SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources

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SMART TOOLS: INTEGRATING SECURITY COOPERATION AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN A PERIOD OF CONSTRAINED RESOURCES

by

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Executive Summary

The Defense Department and State Department continue to work side-by-side to bring the full range of American assets to bear on our foreign policy. Diplomacy and development are equal partners with defense in our smart power approach to promoting American interests and values abroad, building up our economic prosperity, and protecting our national security.1

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

While there are many U.S. foreign policy “tools,” this report examines two specific “tools”—Department of Defense (DoD) lead security cooperation efforts and Department of State (DoS) / U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) foreign assistance programs—to demonstrate a greater need for integrated approaches to implementing foreign policy. Using a variety of sources, this report will demonstrate why integrated, focused approaches to security cooperation and foreign assistance efforts are required to meet today’s national security challenges in a resource constrained environment.

The United States faces an unprecedented “perfect storm” of an increasingly complex and uncertain security environment, constrained national security budgets, and a persistent global economic crisis. Current national strategies and senior leaders articulate the need for “smart power” or an integrated approach to foreign policy and strengthened security capacity abroad. This includes a flexible and adaptive blend of diplomacy, development, and defense to protect, promote, and maintain U.S. national security interests. In short, solutions to contemporary U.S. and international security problems lie in whole of government, interagency approaches.

Interagency cooperation, information sharing, and planning efforts have significantly improved over the past decade; however formal integration has not been fully achieved. There have been some integrated planning and operational successes, most notably the Department of Defense’s Security Cooperation Reform Task Force initiative, the establishment of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and U.S. Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) Interagency Task Force (IATF) and its Special Operations Support Teams (SOST) program. Similar Department of State efforts of change include the recent establishment of a new Bureau of
Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) to focus on conflict prevention and stabilization activities and the initiation of a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) process. The advances in integration of the last twelve years towards whole-of-government action could be lost if specific methods are not institutionalized.

**Conclusions** – From our research, four concluding thoughts inform our recommendations.

1. **Strategic Complexity:** Effective and efficient security cooperation and foreign assistance efforts will become increasingly more important in an era of persistent conflict despite non-peer competitors.

2. **Persistent Budget Constraints:** Funded over the past decade, security cooperation and foreign assistance programs are in jeopardy because of significant budget cuts. National security related authorities and budgets are disparate and disjointed. Competition for funding and resources will increase among the U.S. interagency and military services.

3. **Inter-Program Alignment with Interests:** To be cost-effective foreign assistance, development programs and security cooperation efforts must be aligned with enduring national security interests, regional and country specific objectives.

4. **Formal Integration:** While Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D) efforts and “whole of government” approaches to international affairs and national security are improving, security cooperation and foreign assistance programs are not fully nor institutionally integrated.

**Recommendations** – Formal and institutionalized integration is needed to preserve the gains made over the past decade. The following chart visually depicts the continuation of integrating security cooperation and foreign assistance efforts according to three key components:
We recommend actions from the top of government down to the country level to achieve more effective and efficient security cooperation and foreign assistance integration which will promote global and regional stability, and mitigate conflict:

1. Congress and the Executive Branch should better align related U.S. authorities, resources, and budgets.

2. The Departments of State and Defense with the Agency for International Development must continue to reinforce “whole of government” approaches and integrated frameworks following the ten years of work together in Iraq and Afghanistan.

3. The Departments of State and Defense with the Agency for International Development must leverage regional and international institutions, organizations, and partners in national security planning to best focus our resources.

4. The training elements of the Departments of State and Defense with the Agency for International Development must promote and implement integrated training, education, and professional development.

5. The Departments of State and Defense with the Agency for International Development must require their planners at each level to link security cooperation and foreign assistance efforts to enduring national security interests.

6. Military Combatant Commanders and Ambassadors must institutionalize and fully integrate planning and implementation efforts at the regional and country level.
The United States faces profound challenges that require strong, agile, and capable military forces whose actions are harmonized with other elements of U.S. national power...The balance between available resources and our security needs has never been more delicate.  

The Department of Defense, Strategic Guidance, December 2011

Chapter 1 – National Security amidst Complexity and Austerity

For more than a decade, the United States has engaged in fighting and security force training in the Middle East. Today, two new governments in Iraq and Afghanistan exist. The U.S. and its allies have withdrawn from Iraq and are ready to transition in Afghanistan, negotiating the force strength that will remain after the 2014 deadline. Even as wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to a close, the United States finds itself in an increasingly complicated world.

The U.S. military continues to operate in the Horn of Africa, the trans-Sahel region, and the Philippines. A weaker but capable Al Qaeda remains in the Middle East and Africa. Iran, a neighbor of Iraq and Afghanistan, is on the path to a nuclear weapons program creating a potential regional nuclear arms race. More broadly in the region, the instability of the Arab awakening continues to impact countries from Tunisia to Syria with unique effects in each. The established European-U.S. alliance, NATO, led a regime change in Libya. All this unrest in the Islamic world puts a new level of pressure on the increasingly isolated and allegedly-nuclear state of Israel, another strong U.S. ally.

In addition, previously strong economies are unstable from Europe to China to Australia. At home in the United States, harsh economic conditions challenge us as we balance vital national security interests abroad with the constraints of our domestic financial crisis. The U.S. national deficit is almost $16 trillion and competitors such as China and India own large portions of U.S. debt.

The U.S. grand strategies in previous periods of military down-sizing and economic preservation were isolationism, containment, and selected engagement. The effects of these strategies varied. The corresponding unpreparedness of the military and government at large to deal with the next security crisis were consistent. Our government and military negotiated steep learning curves, and expensive build-ups to respond to World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the post-9/11 operations.
How does the United States avoid slipping into a natural period of decline while satisfying the public expectation of and demand for belt tightening that promotes domestic economic health? How does an administration move forward with a budget that makes the investments necessary abroad to preserve national security interests?

In this period of complexity and austerity, the United States must protect its national interests in even more effective and efficient ways. We subscribe to a specific whole-of-government approach to address national security challenges called the “3D: Diplomacy, Development and Defense” methodology. This approach focuses on integrating the three primary executive branch agencies involved in foreign relations: the Department of State (DoS), the Department of Defense (DoD) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This paper describes one way to address U.S. interests as efficiently and effectively as possible. Although there are many whole-of-government tools available, this paper discusses better and more integrated use of two specific tools: security cooperation and foreign assistance.

The budget process and authorities for these two smart tools are very different. Also, there is a distinct difference in Congressional “constituencies” for military versus foreign assistance spending. National security comprises twenty percent of the U.S. budget, more than five percent of the Gross Domestic Product. Due to the importance of national security, despite current economic conditions, Congress authorizes funding quickly for budget function 50 – national security. The DoD budget of $580 billion for Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) accommodated the unprecedented legislation named the Budget Control Act of 2011, which required spending cuts of $487 billion over ten years. According to this law additional automatic cuts will go into effect for FY13 and future defense budgets. These cuts, commonly called the “sequestration,” require an additional $600 billion be cut from the DoD budget.

The International affairs portion of the U.S. budget – called Function 150, makes up less than one percent of the budget. This $30-40 billion a year primarily covers foreign and security assistance. It does not include costs for all executive branch agencies involved in foreign policy, or all administrative costs of the Department of State. However, the two major “3D” departments, the DoS and USAID operate under budget function 150 – International Affairs. This budget function is not as easily argued or authorized due to the number of committees and lack of constituencies involved with foreign affairs. Although the DoS manages the majority of these funds, there is still no clear budget planning and implementation process across all
departments. This budget function fell short of the departments’ needs in the 1990s, but the 2001 Hart-Rudman commission initiated a period of steady growth supported by Congressional approval for manpower and funding despite cuts to other departments.4

Beyond the small amount and dispersed process of this fund, most Americans are not aware of important facts regarding foreign assistance. Foreign assistance funding that belongs to the State Department covers many military security cooperation activities. Most Americans do not connect how a small investment in foreign assistance relates to large savings on military spending by preventing conflict and building local capacity. In the context of diminishing global economies, many citizens prefer to spend national resources at home. U.S. presidential candidates put forth a “$0 start-point” for foreign assistance. This message resonates with citizens struggling to survive economically. At the same time there is a general misconception about the amount of funding involved. Most Americans believe foreign assistance as part of the function 150 tranche makes up closer to 27% than 1% of the annual budget, as seen in Figure 1.

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![American Misperceptions of U.S. Spending on Foreign Aid](image1.png)

**Figure 1**: U.S. Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Sep 11, 2010
Because operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are concluding, this paper will focus on the traditional “peace time” efforts of the U.S. government via the organization of national efforts under the Ambassador in each country. This paper will not address the entire national security budget function but will focus on the portion determined by Congress for functions-50 and -150 under the subcategories specifically tied to achieving national security interests. Within this context of constrained resources, this paper offers that by integrating security cooperation efforts of DoD and foreign assistance efforts by the DoS and USAID we develop these programs into the “Smart Tools” we need.

The audience for this research is anyone interested in national security beyond operations in Afghanistan, under constrained resources. It should particularly interest those government officials involved in the planning of U.S. Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance activities. This research specifically applies to the DoS and USAID planning and budgeting staff, to the security cooperation agencies within the DoD, and the geographical combatant commanders.

It will also apply to Ambassadors and their country teams which include the military assigned to the Country Team: Defense Attaches Office (DAO), Security Assistance Officers (SAO), and Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) working with the Combatant Command country desk officers to preserve U.S national interests and protect the homeland.

The U.S. administration elected in November 2012 must be smarter than ever, using its combined elements of power. With the funding available, the government must provide the efficiency and effectiveness expected by its people as well as the synergy required to address existential threats given the complexities around us. As a confidence builder, the next administration will want to develop and communicate an effective strategy and corresponding budget for the nation quickly. A “Smart” strategy using “SmartPower” is needed now more than ever.
Chapter 2 – Linking Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance to National Security

Advancing and protecting national security interests is the foundation of U.S. foreign policy efforts, including foreign assistance and security cooperation programs. As such, each program should be nested to strategic or regional objectives that support enduring national security interests. According to the 2010 National Security Strategy, American interests are enduring:

1. The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
2. A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
3. Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
4. An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.5

According to the 2010 Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Independent Panel—the so-called Hadley-Perry Report—the U.S. has routinely failed to match capabilities to enduring national interests and related commitments.6 Since the end of the Cold War, there has been no “Peace Dividend”, and the tempo of U.S. overseas deployments has significantly increased over the past two decades, far exceeding strategic assumptions and planning requirements. The Hadley-Perry Report argues the root of the U.S. military force-planning problem is a failure of its political leadership to recognize and clearly define the essential strategic interests and global trends. Short of having a “Grand Strategy”, the U.S. has, for the most part, pursued four enduring security interests since 1945:

1. The defense of the American homeland;
2. Assured access to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace;
3. The preservation of a favorable balance of power across Eurasia that prevents authoritarian domination of that region; and
4. Providing for the global common good through such actions as humanitarian aid, development assistance, and disaster relief.7

Although national interests are enduring, global threats and trends also drive strategy, foreign policy, and required capabilities. According to the Hadley-Perry report, five key global
trends face the U.S. and its role as the leader of an international system that protects the interests outlined above:

1. Radical Islamist extremism and the threat of terrorism;
2. The rise of new global great powers in Asia;
3. Continued struggle for power in the Persian Gulf and the greater Middle East;
4. An accelerating global competition for resources; and
5. Persistent problems from failed and failing states.8

Given the national interests and global trends framework described above, foreign assistance and security cooperation efforts support enduring interests. Specifically, these programs promote peace, security, and cooperation to meet global challenges, including persistent problems from failed and failing states.

Prior National Security Reform Projects and Reports

The U.S. government has spent time, money and intellectual effort over the past decade to develop ways to update the nation’s national security structure. The emphasis of two wars overseas helped focus many studies and provided lessons of interagency practice. There are two significant studies sponsored by the U.S. government with recommendations that resonate with every department and continue to stand as a foundation for reform and further study.

THE PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM (PNSR) REPORTS

Congress sponsored the PNSR Reports to evaluate reform required for the best methods to provide national security in the 21st Century. Two reports were published: the original in 2008 submitted to President Bush and an updated follow-on report submitted to President Obama in 2009. In the second report, PNSR developed an initiative called “The Next Generation State Department” for both DoS and USAID to recommend ways of developing “soft-power tools” for better U.S. unity of purpose in planning, resourcing and executing of national security missions. The PNSR Reports recommend the State Department institute:

- New Organizational culture to promote operational skill sets and expanded foreign affairs professionals
- Stronger department-level oversight for budget, comptroller and personnel
Family of core subdepartments or bureaus organized around functions with a
degree of operational autonomy
- Management structure that permits integrated thinking, anticipating,
planning, preparing and acting across domains
- Merger of overlapping administrative, budget and planning functions
between State and USAID
- Consolidation of Stabilization and Reconstruction capabilities
- Improved operational chain of command from Secretary to execution lead

Chapter 3 will look at the analysis and research done in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review (QDDR) released in December 2010, in which many of these
recommendations were confirmed, implemented or are planned for implementation in the near
future.

