reform strategy in 2002 in order to “help governments of developing and transition countries fulfill their legitimate security functions through reforms that

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will make the delivery of security more democratically accountable, as well as more effective and efficient, thereby reducing the potential for both internal and external conflict." The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Union are among other organizations that have issued security sector reform strategies in recent years.

Although security sector reform is a recent construct nations have used its underlying principles in the past. Those are the principles that will provide the overarching theory behind the focus of this paper: the building and training of professional security forces; establishment of relevant legal and policy frameworks; improvement of civilian management, leadership, oversight, planning, and budgeting capacities; enhancement of coordination and cooperation among security-related and civil institutions; management of the legacies and sources of past or present conflict or insecurity. These principles coincide with the lines of operations laid out in the joint USAID, DoD, and DoS document on security sector reform and are where improvements

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are necessary in order for successful security sector reform. For DoD, security force assistance is one way to support security sector reform.

U.S. joint military doctrine defines security force assistance (SFA) as the DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.\(^{10}\) It goes on to describe SFA as spanning the range of military operations from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and contingency operations, and if necessary, major operations and campaigns. It can include combat advisory and support activities not falling under security assistance.\(^{11}\) U.S. Army doctrine further simplifies security force assistance to the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. In essence, there is then a linkage between


security sector reform and SFA; SFA is DoD’s contribution to the U.S. government’s security sector reform program

In order to achieve SFA the U.S. DoD turns to individuals variously referred to as advisors, mentors or trainers. To prevent confusion this study provides definitions to distinguish between advisor, mentor, and trainer. The Oxford Dictionary’s definition of advisor is a person who gives advice in a particular field. Both adviser and advisor are correct, but the spelling advisor suggests an official position; this study will use advisor. Oxford defines trainer as a person who trains people or animals. Mentor is defined by Oxford as an experienced or trusted person in a company or educational institution who trains or counsels new employees or students. According to Michael Metrinko, mentor is not a good choice to describe an American officer’s advisory role vis-à-vis a senior foreign official, since mentoring implies a relationship between a superior and someone younger, or inferior in status and rank.12 Since trainer implies that a person is untrained and can have the same negative connotation that mentor has this study will adhere to

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the use of the word advisor when depicting a U.S. military member dealing with members of an indigenous security force. U.S. Army doctrine describes an advisor (or advisor team) as an individual or team tasked to teach, coach, and advise foreign forces in order to develop their professional skills.\textsuperscript{13}

This study will look at how advisors generate or build armies as part of security force assistance. Before an advisor can build an army, he must know what type of army he is supposed to build. U.S. Army doctrine recognizes three types of military operations: offensive, defensive, and stability.\textsuperscript{14} U.S. Army doctrine defines offensive operations as combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers.\textsuperscript{15}


Defensive operations are those operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations.\textsuperscript{16} Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.\textsuperscript{17} The construction and design of the U.S. Army is such that it can simultaneous conduct those types of operations.

It may not be within the U.S. national strategic objectives to build an indigenous security force that is capable of all three operations. Advisors must therefore understand what the U.S. national security objectives are before they start to build an indigenous security force. Once advisors understand what type of army needs built then under current joint doctrine, they conduct

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 3-8.
\textsuperscript{17}FM 3-0 Chg 1, \emph{Full Spectrum Operations}, 3-10.
a variety of tasks advising and assisting indigenous security forces units and institutions in order to ensure the ultimate success of security force assistance.\textsuperscript{18}

Organizing institutions and units can range from standing up a ministry to improving the organization of the smallest maneuver unit. Building capability and capacity in this area includes personnel, logistics, intelligence, and their support infrastructure. Training occurs in training centers, academies, and units.\textsuperscript{19} Training includes a broad range of subject matter to include security forces responding to civilian oversight and control.\textsuperscript{20} The U.S. equips indigenous security forces through traditional security assistance, foreign support, donations, or foreign military sales. The equipment must be appropriate for the physical environment of the region and the indigenous security forces ability to operate and sustain it.\textsuperscript{21} In many cases, particularly after major combat operations, it may be necessary to rebuild existing infrastructure or build new infrastructure to

\textsuperscript{18}JP 3-22, \textit{Foreign Internal Defense}, VI-33.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., VI-32.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., VI-33.

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.
support indigenous security forces. This includes facilities and materiel, but may also include other infrastructure such as command and control systems and transportation networks.  

This study will use the method of structured, focused comparison to analyze the presented case studies. Five hypotheses guide this study. To test the proposed hypotheses several questions guide the collection of empirical data. These questions show how advisors were effective, or ineffective, in building indigenous security forces through the security forces assistance component of security sector reform.

This study will consist of a literature review that covers the contemporary views on advisory efforts. A discussion of the methodology used during the course of the study will follow next. The next section will examine three case studies involving the use of U.S. military advisors: Joint U.S. Military Planning Group – Greece (JUSMAPG-G), 1947–1950; Army Mission Headquarters Iran (ARMISH), 1957-1960; and Military Advisory and Assistance Group –

\[\text{22Ibid.}\]
Vietnam (MAAG-V), 1950–1964. The study will conclude with a cross case analysis and conclusions drawn from the evidence presented in the case studies.

**Literature Review**

**Advise and Assist**

In an October 2007 speech to the Association of the U.S., Army former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated, “The most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting that we ourselves do, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking.”23

Jeremy Gwinn, a former advisor to the Afghan National Army, in an article from *Small Wars Journal*, describes how U.S. military advisors advise and assist foreign armies so that they become capable of conducting independent operations. According to Gwinn, advisors must put __________________________

forth a deliberate effort to develop unit leaders and headquarters staffs to perform their required functions throughout the operations process. Advisors coach and mentor indigenous security forces commanders and staffs to plan, allocate resources, execute, and sustain their force. Advisors should also work to build the capabilities of indigenous security forces previously provided by the advisors or partner units, such as enforcing the units logistics request program or forcing indigenous security forces to use their own communications systems. Gwinn states that taking these steps will transition an indigenous security force from conducting advisor and partner assisted operations to independent operations.24

Frederick Kienle, writing in the context of U.S. advisory efforts in Iraq, reinforces the effect that U.S. military advisors have on indigenous security forces in an article written for the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Kienle points out that Iraqi Security Forces are becoming a credible force, and this is due in no small part to the cadre of embedded

military advisors. Kienle states that the goal of advisors is to develop indigenous security forces that are “competent at all levels, capable over sustained periods of combat, committed to state security and confident in themselves to secure their country” advisors accomplish this by focusing on helping indigenous security forces ability by providing “the guidance and coordination needed to increase combat capabilities.” He also states that, “Embedded advisors were undeniably the greatest contributors to the initial force generation and early successes of the maturing Iraqi security forces. Earlier attempts by contractors to train, equip, coach, teach and mentor Iraqi security forces simply did not produce the desired results in terms of quality, quantity, or sense of urgency.” Kienle concludes that as the U.S. transforms its military to meet the requirements of tomorrow’s conflicts, military advisors should be a central priority.


Ibid., 5.

These articles suggest that indigenous security forces, advised and assisted by U.S. military advisors, are capable of improving their effectiveness to the point of independent operations. The staffs of indigenous security forces advised by U.S. military advisors will be more effective and be more confident in their ability to secure their country. Finally, these articles suggest that advising and assisting will become a focus for the U.S. Army in the future.

**Organize**

Dr. John Nagl, a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel and senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, states that “a state with strong security institutions and an inclusive society that respects the rule of law can withstand cross-border and internal security pressures, creating the conditions for a strong and dynamic civil society. Without functioning institutions, states face the breakdown of social and political order.” Nagl believes that “the U.S. can

achieve national policy goals of strengthening states with weak institutions through SFA.”

He posits that the U.S. military must embrace the advisor component of SFA and be prepared to conduct it since support to partner governments and weak states will continue to remain a national security obligation.

In a recent article published by Small Wars Journal, Kip Whittington, a research associate at the National Defense University, believes that institutional advisor programs, while existing, often take a backseat to combat operations advisory missions. In the context of current operations in Afghanistan, Whittington believes that building capable indigenous national security institutions meets U.S. and international security interests of ensuring a country is free of terrorist sanctuaries; will not descend into civil war or destabilize regional neighbors; become a battleground for regional proxy wars; and become economically embedded in the regional trading systems.

29Ibid., 11.
30Ibid.
networks. Whittington concludes that without advisors organizing indigenous security forces institutions a weak state, especially Afghanistan could become a failed state.

In 2010, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed that while the U.S. military has made “great strides in building the operational capacity of partner countries and mentoring their armies in the field, there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital needed to sustain security over the long term.” According to Secretary Gates, “the U.S. now recognizes that the security sectors of at-risk countries are really systems of systems tying together the military, the police, the justice system, and other governance and oversight mechanisms.” Secretary Gates goes on to state that well integrated training and assistance efforts can achieve real success in this arena and that helping

32Ibid., 1.
33Ibid.
35Ibid.
other countries provide their own security is a key task and a critical part of protecting U.S. security as well.36

Institutions are key to the security of a country and the development of its indigenous security forces. The articles suggest that U.S. military advisors are capable of improving the security of a country by improving the internal institutions. The articles also suggest that U.S. military advisors will improve indigenous security forces by improving institutions.

**Training**

In the ongoing effort to develop Afghan security forces, Lieutenant General William Caldwell, former commander of NATO Training Mission Afghanistan, points out that “We have found that to create an enduring, self sustaining Afghan security force we need leaders. Therefore, we have begun to focus on increasing the quality of the personnel in the Afghan National Security Forces. To increase quality, programs were reoriented to place greater emphasis

on the factors that lead to a professional security force: education, training, and leadership.”

Leadership training has increased through courses for all levels, from junior noncommissioned officers (NCO) to senior officers. Troop Leader Courses, NCO Staff Courses, and a Sergeants Major Academy are now developing nascent NCO Corps. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan, Company Commanders course, a Staff College, and the National Security University are all either running or in development with the goal to create a competent Officer Corps. Lieutenant General Caldwell concludes that by educating and developing the Afghan National Security Forces, “the U.S. ensures that Afghanistan will have a competent security force that will not leave to ensure its national safety.”

John Martin, a retired U.S. Army Colonel and a Visiting Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, wrote an article in the

38Ibid., 75.
Military Review addressing training indigenous security forces. He states that the key to hedging against the selection of poor leaders is investing in leader training and education through the establishment of pre-commissioning and junior officer tactical training, operational training and education for mid-grade officers and some capstone level for the higher operational and strategic leadership. Martin also advocates a similar comprehensive training and education program for NCOs in order to develop them to the same standard as NCOs in western armies. This training and education of indigenous security forces leaders is only one of three pillars that Martin advocates for successfully building an indigenous security force but it is a key one.

In an article that appeared in the Journal of International Security Assistance Management Beth McCormick, former Deputy Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and Scott Schless, DSCA’s Principal Director for Strategy, argue that training


41Ibid.
and education is the foundation of building capacity of partner nations.42 The Department of Defense must “provide traditional military education and training opportunities to foreign partners, but also must ensure that U.S. personnel have the training and resources to provide those resources.” They conclude, “The correct mix of technical training, academic exposure, and hands-on learning, can affect the entire security cooperation community” in a partner state.43

The literature suggests that indigenous security forces that are educated and trained in academies and schools with the assistance of U.S. military advisors are more capable of providing security in their country. The education and training provided by U.S. military advisors also serve to professionalize the indigenous security forces.


