Embassy in the Lead:
Lessons for Interagency Cooperation in Iraq from the 1947–1949 U.S. Mission to Greece

A Monograph
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Embassy in the Lead: Lessons for Interagency Cooperation in Iraq from the 1947–1949 U.S. Mission to Greece

In December 2011, the United States removed all combat troops from Iraq, leaving only a handful of military personnel within the U.S. Embassy. This military presence—in the form of the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq (OSC-I)—seeks to assist Iraqi Security Forces as part of the Embassy’s broader security sector reform (SSR) efforts to finish off a resilient insurgency.

What the U.S. is attempting to do in Iraq today is not without precedent. Analysis of the U.S. mission to Greece between 1947 and 1949 suggests that a high level of interagency unity of effort was the critical component to success there. Indeed, the U.S. Embassy in Athens—with limited support from the U.S. military—led an SSR effort strikingly similar to today’s efforts in Iraq. Without a single U.S. combat soldier on the ground, the United States helped Greece end an insurgency and establish enduring stability.

This monograph provides recommendations for how to foster the extraordinarily high degree of unity of effort needed to succeed in Iraq. Specifically, this paper describes how U.S. officials in Baghdad can revise an outdated assessment, integrate their civil-military lines of effort, and develop shared civil-military metrics to improve the U.S. Mission’s chances of success.
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Abstract


In December 2011, the United States removed all combat troops from Iraq, leaving only a handful of military personnel within the U.S. Embassy. This military presence—in the form of the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq (OSC-I)—seeks to assist Iraqi Security Forces as part of the Embassy’s broader security sector reform (SSR) efforts to finish off a resilient insurgency.

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Introduction

On December 15, 2011, the U.S. mission in Iraq became State Department-led, and all U.S. military activities fell under the U.S. Embassy’s Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq (OSC-I). As the current U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James F. Jeffery noted in early 2011, success is critical as the State Department takes the lead in Iraq to ensure that hard-fought gains do not slip away. Yet there are few, if any, well-known examples of such a transition in U.S. history that might inform civilian and military leaders in Baghdad. Indeed, U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) expert Beth Cole recently noted that, “[w]e have not attempted this type of massive transition between our own agencies since the Marshall Plan.” And, Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides said, “[w]e’ve spent too much money and kids’ lives not to do this thing right.”

Fortunately, there is at least one useful historical example that can inform senior leaders. In 1947, President Truman established the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) within the U.S. Embassy in Athens to stabilize the Greek Government and to help them end a communist insurgency. Despite interagency friction, limited resources, and declining U.S. political will after a lengthy and costly war, the U.S. mission in Greece achieved its goals. Specifically, the U.S.

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Embassy in Athens reformed Greece’s security sector and enabled Greece to finish off a resilient insurgency with only a few hundred military personnel under the ambassador’s control.\(^6\) As the military assumes a supporting role in Iraq, U.S. leaders will face similar challenges to those of their predecessors in Greece. Consequently, close examination of the U.S. mission in Greece between 1947 and 1949 might offer useful lessons for post-transition efforts in Iraq.

Indeed, the mission to Greece in 1947 is perhaps our best and most recent historical example of what the United States is attempting in Iraq. As in Greece, a determined enemy will continue to threaten U.S. gains in Iraq. And, as in Greece between 1947 and 1949, the United States is working to establish enduring security in Iraq without the use of any combat troops.\(^7\) To do this in Iraq, as in Greece, the United States will combine security cooperation efforts with broader economic development and governance improvement efforts as part of an approach that some experts call “security sector reform” (SSR).

Of course, broad SSR efforts like those in Greece and Iraq clearly require strong unity of effort between the Embassy and the military. While a decade of war has given U.S. Government (USG) agencies much practice in interagency cooperation, the shift from Defense to State Department lead is a big change. It is easy to see how interagency cooperation during the next ten years in Iraq will look nothing like it did during the last ten years. For example, the OSC-I today only has 157 civilian and military personnel—a far cry from the nearly 50,000 American troops


in Iraq in 2010. That fact alone illustrates the dramatic contrast between the pre- and post-transition bureaucratic environments.

Therefore, the question is—how can Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. military leaders best support a Department of State-led effort in a post-transition environment to successfully perform SSR and to achieve long-term U.S. objectives in Iraq?

While much literature exists separately on the U.S. response to the Greek Civil War, SSR, and interagency cooperation, no literature exists that combines these topics to capture the relevant lessons from Greece in a way that is useful for today’s leaders in Iraq. Without an examination of interagency cooperation in Greece and the potential lessons for SSR efforts in Iraq today, an important knowledge gap remains.

Recognizing the knowledge gap, senior American officials from throughout government, to include the OSC-I commander Lieutenant General Robert Caslen, attended a USIP conference in February 2011 that sought answers to nearly the exact same question this paper poses. On December 8, 2011, USIP, together with the U.S. Army’s Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation, published a 37-page pamphlet titled, *Interagency Handbook for Transitions* to capture lessons from the February conference and from the past decade of conflict. While the handbook is a decent start toward addressing a complicated issue, it lacks the level of detail needed to be useful to U.S. leaders in Iraq, including Lt. Gen. Caslen.

This paper does not attempt to resolve every issue involved with the transitions to State lead in Iraq; rather, by conducting a case study of the 1947–1949 U.S. mission to Greece, this paper attempts to glean select lessons for leaders to consider today. This study argues that U.S. military leaders in Iraq can best support Department of State-led SSR by making unity of effort a

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9 Lubold, *Navigating Tricky Transitions in Iraq, Afghanistan.*
top priority. Indeed, this study found that State-led SSR missions—as in both Greece and Iraq—require extraordinarily strong unity of effort. To generate this kind of unity, this study asserts that leaders in OSC-I should work closely with the Embassy to sharpen their shared understanding of the situation, should ensure their objectives and lines of effort are well-nested within those of the Embassy, and should work with the Embassy to develop a set of shared metrics. To achieve these goals, this paper specifically recommends that civilian and military leaders at the U.S. Mission-Iraq (USM-I) revisit and update the 2002 Future of Iraq assessment, that the U.S. Embassy and OSC-I work together to develop common lines of effort and objectives based on that assessment, and that the U.S. Embassy and OSC-I do the additional work needed to develop combined metrics to monitor and to help maximize their efforts.