**BEYOND GOLDWATER NICHOLS (BG-N) REPORTS**

Although focused on reforming the Department of Defense to meet the needs of the 21\textsuperscript{st}
Century, the four year research project taken on by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) realized that it must include analysis and recommendations that dealt with reform
across the U.S. government as a whole. The Phase II report focused most on the U.S.
Government and made the following recommendations that apply to this research:

- Conduct a Quadrennial National Security Review to develop U.S. national
security strategy and determine the capabilities required to implement the
strategy.
- Develop common terminologies for each interagency mission area, using
NSC-led interagency working groups.
- Develop common concepts of operation for each interagency mission area,
using NSC-led interagency working groups.
- Develop an agreed set of interagency roles and responsibilities for key
mission areas using an NSC-led interagency working group; codify the
roles and responsibilities in a series of National Security Presidential
Directives; and embody in legislation those roles and responsibilities in
each mission area that are enduring.
- Conduct NSC/OMB mission area reviews for top national security
priorities that require interagency implementation.
- Conduct regular NSC-chaired interagency “summits” in each region.
- Enhance opportunities and networks for information sharing and
collaboration across agency lines and with coalition partners.
- Congress should approve a 10\% personnel float for key civilian agencies
to enable interagency education, training, and rotations.
- Enhance USG capacities for training and equipping indigenous security forces by amending Titles 10 and 22 to permit direct DoD funding of these activities.
- Provide DoD with more flexible contracting authorities and vehicles more responsive to the operational environment.
- Congress should rewrite and fully fund the recommendations outlined in the Lugar-Biden Initiative.
- Strengthen existing operational capacities at USAID.
- Create a new Training Center for Interagency and Coalition Operations.\textsuperscript{10}

**Ensuring National Security is Effective and Efficient**

Executive branch officials, both civilian and military, say the biggest risk to U.S. national security today is the economy. It follows that these departments will support all efforts to turn the U.S. economy around to preserve the nation’s interests.

While the budget debates continue with expected emphasis on the Department of Defense, the U.S. government should focus on synergy and innovative reform that can be institutionalized now. Facets of national security and funding that can be integrated through deliberate planning can provide exponential results for the country. In the next two chapters, this paper will individually investigate the two focus areas of Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance, as planned and executed by the main players: the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). These chapters will define the two areas of security cooperation and foreign assistance, how they are executed, and what successes at reform and integration have been achieved. Each chapter will conclude with findings on what improvements are still needed for these tools to be integrated and effective beyond the drawdown in Afghanistan.
Chapter 3 – Department of Defense: Security Cooperation Efforts and Findings

Key Takeaways

In coordination with the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and supported host nations, the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. military forces conduct security cooperation activities to promote U.S. security interests, engage and build security relationships, develop allied and partner military capabilities, and provide U.S. forces with access to host nations. While there has been security cooperation successes related to doctrine and policy, authorizations and funding, and interagency initiatives, more reforms are needed to fully integrate security cooperation planning and implementation activities.

What is Security Cooperation?

The terms “security cooperation” and “security assistance” are often confused and mistakenly used interchangeably. According to the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) first introduced the term “security cooperation” in 1997. The DRI proposed that certain DoD-funded international programs be managed by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). DSAA already had the management responsibility of many security assistance programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended. With the adaptation of a broader security cooperation mission set, DSSA was re-designated the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), effected 1 October 1998.

Key Term

SECURITY COOPERATION (SC)
Activities undertaken by DoD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

See Annexes B and C for additional SA and SC terms of reference.

Figure 2 - Source: DoD Directive 5132.03, Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, October 24, 2008
According to U.S. military joint doctrine, “security cooperation”, or SC, is defined as “all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”

From a joint doctrine perspective, SC is addressed in Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, while the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) contains specific DoD guidance for SC. The GEF guidance provides regional goals and activities, and provides the overarching framework for many SC activities.

“Security assistance”, or SA, is defined as “the provision of defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of U.S. national policies and objectives.” SA is predominately aimed at enhancing regional stability, while helping nations face external vice internal threats. SA is the military component of foreign assistance implemented by DoD in accordance with policies established by the Department of State (DoS). SA’s principal components include: foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), peace operations (PO), and excess defense articles (EDA). Annexes B and C provide specific details of current SA and SC programs.
A related SC activity, foreign internal defense, or FID, refers to “the U.S. activities that support an host nation’s internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security, consistent with U.S. national security objectives and policies.” SC encompasses both SA (external threats focused) and FID (internal threats focused) activities. FID consists of indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations. The complex relationships among SC, SA, and FID are depicted in Figure 5.

![Diagram of Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, and Foreign Internal Defense]

**Figure 5 - Source: Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010**

**How Security Cooperation Fits into U.S. Strategy and Policy**

According to DoD policy, SC, which includes DoD-administered SA programs, is an important tool of national security and foreign policy and an integral element of the DoD
mission. Figure 6 depicts the relationships of the strategic documents and plans that shape and direct SC activities.

Security Cooperation Focus Areas

The aforementioned GEF provides SC focus areas designed to link geographic combatant commander (CCDR) theater campaign plans to U.S. national priorities and strategic objectives. SC activities, which are integrated into the CCDR theater campaign plans, are grouped into the following ten focus areas:

1. Human Capacity/Human Capital Development – Facilitate activities which enhance and/or develop partner nation’s military members and civilian security officials’ capacity to sustain their defense sector over time.
2. Operational Capacity and Capability Building – Build usable, relevant, and enduring partner capabilities while achieving U.S. and partner objectives.

Figure 6 - Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Campaign Support Plan, January 2010
3. Institutional Capacity – Strengthen partner nation’s security sector long-term institutional capacity and capability through security force assistance (SFA).

4. Support to Institutional Capacity / Civil-Sector Capacity Building – Strengthen partner nation’s non-security civil sector capacity and capability to deliver services to its own population through stable and effective civil sector institutions.

5. Combined Operations Capacity, Interoperability, and Standardization – Develop operational and technical capabilities, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures with partner nations to enable effective combined operations or improve a collective defense capability.


7. Intelligence and Information Sharing – Gain and/or share specific kinds of intelligence or information and develop shared assessments of common threats.

8. Assurance and Regional Confidence Building – Assure allies and partners, enhance regional stability and security, reduce the potential for inter- or intra-state conflict and international consensus building, and/or expand community of like-minded states dedicated to more peaceful and secure international order.

9. International Armaments and Space Cooperation – Encourage armaments and space activity cooperation activities with allies, partner nations and alliances (e.g., NATO), in order to increase efficiencies, leverage expertise, and enhance relationships.

10. International Suasion and Collaboration – Build cooperative political-military relationships with key security influencers and offset counterproductive influence in key regions and international organizations.¹⁴

The following chart, Figure 7, depicts how DoD and the GEF organizes SC activities and tools by the ten SC focus areas and integrated into CCDR campaign plans to support the GEF-directed global end states.
Who Conducts Security Cooperation

The following paragraphs describe the key participants and stakeholders for planning and managing SC activities at both the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

**Strategic / National Level**

The National Security Council (NSC) generally provides the initial guidance and translation of national-level decisions pertaining to FID, SA, and SC. The Department of State (DoS) is generally the lead government agency for U.S. international affairs. The Secretary of State advises the President in forming foreign policy, including the national FID effort. The DoS assists the NSC in building national FID related policies and priorities, and is the lead government agency to carry out these policies. The DoS Policy Planning Staff, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), and the new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) are the most involved with interagency planning for FID, SA, and SC. The Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security is the principal advisor and focal point for SA matters within DoS; control and coordination of SA extends from this office to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. At the national level, the PM is the principal channel of liaison between DoS and DoD. Generally, DoS directs the overall U.S. Government (USG) SA program and DoD executes via SC programs and activities.

DoD Directive 5132.03, Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, dated October 24, 2008, establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities under the GEF, which provides SC guidance to the GCCs, and titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code (USC), and statutory authorities, executive orders, and policies relating to the administration of SC, including SA programs authorized by the FAA and AECA, as amended. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy USD(P) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all SC matters. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs) establishes SA policy and supervises SA programs through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Secretaries of the Military Departments (MILDEPs) coordinate on SC policy guidance, campaign plans, and allocate resources to achieve SC objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides implementation guidance for U.S. military plans and programs and provides the Secretary of Defense with military advice concerning SC.15

Operational and Tactical Level

The Director, DSCA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), directs, administers, and provides DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions, for the execution of DoD SC programs for which DSCA has responsibility. Other security SC programs are managed by other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the GCCs, or MILDEPs. Specifically, GCCs develop campaign plans to conduct SC programs and activities in accordance with the GEF, and complete campaign plan and campaign support plan assessments.16

The U.S. diplomatic mission to a host nation includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically present in a country. The President gives the Chief of Mission (COM), normally an ambassador, full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees in country. The COM has authority over all USG executive branch employees within the mission and host country except for employees.
under the command of a U.S. military commander (Title 22, USC, Section 3927). The Senior Defense Official (SDO) or Defense Attaché (DATT) is the principal DoD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The SDO or DATT is the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy.

In addition to being the diplomatically accredited DATT, the SDO is the chief of the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) within the Country Team. The SCO includes all DoD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SA and SC management functions under titles 22 and 10 USC. SCOs typically include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions.

Most importantly, the Country Team conducts the in-country, interdepartmental planning and coordination among key members of the U.S. diplomatic mission, including FID, SA, and SC efforts. The Country Team structure is depicted in Figure 8.

![Figure 8 - Source: Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010](image-url)
Security Cooperation Successes

Congressional Authorities and Leadership Support

The newer Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip) authority is a step in the right direction in terms of streamlining SC related budgets, specifically supporting SFA and FID efforts. Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, as amended and regularly extended, provides the Secretary of Defense with the authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specified purposes—counterterrorism and stability operations—and foreign maritime security forces for counterterrorism (CT) operations. DoD values this authority as an important tool to train and equip military partners; however, funds may only be obligated with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Thus far, DoD has primarily used Section 1206 authority to provide CT support. In FY 2010 and FY 2011, DoD used Section 1206 funds to provide significant assistance to train and equip foreign military forces for military and stability operations in which U.S. forces participate. Section 1206 allocations or notifications for FY 2006-FY 2011 totaled $1.574 billion. During this period, Section 1206 supported bilateral programs in 40 countries, 16 multilateral programs, and a global human rights program. FY2011 funding totaled $247.5 million, significantly below the $350 million cap on Section 1206 funding. By region, FY2012 funding was: Africa $113.9 million; Greater Europe, $88.7 million, Middle East and South/Southwestern Asia, $19.2 million.\textsuperscript{19} Section 1206 authority is not permanent and will expire in FY2013.

GCCs, who play key roles in planning and executing SC activities, have testified before Congress to express their widespread support for Section 1206-like authorities and funding for SC activities. Admiral Robert Willard, the commander U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), stated, “Congressional 1206 authority is the only partner capability/capacity building tool that we have to address urgent or emergent needs in the region.”\textsuperscript{20} In testimony before the Armed Services Committees, the GCCs have consistently advocated for similar budget reforms. General William Ward, the first commander of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), where SC is a key mission met, stated, “Sustaining our long-term security cooperation programs and activities in Africa requires flexible, multi-year authorities. Existing authorities are designed to support the conduct of individual short-term activities or long-term programs, but do not support the transition from the former to the latter. They are also insufficiently responsive to changing
conditions, such as when train and equip efforts, initiated in response to emergent threats, highlight the need for long-term capacity building.”

Interagency Organizations and Initiatives

USAFRICOM is the first organization of its kind to institutionalize the interagency structure necessary to achieve U.S. national security objectives in a complex region of the world. Fully operational in October 2008, USAFRICOM is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for U.S. military relations with 54 African countries. Prior to the establishment of USAFRICOM, no fewer than three U.S. military headquarters were responsible for building relationships with countries that make up the African continent. USAFRICOM better enables DoD to work with other elements of the USG and others to achieve a more stable environment in which political and economic growth can take place. The USG interagency process is more complex as other departments and agencies simultaneously pursue diplomatic, economic, and informational security objectives throughout the continent. USAFRICOM has incorporated DoD, DoS, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other USG elements into the staff and leadership structure of the command, resulting in greater inclusion within the USG interagency process. For instance, USAFRICOM features two deputy commanders. The traditional Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) is complemented by a senior U.S. diplomat who serves as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA).

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) supports the overall SC efforts via its CT, SFA, and FID mission sets. To improve the efficiency of its liaison and coordination efforts, USSOCOM has placed Special Operations Support Teams (SOST) within key departments, agencies, and organizations of the USG. The purpose of the SOST program is to provide an embedded liaison team at critical nodes of the interagency process to facilitate the exchange of information, the development of courses of action, the preparation of recommendations, and the efficient execution of executive orders. To ensure a more efficient environment for exchange of information, coordination of activities, and synchronization of planning, USSOCOM has established an Interagency Task Force (IATF) that includes DoD, USG interagency components, and partner nations. The IATF provides direct access to USG agencies and departments through the SOST program. The effectiveness of the SOST program lies in the embedded nature of its
members within other agencies and their on-scene responsiveness to the interagency partners. The figure below describes the makeup and interagency components of the USSOCOM IATF and the SOST program.