Equipping

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates laid out the requirement for the U.S. military to conduct not just training of indigenous security forces but equipping indigenous security forces in a February 2011 speech at the U.S. Military Academy.\textsuperscript{44} Secretary Gates sees the requirement to equip indigenous security forces, as a key component of security force assistance, not just in the current conflicts but also in conflicts of the future and there is a need to institutionalize this requirement within the U.S. military.\textsuperscript{45}

John Martin describes equipping to standard as a portion of one of his three pillars of indigenous security forces training. In the case of equipping the New Iraqi Army their soldiers were familiar with former Warsaw pact equipment and knew how to maintain it. The Iraqi government had a better chance of being able to afford the acquisition, operation and


\textsuperscript{45}Ibid.
maintenance of former Warsaw Pact equipment. In addition, a force equipped with Warsaw Pact equipment and well trained on how to use it, which the U.S. intended to make the New Iraqi Army, could, at the least, thwart the achievement of an enemy equipped with superior equipment.46

Derek Reveron, a professor at the Naval War College, believes that the U.S. can “improve its national image, strengthen the state sovereignty system, preempt localized violence from escalating, and protect national security” by not just training indigenous security forces but by equipping them as well.47 Reveron continues by stating that, “Equipping indigenous forces to protect and control their territory is important for long term stability.”48 Reveron concludes, “with few exceptions, U.S. partners’ security forces are too small, poorly equipped and, ill trained” to effectively monitor and secure their borders from intra state and extra state actors that seek to

47Derek Reveron, “Weak States and Security Assistance,” Prism 1, no. 3 (June 2010): 27.
48Ibid., 28.
exploit those deficiencies and that the U.S. should strengthen not just its training program but its equipping program to develop partners capacity.\textsuperscript{49}

The literature suggests that equipping is a key piece of developing indigenous security forces. The right equipment and the training to use that equipment provide indigenous security forces the means to secure their borders. The literature also suggests tailoring the equipment provided in order to meet the indigenous security forces finances as well as its operational needs.

**Infrastructure**

Adil Shamoo, a senior analyst at Foreign Policy in Focus, believes that the construction of roads, schools and other projects, along with necessary security infrastructure in support of indigenous governments is an “important and accepted paradigm for the conduct of war in this century.”\textsuperscript{50} This infrastructure building should focus “not just on providing security and propping

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., 40.

up U.S.-friendly governments” but also build “the political and economic infrastructure for sustainable economic reconstruction and democratic institutions.” 51

Candace Karp, a former Special Assistant to the President of Afghanistan’s Senior Economic Advisor, states that, in Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, consisting of both civilian and military advisors, strengthen the process of state building by utilizing sub-national governance structures to identify Afghanistan’s development needs. 52 The provision of basic services and infrastructure development provided by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and their Afghan government counterparts allow the government to meet public expectations and can increase perceptions of government legitimacy and security. 53

According to Brigadier General Bruce Bingham, former Commander of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, only the U.S. military has the logistics to

51 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 5.
operate in devastated or conflict areas.\textsuperscript{54} In these areas, the mission is to restore stability through establishing a safe, secure environment, promoting conditions for economic growth and developing a long-term infrastructure development plan.\textsuperscript{55} Brigadier General Bingham states that only soldiers, specifically civil affairs advisors, can address issues in a conflict area that have both military and civilian implications.\textsuperscript{56} It was civil affairs advisors working with government ministries that restored essential services in Panama following Operation Just Cause, Kuwait following Operation Desert Storm, and Haiti following Operation Uphold Democracy.\textsuperscript{57}

The literature implies that infrastructure and essential services directly affect security. The literature also suggests that when U.S. military advisors work with indigenous security forces and civilians to improve infrastructure and essential services in a country then stability and


\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., 53.

\textsuperscript{56}Bingham, “U.S. Army Civil Affairs Ministerial Advisory Teams Deploy to Haiti,” 62.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., 53.
security improves. Through the improvement of security and infrastructure, U.S. military advisors also directly improve the legitimacy of indigenous government.

The literature suggests five hypotheses about U.S. military advisors: When U.S. military advisors advise and assist indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. When U.S. military advisors organize indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. When U.S. military advisors train indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. When U.S. military advisors equip indigenous security then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. When U.S. military advisors rebuild or build indigenous security forces infrastructure then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. These hypotheses provide the base of the study. The next section of the study explains the methodology that the study will use to test these hypotheses and build the case to prove or disprove the thesis.

**Methodology**

George and Bennett point out that the case study approach is a detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable.
to other events. They further argue that that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies are the use of a combination of within case analysis and cross-case comparisons. In order to comply with Bennett and George and to understand the task of advisors to build an army under the auspices of SFA; the study will look at three case studies: The Joint U.S. Military Advising and Planning Group in Greece (JUSMAPG-G) from 1947-1950; Army Mission Headquarters Iran (ARMISH) from 1957-1960; and Military Advisory and Assistance Group – Vietnam (MAAG-V) from 1950-1964. These cases will allow the study to directly compare the effects of military advisors and MAAGs as a subset of SFA and within the security sector reform plan that helps achieve the U.S. national strategic objective.

The study uses the method of structured, focused comparison to analyze the case studies. George and Bennett describe this as a simple and straightforward method that is structured in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions


59 Ibid., 17.
are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and accumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The dealing with only certain aspects of the historical cases focuses the method.\textsuperscript{60} The method requires focusing the study: that is, a specific research objective related to the theoretical focus guides the study.\textsuperscript{61} The research objective for the study is to determine how MAAGs in Greece, Iran and Vietnam were effective, or ineffective, in building indigenous security forces through the SFA component of security sector reform theory.

The in-depth historical examination of the three cases provides variance on key concepts such as national strategic objectives, the operational approach taken to achieve the objective, and the use of a variety of military means to also achieve the objectives. For example, the creation of JUSMAPG-G occurred during the demobilization of the U.S. military following World War II, at the outset of the Cold War, and was an initial manifestation of the national security strategy of

\textsuperscript{60}Bennett and George, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development}, 67.

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., 70.
containment. ARMISH grew out of activities begun during World War II, but assumed a new priority as the U.S. found itself increasingly involved in the Cold War in Europe, the Korean Peninsula, and Vietnam. Finally, MAAG-V initially supported the French efforts to maintain internal security, only to see their mission change with the withdrawal of the French and the subsequent change of U.S. national security objectives.

Additionally the use of advisors in these cases was a matter of choice. There was no direct threat to the U.S. by the ongoing violence, or the threat of violence, in the countries represented in the cases. The U.S. military could have recommended not sending assets of any kind to provide assistance or they could have recommended the insertion of large-scale combat units. Instead, the U.S. military made the choice to send advisors.

Several questions derived from the hypotheses guide the study. The important device of formulating a set of standardized, general questions to ask of each case will be of value only if those questions are grounded in – and adequately reflect – the theoretical perspective and research
objectives of the study. This study will use the following questions to focus the comparison across and within cases:

What were the U.S. national strategic objectives? This question assists in determining the type of army that advisors are expected to build in support of the objectives. If the objective was to build an army to promote internal security within the country then that is what advisors will do. If on the other hand the objective is to assist the country in defense against an attack from a neighboring country then the operational approach will be different.

What operational approach did the U.S. military take to achieve these objectives? This question contributes to the type of tasks that the advisors train the indigenous security forces on that they are assisting. If the objective were to establish a legitimate indigenous security forces, then advisors would focus advising and assisting organizations such as indigenous security forces units or security ministries. Advisors could also establish and work in academies or training institutions in order establish a legitimate indigenous security force. If the national objective were

just to improve an indigenous security force’s capabilities then advisors would focus on equipping the indigenous security forces and training them to use the equipment. The operational approach could also be a combination of different methods if that meets the national strategic objective.

Were U.S. military advisors or some other military means allocated to implement the operational approach? This question deals with the type of security force assistance that the U.S. military provided, was the assistance in the form of advisors to assist the indigenous security forces or in the form of combat forces to accomplish the task instead of indigenous security forces.

How did the U.S. military advisors organize indigenous security forces? This question examines the organizations that the advisors established as part of their mission. The answers will reveal if advisors stood up units from the tactical level to units and organizations, such as ministries, that were capable of providing operational and strategic guidance. The question also addresses how advisors assisted with the development of organizations that helped build the indigenous security forces capability and capacity in personnel, logistics and intelligence. Finally it looks at the organizations and units developed and if they reflected the indigenous security forces own unique requirements, interests, and capabilities and not just organizations and units that mirrored existing external institutions.

Did the U.S. military advisors support operational level planning? This question examines the role of the advisor while the indigenous security force was planning operations. It will reveal whether or not if the advisor provided operational advice or if the indigenous security forces planned their own missions without assistance from the advisors.
Did the U.S. military advisors provide operational units advice during combat operations? This question is an attempt to examine the role of the advisor while the indigenous security force was conducting combat operations. This is important as it will reveal the extent of integration of advisors within the indigenous security forces and whether or not if the advisor provided operational advice or if the indigenous security forces executed their own missions without assistance from the advisors.

Did U.S. military advisors train indigenous security forces? This question explores the institutions for training that advisors established. It will look at not just the collective training that takes place in units, but in the individual training that takes place in training centers, and officer and non-commissioned officer academies. This can establish a measure of effectiveness; the expectation of individuals trained in training centers or academies and in units that have received collective training is that, they perform at a higher level than individuals or units that have not.

Did U.S. military advisors provide equipment to indigenous security forces? This question explores the equipment that advisors provided to indigenous security forces. It will examine the appropriateness for the physical environment or region, as well as the indigenous security forces capability to maintain and operate the equipment.

Did U.S. military advisors rebuild or build new infrastructure to support indigenous security forces? This question examines the role the advisors took in building physical structures such as bases, training centers, academies, and depots, as well as the command and control and logistics infrastructures used by the indigenous security forces.
The Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group – Greece (JUSMAPG-G) 1947–1950

How does using advisors to build foreign national Armies as a way to efficiently achieve national strategic objectives fare against the evidence? This section presents the first of three case studies. The results tend to corroborate the theory as an early example of the use of advisors to achieve U.S. national security objectives.

The section provides a test of the case study of the Joint United States Military Advising and Planning Group – Greece (JUSMAPG-G) from 1947-1950. The argument is that the details of JUSMAPG-G support the assertions in the current literature on the use of advisors to achieve national security objectives. The use of advisors in Greece set a powerful precedent as a way to use limited numbers of U.S. military personnel in an advisory role to achieve national strategic objectives. As an institution, the U.S. military had largely forgotten that lesson by the outbreak of the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The study will develop an argument that advisors are an efficient way to achieve national strategic objectives in six steps. First, is the motivation for selecting JUSMAPG-G as a case study. Second, is an outline of the main events. Third, is to develop values for the key independent variables. Fourth, is to assess the role of advisors during the period under consideration. Fifth, is to assess the theory and considerations of other explanations of the JUSMAPG-G outcome. A brief summary assessment will follow.

There are many reasons why the U.S. should not have used advisors during the Greek Civil War; however, they used advisors anyway. The war began with the size of the U.S. military and its budget nearly at its peak World War II levels. Aside from constabulary duties in Europe, the U.S. faced very few other competing military requirements around the world during the time...
of the Greek Civil War. More importantly, the number of soldiers committed as advisors in
Greece was smaller than the number of soldiers committed in interventions in the coming
decades.

Scholars have studied the operations in Greece extensively in the context of the emerging
U.S. security police of containment and as a manifestation of the Truman Doctrine in which the
U.S. demonstrated its willingness and ability to deploy troops to a country or a region in order to
achieve stated national security objectives. The study of using smaller numbers of troops as
advisors and their ability to affect national security strategy outcomes is not as widespread.

The origins of JUSMAPG-G began with the liberation of Greece by British troops in
conjunction with Greek partisans, including communist party members, in October 1944.
Following liberation, an interim government was established with a predominately, anti-
Communist governmental institutions.\(^6^3\) Tensions began to rise between the Communists and the

Greek government. The tipping point finally occurred in Athens on December 1944, when government security forces fired on a Communist organized demonstration.\textsuperscript{64} The resulting conflict pitted former Communist partisan units against Greek security forces, former non-Communist partisan forces and British troops. Communist forces disbanded and turned over their weapons after a ceasefire in early 1945. The Communists, ostracized from the resulting political developments, abstained from the plebiscite that returned the anti-Communist Greek monarchy to power.\textsuperscript{65}

After the liberation of Greece, Great Britain maintained 14,000 combat troops in Greece as well as almost 1,400 advisors in a British Military Mission (BMM) that was responsible for the training of the Greek National Army (GNA).\textsuperscript{66} The BMM was responsible for providing small arms, artillery, clothing, and miscellaneous supplies to the GNA, in addition to its training

\textsuperscript{64}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65}Ibid., 10.
responsibilities. As 1945 continued, the legacies of German occupation lingered. The Greek transportation and communication network were in ruins, famine ravaged the countryside, and inflation soared out of control.\textsuperscript{67} By 1946, the Greek communist party, frozen out of the political process; facing persecution and watching the economy worsen made the decision to move into the border regions with communist Albania and Yugoslavia and start a rebellion against the British backed Greek monarchy.

