

Fall of the Integrated Planning System

**A Monograph
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14. ABSTRACT Planning is an important part of a comprehensive approach to national preparedness. After the September 11 attack on America, several federal mandates led to the creation of the Integrated Planning System (IPS). The IPS was the first national approach to planning. Just over one year after its approval, the White House National Security Staff discontinued the use of IPS. One can ask, why was IPS withdrawn so soon after its implementation? This monograph explores the reasons behind the short lifespan of the Integrated Planning System. To answer the question of why a planning system given so much importance was removed so quickly, it was important to understand the mandates requirements, identify existing federal planning types, identify IPS origins and compare IPS to the mandate's requirements. Ultimately, the government discontinued the Integrated Planning System as the national planning system because in focusing on developing a doctrine for deliberate plan writing it neglected the additional requirement for both crisis action and program planning activities.					
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Abstract

Fall of the Integrated Planning System by Mr. Brian T. Applebee, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 35 pages.

Planning is an important part of a comprehensive approach to national preparedness. After the September 11 attack on America, President George W. Bush directed the creation of a standardized federal approach to preparedness planning. Congress additionally mandated the creation of a national planning system through the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. Congress also assigned the Department of Homeland Security to lead the effort in creating the Integrated Planning System. Just over one year after its approval, the White House National Security Staff discontinued the use of the Integrated Planning System (IPS). The quick removal of the IPS raises the question, why was IPS withdrawn so soon after its implementation. This monograph explores the reasons behind the short lifespan of the Integrated Planning System.

To answer the question of why IPS was cancelled so quickly, it was important understand the requirements for the system, identify existing government planning systems, identify the origins of IPS, and finally compare IPS to the requirements. The mandates that guided the creation of IPS proved to be vague in the beginning, then ultimately over prescriptive. There was no mandate to analyze existing planning activities. A contemporary examination of planning activities at the time of IPS creation shows three distinct types of federal civilian planning; deliberate, crisis action and program. Since no existing civilian planning system addressed the requirements for IPS, developers chose a military planning process to serve as the model. A detailed comparison of IPS and the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) proves JOPP to be the model for IPS' creation. A final comparison of IPS with the requirements shows that the IPS did not meet the requirements for a comprehensive approach to national planning.

Understanding the mandates, analyzing government planning and comparing the Integrated Planning System to its origin and requirements led to several conclusions. Over prescriptive mandates along with hasty implementation of IPS did not allow for proper problem framing. Describing the details of IPS within the mandates precluded exploration of other planning systems. Existing civilian planning also lacked methods to interrelate the disparate planning types. A national planning system like IPS needs to address all existing types of planning. While successful in deliberate planning, the military model used to create IPS was inappropriate to fulfill the interagency requirements of the IPS. Ultimately, the government discontinued the Integrated Planning System as the national planning system because in focusing on developing a doctrine for deliberate plan writing it neglected the additional requirement for both crisis action and program planning activities. Presidential Policy Directive – 8 now gives the appropriate time and research required to re-address the creation of an overarching standardized approach to national planning.

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Introduction

A comprehensive planning system is crucial to the nation's ability to meet the challenges of natural and manmade threats. The September 11, 2001 attack on America highlighted the need to enhance preparedness across the nation to address catastrophic threats. In 2003, President George W. Bush mandated the creation of a national approach to preparedness through Homeland Security Presidential Directive #8.¹ The directive recognized that planning to mitigate and respond to the effects of catastrophic events underpins preparedness. All levels of government worked to address the mandate to enhance national preparedness. Late in August 2005, before realizing a comprehensive approach to preparedness, Hurricane Katrina overwhelmed the nation's existing preparedness and planning capabilities. The effects of Hurricane Katrina stretched the limits of federal disaster response. Katrina made two separate landfalls in four separate states severely taxing the federal response capabilities. The first hurricane response was under-way and employing much of federal capability within the southeast when the second landfall prompted competing requirements for resources and capabilities. Federal and state response capacity was overwhelmed.

The Federal Government came under public scrutiny for the apparently disorganized disaster response. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) after action report concluded that better planning across all levels of government would have assisted the overall preparedness and execution of the response efforts.² The disaster response was not completely inept. Prior staging of resources, rapid resource employment and ongoing programmatic recovery efforts showed elements of prior planning. President Bush responded to the criticisms of the Katrina response by signing Public Law 109-295 on October 4, 2006, better known as the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA). PL

¹ U.S. President, Directive, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, *National Preparedness*, (December 17, 2003).

² U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Hurricane Katrina, Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster Recovery Contracts*, GAO-06-622T, April 10, 2006, U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Results-Oriented Government, Improvements to DHS's Planning Process would enhance Usefulness and Accountability*. GAO-05-300, September 2011.

109-295 sought to address the deficiencies in preparedness and response.³ Within PKEMRA, the mandate for standardized national planning strengthens national preparedness. Implementation of PKEMRA lagged as federal departments and agencies scrambled to build planning capacity.⁴

In September 2006, President George W. Bush directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a national planning system by appending Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 8, Annex-I (National Planning).⁵ Annex-I established a timeframe of two months in which to complete the national planning system. In haste, DHS adopted a joint military planning system as the model for the national planning system. On January 12, 2009, the president approved the Integrated Planning System (IPS) and it became the nation’s first standardized national planning system. Adopting a military model, however, created difficulties for the national planning community. The White House National Security Staff subsequently withdrew IPS in March 2010. Understanding IPS will highlight its successes and shortcomings, informing future efforts to create a national planning system.

To determine why the Integrated Planning System proved inadequate and was withdrawn so quickly, it is first necessary to review what the President’s mandate required. Because the implementation of IPS proved too difficult suggests that not all national planning elements were included. It is necessary to examine the existing planning activities of the various departments and agencies prior to IPS. It is necessary to examine IPS both in comparison to its military origin and to the existing government planning activities. Comparing the existing planning activities with IPS requirement reveals that IPS failed to address essential crisis action and program planning elements required for a comprehensive approach to national planning. The government discontinued IPS as the national planning system because in focusing on developing a doctrine for deliberate plan writing it neglected the requirements for both

³ *Post Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006*, Public Law 109-295-Oct 4, 2006, (2006).

⁴ PKEMRA mandates each federal department and agency to build and maintain an operational planning capability. Many departments and agencies had to immediately seek and hire a cadre of planners to suffice the mandate.

⁵ U.S. President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, Annex-I, “*National Planning*,” (December 4, 2007).

crisis action and program planning. Developing a national planning system that incorporates the concepts in deliberate, crisis and program planning models may provide a pathway to effective federal interagency planning.

The National Preparedness Mandate

It is the policy of the United States Government to enhance the preparedness of the nation to address natural and manmade threats. Terrorist attacks and natural disasters have provided the opportunity for all levels of government to practice their plans and learn from their experiences. Lessons learned from these events have led to several mandates for national preparedness since 2003. Reviewing and describing the various national preparedness mandates will set the baseline for understanding the motives behind IPS's quick demise. An underpinning theme to all national preparedness mandates is the requirement for planning. Requirements for the creation of a national planning system to support national preparedness demanded a hasty solution. Direction provided to DHS through the three mandates created confusion. Some guidance is vague in the requirements. Other guidance was overly prescriptive and did not allow developers the flexibility to create a more comprehensive solution. Overall, the guidance provided to planning system developers contributed to the IPS failure.

In response to intergovernmental investigations into intelligence and failures in information sharing among federal and state agencies prior to the attack on America on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush directed the creation of a unified system of national preparedness.⁶ Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 8, *National Preparedness* (HSPD-8) established “policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by...outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of

⁶ The Government Accountability Office (GAO) provided an after action report concluding that better planning across all levels of government would have assisted the overall preparedness and execution of the response efforts. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Results-Oriented Government, Improvements to DHS's Planning Process would enhance Usefulness and Accountability*. GAO-05-300, September 2011.