![Figure 9 - Source: USSOCOM Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual, Second Edition, April 2011](image)

**U.S. Doctrine and Policy Guidance**

In addition to joint doctrine and DoD policies regarding SC, other non-DoD agencies have developed similar policies and guidance. The issuance of the 2010 DoS and USAID Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy Review (QDDR) and the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development underscore the need for interagency coordination and the importance of international development as a pillar of national security. USAID has also developed civilian-military cooperation policies and published a corresponding Civilian-Military Operations Guide (CMOG). The intent of the CMOG is to bring civilian and military activities closer to planning and programming together, with the goal of producing better and more effective development results. The purpose is to help USAID field program officers enhance understanding of and
cooperation with military counterparts.\textsuperscript{26} Perhaps the most significant SA and SC related planning document to enhance interagency coordination and planning is the “Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D) Planning Guide”. Diplomacy, Development, and Defense or 3D—as represented by DoS, USAID, and DoD—are the three pillars that provide the foundation for promoting and protecting U.S. national security interests abroad. A Washington, D.C. based 3D Working Group, chartered to develop products and processes to improve collaboration among the three organizations, developed the 3D Planning Guide to help interagency planners understand each agency’s plans, processes, and help identify opportunities for coordination. This initiative is a first step in building understanding and synchronizing plans to improve collaboration, coordination, and unity of effort to advance U.S. national interests.\textsuperscript{27}

**Security Cooperation Improvements Needed**

*Security Cooperation Reform Task Force*

In July 2011, the Secretary of Defense approved the DoD Security Cooperation Reform Phase I Report. The Security Cooperation Reform Task Force (SCRTF), led by Mr. Tim Hoffman, Task Force Director and DoD Senior Executive Service (SES), focused its efforts in five principal focus areas:

1. Planning processes to identify Ally/partner country capability requirements;
2. Existing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) sub-processes, in particular contracting, procurement, transportation, and distribution;
3. Training, education, and workforce development;
4. Technology security and foreign disclosure; and
5. Developing a “fast-track” process for addressing urgent Ally/partner capability requirements.\textsuperscript{28}

Although the SCRTF’s findings and recommendations focused principally on the FMS process as it relates to SC, the report generated a number of macro-level SC findings. Specifically regarding focus area number one, the SCRTF found that SC planning is largely reactive and often oriented towards responding to, rather than anticipating, the capability requirements of U.S. allies and partners.\textsuperscript{29} The report determined that effective SC, including
SFA activities designed to build partner capability and capacity, requires all DoD SC activities be coordinated toward a common purpose and overarching objectives. Moreover, DoD has no formal mechanism for integrating its country planning efforts with DoS’s Mission Strategic Resource Plans (MSRPs). Without a common planning methodology designed to anticipate partner capability requirements and achieve regional or country objectives, DoD’s SC activities are often disjointed. As a result, DoD is not well prepared to present an integrated and unified SC strategy to its interagency partners, Congress, industry, and partner countries.  

**Formal Integration of Security Cooperation**

A smart power, integrated approach to SC planning and execution is required. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) “Commission on Smart Power,” smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. Similarly, the SCRTF report recommendation related to SC planning is to institutionalize and integrate country-level SC planning so DoD can better anticipate partner country capability requirements. Such planning should identify and prioritize GEF critical partner capability requirements and establish the GCC Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) as the integrating mechanism for country-level SC planning across DoD. Country-level SC planning refers to the combined efforts of DoD, DoS, and the partner country to identify the needed or preferred capabilities and the requirements to fill these capability gaps. Ideally, this collaborative planning informs the more comprehensive GCC TCP and requirements for SC related resources.
The figure below illustrates the necessary SC planning and integration required to effectively and efficiently achieve common SC objectives that support the overall foreign assistance efforts.

*Integrated Planning to Achieve Common Foreign Policy Objectives*

Figure 10 - Source: DoD Security Cooperation Reform Task Force Report, July 2011
Chapter 4 – Department of State and USAID: Foreign Assistance Efforts and Findings

Key Takeaways

Significant portions of U.S. military security cooperation are funded as foreign assistance activities managed by the Department of State, and appropriated by Congress. With the amount of funding in the Defense appropriations bills, it’s not common knowledge that these military programs are funded under DoS budget authorities. The State Department has always taken its lead role on foreign assistance seriously, as a significant foreign policy tool. Over the past ten years, DoS focused on substantial internal reforms including foreign assistance planning and implementation. The U.S. government struggles to prepare for a future of persistent conflict and budget constraints. It is important to solidify reforms and institutionalize the integrating actions planned in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the 3D Planning Framework to implement effective and efficient foreign assistance activities.

What is Foreign Assistance?

After the pivotal U.S. military and economic investments made during and following World War II, Congress reviewed and consolidated the authorization of U.S. funds to foreign nations by the law known as The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This law states the United States will provide targeted assistance to “promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and external security, and for other purposes.”

In this Act, Congress declared that development resources must be effectively and efficiently used and that five principal goals be reflected in United States foreign policy:

1. The alleviation of the worst physical manifestations of poverty among the world’s poor majority;
2. The promotion of conditions enabling developing countries to achieve self-sustaining economic growth with equitable distribution of benefits;
3. The encouragement of development processes in which individual civil and economic rights are respected and enhanced;
4. The integration of the developing countries into an open and equitable international economic system;
(5) The promotion of good governance through combating corruption and improving transparency and accountability. 

Congress has become more involved and detailed about annually authorizing foreign assistance funds regarding the amounts, types of activities, and countries. The latest official appropriations for foreign assistance have been between sixty and eighty pages of detail. 

Foreign assistance funding is spread over approximately twenty different budget accounts managed by DoS but administered by multiple departments and agencies. This funding is approved by and has the oversight of multiple congressional committees and subcommittees. However, many of these accounts and those for which the State Department is the lead implementation agency are included in the part of the U.S. budget for International Affairs called “Function 150.” For the past decade, this function equated to roughly 55% of U.S. foreign assistance. During this time, the majority of the remainder of the funding was specified as bilateral assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan in special programs such as Coalition Support Funds, and Security Training.

Foreign assistance programs can be separated into four broad categories based on goals:
- Economic assistance for development, or Development assistance;
- Humanitarian assistance;
- Foreign assistance linked to U.S. national strategy;
- Security assistance to reinforce local security forces.

The first two categories of Development assistance and Humanitarian assistance are implemented by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), created in 1961. Congress established the Development Assistance, Global Health and Child Survival, Food for Peace, and the International Disaster and Famine Assistance accounts before the creation of USAID. Each administration may organize funds to address their policies. The Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge account were established by President Bush to specifically help Africa, and other developing countries stabilize and build democratic institutions.

The second two categories of Foreign Assistance linked to U.S. national strategy, and Security Assistance, are the prime focus of this paper and driven by national policy. The accounts in these categories are the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Democracy Support, Support for East European Democracy (SEED)/Freedom Support Act (FSA), International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation Antiterrorism Demining and Related programs (NADR), Stabilization and Reconstruction programs (S&R), and Security Assistance (SA).  

The foreign assistance category called “Security Assistance” includes many traditional Security Cooperation activities such as Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, Peacekeeping Operations, and Excess Defense Articles program. Figure 11 depicts how the DoS executed the foreign assistance funding in 2010. Almost half of the funds were spent in bilateral aid from the U.S to an individual country, likely executed by the Country Team. Eleven percent of the foreign assistance budget in 2010 was direct aid provided by the military.

![Figure 11 - Source: FY10 Composition of the DoS Foreign Assistance Budget](image)

How Foreign Assistance Fits into U.S. Strategy and Policy

Foreign Assistance has always been a method of investing U.S. funds for future peace and security by expanding democratic principles globally as well as having been a carrot in our foreign policy kit bag. In the past, DoS has loosely planned and coordinated assistance programs to preserve global security through support to our allies and assistance to developing nations.

Only recently has DoS formalized the ties to U.S. strategy and policy. Many of the early reforms this decade were laying out a clear connection between national security goals and the spending of precious U.S. resources. Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice both
worked to streamline the responsibilities and oversight of the State Department’s foreign assistance and created a foreign assistance framework tied directly to the National Security Strategy.

Secretary Clinton has continued that reform, further solidifying State’s planning and policy linkages to the national interests and strategies. Figure 12 from DoS’s self-analysis called the first annual Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) in December 2010 reflects this clear relationship between National Security Strategy and every level of DoS planning.

Figure 12 – DoS Strategic Planning Link, Source: QDDR, December 2010
Who Conducts Foreign Assistance

The U.S. State Department is charged with responsibility for all function 150 planning but not execution of the President’s national security strategy and policies. Congress supervises and controls foreign assistance expenditures through legislation, authorizations and appropriations.

Inside DoS, the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources “(F)” ensures the strategic and effective allocation, management, and use of foreign assistance funds and reports to the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources.39

Almost every department or agency in the executive branch: Departments of Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury; the Agency for International Development, the Trade Development Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Peace Corps, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, plans and implements some foreign assistance dollars. Each department argues its foreign assistance need and plans the implementation. This disjointed planning and budget method for foreign assistance overall creates the difficulty in synchronizing, preventing overlap, and ensuring effectiveness.

Foreign Assistance Successes

Over the past ten years many reforms through multiple administrations and different leadership have taken place that moved the United States toward integrated interagency operations. Congress has supported a more balanced approach to foreign affairs by building up the other U.S. national tools besides the U.S. military. Congress approved increased funding for budget function 150, and authorized increased manning for the State Department to hire almost double the Foreign Service Officers. At a time when department budgets are decreasing, budget function-150 increased by 1% to $33 billion for 2012, and will have contingency funds available in an additional authorization as well.40

Strategic Connection to the National Security Strategy

As mentioned above, in 2006, Secretary Rice created the Office the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance “(F)”, who concurrently held the position of USAID Administrator, to strengthen the Secretary’s ability to oversee and coordinate all U.S. foreign assistance by
providing strategic coherence among foreign assistance objectives.\(^{41}\) This integrated foreign assistance program allowed clearer oversight on how these funds directly support the national strategy. Secretary Clinton improved upon this structure to allow the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources and a strong USAID Administrator to work together to manage foreign assistance funding and programs. The Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F) became the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources “(F)” reporting to the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources. The Director of this office is an Assistant Secretary-equivalent senior official, who manages the integrated budget process and participates in the strategic planning processes linking strategic plans to multiyear foreign assistance budgets.\(^{42}\)

**Foreign Assistance Budgeting and Transparency**

Under the leadership of Secretary Rice, a Foreign Assistance framework was developed that laid out the accounts against the national security interests and goals to cross-walk the prioritization of countries and programs. This level of diagramming has continued under Secretary Clinton, as well as the Obama administration, by providing an upgraded framework online called the Foreign Assistance “Dashboard” found at [www.foreignassistance.gov](http://www.foreignassistance.gov).
This dashboard was released in December 2010 just after the release of the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. While not yet complete, the State Department, USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation have uploaded their data. Each department and agency that implements foreign assistance dollars is required to upload their data on a rolling calendar of deadlines. This site provides cuts of the data and funding by sector, agency and country. It includes a historic look at foreign assistance funding spent each year as well as a future look at what has been appropriated for coming years. The more this site is fleshed out and used by every department that executes foreign assistance funding, the more transparent this complex process can become.

**Organization and Initiatives**

Over the past decade, Congress has authorized an increase in the number of Foreign Service Officers and Specialists from approximately 7500 to the current number of 15,200 between State and USAID for the most part. While this is still a small corps compared to the
Department of Defense, USAID is recruiting to double their number of Foreign Service employees from 700 to 1400 in the next couple of years.

Secretary Clinton implemented many of the reform recommendations of the PNSR and BG-N reports as well as the recent QDDR. Responsibility and authority has been shifted to important programs by ensuring the establishment and organization of strong bureaus. One such reorganization involves the newly created Under-Secretary of Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights involved in foreign assistance planning related to national security as depicted in Figure 14. There are now five bureaus, three offices and the Open Government Partnership under this structure. They have the power and authority of an Under-Secretary for the sections of DoS that manage conflict and the foreign assistance related to national security interests.

![Figure 14 - Source: New Bureau Organization, QDDR Dec 12](image)

The State Department also organized internal working groups co-chaired by DoS and USAID leadership for the research and development of the initial Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. These working groups continue today on the next phase of the QDDR process to continue analysis and make recommendations. Currently there are thirteen of these focused task forces. “Task Force 6” deals solely with Foreign Assistance Effectiveness to recommend mechanisms to implement aid effectiveness principles consistently.\(^{44}\)
Training and Development

Newly published in the QDDR, DoS is committed to expanding the training and development programs to increase the scope of each employee. In the report, diplomats must now be able to “lead the implementation of global civilian operations and pursue whole-of-government diplomatic initiatives; build new partnerships and institutions and reshape old ones at both the regional and global level; and be prepared to go beyond the state to engage directly with new networks, from the private sector to the private citizen.” This training goal suits the complex contemporary environment but will require substantial change to come for DoS’s human resource, education and development programs.

