SHAPING THE NATIONAL GUARD IN A POST-WAR ENVIRONMENT

by

Shane C. Crofts

September 2012

Thesis Advisor: Stan Supinski
Second Reader: Jeff Burkett

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# Shaping the National Guard in a Post-War Environment

The National Guard of the United States is the nation’s oldest military service, tracing its roots to the Massachusetts Bay Colony of 1636. Since its inception, the Guard has enjoyed a unique dual-role responsibility of supporting state and federal missions, and while serving in every war since the American Revolution, Guardsmen and women have also supported domestic operations from the southwest border to Hurricane Katrina. Today, the Guard is a fully operational reserve, and a critical part of the national security framework. While fully engaged in the Global War On Terror, the Guard has also made great strides toward becoming the lead military agency in domestic missions, which has always been a key mission of the Guard, and which sets it apart from its Title X counterparts. Recently, the Guard has achieved increased relevance and political victories highlighted by the recent National Guard Empowerment Act that gave the Chief of National Guard Bureau membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As defense spending and the size of the active force is cut in a post-war environment, this thesis reviews the best future use of the Army National Guard, and offers alternative solutions for increased effectiveness, particularly in a domestic capacity.
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SHAPING THE NATIONAL GUARD IN A POST-WAR ENVIRONMENT

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ABSTRACT

The National Guard of the United States is the nation’s oldest military service, tracing its roots to the Massachusetts Bay Colony of 1636. Since its inception, the Guard has enjoyed a unique dual-role responsibility of supporting state and federal missions, and while serving in every war since the American Revolution, Guardsmen and women have also supported domestic operations from the southwest border to Hurricane Katrina. Today, the Guard is a fully operational reserve, and a critical part of the national security framework. While fully engaged in the Global War On Terror, the Guard has also made great strides toward becoming the lead military agency in domestic missions, which has always been a key mission of the Guard, and which sets it apart from its Title X counterparts. Recently, the Guard has achieved increased relevance and political victories highlighted by the recent National Guard Empowerment Act that gave the Chief of National Guard Bureau membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As defense spending and the size of the active force is cut in a post-war environment, this thesis reviews the best future use of the Army National Guard, and offers alternative solutions for increased effectiveness, particularly in a domestic capacity.
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADOS</td>
<td>Active Duty for Operational Support</td>
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<td>AFRRC</td>
<td>Air Force Reserve Command</td>
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<td>AGR</td>
<td>Active Guard and Reserve</td>
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<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
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<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Forces Generation Model</td>
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<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>BOG</td>
<td>Boots on Ground</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Congressional Budget Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Counterdrug Program</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>Critical Dual Use</td>
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<td>CERFP-CBRN</td>
<td>Enhanced Response Force Package</td>
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<td>CNGB</td>
<td>Chief National Guard Bureau</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<td>CS/CSS</td>
<td>Combat Support/Combat Service Support</td>
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<td>CST</td>
<td>Civil Support Team</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Support to Civil Authorities</td>
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<td>EMAC</td>
<td>Emergency Management Assistance Compact</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>FSA</td>
<td>Force Structure Allowance</td>
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<td>GEN</td>
<td>General</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>HLD</td>
<td>Homeland Defense</td>
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<td>HLS</td>
<td>Homeland Security</td>
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<td>HRF</td>
<td>Homeland Reaction Force</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IRR</td>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Forces Headquarters</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Los Angeles Police Department</td>
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<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
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<td>NGAUS</td>
<td>National Guard Association</td>
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<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
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<td>NGRF</td>
<td>National Guard Reaction Force</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>Northern Command</td>
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<td>OCAR</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>Operational Tempo</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<td>ROA</td>
<td>Reserve Officers Association</td>
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<td>SAD</td>
<td>State Active Duty</td>
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<td>SECFOR</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>TSA</td>
<td>Transportation Security Administration</td>
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<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
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<td>USAFR</td>
<td>United States Air Force Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION. SHAPING THE NATIONAL GUARD IN A POST-WAR ENVIRONMENT

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

In a post-war environment, what is the ideal structure of the Army National Guard? How can the National Guard best posture itself to ensure readiness for its Homeland Security (HLS) role? As the active military downsizes, can the National Guard shift its focus to its historic HLS mission, leaving the active component and Reserves in preparation for future conflicts, or will the NG continue to be utilized as an operational reserve, as well as a HLS force? If the Army National Guard will continue to be dual-missioned as an operational reserve to the Army and the first response force to the governors, how can the ARNG be optimally organized and structured to meet these dual roles?

B. PROBLEM SPACE

The National Guard (NG) traces its roots back to the Massachusetts Bay Colony militia of 1636, making it our nation’s oldest service. The NG of the United States consists of the Army National Guard (ARNG), officially established as a reserve component to the Army by the Militia Act of 1903,\(^1\) and the Air National Guard (ANG), established in 1947 as a separate reserve component of the U.S. Air Force.\(^2\) Guardsmen and women have served in every war the United States has been involved in, from the American Revolution to Operation Iraqi Freedom. A unique aspect of the NG, however, is its dual-role as an operational force under control of the governor in peacetime to be used to respond to natural disasters and domestic threats. The history of Guardsmen being used in this capacity is also extensive, and arguably homeland security has always been the primary focus of the NG, from service against the domestic British threat during the

\(^1\) Michael Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War* (University Press of Kansas, 2003), xviii, xvi.

American Revolution and the War of 1812, to service on the Mexican border in 1916, to the stationing of Guardsmen at airports, military facilities, and key infrastructure immediately following the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.³

The mobilization of NG units for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has been the most extensive since World War II; 332K Soldiers, and 86k Airmen have been deployed overseas from a total NG force of 470k.⁴ The attacks of 9/11 propelled the NG from a Cold War strategic reserve to a fully operational reserve and partner in the war on terror. Guardsmen have served and died around the globe in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and perhaps surprisingly, recruiting quotas have been met every year since 2003. In fact, the ARNG is over its authorized strength and has currently capped growth in nearly every state. The deployment of nearly 100% of its forces since 2003 does not come without a price, however. Multiple deployments utilizing equipment left deployed in theatre between rotations results in equipment returning worn out, damaged, or completely non-mission capable. Since 2003, the ARNG has been fielded $23 billion of new equipment to modernize the force in keeping with its active duty counterparts.⁵ Since many ARNG units have deployed to do a non-standard mission (i.e., a field artillery unit conducting a convoy security mission), Soldiers in these units cross-train to a new job, and have suffered degraded skills in their primary job as a result. Therefore, while maintaining end strength goals has not been a problem, the ARNG’s most precious resource, its Soldiers, have been impacted. Since 9/11, most ARNG Soldiers have deployed twice, for 12–18 months, and many have deployed three or more times. Divorces and suicide rates in the NG are alarmingly high, and supportive employers have paid a price. To summarize, the


⁴ This number represents multiple deployments for some Soldiers, and does not mean to imply 89% of all ARNG Soldiers have deployed; in fact 60% of currently serving ARNG Soldiers have deployed at least once since 2003. 2011 National Guard Posture Statement, (n.d.), http://www.arng.army.mil/News/publications/ApostureStatements/2011_ngps.pdf.

GWOT has transformed the NG into a fully operational reserve of the Army and Air Force, and has brought funding and modernization not seen since WWII. However, the GWOT has also stressed and taxed NG personnel and equipment, and has caused some to ask what the best use of the NG may be.

In addition to extensive deployments to OIF and OEF, the NG has also been fervently working to improve its capabilities for domestic response missions, particularly after Hurricane Katrina. GEN McKinley, the current Chief of NGB, has listed homeland security as the number one priority for the NG, with support to GWOT second, as a reinforcement of the NG’s commitment to domestic response missions. The NG’s unique control by state governors during peacetime, and positioning around the country in 3,300 armories and nearly every community makes it an obvious choice for these missions. In fact, the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserves are almost never called up for domestic response missions, and currently require the President’s use of the Stafford Act in a declared national emergency. The NG, as a Title 32 reserve component under state control, is much more accessible than the reserves, which are Title X. These domestic missions generally utilize the same equipment sets NG units deploy overseas with, and while they do not usually require significant training, they do take the same Soldiers away from home, and from their employers. Thus, the NG Soldier/Airmen is faced with the challenge of being called up multiple times during a deployment cycle for State Active Duty (SAD), and the NG must deal with the competing interests of training and equipping for both missions. In short, the NG is busier than it has ever been, and as the active component reduces end strength post-war as planned (50,000–90,000 planned cuts in the Army by 2015), utilization of the NG will become even more critical.

This paper offers alternatives for shaping the ARNG for success in the future. As DoD downsizes and cuts budgets in a post-war environment, the ARNG will likely also experience budget, equipment and manning reductions. However, to avoid the pitfall of “fighting the last war,” the United States must remain ready for future conflicts. As the NG shifts its focus to domestic/HLS missions, it must remain ready to deploy in support of the active forces for future contingencies. If this prediction is accepted, DoD must realign forces across components (active, NG, and reserves) to be successfully poised for
national and homeland defense. We live in an uncertain world, and today’s allies may be tomorrow’s enemies. The post-war realignment must maintain maximum flexibility within the U.S. military to respond to any event, anywhere.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Much debate has ensued about the role of the NG in HLS, as well as discussion about statutory requirements, the NG’s relationship with NORTHCOM, and the command and control structure of the NG. Specific issues, such as the shrinking DoD budget and its associated effects on the NG, elevation of the Chief of National Guard Bureau (NGB) to 4 stars and inclusion on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, training of dual-status commanders capable of commanding Title X (federal) and Title 32 (state-controlled, federally funded) forces in a domestic response mission, and the assignment of NG Officers to NORTHCOM are currently occurring. What has not been widely discussed is the future of the NG, post-war and assuming the role as the primary provider of military support to civil authorities, and whether or not the NG is correctly postured to assume this role. The existing research can be generally lumped into the following categories: Role of the NG in homeland security and defense, the NG’s relationship with NORTHCOM, and command and control (C2) of the NG.

1. Role of the NG in Homeland Security and Defense

Much has been written about the proper role of the NG in homeland security, and most authors agree that homeland security and domestic response is a viable mission for the NG. In fact, Frantz\(^6\) and Steenson\(^7\) suggest this should be the primary role of the NG. NG forces were called to duty within hours of the 9/11 attacks, with 5,000 ARNG Soldiers put on duty guarding key infrastructure and military installations, and 8,200 more assigned to guard the nation’s airports.\(^8\) After Hurricane Katrina, 55,000 NG


\(^8\) Renaud, National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and Beyond, 3.
Soldiers/Airmen were deployed to Louisiana. Therefore, while the NG has been transitioning from a strategic Cold-War reserve to a fully operational reserve in the war on terror, the level of operational tempo (OPTEMPO) experienced by the NG for domestic response missions has also been unprecedented. In 2005, Frantz argues, “the Pentagon should formally refocus the National Guard’s primary mission to homeland security issues, specifically consequence management matters.” He also recommends regionalizing the NG into 11 regions for command and control (C2), to correspond with FEMA regions. Fitzgerald also recommends this idea of regionalization. Stevenson discussed the role of the NG in his thesis entitled, “Enhancing the Effectiveness of NG support of Civil Authorities by Improving Interagency Coordination.” In his essay, he discusses legal and structural challenges associated with NG supporting federal partners, but concludes by saying “The National Guard is positioned and capable to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in an efficient and effective manner.” Finally, Steenson also argues the NG should be given primary responsibility for homeland security, and funded separately for this mission, while being maintained as an operational reserve of the Army. Overall, there is agreement that the NG plays a pivotal role in Homeland Security. The NG is uniquely positioned to act as military first responders since its forces are dispersed throughout the nation in 3,300 armories, and NG Soldiers reside in virtually every community in the nation. Also unique to the NG is the dual-role mission it has handled since its inception in 1636, as under Title 32 (state control) during peacetime, with the ability to be mobilized under Title X (federal) for overseas deployment. Michael Doubler, a retired ARNG officer, has written extensively about the Guard’s use in overseas deployments, from the NG’s inception as the Massachusetts Bay colony militia in 1636, service in the American Revolutionary War

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12 Ibid., 5.

and every U.S. conflict since, and also the Guard’s utilization as a homeland security force during its deployment to the Mexican border in 1916. The Guard’s response after Hurricane Katrina was “praised for its size and comprehensiveness,” and “criticized for its perceived slowness in the House lessons-learned report, “fragmented deployment system” in the White House report, and for its lack of coordination with other military responses in the Senate report,” according to a RAND study conducted for the U.S. Army. This report also recommended the designation of NG units in the Army Forces Generation Model (ARFORGEN) as HLS forces to ensure adequate numbers of NG forces remain at home for domestic use. The major gap in the literature is how the NG can balance the HLS mission with its obligations as an operational reserve to the Army and subsequent overseas deployments. In other words, should the NG be focused on its HLS mission, or war-fighting mission overseas?

2. Relationship with NORTHCOM

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is the military combatant command established in 2002 as the primary military entity responsible for homeland security and defense, and for military support to civil authorities for domestic response. Much has been written about the relationship between the NG and NORTHCOM, since NORTHCOM relies on NG forces for most of its air defense and domestic response missions, but NG forces serving in a Title 32 (state-controlled) status are not under the C2 of NORTHCOM.