This study considers the U.S. mission to Greece between 1947 and 1949 because it is the historical case that most closely resembles the current and near-term future of the U.S. effort in Iraq. It does not consider Greece after 1949 (apart from the fact that Greece’s security situation has not posed a significant threat to U.S. interests since then), because of the subsequent emergence of infinite political and economic variables for which this modest study cannot account. This study considers implications for the United States only, since the notion that a state can defeat an insurgency through SSR without any combat troops on the ground is uniquely American. This study does not consider the myriad other past and present cases of U.S. security assistance and security cooperation because full SSR cases like Greece and Iraq are unique in that they are broader and that they encompass robust military, economic, and governance efforts.

This paper comprises four sections. The first section reviews existing literature and highlights the gap that this study attempts to fill. The second section describes why the Greek case is useful for U.S. leaders in Iraq today and outlines the three key questions this study considers about U.S. efforts in Greece. The third section includes a case study of the U.S. efforts in Greece between 1947 and 1949 and an analysis of how the United States achieved unity of
effort in an Embassy-led environment to defeat a lingering insurgency without the use of combat troops. The fourth section describes the Greek case’s implications for U.S. efforts in Iraq today.

**Literature Review**

This section presents the rationale for conducting this study. Certainly, many authors have written about SSR. Likewise, many have written about how to improve U.S. interagency unity of effort. Unfortunately, no writing exists that uses history to inform Embassy-led SSR. And, while a handful of students have examined the military lessons from the 1947–1949 U.S. mission to Greece, no literature exists that explores the broader lessons for multi-agency SSR. Taken together, these facts highlight a critical knowledge gap. This knowledge gap is unfortunate, because the Greek example is perhaps the most relevant and recent historical example of post-transition SSR.

This paper builds upon existing knowledge by focusing specifically on the lessons from the 1947–1949 U.S. mission to Greece that might apply today for leaders in Iraq. This paper conducts the literature review in four steps. First, it describes the theory underpinning past and present U.S. efforts in Greece and Iraq—what this paper calls the American SSR Theory. Second, it considers the key concepts related to the American SSR Theory. Third, it examines the literature relevant to these key concepts. Fourth, it describes the remaining knowledge gap that this paper attempts to fill.

**American Security Sector Reform Theory**

The United States has occasionally applied its non-military elements of national power to counter a threat when the deployment of combat troops is inappropriate or infeasible. Substituting non-military elements of national power to increase a foreign host nation’s security capacity so that the host nation can confront the mutual threat is the foundation of the theory that often drives such policies. In essence, when the use of combat troops is ruled out, the United States acts in accordance with the American SSR Theory. In short, this theory suggests that if the United States
can effectively unify the efforts of its military, diplomatic, and development agencies then it can successfully reform a host nation’s security sector and establish long-term security without committing combat troops. Indeed, USG interagency doctrine describes the theory that underlies its approach to SSR explicitly, stating, “[t]he most successful outcomes will result only if the activities of other USG departments and agencies are fully integrated in a comprehensive approach to support SSR.” Clearly, the American SSR Theory underpins the approach to solving the problem that this paper poses.

Key Concepts

Any study of the American SSR Theory in action must first define the concepts relevant to the theory. These concepts include interagency unity of effort and security sector reform. Additionally, this paper coins a new term—post-transition SSR—to describe the unique context surrounding the specific type of SSR this study examines.

Interagency Unity of Effort

Former Homeland Security Council chief of staff Joel Bagnal defined interagency unity of effort as “the [synchronization of] all the elements of national power to achieve common objectives.” Bagnal’s definition is clear-cut and elegant; however, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy spoke even more precisely about unity of effort in 2008, describing it as the “established mechanisms…[that enable] full integration of the activities of military forces and civilian agencies on the ground.” The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy

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13 Michèle Flournoy, Achieving Unity of Effort in Interagency Operations, testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, January 29, 2008,
(NSS) goes into further detail by defining what the elements of national power are. Specifically, they are “the organizations, policies, and programs within the defense, diplomatic, economic, development, homeland security, intelligence, and the strategic communications realms of the executive branch.”¹⁴ This paper recognizes the value of all three of the above definitions because, taken together, they clearly describe not only what unity of effort is, but also what achieving it requires. Consequently, this paper defines the unity of effort along all three lines, since anything less could prove insufficient. First, unity of effort requires tailor-made interagency organizations and coordination mechanisms (as in Flournoy’s definition). Second, it requires shared objectives and vision (as in Bagnal’s definition). And third, unity of effort requires a cooperative integration of all elements of national power (as described by the 2010 NSS). Therefore, any effort meant to improve unity of effort should address these three requirements.

Security Sector Reform

In 2009, DoD, State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) joined forces to publish a unique multi-agency paper titled “Security Sector Reform.” The paper defined SSR as “the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way [a host nation] provides safety, security, and justice.”¹⁵ Contrary to what one might think at first glance, SSR is far broader than mere security cooperation. In fact, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, SSR “extends well beyond the narrower focus of more traditional security cooperation.”¹⁶ What distinguishes SSR from other assistance and cooperation efforts is SSR’s inclusion of economic and governance efforts.