Together, the DoS, USAID and DoD have made significant progress to integrate by operating side-by-side on a large-scale in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. government established integrated training to prepare the interagency Provincial Reconstruction Teams for Iraq and Afghanistan as well as Civilian-Military teams in support of programs in the Horn of Africa. However, this training will cease as operations in Afghanistan conclude.

Doctrine and Guidance

In December 2010, State’s unprecedented publishing of the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) provided the DoS its own internal analysis and way forward to make the reforms recommended by outside agencies and bring the DoS into the 21st century. The reforms initiated by Secretary Clinton have broad support from within DoS, without legislative action like the Goldwater-Nichols act which overhauled the Department of Defense. While many reforms have been made, a contemporary way of operating has been solidified as well. With reforms begun a decade ago, DoS and USAID seem to have embraced the need for change on their own. This shift in the diplomatic culture may have been driven by the increased requirements on the department of the post-9/11 period. This new culture of Foreign Service requires a spectrum of individual and organizational capabilities along with responsiveness to the U.S. public in ensuring foreign policy goals meet national interests.

Not only has a new trend of deep departmental analysis and reorganization taken root, the State Department has developed and implemented interagency frameworks and documents to clarify and consolidate foreign assistance efforts. At the heart is the 2006 creation of the Foreign Assistance Framework linked to specific national security goals. This framework is now available on line as mentioned above with the additional documents that provide common
definitions, measures and structure for interagency foreign assistance planning. Among those documents which can be found online are: the April 2010 version of the *Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions*, the 2011 version of the *Master List of Standard Indicators* as well as the by-sector indicators. These foundational and technical guides are developed for interagency and intergovernmental use at the strategic, program area (operational) and element (tactical) level of activities.

USAID and the DoS have furthered the specific relationship with the DoD, such as the 3D Planning Guide, the Conflict Assessment Framework, and the Civil-Military Operations handbook mentioned above. However, the DoS is not finished developing tools that help integrate the efforts of these three organizations effectively. According to the QDDR, DoS and USAID plan to work with other agencies and the National Security Staff to develop a new International Operational Response Framework (IORF) that will clarify leadership structures, lines of responsibility and combine the range of U.S. resources best to respond to an international disaster, crisis or conflict.

**Foreign Assistance Improvements Needed**

The Department of State and USAID must finish the reforms they have started through the QDDR. As this takes place, they must remain engaged with DoD to institutionalize the 3D approach to enable the most effective and efficient implementation of foreign assistance. From Congressional streamline of authorities, down to the Country Team level planning, every Foreign Service Officer in either DoS or USAID must be expected to integrate. DoS and USAID reforms must be institutionalized through departmental planning, training, assignments, and continued integration efforts.

The State Department must create an education process to fulfill the training requirement to build the Foreign Service force it needs. DoS and USAID must continue to work with and depend on DoD to integrate and engage their new cross-sector professionals using an interagency approach to planning foreign assistance in support of national interests despite the drawdown in Afghanistan and the loss of everyday connectivity. This effort will likely take legislative authority to emphasize, promote and reward cross-sector and cross-department assignments and
training similar to what the Goldwater-Nichols Act did for joint duty within the Department of Defense.

While the building blocks or foundation for whole of government action are set from a decade working side-by-side, the work to institutionalize the integration of DoS, USAID and DoD at every level must now be made. At a time when the nation is faced with continued complexity and austerity, this cross-government reform will require the humility and courage of each organization to continue to evolve their culture. It will also take the support and direction of the National Security Staff to create and authorize the best national security budgeting structure and process to use resources in a whole-of-government way.
Chapter 5 – Institutionalizing the Integration of Two Smart Tools

Conclusions

While there have been ground-breaking reforms over the past ten years at integrating the government to build a full kit of national security related tools, the high capacity tools remain relatively stove-piped. Most reforms remain within an agency or department. Now is the time under the pressure of constrained budgets to bridge the agency and department gaps to achieve true integration for the consequent and responsible synergy in relation to national security interests and strategic goals. Specifically, this paper finds the following context that supports integration of smart-power tools now more than ever.

1. Strategic Complexity
   Focused U.S. security cooperation and foreign assistance investments are the most effective and efficient methods to shape the complex global environment and mitigate threats in an era of persistent conflict with non-peer competitors, especially with a military draw down and cuts in procurement.

2. Persistent Budget Constraints
   Congress has recently supported small increases to foreign assistance funding and manpower (e.g. increased the number of Foreign Service officers); however, security cooperation and foreign assistance programs are still in jeopardy because of significant budget cuts. National security related authorities and budgets are disparate and disjointed. Competition for funding and resources will increase among the U.S. interagency and military services.

3. Inter-Program Alignment with Interests
   Foreign assistance and development programs are more effective when aligned with enduring national security interests, country specific and regional objectives, and security cooperation efforts.
4. Formal Integration

While Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D) efforts and “whole of government” approaches to international affairs are improving, security cooperation and foreign assistance programs are not fully integrated. The gains in interagency integration from operations together in Iraq and Afghanistan could easily be lost as U.S. agencies and forces refocus at home on a more austere future.

**Formal Integration Needed**

The following series of charts depict how and where integrated SC and FA efforts support overall foreign policy objectives and national security interests.

The recommended framework for SC and FA is based on closer, more formal integration between DoD and DoS, especially at the regional and country levels, as depicted below.

![Figure 15 - More Formalized Integration Needed](image-url)
The following chart provides a more detailed visual of how an integrated approach better supports national interests and strategic objectives. While it’s important to have cooperation-based policies, working groups, and planning guides at the national level, it’s even more important to achieve integration at the lower levels, specifically at the regional (DoD geographic combatant commands and DoS regional bureaus) and country teams. As indicated below, shared or pooled funding initiatives and reforms would enhance integration and streamline implementation.
Drilling down further, Figure 17, with a follow-on descriptive legend at Figure 18, shows the regional, functional, and country-specific plans that would benefit from formal integration. Specifically, corresponding plan annexes would create a “planning crosswalk” to ensure SC and FA plans, and subsequent implementation, are better integrated and synchronized upon execution.

Integrated Planning Framework

**State Plans**
- BSRP
- MSRP
  - Include Security Assistance Annexes

**Defense Plans**
- TCPs
- CPs
  - Include Foreign Assistance & Development Annexes

**USAID Plans**
- CDCS
  - Ops (with State)
  - Include Security Assistance Annexes

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Figure 17 – Planning and Implementation Level Crosswalk
Key Plans for Integration

**Bureau Strategic and Resource Plans (BSRP)** - Specify each State bureau’s (functional, regional, and management) significant foreign policy goals and resource requirements

**Mission Strategic and Resource Plans (MSRP)** - Identify country-specific foreign policy priorities and requisite resources; also report on results

**Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS)** - Set longer term country-specific development assistance priorities and expected results; CDCSs are reflective of the development agenda of the host nation itself, and work to align U.S. and host nation efforts with other international and bilateral programs working in the country

**Operational Plans (OPs)** - Provide a comprehensive plan of how State and USAID foreign assistance resources are used to support U.S. foreign assistance objectives; provide annual programmatic proposal for the implementation of foreign assistance resources

**Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs)** - “Operationalize” combatant commanders theater or functional strategies; focus on steady-state activities, which include ongoing operations, security cooperation, and other shaping or conflict prevention activities

**Country Plans (CPs)** - Support country-specific TCP objectives intended to integrate DoD security cooperation activities; usually developed by the combatant command country team representative in conjunction with the country desk officers at its headquarters; structure and contents are at the discretion of each combatant command

*Figure 18 - Source: 3D Planning Guide Diplomacy, Development, Defense, 15 September 2011*

Recommendations for Effective and Efficient Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance

Elements of the government from the top to the bottom must take action to institutionalize integration that ensures effective and efficient implementation of two smart tools at a time when resources are scarce. This list of recommendations begins with Congress at the top and continues through the departments to the country level individuals at the bottom.

1. Congress must support the Department of State and the Department of Defense by developing and implementing budget reforms. These reforms must better aligning related authorities, resources, and budgets, where applicable. Although some funding initiatives (e.g.
section 1206 or 1207 funding authorities) have been implemented, many reports, including the Project and the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) and Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N), recommend changes in authorities. Specifically, recommendations include revamping the Foreign Assistance Act and reforming budgets, such as establishing a National Security Budget to combine related Defense and State international affairs spending. An integrated budget or 1206 or 1207-like funding makes sense for certain security assistance programs where SC and FA overlap.

2. DoS Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and Regional Bureaus; DoD Office of Secretary of Defense [OSD] and Joint Staff [JS] must synchronize foreign policy objectives and resources as well as review post-war integration persistence at intervals. These agencies and official must reinforce “whole of government” approaches and strategic / operational frameworks. Various reports, specifically the PNSR and BG-N, recommend significant reforms to the national security process. Frameworks should guide policy development and resource allocation, promote coherence and increased interagency coordination in foreign affairs, and increase the effectiveness of civilian and military efforts. For specific details on BG-N and PNSR, refer to annexes E and F.

3. U.S. Senior Leaders, DoS Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and Regional Bureaus, and Combatant Commanders must build, maintain and support effective partnerships between their organizations. This level of leaders must leverage regional and international institutions, organizations, and partners. As budget cuts and resource constraints face the U.S., DoS and DoD should seek together more partnership opportunities when integrating SC and FA to achieve common security interests and global stability. The U.S. can no longer afford unilateral approaches to implementing foreign policy.

4. DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies, and Combatant Command Trainers must incorporate “3D” approaches into training and leader development. Together these organizations must promote 3D training, education, and professional development that brings their subordinates together. Doctrine, policy, planning, and implementation changes and updates should be reinforced with appropriate training and education programs.

5. Country Teams and Combatant Command Country Desk Officers and Planners must set up procedures to connect with each other and link SC and FA efforts to enduring national
security interests and strategic goals. These individuals must know to synchronize their plans with national security interests and goals along with supporting SC and FA programs and activities.

6. Country Teams and Combatant Command Country Desk Officers and Planners must institutionalize and fully integrate 3D planning and implementation efforts. These individuals must diligently participate in each other’s planning process to ensure Mission Strategic Resource Plans, Theater Campaign Plans and Country Plans are synchronized. Departments and agencies should fully embrace their leaders’ intent and recent updates to department strategies, doctrine and policies as well as planning guides (e.g. 3D Planning Guide). Furthermore, DoD, DoS, and USAID should adopt a deliberate, institutional planning framework or crosswalk (see chart above).

The advances in integration of the last twelve years towards whole-of-government approaches and action could be lost if specific methods are not institutionalized and fully implemented. This paper recommends actions that integrate two smart tools in an effort to protect U.S. national interests. Continued evaluation and follow on research, however, is necessary to measure the effectiveness of these integrated tools to ensure they are serving their legislated purposes.
End Notes


4 Adams and Williams, 16.


7 Hadley and Perry, 25.

8 Hadley and Perry, 26-27.

9 The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), Forging a New Shield, (Arlington, VA: PNSR, 2008) 517-518


12 JP 3-22, I-10.


16 DoDD 5132.03, 4-9.

17 JP 3-22, III-10 and III-11.

18 DoDD 5132.03, 10-11.


22 For more information about U.S. Africa Command, see <http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp>


24 JSOU, 1-32.

25 JSOU, 1-34.


29 SCRTF, 5.

30 SCRTF, Finding 1.1, 8.


32 SCRTF, Recommendation 1.1.1, 8.


34 Congress, FAA, 2.


37 Adams and Williams, 33-34.

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44 State, QDDR, 213

45 State, QDDR, 25-73.


47 State, QDDR, 142-143.
ANNEX A. Bibliography and Related References

U.S. National Strategies and Policies


http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153635.pdf


U.S. Doctrine and Policy Guidance


Books, Documents and Internet Resources


Periodical Articles


**Meetings and Seminars with Subject Matter Experts**

Meetings and seminars with select personnel at Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Army Staff, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and local scholars at Harvard, Tufts, and MIT.
ANNEX B. Security Assistance Programs
Source: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), Management of Security Assistance, updated January 2011

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) outlines security assistance as twelve major programs in DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). While seven of these Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and Arms Export Control Act (AECA)-authorized programs are administered by the Department of Defense (DOD), specifically by DSCA, they remain under the general control of the Department of State (DOS) as components of U.S. foreign assistance. These twelve security assistance programs include the following.

1. Foreign Military Sales

Foreign military sales (FMS) is a non-appropriated program administered by DSCA through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles, services, and training from the USG. The purchasing government pays all costs associated with a sale. There is a signed government-to-government agreement, normally documented on a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) between the USG and a foreign government. Each LOA is commonly referred to as a “case” and is assigned a unique case identifier for accounting purposes. Under FMS, military articles and services, including training, may be provided from DOD stocks (Section 21, AECA) or from new procurement (Section 22, AECA). If the source of supply is new procurement, on the basis of having an LOA which has been accepted by the foreign government, the USG agency or military department (MILDEP) assigned cognizance for this case is authorized to enter into a subsequent contractual arrangement with U.S. industry in order to provide the article or service requested.