Topp discussed the optimal relationship between the NG and NORTHCOM in 2006. In discussing the legal foundation for the control of NG forces by governors until mobilized to Title X status for federal service, and the political implications of the President federalizing NG troops without the consent of the governor, Topp recommends a somewhat status-quo solution, in which NG troops remain in a Title 32 status. He

discusses the use of dual-status commanders who can be properly trained to command forces in Title X and 32, a program currently well underway within the NG, and the inclusion of a NG Brigadier General on NORTHCOM’s staff as the J-3 Operations directorate.\textsuperscript{18} There are currently several National Guard Brigadier Generals at NORTHCOM, and in fact, the Deputy Commander, Missouri Guardsman, LTG Frank Grass, was recently selected as the incoming chief of NGB.\textsuperscript{19}

Dahlman also discusses the relationship between NORTHCOM and the NG in his thesis from the Army War College in 2008.\textsuperscript{20} Again acknowledging the key role the NG plays in NORTHCOM’s mission, Dahlman discusses the associated challenges with the NG’s de-centralized leadership to 54 Adjutant Generals (TAG) and governors, all with their own priorities. He concludes the state’s Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) should commit to increased joint training, training and exercise opportunities with NORTHCOM, training in the National Incident Command System (NIMS) for NG commanders, and for increased communication between NORTHCOM and the states.\textsuperscript{21} Many have recommended the NORTHCOM commander be a Guardsman, including Steenson,\textsuperscript{22} and the recently passed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2012 calls for either the Deputy or the Commander of NORTHCOM to be a Guardsman. While the importance of the relationship is often discussed, a clear-cut solution to the problem of tasking a Headquarters (HQ) (NORTHCOM) to accomplish its mission with non-organic personnel has not been made. Frantz recommends the permanent assignment of NG forces to NORTHCOM\textsuperscript{23}, but this is neither a popular nor a likely outcome.

\textsuperscript{18} Topp, “What Should Be the Relationship Between the NG and U.S. NORTHCOM in Civil Support Operations following Catastrophic Events,” xx.


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., xx.

\textsuperscript{22} Steenson, “The NG: DOD’s Interagency Bridge to Homeland Security,” xx.

\textsuperscript{23} Frantz, “The National Guard—DoD’s Logical Homeland Security “First Responder” for the 21st Century.”
Overall, the literature identifies the problem that while NORTHCOM has the military responsibility for HLS, it does not possess the proper authority over the NG to conduct its missions effectively. Unity of command, a key principle of war, is not achieved, as NG Soldiers responsible to conduct NORTHCOM’s HLS mission are not assigned to NORTHCOM while in a Title 32 status. Recommendations like assigning NG General Officers to NORTHCOM have been implemented, yet even if NORTHCOM is eventually commanded by a NG officer, he will still not achieve C2 over the NG forces assigned to the 54 states and territories. Solutions like regionalization of the NG, being proposed by Fitzgerald, and any suggestion of placing NG forces under NORTHCOM control full-time will be met with stiff resistance from 54 governors, and will dilute the historical foundation of the NG created by the founding fathers who were leery of a large standing Army and federal control. The NDAA signed in 2008 authorizing presidential authority to mobilize NG troops without the governor’s consent met with immediate resistance and was quickly repealed. The use of dual-status commanders capable of commanding forces in both Title X and Title 32 status is the current model, which has been agreed upon by NORTHCOM, the State TAG’s, and the Governor’s council.24 However, little to no discussion has occurred about changing the statutory authority of NG forces to address the ultimate issue, and any recommendation to that end is unlikely to gain much traction.

3. C2 of the NG

As discussed above, the NG consists of the Army and Air National Guard in 54 states and territories, each with its own TAG and governor, who have their own priorities. While the Chief of NGB has declared domestic response a core competency of the NG, NGB is a Title X activity, responsible for administering resources, communicating with DoD, and advising DoD and the JCS on NG matters. The caveat is the states have a vested interest in the relationship with NGB as the provider of resources. While most governors and TAGs continue to embrace the historical domestic mission of the Guard, in

which it has been involved since its inception, some view it as a competing interest with the NG’s federal mission as a provider of ready units and personnel to the war-fight.

Stevenson describes some of these challenges in his essay, discussing the fact NGB does not have the authority to conduct federal interagency coordination, and he raises concerns voiced by many that the current OPTEMPO of the NG cannot be sustained. NGB’s lack of control over the 358.2k NG forces assigned nationwide further exacerbates the problem of NORTHCOM’s C2. For instance, liaison between NGB and NORTHCOM is advocated by many but will not address the lack of command relationship. Even assigning a NG commander to NORTHCOM, as Steenson recommends, will not change the relationship with the states. Without a complete overhaul of the Title 32 statute, which is based on a long and valued history of states’ rights, NGB and NORTHCOM will continue to be coordinating vs. command and control HQ.

The recently signed NDAA placing the Chief of NGB on the Joint Chiefs of Staff is seen as a victory for increased relevance of the NG, but does not address the statutory command and control issues involved. As a Title X activity, NGB does not have C2 over the 425,000 Soldiers and Airmen of the NG generally serving in a Title 32 status, although NGB does have the authority to source NG units for Title X activation. Overall, the gap described above with the command relationship between NORTHCOM, NGB (a federal entity) and the NG forces of 54 states and territories is a statutory issue. Many recommendations have been discussed, but none address the basic command structure issue that the states do not report to NGB or to NORTHCOM, but rather are run as 54 independent military forces within their state, under control of their governors in Title 32 status until mobilized under Title X for federal deployment.

25 Stevenson, “Enhancing the Effectiveness of NG Support of Civil Authorities by Improving Interagency Coordination.”

4. Summary and Conclusion

The literature reviewed demonstrates some challenges in statutory, historical, and relationships that can be improved for the NG to become an effective partner in this endeavor, and several policy level recommendations, some of which have already occurred. As the NG recovers from nearly 10 years at war, and positions itself to be the primary provider of HLS forces, many unanswered questions remain as to whether the NG is being properly utilized, and if it is properly suited to accomplish this mission successfully. While much data is available about the historical use of the NG for HLS/domestic response, a lack of research exists about the competing impacts of the NG’s simultaneous use overseas in the GWOT. While the NG positions itself as the primary provider of military forces to NORTHCOM, the ongoing issue of federal control of NG forces has not been resolved. It is too early to tell what the post-war force shaping and budget cuts will bring across DoD, and a lack of research on how the NG should position itself to successfully accomplish its historical HLS mission, and still be ready to answer the nation’s call for future conflicts.

D. METHODS

This thesis uses the policy options methodology to analyze three possible alternatives for the ARNG, identifies strengths and weaknesses associated with each one, and recommends a solution. This method was chosen as the best way to analyze the issues identified above, identify possible solutions, and measure them against defined criteria. In short, many different options exist for aligning the ARNG for its HLS mission, and the policy options methodology recommends a proposed “best” solution. The proposed solution is a policy recommendation for a realignment of force structure within the active Army, the ARNG, and the United States Army Reserve (USAR).
II. BACKGROUND

THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy.

—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 29

Before identifying the best future use and structure of the ARNG, it is first important to understand the command structure, statutory authority and history of the ARNG and U.S. Army Reserve. This chapter also describes the use of the ARNG and Reserves in the GWOT, and discusses ARNG domestic operations.

A. COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE NG

The National Guard of the United States is the oldest U.S. military service, tracing its roots to the Massachusetts Bay Colony Militia formed in 1636. Due to its earliest foundations as a state militia, and because of the founding fathers’ aversion to a large standing army and support for state’s rights, the NG is historically linked to the 54 states and territories. In peacetime, NG Soldiers are in a Title 32 status, under the command of The Adjutant General (TAG) for their state, who works directly for the governor. In most cases, state statute requires the applicant to hold a minimum grade, and the governor in most states selects the position (TAGs are elected in Vermont and South Carolina). The NG is largely federally funded, and the guard’s full-time force is predominantly comprised of federal employees, dual-status technicians and AGR (Active Guard and Reserve). However, the TAG is a state employee who has no military superior within state boundaries. The TAG is the approval authority for all personnel and administrative actions within the state’s military department, and exercises control of all the employees within the state’s military department while in a non-federalized status. While each state has a Title X (federal) United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) who exercises

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oversight over federal property and funds, an active duty Senior Army Advisor (SRAAG), and an Inspector General (IG), the TAG is not bound by the decisions or recommendations of these individuals. Also, the TAG has no command relationship with either the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB), or the Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). These two entities have no command authority over Title 32 NG Soldiers until they are federalized under Title X status.

B. KEY LEGISLATION SHAPING THE NG

The National Guard of the United States was officially authorized by the Constitution in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 15 that authorized the state militias “to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasion.” The Militia Act of 1792 provided the President the authority to federalize NG troops, and provided federal standards for the state militias. The Insurrection Act of 1807 established Presidential authority to deploy federal military troops within the United States to “put down lawlessness, insurrection, and rebellion.” The Militia Act of 1862 provided for persons of African descent to serve in the militia. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 restricted the use of federal troops in domestic law enforcement operations; however, U.S. Coast Guard personnel in their peacetime role under the Department of Homeland Security, and NG troops not in a federal status are specifically exempted from this statute. The Militia Act of 1903 established the National Guard of the United States as the primary organized reserve force for the U.S. armed forces. The National Defense Act of 1916 established the citizen-Soldier concept, and combined the ARNG, the Army Reserve, and the regular Army into the Army of the United States in time of war. This act mandated the use of the term “National Guard,” increased the number of yearly drills from 24 to 48, increased annual training days from five to 15, and authorized drill pay for the first time. The National Defense Act Amendments of 1920 established that the Militia Bureau (later the National Guard Bureau) chief would be a NG officer, and reorganized the World War I divisions. The National Defense Act of 1947 established the Air
National Guard of the United States, underneath the National Guard Bureau (NGB).\textsuperscript{29} The John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007 changed federal law to enable the President to take control of a state’s NG forces without the governor’s consent during domestic emergencies, which was seen as a dangerous shift away from state’s rights, and was opposed in a letter signed by all 50 governors.\textsuperscript{30} The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) repealed this provision. However, the President is still able to call up NG forces for federal deployment during congressionally sanctioned national emergency or war.\textsuperscript{31} This NDAA also elevated the Chief of NGB to a 4-star billet, and mandated the Commander or Deputy Commander of NORTHCOM be a NG Officer. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s role is defined in this NDAA as follows.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{enumerate}
\item “A principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces and on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense; and
\item The principal adviser to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, on matters relating to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States.”
\end{enumerate}

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
The NDAA 2012, signed into law by President Obama on December 31, 2011, gave the Chief of NGB membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and created a Vice Chief of NGB at the grade of Lieutenant General. This act also contained an amendment requiring that fully qualified officers of the National Guard be considered for appointment to the position of Commander, Army North and Air Force North Command.33

C. HISTORY OF THE NG

In addition to sending forces to every conflict the United States has even been involved in, from the American Revolution to Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, the NG has arguably always been focused on HLS and Homeland Defense (HLD), from repelling British invaders during the American Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812, to the skies over New York and Washington, DC after 9/11. One could say this is the primary purpose of the NG, as a local militia readily accessible to the state governors to protect its citizenry from outside threats, and respond to natural disasters and state emergencies. NG forces have been used to man defensive coastal positions from 1907 through World War II. NG troops were deployed at the beginning of both World Wars to protect critical infrastructure from acts of sabotage, and in 1916 to patrol the Mexican border. ARNG missile men operated nuclear armed Nike Missile launcher sites during the Cold War, and in the late 1990s, the NG formed civil support teams capable of an early response to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. In addition, Soldiers and Airmen of the NG have deployed for riot control and to enforce southern school integration, to assist the LAPD during the Rodney King riots, and more than 50,000 Soldiers representing every state deployed to New Orleans and Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina.34

On September 11, 2001, at 9:37am, Flight 77 roared over the NGB just outside of Washington, DC, and seconds later, crashed into the Pentagon, which killed 189 people


instantly, including two ARNG officers. A number of ARNG medical personnel attending a meeting at the Pentagon became involved in rescue and treatment of casualties. The next day, military policemen from the Maryland and Virginia ARNG were on duty helping form a security perimeter around the Pentagon. In fact, the first responders in the war on terror started that day were not Special Forces or Ranger units, but men and women of the New York National Guard who responded immediately, much like the minutemen they traced their history back to, some arriving in uniform and others still in civilian clothes, assisting policemen, firefighters, and medical personnel.\(^{35}\) Within hours following 9/11, more than 3,000-armed National Guardsmen were deployed to guard critical infrastructure and military installations around the nation, with 5,000 on duty within 10 days. President Bush authorized a partial mobilization of the Reserves on September 15, 2001 for a collection of homeland defense missions known as “Operation Noble Eagle.” These missions consisted of air defense around major cities, and during the 9/11 aftermath, fighters from the New York Air National Guard patrolled the skies over New York City and Washington, DC. Also by order of the President, 8,200 armed ARNG Soldiers were put on duty in the nation’s airports within days of 9/11 before handing over duties to the newly established Transportation Security Administration (TSA).\(^{36}\) Much of this response was in military terms a “show of force,” designed to deter follow-on attacks and restore public confidence in the nation’s security.

