

George Washington: Spymaster and General Who Saved the American Revolution

**A Monograph
by
MAJOR Jared Brandon Harty
United States Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AY 2012-001

Distribution statement:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) __-__-2012		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2007 – JUN 2008	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE George Washington: Spymaster And General Who Saved The American Revolution			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Jared B. Harty			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (SAMS) 120 Reynolds Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <p>This monograph analyzes George Washington as the Intelligence Chief, Spy Master, and Commander in Chief of the Continental Army. It investigates the critical role he played in shaping the American Revolution with the use of espionage, deception, and intelligence operations. It initiates with a review of the beginning of the American Revolution and establishes British and American dispositions, preparations, and intentions. It then transitions to the initial American intelligence failures between 1775 through 1776. The work then addresses how Washington established his intelligence networks in New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia. The monograph highlights the victory and contributions of Washington's spy networks culminating in a Colonial victory at Yorktown in 1781. Finally, it concludes with a comparative analysis and lessons for today's operational artists and compares Washington's intelligence operations against Field Manual 2-0, <i>Intelligence</i> to demonstrate his timeless contributions to the American victory.</p> <p>George Washington was instrumental in delivering a victory during the American Revolution through his effective management of intelligence resources, skillful leadership, and timely alliances. He entered the American Revolution having first-hand experience with costly intelligence failures, which prompted him to focus extensive resources and efforts toward intelligence. He skillfully led the Continental Army by developing timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence that allowed him to avoid battles he knew he would lose and enter battles he knew he would win.</p>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			50

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

MAJ Jared Brandon Harty

Title of Monograph: GEORGE WASHINGTON: SPYMASTER AND GENERAL WHO SAVED THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Approved by:

G. Stephen Lauer, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

James C. Markert, COL, IN

Second Reader

Thomas C. Graves, COL, IN

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

Disclaimer: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, the US Army Command and General Staff College, the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Abstract

GEORGE WASHINGTON: SPYMASTER AND GENERAL WHO SAVED THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

By Major Jared B. Harty, USA, 50 pages

This monograph analyzes George Washington as the Intelligence Chief, Spy Master, and Commander in Chief of the Continental Army. It investigates the critical role he played in shaping the American Revolution with the use of espionage, deception, and intelligence operations. It initiates with a review of the beginning of the American Revolution and establishes British and American dispositions, preparations, and intentions. It then transitions to the initial American intelligence failures between 1775 through 1776. The work then addresses how Washington established his intelligence networks in New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia. The monograph highlights the victory and contributions of Washington's spy networks culminating in a Colonial victory at Yorktown in 1781. Finally, it concludes with a comparative analysis and lessons for today's operational artists and compares Washington's intelligence operations against Field Manual 2-0, *Intelligence* to demonstrate his timeless contributions to the American victory.

George Washington was instrumental in delivering a victory during the American Revolution through his effective management of intelligence resources, skillful leadership, and timely alliances. He entered the American Revolution having first-hand experience with costly intelligence failures, which prompted him to focus extensive resources and efforts toward intelligence. He skillfully led the Continental Army by developing timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence that allowed him to avoid battles he knew he would lose and enter battles he knew he would win.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE.....	ii
APPROVAL PAGE.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION	1
SECTION 2 THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE: BRITISH AND AMERICAN ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS (1763-1775).....	9
SECTION 3 THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING (1775 AND 1777).....	17
SECTION 4 BUILDING THE NETWORKS (1777-1780)	25
SECTION 5 VICTORY AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF WASHINGTON’S SPY NETWORKS: YORKTOWN (1780-1781)	33
SECTION 6 CONCLUSION, COMPARISONS, AND LESSONS FOR TODAY’S OPERATIONAL ARTISTS	40
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	47

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

In order to ensure victory in the Golan Heights in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Mossad (Israeli secret service) sent agent Eli Cohen to infiltrate the Syrian government, where he exploited his high-ranking position to provide crucial intelligence. He gave his Mossad handlers a complete plan of the Syrian defenses on the Golan Heights, the Syrian Armed Forces order of battle, and a complete list of the Syrian military's weapons inventory. Feigning sympathy for Syrian soldiers, he ordered trees planted by every Syrian emplacement to shade them. The Israelis later used these trees as targeting markers.¹

George Washington was born near Fredericksburg, Virginia, on April 30, 1732. Washington spent his formative years as a surveyor and soldier. He later served with the British Army in the French and Indian War (1754-1763) and the American Revolution (1775-1783). During the American Revolution, he served from June 15, 1775, until December 23, 1783, as the first Commander-in-Chief of the American Continental Army.

During the French and Indian War, Washington learned several valuable lessons, the most of important which the extraordinary worth of intelligence in battle. Along with his decisive defeat at the Battle of Fort Necessity in July of 1754, Washington also accompanied General Braddock in July of 1755 at the Battle of the Monongahela. This battle, also known as the Battle of Wilderness, took place on July 9, 1755 at the beginning of the French and Indian War. Prior to the Battle of the Monongahela, Braddock neglected to obtain intelligence on the French Army, which resulted in a

¹ *Battlefield Detectives: Six-Day War*. DVD. 2008. United States: New Video Group, Inc.

surprise attack, a decisive British defeat, thus resulting in Braddock's death. This event left an indelible impression on Washington and contributed to his strict adherence to developing an intelligence capability during the American Revolution. Braddock's campaign not only afforded Washington experience on the battlefield, but it also gave him the opportunity to witness the day-to-day activities of a professional army.² So the future commander-in-chief of the American armies in the Revolution ended his first major military effort in ignominious disaster, but left with important lessons on the importance of intelligence.³

Upon his appointment as Commander-in-Chief on June 15, 1775, Washington immediately began efforts to build an intelligence capacity to assist in obtaining information on the British Army. He accomplished this by creating, directing, and managing spy networks, along with deception, and misinformation efforts in order to mitigate and offset the British military advantage. An additional benefit of serving in the British Army was Washington's appreciation of their military capability. He knew at the outset of the American Revolution that he could not defeat the British Army in European-style warfare. This drove Washington to adopt a protracted, defensive strategy that leveraged all information and intelligence capabilities in order to offset the British tactical advantage.

This newfound intelligence capability enabled Washington, after his defeat during the New York and New Jersey Campaign (July 1776-March 1777), to choose when and where he would commit the Continental Army to battle. In the end, England's chief of

² Don Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1985), 15.

³ North Callahan, *George Washington: Soldier and Man* (New York: William and Morrow Company, 1972), 10.

intelligence in the Colonies grumbled to London newspapers after the war, "Washington did not really outfight the British; he simply out-spied us."⁴

Washington's effectiveness in managing the intelligence networks contributed immensely to achieving victory in the American Revolution. The significance of his contributions is the focus of this study and its significance lies in demonstrating the positive impact that intelligence can have on military operations in general and particularly on the campaigns of the American Revolution.

Many authors have praised George Washington for his significant efforts as the Commander in Chief, and as the Continental Army's Spymaster. Many also proclaim that Washington's intelligence efforts powerfully contributed to the American victory over the British. On the contrary, other individuals have openly criticized Washington for his over reliance on political affairs and lack of focus on military matters. However, the positive effects of his intelligence networks, allowing him to choose his battles wisely, demonstrate the critical effectiveness of his intelligence efforts.

Christopher Andrew noted in his book, *For the President's Eyes Only, Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* that, "No nineteenth-century president came close to equaling Washington's flair for intelligence."⁵ Andrew also pointed out that, "Washington became his own spymaster, using intelligence from his numerous spies to maneuver his troops away from premature contact with the

⁴ Dan Gilgoff, "Washington's web: The general was one accomplished spymaster." *US News and World Report*, <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/030127/27revolution.htm> (accessed November 12, 2011).

⁵ Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 12.

stronger British forces.”⁶ In *Washington’s Partisan War, 1775-1783*, Mark V. Kwasny observed that, “Washington’s strength was his flexibility. He used what he had to use, and he tried to employ the resources available in the best manner possible, learning from his experiences.”⁷ These resources were the hastily developed and untrained intelligence networks, which evolved into an extremely efficient intelligence network. North Callahan declared in *George Washington, Soldier and Man*, “To compare him with other national heroes is to risk losing sight of the fact that Washington had no precedent to follow, as most of them did.”⁸ Additionally, Callahan added, “To some Europeans, Washington’s tactics were bolder than those of the British generals; his use of guerrilla rifleman mystified as well as drew admiration. His refusal to recognize that any season, such as winter, precluded a battle, astounded military leaders.”⁹

David Richard Palmer wrote in, *The Way of the Fox, American Strategy in the War for America (1775-1783)* that, “He [George Washington] won for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the fact that he out-generalled all his opponents.”¹⁰ Palmer added, “Washington was by far the most able military leader, strategically and tactically, on either side of the Revolution. There you have it. He was bold or cautious, brilliant or bumbling, judicious or plain lucky. It depends on which author you choose to read.”¹¹ In Dan Higginbotham’s *George Washington and the American Military*

⁶ Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*, 10-11.

⁷ Mark V. Kwasny, *Washington's Partisan War: 1775-1783* (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1996), 338.