The DOS Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) for fiscal year (FY) 2010 estimated that about 80 foreign countries and international organizations would participate in FY 2010 in the FMS program, with total estimated sales of $37 billion. The final FMS total for FY 2009 was $31.6 billion. This is in addition to the $6.5 billion in pseudo FMS LOA agreements during FY 2009 which were provided by DOD-funded security cooperation programs.

2. Foreign Military Construction Services

Foreign military construction services (FMCS) is a non-appropriated program administered by DSCA and authorized by Section 29, AECA, to include the sale of design and construction services by the USG to eligible purchasers. The construction sales agreement and sales procedures generally parallel those of FMS and are usually implemented by the MILDEP civil engineering agencies.

The FY 2010 CBJ projection for FMCS and actual FMCS sales for FY 2009 are included in the FMS projections stated above.
3. Foreign Military Financing Program

The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) is an appropriated program administered by DSCA that has undergone a variety of substantive and terminological changes over the years. At present, the program consists of congressionally appropriated grants and loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training through either FMS or direct commercial sales (DCS). Foreign military sales construction service (FMSCR) is authorized under the provisions of Sections 23 and 24, AECA, and originally served to provide credit loans as an effective means for easing the transition of foreign governments from grant aid to cash purchases.

Prior to FY 1989, this financing program was variously identified as the Foreign Military Sales Credit Program or the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program. In the FY 1989 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (FOAA), Congress introduced a new title, the FMFP, and the forgiven loan/forgiven credit component of the program was identified as FMFP grants to distinguish them from repayable direct FMFP loans. Also, the terms non-repayable loans or non-repayable credits are often used by various security assistance organizations (including DSCA) in place of the term “FMFP grants”.

Beginning in FY 1992, the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1992 (P.L. 101-508) changed the method of accounting and budgeting for all government loans, including FMFP loans issued under the AECA. This legislation provides a more accurate portrayal of the true cost of loans by providing new budget authority only for the subsidy element of the loan program and is the basis for the establishment of two new financial accounts:

• The first contains only the FMFP grant portion of the program administrative costs
• The second account provides the budget authority needed to fund the subsidy element of the proposed loan programs

While there are previously authorized FMFP loans still being repaid to the USG, this loan element is seldom used; the FMFP grant element (no repayment) is the norm.

FMFP funding for FY 2010 was $5.4 billion. The request for FY 2011 is a similar figure of $5.5 billion. All of these requests and subsequent appropriations are grants.

4. Leases

Chapter 6, AECA, authorizes the president to lease defense articles to friendly governments or international organizations for up to five years (renewable). This non-appropriated program is administered by DSCA. The law allows the lease of defense articles only for compelling foreign policy or national security reasons, and stipulates that the full cost of the lease, with some exceptions, must be borne by the recipient.
Furthermore, leased articles must not be needed for U.S. public use during the lease period, and the U.S. retains the right to terminate the lease at any time. For the recipient country, leases may be cheaper than purchasing the article outright, and they provide a convenient vehicle for obtaining defense articles for temporary use. Leases are executed through a lease agreement, with an associated FMS case to cover repair, training, supply support and/or transportation, if required. The total value of defense articles leased in FY 2008 was $9.1 billion.

5. Military Assistance Program

In FY 1990 the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was formally merged with the FMFP as Congress adopted an Administration proposal for integrating all MAP grant funding into the appropriations account for the FMFP. This appropriated program was administered by DSCA. No MAP funds have been appropriated for subsequent fiscal years, and there is no interest in seeking any such funds for the future. This legislative change, therefore, had the dual effect of causing existing MAP-funded programs to lose their former identity and become FMFP-funded programs and establishing the FMFP as the major U.S. financing program for the acquisition of U.S. defense articles and services by foreign governments.

MAP continues to be identified as a current security assistance program because the MAP-provided articles remain throughout the world with the continued requirements for end-use monitoring (EUM), return to the USG when no longer needed, and any proceeds from a sale to a third country or scrapping being returned to the USG.

6. International Military Education and Training

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program provides grant financial assistance for training in the U.S. and, in some cases, in overseas facilities to selected foreign military and civilian personnel. In earlier years, grant aid training of foreign military personnel was funded as part of the MAP appropriation. Starting with FY 1976, a separate authorization for IMET was established in Section 541, FAA. This appropriated program is administered by DSCA. Although historically a relatively modest program in terms of cost, both the president and Congress attach significant importance to this program. The recipient countries, likewise, are heavily reliant on this grant program and, in many cases; this program serves as the only method to receive training from the U.S. military.

At a time of declining defense and foreign aid budgets, IMET advances U.S. objectives on a global scale at a relatively small cost. In many countries, having a core group of well-trained, professional leaders with first hand knowledge of America will make a difference in winning access and influence for our diplomatic and military representatives. Thus, a relatively small amount of IMET funding will provide a return for U.S. policy goals, over the years, far greater than the original investment.
In 1980, Section 644(m)(5), FAA, was amended to authorize IMET tuition costing in terms of the additional costs that are incurred by the USG in furnishing such assistance. Section 21(a)(1)(C), AECA, was also amended to allow IMET recipients to purchase FMS training on an additional cost basis. The practical effects of these changes were to substantially reduce tuition costs for IMET-funded students, and thereby increase the amount of training an eligible country can obtain with its IMET grant funds and through FMS purchases.

A new IMET initiative was introduced in the FY 1991 FOAA when Congress adopted a Senate-proposed IMET earmark of $1 million to be used exclusively for expanding courses for foreign officers as well as for civilian managers and administrators of defense establishments. The focus of such training is on developing professional level management skills, with emphasis on military justice systems, codes of conduct, and the protection of human rights. Section 541, FAA, was amended to permit non-Ministry of Defense civilian government personnel to be eligible for this program, if such military education and training would:

- Contribute to responsible defense resource management
- Foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military
- Contribute to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counter-narcotics law enforcement efforts
- Improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights

This expanded IMET (E-IMET) program was further extended in FY 1993 to also include participation by national legislators who are responsible for oversight and management of the military. The E-IMET program authority was again amended in 1996 by P.L.104-164 to also include nongovernmental organization personnel.

$93 million was appropriated for the FY 2009 IMET program. An increased level of $108 million was appropriated for FY 2010 to train nearly 8,000 IMET students from over 140 countries. The amount of IMET requested for FY 2011 is $110 million.

7. Drawdowns

During a crisis, Section 506, FAA, authorizes the President to provide USG articles, services, and training to friendly countries and international organizations at no cost, to include free transportation. There is a $100 million ceiling per FY on articles, services, and training provided for military purposes; and another FY ceiling of $200 million for articles, services and training required for non-military purposes such as disaster relief, nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, counter-narcotics, refugee assistance, and Vietnam War-era missing in action/prisoners of war (MIA/POW) location and repatriation.
When emergency support for peacekeeping operations is required, Section 552(c)(2), FAA, separately authorizes the President to drawdown up to $25 million per FY in USG articles and services from any agency. Special drawdown authorities are periodically legislated to include $30 million in support for the Yugoslav International Criminal Court. These are non-appropriated authorities are administered by DSCA when defense articles, services, or training from DOD are to be drawn down.

8. Economic Support Fund

The Economic Support Fund (ESF) is authorized by Chapter 4 of Part II of the FAA. ESF is an appropriated program administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This fund was established to promote economic and political stability in areas where the U.S. has special political and security interests and where the U.S. has determined that economic assistance can be useful in helping to secure peace or to avert major economic or political crises. ESF is a flexible economic instrument available on a grant basis for a variety of economic purposes, including balance of payments support, infrastructure, and other capital and technical assistance development projects.

In earlier years, the ESF program included concessional (i.e., low interest rate) loan as well as grants. Recently, all ESF funds have been allocated as grant assistance. While a substantial amount of these ESF grants are used to provide balance of payments, the ESF also provides for programs aimed at primary needs in health, education, agriculture, and family planning. Where long-term political and economic stability is the primary concern, ESF finances projects that meet the basic needs of the poor.

The final FY 2009 ESF appropriation was $7.1 billion. The initial appropriation for FY 2010 ESF was $6.3 billion with a supplemental of $1.8 billion being requested. The initial ESF request for FY 2011 is for $7.8 billion. All of these requests and subsequent appropriations are grants.

9. Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations (PKO) is an appropriated program authorized by Chapter 6 of Part II of the FAA. For several years, PKO provided funds for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) which implemented the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Subsequent funding has been provided to support peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, East Timor, sub-Saharan Africa, and lately in Afghanistan and the Darfur region of the Sudan.

PKO funds appropriated for FY 2009 totaled $530 million. The initial PKO appropriation for FY 2010 was $332 million. The FY 2011 request is for $286 million. All of these requests and subsequent appropriations are grants administered by the DOS.
10. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program is an appropriated grant program administered by the DOS authorized by Section 481, FAA, to suppress the worldwide illicit manufacture and trafficking of narcotic and psychotropic drugs, money laundering, and precursor chemical diversion, and the progressive elimination of the illicit cultivation of the applicable crops. Recently, the elimination of related narco-terrorism has been included. This program can include the purchase of defense articles, services, and training. There are similar authorized and funded programs within DOD and the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security.

The FY 2009 appropriation for INCLE was $1.8 billion. The initial appropriation for FY 2010 was $1.7 billion with an additional $757 million being requested. The FY 2011 INCLE request is for $2.1 billion.

A similar DOS grant program, the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), was established for the Andean Ridge countries using the same FAA authority and objectives to be jointly administered by USAID and the DOS INCLE Bureau. This program is often referred to as Plan Colombia since the program emphasis and funding go primarily to Colombia. A similar multiyear counter narcotics and transnational anticrime program was announced and first funded in FY 2008 for Mexico and selected Caribbean countries entitled the Merida Initiative.

11. Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

The Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR) programs is an appropriated grant program administered by DOS. It is authorized by Part II, Chapters 8 and 9 of the FAA, and Section 504 of the FREEDOM Support Act, moreover, Section 23, AECA, for NADR focuses on demining activities, the clearance of unexploded ordnance, the destruction of small arms, border security, and related activities. Related defense articles, services, and training can be provided through this program. U.S. funding support for the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission is provided through this program. The DOD significance of this program is that DOS can purchase demining, unexploded ordnance clearance, and anti-terrorism systems with this funding.

The FY 2009 appropriation for NADR funding was $632 million. The appropriation for FY 2010 was $754 million. The NADR request for FY 2011 is $758 million.

12. Direct Commercial Sales

Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) are commercial exports of defense articles, services, and training licensed under the authority of Section 38, AECA made by U.S. defense industry directly to a foreign government. Unlike the procedures employed for FMS, DCS transactions are not administered by DOD and do not involve a government-
to-government agreement. Rather, the USG control procedure is accomplished through licensing by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (PM/DDTC) in the DOS. The day-to-day rules and procedures for these types of sales are contained in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). [22 CFR 120-130]

Of note, not all license approvals will result in signed contracts and actual deliveries. Licenses issued in FY 2008 for defense articles and defense services totaled $34.2 billion and $71.3 billion respectively. No annual estimates were issued for DCS licensing during FY 2009 through FY 2011. Like FMS, DCS deliveries are likely to take place years after the commercial contract is signed and the export license is obtained by U.S. industry from PM/DDTC.

Other Security Assistance Programs

While these two programs are not identified by DSCA in the SAMM as one of the twelve security assistance programs, they are very much related to the duties of the security assistance community, both in the U.S. and recipient foreign governments.

Excess Defense Articles

Excess defense articles (EDA) identified by the MILDEP or DOD agency are authorized for sale using the FMS authority in Section 21, AECA, and FMS processes identified within the SAMM for property belonging to the USG. Prices range from five to fifty percent of original acquisition value, depending on the condition of the article. The current value of EDA offered via FMS during FY 2008 was $67 million, while the current value of EDA deliveries during FY 2008 was $7 million.

Additionally, Section 516, FAA, authorizes the president to transfer EDA on a grant basis to eligible countries (justified in the annual CBJ). While EDA can be transferred at no-cost, the recipient must typically pay for any transportation or repair charges. Under certain circumstances, transportation charges may be waived, with the cost absorbed by DOD appropriated funds. The current value of grant EDA offered during FY 2008 was $133 million, while the current value of grant EDA deliveries during FY 2008 was $131 million.

Third-Country Transfers

Section 3(d), AECA, authorizes the president to manage and approve the transfer of U.S.-origin defense articles from the original recipient country to a third country. Requests for third-country transfers are normally approved if the USG is willing to conduct a direct transfer to the third country. Third-country transfer authority must be obtained from the DOS in advance of the proposed transfer and in writing. This applies to all U.S.-origin defense articles regardless of the method of original transfer from the USG or U.S. industry.
ANNEX C. Security Cooperation Programs
Source: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM),
Management of Security Assistance, updated January 2011

Though not delineated in any one source, the following is a categorized list of
Department of Defense (DOD)-authorized security cooperation programs, with a brief
description and references for each program. It should be noted that the seven Foreign
Assistance Act (FAA) and Arms Export Control Act (AECA)-authorized security
assistance programs administered by DOD, in accordance with DOD 5105.38-M,
Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), fall under the broad definition of
security cooperation.

Other sources for identifying DOD security cooperation programs include the
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Activities Handbook used within the U.S. European
area of operations and the Army International Activities Plan (AIAP) published by the
U.S. Army.