NG Soldiers and Airmen have fought and died in every war the United States has been involved since the American Revolutionary War, and the NG has also been extensively involved in domestic support missions since its inception. Since 9/11, the ARNG has deployed 338,000 Soldiers of an authorized strength of 362,000, and has lost more than 600 Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tempo of deployments have caused the NG to transition to a fully operational reserve, receiving billions of dollars of new equipment, extensive cross training, and extensive funding for the past 10 fiscal years. As a result of this transition, political push by the National Guard Association (NGAUS) and


key Senatorial support, the National Guard Empowerment Act was passed in 2012, despite opposition from all four service chiefs and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). GEN McKinley, the first Chief of NGB to sit on the JCS in 2012, has listed his three priorities for the NG as the following.

Your National Guard:37

- HOMELAND DEFENDERS
  - The Military's First Responders ... A Guard member in every zip code
- PROVEN in BATTLE
  - America's Warriors ... Indispensable, Ready, and Accessible
- POSTURED for the FUTURE
  - Security America can Afford ... Paying Dividends for Four Centuries

D. NG STRUCTURE

The ARNG reached a high of 27 divisions and an authorized end strength of 457,000 in 1989 to a current authorized end strength (force structure allowance) of 358,000 in 2012. The ARNG structure currently consists of eight divisions located in Pennsylvania, Virginia, Minnesota, Kansas, Texas, Indiana, California, and New York, and 32 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), located across nearly every state. The BCT is the primary fighting element of the Army today, and consists of 3–4,000 Soldiers, a mix of armor and infantry units, and is self-sustaining in terms of aviation, field artillery, engineer, intelligence, and logistical support. The ARNG also possesses 16 Maneuver Enhancement Brigades, seven Battlefield Surveillance Brigades, 10 Sustainment Brigades, seven Fires (Artillery) Brigades, six Theatre Aviation Brigades, and 14 separate Functional Brigades; Engineer, Air Defense Artillery, Military Police (MP), Signal, or Chemical, as well as two ARNG Special Forces Groups which are located in Utah and Alabama.38 Table 1 depicts ARNG end strength since 1947.

The numbers in bold reflect large numbers of NG Soldiers serving on active duty during the Korean War, the Berlin Crisis, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, and therefore not counted in the NG rolls. Numbers in Red reflect a peak followed by a decrease. Numbers in italics reflect actual assigned end strength from 2000–2005.

Table 1. ARNG Strength, 1947–2011

E. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE USAR

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) was formed on April 23, 1908 to provide a reserve of medical officers to the Army. The National Defense Act of 1920 reorganized the U.S. Army into the regular Army, the National Guard, and an Organized Officer Reserve and Enlisted Reserve Corps, which later became the Army Reserve. As with the National Guard, the role of the USAR has been greatly enhanced since transitioning to an operational reserve after 9/11. The USAR consists of 205,281 Soldiers located in 1,100 Reserve Centers around the nation, with 15,584 Army Reservists currently deployed around the world, and 196,711 Soldiers deployed since 9/11. The core

39 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 249, 276, 345.

competency of the USAR is providing support units to the Army for federal mobilization, and its units include theatre support, civil affairs, engineering, training divisions, and chemical and biological detection companies. It contains more than two-thirds of the Army’s medical brigades, civil affairs units, dental units, combat support hospitals, and nearly one-half of the Army’s MP, and medical and supply units. An agreement in 1993 after the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War resulted in a reduction of the active component, ARNG, and USAR. The agreement also reorganized the Army force structure between the two reserve components, which left the combat arms units (armor, infantry, field artillery, and special forces) in the ARNG, and combat support (aviation, engineer, transportation) and combat service support (finance, adjutant medical) in the USAR. With about 20% of the Army’s total forces, the Army Reserve currently provides about half of the Army’s combat support and one-fourth of the Army’s mobilization base expansion capability. The Army Reserve currently consists of 15 Operational Commands; Medical, Civil Support, Aviation, MP, Sustainment, Signal, Engineer, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, and Military Intelligence. It also has seven Regional Support Commands that act as peacetime administrative headquarters for USAR units located around the nation, four Institutional Training Commands responsible for replacing active duty training Soldiers while deployed, an Aviation Brigade, and two Training Support Commands, First United States Army East and West, responsible for validation of pre-mobilization training for all reserve component (ARNG and USAR) units. The 100th Infantry Battalion, 442nd Infantry Regiment, located at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, is the only remaining combat arms unit in the USAR, and it has been deployed to Iraq and Kuwait.

Unlike the Chief of NGB, who now sits on the JCS, the Chief of the Army Reserve reports directly to the Army Chief of Staff. USAR Soldiers serve in a Title X


status under federal control. USAR units are organized into major commands by functional area, or under peacetime command and control (C2) Support Commands. These units are not affiliated with a particular state or territory, as NG units are. “The Army Reserve's mission, under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, is to provide trained, equipped, and ready Soldiers and cohesive units to meet the global requirements across the full spectrum of operations. The Army Reserve is a key element in The Army multi-component unit force, training with Active and National Guard units to ensure all three components work as a fully integrated team.”

USAR forces have also been mobilized in large numbers for the GWOT, and have become a fully operational reserve to the U.S. Army since 9/11. Unlike the NG, because of the Title X status of USAR Soldiers, reservists are seldom utilized for domestic/HLS missions. The recently signed NDAA amended Chapter 1209 of Title 10, United States Code states the following.

§ 12304a. Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve: order to active duty to provide assistance in response to a major disaster or emergency

(a) AUTHORITY.—When a Governor requests Federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), the Secretary of Defense may, without the consent of the member affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve to active duty for a continuous period of not more than 120 days to respond to the Governor’s request.

This amendment makes Reservists located around the nation more accessible for domestic missions; however, their use still requires invocation of the Stafford Act. Even in a large emergency, like Hurricane Katrina, Governor Blanco was reluctant to ask for federal assistance, which caused a delay in federal assistance. For a state emergency confined within a state’s boundaries, the use of Army reservists is unlikely.


F. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

The NG suffered a stigma during the Vietnam War when President Johnson made a conscious decision not to mobilize the reserves, but to rely on the draft instead.46 While 8,700 NG troops were deployed to Vietnam,47 during this era of early-1960s to mid-1970s, some joined the NG to avoid the Vietnam War, and most states actually had long waiting lists of potential recruits. George W. Bush served in the Texas and Alabama Air National Guard from 1968–1973; in fact, his critics claimed he was treated favorably because of his father’s political connections based on his aptitude scores and infrequent drill attendance.48 Guardsmen during this time were largely viewed as “weekend warriors,” and this negative stigma remained until the deployment of a large number of NG units for Desert Storm in 1991. The swift defeat of Iraqi forces in that war did much to bring the Army out of the post-Vietnam slump as it transitioned from a draftee to a volunteer force. For the first time since 1970, when the 42nd Infantry Division was mobilized to react to a postal workers strike in New York, ARNG soldiers began entering active duty on August 27, 1990. Ultimately, 62,411 Guardsmen in 398 units saw service in the Gulf War. Despite stories about units arriving unprepared for combat, 94% of the soldiers called were immediately available for overseas service.49

The USAR has deployed 195k Soldiers in support of OIF and OEF since 9/11.50 Since it contains specialty combat support units only available in the USAR, many units have been deployed extensively. Many units have also been broken up, deploying individuals to round out other units, and thousands of Individual Ready Reservists (IRR) have been mobilized to fill up deploying ARNG Brigades. Many Army Reservists have also been deployed for “non-standard” missions, or something other than the job for which they joined, such as security forces (SECFOR), and convoy security.

49 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 307.
50 Stultz, “2011 USAR Posture Statement.”
The ARNG has deployed 338,000 Soldiers in support of OIF and OEF since 9/11.\textsuperscript{51} All the ARNG’s BCT’s and most other brigades have been mobilized at least once, and the ARNG has also been tapped for many company-sized, non-standard missions, such as SECFOR, detainee operations, quick reaction force (QRF), and base camp security. Many of the ARNG’s field artillery units have been mobilized as provincial MP units that require extensive pre-deployment training. Therefore, while deployments have provided increased funding and training to the ARNG and USAR, and transformed both from a Strategic Reserve to a fully Operational Reserve to the Army, these deployments do not come without a price.

Since 2003, the ARNG has been fielded $23 billion of new equipment in an attempt to modernize the force and bring it up to speed with its active duty counterparts.\textsuperscript{52} A model called Army forces Generation Cycle (ARFORGEN) was developed in 2005 to develop a rotation of units to deploy for one year in a five-year cycle.\textsuperscript{53} The year following the deployment would consist of RESET, with three years devoted to individual and collective training, to deploy again. In reality, however, Soldiers in a deployment queue currently are constantly placed on and off orders during the 24 months prior to a deployment for training and new equipment fielding, which forces them to leave their families and employers for weeks or months at a time, before finally deploying for one year. Prior to 2007, ARNG units received 18-month mobilization orders to accomplish 3–5 months of pre-deployment training at a mobilization station, followed by 12 months boots-on-the ground (BOG), and demobilization.

Deployments after 2007 have been limited to 12 months total to reduce the impact on Soldiers’ families and employers. However, to accommodate the pre-deployment training cycle, much of that training is now conducted pre-mobilization during home station training assemblies, and often includes extra training periods during the 24 months prior to mobilization. It has also led to a shortened BOG time of 10 months or

\textsuperscript{51} 2011 National Guard Posture Statement.
\textsuperscript{52} Atlanta Journal Constitution, “Iraq War Drains Guard of Equipment.”
\textsuperscript{53} AR 525-29, Army Force Generation, March 14, 2011.
less, and a subsequently, quicker rotation between units. As units enter the deployment lifecycle 24 months pre-mobilization, and often begin training on a non-standard mission, sometimes Soldiers do not train on their original MOS (military occupational skill) for three years or more, which has resulted in degraded MOS skills, especially in field artillery and other combat arms units. Following a year away, they are placed into a reset cycle and provided resources, such as counseling and veterans services, while simultaneously starting to train again for the next rotation in the deployment. As described above, this cycle has been accelerated by the reduced BOG time for predecessor units, and many ARNG units have deployed three or even four times since 2003. Domestic response missions also occur during this five-year deployment lifecycle, and these missions generally utilize the same equipment and the same Soldiers. Most ARNG Soldiers have been deployed overseas twice and many have deployed three times since 9/11, and many spend at least 15 additional days a year on orders for domestic support operations.

Figure 2 depicts numbers of reserve component Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Coast Guard, and Marines in total, and the numbers deployed since overseas since 9/11. Interestingly, almost every component has deployed nearly 100% of its force. Since 2003, at least 90k Guardsmen and Reservists have been on active duty at any one time, and according to the JCS study on future use of the reserve component, the active component would have needed to be increased by 270k to meet these operational requirements without the Reserves.54

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Figure 1. Reserve Component Assigned Strength\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Figure 2. Composition of the Selected Reserve Component (by Service)}

The long-term effects of this OPTEMPO on the NG remain to be seen. The extensive overseas deployments have resulted in diminished readiness for HLS missions, as noted in the RAND study of the Hurricane Katrina response. This report discusses regionalization of NG forces, and identification of HLS forces in the ARFORGEN model to ensure enough forces are left in CONUS for domestic response. Since many domestic operations involve the same equipment used in overseas deployments, the result of the longest war in U.S. history has been reduced readiness in NG units, particularly from an equipping standpoint. While the NG has met recruiting end strength goals since 2003, attrition has primarily occurred at the mid-level non-commissioned officer (NCO) and junior officer levels, of Soldiers with less than 10 years of service, and two or more

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deployments. Therefore, as the NG loses its experienced veterans, and replaces them with brand new Soldiers, quality of the overall force is reduced.

G. DOMESTIC OPERATIONS AND THE NATIONAL GUARD

In addition to the strains felt by the Reserve Component (RC) since 9/11 due to the high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) created by the GWOT, the NG has also been working hard to establish itself as the premier provider of domestic response forces. As seen by GEN McKinley’s priorities above, the vision for the NG is to be primarily a HLS/HLD force. The NG’s positioning across 3,300 communities makes it ideally suited as such. In response to Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) established several initiatives to improve responses to domestic emergencies, manmade or natural. Each state was directed in 2005 by NGB to establish a joint staff responsible for coordinating Air and Army Guard responses to domestic emergencies. NGB created a Joint Staff at this time, and each state mirrored this organization in some fashion, with the Joint Staff focused on domestic operations in most states. Each state and territory also stood up a Civil Support Team (CST) that consists of 22 full-time Army and Air personnel capable of deploying within three hours and of identifying chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. In addition, each state and territory has established a Joint Task Force (JTF) to provide command and control to military assets deployed in support of civil authorities, a National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF) to provide force protection and security for domestically deployed military forces. A CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear-Explosive) Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) Command and Control Team has been established in each FEMA region to provide an immediate response capability to the governor with search and extraction, decontamination, medical, and command and control capabilities, and a Homeland Reaction Force (HRF) has been stood up in seven states to provide security for the CERFPs.\(^5^8\) NGR 500-1 defines three basic domestic support missions for the National Guard.\(^5^9\)


\(^5^9\) NGR 500-1, Domestic Operations, June 13, 2008.
National Guard domestic operations fall into three mission areas.

(1) Homeland defense for which DoD serves as the primary federal agency and military forces are used to conduct military operations in defense of the homeland

(2) NG civil support for which the NG normally serves in a supporting role to other primary state or federal agencies by providing assistance to U.S. civil authorities at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels

(3) The NG baseline operating posture in which the NG conducts required planning, training, and exercises, as well as some ongoing mandated domestic operations

Homeland defense is defined as “operations conducted in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and in the information environment,” for which DoD is the lead agency, and NG Soldiers and Airmen generally serve in a Title X capacity when conducting such operations. Some NG units have been specifically tasked for homeland defense missions, such as the anti-missile and air defense units assigned to the Alaska National Guard.