By late 1946, the situation in Greece had worsened to the point that Lincoln MacVeagh, the American Ambassador to Greece, worried that BMM’s efforts to train and equip the GNA would fall short and that the Greek economy needed assistance “soonest.”\textsuperscript{68} By early 1947, it was clear to State Department officials that the U.S. would have to shoulder the burden for continued


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aid to Greece. It was not long after this realization, that the British government notified the Truman administration that it intended to stop its economic and military aid to Greece in March 1947. The decision to send economic and military aid to Greece was the catalyst for a March 12, 1947 speech by President Harry Truman where he requested permission to send “civilian and military personnel to assist with the reconstruction of Greece as well as the training of selected Greek personnel.” The U.S. had now committed to the use of advisors in Greece.

What were the U.S. national strategic objectives in Greece? President Truman, in his March 12, 1947 speech before a Joint Session of Congress, stated that one of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the U.S. is “the creation of conditions in which we and other


nations will work out a way of life free from coercion.”

In order to achieve that foreign policy objective the U.S. “must help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes…” and that the U.S. must assume a policy “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

As this policy specifically applies to Greece, the President stated, “If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East…” moreover he stated that it “would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of


73Ibid.
war.” 74 In short, the President laid out a strategic objective to support the Greek government and prevent its overthrow by an armed minority.

The strategic objectives in Greece were further refined when the first contingent of American military advisors arrived in Greece as part of the U.S. Army Group Greece (USAG-G) and General William Livesay, commander of USAG-G, and Greek officials consummated the aid agreement by signing the “Aid to Greece” treaty.75 The formal signing of the treaty took place on June 20, 1947, after the passage of Public Law 75, and laid out the U.S. objectives as “avert economic crisis, promote national recovery, and restore internal tranquility.”76

What operational approach did the U.S. military take to achieve its national strategic objectives? President Truman laid out the operational approach in Greece during his March 12, 1947 speech, where he requested funds for economic and military assistance. Additionally, the

74Ibid.
75 Howard Jones, A New Kind of War, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1989), 70.
76“Aid to Greece,” June 20, 1947, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements 9 (1971): 403.
President asked Congress for authorization to provide authority to supply “needed commodities, supplies and equipment.” To supervise the implementation of those funds and any material aid that was to be supplied the President requested that American military and civilian personnel be sent to Greece. The President also requested training and instruction for selected Greek personnel on the aid provided.77

Dwight Griswold, as the Chief of the American Mission to Aid Greece, was responsible for administering both economic and military aid to Greece. Secretary of State George C. Marshall tasked him to preserve Greek independence and integrity by promoting domestic security and economic rehabilitation. Griswold was to work with Ambassador MacVeagh in making discreet suggestions that would lead Greek leaders to believe that they had made changes

on their own. If he found incompetent or non-cooperative Greek officials, he was to quietly effect their removal in a way that would cause minimal resentment.\textsuperscript{78}

The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), at the request of Undersecretary Acheson, further refined the President’s requests to reflect military aid consisting of “partial equipment for and partial maintenance of [an] Army of 115,000; Gendarmerie of 50,000; and Pioneer force of 5,000; maintenance of a small craft Navy and a strength [of] 13,000; partial equipment for and maintenance of one composite [air] group numbering 5,000”.\textsuperscript{79}

General Livesay, as head of the USAGG, understood that he was responsible to advise the Greeks on the use of provided military equipment. He was only to attend meetings of the High Greek Military Council at the invitation of the Greek government. When present at a meeting, he was only an observer and could only advise on logistical issues or problems.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{80}William Livesay, May 29, June 13, 1947, Livesay Diary, Livesay Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Military Barracks, PA.
Did the U.S. use military advisors or were some other means allocated to implement the operational approach in Greece? The Greek government in its initial request for assistance had specifically asked for “the aid of experienced American administrative, economic and technical personnel to assure the utilization in an effective and up-to-date manner of the financial and other assistance to Greece.”  

In other words, the Greeks asked for economic and administrative advisors in addition to the military advisors.

The 80th Congress passed Public Law 75 on May 22, 1947. Public Law 75 authorized the establishment of the American Mission to Aid Greece. A chief, who would supervise all expenditures and administer both civilian and military assistance programs while keeping the ambassador fully informed, headed the mission. Public Law 75 permitted the utilization of any

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civilian employee of the U.S. government in order to assist the Greek Government. \(^{82}\) The initial commitment of civilian personnel to the American Mission to Aid Greece was 40 personnel but it would soon grow to 175. \(^{83}\) In addition to the civilian personnel advisors advocated by Public law 75, SWCC 360 recommended that in support of already developed programs that U.S. military personal be maintained in an advisory capacity, military supplies and equipment be provided as well as training of key personnel. \(^{84}\)

Did the U.S. military advisors organize or reorganize indigenous security forces? By the end of 1947, the situation in Greece had become such that economic development was ineffective


\(^{83}\) Jones, *A New Kind of War*, 61.

without an improvement in the security situation.\textsuperscript{85} The focus began to lean more heavily on the GNA rather than the Greek economy. In October 1947, the USAG-G recommended to the DoS, with the concurrence of Griswold, that the Greek security forces reorganize. USAG-G recommended that the National Defense Corps grow by 16,000 troops to approximately 32 battalions of 50,000 troops. The GNA increased in size from 100,000 to 132,000 men. More importantly, USAG-G advised the Greek High Military Council to refocus the GNA from garrison duties in cleared areas to chasing down guerrillas. The Gendarmerie and the National Defense Corps, consisting of locally recruited members, then assumed the task of securing towns and villages previously held by the GNA.\textsuperscript{86}

Public Law 75 provided provisions for both economic and military aid assistance to the Greek government in accordance with the President’s request to Congress. Public Law 75 allotted

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\textsuperscript{85} Dwight Eisenhower, October 22, 1947, Memo to Secretary of the Army, Army Staff Records, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Military Barracks, PA.

President Truman, in his report to Congress, attributed many reconstruction projects funded under Public Law 75 as having direct effect on assisting military operations in Greece. Those projects directly referenced included the resurfacing of main highways, reconstruction work at the ports of Piraeus, Salonika, and Volos; the rebuilding of railroad bridges and rail track and the improvements at eight airfields.

After the expiration of Public Law 75 in July 1948, Secretary of State Marshall requested additional funds for fiscal year 1949. Congress approved economic aid funding of $146,000,000.


for fiscal year 1949.\textsuperscript{90} The administration of this allotment and other economic aid to Greece after
the expiration of Public Law 75 came under the oversight of the Economic Cooperation
Administration Mission to Greece, a subset of the Marshall Plan. Paul Porter, the chief of the
Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece from 1949 -1950, related that he and
his office worked to establish the Greek national power network at a cost of about $100,000,000
in order to spur the development of industry in Greece. Additionally, his office worked to
improve and build additions to the road network at the insistence of the military and to allow the
movement of fresh produce throughout the country.\textsuperscript{91}

Did U.S. military advisors provide equipment to indigenous security forces? In February
of 1947, the President authorized the drafting of legislation that “authorized the expeditious
transfer of military and other supplies to the Greek government.”\textsuperscript{92} Public Law 75, enacted May

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid., 197.
\textsuperscript{91}Paul R. Porter, interview by Richard McKinzie and Theodore Wilson, Reston, VA, November
22, 1947 provided $400,000,000 to be used “to procure by manufacture or otherwise and the transfer to Greece of any articles”…“in such a manner and amounts as the President deems necessary.”93 In short, the President had asked Congress for permission to transfer military equipment to the government of Greece and Public Law 75 provided the funding to grant the President’s request.

Specific military equipment provided by advisors included SB2C Helldivers aircraft, heavy machine guns, 75-mm pack howitzers, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and small arms to the GNA. Advisors then took the obsolete British weapons formerly in service with the GNA and provided them to the National Defense Corps, replacing a mixed collection of German and Italian small arms captured during World War II and increasing morale and effectiveness of all involved formations.94


After the GNA’s 1948 summer campaign failed to destroy the guerrilla forces and seal the northern Greek borders, U.S. military advisors implemented an intense six-week basic training program that trained 15,000 soldiers. Those soldiers then reported to the GNA field divisions. The training emphasized fundamental soldier skills and culminated in company and battalion level exercises. U.S. and Greek instructors taught close cooperation between infantry, artillery, and air support during unit training. Advisors also emphasized the use of fire support to suppress enemy defensive positions and followed by infantry assaults under the cover of the fire support.

U.S. advisors also instructed the GNA on how to use the equipment provided to them. The advisors taught tactics, techniques and procedures on how to use provided equipment in order to overcome the pillboxes and reverse slope defenses constructed by the guerrillas.

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95 James Van Fleet, interview by Bruce Williams, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, Carlisle Barracks, PA., vol 3, 20.


General James Van Fleet, commander of the recently established Joint U.S. Military Planning and Assistance Group – Greece, reinforced these lessons and others in a written report to commander of the GNA, General Alexander Papagos. General Van Fleet wrote, “Every day of free time must be devoted to training. Commanders must not be satisfied with mediocre results; they must demand and receive the best. In combat, they must be prepared to pursue relentlessly day and night, regardless of local boundaries. They must have and must instill in their commands, the will and burning desire to close with the enemy at all times.”

Did the U.S. military advisors support operational level planning during the Greek Civil War? As U.S. military advisors and Greek cadre were training the Greek National Army in late 1948, the U.S. Department of the Army sent General Stephen Chamberlin to study the military situation in Greece and to make recommendations on future courses of action. General Chamberlin recommended that the U.S. extend operational advice to the GNA and in order to do so “a joint military planning staff nominally under the ambassador be established.” He further

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98Ibid., 191.
recommended placement of advisors within the GNA down to the division level to assist with operational planning and report developments back to the joint military planning staff. The President approved his recommendation in November. 99 90 officers and 80 enlisted men departed for Greece to join the advisors already in place. 101 These additional personnel formed the initial core of JUSMAPG-G

General Van Fleet and General Papagos sat down in late 1948 and developed a strategy to defeat the guerrilla forces inside Greece. The two generals developed a strategy “that would start at the bottom of Greece, in the Peloponnese, and systematically clear the guerrillas out of the countryside, from north to south.” 102 The staff of JUSMAPG-G and the Greek General Staff issued a plan that called for the GNA to deploy in force and to encircle wide areas with depth in

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100 Ibid., 390 n.
101 Jones, A New Kind of War, 107.
102 Braim, The Will to Win, 200.
combat formations. Within two months of the launch of Operation Pigeon, the GNA had effectively ended guerrilla resistance in the Peloponnese.\textsuperscript{103}

Following the success of Operation Pigeon, the Greek General Staff and the GNA, with the help of JUSMAPG-G, planned and executed Operation Rocket in central Greece. This operation built upon the effects of Operation Pigeon and effectively pushed the guerrilla forces back to their traditional strongholds in northern Greece.\textsuperscript{104}

As spring turned to summer in 1949, the JUSMAPG-G and Greek General Staff began planning another major offensive, Operation Torch.\textsuperscript{105} The joint staffs developed a plan that included a deception plan that looked like the previous summer’s clear and hold attacks in the same area, while the main effort would encircle and cut off the guerrillas from the sanctuaries across the border in Albania and Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{106} Operation Torch inflicted heavy casualties on the

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\textsuperscript{103}Ibid., 201-203.
\textsuperscript{104}Braim, \textit{The Will to Win}, 207.
\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., 214.
\textsuperscript{106}Ibid., 215.
guerrillas causing them to cease to exist as a coherent organization. Furthermore, the GNA deprived those guerrillas that remained of tons of captured supplies.107

Did the U.S. military advisors provide operational units advice during combat operations? Once the President approved U.S. advisors to assist with operational planning they immediately went to work. Advisors went out with companies and platoons in order to observe operations and to offer advice to Greek commanders in the field.108 While in the field those officers had to be careful not to lead Greek troops in combat, a violation of their directive to neither participate in actual combat nor to take command Greek troops that were in involved in combat operations. Despite reports of that U.S. military advisors were leading in troops in combat, an internal U.S. Army inquiry found that advisors were only accompanying troops into battle and offering operational advice.109

107Ibid., 218-219.
108Jones, A New Kind of War, 128-129.
109Jones, A New Kind of War, 107.
During their observation of Greek combat missions, advisors placed an emphasis on night movements, aggressive action at the platoon and company level and the need to demand results up and down the chain of command.\textsuperscript{110} The advisors were reinforcing the training that many of the GNA soldiers had received in the winter of 1948.