Another method of identifying the difference between security assistance and
security cooperation is the source of authority within the U.S. Code (USC) for the
program. The USC is the codification of the general and permanent U.S. laws divided
into 50 titles by subject matter 22 USC, or Title 22, pertains to U.S. foreign relations to
include FAA and AECA security assistance. 10 USC, or Title 10, pertains to the U.S.
armed forces to include DOD security cooperation. However, it should be noted that
certain DOD security cooperation program authorities are also with 22 USC.

FAA and AECA–Authorized Programs Administered by DOD
(See Annex B, Security Assistance Programs)

This includes the seven security assistance programs identified and SAMM:
foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military construction services (FMCS), foreign
Military Financing Program (FMFP), leases, military assistance program (MAP),
international military education and training (IMET), and drawdowns.

Combined Operations

Combined operations or combined exercises are older terms normally used to
describe U.S. operations with other countries. Newer terms include coalition or joint
operations. [Note that the term “joint” originally meant two or more U.S. services in
operations or exercises.] The authorities for these programs are either Title 10 of the
USC or the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) with funding provided
within the annual DOD appropriations acts.
Counter-Drug Support

Section 1004 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991 (NDAA), P.L. 101-510, authorizes counter-narcotics support to U.S. and foreign counterdrug agencies, to include providing defense services and training in support of DOD-loaned equipment as amended. Pseudo case procedures are used by DOD agencies to provide support as required to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict-Interdependent Capabilities [ASD(SOLIC-IC)]. This “1004” authority is currently extended through FY 2011. The Pseudo letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) procedures are in SAMM, section C11.3.

The provision of counterdrug boats, non-lethal equipment and support of previously provided equipment for specified countries is often referred to as Section 1033 support. Section C11.3, SAMM, Pseudo LOA case procedures are likewise used in support of ASD(SOLIC-IC). The authority for this support is the NDAA for FY 1998, P.L.105-85, Section 1033, as amended. The “1033” authority is currently extended through FY 2010 at $75 million annually for 22 specific countries.

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements

Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA) are initiated and negotiated by a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) to allow U.S. logistics support of a military unit of another country. Lethal significant military equipment (SME) or support reasonably available from U.S. commercial sources may not be provided under an ACSA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), OSD, and DOS, to include a thirty day advance notification to Congress, must approve the proposal before the agreement is negotiated and concluded by the GCC. The authority for an ACSA is 10 USC 2341-2350, with procedures provided in DoDD 2010.9, and Section C11.1, SAMM.

However, the NDAA for FY 2007, P.L.110-417, 109-364, 17 October 2006, Section 1202, as amended, authorizes the loan of certain categories of SME defense articles to countries participating in coalition operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or for peacekeeping operations for up to one year. The authorization is extended through FY 2011. It must be determined by the secretaries of state and defense that it is in the U.S. national security interest to provide this loan and there are no unfilled U.S. in-theater requirements for the loaned articles.

Warsaw Pact Initiative

In 1994, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) initiated the Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) program for countries seeking cooperative military and peacekeeping relations with NATO. In the U.S. support of PfP, DOD and DOS combined to establish the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF). DOS uses FMFP while DOD uses its own Title 10 appropriations, administered by DSCA, to support WIF. The authorities used by DSCA are 10 USC 168 for the military-to-military contact program, 10 USC 1051 to provide funding assistance in attending bilateral or regional meetings or seminars, and 10 USC
2010 to fund participation in combined exercises. SAMM, C11.15, provides DSCA policy
guidance in executing the DOD portion of WIF. WIF cannot be the primary source of
exercise funding, used to fund course attendance, or fund activities normally defined as
military assistance.

**Global Peace Operations Initiative**

The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a presidential initiative in
coordination with the other G-8 countries to increase the capacity of selected countries
to deploy in support of international peace operations. It was originally envisioned as a
give-year program (FY 2005-FY 2009). Its goal was to train 75,000 peace support
troops worldwide, with emphasis in the Africa region and building an African command
headquarters capability. GPOI supports the deployment of peacekeepers by providing
equipment, transportation, and sustainment in the field. Remaining a DOS program
requiring DOD support, GPOI subsumed the previous security assistance-funded PKO
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and FMFP-
Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program. The term ACOTA is
still used when referring to the Africa training component of GPOI. In October 2008, a
National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee approved a five year extension of
GPOI (FY 2010-2014). The authorities remain with Chapter 6 of Part II of the FAA and
Section 23, AECA.

**Train and Equip Afghanistan and Iraq Security Forces**

appropriated $6.5 billion in DOD funds for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
appropriated $1 billion in DOD funds for the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). These
programs are intended to provide defense articles and services to the Afghanistan and
Iraq security forces. The FY 2011 DOD proposal for ASFF is for $11 billion and $2
billion for ISFF. These transfers are often, but not always, implemented using Pseudo
LOA case procedures.

**Support of Coalition Forces in Combined Operations**

The NDAA for 2008, P.L.109-364, 17 October 2006, Section 1201, provided for a
new 10 USC 127(c), authorizing up to $100 million in DOD funding annually for logistics,
supply, and services to allied forces to support their participation in combined
provides $1.6 billion in DOD funding to support coalition forces engaged in military and
stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This program is now entitled the Coalition
Readiness Support Program (CRSP) and implemented using Pseudo LOA case
procedures. This funding can also be used to reimburse a key cooperating country for
logistical and military support provided by that country to U.S. operations in Iraq or
Afghanistan.
Combatant Commander Initiative Fund

The Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF) consists of GCC-nominated special interest programs authorized by 10 USC 166a to be funded at a rate of $25 million annually. The FY 2010 DOD appropriations act provides up to $50 million for CCIF with not more than $12.5 million to be used in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Building Partner Capacity of Foreign Militaries

Beginning in FY 2006, up to $350 million in DOD funding may be used annually to equip, supply, and train foreign military forces (including maritime security forces) to conduct counterterrorism operations, or participate in or support military and stability operations in which U.S. forces are participating. Any country prohibited by law from receiving such assistance may not receive such assistance. This program is initially authorized by NDAA FY 2006, Section 1206, as amended, to currently expire at the end of FY 2011. This annual “1206” authority for individual programs is to be notified to Congress fifteen days prior to implementation, with the funds to be obligated prior to the end of the subject FY. This short time requirement places significant pressure on the MILDEP acquisition agencies for execution. Pseudo LOA case procedures are used for the implementation and management of this program. This program is managed by DSCA and the MILDEPs in support of ASD(SOLIC) and the GCC; requests are often initiated by the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO). Both the Secretaries of Defense and State must concur with proposed programs prior to notifying Congress. Legislative proposals have regularly sought to raise the 1206 cap, with $500 million annually requested beginning in FY 2011.

Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction Account

Sometimes referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program, its goals are elimination and the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass-destruction in the republics of the former Soviet Union. This program was first authorized by the NDAA for FY 1991. $424 million of DOD funding was appropriated for this purpose during FY 2010.

Special Operations Support to Combat Terrorism

The NDAA, FY 2005, Section 1208, P.L. 108-375, 28 October 2004, as amended, originally authorized the Secretary of Defense to expend up to $25 million in DOD funding annually to support foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing operations by U.S. special operations forces in combating terrorism. This authority is not to be delegated below the Secretary of Defense and requires the concurrence of the relevant U.S. chief of mission. This annual “1208” authority is now $40 million through FY 2013 with a proposed increase of $50 million annually beginning in FY 2011.
Train and Equip Foreign Personnel to Assist in Accounting for Missing U.S. Government Personnel

The NDAA for FY 2008 provided a new 10 USC 408 authorizing up to $1 million in DOD funding annually to provide training and equipment to any country willing to assist DOD with accounting for and recovery of missing USG personnel.

Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery Capabilities

The NDAA for FY 2009 authorized the use of Navy operations and maintenance (O&M) funding not to exceed $20 million annually through FY 2011 by a GCC to establish, develop, and maintain a capability to recover DOD or U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) military or civilian personnel or other individuals who, become separated or isolated and cannot rejoin their units during U.S. military operations. Procedures for establishing this capability are to be developed by the Secretary of Defense. Concurrence of the relevant chief of mission and notification to Congress are required prior to execution. The authority may, in limited and special circumstances, include providing support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals.

Combined Exercises

Joint Combined Exchange Training

Joint combined exchange training (JCET) includes the deployment by U.S. special operations forces (SOF) with the dual purpose of training themselves and foreign counterparts. 10 USC 2011 provides the authority for the use of DOD funding for JCET. This funding can be used for the training of the foreign counterpart, expenses for the U.S. deployment, and, for developing countries, the incremental expenses incurred by the country for the training. The JCET program is carefully followed by Congress because of concerns about inadequate civilian oversight and fears that such training might benefit units or individuals who have committed human rights violations.

Exercise Related Construction

The Exercise Related Construction (ERC) program is authorized by 10 USC 2805 with policy guidance provided within Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJSCI) 4600.01A to allow overseas construction by the U.S. military in locations where there is no permanent U.S. presence. The construction is to enhance exercise effectiveness, enhance troop quality of life, and increase operational readiness. The construction is typically used by U.S. forces during an exercise but remains intact for host nation use after departure. Projects may include new construction, conversion of existing facilities (e.g., warehouses into exercise operations centers), and restoration of deteriorating facilities. U.S. and/or host nation engineers units and construction contracts may be used to accomplish projects. When construction is accomplished with partner nation engineers, interoperability benefits are
also obtained. The Joint Staff logistics engineering division (J4/ED) manages the program through the engineer divisions of the area GCCs.

**Developing Country Combined Exercise Program**

The Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP) is authorized by 10 USC 2010 to use DOD funds to pay for incremental expenses for a developing country to participate in a combined exercise with U.S. forces. Such expenses normally include rations, fuel, training ammunition, and transportation. The Joint Staff in coordination with the GCC manages DCCEP. This authority was further amended in FY 2009 with a new 10 USC 2010(d) authorizing funding for exercise expenses that begin in one FY and extend into the following FY.

**Defense Health Program**


**International Armaments Cooperation**

This security cooperation effort by the DOD acquisition community has many programs authorized by the AECA, 22 USC and DOD 10 USC and the annual DOD appropriations act. Many DOD scientists and engineers are assigned overseas in a Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the eyes and ears of the U.S. acquisition community looking for good ideas in the foreign defense industrial complex.

**Information Exchange Program**

Title 10 USC 2358 authorizes the DOD acquisition community to enter into international agreements for the reciprocal exchange of research and development (R&D) data with a country, with the goal of saving both DOD R&D funding and time in the U.S. research-development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) process. The OSD administrator for this program is USD(AT&L), with the military departments (MILDEPs) and DOD agency acquisition communities being the implementers.

**Exchange of Engineers and Scientists**

The NDAA for FY 1997 authorizes the DOD acquisition community, among others, to enter into international agreements for the reciprocal exchange of engineers and scientists for cooperative research and training. It is not to be an information collection program. USD(AT&L) provides oversight to this program with the MILDEPs and DOD agency acquisition communities being the implementers.
Foreign Comparative Testing

Title 10 USC 2360(a) authorizes the DOD acquisition community to enter into international agreements for the test and evaluation of operational weapons systems from other countries to determine if the foreign weapon system is a candidate for U.S. acquisition. Again, the USD(AT&L) provides oversight to this program, with the MILDEPs and DOD agencies being the implementers.

Cooperative Research, Development, Test, Evaluation and Production

Section 27, AECA, authorizes the DOD acquisition community to enter into international agreements with countries for the mutually beneficial development and possible production of weapons systems. USD(AT&L) provides the general oversight for this complex program with other countries. The Nunn Amendment provided the initial authority and funding for this cooperative program with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The Quayle Amendment later expanded the Nunn Amendment to include Australia, Japan, and South Korea, referring to them as major non-NATO allies. P.L.99-661 later further expanded eligibility for this program beyond the NATO and major non-NATO allies to include other friendly countries.

No-Cost Equipment Loans

Section 65, AECA, authorizes the loan of a U.S. defense article by international agreement at no cost to a country for the expressed purpose of furthering a cooperative RDT&E program. Again, this program is managed within the DOD acquisition community by USD(AT&L).

Israeli Cooperative Programs

For several years, DOD has been given annual authority and funding for the development and production of the Israeli Arrow missile defense system both in the U.S. and in Israel. The DOD Appropriations Act, 2010, Section 8076, P.L. 111-118, 19 December 2009, provides $202 million in DOD FY 2010 funding for continued support of the Arrow missile defense program and for the short range ballistic missile defense program and the upper-tier component to the Israeli missile defense architecture.

International Training and Education

Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies

Title 10 authorities and DOD appropriations funded the development of five regional centers for security studies. The centers serve as a mechanism for communicating U.S. foreign and defense policies to international students, a means for countries to provide feedback to the U.S. concerning these policies and communicating country policies to the U.S. The regional centers’ activities include education, research,
and outreach. They conduct multi-lateral courses in residence, seminars within their region, and conferences that address global and regional security challenges, such as terrorism and proliferation. Participants are drawn from the civilian and military leadership of allied and partner nations. Security assistance funding is not used to pay for the centers or the students attending them. However, under certain circumstances, DOD funds may be used to fund foreign attendance at the centers. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) in coordination with the relevant GCC provides oversight for the five centers. DoDD 5200.41 provides policy and management guidance. Beginning in FY 2006, DSCA began administering the DOD centers under the direction of the USDP. The five centers include:

- Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), located at the National Defense University in Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. was established in 1999.

- Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), located in Honolulu, Hawaii, was established in 1995.

- Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS), located at the National Defense University in Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. was established in 1997.

- George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (MC), located in Garmisch, Germany, was established in 1993.

- Near-East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA Center), located at the National Defense University in Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. was established in 2000.

Section 904 of the NDAA for FY 2007 finally codified the authority for these regional centers with a new 10 USC 184.

**Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program**

The regional defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was established in 2002 first with DOD funding, later with DOD authorizations, and now under Title 10 USC 2249c. The purpose of the program is to help key partner nations cooperate with the U.S. in the fight against international terrorism by providing education and training on a grant basis to foreign military and civilian personnel. Time objective is to bolster the capacity of friends and allies to detect, monitor, interdict, and disrupt the activities of terrorist networks, ranging from weapons trafficking and terrorist-related financing to actual operational planning by terrorist groups. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs [ASD(GSA)] is the OSD manager of CTFP in coordination with the GCCs. The day-to-day administration of the program is performed by DSCA. $20 million was appropriated to DOD for CTFP. The management of quotas is very similar to that of IMET. Section 1204, P.L.109-364, amended the annual funding authority to $25 million. Later, Section 1214 of P.L. 110-417 amended the authorized annual funding level to $35 million.
**Senior War College**

10 USC 2111 authorizes DOD and the MILDEPs to provide quotas to international students to attend the various senior officer war colleges.

**Military Academies**

The MILDEP Secretaries each may provide up to sixty quotas at any one time to foreign military students to attend the three military academies. The Secretary of Defense may waive all or any part of the requirement to reimburse any cost for attendance. The invitations to attend the academies are offered by the MILDEP Secretaries usually through the defense attaché office (DAO). The authorities for attending the military academies are:

- 10 USC 4344(a)(1) for the U.S. Military Academy
- 10 USC 6957(a)(1) for the U.S. Navy Academy
- 10 USC 9344(a)(1) for the U.S. Air Force Academy

**Military Academy Student Exchanges**

By international agreement, the MILDEP Secretaries each may authorize up to 24 students annually to participate in the reciprocal exchange of cadets to attend the appropriate military academies. The authorities for this exchange program are:

- 10 USC 4345 for the U.S. Military Academy
- 10 USC 6957a for the U.S. Navy Academy
- 10 USC 9345 for the U.S. Air Force Academy

**Professional Military Education Student Exchanges**

Section 544(a), FAA, authorizes by international agreement no-cost, reciprocal professional military education (PME) student exchanges. PME usually includes attendance at the MILDEP leadership and management education institutions but not to include the service academies. The U.S. participant in this program will attend the equivalent institution in the foreign country and be administratively managed by either the local DAO or SCO.

**Flight Student Exchanges**

Section 544(b), FAA, authorizes by international agreement no-cost, reciprocal flight, to include test pilot schools, training student exchanges. This may include military or civilian defense personnel. Again, the U.S. students in a country may be administratively managed by either the DAO or SCO.
Aviation Leadership Program

Section 544(c), FAA, authorizes the cooperative participation of foreign and U.S. military and defense civilian personnel in post-undergraduate flying training and tactical leadership programs at locations in Southwest Asia without charge to participating foreign countries. IMET funds are not to be used in support of the Aviation Leadership program (ALP). U.S. participation is to be funded by the MILDEP. A presidential national interest waiver may be used to allow a country to participate on a no-cost basis with the U.S. MILDEP absorbing the charge.

Latin America Training Waiver

10 USC 1050 authorizes the waiving of training and education costs for a Latin American student to attend a U.S. military training institution. The applicable MILDEP will absorb the waived costs.

Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action Programs

These programs were the first DOD-funded programs to be administered by DSCA under the new security cooperation term. It should be noted that the DOS has parallel programs generally managed by USAID in response to any requests by the affected U.S. embassy. Much of this assistance is provided in coordination with the U.S. embassy, the GCC, DOS, USAID, and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). DOD Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L.110-116, 19 December 2009, initially appropriated $110 million for FY 2010 for expenses related to DOD Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs. Requests for OHDACA funds for any of these programs generally begin in country with the SCO and are consolidated and prioritized at the GCC, and then forwarded to DSCA.

Humanitarian and Civic Action During Military Operations

Title 10 USC 401 authorizes military forces to carry out humanitarian and civic action (HCA) projects and activities in conjunction with military operations. The GCC nominates such action for OSD staffing primarily within ASD(GSA) and DSCA for approval and funding. DoDD 2205.2 and SAMM, C12.3.4, provide policy guidance and DOD component responsibilities for the DOD HCA program.

Humanitarian Assistance Transportation

Title 10 USC 2561 authorizes DOD to fund transportation of humanitarian relief world-wide for nonprofit, non-government, and private volunteer organizations. SAMM, C12.3.5, provides guidance.
Title 10 USC 402 authorizes DOD to transport on a space-available basis, humanitarian relief supplies furnished by a non-government organization. SAMM, C12.3.6, provides guidance. This program is often referred to as the Denton Program.

**Foreign Disaster Relief**

Title 10 USC 404 authorizes DOD to assist countries in its response to man made or natural disaster when necessary to prevent the loss of life. This program enables the GCCs to respond quickly and effectively to disasters in their area of operations and to manage the humanitarian dimensions of security crises. The GCCs engage in foreign disaster relief and emergency response (FDR/ER) activities only when directed by the president, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, and in emergency situations to save lives. Activities may include services and supplies, logistical support, search and rescue, medical evacuation, and refugee assistance. The FDR/ER program allows for the delivery of humanitarian daily rations (HDR) for use in foreign countries to alleviate hunger after man-made or natural disasters. SAMM, C12.3.8 provides guidance.

**Humanitarian Daily Rations**

Title 10 USC 2561 authorizes DOD funding and provision of low cost, nutritional, easily deliverable, daily rations for alleviating hunger in countries after a man made or natural disaster. SAMM, C12.3.7, provides guidance.

**Excess Property Humanitarian Assistance**

Title 10 USC 2557 authorizes DOD to provide excess non-lethal supplies to foreign governments and civilian organizations for humanitarian relief purposes when requested by the U.S. embassy. DOD processes, refurbishes, stores, and transport the property to the country for distribution by the U.S. embassy. SAMM, C12.3.1, provides guidance.

**Humanitarian Demining Assistance**

Title 10 USC 407 authorizes DOD in conjunction with military operations to assist countries in the detection of landmines, and to train partner nations in the procedures of landmine clearance, mine risk education, and victim assistance. The Humanitarian Demining Assistance (HDA) program also develops indigenous leadership and organizational skills to sustain the effort after the departure of U.S. trainers. Except for the concurrent purpose of supporting U.S. military operations, no DOD personnel may engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destruction of landmines.

Title 10 USC 407 authorizes the annual use of $10 million by DOD for humanitarian mine action activities. SAMM, C12.3.3, provides guidance regarding this Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) program. DSCA manages this program through the U.S. Army’s Humanitarian Demining Training Center at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
Commander’s Emergency Response Program

The purpose the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) is to enable field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements. The sense of Congress is that the government of Iraq should start to assume increasing responsibility for emergency response in Iraq. The DOD Appropriations Act, 2010, Section 9005, P.L. 111-118, 19 December 2009, provides for the use of $1.2 billion in Army funding for the FY 2010 CERP activities.

Military-to-Military Contact Programs

These cooperative programs have been around for a long time and continue today as a general program to establish and strengthen professional (and personal) relationships between two country counterparts. In addition to learning new ideas, personal insights and cultural understandings are gained by all participants, which often prove to be deciding factors in successful future diplomatic and military interfaces.

Traditional Combatant Commander Activities

10 USC 168 authorizes DOD, normally the GCC, to conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities with allied and friendly countries to encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces. Some functions include:

- Traveling contact teams
- Military liaison teams
- Exchange of military and civilian personnel
- Seminars
- Conferences within the GCC area of responsibility

Funding for the Traditional Combatant Commander Activities (TCA) program is provided to the GCC by the MILDEPs will act as executive agents. Section 1202, P.L. 110-417, provided a new 10 USC 168(e)(5) authorizing the use of funds for such expenses that begin in one FY and extended into the following FY.

Developing Country Attendance at Bilateral Meetings

Title 10 USC 1051 authorizes the use of DOD funds to support the attendance of representatives from developing countries to attend bilateral and multilateral meetings, usually GCC sponsored.

Defense Personnel Exchange Program

The NDAA for FY 1997, Section 1082, authorizes DOD and the MILDEPs to enter into international agreements for the reciprocal, no-cost exchange of qualified
military or defense civilian personnel with allied or friendly countries. NDAA for FY 2008, Section 1201 amends 10 USC 168(c) authorizing the assignment of personnel on a non-reciprocal basis, rather than an exchange, if determined to be in the U.S. interests. This personnel exchange program (PEP) is widely subscribed to throughout DOD to include the administrative, intelligence, acquisition, training and education, and operational and reserve unit and staff communities. A sample of these programs includes:

- Foreign counterpart visits for the service chiefs of the Army, Air Force, and Navy
- Personnel exchange programs managed by each of the four military services
- The Army’s reciprocal unit exchange program
- The DOD reserve officers foreign exchange program

**State Partnership Program**

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) links U.S. states with partner countries for the purpose of supporting the objectives and goals of the GCC and the U.S. Ambassador. The National Guard’s involvement reflects an evolving international affairs strategy using the unique civil-military nature of the National Guard to interact with both civil and defense personnel of foreign countries. The state partners actively participate in a host of engagement activities, e.g., bilateral familiarization and training events, emergency management, environmental remediation exercises, fellowship-style internships, educational exchanges, and civic leader visits. All activities are coordinated through the GCC, and the U.S. Ambassador’s country team, and other agencies as appropriate to ensure that National Guard support is tailored to meet both U.S. and country objectives.

The SPP was established following the National Guard Bureau’s (NGB) 1993 proposal to pair state National Guards with the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The NGB proposal was prompted by the Commander, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) earlier decision to staff the Military Liaison Teams (MLTs) in the Baltics with reserve component personnel. The SPP thus began as a bilateral military-to-military contact program to engage the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and is a direct outgrowth of USEUCOM’s Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP). It since has grown to include 47 U.S. states, two territories, and the District of Columbia partnered with 63 countries in the USEUCOM, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) areas of responsibility.

All state National Guards have an SPP coordinator who manages the program from the state National Guard headquarters. Many partnerships also include a National Guard officer, known as a bilateral affairs officer (BAO), who is assigned to the SCO in country to manage SPP activities and events. Details are available at the web site of the National Guard Bureau, Office of International Affairs (J5-IA), at http://www.ngb.army.mil/ia/Default.aspx.
## Summary of National Guard State Partnership Program

63 Countries linked to 49 states, 3 territories and Washington, D.C.

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ANNEX D. Foreign Assistance Effectiveness Principles


Foreign Assistance Effectiveness Principles:

Secretary of State Clinton and USAID Administrator Shah have embraced a set of foreign assistance effectiveness principles to ensure that all U.S. assistance adheres to the highest standards and achieves the best results. The principles are based on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action and formulated to address the shared challenges of the State Department and USAID.

1. Partnership: Foreign assistance is most effective when we partner with the countries and people receiving our assistance. To advance this principle, the U.S. will focus on:
   • Country ownership, with partner countries taking the lead in developing and implementing evidence-based strategies, as appropriate. In those countries where governments are strongly committed to development and democracy, country ownership means working much more closely with and through those governments; in all countries it means working closely and consulting with organizations and the people most directly affected by programs and activities.
   • Mutual accountability, creating mechanisms for meaningful commitments for action and resource allocation by both partner governments and donors.

2. Sustainability: To be effective over time, assistance must be sustainable and build the capacity of host nations to create the conditions that make assistance is no longer necessary. The U.S. will focus on:
   • Moving from a primary emphasis on service-delivery to promoting self-sustaining development progress, including improving regulatory environments, institutional capacity, and the responsiveness of governments to their people.
   • Strengthening country systems and capacity by investing in host country systems and implementing partners to the extent practicable and incorporating sustainability into project design.
3. Cooperation: Effective assistance requires cooperation between donors and host nations and among donors and other partners. The U.S. will focus on:

- Strategic coordination with other donors, including non-governmental donors, private businesses and other partners to coordinate objectives, programs and projects, and to the extent possible, reporting processes.
- Multilateral mechanisms, using multilateral institutions and facilities whenever appropriate, and working to strengthen multilateral capabilities.
- Strengthening cooperation across the U.S. government, to take advantage of the specialized expertise and skills of all U.S. departments and agencies.