Federal State and local entities.”⁷ HSPD-8 also directed the heads of each Federal department or agency to undertake quantifiable actions in preparedness, more specifically to include planning.⁸ HSPD-8 also directed DHS to coordinate its implementation. While the directive clearly intended federal departments and agencies to coordinate and unify preparedness activities, guidance about how to achieve coordination was vague. Each federal organization then embraced preparedness and planning at their own pace and in their own manner while DHS attempted to figure out how to coordinate the efforts. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 illuminated the lack of immediate progress in coordination.

The government’s response to Hurricane Katrina fundamentally surprised the nation. Local government’s response was completely overwhelmed. The federal government’s response was viewed as slow to respond and insufficient.⁹ Breakdowns in information flow and communication across federal, state and local government hampered the response efforts. Where were the plans to address such a catastrophic natural disaster? Plans at the federal, state and local levels were up-to-date and succeeded when executed. The failure was the lack of a single system to align the various plans into a coordinated effort. Monday morning, August 29, 2005 witnessed the second landfall of possibly the most famous hurricane to date. Hurricane Katrina had crossed Florida, roared across the Gulf of Mexico and slammed ashore just west of New Orleans, Louisiana. Katrina made landfall as a Saffir-Simpson scale Category 3 Hurricane, a mid-category storm.¹⁰ Katrina was however massive, radiating 109 miles from its center.

⁷ HSPD-8, *National Preparedness*.

⁸ “The head of each Federal department or agency shall undertake actions to support the national preparedness goal, including adoption of quantifiable performance measures in the areas of training, planning, equipment, and exercises for Federal incident management and asset preparedness, to the extent permitted by law...” Ibid., 20.

⁹ A New York Times article highlights the federal, state and local response organizations in a three-way argument over control, resourcing and timeliness. Scott Shane, The New York Times, “After Failures, Government Officials Play Blame Game,” September 5, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/05/national/national-special/05blame.html> (accessed March 11, 2011).

¹⁰ The scale was formulated in 1969 by Herbert Saffir, a consulting engineer, and Dr. Bob Simpson, director of the National Hurricane Center. The scale postulates damage to structures based upon sustained wind speed and storm surge height. As an example a Category III Hurricane, like Katrina, has sustained winds between 111 and 130 miles per hour and damage is predicted as “Some structural damage to small residences and utility buildings with a minor amount of curtainwall failures. Mobile homes are destroyed. Flooding near the coast destroys

Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama coastal residents who did not heed the previous day's mandatory evacuation orders soon wished they had as the powerful winds, rain and storm ravaged coastal population centers. Storm surge and post storm flooding from rainfall weakened and breached levies in the city of New Orleans, flooding 85% of the city.¹¹ Gulfport, Mississippi all but disappeared. In total 1,836 people lost their lives and the nation suffered \$106 Billion in storm related losses.¹² While the U.S. has endured much more powerful storms in the past, the effects of Katrina split response capabilities and resources across multiple states and devastated a metropolitan area.

Hurricane Katrina's effects caused chaos in the devastated city of New Orleans. Local emergency and first responders were unable to muster a coordinated effort. Flooding had cut off police, firefighters and other emergency responders from their precincts. Many had evacuated with their families prior to landfall. A small minority of others joined in chaotic flight or opportunistic looting.¹³ The local emergency responders were completely overwhelmed and could not execute their emergency plans. The federal government seemed slow to respond. Inadequate evacuation assistance stranded thousands without the means to evacuate. Incompatible communications systems hampered efforts to coordinate rescue efforts with the state and local emergency responders. Responders at every level appeared to be competing for priority. There was no apparent overarching plan to direct emergency resources.

smaller structures with larger structures damaged by floating debris. Terrain continuously lower than 5 feet ASL may be flooded inland 8 miles or more." National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "Saffir Simpson Hurricane Scale," <http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/general/lib/laescae.html> (accessed March 1, 2012).

¹¹ Ivor van Heerden, NOVA, "How New Orleans Flooded," November 2005, <http://www.pbs.org/wbgh/nova/earth/how-new-orleans-flooded.html> (accessed March 11, 2011).

¹² Discovery Channel, <http://dsc.discovery.com/convergence/katrina/facts/facts.html> (Accessed 10 February, 2012)

¹³ Four New Orleans police officers were suspended over allegations and witnesses to police officers joining the looting spree immediately following Katrina. CNN.com, "Witnesses: New Orleans Cops Among looters," September, 2005, http://articles.cnn.com/2005-09-29/us/nopd.looting_1_police-officers-eddie-compass-police-department?_s=PM:US (accessed March 11, 2011).

Even before Katrina had passed inland and dissipated, the public media began to assess blame. The media painted the federal government's response, especially in support of Louisiana, as abysmal.¹⁴ The Government Accountability Office (GAO) immediately set out to investigate the failures as outlined by the media.¹⁵ The truth was much different from the accusations of the media in response effort. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had moved response capabilities and relief commodities to the borders of Louisiana prior to Katrina's landfall. Federal departments and agencies were on alert and preparing to assist in response as Katrina first moved into the Gulf of Mexico. So what delayed the response?

Law prohibits the federal government from responding to an incident prior to a State's request for assistance.¹⁶ On Saturday, August 27, President Bush declared Louisiana in a state of emergency and ordered federal resources to aid state and local response efforts. Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco sent the official request for Stafford Act assistance on August 28.¹⁷ Katrina made landfall early in the morning on August 29. At that point, federal response capabilities were able to rush into Louisiana to provide assistance. While there was a plethora of support capability on-scene in a relatively timely manner, organization of the response effort proved challenging. Plans existed at federal, state and local governments. However, a lack of plan standardization and synchronization frustrated the leaders of the combined response. The simultaneous execution of many emergency response plans led to overall confusion.

¹⁴ Scott Shane, The New York Times, "After Failures, Government Officials Play Blame Game," September 5, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/05/national/national-special/05blame.html> (accessed March 11, 2011). Find Article Aug-2005

¹⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 10, 2006, Hurricane Katrina, Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster Recovery Contracts, GAO-06-622T.

¹⁶ Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended by Public Law 106-390, October 30, 2000.

¹⁷ TPM, "Hurricane Katrina Timeline," Version 1.4, September 20, 2005, <http://talkingpointsmemo.com/katrina-timeline.php> (accessed February 23, 2012).

The response to Katrina surprised the nation because preparedness actions did not achieve the anticipated results. Federal, state and local hurricane plans outlined actions at each governmental level, but were not coordinated. Law codified support relationships, but did not provide the timely decision-making guidance. Because of reforms following the 9/11 attacks, communications systems locally and with the state were interoperable. Federal communications systems however required modifications to work with the state and local systems. Why was the nation enduring failures identified in the post 9/11 investigations? Preparedness efforts after 9/11 were still in their infancy. Findings in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina identified the need to unify federal, state and local plans and preparedness programs to provide a more effective response to catastrophic events. Congress took immediate action to ensure national preparedness advanced to the forefront of national priorities. To empower DHS to address national preparedness issues, the U.S. Congress proposed changes in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006 under Public Law 109-295.