NG civil support missions are defined by DoD as “Department of Defense support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities.” This mission is further defined by NGB as “Support provided by the National Guard of the several states while in State Active Duty status or Title 32 duty status to civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities.” This support is almost always done in a state active duty, or Title 32 status, but the President has the authority under the Insurrection Act to mobilize Guardsmen in a federal status. NG civil support missions are conducted for the following.

(1) Supporting civil authorities whose capabilities or capacity is insufficient to meet current requirements with general purpose, specialized, or unique Guard forces or capabilities

(2) Protecting the life, property, and safety of U.S. citizens and U.S. persons

(3) Protecting critical U.S. infrastructure

(4) Providing humanitarian assistance during disaster response and domestic emergencies

(5) Providing support to designated law enforcement activities and operations

(6) Providing support to designated events, programs, and other activities
Civil support missions also include disaster response and domestic emergency missions, which are also generally conducted in a state Active Duty or Title 32 status. The lead agency for these response missions is at the state/local level, with the NG in a supporting role, and states have the ability to request cross-border support from neighbor states using the Emergency Management Agreement Compact (EMAC) process. Some units like the CST are specifically designated for these types of missions, but generally units are tasked based on capabilities and location in relation to the disaster. In addition to the types of missions listed above, NG Soldiers and Airmen also support law enforcement activities under the counterdrug program, protection of critical infrastructure, and national special security events.

The NG baseline operating posture is defined as day-to-day operations, involving training, planning and exercises, and maintaining situational awareness of the homeland security environment. The NG baseline operating posture is intended to do the following.

1. Assist in deterring and preventing attacks on the U.S. homeland
2. Maintain well-trained and well-equipped units prepared to conduct or support state or federal missions
3. Maintain situational awareness and detect threats or concerns
4. Conduct mandated ongoing domestic operations, e.g., counterdrug operations

As NGR 500-1 explains, the NG possesses unique capabilities for domestic operations. NGB has identified key units essential to every state to support state missions. Known as the “Essential 10” capabilities list, NGR 500-1 offers the following definition: “Governors count on National Guard assets to be available to them within the first hours of a domestic incident. To meet the Governors’ requirements, the CNGB established the following list of 10 essential capabilities for National Guard Domestic Operations.”

1. Aviation/Airlift
2. Command and Control (C2)
3. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosives (CBRNE) response
4. Engineering

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60 National Guard Regulation 500-1, National Guard Domestic Operations, June 13, 2008, 7–16.
(5) Medical
(6) Communications
(7) Transportation
(8) Security
(9) Logistics
(10) Maintenance

**H. SUMMARY**

The NG has an extensive history as a provider of forces for homeland security and homeland defense missions. Both the Army Reserve and the NG have extensively been involved in the GWOT since 9/11, transitioning from a Cold-War, strategic reserve to fully operational reserves in their own right. As the Army prepares to downsize as many as 90,000 Soldiers in a post-war environment, the reserve component will likely be relied upon even more heavily in the future. The world is an uncertain place, and DoD faces some extensive challenges in trying to balance the economic constraints the United States is currently facing with being adequately prepared for future threats. It has been said the pitfall of war planning is “always fighting the last war.” In continuing on a path to sustain 11 carrier groups, and continue development of the F-35 fighter program, along with a commitment to increase the U.S. presence in the Pacific Rim, while cutting ground forces (Army and USMC), this administration does not seem to be overly focused on the counterinsurgency operations dominating DoD’s attention for the past 10 years. However, homeland defense, homeland security, and defense support to civil authorities for natural disasters are not expected to decline. These services are going to continue to be needed, and the NG is likely to continue to be their primary provider.
III. POLICY OPTIONS

A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

–2nd Amendment, as ratified by Thomas Jefferson, 1791

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, the Army will cut 90,000 troops from its authorized end-strength, and reduce it to 490,000 by 2014. The ARNG is programmed to remain at 350,200, with the USAR staying at 205,000, at least through 2014. The Navy, Air Force, and USMC are also planning significant force reductions in their active components. The two-major contingency policy followed by DoD since the beginning of the Cold War is now being criticized as cost-prohibitive. Post Cold War troop reductions at overseas bases have been implemented in Europe, yet the current Presidential Administration has announced a renewed interest in maintaining a presence in the Pacific Rim. After reaching a high of 750,000 in 1985, the active Army was reduced to 480,000 by the late 1990s, and at 490,000, it will be back to pre-9/11 levels. Thus, while the Army positions itself to a post-war posture, it will inevitably continue to include both its reserve components in contingency planning for future conflicts. As budgets and manning decrease, is it possible for the NG to maintain a dual-mission focus, and continue to be a fully operational reserve? As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan end, and the NG shifts focus to its DSCA mission, how can the NG best posture itself for success?

A. MILITIA

Much debate has ensued in this country about the right to bear arms, as prescribed by the 2nd amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently ruled the language in this amendment applies to all free citizens concerning gun ownership, yet fundamental is the language regarding the militia.


In the Federalist Papers No 29, Alexander Hamilton writes that a “if a well-regulated militia be the most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of national security.”\(^63\) He goes on to say “if standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force.”\(^64\)

To understand the context of this discussion, and framing in the Constitution, it is important to consider the experience of this nation with British occupation. The 2nd amendment mentions a “well-regulated militia,”\(^65\) the 3rd amendment states “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without consent of the Owner,”\(^66\) and the 4th amendment prohibits search and seizure.\(^67\) These amendments are all attributable to the founding father’s aversion to a large standing army and use of the military to enforce the King’s rule from across the Atlantic. The 10th amendment specifically preserves states rights, also indicating a strong aversion to centralized control and tyranny. These provisions not only set the United States apart from all other countries in the world, they set the foundation for a strong, state-controlled militia (NG), not only to defend the nation against foreign invaders, but also as an economic necessity (since standing armies are costly), and as a mechanism to avoid tyranny. In other words, the modern NG was born and is key to the nation’s fundamentals. The Guard was deliberately incorporated into the fundamental architecture of the United States since its inception, with the dual-role mission it had already been doing for over 100 years prior to

\(^{63}\) Hamilton, “The Federalist Papers: Concerning the Militia.”
\(^{64}\) Ibid.
the nation’s founding. While other nations have reserve components to their military, the state/federal relationship of the NG is unique to the United States. A consequence of this relationship brings about the biggest strength of the NG, which is its political power. Ties to each state’s congressional delegation, and the council of 50 Governors and Adjutants General, combined with the lobbying power of NGAUS, make the NG a uniquely political-military organization, capable of effectively navigating between local, state, and federal missions, while adding a layer of national security, as well as a “military first-responder in every zip code.”68

B. SECURITY AMERICAN CAN AFFORD

The United States spends approximately 20% of its annual budget on defense, nearly four times as much as the next leading competitor China, and more than the next 20 competitors combined. This figure represents 4.06% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2012, second only to Saudi Arabia that spends 10% of its GDP, and is a historically low figure, reaching 38% in 1944.69 However, many have called for decreased defense spending in light of current economic troubles, and billions of dollars spent from supplemental authorizations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which leads some to question the return from those expenditures.

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68 National Guard, “National Guard Leadership.”

As outlined in an NGB posture statement, the NG provides a bargain to the U.S. taxpayer. “Security American Can Afford,” is described by NGB as follows.71

- For 11% of the Army budget, the ARNG provides 32% of the Army’s total personnel and 40% of its operating forces
- For 7% of the Air Force budget, the ANG provides 19% of the Air Force’s total personnel and 30–40% of the Air Force fighter, tanker and airlift capacity
- An “as needed” force, the NGs community-based, part-time structure offers a myriad of savings (nearly 85% of NG is part-time)
  - Fewer pay days per year; lower medical costs
  - Lower retirement expenditures
  - Significantly lower training costs beyond initial qualification training

70 Wikipedia, “Military Budget of the United States.”

71 “Security America Can Afford, National Guard Talking Points, National Guard: A Great Value to America,” FY12 NGB Posture Statement, G-5/A8, November 17, 2011.
- Virtually no cost for moving families and household goods to new duty stations
- Fewer entitlements, such as housing and food allowances
- Lower base support costs in terms of services and facilities, such as housing and child care facilities
- For the cost of one active duty service member, our nation can train, retain and deploy three NG Soldiers or Airmen
- Much of the NGs dual-use equipment can be employed for federal and domestic missions
- The ANG operates for less than two cents of every dollar spent on defense

In fact, some have suggested as the defense budget gets trimmed, expensive, heavy type units like armor and artillery formations be moved into the NG to experience a reduced OPTEMPO expense. NG units operate the equipment less, thereby using less fuel and maintenance funds. Retired Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ron Fogelman has suggested the value of growing the reserve component, while drawing down the active duty forces as a way to maintain expandability for future operations while cutting costs in the near term.72

C. STRATEGIC VS. OPERATIONAL RESERVE

There has been much discussion in the industry about the reserve component transitioning from a Cold-War strategic reserve to an operational reserve. In 2007, the Army published a proposed definition of operational reserve.

The total Reserve Component structure that operates across the continuum of military missions performing both strategic and operational roles in peacetime, wartime, contingency, domestic emergencies, and homeland defense operations. As such, the Services organize, resource, equip, train, and utilize their Guard and Reserve Components to support mission requirements to the same standards as their active components. Each Service's force generation plan prepares both units and individuals to participate in missions, across the full spectrum of military operations, in a

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cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, service members, their families, and civilian employers.\textsuperscript{73}

This is an extension of the Total Force Policy introduced by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1973, the same year the draft was abolished.\textsuperscript{74} After suffering a severe stigma when President Lyndon B. Johnson decided not to mobilize the reserve component for Vietnam, this policy ensured that the Army would never go to war without its reserves again. In addition to maintaining the same standards of training and readiness, reserve component units would now be programmed into active war plans. After a period of inactivity since the Korean War, more than 22K Soldiers from the ARNG and USAR were activated for Desert Storm in 1990.\textsuperscript{75} 9/11 and the ensuing GWOT starting in 2003 caused a use of the reserve component unlike anything since the Korean War. To date, more than 500K ARNG and USAR Soldiers have served in OIF or OEF, and at one point, half of the combat brigades in Iraq were from the ARNG.\textsuperscript{76} This transition to an operational reserve consisted of increased funding, equipment modernization, and training unlike anything experienced previously. No Soldier who joined the ARNG after 9/11 has experienced the one weekend a month, two-week annual training model, as 63% of Guardsmen have deployed once, and 37% have deployed twice since 2003.\textsuperscript{77} As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, and budgets are reduced across DoD, the maintenance of two separate, fully operational reserves for the Army is unsustainable.

The shift from strategic to operational reserve brought an increase in resources. New equipment expenditures between 2005–2010 reflect the most extensive modernization since World War II, yet equipping has now tapered off, and the 2011

\textsuperscript{73} Joseph Whitlock, “What is an Operational Reserve?,” \textit{Joint Matters}, December 2007, \url{www.ameriforce.net/PDF/rng_dec07/RNG_Dec07_006-008.pdf}.


\textsuperscript{76} The National Guard, “About the Army National Guard.”

budget is a mirror of 2010, with future budgets projected to be capped at 2009 levels. In a troubled economy, DoD is feeling the pressure of all federal agencies and planning to downsize and cut equipping programs.78 As the Army downsizes further, it is a logical conclusion that reliance on the NG will likely increase.

D. FUTURE USE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT

A comprehensive review of the future role of the reserve component conducted by the Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs suggests the elimination of the term strategic and operational reserve, asserting the reserve component has become an integral part of the U.S. military. “During a decade of sustained engagement in combat operations, the Reserve Components of our Armed Forces have been transformed, both practically and philosophically, from a strategic force of last resort to an operational reserve that provides full-spectrum capability to the Nation.”79 The report recommends several changes, yet emphasizes areas in which the reserve component is particularly well suited, including operational rotations, theater security cooperation and partnership program activities, individual augmentees, units, teams, HLD and DSCA missions (which is specified in the report as specifically well suited for the NG), and for rotational training missions. The report reiterates the total force concept, and the Abrams policy, coined by GEN Creighton Abrams after Vietnam, who stated the Army would “never go to war without its reserves again.”80 The report also recommends “rebalancing” the total force in order to enhance capabilities, reduce stress, preserve readiness, and provide a level of predictability for deployments, with an emphasis on AC/RC integration.81 In short, the reserve component has become a critical part of national strategy and defense planning, and will be for the foreseeable future. Table 3 depicts potential missions identified by the report for the Reserve component.

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80 Ibid., 15.

81 Ibid., 16.
Naval War College professor and strategist Thomas Barnett proposes the idea of splitting the U.S. military into a “Leviathan” force capable of conducting rapid deployments, and extremely swift and violent military actions anywhere in the world, and a “sys-admin” force capable of following the initial invasion and conducting the difficult and lengthy stability operations to follow. His concept of the sys-admin force is an older, more mature force comprised of Citizen-Soldiers with expertise in necessary fields like civil affairs, public works, and law enforcement. In short, he describes the reserve

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component of the Army. Thousands of reserve component Soldiers have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct such “sys-admin” missions. These types of nation-building missions are complex, and time-consuming, as witnessed in Iraq after a swift initial occupation of Baghdad, followed by a long period of rebuilding that is continuing even after the United States has left. Following Barnett’s logic, a larger sys-admin force, combined with a smaller Leviathin force, will not only conserve precious resources, but will ultimately lead to a more effective U.S. military, and ultimately, a more stable world.