⁸ North Callahan, *George Washington: Soldier and Man* (New York: William and Morrow Company, 1972), 10.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 279.

¹⁰ David R. Palmer, *The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War of America* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 204.

¹¹ David R. Palmer, *The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War of America*, xix.

Tradition the author pointed out, “No officers have ever equaled Washington and Marshall in effectively bridging the gap between the civilian and the military.”¹² His extensive pre-war political experience served as an advantage to Washington while he relied upon and leveraged his commander’s military strengths.

Thomas Flexner stated in his work *George Washington in the American Revolution, 1775-1788* that, “The crucial military difference between Washington and the commanders who opposed him was that they were sure they knew all the answers, while Washington tried every day and every hour to learn.”¹³ Flexner added that, “Washington proved at what might well have been the most crucial moment in the entire history of the United States, a defender of republican principles such as the world has rarely if ever otherwise known.”¹⁴

Other authors, however, claimed that Washington lacked the necessary ability and experience to command a large army in combat. Washington also received criticism for lacking the technical skills and familiarity with artillery and cavalry, all of which were required to be an effective commander-in-chief. John Keegan noted in *Intelligence in War*, “Victory is an elusive prize, bought with blood rather than brains. Intelligence is the handmaiden, not the mistress, of the warrior.”¹⁵ He also added, “There is an elemental point about intelligence...it is a secondary factor in war.”¹⁶ Prior knowledge of the enemy did not guarantee victory over your adversary. Knowledge of the enemy’s

¹² Don Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1985), 15.

¹³ James T. Flexner, *George Washington in the American Revolution 1775-1788* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967), 535.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁵ John Keegan, *Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al Qaeda* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 6.

¹⁶ John Keegan, *Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al Qaeda*, 348.

capability and intentions was not enough to ensure security, unless you have the capability to resist. Carl Von Clausewitz stated in *On War*, “In short, most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies.”¹⁷ In addition, Clausewitz noted that, “As a rule most men would rather believe bad news than good, rather tend to exaggerate bad news.”¹⁸ Thus, a commander must trust his judgment when dealing with intelligence reports and professionals.

James T. Flexner also wrote, “George Washington has received significant criticism throughout history on his ability to command. He remained to the end of the war a civilian serving half-reluctantly in uniform.”¹⁹ He pointed out that, “In military matters, Washington was much less sure of himself. His previous experience had been limited to leading untrained and unconventional Indian-fighters mostly against savages and always in the wilderness.”²⁰ Dan Higginbotham further noted, “Admittedly he lacked meaningful familiarity with artillery and cavalry, and he had never led a large army in open-field combat.”²¹ David Richard Palmer wrote, “Washington did not really win the war but Britain lost it, mainly to circumstances rather than the American enemy.”²² In addition, Palmer wrote, “In the opinion of Thomas Jefferson, the military mind of the commander-in-chief was “sure in conclusion” but disappointingly “slow in operation, being little

¹⁷ Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. *Carl Von Clausewitz, On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 117.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹⁹ James T. Flexner, *George Washington in the American Revolution 1775-1788* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967), 535.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 535.

²¹ Don Higginbotham, *George Washington and the American Military Tradition* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1985), 15.

²² David R. Palmer, *The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War of America* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 204.

aided by invention or imagination.”²³

The most notable criticism of George Washington came from several influential Americans, General Horatio Gates, General Thomas Conway, and Benjamin Rush. This criticism arose in 1777, which many refer to as the low point of Washington’s military career. The detractors gained fame as “The Conway Cabal.” They questioned Washington’s handling of the war and “pleaded with Congress to have the commander in chief sent home to Mount Vernon and to replace him with the more successful [Horatio] Gates.”²⁴ This group also pointed out additional shortcomings of how Washington procured supplies, his battlefield performance, and the supervision of the soldiers by the commander and chief.

Despite his perceived shortcomings as Commander-in-Chief, Washington overcame these challenges with effective intelligence and generalship. His ingenious ability to understand the advantages of the environment, the strengths, and weaknesses of American and British forces and incorporate intelligence allowed him to blunt the British in North America. Simply put, General George Washington out-spied, out-witted, and most importantly out-last-ed the British.

This monograph is a chronologically organized work, which highlights the effectiveness American intelligence operations during the Revolutionary War. Section II begins with the run up to the opening of the American Revolution and highlights both the British and American ends, ways, and means. The next part, section III discusses the American intelligence and information failures during the New York and New Jersey

²³ David R. Palmer, *The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War of America*. xviii.

²⁴ UShistory.org. "The Conway Cabal" 1, <http://www.ushistory.org/MARCH/other/cabal.htm> (accessed January 12, 2012).

Campaigns that resulted in numerous tactical defeats between 1775 and 1777. Section IV will highlight the efforts of George Washington from 1777-1780 in which he created an intelligence capacity within the American Army. Section V focuses on the intelligence contributions by Washington and his spy networks that enabled a Continental victory at Yorktown in 1781. The concluding portion of the monograph, Section VI, is a comparison between the intelligence practices of George Washington, his Spy Rings, and other individual agents against the nine characteristics of effective intelligence found in *Field Manual (FM) 2-0, Intelligence*. The characteristics used will be accuracy, timeliness, usability, completeness, precision, reliability, relevancy, predictability and tailored. Lastly, it will demonstrate lessons that today's operational artists can apply when planning for a military operation.

SECTION II

THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE: BRITISH AND AMERICAN ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS (1763-1775)

General George Washington led an untrained and wretched expedition in May of 1754 into the Ohio Valley in order to establish a post at the Forks of the Ohio. This expedition was successful in defeating the French contingent and killing the French commander the Sieur de Jumonville. Nevertheless, in July of 1754 Washington was defeated by the French at Fort Necessity. He later surrendered but was permitted to march his troops back to Williamsburg. How such a combination could produce a backwoods massacre is not, perhaps, hard to imagine. How that particular butchery gave rise to the greatest war of the eighteenth century.²⁵

The American Revolution was fought on land that was unfavorable to European style of warfare but favored a more irregular style of warfare. In 1775, within the thirteen English North American colonies, the British faced a rugged, sparsely populated, and primordial land. Colonial settlements stretched from New England to Georgia and were peopled by just over two million people. The colonies encapsulated a vast territory, extending from Georgia to the Canadian border, from the Atlantic to the Appalachians, but centered in five major cities, seaports all.²⁶ The limited road networks and bridges large stretches of uninhabited lands made supplying this war immensely difficult.

Hydrology played an enormous part in the American Revolution, specifically for trade,

²⁵ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America (1754-1763)* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 7.

²⁶ William J. Casey, *Where and How the War Was Fought: An Armchair Tour of the American Revolution* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1976), 10.

resupply, and maneuvering of forces. The Atlantic Ocean, Hudson River Valley, Delaware River, and the Chesapeake Bay were critical to both the Americans and British.

The colonies consisted of two and a half million inhabitants and were located within the five large population centers. The cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Newport, and Charleston contained a preponderance of the North American population estimated at ten thousand citizens each. Communication within the colonies was slow and uncertain due to the distances and sparseness of the terrain. Manufacturing during the American Revolution was discouraged by the British trade policies. Although shortages existed within the colonies, the Americans produced small ships, cannons, agricultural goods, and small arms weapons.

The American colonists were primarily independent farmers, who owned their own land and voted for their local and provincial government. By 1776, about 85% of the white population was of English, Irish, Scottish or Welsh descent, with 9% of German origin and 4% Dutch. Over 90% were farmers, with several small cities that were also seaports linking the colonial economy to the larger British Empire.²⁷ The Colonial Rebels opposed British control during the American Revolution. In the Thirteen Colonies between 40 and 45 percent of the white population supported the Patriots' cause, between 15 and 20% supported the Loyalists, and the remainder were neutral or kept a low profile.²⁸

The thirteen American colonies in 1775 enjoyed a level of economic prosperity

²⁷ Daniel S. Smith, "The Demographic History of Colonial New England," *Journal of Economic History*, no. 1 (1972): 165-18.

²⁸ Robert M. Calhoun, *A Companion to the American Revolution* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 235.

that was significantly higher than the rest of the world. Throughout the colonies, people lived primarily on small farms and were self-sufficient. In the few small cities and among the larger plantations of South Carolina, and Virginia, some necessities and virtually all luxuries were imported in return for tobacco, rice, and indigo exports.²⁹ The standard of living at the time of the American Revolution was nearly the highest in the world. The increased demand from overseas markets grew because of colonial production of timber, tobacco, and rice. This sort of prosperity was not normally indicative of a coming revolution, which may have been an additional motivation of the colonials. After 1750, inland trade among the colonies also expanded by leaps and bounds, fostering both economic interactions and increased intercommunication among colonists.³⁰

The British had controlled colonial trade and taxed both imports and exports since 1660 in North America. This British accomplished this through a mercantile system and many believed that the American Revolution was an outgrowth of conflict between the colonies and England brought about by England's mercantilist policies.³¹ The French and Indian War (1754-1763) nearly doubled Britain's national debt. As a result, the British Crown, seeking sources of revenue to pay off the debt, attempted to impose new taxes on its colonies. These attempts were met with increasingly stiff resistance, until troops were called in so that representatives of the Crown could safely perform their duties. These acts ultimately led to the start of the American Revolutionary War.³²

²⁹ Edward J. Perkins, *The Economy of Colonial America*. 2nd ed. (New York City: Columbia University Press, 1988), 64.