Hypothesis one states that when U.S. military advisors advise and assist indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations was found to be supported. U.S. military advisors advised and assisted the GNA by providing operational advice at the division level and by providing lower echelon operational units with advice and assistance during combat operations against guerrilla forces. Thus, the evidence supports hypothesis one.

Hypothesis two states that when U.S. military advisors organize indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations);

\textsuperscript{110}Braith, \textit{The Will to Win}, 183-185.
capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations was supported. U.S. military advisors in Greece reorganized the GNA by increasing its size and changing its focus from garrison operations controlling cleared towns and villages to chasing down guerrilla formations along the northern border. Advisors also increased the size of and changed the focus of other security forces, such as the Gendarmerie and the National Defense Corps. Thus, the evidence supports hypothesis two.

Hypothesis three states that when U.S. military advisors train indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. Advisors in Greece devised a training plan for both individual soldiers and for operational units from squad to battalion size. Advisors provided soldiers training on the employment of new equipment such as recoilless rifles, Helldiver airplanes and pack howitzers. Advisors trained soldiers and units on techniques on how to integrate new equipment into all levels of operations. Thus, the evidence supports hypothesis three.

Hypotheses four states that when U.S. military advisors equip indigenous security then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations was supported. Advisors provided new equipment to the GNA. Recoilless rifles, pack howitzers, heavy machine guns and aircraft allowed the GNA to counter defensive tactics adopted by guerrillas in the mountains. The provision of new American small arms to the GNA allowed the National Defense Corps to standardize their equipment with British equipment rather than the mixed German and Italian equipment previously utilized. Thus, the evidence supports hypothesis four.
Hypotheses five states that when U.S. military advisors rebuild or build indigenous security forces infrastructure then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or army capable of offensive operations, showed mix results. The provision of economic aid to Greece in order to assist in reconstruction of infrastructure was a part of the aid package to Greece, and President Truman directly related the effects of the economic aid to assisting with the defeat of the guerrillas. Thus, the evidence supports hypothesis five.

The case of JUSMAPG-G supports the study’s thesis. The use of advisors to build the GNA helped to efficiently achieve the U.S. strategic objectives in Greece. The advisors clearly understood that they were to build an army capable of maintaining internal stability and security. Advisors accomplished the U.S. national strategic objectives by advising and assisting, organizing, training and equipping the Greek National Army and other Greek security forces. Advisors administered economic aid in order to rebuild or build infrastructure for indigenous security forces and the whole country but those efforts were secondary to the other tasks.

**Army Mission Headquarters Iran (ARMISH) from 1957-1960**

This section presents the second of three case studies. The results tend to corroborate the theory as an early example of the use of advisors to achieve U.S. national security objectives. The section provides a test of the case study Army Mission Headquarters–Iran from 1957-1960. The argument is that the details of ARMISH support the assertions in the current literature on the use of advisors to achieve national security objectives. The use of advisors in Iran reinforced the precedent previously established by the use of advisors in Greece as a way to use limited numbers of U.S. military personnel in an advisory role to achieve national strategic objectives. As
mentioned previously the U.S. military had largely forgotten this lesson learned in Greece and reinforced in Iran by the outbreak of the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As with the previous case study, this study will develop the argument that advisors are an efficient way to achieve national strategic objectives in five steps. First, is the motivation for selecting ARMISH as a case study. Second, is an outline of the main events. Third, is to develop values for the key independent variables. Fourth, is to assess the role of advisors during the period under consideration. Fifth, is to assess the theory and considerations of other explanations of the ARMISH outcome. A brief summary assessment then follows.

There are many reasons why the U.S. needed to use advisors in Iran from 1957-1960. The late 1950’s found the U.S. recovering from the conflict on the Korean peninsula and forced to maintain large numbers of combat troops in case of violations of the 1953 ceasefire. The U.S. also maintained large numbers of troops in Europe to counter the threat of Soviet invasion. Finally, the U.S. was becoming increasingly involved in Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Accords. With competing military requirements around the globe and the recent success of military advisors in Greece, it made sense to deploy military advisors to Iran.

Scholars have studied the operations in Iran mainly from the standpoint of an extension of the U.S. containment policies of the Cold War, the provision of military equipment to non-Soviet aligned states, and as a manifestation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The new doctrine authorized the President to employ American armed forces, as he deemed necessary, to protect the independence and integrity of any nation or group of nations in the Middle East requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism. The use of advisors in Greece and Vietnam overshadows the study of advisors and their affect on
national security strategy outcomes in Iran. Finally, the Korean Conflict and the larger context of the Cold War during the 1950’s cast additional shadows on the U.S. involvement in Iran.

An early version of ARMISH, along with the Gendarmerie Mission Headquarters an effort to build up and aid the Iranian Gendarmerie or rural police force, began operating in Iran during World War II. These military advisory missions coupled with the presence of other missions to assist various facets of the Iranian government and the presence of 30,000 Allied troops tasked with keeping supply lines to the Soviet Union open gave the U.S. a foothold in Iran prior to the outbreak of the Cold War. The effects of relationships built during World War II would assist U.S. efforts to use Iran as a key piece of its containment policy during the 1950s.

Following the end of World War II, the U.S. remained involved in Iran in an effort to force Soviet troops to withdraw from the northwest Iranian province of Azerbaijan. According to the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, Soviet Union, and Iran, all foreign forces were to withdraw within six months of the end of World War II. The Soviets delayed the withdrawal of their soldiers for numerous reasons: the security of their oil concessions; support of
communist groups and separatist movements; as well as an attempt to force additional oil, economic, and general political concessions. The U.S. ambassadors to the Soviet Union, first Averell Harriman then Walter Bedell Smith, worked with Joseph Stalin to ensure the withdrawal of Soviet troops without Iranian concessions.

The next involvement of the U.S. in Iran was during the oil nationalization crises of 1951-1953. During this time, a split in the Iranian government occurred as Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddiq and his party voted to nationalize British oil concessions against the wishes of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Initially, the U.S. tried to mediate this process but over time the U.S. stance became confrontational as the fear of instability in Iran would eventually lead to communist control of Iran, and the subsequent loss of U.S. access to oil in Iran and other

In August of 1953, the U.S. and Britain, in cooperation with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the majority of the Iranian military, as well as other conservative groups in Iran overthrew the Musaddiq led government. The U.S. support of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the establishment of a pro-monarchy government in Iran gave the U.S. an important, economic, political, and strategic ally in the Middle East. The U.S. would soon employ advisors to ensure that their Middle Eastern ally would help it achieve their national strategic objectives.

What were the U.S. national strategic objectives in Iran? In the closing sentence of a letter from President Dwight Eisenhower to Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, dated December 12, 1956, the President began to reveal the beginnings of the U.S. national strategic objectives in Iran when he stated that, “I continue to regard any threats to Iran’s territorial integrity and political

115 Ibid., 42.
independence as a matter of the utmost gravity.”116 That sentence initially crafted by the DoS and forwarded to the President for his approval became the basis for a new doctrine for the Middle East.

President Eisenhower publicly announced the U.S. national security objectives for the Middle East in speech to a joint session of Congress on January 5, 1957. This speech requested that Congress pass a bill that consisted of three points relative to the Iran and the Middle East as a whole. First, the President proposed to “authorize the U.S. to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.”117 Second, the President requested authorization “to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation


with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid.”\footnote{Ibid.} Finally, the President requested that Congress “authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the U.S. to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.”\footnote{Dwight Eisenhower, “Speech as Delivered by President of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, at a Joint Session of Congress, Washington, D.C., January 5, 1957.” (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11007#axzz1v45wG2vs accessed July 18, 2012).} The President went on to state that the legislation is primarily designed “to deal with the possibility of Communist aggression, direct and indirect.”\footnote{Ibid.} The application of President Eisenhower’s request for legislation formed the basis of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Eisenhower Doctrine, in respect to Iran, was further refined in National Security Council Resolution 5703/1, U.S. Policy Toward Iran, which President Eisenhower approved and directed immediate implementation of its tenets on February 8, 1957. This resolution laid out six

\footnote{Ibid.}
strategic objectives that the U.S. wanted to achieve in Iran: An independent, friendly Iran, free from Communist control; A strong stable government with the capability and determination to resist Soviet pressures, to prevent Communist penetration and to cooperate actively with the anti-Communist governments of the Free World; A government that can and will make maximum balanced use of all available resources in order to provide early and visible progress toward economic improvements that will meet rising popular expectations; Iranian armed forces capable of maintaining internal security and resisting external aggression by defense delaying action; Active Iranian participation in Northern Tier defense arrangements; Continued availability of Iranian oil to the Free World and denial of such resources to Communist-dominated areas.121 This National Security Council Resolution coupled with the President’s speech to Congress laid the foundations for the continued U.S. involvement in Iran during the latter half of the 1950s.

What operational approach did the U.S. military take to achieve U.S. national strategic objectives? The operational approach that the U.S. military would was laid out in NSC 5703/1, which directed the U.S. military to “provide necessary military assistance for the purpose of assisting Iran (1) to buildup, maintain and properly deploy armed forces which will be capable of maintaining internal security and with outside air and logistic support, fighting defensive delaying actions in northern Iran against Soviet forces; (2) to accomplish necessary military construction incident to this build up and redeployment.” The U.S. military was also to “encourage Iran to continue to participate actively and effectively in military cooperation with its neighbors”.

In addition to military support, the U.S. implemented an economic aid program in which funds were devoted to increasing Iran’s economic capability coupled with the provision of technical assistance in order to aid public administration. Additionally, NSC 5703/1 directed the country team to exert its influence to translate the country’s financial and economic resources

123Ibid.
124Ibid., 907.
more rapidly into tangible benefits for the masses and take effective steps to introduce better overall coordination and national planning of the use of the country's resources.\textsuperscript{125}

The continuing use of U.S. military advisors assigned to ARMISH, established in World War II, supported the operational approach described in NSC 5703/1. In the case of the invasion of Iran by the Soviet Union, NSC 5703/1 envisioned the U.S. and other allies providing logistics and air support while Iranian forces fought a defensive delaying action until additional forces arrived.

NSC 5703/1 also recommended the provision of funds to Iran to support the equipping, training, reorganization, and redeployment of Iranian security forces. NSC 5703/1 also recommended a sizable infrastructure construction program. NSC 5703/1 laid out estimates of the funds needed to achieve the operational approach, through fiscal year 1960.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{125}Ibid.