In an increasingly globalized economy, comprised of what Bobbitt describes as “market states” vs. “nation-states,” 84 anti-terrorism/counterinsurgency/asymmetrical operations seem much more likely for the future of the U.S. Army than a large-scale, “near-peer” war with a state power, such as China or North Korea. This viewpoint further supports Barnett’s argument for a more stable world being achievable by shrinking the “gap” and expanding the “core,” with core states being economically connected stable countries, and the gap being those disconnected, failed or ineffective states that harbor terrorists, breed corruption, and deter investors and economic development. Since the gap countries produce most of the world’s terrorism, the theory is that shrinking this gap is the only way to win the long-term war on terror. As the United States struggles economically and is faced with the realities of decreased defense spending, it is essential to identify how to accomplish this new world order on the cheap. In short, today’s Army must gain efficiencies to cut costs, continue to do more with less, and prepare for an uncertain future, overseas and domestically. In any scenario, it will be unable to do so without its reserve component.

While the GWOT has transformed the USAR and ARNG into fully operational reserve forces, the ARNG has also been very proactive in positioning itself to be the lead provider of Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). The recent law enacted giving the Chief of NGB membership on the JCS will only strengthen the NG’s unique role as a kind of “military first responder.” The USAR, faced with decreased relevance, and imminent budget cuts, has also expressed interest in joining the “home game,” and

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NDAA-2012 removed some of the roadblocks to the use of Title X reservists for domestic operations. However, the NG maintains its unique dual-status under control of the governors until federalized for active service in Title X. The flexibility Guardsmen have to be mobilized in State Active Duty (SAD), Title 32 (federal dollars under state control), or Title X (federal control) is something the USAR cannot match. In a postwar, reduced budget environment, the Army must seek to gain efficiencies with its reserve component. The NG cannot continue as an operational reserve, focus on domestic operations, and do so effectively with less resources and reduced manpower. The following policy options outline some possible solutions to this problem the NG is about to face.

E. OPTION ONE

The ARNG becomes primarily a HLS force focused on domestic missions. The NG has made great strides since 2003 to establish itself as the premier provider of HLS forces for domestic missions, manmade and natural. The NG has a long history of providing homeland defense since its inception as a militia force, and its unique state control during peacetime offers governors direct and expedient access to military forces. In this option, the ARNG would focus on domestic missions, and shift to a strategic reserve as it would still need to be able to deploy in support of a state actor conflict (Gulf War scenario) since the active Army will be too small to handle a large or multiple contingencies without the support of the ARNG.

Since 2003, under the leadership of then Chief of NGB LTG Blum, NGB underwent several initiatives to improve NG readiness for domestic operations that was largely a response to lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina, during which more than 55K Soldiers representing all 50 states were deployed to LA and MS.\textsuperscript{85} LTG Blum came to NGB from NORTHCOM, and was intimately aware of domestic preparedness shortcomings across the NG. He announced a plan in July 2003 to create a joint staff at NGB, and in each state, to synthesize the Army and Air staffs into one joint staff responsible for planning and preparing for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)

\textsuperscript{85} The National Guard, “About the Army National Guard.”
missions. This plan would create efficiencies, and eliminate staff positions in the states. However, the states all approached this in different ways, and in many states, a third joint staff was created in addition to the Army and Air staffs. In most states, the joint staff is focused on DSCA.

In addition, each state and territory has established a Joint Task Force (JTF) to provide command and control to military assets deployed in support of civil authorities, a Civil Support Team (CST) for CBRNE detection and response, a NGRF to provide force protection and security for domestically deployed military forces, and a CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) Command and Control Team has been established in each FEMA region to provide immediate response capability to the governor with search and extraction, decontamination, medical, and command and control capabilities. The CST and CERFP response teams, in particular, are uniquely NG, as they are non-deployable overseas, and can only be utilized in a Title 32 capacity.

This option would involve the focus of the ARNG to shift from Title X war-fighting capabilities to a focus on DSCA, in particular, the CBRNE expertise already residing in the NG, which would involve a fundamental shift away from the traditional train-equip-deploy model of the ARNG. While saying the ARNG should never be deployed overseas is unrealistic, a paradigm shift of the NG back to a Cold War, strategic reserve, with a renewed emphasis on domestic missions, is required. Otherwise, reduced funding will decrease readiness for both missions, and doing “more with less” is not sustainable indefinitely.

The first necessary step is the creation of a truly joint, integrated staff in every state, focused on DSCA. The joint staff should consist of a single primary staff officer responsible for personnel (J1), intelligence (J2), operations (J3), logistics (J4), and (J5)

87 National Guard, “The National Guard’s Role in Homeland Defense.”
civil affairs, etc, responsible for planning and sourcing all federal and state missions for the Army and Air components. Each directorate would be staffed with Soldiers and Airmen working service-specific programs (Airmen working air operations, Soldiers working ground operations, etc.), gaining efficiencies by consolidating common functions (finance, personnel administration, and ground maintenance), and reduce overhead at the staff director level by consolidating from three staffs to one. In other words, instead of having an Army Colonel doing Army Operations (G3), an Air Colonel doing Air Operations (A3), and a third Colonel doing Joint Operations (J3), a joint staff directorate would be created with Soldiers and Airmen working under one “purple” (Army or Air) Colonel planning Army, Air, and state (HLD) missions. A consolidation of staff would be more in line with the Goldwater Nichols Act, which established DoD joint operations statutorily in 1986, and NG Soldiers and Airmen have been working together in theatre since the Gulf War.89

The mobilization policy of the U.S. Army should also be revisited. FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3 (FORMDEPS), has not been updated since 1999. The five levels of mobilization shown below should be revised under this option to specify use of the NG only during a full mobilization, or total mobilization scenario. In short, the NG would become a strategic reserve, while maintaining the USAR as an operational reserve, to be utilized more frequently using the partial mobilization criteria defined below.90

89 Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations, August 2011.
90 FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), July 15, 1999.
### The Mobilization Spectrum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERAL DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>HOW MANY?</th>
<th>WHO AUTHORIZED?</th>
<th>STATUTORY AUTHORITY</th>
<th>UNITS OR INDIVIDUALS OF OR UNITS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SELECTIVE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilization of NGS</td>
<td>As needed</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 107-209</td>
<td>NGS as a Federal Agency, service as a reserve to the Army in case of future conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Guard Reserve (U.S. Armed Forces)</td>
<td>As needed</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 10202</td>
<td>NGS as a Federal Agency, service as a reserve to the Army in case of future conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet</td>
<td>As needed</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 10921</td>
<td>NGS as a Federal Agency, service as a reserve to the Army in case of future conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP</strong></td>
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<td>For Low-Intensity Conflicts through Multi-National Conflicts</td>
<td>As needed</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 10342</td>
<td>NGS as a Federal Agency, service as a reserve to the Army in case of future conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Stage III</td>
<td>As needed</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 10921</td>
<td>NGS as a Federal Agency, service as a reserve to the Army in case of future conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PARTIAL MOBILIZATION</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>RC Forces</td>
<td>As needed</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 10342</td>
<td>NGS as a Federal Agency, service as a reserve to the Army in case of future conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready Reserve - up to 1,000,000</td>
<td>As needed</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 10342</td>
<td>NGS as a Federal Agency, service as a reserve to the Army in case of future conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FULL MOBILIZATION</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>RC Forces</td>
<td>As needed</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 10342</td>
<td>NGS as a Federal Agency, service as a reserve to the Army in case of future conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready Reserve - up to 1,000,000</td>
<td>As needed</td>
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<td>10 U.S.C. 10342</td>
<td>NGS as a Federal Agency, service as a reserve to the Army in case of future conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MOBILIZATION</strong></td>
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<td>RC Forces</td>
<td>As needed</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 10342</td>
<td>NGS as a Federal Agency, service as a reserve to the Army in case of future conflicts.</td>
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</table>

Table 3. The Mobilization Spectrum

While the ARNG will always be a necessary part of the total force as a reserve to the Army in case of future conflicts, this option would transition the NG from an operational reserve back to a Cold-War strategic reserve. Faced with diminished budgets, and future manpower cuts, the NG must choose a single focus; It can do DSCA well, or continue to try and do federal and state missions poorly. Readiness costs money, and in a post-war environment, money must be conserved.

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Implications are many, ranging from a shift of training focus, to modification of the ARFORGEN model. ARNG units should not be included in contingency plans, or programmed for deployment in an AFORGEN cycle, or the model should be spread out to allow for a more substantial number of NG forces to remain at home for domestic use. In other words, rather than being programmed for a deployment once in a five-year cycle, NG units should be spread to one in seven or eight years, with specific “Essential 10 capabilities” (as described above) units left out of the model altogether, giving governors peace of mind knowing their most used units will not be deployed overseas when they are needed domestically.

1. **Advantages**

This option is the closest to status quo; it requires the least amount of change from the Army’s current structure, so will therefore be the most politically palatable. As funding is cut, the ARNG will naturally experience diminished readiness, and maintenance as an operational reserve will naturally become infeasible. The current ARFORGEN model will become less important as the United States transitions military forces out of Afghanistan. The current 12-month deployment policy will need to be reviewed as readiness declines, and future call-ups will likely require more substantial train-up time, new equipment, and funding to do so. Future conflicts are not likely to be against a nation-state threat, but rather a failed state, or terrorist threat, which will likely be handled by active duty special forces (SF) units, and the “sys-admin” forces of the reserve component described by Barnett will likely have time for significant amounts of train-up pre-deployment.

2. **Disadvantages**

This option does not come without risk by Army and ARNG leadership. Since World War II, the Army has employed a Total-Force policy that includes the ARNG in war plans, alignment of ARNG units with active duty brigades, assigning designated mobilization stations, and focused training for standard missions. This option would require a fundamental paradigm shift in the train-equip-deploy cycle the ARNG has used for the past 60 years. The transition to an operational reserve came with many benefits,
such as increased funding, equipment modernization, and the current 12-month mobilizations/pre-mobilization training model generally seen as NG victories. A shift back to a less ready, Cold-War strategic reserve will likely not be viewed favorably by NG leadership, which has made great strides toward increased NG relevance. More importantly, the world is an uncertain place. Can America really afford to have a smaller active military and a less ready NG?

3. **Probability of Success**

The NG has successfully maintained a dual-role mission set since its inception. There is no reason to believe it cannot do so today. Yet decreased funding will result in decreased readiness, and something will have to give. Valuable training time must be focused, and while preparing for federal and state missions is not diametrically opposed, they are different, and depending on the type of unit, sometimes quite different. While this option would allow the NG to focus on domestic missions and only be used for federal mobilizations in dire occasions, it may not be possible with an already thinly stretched and downsizing Army.

The use of the National Guard with its present powerful armament is not generally suitable for the execution of state missions…. and not consistent with sound public policy” and that “the same forces can no longer be expected to perform both local and national function and that a modern Federal striking force cannot be prepared adequately under state control.

–The Gray Board Report, June 1948

F. **OPTION TWO**

The NG focuses on becoming the premier HLS force, while remaining an operational reserve to the Army and Air Force. As the Army downsizes, some are calling to move heavy units (armor and artillery) to the reserve component as a cost-savings measure; since OPTEMPO is lower, these expensive units would be cheaper to maintain. This option would require a reversal of the off-site agreement of 1994 that left all combat arms units in the ARNG, and the Army Reserve with Combat Support (CS) and Combat

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92 Buchalter, “Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components,” 2.
Service Support (CSS) units. For the ARNG to focus on HLS, this option would move combat arms units into the USAR as a strategic reserve to the Army, and CS and CSS units into the ARNG to serve primarily as a HLS force for the governors, and secondarily as a strategic reserve to the Army.

A review conducted in 1994 resulted in a restructuring of the ARNG and Army Reserve. In a post-cold war environment, the ARNG would consist of combat arms, and the USAR of CS and CSS. In 1996, the USAR was affirmed as a separate command of the Army, and in 1997, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) addressed the need to create enhanced separate ARNG brigades, as recommended by the 1994 review. This is the current arrangement with which the Army went to war in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, due to the nature of those contingencies, (quickly transitioning to counterinsurgency following the initial invasions), many combat brigades of the ARNG were deployed for non-standard missions like convoy security, detainee operations, and security forces. In short, there were not enough MP units to meet the requirements. Thus, combat arms units, such as field artillery, were largely retrained for other types of security missions that resulted in large inefficiencies, in which equipment was fielded for a doctrinal mission (artillery), then parked while the unit deployed to do a different type of mission altogether. This also caused additional strain on individual Soldiers who were required to complete their MOS training for the job they joined to do, then spend many more weeks on additional orders pre-deployment to be cross trained for a security mission, then deploy for the non-standard mission, only to return and be required to complete additional leadership and MOS skill training to remain proficient and be eligible for promotion within their duty assignment.

A hazard of utilizing lessons learned from recent conflicts for future planning is “fighting the last war.” If it is assumed that future conflicts will also involve counterinsurgency operations, and not require heavy combat formations, the tendency might be to reduce the number of combat arms units across the Army. A future conflict with a state-actor, such as North Korea or China, while seemingly unlikely, would prove

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93 Buchalter, “Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components,” 20.
94 Ibid.
that decision to be short sighted. However, aside from that discussion, which requires some future predictions, the optimal mix of force structure should be reviewed. Another review like the one conducted after the Gulf War is in order. What is the optimal structure of the ARNG, Army Reserve, and active Army?