³⁰ Gordon Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 140-142.

³¹ Joseph C. Morton, *The American Revolution* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003), 9.

³² Fred Anderson, "The Real First World War and the Making of America." *American Heritage* 56, no. 6 (2005): 1-3.

In 1763, the British colonists in North America proudly rejoiced in the decisive victory over the French and their Spanish and Indian allies. However, the cost of the French and Indian War, both human and financial terms, was immense. Desperate to find new sources of revenue, the British looked to the colonies and viewed from cash-strapped London, the North American settlements were very attractive.³³ In 1775, Lord North, Prime Minister of Great Britain, and Lord Germain, Secretary of State, led the British efforts during the American Revolution. However, North deferred the overall war strategy to Lord George Germain.

The Second Continental Congress spearheaded the political efforts in America with its headquarters in Philadelphia. In May of 1775, the Second Continental Congress was forged with John Hancock as the President. Hancock was also one of the leaders in Boston in 1775 when the American Revolutionary War commenced. During Hancock's time in Congress, he led the efforts to create the Continental Army and the eventual appointment of General George Washington as the first Commander-in-Chief. The Continental Congress managed the war effort, raised armies, directed strategy, and moved incrementally toward independence in 1776.

The political end state for the British was to regain control of the thirteen American colonies and the colonial subjects who had been allowed near-autonomy for too long. In the aftermath of the Seven Years' War, British political leaders and imperial administrators sought to assert greater control over the far-flung parts of the empire and in so doing, they came into conflict with the political traditions and assumptions of the

³³ Francis D. Cogliano, "Was the American Revolution Inevitable?" BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/american_revolution_01.shtml (accessed January 21, 2012).

colonists who resisted what they saw as unconstitutional parliamentary innovation.³⁴ As a result, the British imposed several acts on the colonists in order to exert control and reduce the empire's debt. The military objective for the British, although critically important, was often disputed amongst the British Parliament. The primary objective of this end state was to subdue the rebellious colonies. The British military end state in 1775 was to defeat the Continental Army, the colonial rebels, and suppress the rebellion.

For the Americans, the political end state of the American Revolution was to achieve independence from Great Britain. The Americans had contributed significantly to the British victory in the French and Indian War (1754-1763) and "believed they possessed a stake in the future of America by virtue of membership in what they saw as the world's greatest empire."³⁵ The American military end state was to defeat the British forces in North America and to maintain a Continental Army in the field.

The approach of the British Army in the American Revolution was to destroy the Continental Army and militias through military action. All the English leaders agreed on the ultimate aim of the war. It was quite simple: to obtain some sort of settlement which would restore the rebellious colonies to their former status as subservient members of the British Empire.³⁶ The British plan was to apply overt military action in an attempt to quell the rebellion. But, decentralized, popular government in the Anglo-American provinces made military coordination almost impossible.³⁷ A flaw of the British political and military strategy was due to a faulty assumption that the colonists would collapse

³⁴ Ibid., 7.

³⁵ Francis D. Cogliano, "Was the American Revolution Inevitable?" BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/american_revolution_01.shtml (accessed January 21, 2012).

³⁶ Ibid., 38.

³⁷ Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, eds. "Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present," Vol. 51. (1986): 8.

under the superior British military and eventually succumb to the wishes of Parliament. In the end, a British expeditionary force, huge for the time, stayed locked up in New York and stumbled inconclusively around the countryside, leaving Parliament humiliated by the cost of carrying on a land war across an ocean against an armed population.³⁸

To win the war, Americans only had to survive militarily. As long as General Washington could maintain an army, even a small ill-equipped, ill-trained one, in the field, he was not losing the contest.³⁹ Washington simply had to avoid decisive engagements with the superior British Army. Therefore, Washington adopted a strategy of delayed confrontation hoping ultimately to lure the British into battle where the situation favored an American victory.⁴⁰ The keys to American victory over the British were to avoid decisive engagements, maintain an American army in the field, and convince the British Parliament that a military victory was not worth the cost financially. Washington understood that every American success deepened the resolve of British leaders to break the colonial rebellion, as they had broken other rebellions in Scotland, Ireland, and England.⁴¹

The British means available in achieving their strategic and military end states was by use of the British Army, German Hessian mercenaries, and Loyalists. The Americans had the Continental Army and state militias. At the outset of the American Revolution, the opposing militaries could not have more different. The British Army was a highly professional force accustomed to fighting a European-style of warfare. In 1775,

³⁸ William J. Casey, *Where and How the War Was Fought: An Armchair Tour of the American Revolution* (New York: William Morrow and Company), 1976, 42.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁴⁰ Ruluff D. McIntyre, "George Washington- Master of Misinformation." *The Order of the Founders and Patriots of America*. http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/2004_winter_spring/washington.html (accessed December 19, 2011).

⁴¹ David H. Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 11.

the British Army was extremely capable, well equipped, and led by officers picked from the upper classes of English society. They brought twenty-three thousand British Regulars, plus ten-thousand German troops, many civilian workers, and several thousand women of the army.⁴² However, the problem for the British was that they were never able to bring all these forces to bear in America. The experience level of the British Army in 1775 was enormous compared to that of the colonial militias. From 1755 to 1764, the British Army fought on five continents and defeated every power that stood against it.⁴³

General Thomas Gage led the British Army initially in January of 1775 until General Sir William Howe replaced him in September of 1775. General Gage had served in British North America from 1763 to 1765 and as British Commander-in-Chief during Pontiac's Rebellion (1763). Howe, a veteran of the French and Indian War, arrived in America in May of 1775 and served until 1778.

On April 19, 1775, at the Battle of Lexington and Concord, the Americans were without a national army. The troops arrayed against the British in the spring of 1775 consisted of partially trained militia.⁴⁴ These battles were the first military engagements of the American Revolutionary War.⁴⁵ Following a day of battle, the Colonial rebels had repulsed British forces at the Battle of Lexington and Concord and prepared to march to Boston. In the morning, Boston was surrounded by a huge militia army, numbering over 15,000, which had marched from throughout New England.⁴⁶

During the Boston Campaign (April 1775- March 1776), the Second Continental

⁴² David H. Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 33.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁴⁴ Daniel Marston, *Essential Histories: The American Revolution 1774-1783* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 20.

⁴⁵ Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington: The Nineteenth of April 1775* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1925), 2.

⁴⁶ Victor Brooks, *The Boston Campaign* (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1999), 96.

Congress met and officially identified the Colonial forces outside of Boston as the Continental Army on May 26, 1775.⁴⁷ The first Continental Army was referred to initially to as the New England Army, because it was drawn primarily from the five northern most colonies. Washington brought order and rationality by immediately organizing the army into divisions and brigades. The Continental Army began with 3 divisions, 6 brigades, and 38 regiments with an estimated strength of 14-16,000 men. George Washington immediately assigned his officers to brigades and divisions while also assigning them areas of operations.

On June 15, 1775, General Washington assumed command of the Continental Army. Unlike that of the British, the Continental Army had only one commander-in-chief during the American Revolution. Washington served as the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army from 1775 until 1783 and later became the first President of the United States. The task he took on was enormous, balancing regional demands, competition among his subordinates, morale among the rank and file, attempts by Congress to manage the army's affairs too closely, requests by state governors for support, and an endless need for resources with which to feed, clothe, equip, arm, and move the troops.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Richard Frothingham, *History of the siege of Boston, and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1903), 429.

⁴⁸ Wikipedia. "George Washington in the American Revolution," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington_in_the_American_Revolution (accessed February 4, 2012).

SECTION III

THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING (1775 AND 1777)

Sun Tzu noted if you, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”⁴⁹ If you are ignorant of the enemy, but know yourself, your chances of prevailing or collapsing are very likely. Moreover, if you are ignorant of both yourself and your enemy, you are surely to perish or be defeated. At the outset of the American Revolution, Washington did know his enemy, but was deficient in knowing the intentions of the British Army. Until Washington developed an intelligence capacity in 1776, it plagued him in the early stages of the war.

Although assuming command of the Continental Army on June 15, 1775, he did not join his army until July 3, 1775 in vicinity of Boston. Washington assumed command of the colonial forces outside Boston, during the ongoing siege of Boston, after stopping in New York City to begin organizing military companies for its defense.⁵⁰ Upon taking command of the Continental Army, Washington was constantly plagued with maintaining an adequate army in the field due to short enlistments and desertion. Additionally, he possessed no formal intelligence organization within the Continental Army. The failure to inaugurate an adequate intelligence capability resulted in many failures throughout 1776 and 1777.

The Boston Campaign (April 1775 – March 1776) was the opening operation of the American Revolution. During this campaign, the American colonial irregular militia

⁴⁹ Martin V. Crevel, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought* (London: Smithsonian Books, 2002), 39.