On October 4, 2006, President Bush signed the Homeland Security Appropriations Act into Public Law 109-295, better known as the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA). PKEMRA sought to address the deficiencies in preparedness and response programs through additional funding.¹⁸ Title VI within PL 109-295 provided for the creation and oversight of a comprehensive preparedness system. The comprehensive preparedness system sets a National Preparedness Goal, establishes a National Preparedness System, and provides the capabilities by which to achieve both. The purpose of the preparedness system is to support the existing National Response Plan (NRP). The National Response Plan is the single document outlining federal department and agency responsibilities in response to a catastrophic event. The NRP outlines the requirements for federal departments and agencies disaster response capabilities. However, additional crisis planning was required to adapt the NRP to an operational state to identify, deploy and employ resources. Further delineation of planning within the federal interagency is required. Under Title VI, PKEMRA “the President shall ensure that each federal

¹⁸ *Post Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006*, Public Law 109PKEMRA, PL109-295-Oct 4, 2006, (2006).

agency with... responsibilities under the National Response Plan has the operational capability to meet the national preparedness goal.”¹⁹ The law also includes “developing deliberate operational plans and the corresponding capabilities, including crisis planning, to respond effectively, in support of the National Response Plan to ensure a coordinated federal response.”²⁰ It further outlines the definition, applicability and content of operational plans. Federal law had established planning as the basis for preparedness activities. Congress wanted to convey the importance of integrated planning to national preparedness. PKEMRA mandated many specific details in the creation of the national preparedness system. PKEMRA also gave DHS and FEMA the authority to create a system by which to coordinate the writing of scenario-based deliberate interagency plans to support a coordinated federal response. The National Response Plan outlined federal department responsibilities and capabilities. Subsequently, department and agency operational plans would further identify, deploy and employ resources. The nation needed a system of planning to align and coordinate all response planning efforts.

On December 4, 2007, President Bush approved an annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 that established a national planning system. Annex – I formally established a “standard and comprehensive approach to national planning.”²¹ The policy was to standardize a federal planning process, create a national planning doctrine, establish resources to perform operational and tactical planning, delineate levels of planning from strategic to tactical, and provide a system for integrating plans among all levels of government.²² This was the first attempt of the federal government to standardize planning across the interagency. Annex – I set an aggressive schedule for developing the planning system. The Department of Homeland Security only had two months in which to outline the system that would

¹⁹ *Post Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006*, Title VI, Sub Title C, Chapter I, Section 653.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ “(28) This Annex is intended to further enhance the preparedness of the United States by formally establishing a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning. It is meant to provide guidance for conducting planning in accordance with the Homeland Security Management System in the National Strategy for Homeland Security of 2007”, U.S. President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, Annex-I, *National Planning*, (December 4, 2007).

²² HSPD-8 Annex-I, *National Planning*, 2.

create a “family of plans”, consisting of documents across the strategic, operational and tactical levels.²³

Undertaking such a complicated task in such short time left little time for interagency comment and staffing. Designers of the planning system met the initial due date and the President approved IPS for use in January 2009. The haste in the creation of IPS meant IPS was ill conceived and impractical.

Implementation of the IPS immediately produced organizational problems. Interagency planning partners found the new plan writing system cumbersome, perhaps because it was not a planning system. IPS did not easily match the existing planning activities of the federal departments and agencies. Just over a year after its implementation, the White House National Security Staff discontinued the use of IPS and withdrew the system.²⁴

New directives commonly supersede existing presidential directives when Presidential administrations change. On March 30, 2011, newly elected President Barack Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive -8, *National Preparedness* (PPD – 8) superseding Homeland Security Preparedness Directive – 8 and Annex - I.²⁵ The new directive officially halted all actions taken under the previous directive. PPD – 8 reset the requirements for national preparedness and planning but did not significantly change the goals of HSPD – 8.

Mandated in 2003, HSPD-8 was the first directive to assign the Secretary of Homeland Security responsibility to develop a multi-year planning system. Before completion of a national approach to planning, Hurricane Katrina overwhelmed the existing planning capacity and highlighted a need for integrated planning. In 2006, Public Law 109-295 (Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act)

²³ “(33) No later than 2 months after the issuance of this Annex, the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) shall submit to the President for approval, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, an Integrated Planning System (IPS) that is developed in coordination with the heads of Federal agencies with a role in homeland security that (a) provides common processes for developing plans...” HSPD-8, Annex-I, *National Planning*, 2.

²⁴ From official minutes recorded during the March 24, 2010 Emergency Support Function Leader Group (ESFLG) meeting. The ESFLG is a Deputy Secretary Action Officer level group comprised of the fifteen federal departments and agencies and other partners representing the Emergency Support Functions as prescribed by the National Response Framework.

²⁵ U.S. President, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8, “National Preparedness,” (March 30, 2011).

provided the funding and specifically defined requirements for a national preparedness system. The appropriations bill itself listed the details of a planning system. Annex – I to HSPD – 8 embellished the requirements for an Integrated Planning System focused on a national doctrine for writing of a family of deliberate plans. The three mandates for national preparedness and planning had not afforded DHS the appropriate time required to assess the status of planning within the federal government. Thus, the mandates helped create confusion and led to the adoption of an inadequate planning system. The IPS *did* standardized federal plan writing, but for only a year before its discontinuance. Planning went back to a voluntary activity within each federal government organization. In an act highlighting the importance of national integrated planning, President Obama’s new directive has reaffirmed the overall policy and confirmed the goal of establishing a comprehensive approach to national preparedness and planning. Presidential Policy Directive – 8 gives greater latitude for the comprehensive approach to planning and allows time for developers to assess the planning activities already existing within the government.

Three Types of Government Planning Activities

Prior to Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 8, Public Law 109-295 and Annex – I to HSPD – 8 calling for a standardized national planning system, each federal government department and agency planned in support of its own requirements. Federal departments and agencies are willing to share their planning methodologies. A quick web search for federal government planning systems provides hundreds of results that cover all departments and agencies over a span of more than a decade. Governments conduct planning for contingencies, crises, budget, work force and various other programs required to accomplish their missions. Henry Mintzberg identifies a basic planning model called the Core “Design School” Model.²⁶ The Core Design Model underlies virtually all formal planning and strategy creation processes. The Core Design Model process begins with a concurrent internal investigation of an organizations strengths and weaknesses and external investigation of opportunities and threats. These

²⁶ Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners,*” New York: The Free Press, 1994, 36.

investigations provide context to what an organization can do to address the external opportunities and threats. This leads to creation of strategies to address the issues. The process continues to evaluate and select a strategy and then implement. The underlying process of the Core Design Model is present in almost all planning processes today.

Research on planning throughout government organizations has highlighted three basic types of planning; deliberate, crisis action, and program planning. All of the planning types fundamentally fit within the construct of the Core Design Model. However, each type of planning defines its own process to assist decision-making. Additionally, each type of planning has characteristic features suited for a specific planning purpose. The discussion that follows of these types of planning will show how they all serve a purpose in an overarching comprehensive approach to federal government planning.

Deliberate Planning:

Deliberate planning, also called contingency planning exists throughout the government. Deliberate planning is the means by which departments and agencies write plans for responding to potential future events. Deliberate planning takes advantage of a calm environment and ample timeframe to address scenarios identified as a future threat. Planners follow a basic planning process when preparing deliberate plans. Organizations save precious time during a crisis if their deliberate plans anticipated crisis requirements and identified the resources needed for a proper response. Deliberate planning requires ample time available to conduct in-depth research and analysis.²⁷ A relaxed planning environment fosters critical and creative thinking, which leads planners understanding the organization's requirements better and to better prediction of future functional needs. Deliberate planning does not apply to situations in which time is severely constrained.

²⁷ "Contingency planning encompasses the activities associated with the development of OPLANs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of apportioned forces and resources in response to a hypothetical situation identified in joint strategic planning documents." Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December, 26 2006), I-17, (2).

To write a deliberate plan, a group of planners assumes or estimates a situation or scenario that provides the basis for the mission of what the plan is to accomplish. Detailed analysis, calculations and assumptions lead to several possible courses of action to address the future crisis. Further calculations and resource allocations provide the fine details of the plan's execution. The fundamental output of this process is a plan, checklist or menu of options for leaders in the event of an emergency. One example of deliberate planning is the joint FEMA/Louisiana hurricane plan conducted just one year prior to Hurricane Katrina.