In this option, the 1994 agreement would be reversed, with combat arms units going to the USAR, and the CS and CSS units of the USAR moving to the ARNG that would leave the USAR as a strategic reserve to the Army, with heavy armor and artillery formations, and combat brigades becoming reserve assets to be used in the event of future conflicts. In this option, the ARNG would keep all its non-combat arms type of units (Engineer, Aviation, etc.), and transfer all combat arms (artillery, armor, and infantry) units to the USAR. The USAR would transfer all of its current force structure to the NG of whatever state in which its units reside. The units currently residing in the USAR are all units on NGB’s “Essential 10” capabilities list described above, and therefore, would increase each state’s capability to respond to natural and man-made disasters. This plan would allow the ARNG to focus on the DSCA mission, and the USAR to become the primary reserve to the Army, with the understanding that the support units of the ARNG would still be available for overseas deployment in the event of future conflicts.

In this option, both reserve components would remain operational reserves to the Army, but with very different mission capabilities. The USAR would be available to provide a “punch” to the “Leviathan” force as needed for rapid, violent deployment to trouble spots, while the NG, heavily engaged in DSCA operations domestically, would be able to provide “sys-admin” forces to provide security, civil affairs, and nation-building type capabilities to the ensuing peacekeeping/stability/operations other than war.

1. **Advantages**

This option provides maximum flexibility to the Army by optimizing the force structure mix between the ARNG and USAR by moving the CS and CSS units from the USAR to the ARNG for domestic support missions, and leaving a reserve combat force in the Title X USAR, as well as maintain ARNG combat support forces for federal deployment as needed. In fact, every type of unit possessed by the USAR is on NGB’s
“Essential 10 capabilities” list. This option would maintain a separate federal (Title X) reserve to the Army, which is directly accessible by the Chief of Staff without State control, and would leave the ARNG to focus on DSCA missions. It would create a tiered approach to mobilization, with the USAR focused on the war-fight, and the ARNG focused on domestic operations, and the nation-building missions required post-invasion.

2. Disadvantages

This option, while increasing NG capabilities for the DSCA mission, may not be popular among ARNG commanders, who traditionally have not been interested in the support role of USAR units. This resistance has been evidenced by the reluctant deployment of combat arms units to conduct non-standard (security) missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It may not be popular with USAR leadership either, who have had a combat support role since the inception of the USAR. This option also continues the inefficiency of maintaining two separate reserve components, which is economically troubling in light of today’s budget environment. It creates a significant amount of turbulence by transferring units between the ARNG and USAR. Soldiers may be faced with switching units, cross training into a new MOS, or switching service components, all of which incur associated costs, and possible retention issues.

3. Probability of Success

This option will greatly increase the NG’s ability to perform its DSCA mission by increasing the types of support units needed for those missions. It will also maintain a dedicated reserve component for federal missions, which will be necessary as the active Army downsizes. While it involves a significant amount of turbulence, and will likely experience resistance initially, it provides maximum flexibility to the Army.
Every man therefore that wishes to secure his own Freedom, and thinks it his Duty to defend that of his Country, should, as he prides himself in being a Free Citizen, think it his Truest Honour to be a Soldier Citizen.

–Exercise for the Militia of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, Boston, 1758

G. OPTION THREE

The NG focuses on becoming the premier HLS force, while also maintaining itself as a fully operational reserve, subsuming the USAR, and maintaining a high state of readiness for both state and federal missions. The NG since 2003 has been actively reorganizing to become the premier provider of HLS forces. Due to its unique state-control during peace, its positioning around the country in nearly every community, and a long history of first response, the NG is uniquely suited for this domestic mission. Since 9/11 and the GWOT, the NG has deployed more forces overseas than at any time since WWII. As a result of this high OPTEMPO, the NG has been funded, equipped, and trained better than at any time in its long history. This option would continue that high state of readiness for federal missions as a fully operational partner to the active Army and Air Force, while simultaneously achieving the lead role in homeland security/domestic response missions.

In this option, the ARNG and USAR merge into a single reserve component. This idea has been suggested before; primarily in 1947 by the Gray Board, convened by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. The Gray Board recommended merging the ARNG and USAR into a federal controlled force called the “National Guard of the United States.” However, Secretary Forrestal did not endorse the recommendation, and it experienced intense criticism from the National Guard and the National Guard Association (NGAUS). Then, in 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed a plan to merge all reserve components of the Army under the management of the NG, or just the opposite of the Gray Board’s recommendation. This plan also came under heavy fire from the Reserve Officers Association (ROA), and was rejected by Congress. In

95 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 1.
addition, a report authored by five retired general officers (three ANG, and two USAFR), in 2011 recommended the creation of a unified Air Reserve component, by merging the ANG and the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC).\footnote{Dyches et al., “A Unified USAF Air Reserve Component,” July 20, 2011.} This proposal was also not implemented by the Air Force, despite the proposal’s assertion that it would save billions of dollars after implementation.\footnote{Marcus Weisberger, “USAF Nixes Guard-Reserve Merger Proposal,” Defense News, August 18, 2011, \url{http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110828/DEFSECT01/108280301/USAF-Nixes-Guard-Reserve-Merger-Proposal}.} In fact, a 1997 report from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated a $500 million annual savings from a merger of the Guard and Reserves.\footnote{Congressional Budget Office, “Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options,” March 1997, 66.} This option would recommend placing all units of the USAR under ARNG control, and effectively eliminating the USAR, subsuming all USAR units into the ARNG of the states to which they are assigned, and reducing overhead by placing administrative control to the TAG’s and JFHQ of the gaining states.

While this idea is not new, and has always met fierce resistance, today’s fiscal and political environment provides an opportunity to renew the argument. In reality, a merger would consist of the integration of all the USAR force structure into the ARNG of the state in which it resides. The similarities between these two reserve components of the Army are so many that most outside observers do not know the difference. Both are trained, equipped, and organized the same way, and each force consists of citizen-soldiers, employed full-time across all walks of life, and training periodically (typically one weekend/month and two weeks/year). The only real difference is the authority creating the two forces. USAR Soldiers serve on Title X under federal control at all times, unlike NG Soldiers and Airmen who serve their governors in Title 32 status until mobilized for federal missions. Therefore, USAR Soldiers, many of whom reside in the same communities as ARNG Soldiers, normally are not mobilized for domestic missions like disaster response, unless called upon for a national emergency by the President. Conversely, NG Soldiers and Airmen have the flexibility of being employed by their respective governors in a SAD or Title 32 status for local emergencies, or can be
federalized for Title X service. The combination of these forces would increase the number of military responders available for domestic missions by 70 percent. In fact, after the initial turbulence, (which would be substantial), the efficiencies created by merging these forces would result in cost savings for the taxpayer, and greatly enhance U.S. ability to respond to domestic emergencies, manmade or natural.

This proposal is obviously detrimental to the USAR. As with the NG, the role of the USAR has been greatly enhanced since transitioning to an operational reserve after 9/11. The USAR consists of 205,281 soldiers located in 1,100 reserve centers around the nation, with 15,584 Army Reservists currently deployed around the world, and 196,711 soldiers deployed since 9/11.\textsuperscript{100} The core competency of the USAR is providing support units to the Army for federal mobilization, and its units include theatre support, civil affairs, engineering, training divisions, and chemical and biological detection companies, and it contains more than 2/3 of the Army’s medical brigades, civil affair units, dental units, combat support hospitals, and nearly one-half of the Army’s MP, medical and supply units.\textsuperscript{101} Many of these types of support units are considered critical dual use (CDU) units identified by NGB as essential to every state to support state missions, and every one of NGB’s “Essential 10” capabilities, as defined above, resides in the USAR.\textsuperscript{102}

This option benefits the ARNG greatly. Force structure brings resources, and the ARNG would stand to increase its presence in every state, and by as many as 18,611 soldiers in Texas.\textsuperscript{103} The ARNG would presumably absorb the USAR’s budget ($8.1 Billion in 2011), and take control of its six installations and 1,100 reserve centers. In addition, the ARNG would either consolidate or be the beneficiary of 16 operational commands, and six training commands commanded by two-star generals. The USAR has struggled to maintain relevance since the elevation of the Chief of NGB to a four-star general three years ago, and the recently signed National Defense Authorization Act

\textsuperscript{100} Stultz, “2011 USAR Posture Statement.”
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} National Guard Regulation 500-1, National Guard Domestic Operations, 16.
\textsuperscript{103} Stultz, “2011 USAR Posture Statement.”
(NDAA) that gave the CNGB full membership of the JCS, while the USAR remains subordinate to the Army Chief of Staff. The USAR has reorganized several times since 9/11 to reduce “overhead,” and has been reduced to nine support, and six training commands, while the NG consists of 54 state adjutant generals, fully supported and resourced by 54 governor and Congressional delegations from each state and territory. The Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR), commanded by a 3-star general, and consisting of five general officer positions, and eight regional support commands, commanded by a two-star general, would be rendered obsolete as peacetime HQ whose functions would be assumed by the Joint Forces HQ in the gaining states. By reducing the overhead of administrative headquarters, efficiencies will be gained that will ultimately provide cost savings.

1. **Advantages**

This option would create efficiencies by maintaining one reserve component for the Army. The effects would be to increase the number of Citizen-Soldiers available for DSCA from 350K to nearly 600K, a 70% increase without associated costs. In fact, an ultimate cost savings will be achieved which are estimated to be as much as $500 million annually. All these forces and equipment would then be available to the governors for natural disasters and domestic response. The efficiencies and economies of scale gained would offset proposed budget cuts, enabling the ARNG to continue to function as an operational reserve, fully supporting the Army for its federal mission as well. Future deployments would now be wholly sourced by NGB in support of the combatant commander.

2. **Disadvantages**

This idea has been proposed several times before, and because it is so politically charged, it has never been implemented. It is likely to receive severe criticism from not only USAR leadership, but also from the Army leadership, and the ROA.

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104 USAR, “Mission.”

3. **Probability of Success**

If implemented, this solution could result in increased readiness for domestic and federal missions, make a move in the direction of unity of command, and potentially save millions of dollars currently being spent duplicating efforts across two nearly identical reserve components. As the USAR continues to struggle for relevance, and the lines between Title 32 and Title X accessibility become blurred, there is less of a need to maintain two separate components than ever before.
IV. ANALYSIS

A. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Option One retains the ARNG and USAR as reserve components to the Army, while shifting focus of the ARNG to domestic operations. Option Two also maintains a separate ARNG and USAR, but switches force structure between them to optimize the ARNG’s effectiveness for DSCA. Option Three involves absorption of the USAR into the ARNG, increasing its size by 70%, and making the 220K Soldiers of the USAR available for domestic operations as National Guardsmen. This chapter discusses the criteria used to evaluate these solutions.

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Table 4. Summary of Proposed Solutions

We have to fund the operations we’re in. We have to make sure we resource our people. And then, obviously, we’ve got to get it right in both the equipment and systems that they need, both now and in the future. So I think what Secretary Gates is undertaking is critically important. I’ve said it several times publicly: I think the biggest threat we have to our national security is our debt.

—Admiral Mike Mullen, in a “Tribute to the Troops” Speech June 2010

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA

1. Funding

In light of current U.S. economic troubles, and a reduced DoD budget highlighted by a reduction of the Army by 90K personnel, the most important criteria in evaluating the above described policy options is funding. While the ARNG is not programmed for 106 Mike Mullen, “A Tribute to the Troops,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 24, 2010, http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1413.
manpower reductions in 2012, the budget has already been frozen to 2010 levels, the ANG budget has been severely cut, and further cuts are expected. Therefore the Guard, like all other DoD entities, will continue to be expected to do more with less. As the NG’s focus shifts from overseas to domestic missions, the Guard must be able to operate more efficiently and cost effectively. While the extensive deployments experienced by the reserve component since 2003 have in some ways been a distracter from the HLS mission, they also brought to bear many resources that will now dwindle. These deployments also pushed the ARNG and USAR from a supporting role into a fully operational partner with the active component, to the extent the latest JCS study recommended deleting the terms “strategic reserve” and “operational reserve” from the vernacular. As the active military downsizes and funding is cut, the NG must decide how best to “trim the fat,” and refocus itself as the primary provider of DSCA forces.

Of the above options, the first option is initially the least costly. Since it essentially describes a status quo scenario, in which the ARNG and USAR are maintained as separate reserve components of the Army, and as funding is cut, they both gradually shift from a fully engaged, operational partner in the GWOT to more of a Cold-War, strategic reserve. This term seems to be somewhat pejorative, and will likely not be used by Army leadership, who has paid lots of lip service to the “total-force” concept since the concept was first introduced. The reality, however, is operationalizing the reserve component costs money. The levels of force modernization that have occurred within the RC since 2003 have been the most extensive since World War II, and the systems purchased with GWOT funds will need to be maintained. Current readiness levels cannot be maintained with decreased funding. In short, maintaining the status quo of two operational reserves while cutting costs is not a realistic option.