⁵⁰ Barnett Schecter, *The Battle for New York: The City at the Heart of the American Revolution* (New York: Walker and Company, 2002), 61.

units were transformed into a unified Continental Army. The Siege of Boston began at the Battles of Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775 and ended eleven months later with the withdraw of British forces. However, the Colonial siege did not blockade the harbor, which permitted the British to evacuate Boston by sea on March 17, 1776. The fleet departing from Boston included 120 ships, with more than 11,000 people aboard. Of those, 9,906 were British troops, 667 were women, and 553 were children.⁵¹ The British departure ended major military activities in the New England colonies. Washington, fearing that the British were going to attack New York City, departed on April 4 with his army for Manhattan, beginning the New York and New Jersey campaign.⁵²

The New York and New Jersey Campaign (July 1776 – March 1777) was a series of battles for control of New York City and New Jersey. As early as March 13, 1776, four days before the British left Boston, Washington advised Congress that the enemy would strike next at New York and warned that if they succeeded in “making a lodgment,” it would not be easy to evict them.⁵³ After defeating the British in the Siege of Boston in March of 1776, General Washington brought the Continental Army to defend the strategic port city of New York.

In July of 1776, the British began landing forces on Staten Island in order to build an adequate force to attack New York City. On July 3, 1776, Washington was about to fight his first battle of the war and to suffer his first defeat. The day was to be lost because of an American intelligence failure.⁵⁴ General William Howe landed across the

⁵¹ David McCullough, *1776* (New York City: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 105.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 112.

⁵³ David H. Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 11.

⁵⁴ G.J.A. O'Toole, *Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991), 21.

harbor on Staten Island, where over the next month and a half he slowly built his army, bringing the total force to 32,000 men before moving on the city.

The first major battle of the American Revolution following the signing of the Declaration of Independence was the Battle of Long Island on August 27, 1776. Washington understood the difficulty in holding New York City but expected the British to initially attack Manhattan. As a result, Washington moved the bulk of his forces there in anticipation of a British assault. The primary tactical error occurred when Washington concentrated his forces in Manhattan instead of dispersing his forces throughout the New York harbor. When the British began landing on Long Island, Washington was unable to reposition his units quickly and was driven from the City in disarray. The Battle of Long Island ended with the Continental Army withdrawing to New Jersey on August 30, 1776. To Washington's fault, he concentrated all of his forces in Manhattan and neglected to reposition them prior to the battle.

Herein lies the first operational effect of an intelligence failure of the Continental Army. The lack of an intelligence capability during the New York Campaign allowed the British to gain a foothold in New York. By securing New York City, the British were able to control a majority of the waterways in and around New York City for the remainder of the war. If the British could maintain control of this vital port city, it could easily receive supplies from England, extending their operational reach. The failure was due in large part of the lack of forewarning provided to Washington on the intentions of the British naval forces. Prior knowledge of British plans would have allowed Washington to concentrate his army instead of dividing it throughout New York area.

Soon after the Continental Army's loss at the Battle of Long Island in August of

1776, George Washington suffered a second intelligence failure of the campaign. The intelligence failure prior to the Battle of Long Island enabled the British to secure a critical foothold in New York City. Despite failing to inaugurate intelligence operations, Washington found himself mired in a battle in New York and New Jersey holed up in Manhattan in 1776 after losing Long Island, Brooklyn, and 1,400 soldiers in a single week. Commander in Chief Washington devised a bold plan to divine the next British maneuver: the Army's newly established intelligence division would send a spy behind enemy lines.⁵⁵ This spy would be Captain Nathan Hale who was dispatched to New York City to attempt to obtain information on future British intentions.

This fateful mission of Captain Hale was the third intelligence failure in the summer of 1776. This failure further delayed the American's ability to gather timely intelligence on British forces in New York City. Nathan Hale was born in Coventry, Connecticut in 1755. He was a Yale classmate of another famous American spy, Benjamin Tallmadge who would go on to lead the famed Culper Ring in the American Revolution. Upon graduation from Yale, Hale joined the Connecticut Militia, was elected as a first lieutenant, and later accepted a commission as first lieutenant in the 7th Connecticut Regiment. Therefore, when a 21-year-old Yale named Nathan Hale finally stepped forward, it should have been obvious that he was ill suited for espionage. Hale was ill suited to be a spy because of his height, his electric-red hair, scarred complexion, and had an unfailing honest manner. However, most important, was that Hale was ill-equipped, ill-trained, lacked field craft, and an adequate cover story.

⁵⁵ Dan Gilgoff, "Washington's web: The general was one accomplished spymaster," *US News and World Report*, <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/030127/27revolution.htm> (accessed November 12, 2011).

Up to this point, Hale had experienced no combat during the American Revolution and saw this as an opportunity to contribute to the patriotic cause. Hale received no training, had no planned cover, no contact instructions with Patriotic Americans on Long Island, no communications procedures and no exfiltration planned.⁵⁶ Captain Hale embarked for Long Island on September 12, 1776, and for a week or so executed his duties. Hale's mission was to observe, document, and report to Washington on British activities and intentions in and around New York City. However, a short ten days later, the British apprehended Hale while attempting to return to Washington with the much-needed intelligence. Soon after, the British hung Nathan Hale for spying on the British in New York.

In September 16, 1776, American and British forces fought at the Battle of Harlem Heights. This battle was both Washington's first tactical victory and an intelligence failure. Outnumbered nearly three to one, the Americans still achieved victory due in large part to the outstanding generalship of General Washington. Harlem Heights began with an initial skirmish and a pursuit by the British, Washington ordered his army to conduct a simultaneous feint and flank. This action prompted a British retreat in which Washington's Army quickly pursued until the British withdrew from the field of battle. The victory at Harlem Heights marked the first victory of the war for the army directly under George Washington's command.⁵⁷ Despite the victory the Continental Army would go on to suffer its fourth intelligence failure of the campaign. On the morning of September 16, Washington received word that the British were advancing

⁵⁶ Harry T. Mahoney and Marjorie L. Mahoney. *Gallantry in Action: A Biographic Dictionary of Espionage in the American Revolutionary War* (Lanham, NY: University Press of America, 1999), 173.

⁵⁷ Edward Lengel, *General George Washington* (New York: Random House, 2005), 157.

toward their prepared positions in Manhattan. Washington, who had been expecting an attack, sent a reconnoitering party of 150 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton to probe the British lines.⁵⁸ However, during a flanking attack against British forces, Lieutenant Colonel Knowlton was killed during the Battle of Harlem Heights.

The loss of LTC Knowlton in September 1776 was a major setback to the neophyte American intelligence and reconnaissance capability, as Knowlton had created and led the first intelligence unit of the Continental Army, at the direction of Washington. The loss of this unique intelligence capability resulted in three subsequent defeats at White Plains, Fort Lee, and Fort Washington. The Battle of White Plains (October 28, 1776) was the first of a string of defeats following the American withdraw from New York City. During the American retreat from New York City, General William Howe's army drove Washington from his positions in the village of White Plains. Washington never regained the initiative at the Battle of White Plains and withdrew his army north. Less than a month later, on November 16, 1776, the Americans lost Fort Lee and on November 19, 1776 lost Fort Washington. Washington continued his retreat through early December, passing through Princeton on way to the Delaware River.

In the end, General Howe was successful in driving General Washington out of New York in the winter months of 1776. The British gained control of New York harbor and the surrounding agricultural areas, and held New York City and Long Island until the war ended in 1783.⁵⁹ After the string of operational setbacks that followed the

⁵⁸ Ibid., 156.

⁵⁹ Christopher Ward and John Alden, eds. *The War of the Revolution* (New York: Macmillan, 1952), 837.

Continental Army's intelligence fiasco in New York, Washington became deeply involved in intelligence-gathering and cultivated many sources to provide relevant and timely information.⁶⁰

Following the New York Campaign (1776-1777), Washington and much of his army crossed the Hudson River into New Jersey, and retreated all the way across the Delaware River on December 25, 1776 into Pennsylvania. During the retreat, the Continental Army shrank due to ending enlistment periods, desertions, and poor morale. Despite these challenges, Washington, armed with timely intelligence, executed a daring attack against Colonel Rall's Hessian forces in Trenton. Following a brief battle in Trenton, almost the entire Hessian force was captured, with minimal American losses. The Battle of Trenton and the war might have turned out differently without the help of a willing double agent: John Honeyman.⁶¹

Honeyman was born in Ireland in 1725, and at the age of twenty-nine, he joined the British Army and later fought in the French and Indian Wars. Following the French and Indian Wars, he relocated to Philadelphia for a brief period, but was too popular to carry out his spying operation. He then relocated his family to Griggstown, New Jersey in order to begin supporting General Washington's intelligence efforts. On December 10, 1776, posing as a colonial loyalist, John Honeyman went to Trenton to gather information on the Hessian stronghold. Over the next two weeks, Honeyman moved freely between Trenton and Washington's headquarters with information on the disposition, composition, and strength of Hessian forces. Finally, he returned to Colonel

⁶⁰ David H. Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 279.

⁶¹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Intelligence Throughout History: John Honeyman and The Battle of Trenton." <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/intelligence-throughout-history-john-honeyman.html>,1 (accessed February 3, 2012).