On July 3, 2004, Federal and Louisiana government officials could finally breathe a sigh of relief. Hurricane Pam had just dumped twenty inches of rain and pummeled the Louisiana gulf coast with 120 mph sustained winds. New Orleans levees overtopped, approximately 500,000 buildings were destroyed and one million evacuees resided in shelters.²⁸ Thankfully, there were no casualties. Hurricane Pam was the fictitious planning scenario used to drive a joint Louisiana & federal exercise. Each used Pam to test their hurricane and disaster relief plans in preparation for the 2004 hurricane season. Federal and state planners used a relaxed environment to write and modify existing plans for the future threat of a tropical weather event. Building upon assumptions of a possible future situation, planners were able to understand what actions would stabilize New Orleans after a major hurricane. With their plans, each level of government exercised the plan against the fictitious Hurricane Pam scenario. Exercise after action reports identified plan shortfalls that needed correction. Through an iterative process, planners adjusted the response outlined in the plans to better prepare for a future hurricane. The Hurricane Pam exercise was a success by testing deliberate joint federal and state disaster response plans. Exercise players used the plans as a script for actions and a menu for resources. While it was beneficial to have a baseline plan with which to begin a response, the Hurricane Pam scenario had exercised existing plans, not the capability to conduct planning. Deliberate planning alone cannot address the peculiar aspects of future emergencies.

²⁸ Federal Emergency Management Agency, news release, "Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes," July 23, 2004, <http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=13051> (accessed February 15, 2012).

Organizations often falter when they rely only on well-laid plans to address crises. Deliberate plans require amending and augmentation through crisis planning to become relevant to an actual emergency.

Crisis Action Planning:

Leadership within a crisis requires the best information and options to take action. Crisis action planning uses the basic planning process to assist leaders to expedite making decisions during a crisis.²⁹ Crisis action planning also assists leaders with little time by adapting or operationalizing an existing deliberate plan. Successful crisis action planning depends upon experienced planning practitioners and a culture of planning within an organization. Crisis action planning applies to actual situations. Usually, crisis action planning begins upon the first indications of a rapidly unfolding event. Organizations use this rapid type of planning to stabilize the situation and to gain the operational initiative. Once response operations can comfortably manage the effects of the event, planners forecast the future requirements. Planning within a crisis or during an event requires planners who understand the basic planning process. The method for planning within a crisis involves rapid execution. Planners take shortcuts and omit details documented in deliberate plans. Crisis planners bring existing deliberate plans up-to-date and make them relevant to the event. Not all crisis action planning efforts require life-and-death immediacy. The actual event and situation dictate the time allotted for planning. When an incident occurs, planners will attempt to find an existing plan that may address the problem. In the event a deliberate plan addresses the problem, basic planning process validates the assumptions and facts of the plan. The crisis action planning methodology adapts the existing plan to the situation at hand, saving time in the initial response. If no plan exists, crisis planners will establish a quick understanding of the situation and mission. This understanding will drive the options for action. Development of multiple options or a single course of

²⁹ “Crisis action planning encompasses the activities associated with the time-sensitive development of (orders) for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources in response to an actual situation . . .,” JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (2006), I-19, (2).

action depends upon time available. As the situation stabilizes, the planning horizon lengthens and plans become more detailed. FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina exemplifies existing crisis action planning.

Hurricane Katrina first threatened the U.S. and made landfall crossing the Florida peninsula days earlier. As the initial response to Katrina's landfall was unfolding in Florida, attention shifted focus to the Gulf of Mexico where Katrina re-strengthened and moved northward. Federal resources were already responding to Florida from all across the east coast and Gulf region. Crisis action planning quickly identified the requirement for a second group of federal resources to address the potential of Katrina making landfall again elsewhere. To the credit of FEMA planning, a full day before Katrina made landfall in New Orleans, Federal resources were in-place and awaiting the official call for assistance from Louisiana's Governor. In both Florida and Louisiana, the deliberate plans written for the 2005 hurricane season, much like the plans used in the Hurricane Pam exercise, provided the basis for response.

Crisis action planning is a key element to an overarching planning system. Whether making a deliberate plan relevant or conducting planning from scratch within an event, it is important for an organization to have the capability to plan during an event. Examples of exercise and actual crisis action planning activities highlight how important this type of planning is to all levels of government. Any planning system that professes a comprehensive approach to planning must contain crisis action planning as a key basic element.

Program Planning

Deliberate and crisis action planning does not address all of the requirements of an overarching system of planning. Program planning addresses long term of ongoing planning. Like deliberate and crisis action planning, program planning also follows the core model process. Unlike deliberate and crisis action planning, program planning may not have a clearly defined end-state. Program planning outputs are a series of effects. The iterative nature of programmatic planning adjusts implementation in relation to feedback mechanisms. Constantly reassessing the program's effectiveness against the feedback mechanisms continues the ongoing effort. Program planning applies to all government organizations

because it provides them a systematic approach to planning their activities. Program planning provides department and agency threats, solutions, and progress. Whether long term, or indefinite, program planning seeks to attain desired effects in a system. Like deliberate and crisis action planning, program planning applies to immediate and potential threats. The difference is the scope of an ongoing planning horizon. Program planning methodology also differs from both deliberate and crisis action planning. A group of stakeholders identifies a current or future problem to address with a long term series of solutions. Understanding the situation and relevance to overall organizational mission underpins the existence of the program. Examination of multiple programs leads to an order of priorities that directs the allocation of available resources. Planners envision desired program outcomes, not a specific end-state. Effectiveness criteria, both positive and negative, set the boundaries for the program. Implementation efforts guide internal and external inputs and outputs toward the desired effect. The dynamic nature of programmatic planning ensures an ongoing solution to an identified problem. An example of federal, state and local partnerships in program planning resides with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

The USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) manage the federal funding associated with Cooperative Extension Services.³⁰ These educational services include the areas of agriculture and food, home and family, the environment, and community economic development. The direct federal to local interaction has developed for almost 150 years. The logic model is currently the preferred methodology for Cooperative Extension planning. Its use is required to gain access to federal program funding submitted to NIFA. The December, 2001 *Cooperative Extension Program Planning in Wisconsin* handbook guides Cooperative Extension members in collaborative program planning with the local communities. The handbook accomplishes cooperative planning through a process called the logic model. The steps in the logic model process are analyze the situation or context, set priorities, design an action plan, implement the plan, and evaluate inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts. This methodology is

³⁰ NC State University, "History of Cooperative Extension," <http://www.ces.ncsu.edu/depts/hort/consumer/history.html> (Accessed January 21, 2012).

different from deliberate and crisis action planning because the basic planning process is not used. Analyzing the situation or context identifies the current needs and assets along with separating the symptoms from the problems. Setting priorities builds involvement and ownership. Planners establish priorities in light of the resources that are available to help achieve the required outcomes and impact.³¹ Designing an action plan incorporates partners to establish the actions taken to reach the required outcomes and impact. Implementing the plan involves all participants in the planning process. The most important feature of the program planning process is the feedback mechanisms. The plan is revised or restarted based upon the constant feedback from evaluation. Evaluating feedback from inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts drives the iterative process of program planning.

The Cooperative Extension logic model produces two products, a plan of action and a long-term program. With in-depth problem analysis and an established priority, participants create and implement a plan of action to begin the program. The plan of action identifies feedback mechanisms for understanding the system inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impacts feed the direction of subsequent actions to take to achieve the desired effects. The plan only gets the system started. The feedback mechanisms continually drive the iterative planning process. Because the feedback mechanisms adjust the plan of action, the program is inherently adaptive. This program planning methodology continues until the program is irrelevant or it achieves the desired effects. If the desired effects shift significantly, the program becomes unproductive and resources shift to other programs.