¹⁵ State, Defense, and USAID, Security Sector Reform, 3.
Interestingly, neither the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad nor OSC-I use the term “SSR” to describe what they do. OSC-I seems to prefer the term “enabled security cooperation,” which has been described as “similar to other OSC offices in places like Turkey and Egypt.”17 Yet, combined with the U.S. Embassy’s extraordinarily broad efforts, what the United States is doing in Iraq is much more than security cooperation. In fact, a U.S. Embassy spokesman recently described their efforts as “very wide,” including “[e]verything from economic cooperation, political and diplomatic cooperation, educational, scientific and technical cooperation, law enforcement and health care.”18 U.S. efforts in Iraq are clearly broader than mere security assistance and the other routine functions of an Embassy; therefore, this paper argues that SSR is precisely what USM-I’s mission is. And, while some have said that SSR only “emerged as a discipline over the last decade,”19 this paper argues that the United States performed SSR long before the phrase existed—particularly in Cold War Greece.

Post-Transition SSR

This paper coins the term “post-transition SSR” to refer to USG efforts following a leadership shift from DoD to State in the presence of a significant residual threat.20 Such a shift occurred in Iraq on December 15, 2011 when U.S. Forces–Iraq cased its colors and OSC-I assumed responsibility for U.S. military activities in Iraq despite the continued threat of what

17 See Appendix for copy of OSC-I, Point Paper on Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq Strategic Plan, December 3, 2011. In this paper, a staff officer recommended that OSC-I’s mission should be to conduct “enabled Security Cooperation activities to build partner capacity.” Although predecisional, it gives important insight into much of the initial thinking within OSC-I. See also C. Todd Lopez, “The Office of Security Cooperation Maintaining a Presence In Iraq Once Soldiers Go Home,” Soldiers (December 1, 2011.) http://www.army.mil/article/70048/The_office_of_security_cooperation_maintaining_a_presence_in_Iraq_once_soldiers_go_home/ (accessed on January 20, 2010).

18 Lopez, “The Office of Security Cooperation Maintaining a Presence In Iraq.”

19 State, Defense, and USAID, Security Sector Reform, 3.

20 Post-transition SSR is related, but not synonymous to, the existing term “post-conflict SSR” which emphasizes disarmament and reintegration. Simply put, while “post-conflict” refers to the condition of the state receiving assistance, “post-transition” refers to the condition of the state providing the assistance.
OSC-I calls “a semi-permissive environment.” Unlike security assistance and cooperation, where a defense attaché often supervises foreign military sales programs and training efforts, post-transition SSR missions are sometimes characterized by an operational advice line of effort, and are usually led by an influential general or flag officer. In its most recent report, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) suggests that OSC-I might assume the role of providing operational advice and planning assistance to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the future. Regardless of what level U.S. military leaders currently advise ISF leaders at, it is clear that OSC-I’s commander is much more than a defense attaché. Lt. Gen Caslen last served as the commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center, a position held by Gen. David Petraeus just prior to his command of the 2007 Iraqi troop surge. Caslen himself has commanded combat formations at every level—most recently as a division commander in Northern Iraq. Post-transition SSR is also unique because it requires influential officers like Caslen to make the significant mental leap from being the supported effort to the supporting effort. In Iraq, OSC-I has made that leap. Indeed, OSC-I has made it very clear that it works for the Embassy, and that its commander reports to the Ambassador.

Post-transition is also an important term to understand because it significantly narrows the scope of this study. While there are numerous examples of U.S. interventions around the world, there are very few examples of the U.S. military shifting from the main effort to supporting effort despite the residual presence of a dangerous threat.

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22 Special Inspector for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Quarterly Report to Congress, January 30, 2012, http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/index.html (accessed February 1, 2012), 48; See also Appendix, 2. In its draft paper, OSC-I discusses “mission command,” “deployed site activities,” and combined “planning efforts” which also suggest that OSC-I might retain the potential to provide operational advice to Iraqi military leaders down to some level.


Further, the term implies that transition itself is one of the key challenges since it requires an agency to hand over a remarkable amount of responsibility amidst ever-present bureaucratic inertia. As political science professor James Q. Wilson once declared, “all organizations seek the stability and comfort that comes from relying on standard operating procedures, or SOPs.” Since the mission in Iraq changed, the old SOPs no longer apply. Yet, as Wilson pointed out, getting people to recognize this fact might be challenging. The need to arrest and reverse powerful bureaucratic inertia is another unique characteristic of post-transition SSR. To achieve the level of unified effort it needs to succeed, USM-I must overcome these significant hurdles.

The Lack of Knowledge about the American SSR Theory in Action

Today, senior policymakers tout the coordinated use of all elements of national power—often calling this approach “smart power”—as if it were some innovative new method. Yet, there is nothing new about the need for unity of effort. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations James Locher described lack of unity of effort as one of today’s most pressing security challenges. In recent years, think tanks have published a flurry of documents geared toward improving unity of effort, ranging from Locher’s sweeping Project for National Security Reform to short papers focused on very specific contexts. Defense expert Nadia Schadlow’s 2010 Army War College thesis typifies the bulk of recent literature regarding improving unity of effort. In her paper, Schadlow argued that the U.S. military must embrace an expanded role and be

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prepared to complement the limited capabilities of civilian USG agencies.28 Papers like Shadlow’s typically describe ways to modify existing organizations, change authorities, create new organizations, manage information, reallocate resources, or operate in accordance with some kind of joint doctrine.29 Other scholarly writings focus specifically on how to improve unity of effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, in 2009, U.S. Army Major David Doyle described how U.S. Central Command reorganized itself to integrate interagency capabilities and to better support the Iraqi and Afghan wars.30 Taken together, this growing body of knowledge continues to prove quite useful; nevertheless, no article addresses Iraq in the specific context of post-transition using a relevant historical example.