Rall's headquarters in Trenton and assured him that the Continental Army was not planning to attack Trenton. Honeyman's misinformation was the reason Rall felt comfortable about the traditional drinking and feasting that usually went with Christmas and so was unprepared for the December 26, 1776 attack of Washington's Continentals.⁶²

General George Washington's victory over Hessian forces — or German regiments hired by the British — at the Battle of Trenton on December 26, 1776, ranks as an occasion where intelligence properly gathered and utilized secured a major Patriot victory.⁶³ This victory was a result of the individual efforts of John Honeyman who was instrumental in providing General Washington accurate locations and dispositions of the Hessian forces. Early indicators of how Continental intelligence operations were improving was the Continental Army's capture of Trenton in December 26, 1776.⁶⁴

⁶² McIntyre, Ruluff D, "George Washington- Master of Misinformation," The Order of the Founders and Patriots of America. http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/2004_winter_spring/washington.html (accessed December 19, 2011).

⁶³ Ibid., 1.

⁶⁴ John E. Bakeless, *Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes* (Philadelphia & New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1959), 166.

SECTION IV

BUILDING THE NETWORKS (1777-1780)

To win the war, however, another Washington emerged; a spymaster, who successfully planned, communicated with, controlled, and maneuvered a hidden army of spies and intelligence officers that the British could never effectively counter.⁶⁵ Following the initial intelligence failures of 1776-1777, Washington took a more aggressive approach in acquiring information and intelligence on the British in an attempt to gain the initiative. As a result, in the winter campaign of 1776-1777, Washington developed a system of intelligence that became a part of his new way of war.⁶⁶

Washington understood the necessity of developing many separate sources and channels of intelligence in New York in order to be able to confirm the reports of his spies by cross-checking them and of not putting all his intelligence eggs in a single basket that might suddenly fall into British hands.⁶⁷ Initial success of the Continental Army was due in large part to the efforts of George Washington, Major Benjamin Tallmadge, Major John Clark, the Culper and Mersereau Spy Rings, and John Honeyman.

In 1776, the Mersereau family had begun the espionage (first on Staten Island, later in New York) which they were to continue to the end of the war.⁶⁸ Washington created the ring in order to gather intelligence on the British in Staten Island and Manhattan. Colonel Elias Dayton who was born in Elizabeth, New Jersey on May 1,

⁶⁵ Sean Halverson, "Dangerous Patriots: Washington's Hidden Army during the American Revolution," *Intelligence and National Security*, (2010): 123-146.

⁶⁶ David H. Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 375.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁶⁸ John E. Bakeless, *Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes* (Philadelphia & New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1959), 123.

1737, led the Mersereau Ring. In 1776, Dayton was appointed colonel of the Third New Jersey Regiment of Foot, also known as the Third Battalion, New Jersey Line, in the Continental Army.⁶⁹

When New York fell to the British in July 1776, the Mersereau family lost large amounts of their property and moved from Staten Island, New York, to Guilford, Connecticut. Washington frequented the Mersereau family home and asked the family to stay behind in order to collect information on the British. The family owned a tavern in Staten Island, New York and ran a stagecoach line between New York and Philadelphia. The value of the Mersereau family was their access and knowledge of the New York area, familiarity of the roads between Philadelphia and New York, their family owned ferry and stagecoach businesses. These assets served as a cover for action and legitimate means for the Mersereau family to gather and transport intelligence throughout the war. The result was eighteen months of highly successful espionage by young Mersereau himself and the later development of a large intelligence network by his father, brother, uncle, and numerous intrepid assistants.⁷⁰

The Continental Army's first intelligence success was the Mersereau Ring obtaining information about the British intentions to cross the Delaware River in December 1776 in an attempt to destroy the Continental Army. Prior to the crossing, the Mersereau Ring had discovered several troop carriers that the British had intentionally sunk. The British deliberately positioned and sunk a small fleet of troop carriers along the

⁶⁹ New Jersey Historical Society, "Manuscript Group 94, Elias Dayton (1737-1807), Revolutionary War officer Papers, 1759-1783." <http://www.jerseyhistory.org/findingaid.php?aid=0094> (accessed December 16, 2011).

⁷⁰ John E. Bakeless, *Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes* (Philadelphia & New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1959), 177.

Delaware with the intention to later refloat them and use them to pursue the Continental Army. Most of Washington's army crossed the Delaware River into Pennsylvania north of Trenton, New Jersey, and destroyed or moved to the western shore all boats for miles in both directions

Therefore, when General Howe arrived and found the destroyed boats, he no longer had the means to pursue the Continental Army. Howe, rather than pursuing Washington, set up a series of outposts throughout New Jersey in preparation for the winter. The Mersereau Ring made it possible to counter the British intentions to capture Washington and the Continental Army in the fall of 1776.

Battle of Princeton

In response to the loss at the Battle of Trenton (December 26, 1776), General Cornwallis repositioned his army in vicinity of Princeton on January 3, 1777 to oppose Washington. After two days of battle, Generals Washington and Mercer repulsed the attacking British Army. The Battle of Princeton was the scene of the second intelligence success of the Continental Army. First, British prisoners from the Battle of Trenton revealed that the British were planning to send troops to Princeton. Second, Washington directed Colonel John Cadwalader, a Philadelphia militia commander, to dispatch someone to gather information on British forces in Princeton. Later, Cadwalader delivered to Washington that the British had been reinforced, had strength of 8,000, and intended to advance onto Trenton. Additionally, the agent produced a sketched map of the British garrison in Princeton. The Battle of Princeton was a decisive victory for Continental troops, which used the information provided to take the British force by

surprise.⁷¹ After the battle, Washington moved his army to Morristown, and with their third defeat in ten days, the British evacuated southern New Jersey.

British Capture Philadelphia

With the British capture of Philadelphia on September 26, 1777, and with the Continental Army opposing the invaders with declining numbers, equipment, and health, General Washington was forced to take stock of his situation. To ensure the safety and freedom of maneuver of his army, he sought immediate, first-hand intelligence of the enemy's intentions, motions, and condition.⁷² To manage this critical undertaking Washington sought a man with discretion but possessing the necessary competence. This individual had to possess knowledge of the people and terrain for which he was about to operate and be trust worthy. The man chosen for this task was Major John Clark, Jr.

Major John Clark, Jr. was born in Lancaster, Pennsylvania and volunteered for duty in 1775 with the Pennsylvania Rifle Corps. He later joined the regular Continental Army, recognized for gallantry during the New York Campaign (1776-1777) and ran an intelligence network throughout Philadelphia in 1777. Major Clark was not content with merely supplying the Continental Army with accurate intelligence only; he also was very adept at planting false information about American strengths and weaknesses that completely deceived the British.⁷³

General Washington, motivated by safety and future maneuvers of his army, sought immediate, first-hand intelligence of British intentions, motions, and conditions in

⁷¹ James T. Flexner, *George Washington in the American Revolution 1775-1788* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967), 189.

⁷² John F. Reed, "Spy System: 1777," Valley Forge Historical Society. <http://www.ushistory.org/valleyforge/history/spies.html> (accessed December 3, 2011).

Philadelphia. Throughout 1777, Clark's network provided a steady stream of information to Washington concerning General's Howe and Cornwallis dispositions in and around Philadelphia. His agents routinely provided Washington information concerning British activity along the Schuylkill River, a critical river route connecting to the Delaware River. They also routinely observed and relayed information of the status of American Fort's Mercer and Mifflin. The Continental Army along the Delaware River constructed these forts in order to protect the American capital of Philadelphia.

Despite the British capture of Philadelphia in September of 1777, Clark's agents quickly built rapport with General William Howe. This relationship allowed unlimited freedom and access throughout the city of Philadelphia. The third intelligence success was the Clark networks steady flow of information on British defenses, dispositions, and munitions. Throughout the Philadelphia Campaign (1777-1778), Clark tirelessly rode, despite declining health, around the perimeters of enemy fortifications, camps, and maneuvers, reporting his and his subordinates' observations, as well as hearsay rumors, back to his chief.⁷⁴ Other critical pieces of information were routinely passed to Washington, which assisted him in making tactical and operational decisions. Clark's agents often passed information to Washington concerning morale, status of food for men and horses, ammunition, and current dispositions. His intelligence efforts during the Philadelphia Campaign enabled Washington to maneuver his Army in and around Philadelphia and "prevented the destruction of Washington's army at least three different times."⁷⁵

The Continental Army's fourth intelligence success occurred in December of

⁷⁴ Glenn P. Hastedt, *Espionage: A Reference Handbook* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 66.

1777 when Major John Clark's agents became aware that General Howe was planning one final attempt to destroy Washington's army before the onset of winter. While operating in Philadelphia, Major Clark's intelligence network became aware of British intentions to surprise the Americans. Lydia Darrah, who housed British officers in her home, overheard several officers discussing General Howe's plan. This information was rapidly passed to General Washington whose Army was in a well-prepared defense approximately sixteen kilometers north of Philadelphia. What unfolded next was an American operational victory between December 5-8, 1777 at the Battle of Red Bank.