Program planning exists in every organization within all levels of government. This planning process addresses ongoing and long term planning goals. It also builds and maintains critical preparedness capabilities. A quick comparison of program planning and the Core Design Model show many underlying similarities. Both use internal and external investigations to drive several strategies. Evaluating and selecting a strategy continues both processes into the strategy implementation step. Program planning

³¹ Terry L. Gibson, "Cooperative Extension Program Planning in Wisconsin" Cooperative Extension University of Wisconsin-Extension. <http://www.uwex.edu/ces/pdande/planning/pdf/ProgramPlanning.pdf> (Accessed December 3, 2011), 10.

differs from the Core Design Model because there is no final strategy for implementation but a series of iterations based upon feedback. The Core Design Model can also be iterative, however, program planning requires iteration. Recognizing that program planning uses the underpinning elements of the basic planning process can inform planners experienced with the other two types of government planning. For an overarching planning system to be comprehensive program planning must be included.

To approach planning as a system, all three types of planning, deliberate, crisis and program, should serve a common purpose. Each planning type already shares the Core Design Model. The types also support each other within their own applications. Disaster planning can illustrate how all three types of planning mutually support one another. In preparing for the yearly hurricane season, FEMA planners embark on a deliberate planning effort to write the Federal Interagency Hurricane Plan. Interagency working groups identify and plan for the worst-case, a hurricane affecting a metropolitan area. Planners identify and allocate resources, capabilities and preparedness efforts. Based upon an array of assumptions, the plan covers the actions of the federal government in support of state response efforts. Departments and agencies involved in hurricane response participate in a federal exercise that is held at the start of the hurricane season, on or around June 1st each year.

When a tropical weather event threatens the United States, FEMA and the interagency partners prepare to respond to the event. Planners consult the deliberate hurricane plan and begin to alert federal resources to possible action. Planners re-establish timelines outlined in the hurricane plan to reflect the storm's current size, speed, growth potential and most importantly possible locations for landfall. Crisis action planning has begun. An interagency planning team begins to anticipate storm landfall and predict possible damage. FEMA alerts federal response resources for deployment. The interagency planning team consults the state's plans to align the federal resources in support. Crisis action planning narrows the scope of support needed for the location of probable landfall. At the same time, program planning begins.

FEMA recovery and mitigation planners assess the potential long-term effects of the impending storm. Recovery and mitigation planners assist in the response crisis action planning to set the conditions for a successful long-term recovery program. Demographics, economics, infrastructure and population

density all affect the requirements for a long-term recovery effort. Evacuees seek shelter and require temporary housing and a plan for return. Before the impending storm sheds a drop of rain on land, interagency recovery program planning has begun. Thus, programmatic recovery planning often parallels crisis action response planning. Crisis action planning becomes top priority as the hurricane makes landfall. Alerted resources deploy as close to the impacted area as is deemed safe. Operations begin as soon as the hurricane force winds subside. Life saving and sustaining operations are the focus of response planning. Response planning efforts seek to stabilize the situation within 72 hours after impact. Joint Preliminary Damage Assessments with state officials provide the basis for decisions as to which areas are safe to re-populate. The initial plan for long-term community recovery takes shape and is supported by response efforts.

As the situation stabilizes and lives are no longer in immediate danger, the program planning that started before landfall then takes priority. Recovery and mitigation planners assist and guide state officials in the Long Term Community Recovery Planning Process.³² Community recovery could take years or even decades, depending on the severity and location of the storm's effects. Deliberate planning sets a baseline from which to start a response based upon a scenario cooperatively agreed upon by interagency partners. Crisis action planning adapts the deliberate plan to the actual situation when a hurricane threatens. As the situation becomes clearer, program planning begins to address the potential long-term effects. Parallel crisis action and program planning drive response and recovery actions. Any one or two of the planning types could not address all of the applications required. All three types of planning, deliberate, crisis and program, guided by a common purpose, are required for a comprehensive approach to planning. Three types of planning existed throughout federal departments and agencies prior to Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 8. Deliberate planning produced plans for identified future threats. Crisis action planning supported rapid decision making and adaptation of deliberate plans.

³² Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Long Term Community Recovery Planning Process," December 2005, <http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2151> (accessed February 20, 2012). CH 1.

Program planning is the basis for all ongoing and long-term government actions. A national planning system cannot be comprehensive without all three types of planning.

Comparing Origin and Mandate

Problems encountered during the implementation of IPS also highlight problems with civilian organizations attempting to apply military doctrine. Given that HSPD – 8, Annex – I created a hasty two-month timeframe in which to fulfill the mandate to create an integrated approach to national planning, developers needed to look to an existing planning doctrine for model for IPS. The military planning system offered several ready options. A comparison of the IPS to the military’s Joint Operations Planning Process revealed many key similarities. These similarities show that developers of IPS used Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) as a model for creating IPS. Developers of IPS decided to select an existing military planning system as its model, but focused only on the planning process. The Department of Defense (DoD) has numerous planning systems. Within DoD, each service component embraces its own planning system and processes. Additionally, the Joint Staff uses an overarching planning process for joint service operations. The JOPP is fundamentally similar to service component operations planning processes. Any service planner can lead the implementation of JOPP because he is familiar with the process and the products. The JOPP provided a logical example to emulate across the federal interagency. JOPP focuses and champions collaboration among planning partners, and permits understanding the problem from all perspectives, not just military.³³ However, JOPP is an operations planning process, not a planning system. JOPP is a component of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Comparing JOPP with the IPS reveals that IPS directly descends from JOPP, but does not fulfill the role of a planning system.

³³ The 2006 version of JP-5.0 describes the nuances of interagency plan coordination in chapter II. The 2011 version of JP-5.0 provides a more detailed discussion of interagency planning coordination than its predecessor. The manual al372319ludes to the increased role and importance of DoD in interagency, non-military planning efforts. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 2006. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (August 11, 2011).

The IPS and the JOPES intend to serve similar purposes. IPS was an attempt to create an overarching national planning system. JOPES is the sum of policies, procedures, formats, and automated networks. JOPES also contains elements of a comprehensive planning system such as education and training and involvement of external partners. JOPP is the planning process within the overarching planning system, JOPES. IPS focused almost solely on the procedures and formats for writing plans. Plan writing is the key relationship between IPS and JOPP. HSPD-8, Annex-I identifies IPS' purpose to standardize a comprehensive approach and provide guidance for the conduct of planning. JOPES outperforms IPS in succeeding to accomplish that mandate. Here is the first reason to believe that JOPP, a planning process, was the chosen model for IPS. IPS defines two purposes for IPS. First is to fulfill the requirement for a standardized planning system as set forth by HSPD-8, Annex-I by creating a how-to guide for federal contingency planning. Secondly, IPS supports the development of a family of related planning documents from national strategic to tactical.³⁴ IPS's purpose focuses on deliberate plan writing. What is missing is the alignment of the existing elements of federal government planning to achieve a comprehensive approach to planning. This is another reason to believe that JOPP instead of JOPES influenced the IPS developers.

National planning should not be limited to writing plans. A comprehensive doctrinal approach to planning informs practitioners of the merits and applicability of planning, types of planning (not just types of plans), prioritization of efforts, interconnectivity to other organizational functions, and plan writing. The Integrated Planning System is an incomplete system. It lacks many of the elements of a comprehensive planning system. Despite its shortcomings, IPS, nevertheless, succeeds in aligning federal plans under a standardized and mutually supportive framework or family of plans.

JOPES is an example of a comprehensive planning system. JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning defines the joint planning environment and ;

³⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Integrated Planning System, (January 2009), 1-1.

. . . sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It also provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.³⁵

JOPES's purpose is masterful in covering many aspects of a comprehensive system. The wording is appropriately ambiguous to address a wide audience yet still focused on its task. The joint doctrine guides actions but does not compel combatant and joint force commanders to adhere to the doctrine if their judgment the guidance does not meet the situation. The doctrine addresses both operations and planning. The audience is the military. Nevertheless, the doctrine recognizes the need for the military to plan with interagency and international planning partners. JP 5-0 further prescribes requirements for actions for sustainment, such as education and training. Ultimately, the purpose statement ends with all elements of the doctrine leading to the support of developing appropriate plans. IPS and JOPP possess similar purposes. IPS focuses on the production of interrelated federal plans to answer the mandate for a comprehensive approach to national planning. JOPP is a joint military planning process. What is missing is the overarching system inherent in JOPES. The similarity between the plan development process in IPS and that in JOPP is the only similarity between IPS and JOPES. This relationship, however, is important to demonstrating that IPS was derived from JOPP, not JOPES.