In early 2011, USIP and the Army’s Simons Center published the Interagency Handbook for Transition.31 In fact, the current OSC-I commander, Lt. Gen. Caslen, wrote the foreword.32 The Handbook included several useful tools including a useful set of cross-cutting principles and a list of conditions needed for enduring stability.33 Unfortunately, the handbook relied on lessons from only the past ten years.34 Since the past decade has been dominated by DoD-led efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, its lessons might not be completely appropriate to inform the years ahead. Also, while the Handbook laid out a number of considerations for strategic-level policymakers, it lacked specific operational-level recommendations for leaders like Lt. Gen. Caslen.35

29 In the methodology section, this paper cites several such works to develop criteria for evaluating unity of effort.
32 Simons Center, Interagency Handbook for Transitions , iii.
33 Ibid., v.
34 Ibid., iii.
Part of the difficulty in developing solutions to the unity of effort problem in a post-transition environment lies in the misperception that we face a new problem. Fortunately, using history as a guide, leaders need not invent wholly new solutions. The United States has encountered this problem before and evidence suggests that the need for unified USG action predates recent history. In fact, in 1948, senior policymakers in the Truman Administration recognized the importance of improving unity of effort as the United States attempted to thwart communist Soviet expansion. For example, as the United States began to develop its approach to supporting the Greek government, White House officials recognized how “effective implementation of U.S. policy [had been] hampered by lack of centralized control.”36 More specifically, one State Department official noted in January 1948 that lack of unity “perplexed” U.S. agencies on how to respond to issues and rendered the USG “slow in countering the moves of international Communism.”37 Clearly, the need for a unified approach is nothing new; rather, it has been an important part of U.S. responses to threats for some time.

Only a handful of scholars have written about potential lessons from the U.S. intervention in the Greek Civil War. U.S. Army Major Frank Abbott discovered that Greece was one of the least-considered subjects and that, “[f]rom 1949 to 1969, only thirteen articles appeared in professional military journals on that topic.”38 Abbott’s 1994 paper provided an informative summary of the Greek military campaign, yet it failed to consider the important and complementary non-military efforts. In 1989, historian Howard Jones asserted that the United States succeeded in Greece because it pursued a positive aim of Greek self sufficiency as opposed


37 Loy Henderson, “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Secretary of State,” in FRUS 1947, 28.

38 Abbott, The Greek Civil War, 1.
to a negative aim of preventing Communist expansion.\textsuperscript{39} Unfortunately, Jones’ strategic caveat does little to inform today’s operational-level challenges in Iraq. Finally, in a 2003 thesis, Ohio State University masters candidate John Walmsley described the central role of the U.S. military in Greece.\textsuperscript{40} Nevertheless, Walmsley failed to consider the essential U.S. Embassy contributions and neglected to examine the interagency coordination that drove SSR in Greece.

In sum, while many authors have written about unity of effort within the USG, no literature exists that explores how the USG unified its efforts to conduct SSR successfully in Greece. Likewise, no literature exists that explores how the lessons from Greece can guide current and future U.S. efforts in Iraq. To fill this gap, this paper builds upon existing knowledge to provide specific recommendations for U.S. military leaders in Iraq today.

**Methodology**

This section provides the rationale for examining the case of the U.S. mission to Greece and describes the method used to study the Greek case. As social scientists Alexander George and Andrew Bennett noted, the case study method is particularly appropriate for offering “useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems.”\textsuperscript{41} Additionally, Oxford professor Bent Flyvbjerg asserted that a well-chosen case study yields more than mere knowledge; it can also yield a degree of expertise by framing the knowledge in broader context.\textsuperscript{42} This section begins by justifying the selection of the U.S. mission to Greece by explaining that it is a good example of how the United States unified its efforts with limited resources to conduct SSR successfully and, therefore, might be the most relevant historical case to inform U.S. leaders in Iraq today. Next,

\begin{quote}

\textsuperscript{40} John Walmsley, *U.S. Military Advisors in Greece: The Development of United States Military Assistance and Counterinsurgency Operations During the Greek Civil War* (The Ohio State University, 2003), iii.


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this section describes what George and Bennett’s structured, focused comparison method is, how this study employed it, and what criteria were used to conduct the study. Finally, this section describes the scope of the study and how it focuses keenly upon the unity of effort aspects of the Greek case.

The 1947 U.S. Mission to Greece: A Relevant Historical Case

This paper asserts that the U.S. mission to Greece from 1947 through the early 1950’s is a relevant historical case to inform the USG’s efforts in Iraq today. U.S. efforts in 1947 Greece and Iraq today are both examples of the American SSR Theory in action because they are attempts to end lingering conflict without combat troops through unified civil-military assistance. By looking beyond the past ten years, this study hopes to avoid the potential emotional bias that more recent experiences can evoke and seeks to build upon historical reflections and classified documents not released until the 1970’s. Perhaps more importantly, however, there are many aspects of the Greek case that make it a very relevant historical analogy. Although George and Bennett warn that single case studies are prone to overgeneralization, this section applies Richard Neustadt and Ernest May’s timeless advice in their book *Thinking in Time* to avoid this pitfall. Neustadt and May urged those using historical analogies to examine the similarities between a historical case and a current situation carefully. In this case, the similarities between the Greek and Iraq cases include the lack of domestic political will to deploy combat troops, the presence of a persistent threat, and the presence of a political crisis that threatens stability amidst focused U.S. governance aims.

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43 For scientific findings on emotional biases from recent historical events, see Oswald Bratfisch, Gosta Eckman, Ulf Lundberg, and Kunnibert Kruger, “Subjective Temporal Distance and Emotional Involvement,” in *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology* (vol 12, issue 1, September 1971, 147–160), 147.


First, not unlike today, the years following World War II saw severely limited American political will to intervene overseas with combat troops. For example, despite some initial planning efforts, defense leaders admitted that policymakers never seriously considered deploying combat troops to Greece due to political infeasibility. This trend came to its pinnacle in 1949 when the United States stood by as Chinese Communists took over mainland China during the Chinese Civil War. In January 1949, the U.S. Ambassador to China expressed the USG’s reluctant stance, stating, “[combat troop intervention in China] is hardly a program we should encourage.”47 Today, President Obama noted how “[t]he tide of war is receding,” and that, when possible, alternatives to combat troops are preferred.48 Clearly, not unlike today, the United States in 1947 faced the onset of a period of extremely limited political will to commit ground troops to satisfy its foreign policy ambitions.