4. Investing for results: Investments must be focused to achieve measurable results. The U.S. will promote results-based, focused investments through:

- Adaptable approaches, tailoring strategies to fit country contexts.
- Sustained commitments, taking a long-term planning horizon with multi-year funding guidance to sustain commitments over time.
- Focus on outcomes and impact rather than inputs and outputs, and ensure that the best available evidence informs program design and execution.

5. Transparency: State and USAID will provide timely, quality information about commitments, programs, and results to promote accountability and help governments, civil society and the public in the U.S. and abroad better understand our investments.

6. Gender equality: State and USAID will ensure that gender equality and analyses of impact by gender are incorporated and operationalized throughout our programs at all stages in the program cycle.
ANNEX E. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N) Report Findings

The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Reports were created by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) over a four-year period. The BG-N project makes recommendations for adapting the U.S. national security structure to meet the challenges of a new strategic era.

Phase I Report (2004): - Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era - The key issues identified for defense reform were: Rationalizing Organizational Structures in the Department of Defense; Toward a More Effective Resource Allocation Process; Procuring Joint Capabilities; Strengthening Civilian Professionals in Defense and National Security; Improving Interagency and Coalition Operations; and Strengthening Congressional Oversight.

Phase II Report (2005): US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era - The interagency recommendations share a broad theme: they aim to get the many disparate parts of the U.S. national security structure to work together, in both planning and execution. The study team’s challenge was to identify ways to better integrate efforts while retaining the agencies” distinctive knowledge and approaches to issues.


ANNEX F. The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) Findings

Since the current national security system was developed in 1947, the world has changed. As President George W. Bush announced, “We can’t win the future with a government of the past.” PNSR’s sole focus is to help government transition its national security system into an institution that looks at opportunities as much as threats, plays America’s strengths, preserves its national values, and helps fulfill its promise to its people and the world as a leading force for good.

PNSR is funded and supported by Congress, foundations and corporations, and led by a 26-member Guiding Coalition that includes former senior federal officials with extensive national security experience. In 2008, PNSR issued one of the most comprehensive studies of the U.S. national security system in American history -- Forging a New Shield -- which recommends solutions to the problems that plague the current system.

**Problems:**

1. The system is grossly imbalanced. It supports strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.

2. Resources allocated to departments and agencies are shaped by their narrowly defined core mandates rather than broader national missions.

3. The need for presidential integration to compensate for the systemic inability to adequately integrate or resource missions overly centralizes issue management and overburdens the White House.

4. A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole to be agile and collaborative at any time, but it is particularly vulnerable to breakdown during the protracted transition periods between administrations.

5. Congress provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce the first four problems and make improving performance extremely difficult.
Recommendations:

1. We must adopt new approaches to national security system design focused on national missions and outcomes, emphasizing integrated effort, collaboration, and agility.
   - Establishment of a President’s Security Council (PSC) that would replace the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council.
   - Statutory creation of a Director for National Security (DNS) within the Executive Office of the President.
   - Issuance of an Executive Order, supplemented to define the national security system.
   - Congress prescribe in statute the national security roles of each executive branch department and agency.
   - Transforming the Department of State by consolidating within it all functions now assigned to other departments and agencies that fall within the core competencies of the Department of State.
   - Statutory creation of a Homeland Security Collaboration Committee venue for the collaboration of state local government authorities, the private sector, and nongovernmental.

2. We must focus the Executive Office of the President on strategy and strategic management.
   - Instituting a National Security Review at the beginning of each presidential term.
   - Preparation of the National Security Planning Guidance.
   - An executive secretary of the President’s Security Council be empowered by statute, as detailed in the report, to support overall system management.
   - Creation of an official, reporting to the director for national security, to analyze interagency operations, including real-time assessments of overall system performance and system components performance.
3. Even as we centralize strategy formulation, we must decentralize the modalities of policy implementation by creating Interagency Teams and Interagency Crisis Task Forces.
   - The President selectively shift management of issues away from the President’s Security Council staff (and supporting interagency committees) to new empowered Interagency Teams.
   - The President create Interagency Crisis Task Forces to handle crises that exceed the capacities of both existing departmental capabilities and new Interagency Teams.
   - The Secretary of Homeland Security develop a National Operational Framework that specifies operational integration among the private sector.

4. We must link resources to goals through national security mission analysis and mission budgeting.
   - National security departments and agencies be required to prepare six-year budget projections derived from the National Security Planning Guidance.

5. We must align personnel incentives, personnel preparation, and organizational culture with strategic objectives.
   - Creation of a National Security Professional Corps (NSPC), increasing civilian personnel authorizations and appropriations in annual increments to be phased in over five years using the National Security Education Consortium, established by Executive Order 13434.
   - The development of a National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan, establishing the expectation that, within an administration, each presidential appointee would serve until the president has appointed his or her successor.

6. We must greatly improve the flow of knowledge and information.
   - Creation of a chief knowledge officer in the PSC Executive Secretariat.
   - Creation of a chief knowledge officer in each national security department and agency.
- Creation and development of a collaborative information architecture.
- Establishment of a single security classification and access regime for the entire national security system.

7. We must build a better executive-legislative branch partnership.
- Establishing Select Committees on National Security in the Senate and House of Representatives jurisdiction over all interagency operations and activities, commands, other organizations, and embassies; funding; personnel policies; education and training; and nominees for any Senate-confirmed interagency positions that may be established.
- New House and Senate rules be adopted.
- Each nomination for the ten most senior positions in a national security department or agency should be placed on the executive calendar of the Senate.
- Abolition of the practice of honoring a hold by one or more Senators.
- Comprehensive revision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by the end of the 111th Congress (December 2010).
- Consolidating oversight of the Department of Homeland Security to one authorizing committee and one appropriations subcommittee per chamber.

In 2009, a follow-on PSNR report -- Turning Ideas into Action -- was published that proposes next steps and provides the implementation tools that will be required to make national security reform a reality.

PNSR is now partnering with key stakeholders to transform the system through initiatives such as proof-of-principle pilot projects and the development of the National Security Reform Roadmap and Scorecard.
Current U.S. National Security System

Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, (Arlington: PNSR, 2008)
Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, (Arlington: PNSR, 2008)
ANNEX G. Related Terms of Reference
(Sources listed in parentheses)

**Assistance.** Activities that provide relief to refugees, conflict victims, and internally displaced persons. Such relief includes food, clean water, shelter, health care, basic education, job training, sanitation, and provision of physical and legal protection. Humanitarian assistance is often given in emergencies, but may need to continue in longer-term situations. (State Department)

**Campaign Plan.** A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space in accordance with DoD’s Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). The campaign plan is the primary vehicle for designing, organizing, integrating, and executing security cooperation activities. (DoD Directive 5132.03, Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, October 24, 2008)

Specific types of campaign plans include:

a) Campaign Support Plans. Plans developed by the DoD Components that focus on activities conducted to support the execution of global and theater campaign plans, and on their own security cooperation activities that directly contribute to the campaign end states and/or DoD Component programs in support of broader Title 10 responsibilities.

b) Functional Campaign Plans. Plans developed by functional combatant commands that focus on translating global strategies into operational activities through the development of an operation plan for a campaign.

c) Regional Campaign Plans. Support and implement the objectives of the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies and the Unified Command Plan through execution and assessment of regional, functional, contingency, and DoD Component plans. Regional campaign plans, along with DoD Component and directorate supporting plans, focus on activities, which include ongoing operations and security cooperation programs to achieve the theater objectives.

d) Theater Campaign Plans. Plans developed by geographic combatant commands that focus on the command’s steady-state activities, which include operations, security cooperation, and other activities designed to achieve theater strategic end states. It is incumbent upon geographic Combatant Commanders to ensure any supporting campaign plans address objectives in the GEF global planning effort and their respective theater campaign plans. Contingency plans for responding to crisis scenarios are treated as branch plans to the campaign plan.

**Capacity-Building Activities.** Training staff of humanitarian organizations to provide better quality service to refugees and internally displaced persons. (State Department)
Civil Affairs (CA). Designated active and reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CA activities and to support civil-military operations. (JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations)

Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02, JP 3-57)

Civil-Military Operations (CMO). The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. (JP 1-02, JP 3-57)

Combatant Command (COCOM). A unified or specified command with a broad continuing command under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning)

Combatant Commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0, Joint Operations)

Comprehensive Approach. An approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government (USG), intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07, Stability Operations)

Country Team. The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02, JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense)

Crisis State. A nation in which the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory. (FM 3-07)
Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. Those activities and measures taken by the DoD components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts from the USG. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, JP 3-13, Information Operations)

Developmental Assistance. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) function chartered under Chapter 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 primarily designed to promote economic growth and the equitable distribution of its benefits. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations)

Foreign Assistance. Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters; U.S. assistance takes three forms: development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. The FHA operations are those conducted outside the U.S., its territories, and possessions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 1-02, JP 3-22, DoD Instruction 5000.68, Security Force Assistance, October 27, 2010)

Foreign Military Sales (FMS). That portion of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and conducted on the basis of formal contracts or agreements between the USG and an authorized recipient government or international organization. FMS includes government-to-government sales of defense articles, defense services, and training from DoD stocks or through new procurements under DoD-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. (Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management [DISAM], Management of Security Assistance)

Fragile State. A country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. (FM 3-07)

Governance. The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. (FM 3-07)
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA). Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to 1) medical, dental, veterinary, and preventive medicine care provided in rural areas of a country; 2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; 3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and 4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (JP 1-02, JP 3-22)

Information Sharing. Providing a common platform for ideas, information (including databases), strategies, approaches, activities, and plans and programs. (UN)

Interagency. USG agencies and departments, including the DoD. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Interagency Coordination. Within the context of DoD involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of DoD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

Internal Capacity Building. Facilitating capacity building and skills development of members with critical expertise to support actors in disaster management and other activities through training, joint activities, and sharing lessons-learned experiences. (UN)

Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. (JP 3-22)

Intergovernmental Organization (IGO). An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the African Union. (JP 1-02, JP 3-22)

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported joint force commander, the JIACG provides the joint force commander with the capability to coordinate with other USG civilian agencies and departments. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)
**Joint Proponent.** A Service, Combatant Command, or Joint Staff directorate assigned coordinating authority to lead the collaborative development and integration of a joint capability with specific responsibilities designated by the Secretary of Defense. (DoDI 5000.68)

**Lead Agency.** Designated among USG agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies, and is responsible for implementing decisions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Military Civic Action.** The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas. (JP 1-02, JP 3-22)

**Nation Assistance.** Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10, U.S. Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02, JP 3-22)

**National Policy.** A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (JP 1-02)

**National Security.** A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the U.S. Specifically, the condition provided by:

a) Military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations;
b) Favorable foreign relations position; or
c) Defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP 1-02)

**Nongovernmental Organization (NGO).** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Partner Nation (PN).** Those nations that the U.S. works with to disrupt the production, transportation, and sale of illicit drugs or to counter other threats to national security, as well as the money involved with any such activity. (JP 1-02, JP 3-22)
**Preventive Diplomacy.** Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Public Diplomacy.** 1. Those overt international public information activities of the USG designed to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. 2. In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations. Its objective is to promote and sustain consent for peace building both within the host nation and externally in the region and in the larger international community. (JP 1-02, JP 3-22)

**Security Assistance (SA).** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The DoD does not administer all security assistance programs. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by DoD/Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Those security assistance programs administered by the DoD are a subset of security cooperation. (DoDD 5132.03, JP 1-02, JP 3-22)

**Security Cooperation (SC).** All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 1-02, JP 3-22)

SC, as defined by DoD Instruction 5000.68, Security Force Assistance, and DoD Directive 5132.03, Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation. Activities undertaken by the DoD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives. Includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that:

- a) Build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities;
- b) Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and
- c) Provide U.S. Forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.
Security Cooperation Organization (SCO). All DoD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance and security cooperation management functions under section 515 of Title 10 U.S. Code. SCOs include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions. The term “SCO” does not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities such as mobile training teams, mobile education teams, or operational units conducting security cooperation activities. (DoDD 5132.03, JP 1-02, JP 3-22)

Security Force Assistance (SFA). DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (DoDI 5000.68, JP 1-02, JP 3-22)

SFA, as defined by FM 3-07, Stability Operations: The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation (HN), or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.

Security Sector Reform (SSR). The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. From a donor perspective, SSR is an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; or reduction of armed violence. The DoD primary role in SSR is supporting the reform, restructuring, or re-establishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the operational spectrum. (DoDI 5000.68)

SSR, as defined by FM 3-07, Stability Operations: The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.

Senior Defense Official (SDO) or Defense Attaché (DATT). Principal DoD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The SDO or DATT is the Chief of Mission’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. (DoDD 5132.03)
**Stability Operations.** An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

**Strategic Communication.** Focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

**Strategy.** A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 2-0, JP 3-0)

**Unified Action.** The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1-02)

**Unity of Effort.** The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1-02)

**Vulnerable State.** A nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the population. (FM 3-07)

**Whole-of-Government Approach.** An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)

**With, Through, and By.** Describes the process of interaction with foreign security forces that initially involves training and assisting (interacting “with” the forces). The next step in the process is advising, which may include advising in combat situations (acting “through” the forces). The final phase is achieved when foreign security forces operate independently (act “by” themselves). (DoDI 5000.68)