By 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had drawn up an outline of U.S. forces, other than the ARMY advisors, allocated to Iran in the case of a Soviet invasion. Forces allocated included nuclear demolition teams, teams training in the firing of artillery delivered nuclear munitions, Special Forces teams, four naval destroyers, and an Air Division with three fighter-bomber squadrons, two interceptor squadrons, and one each refueling, reconnaissance and troop carrier squadron. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also were prepared to implement contingency plans for the movement of forces from the U.S. or Europe as necessary. These allocated and contingency forces supported the Iranian Army’s defensive actions in the northern mountains.127

Did the U.S. military advisors organize or reorganize indigenous security forces? NSC 5703/1, on the recommendation of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, approved U.S. military aid to create, equip, maintain, and advise the following Iranian Army forces: six full strength infantry divisions of three regiments each; six reduced strength infantry division of one regiment and

support forces each; five reduced strength brigades. The Iranian Air Force was to have three fighter-bomber squadrons, one reconnaissance squadron, and one transport squadron. The Iranian Navy was to have three gunboats, four patrol craft, and four coastal minesweepers.¹²⁸

In 1958, in response to the Shah’s repeated requests for a larger army and in response to the coup in Iraq, President Eisenhower agreed to bring the reduced strength infantry divisions and independent brigades up to agreed upon operational strength of 85 percent.¹²⁹ The U.S. was to provide additional training assistance to accomplish this increase. The mission of the Iranian Army was still internal security and the defense of the country in case of a non-nuclear limited war.¹³⁰

Did the U.S. military advisors rebuild or build new infrastructure to support indigenous security forces in Iran? NSC 5703/1 contains a financial appendix that includes the provision of a sizeable construction program for troop housing, related facilities and airfields, in support of the

¹³⁰Ibid., 709.
reorganization and redeployment of Iranian security forces.\textsuperscript{131} NSC 5703/1 allocated the majority of construction funds to support the Iranian Army housing, access roads, and other facilities in the proposed defensive zone of the Elburz and Zagros mountains of northern Iran.

President Eisenhower’s Special Assistant to the Department of State, Ambassador James P. Richards, committed U.S. economic aid in order to improve other infrastructure in Iran. The aid funded Iran’s portion of a regional telecommunications network. Ambassador Richards also committed funds to complete the survey of the Iranian portion of a railway link between Iran and Turkey.\textsuperscript{132} These economic aids program were designed to assist with the economic development of the region but also established transportation and communications links between key U.S. allies in the Middle East in case of Soviet hostile action.

Did U.S. military advisors provide equipment to indigenous security forces? During 1957, U.S. military advisors provided F-84G fighter-bombers, recoilless rifles, an assortment of

\textsuperscript{132}\textit{Ibid.}, 925.
tanks, including the M48, and two and half ton 6x6 trucks to the Iranian Army. 133 This was the equipment that the U.S. envisioned the Iranian Army fighting a defensive action against any Soviet invasion.

Equipment continued to flow into Iran during 1958, with the Iranian Army receiving more M48 Patton tanks, the same tank front line U.S. Army armored units were equipped with, 155mm and 105mm howitzers, M36 and M18 tank destroyers, recoiless rifles, assorted trucks and various small arms. 134 The Iranian Air Force, received more F-84G fighter-bombers, C-47 transport planes and T-33 trainers as well as an assortment of other trainer and liaison planes. 135 The Iranian Navy received two coastal patrol boats and two large troop-landing ships. 136

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135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
The U.S. continued to provide equipment in 1959 and 1960, including nuclear capable 8-inch howitzers. In response to the Shah’s repeated requests for more modern equipment and his fears of a Soviet backed Iraqi invasion, after the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, the Iranian Air Force was provided with F-86 fighter-bombers and sidewinder missiles. The Iranian Navy received two corvette destroyers in 1959.

Did U.S. military advisors train Iranian security forces? By 1957, U.S. military advisors in the form of ARMISH had been in Iran since 1943. ARMISH expanded in the summer of 1955 to six teams consisting of 200 U.S. officers and enlisted personnel who worked with the Iranian Army down to the brigade level. At the time of NSC 5703/1 publication, the U.S.

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137 Ibid., 558.
139 Ibid., 652n.
141 Ibid., 707.
assessed the Shah and Iranian government officials and security forces as welcoming U.S. advisors without hostility while, at least, superficially accepting U.S. advice.\textsuperscript{142}

During 1958, U.S. advisors worked to improve the Replacement Training System for the Iranian Army, establish an Armor Training Center, and an Artillery Training Center.\textsuperscript{143} This was part of the plan in support of President Eisenhower’s letter to the Shah of July 1958 where he promised to bring the Iranian Army up to the agreed upon operational strength.\textsuperscript{144} This meant an addition of 32,000 more officers and men as well as the improvement of the Iranian Army’s armor and artillery formations as they trained in new facilities with U.S. advisors.\textsuperscript{145}

Did the U.S. military advisors support operational level planning with their Iranian counterparts? Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955.\textsuperscript{146} The Baghdad Pact was an alliance

\textsuperscript{142}Ibid., 929.
\textsuperscript{144}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{146}Ibid., 928.
consisting of Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey, that was committed to the mutual defense of the Middle East. In 1957, the U.S. accepted an invention to participate in the Baghdad Pact’s Military Committee and subsequently provided a Major General, who served as the Deputy Director of the Baghdad Pact’s Combined Military Planning Staff. The U.S. provided additional officers to the Combined Military Planning Staff who based their input into the Baghdad Pact’s planning for the defense of the region on the actual U.S. plans. Through the advisors and staff officers assigned to the Baghdad Pact the U.S. affected not just the regional security plan but also the development and integration of Iran’s strategic and operational level plans into the regional plan.

ARMISH integrated a planning staff with the Iranian Supreme Commander’s staff that focused on the training and equipping requirements of the Iranian army as well as prioritization of the receipt of U.S. provided equipment. Additionally, the task of the 303 military and civilian

148 Ibid., 580.
advisors assigned to ARMISH by 1958 was to work in close coordination with the Iranian security forces.\textsuperscript{149}

Did the U.S. military advisors provide operational units advice during combat operations? During the period examined for the case study, Iranian security forces were not involved in active combat operations with either insurgents or external aggressors. Therefore, U.S. military advisors did not provide operational advice to units during combat operations.

Hypothesis one states that when U.S. military advisors advise and assist indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations is supported. U.S. military advisors advised and assisted the Iranian Army by providing operational advice from the strategic level down to the brigade level.

Hypothesis two states that when U.S. military advisors organize indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations is supported. U.S. military advisors advised and assisted the Iranian Army by providing operational advice from the strategic level down to the brigade level.

\textsuperscript{149}\textit{Ibid.}, 556.
capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or army capable of offensive operations is supported. U.S. military advisors in Iran reorganized the Iranian Army by increasing its size and kept its focus on providing internal security and defending the country from an external invasion from the Soviet Union or an invasion by Soviet backed neighbors.

Hypothesis three states that when U.S. military advisors train indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations is supported. Advisors in Iran improved the replacement training for the Iranian Army and then developed specialized training centers. Advisors provided soldiers training on the employment of new equipment such as recoilless rifles, M48 tanks and 8-inch howitzers. Advisors trained soldiers and units on techniques on how to integrate new equipment into all levels of operations.

Hypotheses four states that when U.S. military advisors equip indigenous security then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations is supported. Advisors provided new equipment to the Iranian Army; recoilless rifles, tanks, howitzers and fighter-bombers allowed the Iranian security forces to defend Iran from an external threat as well as provide internal security.

Hypotheses five states that when U.S. military advisors rebuild or build indigenous security forces infrastructure then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations is supported. The U.S. built both military and civilian infrastructure in Iran that allowed it to defend its borders and provide internal security.
The case of ARMISH supports the study’s thesis. From 1957-1960, U.S. military advisors in Iran focused on reorganizing, training, equipping, and advising the Iranian Army in order to achieve the U.S. national strategic objectives in Iran. The advisors understood their task to build an army capable of maintaining internal security and to defend against an external threat, both real and perceived, to Iran. Despite the fact that advisors did not provide operational advice during combat operations, that was only because Iran was not at war against either internal or external forces during the period of the study. In essence, the ways and means allocated by the U.S. achieved the national strategic objectives in Iran between 1957 and 1960.

Military Advisory and Assistance Group – Vietnam (MAAG-V) 1950-1964

This section presents the final of three case studies the Military Advisory and Assistance Group – Vietnam (MAAG-V) from 1950-1964. The argument is that the details of MAAG-V support the assertions in the current literature on the use of advisors to achieve national security objectives. The previous case studies of JUSMAPG-G and ARMISH set the precedent and further reinforced the use of advisors in Vietnam as a way to use limited numbers of U.S. troops in an advisory role to achieve national strategic objectives. As mentioned previously, the U.S. military had largely forgotten this lesson learned in Greece and reinforced in Iran by the outbreak of the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As with the previous case studies, this study will develop the argument that advisors are an efficient way to achieve national strategic objectives in five steps. First, is the motivation for selecting MAAG-V as a case study. Second, is an outline of the main events. Third, is to develop values for the key independent variables. Fourth, is to assess the role of advisors during the period
under consideration. Fifth, is to assess the theory and considerations of other explanations of the MAAG-V outcome. A brief summary assessment concludes the case study.

There are many reasons why the U.S. used advisors in Vietnam from 1950-1964. As with the Iran case study, the 1950s found the U.S. fighting and recovering from the Korean War and the subsequent requirement to maintain large numbers of combat troops there in case of violations of the 1953 Korean ceasefire. The 1950s also saw the growth of U.S. force levels in Europe to counter the perceived threat of Soviet invasion. Finally, the U.S. learned from the success of advising the Greek Civil War and thought to replicate that success in Vietnam and other countries.

Scholars have extensively studied the American involvement in Vietnam. They have mainly focused on the introduction of combat troops in 1965 and the use of advisors in conjunction with major combat forces during the Vietnamization program of the early 1970s. The use of U.S. military advisors in Vietnam during the period prior to the French withdrawal in 1956 and before the introduction of U.S. combat troops is overshadowed by study of the actual French
defeat and withdrawal from Vietnam followed by the full scale involvement of the U.S. military of the late 1960s early 1970s.

During the decades prior to World War II, the French brutally put down two different revolts in Vietnam; one loosely based on Vietnamese nationalism and the other loosely based on communism.\textsuperscript{150} During World War II, the Japanese pressured the Vichy French government to first stop providing war materials to China and then allow Japanese transit rights and airfields in northern Indochina as well as the stationing of troops at the port of Haiphong. Shortly after the liberation of France in 1944, the Japanese demanded that the French turn over direct control of the government, police and armed forces in all of Indochina.\textsuperscript{151} Within hours of the demand, Japanese forces in Indochina attacked French garrisons and secured the country. The Japanese declared Vietnam independent and installed a government under the Nguyen Emperor Bao Dai

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\textsuperscript{151}Spector, Advice and Support, The Early Years, 30.
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and Prime Minister Tran Trong Kim, a long time Japanese collaborator, Japanese forces remained in control of Indochina and Vietnam until the Japanese surrender in August 1945.152

After the Japanese surrender, the Allies decided to divide Vietnam at the 16th parallel. Nationalist Chinese forces with U.S. advisors and liaison officers would enter northern Vietnam and accept the surrender of the Japanese forces stationed there.153 British forces would enter southern Vietnam and accept the surrender of Japanese forces there. In the month that it took Chinese forces to reach Hanoi, the communist controlled Viet Minh, who had been gaining popular support since the Japanese overthrow of the French Colonial government, stepped into the power vacuum created by Japan’s collapse.154 When the U.S. supported Chinese forces arrived in Hanoi they found a nationalistic government in place that was “strong, belligerent and definitely anti-French.”155 The British, upon arrival in Saigon, found a similar situation, although

152Ibid., 55.
153Ibid., 53.
154Ibid., 55.
155Ibid., 57.
the Viet Minh had more competitors for power. The British, unlike their allies in the north, were
unwilling to work with and through the existing Viet Minh government.\textsuperscript{156} Large-scale
demonstrations and riots occurred in the south as the French attempted to regain control.\textsuperscript{157} As the
French worked to regain control of their former colony, they eventually agreed to recognize
North Vietnam as the free state of Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as part of the Indo-China
Union within the French Union.\textsuperscript{158} The French did not believe that this applied to the parts of
Vietnam below the 16th parallel and when the Viet Minh controlled Democratic Republic of
Vietnam declared that northern, southern, and central Vietnam were one and indivisible, a
showdown between the French and the Viet Minh became inevitable.\textsuperscript{159}

By the end of 1946, general war had broken out between the French and the Viet Minh. In the latter half of the 1940s, events began to come to a crisis point as the French continued to

\textsuperscript{156}Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{157}Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{158}Spector, \textit{Advice and Support, The Early Years}, 78.
\textsuperscript{159}Ibid., 81.
struggle to put down the communist Viet Minh; the Chinese communist’s overthrew Nationalist China; and relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union began to crumble. U.S. Joint Staff Planners came to express the view that the Communist success in China constituted a grievous defeat for the U.S. and warned, “That if Southeast Asia is also swept by the Communism, we shall have suffered a rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world.”