Second, with its limited resources, the United States began to square off in 1947 against degraded, but not defeated, enemies who enjoyed cross-border sanctuary. In March 1948 during the early days of the American efforts in Greece, AMAG’s chief, Dwight Griswold, described how Greek insurgents lost the initiative but were still highly capable because they could attack and control key population centers.49 Similarly, the current U.S. Ambassador to Iraq recently noted, “[a]-Qaeda in Iraq is degraded but determined, [and]… Shi’a extremist groups continue to be a serious threat.”50 In addition, in 1947 and 1948, the Greek rebels enjoyed support from, and

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dwight griswold

46 Jones, A New Kind of War, 85.
sanctuary in, Albania and Yugoslavia. Likewise, in Iraq, al-Qaeda and Iranian-backed terrorist sanctuary has not yet been fully addressed, according to influential historians and strategy advisers Kimberly and Frederick Kagan—who informed President George W. Bush’s decision to implement the 2007 Iraq troop surge.

Third, in both cases, an ongoing political crisis threatens stability. The Kagans are among the most vocal of those who point out how the well-known and ongoing political crisis in Iraq threatens to undo hard-fought gains. Likewise, the United States in Greece faced similarly volatile divisions between Communist sympathizers, a right-wing authority often accused of oppression, and several other disaffected groups. In Greece as in Iraq, the United States sought an adequate, but not perfect, solution to governance. In a 1948 paper, the National Security Council (NSC) staff described U.S. governance efforts as, “strengthen[ing] the Greek Government sufficiently to enable it to withstand communist pressure.” Similarly, in 2009, President Obama stated that, in Iraq, “[w]hat we will not do is let the pursuit of perfect stand in the way of achievable goals.”

Clearly, similarities between the Greek and Iraqi cases abound. Because of these parallels—and because of this study’s ability to heed Neustadt’s and May’s advice in finding the right historical case to study—the U.S. mission to Greece in the late 1940s is among the best cases to inform contemporary efforts in Iraq.

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56 Obama, *Responsibly Ending the War In Iraq*. 
Case Study Method and the Analytical Criteria

This study used George and Bennett’s structured, focused comparison method to determine what the USG did in Greece to enable unity of effort and, in turn, success. Simply put, the method is *structured* because the case study is tightly bound by a set of guiding questions. The method is *focused* because it considers only certain aspects of the Greek case. Consequently, this section defines the questions used to examine the case. Taken together, the answers to these questions will help answer the overall research question by discovering why or why not the United States achieved unity of effort in Greece.

Therefore, the overarching question is: how does one really know that unity of effort exists? According to the comprehensive definition this study chose, there are at least three requirements for unity of effort. This paper described these requirements of having tailor-made interagency organizations and coordination mechanisms, a shared understanding of objectives, and a cooperative integration of all elements. Below, this paper describes the three requirements in greater detail and labels these criteria as mission-focused organization, shared vision, and selfless cooperation.

The first criterion is mission-focused organization. Simply put, this criterion determines if form followed function. In 2009, former Undersecretary of Defense Flournoy claimed that unity depended on good horizontal integration. Yet, even when forced to work together, agencies still often either work separately but in concert, work separately but in conflict, or simply work redundantly. Nevertheless, cases of agencies working well together do exist—and one important factor seems to be that the form of those organizations matched a carefully chosen function. In 2008, Army War College student Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Copeland described

57 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 67.
58 Ibid.
how the National Incident Management System (NIMS) helped significantly improve unity and
effectiveness by blending multi-agency capabilities in response to a specifically identified
requirement to improve information-sharing. By identifying the requirement before forming the
interagency organization, NIMS seemed to mitigate any other competing requirements.

Apparently, unified effort does not occur merely because an organization blends representatives
from various agencies together, but also because the organization is oriented toward a specific
requirement. Clearly, ensuring form follows function is is essential to unity of effort. Therefore,
when examining the case, the question this study posed was, did USG agencies formed
organizations after identifying operational requirements?

The second criterion is shared vision. Another of Flournoy’s key concepts is vertical
integration, where policy decisions translate into action in the field. And, as Army War College
student Lieutenant Colonel Robert Madden noted, all elements should recognize that there is one
lead agency. This study draws upon both concepts. Specifically, shared vision should link
actions in the field to the broader policy goal, help each agency know who has the lead, give each
agency some understanding of how its efforts fit together with other agencies for a broader
purpose, and help each agency focus on what is most important. Therefore, when examining the
Greek case, the question this study posed was, do all elements understand how their efforts
contribute to the broader policy goals, do they understand who the lead agency is, do they
understand how their efforts work together, and do they focus on the most important tasks?

The third criterion is selfless cooperation. Simply put, selfless cooperation occurs when
various elements or agencies act in ways that contribute to the overarching U.S. effort, even if

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60 Jeffrey Copeland, *Emergency Response: Unity of Effort Through a Common Operating Picture*,


62 Robert Madden, *Achieving Unity of Effort* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,
1998), 5.
those actions are contrary to their parent organization’s interests. Flournoy’s horizontal integration concept—where various agencies work together as a team—is an important part of selfless cooperation. However, this criterion takes teamwork one step farther since it demands employees to prioritize USG’s interests over their parent agency’s interests, within the authorized limits. Unity of effort cannot occur only when it is convenient. Therefore, when examining the case, the question this study posed was, to what degree do various elements work toward the interagency organization’s goals instead of working toward the goals of their parent organization?

Scope

Clearly, to apply the three criteria to the case of the United States in Greece in the late 1940’s, this study need not consider every document on the Greek Civil War. To the contrary, this study focuses on the original source documents related to the U.S. mission to Greece. The operational-level USG efforts in Greece undertaken by the U.S. Embassy, the civilian-led AMAG, the U.S. Army Group–Greece (USAGG), and later the military-led Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), took place within the significantly important strategic context of the Truman Administration during the onset of the Cold War. Consequently, the official records and personal correspondence of senior Truman Administration officials and declassified policy deliberation documents within the State Department’s *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes between 1946 and 1949 are of particular interest. Further, personal papers of the JUSMAPG chief, Army Lieutenant General James Van Fleet, provide insight into the relationship between various USG elements in Greece. As a result, this study considered papers from the Van Fleet Collection. By focusing on these kinds of original sources, this study gained an unvarnished glimpse of how the United States achieved unity of effort in Greece.