The second option, of shifting force structure between the ARNG and USAR to optimize the HLS/HLD capabilities of the ARNG, while maintaining the USAR as a “federal reserve,” focused on the Title X “war-fighting” mission, is the most costly. Since this option still requires maintenance of two separate reserve components, readiness will decline as OPTEMPO budgets are reduced. As General Fogelman and others have
suggested, moving expensive heavy units from the active component to the reserves may reduce overall OPTEMP costs within the Army, but will greatly increase costs within the USAR and will require reallocation of OPTEMPO dollars between components. In turn, the HLD capabilities of the ARNG, which will be left to compete with the USAR for precious resources, will be negatively affected. In addition, the initial turbulence created by moving units between the ARNG and USAR will create initial costs that must be borne by the Army. Associated costs will come from Soldier cross training/reclassification, transportation of equipment, redesignation of units, and facility modification.

Option three, combining the USAR and ARNG into one reserve component, capable of performing in state active duty, Title 32, or Title X, will result in the most cost-effective option in the long term. While this option is politically charged, and will initially cause significant amounts of turbulence, efficiencies gained will eventually result in cost savings, as much as $500 million annually. While this option has been seriously discussed twice before, both initiatives were defeated by Congress, in large part due to pressure from lobbying groups like NGAUS and the ROA. However, in light of today’s fiscal constraints, innovative and unpopular decisions must be considered. Some have gone so far as to suggest a move back to pre-1947, and making the U.S. Air Force part of the Army again as a cost-savings/efficiency gaining measure.

The U.S. deficit is of huge concern to policymakers at all levels, and as former Chairman of the JCS Admiral Mullen stated, is also a security issue. The implications of a potential adversary (China) holding so much U.S. debt are not fully understood, and is a topic for another discussion. However, the policy implications from a HLS perspective

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107 Fogelman, “Going Back to the Future.”
are that cost-savings must be found. It is absolutely necessary to find innovative ways to secure the homeland without the benefit of unlimited funding, supplemental appropriations, and two wars to fuel the defense budget.

Readiness levels will continue to suffer as long as we stay the current course with U.S. troops bogged down in an intractable civil war in Iraq. Deterioration in readiness levels already constrains our ability to deal with the escalating conflict in Afghanistan, much less potential crises in North Korea and Iran.”

–Letter from Senators Pelosi and Reid to President Bush, November 2006

2. Readiness

Readiness is defined by Joint Publication 1-02 as “The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct, but interrelated levels, unit readiness and joint readiness. Unit readiness is the ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions, which is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. Joint readiness is the combatant commander’s ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute their assigned missions.”

AR 220-1 describes four measured areas that comprise a unit’s overall (C) rating: Personnel (P), equipment and supplies on-hand (S), equipment readiness/serviceability (R), and unit training level proficiency (T). The unit’s overall rating (1–4) cannot be higher than the lowest rating of the four measured areas; in other words, a unit with personnel or equipment shortages cannot be fully mission capable. Training is a subjective rating, measured by the commander’s perceived ability to accomplish the assigned mission, based on the status of the other measured areas. In other words, a unit cannot effectively train with severe personnel or equipment shortages.


113 AR 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting, April 15, 2010.
All Army units, ARNG, USAR and active, report at least quarterly on their readiness, and previously their reported readiness levels were used to source units for deployment. In 2007, the Army adopted a sourcing/resourcing model called Army Forces Generation Model (ARFORGEN), in which units are “rack and stacked” into a deployment model, one year in five for ARNG, one in four for USAR, and one in three for active duty units.114 This model assumes the highest levels of readiness in the final “ready” year, and increased readiness in the years leading up to the ready year, with readiness tapering off following a ready year, whether the unit actually deployed or not. Accordingly, resources are decreased in the years following a deployment, and the focus is on individual Soldier training, with collective unit training occurring in years three to four, prior to the available year. The model is subject to be compressed based on the requirements of the combatant commander, resulting in reduced dwell time between deployments, a term called “WARFORGEN” by then First U.S. Army Commander LTG Russell Honore.115 Also, the model does not currently account for domestic missions, of particular concern to the NG, although discussion has occurred about shaping ARFORGEN to ensure sufficient ARNG units remain home for their governor’s use for DSCA missions.116

After nearly ten years of combat, readiness across the ARNG and USAR has been diminished. Equipment has spent several years in combat theatres, and rotated between units and experiencing harsh climates in Iraq and Afghanistan. Maintenance is a constant challenge while deployed, and rolling stock (wheeled vehicles), typically spend three to four years in theatre before being rotated home for reset. While personnel strength has been maintained across the ARNG, attrition rates exceed NGB’s goal of 15% in most states.117 Manning and equipping readiness rates for units are expected to be lower in reset years, which means conduct of its assigned mission will be largely degraded.118

114 AR 525-29, Army Force Generation.
115 Author’s notes from a 1A Joint Assessment in 2008.
116 A final report of the select bipartisan committee to investigate the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina to the U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative, February 15, 2006.
117 Author’s notes from quarterly NGB strength brief, May 15, 2012.
118 AR 525-29, Army Force Generation.
Multiple deployments have taken a toll on Soldiers, their families, and their employers, and mid-level NCO’s and junior officers are leaving the force in large numbers. The amount of time and funds required to train a replacement Soldier or Airmen signals an alarming trend, and tougher to measure is the experience lost when a seasoned veteran leaves the force. Therefore, while recruiting goals continue to be met in a tough economy, personnel readiness has suffered. As 90K Soldiers depart the active Army, the ARNG and USAR can expect to pick up many seasoned, experienced Soldiers. However, many Soldiers who are also weary from nearly ten years of even more frequent deployments may steer clear of the reserve component as well, as they have seen ARNG and USAR Soldiers deployed alongside them since 2003.

Readiness will be a challenge in light of diminishing budgets. War has been good for business, and a decreased federal mission will have the secondary negative effect of reducing the NG’s domestic preparedness. Option one will have the effect of decreased readiness in the ARNG and USAR. As resources dry up, both components will gradually fade back to a strategic reserve, regardless of terminology, domestic preparedness will be reduced, and both services will require more train-up time to deploy. Option three will reduce the inefficiencies of maintaining two separate reserve components, ultimately realizing cost savings, which could be used for increased readiness. However, cost cutting will be seen as a necessity, rather than an accomplishment, and any saved resources will likely not be available to invest in increased resources. Therefore, option two offers the best chance at increasing current readiness by providing a separate focus for the ARNG and USAR, with the Guard focused domestically, and the Reserves focused overseas.

The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 515) that would amend chapter 1209 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of Defense, without the consent of the member affected, to order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force
Reserve to active duty for a continuous period of not more than 120 days in response to a Governor’s request for Federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or emergency.

—NDAA 2012

3. Accessibility

Much discussion has occurred about accessibility of the reserve component for domestic missions. In the past, the five Title X reserve components (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard Reserve) have been seldom used for DSCA missions domestically. The 2012 NDAA contained the language above, which did make the reserves more accessible to a governor for a declared emergency. However, use of the reserves in a state still requires asking for federal assistance and use of the Stafford Act to mobilize Title X (federal) troops. Therefore, while the reserves are more accessible now, they are still to be used as a “last-resort,” since NG forces can be called to SAD without asking for federal assistance, or mobilized under Title 32 using federal funds but remaining under state control.

NORTHCOM has made great strides with the dual-status commander program, in which general officers from the NG receive training and certification to be designated as dual-status commanders, with authority to command both Title X and Title 32 forces. A dual-status commander is an intermediary between two distinct chains of command; one from the governor and adjutant general, exercising command and control (C2) over NG forces from the supporting state (s), and also from the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the supported Combatant Commander (NORTHCOM), who exercises C2 over Title X forces. The memorandum of agreement (MOA) signed by 51 governors and the SECDEF identified four options for designating a dual-status commander for a specific event or incident.120


Option #1: The governors of all affected states and the Secretary of Defense agree it is necessary and proper to designate a dual-status commander for each affected state (to date, this has never happened).

Option #2: The governors of all affected states and the Secretary of Defense agree it is necessary and proper to designate a single dual-status commander for all of the affected states (that was the case for the November 2004–January 2005 Operation Winter Freeze, which involved a New York National Guard dual-status commander for the states of New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont).

Option #3: The governors of some of the affected states and the Secretary of Defense agree it is necessary and proper to designate a dual-status commander for their states (that was the case for the response to Hurricane Irene in August 2011).

Option #4: The governors of the affected states and the Secretary of Defense agree it is not necessary and proper to designate any dual-status commanders or do not agree it is necessary and proper to designate any dual-status commanders (to date, that has never happened).

While this MOA was a positive step for DSCA mission within the CONUS, it is being used exclusively for NG officers. Thus, while designated dual-status commanders can command NG, USAR, and active forces, the inverse is not true; USAR officers cannot command Title 32 forces, and never command Air personnel. Since USAR Soldiers always serve in a Title X status, this situation is not likely to change.

Of the three proposed options, option three provides complete access to the USAR by subsuming it into the ARNG. This option, as described above, would place all 200K Soldiers of the USAR into a Title 32 status, which would increase the number of Soldiers available for DSCA missions by 70 percent. The other two options both maintain the USAR as a separate federal reserve, which is accessible to governors in accordance with the 2012 NDAA, but require a request for federal assistance.

The citizen soldier’s time has come

–Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.)121

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4. Political Will

The reserve component, and especially the NG, has long enjoyed the political benefits of its close relationship to the governors of the 54 states and territories, and to its states’ congressional delegations. President Johnson’s decision not to mobilize the NG for Vietnam created a huge stigma for the Guard that took years to overcome, and prompted the total force concept of fully integrating the reserve component into the national defense structure. The success of the NG and Reserves in the two most recent wars is due largely to policy, and any plan to marginalize, downsize, or drastically restructure the reserve component is likely to meet strong resistance from the governors and TAGs. Additionally, lobbying groups like the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), the Reserve Officers Association (ROA), have been tremendously effective at shaping legislation affecting the NG and Reserves. Political will then is defined as popularity, and in this case, will be measured in terms of popularity at the state governor/Congressional delegation level, since the NG has the largest political support base of any of the three components of the Army.

The issues of accessibility, readiness, and the best use of the NG have been politically divisive. The NDAA signed by President Bush in 2007, which repealed the need for governor approval for federal mobilization of NG forces, was repealed in 2009 after the National Governors Association sent a letter of petition.122 NORTHCOM has realized the value of collaboration with the NG, and the dual-status commander program was rolled out only after being approved by the Council of Governors.123 The 2012 NDAA contained legislation placing the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) on the JCS. Despite being opposed by all four service chiefs, and the Secretary of Defense, this legislation was signed into law by President Obama in December 2011.

In fact, state control of the militia, especially when used in a domestic capacity, is a time-honored value of the United States since the NG’s inception in 1636. States’ rights


and an aversion to a large standing Army based on their experience with British occupation was so important to the founding fathers as to be included in the Constitution (2nd, 3rd, 4th and 10th amendments), and in the Federalist Papers 29.

Due to this history, and recent legislation giving the NG more power nationally, while also preserving the authority of governors to control their NG forces, political will in this context is defined as the likelihood of support from the Council of Governors, TAG’s, and Congressional delegates. While the USAR has been actively trying to enter the DSCA environment, they are still statutorily and politically hampered from doing so. Therefore, the option most likely to receive political support is option three that combines the ARNG and USAR and create a larger response force available to governors for domestic missions. The other two options, which maintain separate reserve components, will be easier to “sell” nationally, but will provide less benefit to the states for DSCA operations.

The team is strong because one individual from each Service—the Service Chief—has the responsibility, the authority, and the accountability for providing air, sea, and land forces for the Nation. The case to change this is simply not compelling. I would also note that unlike the CNGB, each of the Service Chiefs, the Vice Chairman, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is subject to the civilian oversight of a single appointed and confirmed Secretary.

—GEN Martin Dempsey, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

5. Support from the JCS

This criterion is essentially the opposite of the previous criteria used, defined in this case as likelihood of support from the federal chain of command: Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the JCS, Secretary of the Army, and Army Chief of Staff. HLS/HLD is a DoD mission largely seen as secondary to the primary wartime mission of the Army, and any proposal to strengthen the HLS capabilities of the reserve component may be seen as a competing interest to the Army leadership. While Army leadership has clearly recognized the importance of the ARNG and USAR to the national defense

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124 Testimony on Whether the Chief, National Guard Bureau, should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 10, 2011, 10.
strategy, interest in domestic responsibilities has been less forthcoming. The Army is likely to support the maintenance of two separate reserve components, as with options one and two, as the Guard may be viewed as too political in nature. The time-honored tradition of state control of the militia is likely to be viewed as a disadvantage of the NG by Army leadership, although it is the primary strength in terms of supporting the domestic mission.

The recently passed legislation giving the Chief of NGB full membership on the JCS was opposed by all four service chiefs, the Chairman, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman’s (GEN Martin Dempsey) position was basically that the Army and ANG are already represented on the JCS by the Army and Air Chiefs. Senator Lindsey Graham, however, made his point clear when he asked GEN Dempsey how much contact he had with the TAGs (State Adjutants General), who replied “none.” When asked the same question, GEN McKinley’s reply was “daily.”125 The point of the exchange was this communication was not a priority for the Chairman, who was recently promoted from the Army Chief of Staff. Interestingly, GEN Amos, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, was the most vocal opponent of inclusion of the NGB Chief to the JCS, despite the fact the Marine Corps Commandant was not added as a member of the JCS until 1979, after 20 years of lobbying for full membership.126

The fact that this legislation passed anyway, and GEN McKinley’s testimony answered five primary concerns of the service chiefs, focused primarily on budget authority, the chief of the NGB’s statutory advisory role, as it currently exists, maintaining Title X command authority, and civilian oversight issues127, signifies a current political climate favorable to the NG. In particular, two Senators, Lindsey Graham (R-SC), himself a former Air National Guardsman and Air Force Reservist, and


Senator Leahy (D-VT), who co-sponsored the 2011 National Guard Empowerment Act, were able to overcome opposition from other Congressmen and DoD leadership.