Comparing the uses of the different planning processes reveals a deeper relationship. If the comparison of two planning processes shows vastly different outcomes, then it can be inferred that they have little in common. On the other hand, two different planning processes with similar uses can lead to the conclusion that there is an underlying relationship between the two. A comparison between IPS and JOPP shows a significant number of similarities.

³⁵ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (2006), i.

The Integrated Planning System is applicable to federal agencies with a role in homeland security operations requiring significant and complex planning. It also applies to the same federal agencies when developing plans based upon the national planning scenarios. IPS better aligns existing federal planning processes through standardized planning. IPS does not impinge upon any existing state or local planning system. However, it is recommended state and local authorities use IPS when planning with federal partners for the national planning scenarios.³⁶ IPS is not supposed to supersede any existing planning systems within a government organization. However, when planning for the National Planning Scenarios, federal government planners must use IPS. This allows the departments and agencies to choose a planning system that fits their needs yet still embrace IPS in joint planning. Individual federal departments and agencies would align their planning process closely with IPS's to foster efficiency. The efficiency is achieved when plans produced under an organization's planning process support interagency IPS planning with little translation. IPS applicability seeks to align federal planning for greater collaborative efficiency.

The Joint Operations Planning Process applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services and combat support services.³⁷ When more than one military service component is involved in operations planning the participants must use JOPP. JOPP also takes precedence if there is a conflict between any Service planning doctrine and the JOPP. This would ensure that any planning process the Services embrace aligns closely with the JOPP. Even the US Military does not have a comprehensive unified approach to planning. Each Service embraces planning a little bit differently. JOPP provides the authoritative planning guidance when more than one Service is involved in operations. Each Service can plan using its own procedures internally, but must adhere to JOPP requirements whenever planning ventures outside the organization. Employing a common planning process saves in time and effort. The

³⁶ *The Integrated Planning System*, 1-3.

³⁷ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (2006), i

overarching doctrine leads the Services to greater planning efficiency by ensuring their own planning processes closely support JOPP.

The federal civilian departments and agencies were not alone in their fondness for using different planning systems. Each military service has its own internal planning system and set of procedures. Both IPS and JOPP recognize existing planning processes within organizations. IPS and JOPP also both mandate their use when an organizations planning extends beyond internal considerations to external partnerships. Both processes seek to create a more efficient environment for the conduct of planning across multiple levels and among external partners. The similarity between IPS, its use and scope suggests JOPP influenced IPS.

Planning Process Comparison			
JOPP		IPS	
Step 1	Planning Initiation	Phase 1	Understand the Situation
Step 2	Mission Analysis	Phase 2	Determine Goals and Objectives
Step 3	Course of Action (COA) Development	Phase 3	Plan Development
Step 4	COA Analysis and Wargaming		
Step 5	COA Comparison		
Step 6	COA Approval	Phase 4	Plan Preparation and Review
Step 7	Plan or Order Development	Phase 5	Plan Refinement Through Training, Exercise and Execution

Figure 1 Planning Process Comparison

There is another strong similarity between IPS and JOPP. The IPS' planning process steps are almost identical to those found within JOPP. IPS uses a five-phase planning process called the Federal Plan Development Process. JOPP defines seven steps. However, the IPS planning phases most closely match what joint doctrine describes as the planning functions.³⁸ However, looking beyond the number of steps and or phases, the sub-tasks within the steps and phases align, as is portrayed in Figure 1.

³⁸ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (2006), I-14.

IPS Phase 1 involves tasks performed in JOPP Step 1. To understand the situation, planners initiate preparations for planning by gathering relevant planning partners to form the collaborative planning team.³⁹ The planning team develops staff estimates and conducts research to gather pertinent planning information. At the end of both IPS Phase 1 and JOPP Step 1, the planning teams are identified, assembled and information is gathered in preparation for Phase/Step 2.

IPS Phase 2 (Determine Goals and Objectives) encompasses JOPP Steps 2, and 3 (Mission Analysis and Course of Action (COA) Development). IPS begins the information analysis, identification of facts and assumptions, developing the threat scenario, tasks, objectives and the mission statement. This is the point where JOPP Step 2 ends and Step 3 begins, but IPS Phase 2 continues. The IPS courses of action differ from those the military develops, but they both must meet the same criteria to be valid. COA's must be adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable and complete.⁴⁰ JOPP Step 4 separates the action of analyzing the COAs based upon the aforementioned criteria. Thus, the listing of tasks into steps or phases in IPS and JOPP differ. However, the actual list of tasks in IPS Phase 2 completely covers the same tasks accomplished within JOPP Steps 2 and 3.

IPS Phase 3 (Plan Development) encompasses JOPP steps 4, 5 and 6 (COA Analysis and Wargaming, COA Comparison and COA Approval). Both IPS (Phase 3) and JOPP (Step 4) analyze the COAs developed in the previous Phase/Step. This analysis includes a feasibility check by stepping through the COAs in an artificial timeline also referred to as wargaming.⁴¹ Wargaming ends JOPP Step 4. As IPS Phase 3 continues, JOPP Step 5 begins, with the COA comparison. This step uses a weighted numerical system to categorize COA. This system establishes a mathematical superior COA. The COA that mathematically 'wins' is usually the COA offered to leadership for approval. IPS Phase 3 and JOPP

³⁹ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (2011), IV, 24-25.

⁴⁰ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (2006), 5-8.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, III-31.

Step 6 both end with COA Approval. At this point, “The leader will approve the COA recommended by the planning team or direct the team to start over.”⁴²

IPS Phase 4 (Plan Preparation and Review) aligns with JOPP Step 7 (Plan or Order Development). In each process, the planning team now writes the plan (or order in the case of JOPP) using the appropriate format.⁴³ For JOPP, approval of the plan or order elicits immediate action in the case of crisis action planning or otherwise results in dissemination of the plan. At this point, IPS now takes a much more bureaucratic approach. IPS planners transmit the completed draft plan to all interagency partners for an initial review and comment. After the review period, the planning team and any other partners who have with commented on the plan conduct initial review adjudication. This is the opportunity for planners and staff members to make changes to the draft plan based upon the comments provided. Once the initial review adjudication is complete, the planning team includes the adjudicated comments into the final draft plan. The planning team leader re-submits the final draft plan to the interagency community to gather final leadership level comments. After incorporating the final interagency leadership review comments, the planning team leader offers the plan to the Secretary of Homeland Security for signature.⁴⁴ The plan is now “active” and ready for use in a contingency. The Joint Operations Planning Process produces plans and orders for immediate and/or future use. The Integrated Planning System produces only contingency plans to address a specific scenario.

IPS process contains an additional step not represented in JOPP. In Phase 5 (Plan Refinement) each plan is tested by conducting training, exercises and or, if necessary, immediate execution. The plan writing team incorporates after-action comments and disseminates the plan to the interagency community as a change-to-plan. There is no corresponding step in JOPP to the IPS Phase 5. This extra step in IPS allows for plan maintenance over an extended period.

⁴² JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (2006), 5-10.

⁴³ Strategic Plans and CONPLANS have slightly different formats as dictated by IPS.

⁴⁴ If the plan determines another lead federal agency, or direct, peer-ownership of the plan, Multiple Secretary’s signatures must be obtained prior to publishing.