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63 Flournoy, *Achieving Unity of Effort in Interagency Operations*. 

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Case Study: the U.S. Response to the Greek Civil War

The U.S. response to the Greek Civil War in 1947 is a case of the successful application of the American SSR Theory. This case study affirms that the United States achieved a remarkable degree of interagency unity of effort, successfully reformed Greece’s security sector, and established long-term security without combat troops. Specifically, this case study found that the U.S. met all three criteria for unity of effort. The U.S. mission to Greece established a mission-focused organization with significant integration between State and Defense elements, despite some initial difficulty. Additionally, the USG had a remarkable degree of shared vision in terms of focus, depth, and synchronization that, on at least one occasion, mitigated friction between the civilian and military leadership. And, U.S. agencies in Greece cooperated selflessly to a large degree, although much of this could be due to the relative isolation of elements in the field from their home agencies in Washington. This section examines precisely how the United States was able to unify its efforts in Greece and, in turn, create a Greek military that, in 1952, the State Department would describe as “among the best.”64 The first part of this section provides an overview of the Greek Civil War and the American response. The second part evaluates the U.S. response against the three criteria for interagency unity of effort.

Case Overview

1941–1946: Lead up to Crisis in Greece

In October 1940, Italy invaded Greece as the Axis extended their control of Europe.65 Greek government forces successfully ground Italy’s advance to a halt along Greece’s northwest


65 Abbott, The Greek Civil War, 3.
This success inspired both Britain and the United States to extend material support to Greece. Yet Hitler was unwilling to accept stalemate in Southern Europe; consequently, he assisted the Italians in April 1941 with a blitzkrieg invasion that toppled the Greek Government in a matter of weeks. Following the invasion, the Germans established a brutal occupation regime that crippled Greek infrastructure. During the occupation, a diverse group of factions united under communist leadership to form the National Liberation Front (EAM) and its Partisan Army (ELAS). According to historian Lawrence Wittner, most Greeks were not concerned about ELAS’s roots within the Greek Communist Party (KKE); rather, Greeks from all political preferences supported ELAS because of ELAS’ ability to frustrate the Germans throughout their brutal occupation that persisted until 1944.

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 1. Anti-establishment groups in Greece before, during, and after WWII**

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66 Ibid.
67 Paul Calbos, *Cold War Conflict: The American Intervention in Greece* (Department of West European Studies, Indiana University, 1993), 11.
68 Calbos, *Cold War Conflict*, 11.
70 Department of State, *Background Memo on Greece*, 1.
After the withdrawal of Axis forces in 1944, British troops attempted to reestablish the *status quo antebellum* by helping Greek King George II to reoccupy the throne.\textsuperscript{72} The British also administered new United Nations relief programs in Greece and supervised a series of reforms to support the right-wing government’s consolidation of control.\textsuperscript{73} Nevertheless, Greek society fragmented once again and, between 1944 and 1946, they endured an ELAS uprising against the government, a short-lived truce, and two highly contested elections.\textsuperscript{74} In August 1946, the Greek Government asked London and Washington to help finance its increasingly costly efforts to rebuild and bring order to its country, yet the White House was reluctant to help Greece unless it did more to help itself by implementing needed fiscal reforms.\textsuperscript{75} By October 1946, the situation seemed dire as Greece’s nascent government and army found itself trying to suppress a growing insurgent communist force with a new name: the Democratic People’s Army, or the DSE.\textsuperscript{76}

**Early 1947: The U.S. Assessment and Response**

In early 1947, the White House fully realized the growing threat at hand. In contrast to its more moderate predecessor, ELAS, the DSE held strong ties to the Soviet Union and aimed to establish a breakaway independent communist state.\textsuperscript{77} U.S. officials moved quickly to counter a potential Soviet “encirclement” of Germany and Turkey.\textsuperscript{78} In January 1947, President Truman dispatched Paul A. Porter, a recently retired political appointee, to assess the situation in Greece.

\textsuperscript{73} U.S. Department of State, *Background Memo on Greece*, 3.
\textsuperscript{74} Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, 42.
\textsuperscript{77} U.S. Department of State, *Background Memo on Greece*, 3.
and to make recommendations for what to do there.\textsuperscript{79} Although the Administration called Porter’s mission the American \textit{Economic} Mission to Greece, the State Department instructed Porter to also assess reconstruction needs, aid requirements, and other potential U.S. activities.\textsuperscript{80} He maintained a meticulous diary of his observations and reflections. On April 30, 1947, Porter published a remarkably complete, objective, and thorough report.

Porter’s assessment was complete in that he met with a wide array of Greek personalities and visited many locations. Instead of only meeting government officials, Porter obtained counter-perspectives from experts outside of government, and, when possible, he confirmed what he heard with field observations. For example, when a Greek minister argued for printing more currency to facilitate civil servant pay increases, Porter remained non-committal. Porter later met with actual civil servants and had face-to-face discussions with port and railway workers. He eventually determined that pay increases were indeed necessary, but that the larger problem was that public construction projects were too inefficient to mobilize private investment.\textsuperscript{81}

Porter’s assessment was also objective in that he avoided making conclusions based on the input of any one official. During a press conference, Porter stated, “we are here to undertake analyses…in good faith without regard to prevailing attitudes of any particular group.”\textsuperscript{82} In the example above, Porter refrained from judgment after listening to public officials advocate popular civil servant wage increases. Porter continued to examine the wage issue throughout his visit. He eventually concluded that pay increases in the short run could actually harm the economy by increasing inflation in the long run.\textsuperscript{83} Instead, Porter recommended the alternative approach of

\textsuperscript{79} Paul A. Porter, \textit{American Economic Mission to Greece, Diary}, January 21, 1947, 2, in folder 1, Box 1, Paul A. Porter Papers. Hereafter referred to as \textit{Paul A. Porter Diary}.