While the passage of the Empowerment Act is seen as a huge victory for the NG, Army leadership did not view it favorably. In fact, a joint letter signed by Army Secretary John McHugh and Army Chief of Staff GEN Ray Odierno stated, “…this legislation could effectively be creating a de facto separate domestic military Service by elevating the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to a level equal to the Chiefs of Staff of the other Services. This could lead to potentially divided views on global force management, funding, modernization, RDT&E, training, doctrine and operational concepts.” In other words, the NG is now being viewed by the Army as a competitor service rather than a subordinate component. Long-term effects of this rift remain to be seen, but any option to further strengthen the ARNG, in this case option three, will likely be opposed by Army and DoD leadership.

C. RESULTS

Table 5 represents a ranking of all three-policy options, based on the criteria described above, with 1 being the best option and 3 being the worst (less is better).

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<td>GWOT</td>
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Table 5. Analysis of Proposed Solutions (Decision Matrix)

D. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION

Option three is the preferred alternative, based on a measure of the criteria described above. Although it requires capitulation of the USAR, which will be politically treacherous, the current political support of the NG is such that this argument should be renewed. While this solution will also likely be opposed by Army and DoD leadership, who have been generally averse to increased NG status, it will also create efficiencies that cannot be ignored in light of today’s economic challenges. Accessibility for HLS/HLD/DSCA missions will be greatly enhanced through implementation of this option, which increases the number of ARNG Soldiers available for domestic missions by 70 percent. This option also leaves the ARNG large enough to continue functioning as a fully operational reserve to the Army for future contingencies as it has done since its participation in the American Revolution.

The clear advantage of Option three is the economic efficiencies to be gained by combining the USAR and the ARNG. Efficiencies created in manning, training, equipping, and administrative “overhead” will enable the NG to continue its quest to become the premier provider of DSCA, and also maintain itself as a highly professional, fully operational force. This is not to take anything away from the USAR, which has also deployed nearly 100% of its force overseas, and performed exceptionally well next to their NG and active duty counterparts. Yet, the duplication of the federal mission for the USAR and the ARNG, and the secondary (primary) domestic mission unique to the NG, combined with current fiscal challenges and postwar opportunities, make this an ideal time to combine these forces into one highly efficient, cohesive, strong, versatile force capable of deploying anywhere within or outside the United States in support of any assigned mission.

Option two is more politically “sellable,” since it maintains two separate reserve components, and a reorganization of force structure will make both organizations more efficient in their core competencies. The USAR will be maintained as a “sys-admin” force for a leaner active component “Leviathan” force, to use Barnett’s terms.129 A

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challenge of postwar planning in shaping forces for the future is to avoid the pitfall of “re-fighting the last war,” that is, assuming all future conflicts will resemble the counterinsurgency conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and assuming away large conflicts with nation-states. However, as Admiral Mullen said, “it’s an uncertain world,” and the future nature of conflict is at best an educated guess, which is affected by many factors beyond U.S. control. Option two provides the most flexibility, by leaving a federal reserve in place dedicated to the Army, and allowing the ARNG to shift focus to the homeland. While it will likely be more popular with Army and DoD leadership, it will create initial cost and turbulence that will be significant.

Option one is essentially the “status quo” option. Sometimes the best option is to do nothing, and many would argue the current arrangement of the USAR and ARNG has been working. Clearly, reserve component participation in the GWOT would support this argument. However, as the Army and DoD downsize, and budgets are cut, the operational benefits felt by both the USAR and ARNG during the past ten years will fade away, and both forces will begin to experience declining readiness as resources dwindle. Doing “more with less” eventually becomes unrealistic, and to maintain a quality force, priorities must be carefully reviewed. In short, status quo is not an option. While option one contains the least amount of change, and will cost nothing initially, the resulting gradual decline in readiness and shift back to a “strategic reserve” will be a tragic waste of an opportunity, and will not do justice to the current quality force that the USAR and ARNG is.

E. IMPLEMENTATION

The concept of merging the ARNG and USAR has failed previously when proposed by two different Secretaries of Defense due to the ensuing political fight. The current environment lends itself to renewing the fight, particularly in light of the overwhelming political support for the recently passed National Guard Empowerment Act. The success of that initiative, based on the support of two key senators, and pushed along by the powerful lobbying group NGAUS, indicates a political environment ripe for success. While the Army Reserve has also distinguished itself during repeated deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, it has also struggled for relevance, reorganized
itself several times over the past 10 years, and is now clamoring to join in the DSCA arena that the NG has held the monopoly on for 375 years. Simply put, the USAR is not as politically powerful as the Guard, which enjoys strength from its affiliation to each state and territory’s governor and Congressional delegation. With support from a key Congressman, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, the backing of the Council of Governors, and lobbying by NGAUS of its 45,000 members, this initiative could work, despite probable opposition from DoD. With the Chief of NGB now a full member of the JCS, a Vice Chief of NGB now authorized, and NG commanders at Army and Air North, the infrastructure is in place to effect this change.

1. Crossing the Chasm

Short of “bulldozing” this plan over the top of Army Reservists, careful salesmanship is key. While this idea will not be popular to USAR leadership, and will likely be opposed by Army and DoD leadership, it will be transparent not only to outside observers, but also to the citizen-soldiers of each service. Reservists, like Guardsmen, live and work in the communities they serve, and the impacts of their transitioning from Army Reservists to Guardsmen will be minimal. In fact, in states that provide free tuition at state universities, life insurance reimbursement, and other benefits to their Guardsmen, benefits are likely to increase for transitioning reservists. Cuts are likely to occur only at the senior levels, as the “peacetime overhead” involved with administering two separate reserve components is streamlined, but the number of individual units and Soldiers will remain unaffected. Lifecycle management can ease the transition of senior leaders, either into the ARNG or to retirement. As the ARNG assumes a larger footprint, (as many as 18K additional Soldiers in Texas), State Joint Forces Headquarters and other administrative commands will need to grow to absorb some of the senior leaders from the USAR. Transfer of real property, facilities, and equipment must be carefully managed to avoid losses and waste, and the agreements with the states to help maintain armories will have to be negotiated when assuming federal reserve buildings. In many cases, expensive leases can be discarded, and reserve units relocated to existing NG facilities, or incorporated into programmed military construction. Successful implementation should be carefully planned and phased in over three to five years, modeled after a corporate
merger, with the idea of gaining efficiencies, but without the hostility of a takeover. An extensive awareness campaign for all stakeholders is key, primarily focused on USAR Soldiers to ensure they view the change as a positive opportunity rather than a negative reorganization. Retention of historical lineage and honors of USAR units is also critically important.

2. Projected Outcomes

Option three, merging the USAR and ARNG, is not a new idea and was proposed twice before, by Secretary of Defense Forrestal in 1947, and again by Secretary McNamara in 1964. Each proposal was met with fierce resistance by powerful lobby groups, and was ultimately defeated by Congress. The current momentum of Congressional support for the NG, evidenced by the success of the National Guard Empowerment Act, indicates the time to propose this merger again. This act, which gave the Chief of the NGB full membership on the JCS, was passed despite opposition by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and all four service chiefs. Empowerment gained strong Congressional support, with 43 states having at least one Senate cosponsor, and eventually achieving 71 Senators in support. This support was largely due to the efforts of the powerful lobbying group NGAUS, a group of nearly 45,000 current and retired NG officers.130

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The power of the Council of Governors and adjutant generals is also evidenced by the quick reversal of the 2007 NDAA change to federal law allowing Presidential call-up of NG forces for domestic emergencies without a governor’s consent. Implemented in response to lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina, this law was seen as a blow to peacetime state control of the NG, and was quickly changed after opposition from all 50 governors and adjutants general. The dual-status commander program, endorsed by the Council of Governors and implemented by NORTHCOM, also indicates an opportune time for this proposal.

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS/CONCLUSION

The NG is currently positioned in an exciting, challenging, and pivotal time in its history. After ten years of war, the NG has effectively transitioned from a Cold-War, strategic reserve to a fully operational partner in U.S. national defense planning. The Chief of NGB is an equal member on the JCS and no longer subordinate to the Army or Air Force service chiefs who oversee the parent services of the Army and ANG. Qualified NG officers can serve as dual-status commanders, commanding Title 32, state active duty, and Title X Soldiers and Airmen in a domestic contingency operation. The 2012 NDAA that authorized the Chief of NGB as a member of the JCS also authorized a three-star vice chief of the NGB, authorized NG officers to command Army North and Air Force North, and the commander or deputy commander of NORTHCOM has been mandated as a NG billet. Somewhat ironically, the impetus for increased NG relevance was the NG’s performance overseas and domestically in support of the GWOT, yet the NG has openly shifted its priority to the homeland.

The NG is the clear front runner in the DSCA environment, and while the USAR is interested in domestic operations, they cannot compete with hundreds of years of militia tradition, an ingrained culture of domestic support, and the powerful lobbying abilities of the Council of Governors, Congressional delegates from every states, and the autonomous group of 54 Adjutants General who do not work for DoD. In today’s post-war environment of diminished budgets, the Army and DoD must seek efficiencies and operating two separate reserve components of the Army is no longer feasible.

As the Army and DoD downsizes, and cuts budgets, the NG faces the challenge of shifting priorities, maintaining readiness, and avoiding a gradual decline in relevance. Like all services, the NG must constantly seek efficiencies and ways to “do more with less” in a fiscally constrained environment. The active Army and the ARNG is weary from ten years at war, and as the Army prepares to downsize up to 90,000 Soldiers, and the ARNG faces increasing retention challenges, the NG must carefully manage its priorities to maintain a quality force. The natural shift from overseas deployments to the homeland provides the NG the opportunity to rest, recover, and shift focus to its historical
role as the primary provider of DSCA. However, the world is an uncertain place, and a smaller Army will always rely on the ARNG for support in future conflicts. Soldiers who joined the ARNG since 9/11 did not consider if they would be deployed, but when. This breed of Citizen-Soldier, smarter, better equipped, better trained, and with access to more information than ever before, must be carefully maintained, trained, equipped, cared for, and utilized for the service they joined.

In addition to the proposed solution described above, the following recommendations should be considered as the NG strives to become the premier HLS force.

- Merge the Air National Guard and U.S. Air Force Reserve
- Make the NORTHCOM Commander a NG officer
- Increase end strength of the NG to correspond with active component reductions
- Add ADOS/AGR NG officers to the NORTHCOM Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)
- Rotate Title 32/Title X AGR Officers between NORTHCOM, NGB, and the states
- Review the force structure of the ARNG, and reduce the overall number of heavy units like field artillery and armor, which are not likely to be utilized overseas, and are of no value domestically
- Increase the number of “sys-admin” type of units in the reserve component; civil affairs, psychological operations, engineer, public works, military police, aviation, and special forces
- Explore the creation of a new type of unit called a security company, to be utilized domestically as a reaction force/support to local law enforcement, and overseas for security forces operations

The NG has a long and proud history as not only the nation’s oldest military service, but also as a militia force accessible to the governor for local protection. As a force comprised of Citizen-Soldiers who live and work in the 3,300 communities nationwide in which they serve, Guardsmen and women are ideally suited to serve those communities. The dual-role mission and state relationships unique to the NG is a proud and time-honored element of the NG, and is in fact, the Guard’s greatest strength. While the NG will always remain an integral part of the National Defense Plan, its focus should
be domestic, and the current post-war environment provides an opportunity to shift focus to the homeland. Today’s NG is highly trained, well equipped, well trained, and relevant. With outstanding leadership, support, and resources, tomorrow’s NG will be even better.

I am the Guard

Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War...of security and honor for three centuries I have been the custodian...I am the Guard!

At Concord's bridge, I fired the fateful shot heard 'round the world. I bled on Bunker Hill. My footprints marked the snows at Valley Forge. With Washington on the heights of Yorktown, I saw the sword surrendered...I am the Guard. These things I know - I was there! I saw both sides of the War Between the States - I was there! The hill at San Juan felt the fury of my charge; the far plains and mountains of the Philippines echoed to my shout. In France the dark forests of the Argonne blazed with my barrage; Chateau-Thierry crumbled to my cannonade.

I am the Guard. I bowed briefly on the grim road at Bataan. Through the jungles and on the beaches I fought the enemy...beat, battered, and broke him. I scrambled over Normandy's beaches - I was there! I flew MiG Alley to the Yalu - I am the Guard! I fought in the skies above Vietnam - I was there! In the skies and on the ground, I made the Arabian desert feel the fury of the storm. I am the Guard!

Civilian in peace, soldier in war...the stricken have known the comfort of my skill. I have faced forward to the tornado, the typhoon, and the horror of the hurricane and the flood. I saw the tall towers fall - I was there!

I am the Guard. For three centuries the custodian of security and honor, now and forever...I am the Guard.

Figure 5. 300th Armored Field Artillery in Korea\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{133} Mort Kunstler, “Cowboy Artillery at Soyang,” Heritage Series, \textit{National Guard}, (n.d.), \url{http://www.ng.mil/resources/photo_gallery/heritage/soyang.html}. 
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