The Integrated Planning System and Joint Operations Planning Process processes are similar. Differences in titles such as phases and steps do not undermine the fundamental similarities between the processes. Sub-tasks in each process are almost identical. Unlike JOPP, IPS requires the input and agreement of all departments and agencies involved to move forward. Within IPS, competing authorities and statutes must be resolved and a consensus, created unlike disputes within JOPP that are decided upon by a commander. Despite the differences at the end of the process, IPS seems to show direct lineage to JOPP.

Comparing the planning products of different planning processes may also show a relationship.⁴⁵ Along with the vast array of planning processes available to use, there is a corresponding array of products. The permutations of planning processes to products are almost infinite. Levels, structures and applications of planning products vary greatly. Showing commonality between two different planning processes' products can again lead to the conclusions about lineage. Comparing the products of both IPS and JOPP will highlight commonality between the two.

Both the Integrated Planning System and Joint Operations Planning Process produce plans for action crossing multiple echelons. IPS classifies plans into five categories: strategic guidance statement, strategic, conceptual, operations and tactical plans. JOPP also covers five levels of planning products: commander's estimate, base plans, concept plans, operations plans, and supporting plans.⁴⁶ IPS strategic guidance statement outlines broad strategic priorities and broad national strategic objectives.⁴⁷ The JOPP commander's estimate, a Level 1 plan, provides options to the strategic military leadership. IPS strategic plans define the federal mission, identify authorities, delineate roles and responsibilities, establish mission essential tasks, determine required and priority capabilities, and develop performance and effectiveness

⁴⁵ Planning products refers to the plans or orders produced by a prescribed planning process.

⁴⁶ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (2006), I-12.

⁴⁷ *The Integrated Planning System*, 5-1.

measures to meet the senior leadership's intent.⁴⁸ JOPP base plans describe the concept of operations, major forces, concepts of support and anticipated timelines for accomplishing the mission.⁴⁹ IPS conceptual plans (CONPLANS) describe the concept of operations for integrating and synchronizing existing federal resources resident across the interagency to accomplish the mission essential tasks from the strategic plan.⁵⁰ JOPP concept plans (CONPLAN) is an abbreviated operations plan requiring a greater amount of detail to become operational. IPS operations plans (OPLAN) detail resource allocations identified through the CONPLAN in order to support state and local requirements.⁵¹ JOPP operations plan (OPLAN) is a complete and detailed joint plan identifying specific forces, functional support and required resources in order to execute the plan. IPS tactical plans develop tasks, actions and objectives to employ the resources identified by the OPLAN for solving of immediate problems.⁵² JOPP tasks subordinate commanders to produce supporting plans that describe how the supporting commanders and staffs intend to achieve their assigned objectives and tasks.⁵³ Each of these types of plans informs and mutually supports the plans at command levels above and below. A full family of IPS plans spans leadership direction and intent from the highest levels of government to the application of resources in a local crisis.

The structure represented in each type of plan promotes the efficiency of the process. Both planning processes delineate planning at similar levels. The basic structure of both planning systems products are the same. CONPLANs, OPLANs, and subordinate/tactical plans developed under both IPS and JOPP have two basic structural elements, the base plan and relevant annexes. The base plan is a short, conceptual approach to solving a problem. Within both processes, the base plan contains five major sections. Figure 2 compares the steps in each of the planning processes.

⁴⁸ *The Integrated Planning System.*

⁴⁹ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (2006), I-10.

⁵⁰ *The Integrated Planning System*, 5-1.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (2006), II-28.

Plan Structure Comparison		
	JOPP	IPS
Section 1	Situation	Situation
Section 2	Mission	Mission
Section 3	Execution	Execution
Section 4	Administration and Logistics	Administration, Resources and Funding
Section 5	Command and Control	Oversight, Coordinating Instructions and Communications

Figure 2 Plan Structure Comparison

In both cases, the situation section provides the plans purpose, a brief description of the background, applicable authorities, a description of the threat, assumptions, and those tasks essential to mission accomplishment. The mission is a reflection of the organization’s mission within the current situation.⁵⁴ The execution section describes the intent and concept of how to accomplish the mission. The IPS administration, resources and funding section mirrors the JOPP administration and resources section by explaining the logistical support required to make the execution section work. The final sections, (IPS - oversight, coordinating instructions and communications / JOPP - command and control) both establish the organization or individual responsible for the plan along with the coordination and communications means employed to accomplish the plan’s mission. Annexes explain in detail any section of the plan or aspect of the concept of operations requiring further detail or explanation. Each section of both IPS and JOPP plans progressively informs the executing headquarters or agency about who, what, where, when, and why, actions are to be taken.

IPS plans address complex interagency crisis response. Hurricane Katrina and other major incidents illustrate the need for all levels of government to plan to prevent, protect against, respond to and

⁵⁴ At each level or type of plan, the mission differs slightly as the mission of the department/agency/organization adapts into the current situation for the purposes of the plan. The department/agency/organization’s overall mission does not change.

recover from a wide spectrum of possible events that would exceed the capabilities of any single entity.⁵⁵ IPS plans must coordinate all levels of government to ensure a single operational focus. IPS produces a family of plans to address the National Planning Scenarios as articulated within the National Response Framework and all other hazards.⁵⁶ JOPP plans are directly interrelated with military operations as an orderly, analytical process to develop and produce a plan or order.⁵⁷ Plans and orders are the products of an integrated decision making process which commanders and their staffs perform continually. JOPP planning produces products for immediate and future threats. Products designed to address future threats are contingency plans.

Comparing products of both IPS and JOPP further illustrate a commonality between the two processes. The levels of the planning products share a common language. The structures of planning products from IPS and JOPP are almost identical. Slight differences in base plan section titles delineate IPS' inability to command and control other interagency partners. However, the sub sections address the same functions as JOPP. The purpose of the products produced by IPS and JOPP differ slightly. IPS writes plans to coordinate interagency actions. These plans do not explicitly align with daily operations. JOPP, like other military planning processes, integrate the process of decision-making into operations. Despite a few dissimilarities, the mapping of IPS to JOPP products levels, structure and applicability strongly indicates that JOPP influenced the development of IPS. This identifies IPS as a commander-centric planning model, which is inappropriate to its application within the federal interagency community.

⁵⁵ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *The Integrated Planning System*, (January 2009), 4-1.

⁵⁶ The fifteen National Planning Scenarios include: Nuclear Detonation (Improvised Nuclear Device), Biological Attack (Aerosol Anthrax), Biological Disease Outbreak (Pandemic Influenza), Biological Attack (Plague), Chemical Attack (Blister Agent), Chemical Attack (Toxic Industrial Chemicals), Chemical Attack (Nerve Agent), Chemical Attack (Chlorine Tank Explosion), Natural Disaster (Major Earthquake), Natural Disaster (Major Hurricane), Radiological Attack (Radiological Dispersal Device), Explosives Attack (Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device), Biological Attack (Food Contamination), Biological Attack (Foreign Animal Disease), and Cyber Attack.

⁵⁷ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (2006), III-1.

By comparing purpose, use, process and products of both the Integrated Planning System and Joint Operations Planning Process, it is reasonable to conclude that JOPP informed and heavily influenced the IPS development. IPS and JOPP are well aligned. Both processes recognize existing planning processes within organizations. IPS and JOPP also both mandate their use when an organization's planning extends beyond internal considerations to external partnerships. Both processes seek to create a more efficient environment for the conduct of planning across multiple levels and among external partners. The steps in IPS and JOPP processes are similar. The bureaucratic processes required within an interagency process like IPS cause the titles of the process to differ. Sub-tasks under each process' steps are nearly identical. The similarities demonstrated by comparing IPS and JOPP show that the IPS was most likely modeled after the joint military planning process. A military planning system is not entirely appropriate for civilian planning purposes. Additionally, JOPP is only one part of a comprehensive joint planning system, JOPEs. Because IPS focused on the deliberate plan writing process within JOPP, IPS did not fulfill the requirements of a national planning system.