After the British occupation of Philadelphia, Major Benjamin Tallmadge was appointed as Washington's chief of intelligence. Tallmadge was an American officer in the Continental Army who led the Culper Ring during the American Revolution. Tallmadge was born in Brookhaven, Long Island in 1754, and was a Yale classmate of Captain Nathaniel Hale. He later received a commission in the 2nd Regiment Light Dragoons in June of 1776. Tallmadge, through his former Long Island neighbors, was able to establish the spy net in New York City that Washington was calling for.⁷⁶

Beginning in the summer of 1777, Washington directed the creation of multiple spy networks, Culper and Mersereau, which focused on providing Washington forewarning of British movements and intentions. Tallmadge developed and case officered the Culper spy network with Abraham Woodhull as Culper, Senior as Robert Townsend as Culper, Junior.⁷⁷ Its purpose was to provide Washington increased predictability of British intentions and locations in order to enable the Continental Army

⁷⁶ Edmund R. Thompson, *Secret New England: Spies of the American Revolution* (Kennebunk, ME: The David Atlee Phillips New England Chapter, 1991), 52.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 306.

to survive in the field. Within a year of its creation, the Culper Ring was working at peak efficiency, feeding Washington a steady diet of reliable, high value reports on British capabilities and intentions.⁷⁸

The fifth intelligence success of the Continental Army was the Mersereau Ring's capture of British spy, Major John Andre in September of 1779. An agent from the Mersereau Ring reported that Major Andre using a false name and was expecting the surrender of the American garrison at West Point, New York. Upon learning of Major Andre's identity, Major Tallmadge had Andre immediately arrested. The capture of Major John Andre by American forces thwarted the British plot to purchase the American fort at West Point, New York from American General Benedict Arnold. While working John Andre, Arnold had agreed to surrender West Point to the British for £20,000 (approximately \$1.1 million dollars), which would have enabled the British to isolate New England from the rest of the colonies.

The Continental Army's sixth intelligence success, a product of the Culper Ring, was the discovery of British plans to attack French forces in 1780 while disembarking in Rhode Island. Washington knew if a decisive blow were dealt to the French, it would greatly decrease the chances of a Franco-American victory in the American Revolution. The Culper Ring reported that British General Sir Henry Clinton had decided to send British troops by sea from New York City to Newport, Rhode Island, to attack newly arrived French forces under General Rochambeau.⁷⁹ Following the discovery of this vital

⁷⁸ Alexander Rose, "The Culper Ring: George Washington's Spies Were the Unsung Heroes of the Revolutionary War," *Armchair General: Spy Wars*, (2009): 26-27.

⁷⁹ P.K. Rose, "The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence," Central Intelligence Agency. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/the-founding-fathers-of-american-intelligence/art-1.html> (accessed January 21, 2012).

information, Washington once again devised another misinformation campaign against the British Army. Washington had the misinformation plan purposely leaked by his spies, which stated the Continental Army would be attacking New York City. His deception efforts convinced Clinton that Washington's Army was planning to attack New York City and not march south, thus allowing the decisive battle in Yorktown. As a result, Clinton maintained his forces in New York City for fear that the Americans would attack. Washington's misinformation machine had maneuvered the British army into a battle the Americans could win.⁸⁰

To the end of the war, the Culper's flow of information proceeded—arrival and departure of British ships; British morale; British guesses about the peace; British losses in action; warnings against British agents in the American lines; maps and position sketches; exact location of individual units; quartermaster supplies; movements of British generals and other senior officers.⁸¹ This information, gathered by his network of agents, helped shape the campaign and allow him to fight and avoid battles throughout the American Revolution.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 1.

⁸¹ John E. Bakeless, *Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes* (Philadelphia & New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1959), 237.

SECTION V

VICTORY AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF WASHINGTON'S SPY

NETWORKS: YORKTOWN (1781)

It was in Virginia, not South Carolina, that the culminating campaign of the Revolutionary War in the South was to occur.⁸² The Yorktown Campaign (January – October 1781) was a series of military battles and maneuvers during the American Revolutionary War that culminated in the decisive Siege of Yorktown in October 1781. By the end of September, American land forces under Rochambeau and Washington had trapped Cornwallis' army in the west, and Comte de Grasse's naval forces had trapped Cornwallis from the east. Washington and Rochambeau faced two significant challenges, preventing the British fleet from rescuing General Lord Cornwallis in Yorktown by sea and stopping Sir Henry Clinton's army from attacking the colonials as they moved south toward Yorktown.

By December 1780, the American Revolutionary War's North American theaters had reached a critical point. The Continental Army had suffered major defeats earlier in the year, with its southern armies either captured or dispersed in the loss of Charleston and the Battle of Camden (April 1780) in the south, while the armies of George Washington and the British commander-in-chief for North America, Sir Henry Clinton watched each other around New York City in the north.⁸³

With the British Army split between the north and south, Washington and

⁸² Dan Morrill, *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution* (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993), 171.

⁸³ Richard M. Ketchum, *Victory at Yorktown: The Campaign That Won the Revolution* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004), 92.

Rochambeau went into action. Before Rochambeau and Washington could turn south, they needed to fully understand Sir Henry Clinton's intentions and capabilities.

Therefore, Washington's deception and misinformation leading up to Battle of Yorktown was no different. Washington quickly generated a "top secret" detailed plan which was the seventh intelligence success of the Continental Army. This plan stated that Washington would attack New York with every available soldier in the middle states. This "top secret" plan was passed by an American double agent in New York who intentionally let the plan fall into British hands. Upon hearing of this plan, Sir Henry Clinton, not knowing it was a fake; immediately returned to New York and stayed there awaiting the American assault that never came. In the end, Washington's misinformation machine had maneuvered the British army into a battle the Americans could win.⁸⁴ On August 21, 1781, while Sir Henry watched the decoy camp in New Jersey, General Washington, and Count d Rochambeau quietly moved out with their armies, marching southward.⁸⁵

American Preparations for Yorktown

As the final crisis of the Revolution approached, in the late summer of 1781, General Washington found himself in immediate need of more intelligence from New York City and Long Island than Tallmadge, the Culpers, Dayton, the Mersereau's, Mulligan, and the various secret agents assisting them could supply.⁸⁶ Even after Washington decided to attack Yorktown instead of New York, it was vitally important to

⁸⁴ Ruluff D. McIntyre, "George Washington- Master of Misinformation," *The Order of the Founders and Patriots of America*.
http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/2004_winter_spring/washington.html (accessed December 19, 2011).

⁸⁵ Lynn Groh, *The Culper Spy Ring* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969), 128.

⁸⁶ John E. Bakeless, *Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes* (Philadelphia & New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1959), 345.

keep a constant eye on the British in New York City.

In late August 1781, the Continental Army was strong enough to leave troops surrounding New York while Washington's main force, reinforced by French infantry marched to Chesapeake Bay to engage the British southern army under Cornwallis.⁸⁷ George Washington, still in command of the Patriot Army in vicinity of Peekskill, New York, sent 1,200 troops to serve with Marquis de Lafayette. The problem for Washington was that he only had 3,500 Continentals with which to oppose Clinton's 10,500 troops in New York City.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, Washington and Rochambeau began moving the Franco-American army toward Virginia on August 19, 1781. General Washington, and French General's Rochambeau and de Grasse led the American-Franco armies.

The remainder of the Continental Army stayed in vicinity of New York City under the command of General William Heath. As a final deception, General Washington began building what appeared to be a permanent camp, a base of operations, in New Jersey near Chatham.⁸⁹ The goal of this deception plan was to make a demonstration against the weakened British base at New York.

British Preparations for Yorktown

In December of 1780, Henry Clinton, who wanted to establish a firm foothold on the Chesapeake to support future large-scale naval operations, sent a force of some 1,600 men under Benedict Arnold to Virginia.⁹⁰ Despite his intent, he never articulated a coherent vision and goals for British operations in the early months of 1781. Sir Henry

⁸⁷ Michael L. Lanning, *Senseless Secrets: The Failures of U.S. Military Intelligence, From George Washington to the Present* (New York: A Birch Lane Press Book, 1996), 64.

⁸⁸ Dan Morrill, *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution* (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993), 177.

⁸⁹ Lynn Groh, *The Culper Spy Ring* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969), 128.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 171.

Clinton thought that Washington and Rochambeau were planning to attack New York City while a large part of the British Army was in the south. If the British Commander in Chief decided to send troops to aid Lord Cornwallis, New York's defenses would be weakened, and General Washington would attack the city.⁹¹ Regardless, the British dispatched several thousand soldiers to Virginia in anticipation of a confrontation with the Continental Army. Cornwallis marched his Army out of Wilmington in mid-April and reached Petersburg, Virginia on May 20, 1781, where he assumed command of more than 7,000 troops. General Cornwallis, Major General Phillips, and Benedict Arnold led the British at Yorktown.

Yorktown

After the failure of the Saratoga campaign, the British largely abandoned operations in the Middle Colonies and pursued a strategy of pacification in the Southern Colonies.⁹² The British southern strategy began in 1778 with the capture of Savannah, Georgia, and clashes with the Continental Army in 1780 in Camden and Charleston. However, American victories at the Battle of King's Mountain (October 7, 1780) and the Battle of Cowpens (January 17, 1781) served to weaken the overall British military strength prior to the Battle of Yorktown. On May 20, General Charles Cornwallis arrived at Petersburg, approximately eighty miles west of Yorktown, with 1,500 men after suffering heavy casualties at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, joining the army of Phillips, who had recently died of a fever.⁹³ Sir Henry Clinton, had not given permission to Cornwallis, but he believed that Virginia would be the easiest to conquer. Additionally,

⁹¹ Lynn Groh, *The Culper Spy Ring*, 127.