\textsuperscript{80} U.S. State Department, \textit{Terms of Reference}, undated, in folder 4, box 1, Paul A. Porter Papers.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Paul A. Porter Diary}, January 27, 1947, 1.

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Paul A. Porter Diary}, January 21, 1947, 1.

reducing the number of civil servants and focusing reconstruction efforts on certain key infrastructure projects. By remaining objective, Porter was better able to make a recommendation that could generate both short and long-term benefits.

Third, Porter’s assessment was thorough. His staff prepared him with detailed lists of questions which were meant to generate precise answers. For example, one set of thirty questions included, “[w]hat amounts of exports do you consider possible in the year 1947? How much is to be expected? [and] Please list by principal commodities.” Another set of questions asked, “[h]ow many buildings in this town were destroyed? How many have been reconstructed?” Porter’s diary is full of detailed information about myriad economic and governance issues.

As Ambassador Porter finished his assessment, a series of high-level deliberations took place among policymakers in Washington. Policymakers were becoming increasingly familiar with Porter’s thoughts as early as mid-February, as he had been sending frequent updates to Washington as well as preliminary recommendations to State. In early March, President Truman proposed the ambitious aid program to Greece and Turkey and connected this effort to a broader effort to contain the spread of Communism. In his speech to Congress on March 12, 1947 titled, “Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey,” Truman declared, “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.” This declaration, also known as the “Truman Doctrine,” marked the official beginning of the U.S. strategy to contain Communism.

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84 Paul A. Porter Report, 1.
85 Paul A. Porter Diary, January 31, 1947, 1.
86 Paul A. Porter Diary, January 30, 1947, 1.
89 Truman, Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 1.
Truman’s March 1947 speech was an important historic milestone. What historians do not often cite, however, are the particulars regarding Truman’s approach to Greece within the speech. In his speech, Truman described the three elegant lines of effort that the United States would pursue in Greece: 1) economic development (toward a “stable and self-sustaining economy,” 2) security force development (toward a Greek military that can “cope with the situation” and “restore the authority of government throughout Greek territory” and, 3) governance (toward a Greek Government that can effectively conduct “public administration” or, in other words, manage the economy and its security forces.\(^{90}\) And, despite the detailed work behind his assessment, Porter’s final report to the Administration was similarly elegant. In a tightly written 29-page report, Porter recommended specific economic and governance lines of effort and key objectives along each. Clearly, information from Porter’s assessment shaped Truman’s approach. In fact, Truman’s broad lines of effort even seem to be lifted straight from Porter’s assessment. Indeed, it is easy to conceive how Truman might have combined Porter’s agricultural, industrial, reconstruction, and trade lines of effort into one broad “economic development” line of effort. Likewise, it is easy to see how Truman might have aggregated the government administration, budget, and political reconciliation lines of effort from Porter’s Assessment into a broad “governance” line of effort. Figure 2 on the following page depicts the U.S. approach to Greece in both ways. Along the left side, the figure shows Truman’s economic development, governance, and security force development lines of effort. Within those broad lines, Figure 2 also depicts Porter’s four economic and four governance lines of effort and the associated objectives. While no such diagram existed in 1947, it depicts how Truman and Porter might have conceptualized the U.S. effort in Greece.

\(^{90}\)Truman, *Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey*, 2.
Figure 2. Author's depiction of the April 30, 1947 Porter Report
Congress appropriated $400 million (just over $4 billion in 2011 dollars) in economic and military assistance to Greece in May 1947. President Truman established AMAG, appointed the politically ambitious former Nebraska Governor Dwight Griswold to lead it, and sent him to Athens to work alongside career diplomat Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh.

AMAG’s mission was to “advance reconstruction and secure recovery in Greece as soon as possible” and to work generally toward the objectives that Porter had recommended in his assessment. AMAG also established the 50-man U.S. Army Group–Greece, or USAGG, which, under the direction of Griswold, was to procure supplies and equipment for the Greek National Army (GNA). Throughout the summer of 1947, as the Greeks prepared to launch a summer offensive against the guerilla “bandits,” Ambassador MacVeagh, Governor Griswold, and USAGG’s new leader, Army Major General William G. Livesay, began their work in Athens.

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96 U.S. Army Group Greece, USAGG History: Volume II, 6.
Late 1947: AMAG Fails

Despite generally following the plan laid out in Paul A. Porter’s report, the initial U.S. efforts were disorganized and, consequently, inadequate. Specifically, the U.S. efforts in Greece in 1947 were inappropriately limited, U.S. civilian efforts were poorly coordinated, and the military efforts were amateurishly led.

First, the scope of U.S. efforts was inappropriately limited. USAGG’s official mission “limited [its efforts] to matters of supply.”97 In its instructions to Livesay, Washington urged the general to limit his advice to mere “personal observations.”98 Despite the arrival of the first shipment of military supplies in August 1947 (see Figure 3), the Greek Army’s 1947 offensive failed miserably.99 In July, as AMAG operations began, the guerillas launched a counteroffensive and seized key terrain throughout northern Greece.100 By November 1947, the DSE guerillas—led by Markos Vafiades from his sanctuary in the northern Grammos Mountains—enjoyed significant freedom of movement throughout Greek rural areas, were able to successfully avoid the GNA’s assault, and were able to frustrate AMAG’s assistance efforts.101 Historian Andrew Birtle noted that, since supply and equipment matters are inextricably linked to operations, AMAG’s inability to provide operational advice to the GNA prevented the Greek Government from defeating the insurgency and prevented AMAG from achieving its mission.102