Given the mandate that drove the requirement for a national planning system, developers reviewed three types of planning that exist in federal government agencies. Comparing the IPS to the Annex – I mandate shows that IPS failed to address several requirements, possibly because its development was rushed. HSPD – 8, Annex – I describes, in detail, the development of a standardized national planning process and integration system. In the same paragraph that mandates the two-month suspense for the creation of IPS, Annex – I requires IPS to contain six key elements: Planning doctrine and guidance, plan development criteria, plan refinement and execution criteria, plan cycle alignment across echelons, plan integration across echelons, and all-hazard planning guidance. While developers included sub sections addressing each of these elements within the IPS, there was insufficient detail for accomplishing each requirement.

As just has been discussed the IPS copied the details of the Joint Operations Planning Process and, thus, provided guidance for the structure and contents of a variety of plans. Plans so constructed would inevitably prove useful, but IPS provided no system for planning that addressed the complexity

that arises when the planning organizations are not responsive to a single authority and when programming requirements are not addressed in plan development. This defect was evident throughout the IPS planning process and most evident during plan comment and adjudication. The first two CONPLANS written under IPS missed their 180-day deadlines as prescribed within IPS. FEMA left a full third, 60 days, of the 180 days to gain interagency concurrence through a process of comment and adjudication. The process, as turned out, took a full four-months to address and re-address interagency concerns. IPS did not anticipate nor provide direction for the collaboration required by an interagency planning process.

The final plan approved under the IPS direction was the *Federal Interagency Operations Plan: Rapid Medical Countermeasures Distribution*. While the federal interagency plans are the responsibility of FEMA to facilitate, both departments of Health and Human Services and Homeland Security retained a joint-lead federal agency status. Planning progressed slowly as each element of the plan met with disagreement over which department retained the authority and how to address the problem. Additionally, each progress brief, decision point and regular update required the presence of senior leadership from all three departments. IPS did not address the complexities and intricacies of inter-departmental disagreements between the lead federal agencies nor the coordination of the calendars of various deputy secretaries. Working through the issues related to the absence of a single authority complicated the efforts of the planning lead.

The Integrated Planning System worked as a standardized doctrine to guide deliberate plan writing. It also established a series of mutually supporting deliberate plans at various levels of federal government. What IPS did not take into consideration is how deliberate plan writing and the family of plans worked with the other existing elements of government planning. The crisis action planning guidance within IPS is extremely brief and does not address the interdependence between deliberate plans and crisis action plans. For example, IPS spends just two paragraphs, approximately 160 words

explaining that the contingency planning process should be truncated to conduct crisis action planning.⁵⁸ Crisis action planning as explained in JP 5-0 also describes similarity between crisis action planning and contingency planning.⁵⁹ JOPES, on the other hand, relegates an entire chapter, twenty pages, to crisis action planning.⁶⁰ The length of the JOPES discussion in comparison to IPS indicates that IPS guidance for crisis action planning is insufficient. IPS makes no mention of program planning. By not incorporating all three types of planning; deliberate, crisis and program, into the IPS, it could not encompass the planning activities of the federal departments and agencies. Without a holistic approach to planning, the IPS addressed only one type of planning within the federal government. Each department and agency had to determine how to incorporate IPS within the existing planning activities. By not including all of the existing types of federal planning IPS contributed significantly to the problems encountering implementing the planning system.

The hurried implementation of IPS contributed to its quick demise. To prepare for the 2008 presidential election, the federal government joined to plan for potential threats to the inauguration. The timeframe from election results to inauguration was dubbed a period of heightened alert throughout the federal government. Under a new draft planning doctrine called the Integrated Planning System, beginning in March 2008, DHS and FEMA facilitated interagency planning activities to address potential threats to the inauguration. The White House National Security Staff approved the first Concept Plan written using IPS on September 11, 2008. However, President Bush did not approve IPS until January 2009, four months after the interagency began using IPS guidance. Using IPS prior to presidential approval highlights the rush to implement the system. Proper study and application of organizational principles for implementing change might have created a better prospect for IPS' success. Hasty development and implementation contributed to the short duration of IPS. IPS did not completely address

⁵⁸ *The Integrated Planning System*, 2-9.

⁵⁹ JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, (2006), I-19 – I-

⁶⁰ Joint Publication 5-03.1 *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume 1: Planning Policies and Procedures* (Washington DC, The Joint Staff, August 04, 1993), I V-1 – V-20.

the requirements within the mandate. The rushed development led to inadequate governmental planning doctrine. Thoroughly answering the requirements within HSPD – 8, Annex – I, and a proper method for implementing the change may have made IPS a success.

Conclusions:

In the wake of the attack on 11 September 2001, President Bush issued a Homeland Security Directive calling for greater national preparedness in order to equip the country to respond to disasters better. The federal response to Hurricane Katrina reinforced the demand for an integrated national preparedness planning system and led in turn to the hastily assembled and short-lived Integrated Planning System. Several contributing factors led to the IPS' early demise.

The initial mandate, Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 8, provided vague guidance for the creation of a national preparedness system in 2003. The federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, interrupting the progress being made in implementing HSPD-8, and prompted Congress to act. Congress allocated additional funding to the DHS appropriations bill to hasten the completion of a national preparedness and planning system. Through the *Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006*, Congress outlined the details for creating a national planning system. The 2007 Annex – I to HSPD-8 further outlined the details for creating the Integrated Planning System within two months' time. Vague language and a hasty schedule set IPS for failure. An appropriations bill is an inappropriate venue by which to deliver detailed instructions for a planning system of the future. Additionally, none of the mandates for national preparedness and planning required developers to assess the existing planning within the federal government. The first step to addressing a problem is to understand the environment in which the problem exists.

Prior to the 2001 attack on America, existing planning types within the government accomplished agency and department planning goals, but the plans lacked integration. The lack of integration led to uncoordinated execution in the face of both 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. Deliberate, crisis action, and program planning was found throughout the government. Without an overarching and standardized

approach to planning, the federal government lacked the ability to interrelate these disparate plans. Federal government planning doctrine should have discussed how the different planning methodologies and their products interrelate and how to make them mutually supportive through a basic planning process. However, the press of the two month deadline forced IPS developers to look for an existing planning system to answer the requirements.

A comparison of IPS with the Joint Operations Planning Process shows the origins of IPS. The IPS elements drawn from the military planning model provided the basis for contingency planning. The IPS provided insufficient guidance for crisis action planning and did not address program planning. The IPS, however, did succeed in translating the Joint Operational Planning Process into deliberate plan writing doctrine. Standardization of deliberate planning and products is a necessary element of a national planning system. The methodology for deliberate planning within IPS should be incorporated into a future national planning system, not discarded. While a part of the overall system, deliberate planning did not answer all of the requirements within the mandates.

Implementing the IPS before it could be assessed also led to its failure. Hasty and forced implementation exacerbated resistance to the adoption of the IPS. Investment in proper doctrine development is the key to long-term success. To change an organization's culture on the scale of government planning requires careful planning and execution. Any future attempts to establish organizational change within the federal government should consult the methodologies of experts in the field of organizational change. Investing in proper implementation will assist in lasting and fundamental change within any organization.

Ultimately, the government discontinued the Integrated Planning System as the national planning system because by focusing on developing a doctrine for deliberate plan writing it neglected the requirements for both crisis action and program planning activities. Several contributing factors accelerated the decision to withdraw the Integrated Planning System. The IPS was incomplete and its initial use produced failure which left IPS discredited. An informed review of planning within the federal government and application of findings from a review may contribute to the future efforts to establish a

comprehensive approach to national planning as mandated by Presidential Policy Directive – 8. The contemporary Presidential Policy Directive – 8 now allows time and latitude for the appropriate framing of the environment and problem to address what is required for a comprehensive approach to national planning.

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