⁹² Christopher Hibbert, *Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution through British Eyes* (New York City: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002), 235.

⁹³ Edward Lengel, *General George Washington* (New York: Random House, 2005), 329.

the British needed a protected harbor for their fleet in the lower Chesapeake Bay and Cornwallis chose Yorktown because of its deep-water harbor along the York River.

By the beginning of October 1781, approximately 17,600 American and French soldiers arrived in Williamsburg while Yorktown contained only 8,300 British soldiers, including a small number of Hessians. Cornwallis recognized the allies had the numerical advantage and subsequently requested additional troops from Sir Henry Clinton. However, these British troops did not arrive until after the Battle of Yorktown.

Yorktown was a small village, maybe sixty houses, but the British were well-dug in.⁹⁴ Yorktown is situated along the York River in southeastern Virginia. Its location makes Yorktown a strategic place in control of upstream portions of the York River and its tributaries and their access to the Chesapeake Bay. General Cornwallis occupied Yorktown in August 1781 in order to resupply his troops during the southern campaign. Due to these well-prepared British defenses, “a classic eighteenth-century siege was needed.”⁹⁵

By September 26, all of Washington and Rochambeau’s troops were concentrated around Williamsburg where, in combination with Lafayette and de Grasse’s soldiers, they prepared for their final move against Yorktown.⁹⁶ The Franco-American strategy to defeat Cornwallis was by a methodical, classic siege operation. Cornwallis was in a hopeless situation and was outnumbered more than two to one at Yorktown.

On October 3, 1781, the British were defeated in a battle near Gloucester, Virginia, which further isolated British forces. Finally, on October 9, the French and

⁹⁴ Paul S. Vickery, *Washington: A Legacy of Leadership* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2010), 197.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 182.

American batteries opened up.⁹⁷ From October 9 – October 19, 1781, Franco-American forces lay siege to Yorktown with artillery and infantry. Although his artillery was ready first, Washington deferred to the French, allowing them to begin the bombardment at three o'clock on the afternoon of October 9.⁹⁸ Initially, the artillery was extremely accurate and successfully destroyed several British naval vessels along the York River. The Franco-American artillery was constant and extremely successful in the early stages of the siege. All of the British guns on the left were soon silenced. The British soldiers began to pitch their tents in their trenches and British soldiers began to desert in large numbers.⁹⁹

In addition to the artillery, the French and American forces dug trenches to enable the movement of larger artillery and infantry closer access and range to the British fortifications. As the siege progressed, the trenches slowly approached the British defenses and soon were within musket range. On October 14, 1781, the Americans attacked the British redoubts, or fort, under the cover of darkness. The bayonet-lead Americans cleared the British out of the redoubt and almost the entire garrison was captured. The French simultaneously attacked alongside the Americans and captured a Hessian-manned redoubt.

On October 15, Cornwallis turned all of his guns onto the nearest allied position. He then ordered a storming party of 350 British troops under the command of Colonel Robert Abercromby to attack the allied lines and spike the American and French

⁹⁷ Dan Morrill, *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution* (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993), 182.

⁹⁸ Paul S. Vickery, *Washington: A Legacy of Leadership* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2010), 198.

⁹⁹ Burke Davis, *George Washington and the American Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1975), 219.

cannons.¹⁰⁰ Despite their gallant attempt, the French drove them out of the allied lines and back to Yorktown. French and American artillery intensified on October 16, 1781 in an attempt to garner a British surrender. However, in desperation, Cornwallis attempted to evacuate his troops across the York River to Gloucester Point.¹⁰¹ Cornwallis plan was to break through French and American lines, escape into Virginia, and return to New York. However, a squall hit during the British retreat thus thwarting the British retreat. On the morning of October 17, a drummer appeared followed by an officer waving a white handkerchief.¹⁰²

After ten days of battle, the Siege of Yorktown was over. Generals Cornwallis and Washington argued over the terms of the surrender for two days but “the articles of capitulation were eventually signed on October 19, 1781.”¹⁰³ Washington’s effective misinformation plan was instrumental in preventing Clinton from dispatching British forces to assist General Cornwallis. This plan led to the decisive British defeat at Yorktown and eventually led to their surrender. Despite this tremendous Franco-American victory, it did not end the war. The American Revolution lasted until 1783 when the British lost the will to continue the war. The Treaty of Paris, officially ending the conflict, would not be signed until September 3, 1783, nearly two years later.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ Burke Davis, *George Washington and the American Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1975), 234.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 236.

¹⁰² Edward Lengel, *General George Washington* (New York: Random House, 2005), 342.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 342.

¹⁰⁴ Paul S. Vickery, *Washington: A Legacy of Leadership* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2010), 202.

SECTION VI
CONCLUSION, COMPARISON, AND LESSONS FOR TODAY’S
OPERATIONAL ARTISTS

John Keegan notes “No war can be conducted successfully without early and good intelligence”¹⁰⁵ and “From the earliest times, military leaders have always sought information of the enemy, his strengths, his weaknesses, his intentions, and his dispositions.”¹⁰⁶ G.J.A. O’Toole notes, “The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged.”¹⁰⁷ General George Washington, through his individual efforts in the American Revolution, singularly influenced the American victory in the Revolutionary War by following these maxims.

Comparison

Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence, identifies nine characteristics of effective intelligence. The elements of effective intelligence are; accuracy, timely, usability, completeness, precision, reliability, relevancy, predictability, and tailored.¹⁰⁸ These characteristics identify the necessity of intelligence that is required by a commander prior to executing operations. During the American Revolution, “Everything depended upon intelligence, Washington told his commanders.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ John Keegan, *Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al Qaeda*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 7.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁰⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2010), 1-17-1-18.

¹⁰⁹ G.J.A. O’Toole, *Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991), 24.

The effectiveness of the intelligence war fighting function is measured against the relevant information quality criteria. This section will compare the efforts of General George Washington against the nine characteristics of effective intelligence from FM 2-0, Intelligence.¹¹⁰ The first element of effective intelligence is accuracy. The intelligence must give commanders an accurate, balanced, complete, and objective picture of the enemy and other aspects of the operational environment. Timeliness is the second element of effective intelligence and must be able to support operations, and prevent surprise from enemy action. The third element of effective intelligence is usability. Intelligence must be presented in a form that is easily understood or displayed in a format that immediately conveys the meaning to the consumer to be considered useable. Completeness is the fourth element of effective intelligence and must convey all the necessary components to be as thorough as possible.

The fifth element of effective intelligence is precision which should provide only the required level of detail and complexity to answer the requirements. Reliability is the sixth element of effective intelligence. This component must be evaluated to determine the extent to which the information that has been collected and is trustworthy, uncorrupted, and undistorted. The seventh element of effective intelligence is relevancy and must support the commander's concept of operations and be relevant to the capabilities of the unit, the Commander's Critical Information Requirements, and the commander's preferences. Predictability is the eighth element of effective intelligence, which should inform the commander about what the threat can do, and what the threat is most likely to do. Lastly, the final element of effective intelligence is that it must be

¹¹⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 2-0*, 1-17-1-18.

tailored. It must be presented based on the needs of the commanders, subordinate commanders, and staff in a specific format that is clear and concise so they can understand it, believe it, and act on it.

The first example of effective intelligence was Major John Honeyman's efforts, which set the conditions for an American operational victory at the Battle of Trenton in December of 1776. On December 10, 1776, posing as a colonial loyalist, John Honeyman went to Trenton to gather information on the Hessian stronghold within Trenton. Honeyman moved freely between Trenton and Washington's headquarters passing information on the disposition, composition, and strength of Hessian. Upon return to Colonel Rall's headquarters in Trenton, Honeyman assured him that the Continental Army was not planning for an attack on Trenton. Honeyman's misinformation generated complacency amongst Colonel Rall and his soldiers thus resulting in the Hessians being unprepared for the American attack on December 26, 1776. The intelligence Honeyman provided General Washington concerning British forces in Trenton was both timely and predictive. It was timely because it stated that a small window of opportunity existed to conduct an attack against the Hessian garrison. Therefore, had Washington not acted upon this information he may have missed an opportunity to attack Trenton. Additionally, the information was predictive because of Honeyman's reconnaissance efforts generated an accurate depiction of the Hessian forces in Trenton. Honeyman's work greatly increased the likelihood of success of the American attack in Trenton. The impacts of Honeyman's intelligence on the Battle of Trenton were significant in many aspects. Just a few months prior, the Continental Army suffered a decisive defeat in the New York Campaign at the hands of the British Army. Therefore, the Continental Army's victory at

the Battle of Trenton boosted the fledgling morale, and inspired re-enlistments.