The U.S. had started down the road of involvement in Vietnam.

What were the U.S. national strategic objectives in Vietnam? Secretary of State Dean Acheson initially framed the U.S. national security objectives in Vietnam with his February 2, 1950 memo to President Truman recommending that the U.S. recognize Vietnam as an autonomous country within the French Union on the grounds that: Encouragement to national aspirations under non-Communist leadership for peoples of colonial areas in Southeast Asia; the establishment of stable non-Communist governments in areas adjacent to Communist China; support to a friendly country which is also a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty; and as a

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160Department of Defense, Joint Chief of Staff Report 1721/42, December 17, 1949, Joint Chief of Staff Records.
demonstration of displeasure with Communist tactics which are obviously aimed at eventual domination of Asia, working under the guise of indigenous nationalism.\(^\text{161}\)

NSC 64 drafted in late February 1950 and approved by President Truman on April 24, 1950 broadly laid out the formal U.S. national strategic objectives in Vietnam (Indochina). NSC 64 recommended, “It is important to U.S. security interests that all practical measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.”\(^\text{162}\) Finally, NSC 64 directed DoS and DoD to “prepare as a matter of priority a program of all practicable measures designed to protect U.S. security interests in Indochina.”\(^\text{163}\)

Shortly after the approval of NSC 64, R. Allen Griffin returned from a fact-finding mission to South and Southeast Asia and he further recommended the provision of aid to the


\(^{162}\)Ibid., 747.

\(^{163}\)Ibid.
Vietnam government, since it was “not secure against internal subversion, political infiltration, or military aggression.”

Griffin further recommended that the aid “assist as much as possible in building strength and in doing so, assure the several peoples that support of their governments and resistance to communist subversion will bring them direct and tangible benefits and well-founded hope for an increase in living standards.”

In early 1954, with the French wanting to end the fighting in Indochina, the U.S. national strategic objectives changed slightly in regards to Vietnam. NSC 5405, issued in January 1954 stated that the U.S. objective in Southeast Asia was to prevent the countries in the region from “passing into the communist orbit; to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free governments with the will and ability to resist communism from within and

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165Ibid.
without to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.”

NSC 5405 continued to lay out courses of action that the U.S. should take to achieve the objectives, both in the case of and without Chinese Communist interference in Indochina.

After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Accords of July 1954, the U.S. began to rework their National Security Policy for the Far East, including Indochina and Vietnam. The U.S. issued the new policy in late 1954 as NSC 5429/5. NSC 5429/5 was a broad policy for the whole Far East that referenced previously issued NSC 5405 but contained an annex that gave updated U.S. objectives for Indochina that include: maintain a friendly non-Communist South Vietnam, and to prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections; Urge the French to recognize and deal with free Vietnam as an independent sovereign nation; Strengthen U.S. representation and deal directly with the government of free Vietnam; Work through the French only insofar as necessary, to assist free Vietnam to maintain (1) military forces necessary for

internal security and (2) economic conditions conducive to the maintenance and strength of non-
Communist regimes that compare favorably with those in adjacent Communist areas; Aid
emigration from North Vietnam and resettlement of peoples unwilling to remain under
Communist rule; Exploit available means to make more difficult the control of North Vietnam by
the Viet Minh; Expose Communist violations of the Armistice in Indochina; Conduct covert
operations on the maximum feasible and productive scale in support of the foregoing policies.167
These objectives, with minor refinements, would govern U.S. involvement in Vietnam throughout
the remainder of the 1950s.

The National Security Council released NSC 6012 in July 1960 that broadly updated U.S.
Strategic Objectives in Vietnam for the 1960s. The stated objectives were to “prevent the
countries of Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, from passing into or becoming economically
dependent upon the Communist Bloc; to persuade them that their best interests lie in the greater
cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the Free World; and to assist them to develop

toward stable, free representative governments with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the Free World."168

Specifically in Vietnam, the U.S. wanted to assist Vietnam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government to enable Vietnam to assert a contrast to conditions in North Vietnam and to assist internal and external public relations and information programs of Vietnam. To achieve that; Work toward weakening the Communists in both North and South Vietnam in order to bring about the peaceful unification of Vietnam under anti Communist leadership; Support the position that all-Vietnam elections can only take place when genuinely free elections can be held in both North and South Vietnam; Assist Vietnam to build up indigenous armed forces, including logistical and administrative services, capable of assuring internal security and initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh; Encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense against external aggression along lines consistent with U.S. planning concepts and approved U.S. policy for the

region; Encourage and support improved relations between Vietnam and Cambodia.\textsuperscript{169} This policy would guide U.S. actions through the end of the Eisenhower administration and the early years of the Kennedy administration.

What operational approach did the U.S. military take to achieve U.S. national strategic objectives? On May 1, 1950, President Truman allocated $13 million from the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 in order to fund programs of military assistance to Indonesia and Indochina. Additionally, the President allocated $750 million in economic assistance to Indochina. The Secretary of State was to approve the military programs, which the Secretary of Defense would implement.\textsuperscript{170} On July 3, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson informed the president that the principal components of the fiscal year 1950 programs for Indochina would include providing equipment for the establishment of 12 Indochinese infantry battalions, assorted engineer and anti aircraft equipment, fighter aircraft, naval landing craft, armed river patrol boats,

\textsuperscript{169}\textit{DoS, FRUS: 1952-1954, Vol. XII, 220-221.}

\textsuperscript{170}\textit{DoS, FRUS: 1950 Vol. VI, 791.}
transport aircraft, as well as ancillary training on the equipment provided.\textsuperscript{171} In December 1950, the U.S., France and the associated states of Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) signed an agreement under which the U.S. would supply “further quantities of equipment based upon requests made by the French government”.\textsuperscript{172} Under this agreement, the U.S. established Military Advisory and Assistance Group – Indochina to administer the provision of equipment.\textsuperscript{173} The U.S. now had committed advisors and equipment to assist the developing Vietnamese Army.

\textsuperscript{171}Ibid., 836.


\textsuperscript{173}James L. Collins, \textit{The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army: 1950-1972} (Washington D.C: Center For Military History, 1975), 1. Brigadier General James L. Collins was serving as U.S. Army Chief of Military History when he wrote \textit{The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army}. The book is based primarily on official records, with additional material from published and unpublished secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography were omitted from the published version; a fully documented account with bibliography is filed with the U.S. Army Center of Military History. The author of this monograph was unable to consult with the annotated version and has therefore treated \textit{The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army: 1950-1972} as a cross between a secondary and primary source.
As the situation in Vietnam changed after the signing of the Geneva Accords in July 1954, so did the operational approach. In June of 1954, General Paul Ely, French Commander in Chief Indochina, agreed to Lieutenant General John O’Daniel’s, Chief MAAG-I, request for U.S. advisors to take over the training, organization, and equipping of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).174 Neither the French nor the U.S. could agree to the details of the roles of U.S. and French advisors, composition, and other details until December 1954. Under the terms of the December 1954 agreement, the U.S. would provide direct military aid to the Vietnamese National Army; the French would grant full autonomy to the ARVN no later than July 1, 1955; full authority for the training, organizing and equipping of the ARVN would reside with the Chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Group under the overall authority of French Commander in Chief in Indochina; both French and U.S. personnel would be assigned as advisors and instructors to the

Vietnamese National Army.\textsuperscript{175} In order to accomplish the mission in Cambodia and Vietnam, MAAG-I split into two new MAAGs, one for Cambodia (MAAG-C) and one for Vietnam (MAAG-V).\textsuperscript{176} MAAG-V was responsible for the U.S. operational approach in Vietnam until the creation of Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MAC-V) in 1961. MAAG-V was absorbed into the structure of MAC-V and remained responsible for the Vietnamese security forces training advisory function.\textsuperscript{177}

Were U.S. military advisors or some other military means allocated to implement the operational approach in Vietnam? During the period of the study, the U.S. military used advisors to implement the operational approach in Vietnam. MAAG-I was implemented in 1950 when DoD recommended the establishment of a MAAG to oversee the provision of equipment to the French and Indochinese forces fighting the Viet Minh.\textsuperscript{178} Shortly after the President approved the

\textsuperscript{175}Ibid., 2367.
\textsuperscript{176}Collins, \textit{The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army}, 2.
\textsuperscript{177}Ibid., 27.
DoS and DoD plan for aid to Indochina, a MAAG, under the direction of Brigadier General Francis Brink, was in place and making a detailed appraisal of the French requests for military assistance.\textsuperscript{179} Despite wording in the Pentalateral Agreement of December 1950, that called for the U.S. advisory group to “carry out their assigned responsibilities for observation of the progress and technical use made of the assistance granted” the MAAG turned over most supplies to the French and functioned as a small logistical accounting group, with the French not allowing observation of units in the field.\textsuperscript{180} In addition to MAAG-I, the U.S. established a special economic mission with the responsibility of working with the governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in order to restore stability in the region and pursue the peaceful and democratic development of the countries.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{179}Ibid., 841.


\textsuperscript{181}DoS, FRUS: 1950 Vol. VI, 818.
Following the Geneva Accords, the U.S. continued to use advisors, including French and U.S. civilian contractors to develop an ARVN command and staff, planning, logistical and unit training programs. MAAG-V established the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) as a subordinate organization. Key staff positions were held by both French and U.S. officers and they advised the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, the Vietnamese General Staff, the Vietnamese Arms and Service directorates, as well as subordinate headquarters, units, schools, training centers and installations. In order to keep the troop levels of MAAG-V at the 342-man ceiling imposed by the Geneva accords mobile training teams rotated in on temporary duty basis. When the International Control Commission asked MAAG-V to stop this practice, 

184 Ibid., 4.
contractors provided advisory personnel to assist with the development of the territorial militia and an effective police organization.\textsuperscript{185}

MAAG-V dissolved the TRIM and initiated a Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) in its place when the last French troops withdrew in 1956. The task of TERM was to recover war material left behind by the French that was obsolete, wore out, or excess to the needs of the ARVN. In reality, it turned into an advisory mission to the fledgling Vietnamese logistical system.\textsuperscript{186} TERM ceased operations in 1960 and most of its personnel converted to other positions inside MAAG-V.\textsuperscript{187}

Did the U.S. military advisors organize or reorganize indigenous security forces? Prior to December 1950, there was no such thing as a Vietnamese Army. Vietnamese soldiers fought as members of the French Expeditionary Corps with an officer and non-commissioned officer cadre of native French. In 1950, the French concluded a military convention with the newly

\textsuperscript{185}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{186}Collins, \textit{The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army}, 7.

\textsuperscript{187}Ibid., 8.
autonomous Vietnamese government that created an independent precursor to the ARVN. The majority of the Vietnamese soldiers in the French Expeditionary Corps transferred to this new organization, still primarily led by French officers and non commissioned officers who wore Vietnamese uniforms under the orders of the Vietnamese government. MAAG-I remained primarily concerned with supplying equipment for the war effort.