The second example of effective intelligence was the efforts of Major John Clark's network, which set the conditions for an American operational victory at the Battle of Red Bank in December of 1777. Major Clark's agents discovered that General Howe was planning to surprise Washington's army and ultimately destroy the Continental Army prior to the onset of winter in 1777. Lydia Darrah, who housed British officers in her home in Philadelphia, overheard several officers discussing General Howe's plan. Later, Lydia Darrah rapidly passed the information to General Washington who had prepared defensive positions prepared for Howe's 10,000 men prior to midnight on December 4, 1777. The intelligence Major Clark provided to Washington in December of 1777 was useable and reliable. The information obtained by Darrah was useable to Washington because it provided precise details of British intentions to attack Washington in vicinity of Red Bank. In addition, it was accurate because it provided Washington with General Howe's axis of advance toward Red Bank. The information provided by Clark's network played a significant role in the Battle of Red Bank. This vital information, provided by Clark's network, provided Washington adequate forewarning of General Howe's advance toward the Continental Army's defense in the area surrounding the Red Bank township. This intelligence-enabled victory forced the British back to Philadelphia and allowed Washington to quarter his troops in Valley Forge for the winter season.

The final example of effective intelligence was Colonel John Cadwalader's efforts, which generated an American operational victory at the Battle of Red Bank in

January of 1777. Following instructions from Washington, Colonel Cadwalader reconnaissance efforts generated a highly detailed map of the British garrison within Princeton. This map included the road network, bridges, buildings, British troop locations and numbers, positions of British cannons, and cannon positions under construction. He also informed Washington that the British force was much smaller than previous estimates of approximately five thousand. Not only did Cadwalader provide an accurate description of Princeton but also gave Washington an estimation of what would exist by the time the attack would be conducted. His efforts provided the necessary level of information without burying it in a sea of irrelevant facts. These actions produced complete and precise reports, which generated a decisive American victory. The intelligence that Colonel Cadwalader provided to Washington was useable and reliable. It was useable because the map enabled Washington to plan a focused and effective attack. Additionally, it was reliable because it provided Washington an accurate lay down of the road network, bridges, and British troop's locations in Princeton. The results of the Battle of Princeton are often considered a great American victory, on par with the battle of Trenton. With their third defeat in ten days, the British subsequently evacuated southern New Jersey.

Although the Nine Characteristics of Intelligence did not exist in 1776, it is clear that if they had, Washington would have received good grades for his management of intelligence operations. Moreover, these accomplishments are truly significant due to the American's rapid creation and initiation of intelligence operations while engaged in combat with the British Empire.

Lessons for Today's Operational Artists

The commander must think and see deeply in order to ensnare his opponent while avoiding pitfalls himself.¹¹¹ In comparing intelligence operations between the 18th and 21st centuries, it is still apparent that timely and accurate intelligence remain critical to overall mission success. Intelligence superiority is the fashionable term in the current day and age. John Keegan notes in his book, *Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al Qaeda*, intelligence must be acquired, delivered, accepted, interpreted, and implemented.¹¹² Most importantly, commanders must understand the capabilities of all of his intelligence resources, limitations, and employ them to their fullest potential. These assets will in turn enable him to effectively shape the decisive operation within the area of operation.

In summary, a commander must incorporate and maximize to the fullest potential, available reconnaissance, and surveillance assets throughout the area of operation. The commander must also maximize the use of all available types of intelligence, signal, human, imagery, measures, and signals in order to confirm or deny the accuracy of the intelligence.

¹¹¹ James P. Finley, *U.S. Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook* (Fort Huachuca, AZ: U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, 1995), 21.

¹¹² John Keegan, *Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al Qaeda* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 5-6.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES

Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Anderson, Fred. *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and The Fate of Empire in British North America (1754-1763)*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.

Andrew, Christopher. *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995.

Bakeless, John E. *Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes*. Philadelphia & New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1959.

Battlefield Detectives: Six-Day War. DVD. 2008. United States: New Video Group, Inc.

Brooks, Victor. *The Boston Campaign*. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1999.

Calhoun, Robert, M. *A Companion to the American Revolution*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2000.

Callahan, North. *George Washington: Soldier and Man*. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1972.

Casey, William J. *Where and How the War Was Fought: An Armchair Tour of the American Revolution*. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1976.

Central Intelligence Agency. "Intelligence Throughout History: John Honeyman and the Battle of Trenton." <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/intelligence-throughout-history-john-honeyman.html> (accessed February 3, 2012).

Cogliano, Francis D. "Was the American Revolution Inevitable?" BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/american_revolution_01.shtml (accessed January 21, 2012).

Crevelld, Martin V. *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*. London: Smithsonian Books, 2002.

- Davis, Burke. *George Washington and the American Revolution*. New York: Random House, 1975.
- Finley, James P. *U.S. Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook*. Fort Huachuca, AZ: U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, 1995.
- Fischer, David H. *Washington's Crossing*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Flexner, James T. *George Washington in the American Revolution*. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967.
- French, Allen. *The Day of Concord and Lexington: The Nineteenth of April 1775*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1925.
- Frothingham, Richard. *History of the Siege of Boston, and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*: Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1903.
- Gilgoff, Dan. "Washington's Web: The General Was One Accomplished Spymaster." US News and World Report.
<http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/030127/27revolution.htm>
 (November 12, 2011).
- Groh, Lynn. *The Culper Spy Ring*. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969.
- Hagan, Kenneth J., and William R. Roberts, eds. *Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present*. Vol. 51. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986.
- Halverson, Sean. "Dangerous Patriots: Washington's Hidden Army during the American Revolution." *Intelligence and National Security*, April 2010, 123-146.
- Hastedt, Glenn P. *Espionage: A Reference Handbook*. N.P.: ABC-CLIO, 2003.
- Hibbert, Christopher. *Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution through British Eyes*. New York City: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002.
- Higginbotham, Don, ed. *Reconsiderations of the Revolutionary War: Selected Essays*, Vol. 14. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978.
- . *George Washington and the American Military Tradition*. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1985.
- . *The War for American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice 1763-1789*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983.

- Howard, Michael, and Peter Paret, eds. *Carl Von Clausewitz, On War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Keegan, John. *Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al Qaeda*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.
- Ketchum, Richard M. *Victory at Yorktown: The Campaign That Won the Revolution*. New York: Henry Holt, 2004.
- Kwasny, Mark V. *Washington's Partisan War: 1775-1783*. Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1996.
- Lanning, Michael L. *Senseless Secrets: The Failures of U.S. Military Intelligence, From George Washington to the Present*. New York: A Birch Lane Press Book, 1996.
- Lengel, Edward. *General George Washington*. New York: Random House, 2005.
- Mahoney, Harry T., and Marjorie L. Mahoney. *Gallantry in Action: A Biographic Dictionary of Espionage in the American Revolutionary War*. Lanham, NY: University Press of America, 1999.
- Marston, Daniel. *Essential Histories: The American Revolution 1774-1783*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002.
- Matheny, Michael R. *Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011.
- McCullough, David. *1776*. New York City: Simon and Schuster, 2005.
- McIntyre, Ruluff D. "George Washington- Master of Misinformation". The Order of the Founders and Patriots of America.
http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/2004_winter_spring/washington.html.
- Morrill, Dr. Dan L. *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution*. Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993.
- Morton, Joseph C. *The American Revolution*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003.
- New Jersey Historical Society. "Manuscript Group 94, Elias Dayton (1737-1807), Revolutionary War officer Papers, 1759-1783."
<http://www.jerseyhistory.org/findingaid.php?aid=0094> (accessed December 16, 2011).
- O'Toole, G.J.A. *Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA*. New York: The Atlantic

- Monthly Press, 1991.
- Palmer, David R. *The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War of America*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975.
- Perkins, Edward J. *The Economy of Colonial America*. 2nd ed. New York City: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Reed, John F. "Spy System: 1777." Valley Forge Historical Society.
<http://www.ushistory.org/valleyforge/history/spies.html> (accessed December 3, 2011).
- Rose, Alexander. *Washington's Spies: The Story of America's First Spy Ring*. New York: Bantam Dell, 2006.
- Rose, P.K. "The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence". Central Intelligence Agency. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/the-founding-fathers-of-american-intelligence/art-1.html> (accessed January 21, 2012).
- Schechter, Barnett. *The Battle for New York: The City at the Heart of the American Revolution*. New York: Walker and Company, 2002.
- Smith, Daniel S. "The Demographic History of Colonial New England." *Journal of Economic History* 32, no. 1 (1972).
- Thompson, Edmund R., ed. *Secret New England: Spies of the American Revolution*. Kennebunk, ME: The David Atlee Phillips New England Chapter, 1991.
- USHistory.org. "The Conway Cabal," 1,
<http://www.ushistory.org/MARCH/other/cabal.htm> (January 12, 2012).
- Vickery, Paul S. *Washington: A Legacy of Leadership*. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2010.
- Ward, Christopher, and John Alden, eds. *The War of the Revolution*. New York: Macmillan, 1952.
- Wikipedia. "George Washington in the American Revolution,"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington_in_the_American_Revolution (February 4, 2012).
- Wood, Gordon. *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*. New York: Vintage Books, 1991.

JOURNALS, MONOGRAPHS, AND THESES

McIntyre, Ruluff D. "George Washington - Master of Misinformation." Archiving Early America. 2009.
http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/2004_winter_spring/washington.htm
(December 19, 2011).