When the Geneva Accords went into effect in 1954, the ARVN consisted of 171 battalions, mainly consisting of infantry but with some armor, artillery and engineer battalions. There were no organizations larger than battalion sized. As negotiations between the U.S. and the French continued about MAAG-I’s assumption of the ARVN training mission, MAAG-I Commander, Lieutenant General O’Daniel insisted with his counterpart General Paul Ely, that the reorganize into divisions with Vietnamese officer and non-commissioned officer cadre. The French were initially resistant to the idea of reorganization but General Ely eventually agreed in

188 Spector, Advice and Support, The Early Years, 134.
June 1954 that the U.S. should take over the training and organization of ARVN units into divisions.\textsuperscript{191} In late 1954, acting Ambassador Randolph Kidder and Lieutenant General O’Daniel recommended that the ARVN reorganize into three territorial divisions and three field divisions of almost 80,000 soldiers. The focus of the territorial divisions was internal security while the field divisions would provide a mobile element to reinforce the territorial divisions and become a defensive shield in the event of external aggression.\textsuperscript{192}

By the time the last of the French Expeditionary Corps withdrew from Vietnam, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, reported to the National Security Council that the ARVN consisted of 4 field divisions, 6 light divisions, and 13 territorial regiments of approximately 156,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{193} This organizational structure would persist in the ARVN until 1959-1960.

In addition to the ARVN, a Vietnamese Presidential decree created a paramilitary Civil Guard in 1955. By 1958, the Civil Guard consisted of approximately 68,000 personnel organized into two to eight companies in each province with an additional eight general support mobile battalions. The primary function of the Civil Guard was to relieve regular forces of internal security duties and local intelligence collection and counter-subversion.\textsuperscript{194} Vietnam established an additional paramilitary force, the Self-Defense Corps, in 1956 to free regular forces from internal security duties. The 48,000 members of the Self-Defense Corps were a policing organization of four to ten men inside villages with a population of 1,000. The Self-Defense Corps’ chain of command reported to the Ministry of Interior through the village chief, district chief, and provincial chief.\textsuperscript{195}

After a period of testing and evaluation Lieutenant General Samuel Williams, MAAG-V commander, directed a reorganization of the ARVN into what he termed seven balanced divisions

\textsuperscript{194}Collins, \textit{The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army}, 10.
\textsuperscript{195}Collins, \textit{The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army}, 10.
and support services.\textsuperscript{196} MAAG-V designed these divisions to have both effective defensive and internal security capabilities. The new divisional structure reflected the MAAG-V’s view that the most likely threat to Vietnam was a North Vietnamese invasion.\textsuperscript{197}

By 1962, in response to an increasing threat from the Viet Cong guerrillas and invasion of North Vietnamese forces, the ARVN grew in strength to approximately 219,000 men. The Civil Guard expanded to a total of 77,000 personnel, and the Self-Defense Corps to 99,500. The Vietnamese government also introduced an additional paramilitary force, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, which totaled almost 15,000 men.\textsuperscript{198}

Did the U.S. military advisors rebuild or build new infrastructure to support indigenous security forces in Vietnam? The U.S. provided funds to Vietnam in order to rebuild or build new infrastructure. In calendar year 1955, the U.S. allocated $303.2 million to reorganize, train, and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{197}Spector, \textit{Advice and Support, The Early Years}, 300.
  \item \textsuperscript{198}Collins, \textit{The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army}, 29.
\end{itemize}
construct facilities for the ARVN. MAAG-V allocated some of those funds to a strategic road network, just below the 17th parallel, that supported a defense against an invasion of southern Vietnam by northern Viet Minh forces.

By 1958, DoS’s plan for Vietnam called for the International Cooperation Administration to conduct large-scale highway rehabilitation and improvement, improvement of airport facilities, construction and expansion of power generating and distribution facilities, as well as the improvement of municipal water supply systems. The International Cooperation Administration started the construction of a new 10,000-foot heavy-duty runway at Ton Son Nhut, near Saigon, in order to meet an economic requirement, with the potential for dual military

200Ibid., 684.
use for both the Vietnamese Air Force, when it was equipped with jets, and the U.S. Air Force in
defense of Vietnam.\textsuperscript{202}

Did U.S. military advisors provide equipment to indigenous security forces? After
President Truman decided to provide military assistance to both the French and the ARVN,
equipment for “twelve infantry battalions (less small arms) for the Vietnamese state forces and
aircraft and naval equipment for the French Union forces” arrived in Vietnam by October
1950.\textsuperscript{203} By summer of 1952, the Ambassador to Vietnam, Edmund Gullion, was convinced that
the Franco-Vietnamese forces “are now in possession of both power and mobility as a result of
receiving U.S. tanks, artillery tracks, air and naval craft, and radio equipment” delivered to
Indochina within the last year.\textsuperscript{204} According to the Ambassador, the problem was to now create

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{203}DoS, \textit{FRUS: 1950, Vol. VI}, 717, 878.
\end{itemize}
troop strength by the further development of Vietnamese and French Union forces in order to achieve internal peace.205

From 1954-1960, MAAG-V did not just process the receipt of Mutual Defense Assistance program material, but it sorted through all of the excess equipment provided to the French Expeditionary Corps and the Vietnamese National Army.206 The Vietnamese had received quantities of weapons and equipment greater than their authorized strength army could use.207 By 1957, MAAG-V had actually out shipped nearly $100 million worth of excess equipment.208 The out shipment of equipment ceased by 1960, but MAAG-V continued to approve equipment requests totaling nearly $14 million dollars under the Military Assistance Program including a sixty-day reserve of ammunition and thirty-four 155mm howitzers.209

205Ibid.
207Spector, Advice and Support, The Early Years, 259.
Did U.S. military advisors train Vietnamese security forces? Despite the fact that the French Commander in Chief Indochina, General Ely, and the MAAG-V Chief, Lieutenant General O’Daniel agreed in principle to a joint French-U.S. training mission for the ARVN, the governments of France and the U.S. did not sign a formal agreement until 1954. As of April 1954, MAAG-V was not able to influence the morale, discipline or readiness of the ARVN.\(^{210}\) By May 1954, MAAG-V started to place advisors within all the current ARVN schools and training centers in order to assist the French and Vietnamese instructors.\(^{211}\) Starting in August 1957, the Vietnamese instituted a draft.\(^{212}\) The draftees underwent a 31-week training program, conducted in four phases: basic individual, advanced individual, basic unit, and advanced unit training. U.S. advisors developed these programs by modifying appropriate U.S. Army training programs.\(^{213}\) By

\(^{210}\)Ibid., 233.


\(^{212}\)Ibid., 801.

\(^{213}\)Collins, *The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army*, 12.
the end of 1957, in addition to the ARVN training, MAAG-V had forty-four advisors training the Vietnamese Air Force and Navy at the request of the Vietnamese government. 214

By 1960, the ARVN used programs of instruction developed jointly with MAAG-V in their 6-week Ranger company course as well as the infantry advanced individual and basic unit training. 215 U.S. advisors who taught these programs of instruction and Vietnamese instructors emphasized counter guerrilla training and teaching members of the squads, platoons, companies and battalions to “function together as a smoothly integrated team combining firepower, maneuver and control to destroy the enemy.” 216 The goal of this training was to develop a conventional military force. 217

Did the U.S. military advisors support operational level planning with their Vietnamese counterparts? After the 1954 Geneva Accords, Lieutenant General O’Daniel, MAAG-V chief,

215 Ibid., 475.
was adamant about placing U.S. advisors inside the ARVN at the division, brigade and battalion levels and remain there, sharing planning and operational control of the advised forces and accompanying them during combat operations.\textsuperscript{218} After the Geneva Accords, MAAG-V had an active part in developing the plans for pacification of the areas of Vietnam formerly occupied by the Viet Minh.\textsuperscript{219} From 1955-1959, Vietnamese division commanders had a U.S. Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel advisor, while regimental commanders were provided with a U.S. Major as an advisor. The advisors spent the majority of their time with the commander as well as observing and inspecting the components of the advised unit either alone or with his counterpart. The advisor directed the rest of his time toward persuading his counterpart of the “wisdom of certain policies, procedures, or assignments he wished the Vietnamese to adopt.”\textsuperscript{220} In the case of a Viet Minh invasion of southern Vietnam, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Arthur Radford,


\textsuperscript{220}Spector, \textit{Advice and Support, The Early Years}, 291-293.
envisioned embedding advisors in fighting units in order to provide operational advice to the Vietnamese.  

In 1959, the ARVN found itself conducting operations against guerrilla bands reportedly led by Viet Minh cadre. Lieutenant General Williams requested authorization for MAAG-V advisors “to participate in operation planning and to accompany their counterparts on those planned operations, as long as those operations did not take place in areas immediately adjacent to national boundaries.” Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, authorized MAAG-V advisors to operate “down to and including infantry regimental level and artillery, armored and separate Marine battalion level.” “In order to furnish advice on the preparation of daily plans, monitor the day-to-day conduct of operations and render on-the-spot advice based on the situation as it exists at the time.” Admiral Felt envisioned that advisors would provide

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223 Ibid., 179.
224 Ibid., 200.
tactical, logistical, and medical advice to their supported unit. MAAG-V advisors were limited to advisory functions and “under no circumstances would they participate directly in combat operations.”

Did the U.S. military advisors provide operational units advice during combat operations? As MAAG-V was splitting from MAAG-I and assuming responsibility for the training and advising of the ARVN the planning assumption was that U.S. advisors would embed inside Vietnamese units and remain with them during combat operations. The Mutual Security Act of 1954 stated that “personnel of the MAAG are authorized to participate in an advisory or training capacity with Vietnamese field units, training agencies, logistics agencies engaged in operational, mobilization and war planning…in order to insure proper utilization of the military equipment and supplies furnished to the Vietnamese Government under the aid program.”

When Lieutenant General Williams assumed duties as Chief of MAAG-V in late 1955, he found

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that it was contrary to policy for U.S. or French advisors to accompany troops on combat
operations and he subsequently issued verbal orders that no MAAG-V personnel were to
accompany units on combat operations.\textsuperscript{228} That policy did not change until Commander in Chief
Pacific Forces, Admiral Felt, authorized MAAG-V advisors to accompany their counterparts on
operational missions in 1959. MAAG-V advisors were still limited to acting only in self-defense,
much as their predecessors in Greece had been thirteen years earlier.\textsuperscript{229} As was the case in
Greece, many advisors found themselves involved in combat operations, although not directly
participating in them, as they accompanied their counterparts on planned operations.

Hypothesis one states that when U.S. military advisors advise and assist indigenous
security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability
operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or
capable of offensive operations. The evidence presented in the case supports the hypothesis.

\textsuperscript{228}Ibid., 178.
\textsuperscript{229}Collins, \textit{The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army}, 26.
Hypothesis two states that when U.S. military advisors organize indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. The evidence presented in the case supports the hypothesis.

Hypothesis three states that when U.S. military advisors train indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. The evidence presented in the case supports the hypothesis.

Hypotheses four states that when U.S. military advisors equip indigenous security then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. The evidence presented in the case supports the hypothesis.

Hypotheses five states that when U.S. military advisors rebuild or build indigenous security forces infrastructure then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. The evidence presented in the case supports the hypothesis.

The evidence in the case of MAAG-V supports the study’s thesis. However, despite that the fact that all of the hypotheses are supported, advisors were unable to build an army capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); an army capable of defending borders against external threats (defensive operations); or an expeditionary army capable of offensive operations. The failure of advisors to build a competent ARVN from 1950–1964 led to the introduction of
major U.S. combat units in 1965, as the U.S. continued to attempt to secure Vietnam from internal and external threats.

**Findings and Analysis**

This section will assist the reader in moving beyond the initial impressions of the topic of advisors and improve the likelihood that the evidence presented is reliable. The use of a comparison matrix will illustrate patterns across the three case studies and the research questions to validate the hypotheses. By comparing the case studies with each other, the findings are stronger and assist in supporting the hypotheses. If the findings conflict, then this analysis will identify and explain the sources of conflict in the research.

There are three steps to the findings discussion. First, the comparison matrix, Table 1, provides a visual representation of each research question and the corresponding summary of data presented in each case study. Second, restated research questions ensure standardization across the findings. Finally, highlights of each case study’s response provide justification for the finding and transition to the analysis portion.

Research Question 1: What were the U.S. national strategic objectives? During the U.S. involvement in Greece, the national security objective was to support the Greek government and prevent its overthrow by an armed minority. In Iran, the U.S. wanted to maintain an independent, friendly Iran free of Communist control, with a strong, stable government. U.S. national security objectives in Vietnam were constantly evolving during the period covered in the case study, but the overriding theme was to recognize and support South Vietnam as a state within the world community and prevent the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia.

Research Question 2: What operational approach did the U.S. military take to achieve those objectives? In order to implement the operational approach in Greece, the U.S. allocated
economic and military aid in addition to advisors for the Greek military and government. The U.S. took a similar approach in Iran by providing economic and military aid packages as well as military advisors to the Iranian security forces and members of the DoS to assist the Iranian government officials with administrating the supplied aid. In Vietnam, the U.S. provided both economic and military aid packages as well as military advisors.

Research Question 3: Were U.S. military advisors or some other military means allocated to implement the operational approach? In Greece, the U.S. used military advisors as the means to implement the operational approach. U.S. military advisors were also the means allocated in Iran. Finally, the U.S. also allocated military advisors to Vietnam in order to implement the operational approach.

Table 1. Case Study Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>JUSMAP-G</th>
<th>ARMISH</th>
<th>MAAG-V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What were the U.S. National Strategic Objectives?</td>
<td>Support Greek</td>
<td>Maintain an</td>
<td>Recognize and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government and</td>
<td>independent Iran</td>
<td>support South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prevent its</td>
<td>free of Communist</td>
<td>Vietnam and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>overthrow.</td>
<td>Control.</td>
<td>prevent the spread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of Communism in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Southeast Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What operational approach did the U.S. military take to achieve those</td>
<td>Economic and</td>
<td>Economic and</td>
<td>Economic and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Were U.S. military advisors or some other military means allocated</td>
<td>Advisors</td>
<td>Advisors</td>
<td>Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to implement the operational approach?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Did the U.S. military advisors organize indigenous security forces?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Did U.S. military advisors rebuild or build new infrastructure to</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support indigenous security forces?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Did U.S. military advisors provide equipment to indigenous security</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forces?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Did U.S. military advisors train indigenous security forces?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Did the U.S. military advisors support operational level planning?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Did the U.S. military advisors provide operational units advice</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during combat operations?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Research Question 4: Did the U.S. military advisors organize indigenous security forces? In Greece, the military advisors reorganized the structure of the National Defense Corps. Advisors also increased the size of the National Defense Corps, Greek National Army, and Greek Gendarmerie as well as refocusing the missions each in order to allow the GNA to pursue guerrilla forces. In Iran, the military advisors organized the structure of the Iranian Army into full strength infantry divisions, reduced strength infantry divisions, and independent brigades. Military advisors in Vietnam reorganized the ARVN from an organization consisting only of battalions to an organization with corps, divisions, regiments and battalions. Advisors in Vietnam also helped with the creation and organization of a Civil Guard, Self Defense Corps, and Civilian Irregular Defense Group.

Research Question 5: Did U.S. military advisors rebuild or build new infrastructure to support indigenous security forces? U.S. military advisors in Greece administered economic aid that rebuilt ports and railroads, resurfaced highways, and improved the capacity of airfields. In Iran, U.S. military advisors built new Iranian Army housing units, access roads, and airfields, as well as improving the regional telecommunications and railway networks. Advisors in Vietnam supervised construction of education and housing facilities for the ARVN as well as strategic road networks. Advisors also administered other projects in Vietnam including improvements to airfields, water supply systems, and power generation and distribution facilities.

Research Question 6: Did U.S. military advisors provide equipment to indigenous security forces? In Greece, U.S. military advisors supplied Greek security forces with small arms, heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, pack howitzers, and airplanes. U.S. military advisors in
Iran provided the Iranian Army with M48 tanks, tank destroyers, 155mm and 105mm howitzers, recoilless rifles, trucks and small arms. The Iranian Air Force received F-86G fighter-bombers and transport aircraft, while the Iranian Navy received destroyers, patrol boats and troop landing ships. Vietnamese security forces received tanks, howitzers, airplanes, patrol boats, radio equipment, and small arms. Additionally, U.S. military advisors provided units with ammunition for all weapons.

Research Question 7: Did U.S. military advisors train indigenous security forces? The GNA received training in fundamental soldier skills, as well as company and battalion level tactics from their U.S. military advisors. Advisors also taught advanced techniques in close cooperation between infantry, artillery and air support. U.S. military advisors in Iran trained new recruits who entered the Replacement Training System. U.S. military advisors also established an Armor Training Center and an Artillery Training Center to train Iranian soldiers. In Vietnam, U.S. military advisors taught in the ARVN schools and training centers, as well as developing the curriculum for basic individual, advanced individual, basic unit and advanced unit training. As in Greece, U.S. military advisors taught the Vietnamese to integrate firepower and maneuver to destroy the enemy, as well as counter guerrilla tactics.

Research Question 8: Did the U.S. military advisors support operational level planning? U.S. military advisors in Greece, with their counterparts on the Greek General Staff, developed the operational plans that called for the GNA to start at the southern portion of Greece, deploy in force, encircle wide areas in depth with combat formations, and then slowly close the circle to destroy guerrillas trapped inside. This plan eventually cleared Greece of the guerrilla threat. In Iran U.S. military advisors with the Baghdad Pact, which Iran was a member of, advised, influenced and integrated the member states defense plans into one larger coherent regional plan.
ARMISH integrated U.S. military advisors into the Iranian Supreme Commander’s staff in order to influence Iranian Army planning, training, and equipment distribution. U.S. military advisors in Vietnam worked with their counterparts at the corps, division, regiment, and battalion levels to develop the plans to pacify areas of Vietnam formerly occupied by the Viet Minh.

Research Question 9: Did the U.S. military advisors provide operational units advice during combat operations? U.S. military advisors in Greece accompanied battalions, companies and platoons on operations in order to offer advice to Greek commanders in the field. During the period examined for the case study, Iranian security forces were not involved in active combat operations with either insurgents or external aggressors. Therefore, U.S. military advisors did not provide operational advice to units during combat operations. From 1950 until 1959, MAAG-V policy did not allow military advisors to accompany troops on combat operations. That policy changed in 1959 when advisors began to accompany their counterparts on operational missions in order to provide immediate advice to commanders in the conduct of their duties.

In the analysis discussion, four steps encompass the process. First, the comparison matrix, Table 2, provides a visualization of each hypothesis and its stance as supported or not supported in each case study after analyzing the research questions in the findings section. Next, restated hypotheses ensure standardization across findings. Then, a discussion on the highlights of each hypothesis provides justification for the analysis. Finally, the analysis concludes by determining if each hypothesis does support or does not support each case study.
Table 2. Cross Case Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>JUSMAPG-G</th>
<th>ARMISH</th>
<th>MAAG-V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. When U.S. military advisors advise and assist indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); an army capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or an expeditionary army capable of offensive operations.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. When U.S. military advisors organize indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); an army capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or an expeditionary army capable of offensive operations.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. When U.S. military advisors train indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); an army capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or an expeditionary army capable of offensive operations.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. When U.S. military advisors equip indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); an army capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or an expeditionary army capable of offensive operations.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. When U.S. military advisors rebuild or build indigenous security forces infrastructure indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); an army capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or an expeditionary army capable of offensive operations.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by Author.

Hypothesis one states that when U.S. military advisors advise and assist indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. The findings from Greece and Iran support this hypothesis. The GNA, with the assistance of U.S. military advisors, was able to clear the country of guerrillas and prevent the guerrillas from overthrowing the government. In Iran, U.S. military advisors created an Iranian security forces that were a key component of the regional defense plan and deterred...
Soviet aggression in the Middle East region during a period of heightened tensions. In Vietnam, U.S. military advisors advised and assisted the ARVN; it was still unable of maintaining internal security or defending its borders against external threats.

Hypothesis two states that when U.S. military advisors organize indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. The findings from Greece and Iran support this hypothesis. The U.S. military advisors in both countries reorganized and refocused the security forces and in Greece defeated the guerrillas and in Iran deterred external aggression. In Vietnam, U.S. military advisors reorganized the ARVN from an integrated element of the French Union forces to a stand-alone army and that was still unable to defeat the Communist guerrillas.

Hypothesis three states that when U.S. military advisors train indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. The findings from Greece and Iran support this hypothesis. In Greece, the GNA put the training provided by U.S. military advisors to use while defeating the guerrilla forces. In Iran, the level of readiness of the Iranian security forces deterred aggression from external and internal sources. U.S. military advisors in Vietnam provided training to the ARVN, which was still unable to put down internal threats and prevent external aggression.

Hypothesis four states when U.S. Military advisors equip indigenous security forces then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. In Greece, the addition of modern equipment and the standardization of small arms
across the GNA, coupled with training on integrating the modern equipment into operations allowed the GNA to counter guerrilla tactics, such as reverse slope defenses, that they had previously been unable to defeat. The addition of modern weapons into the Iranian security forces created an army that was capable of fighting a defensive fight until other U.S. forces could be committed to assist. The ARVN was unable to defeat both the internal and external threats it faced despite the introduction of modern weapons by U.S. advisors.

Hypothesis five states that when U.S. military advisors rebuild or build indigenous security forces infrastructure then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations. U.S. advisors administered economic aid in all three countries in order to build or rebuild infrastructure but it was only in Greece and Iran that the infrastructure contributed to achieving the national security objectives set out by the President. In Vietnam, U.S. advisors rebuilt existing infrastructure and built new infrastructure but the ARVN was still unable to defeat the guerrillas and deter external aggression.

**Conclusion**

This study finds that in two out of three case studies presented, Greece and Iran, that using U.S. military advisors to advise and assist indigenous security forces units and institutions, organize units and institutions, train indigenous security forces, equip indigenous security forces, and rebuild or build infrastructure for indigenous security forces is an efficient way to accomplish U.S. national security objectives. In Vietnam, U.S. military advisors conducted all of the same requirements that they had previously conducted in Greece and Iran but were unable to put down internal unrest and defeat external aggression forcing the U.S. to eventually introduce major combat forces in the years following the period examined in the case study.
This study began with the proposed thesis that the use of U.S. military advisors to advise and assist indigenous security forces units and institutions, organize units and institutions, train indigenous security forces units, equip indigenous security forces, and rebuild or build infrastructure for indigenous security forces, is an efficient way to achieve U.S. national security objectives. Based on a literature review five hypotheses were developed: when U.S. military advisors advise and assist indigenous security forces; when U.S. military advisors organize indigenous security forces; when U.S. military advisors train indigenous security forces; when U.S. military advisors equip indigenous security forces; when U.S. military advisors rebuild or build indigenous security forces infrastructure then foreign armies are capable of maintaining internal security (stability operations); capable of defending its borders against external threats (defensive operations); or capable of offensive operations.

The study followed the development of five hypotheses with the use of a structured focus comparison methodology consisting of a series of questions in order to guide the collection of empirical data. The study used the developed research questions to examine three case studies for findings. A cross case analysis was conducted to examine the findings and determined that there was a common trend of actions taken by the U.S. government and military in the selected case studies. In two of the case studies, U.S. military advisors accomplished U.S. national security objectives in lieu of other options, while in the third U.S. military advisors failed to accomplish U.S. national security objectives and the U.S. eventually introduced other means in an attempt to achieve the U.S. national security objectives.

The implications of the study suggest that U.S. military advisors, in lieu of other options, are a way to efficiently accomplish U.S. national security objectives. There is a chance that the U.S. must resort to other means if the advisors fail to accomplish the U.S. national security
objectives. As the U.S. military moves forward after the conclusion of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the study is significant in that it indicates that the U.S. military needs to prepare to implement security forces assistance using advisors as an operational approach in order to efficiently achieve U.S. national security strategy.
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