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97 U.S. Army Group Greece, *USAGG History: Volume I*, 75.
100 George C. Marshall, “Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman,” July 16, 1947 in *FRUS 1947*, 237.
Second, the U.S. civilian efforts were poorly coordinated. Indeed, a paralyzing friction between Ambassador MacVeagh and Governor Griswold quickly set in. While the initial arrangement specified that MacVeagh focus on diplomacy and governance, and that Griswold was to focus specifically on the distribution of economic and military aid, Griswold found it difficult to stay in his own lane. For example, when MacVeagh argued against deploying U.S. combat troops to Greece, Griswold sent a telegram directly to Secretary Marshall favoring the opposite.103 And, even though Griswold was told to avoid interfering in Greek political matters, he used aid funds to leverage personnel changes in the Greek government despite Ambassador MacVeagh’s intent to take more deliberate approach.104 In fact, Griswold went so far as to tell officials in Washington that, in his opinion, MacVeagh’s approach “alarmed” him and suggested that MacVeagh’s ideas threatened the overall mission.105 The friction between MacVeagh and Griswold finally came to a head when Griswold publicly questioned the legitimacy of the Greek

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104 Griswold to the Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey (McGhee), memorandum, August 14, 1947, in FRUS 1947, 295.
105 Ibid.
Government and insulted the Greek Prime Minister in direct contrast to MacVeagh’s intentions.\textsuperscript{106} To add injury to insult, Griswold appeared complicit in the release of a \textit{New York Times} article titled, “Griswold, Most Powerful Man in Greece,” which further increased the divide between the Ambassador and the AMAG chief.\textsuperscript{107} By the end of 1947, it was clear to policymakers in Washington that something had to change.

\textbf{Figure 4.} \textit{New York Times} headline, October 16, 1947 (Courtesy of the Truman Presidential Library)

Third, while few writers have commented on the quality of Maj. Gen. Livesay’s leadership, careful consideration of the source documents suggest that his command of USAGG left much to be desired and that his efforts were not well-integrated into those of the overall mission. For example, during the important policy discussions in Athens and in Washington in the summer of 1947 about the question of U.S. troop presence, Livesay’s name is noticeably absent from the discussion. In fact, not a single document in the official historical record mentions any advice from Livesay on this question.\textsuperscript{108} Notably, as senior U.S. officials in Washington and Athens began to realize that their limited approach was not working, MacVeagh said that a “superior officer of broader vision” was needed, suggesting that Livesay simply did


\textsuperscript{107} Robert A. Lovett to AMAG, telegram, October 17, 1947 in \textit{FRUS 1947}, 371.

\textsuperscript{108} In \textit{FRUS 1947}, there is no evidence that Maj. Gen. Livesay passed along any military advice to Washington through neither the AMAG Chief nor the Ambassador, which is in stark contrast to the abundant military advice that Livesay’s successor.
not have what it took to lead USAGG. Indeed, in early 1948, as policymakers considered a new way forward, Secretary of State Marshall concluded that the U.S. mission needed “a more impressive personality at the head of the military contingent,” and that this need was “urgent.”

Signs of AMAG’s progress in 1947 were few-to-nil. Despite the arrival of new military aid, the strength of guerrilla DSE forces increased sharply in 1947, according to some estimates. Guerillas continued to enjoy active support from many Greeks in terms of freedom of movement, supply, and intelligence, and the DSE controlled much of the countryside. A spring 1947 “pincer campaign” to cut the DSE off from external support lines from Albania and communist Yugoslavia failed, allowing the guerillas to escape to new locations. By the end of 1947, the Greek Army found itself back in the static defense of major population centers, further expanding guerilla freedom of movement. In addition, governance and economic conditions were no better than they were a year before. On January 6, 1948, the newly established U.S. National Security Council circulated a classified assessment throughout the government and concluded, “the Greek Government rests upon a weak foundation and Greece is in a deplorable economic state.” Clearly, the limited aim of U.S. efforts, the lack of coordination, and the inadequate military leadership did little to reverse the negative trends in Greece in 1947.

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111 See Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1945–1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 406. Estimated guerilla strength was 18,000 in the summer of 1947, then grew to 25,000 by autumn.
112 Jones, A New Kind of War, 152.
113 Abbott, The Greek Civil War, 11.
114 Ibid.
January 1948: Making Unity of Effort a Top Priority

In late 1947, Ambassador MacVeagh began to suspect the assumption that the United States could succeed in Greece by simply distributing economic and military aid was “fallacious.” In fact, one military officer told MacVeagh that, in Greece, the “house is on fire, but few in Athens or Washington seem to realize how fast the flames are spreading.” In September, the State Department asked Army Chief of Staff General Dwight Eisenhower to send a special representative to Greece to survey the military situation and make recommendations on how to improve it. On October 20th, Army Maj. Gen. S. J. Chamberlin, submitted his report to Eisenhower. Chamberlin’s recommendations were straightforward: to succeed in Greece, the U.S. mission in Greece needed to add military operational advice to its mission. And, for that to be effective, the United States needed to better unify its efforts in the field. In November, President Truman authorized the additional task of providing military advice. In the January 6th NSC paper, the NSC staff concluded that, since “[e]ffective implementation of U.S. policy [has been] hampered by lack of centralized control,” future U.S. efforts must be better coordinated. The NSC paper further described how one individual must oversee all U.S. activities in Greece and that he must assume the mission of “strengthen[ing] in every practicable

118 Loy Henderson, “Memorandum of Meeting With State Department Representatives on the Greek Situation, September 17, 1947,” in FRUS 1947, 344.
119 S. J. Chamberlin, “Report to the Chief of Staff of the Army (Eisenhower),” in FRUS 1947, 376.
120 Among other detail-oriented recommendations in his report, Chamberlin specifically recommended the establishment of an advisory and planning group to perform additional function of furnishing military advice through an advisory team and that the group report to the Ambassador instead of the AMAG chief.
121 See Abbott, The Greek Civil War, 37; also, evidence exists that suggests that U.S. policy began to shift toward providing advice as early as November 14, 1947. In a telegram to the Embassy in Greece, Secretary Marshall mentions the need to provide assistance “in the form of supplies or advice.” See George C. Marshall in FRUS 1947, 407.
way the Greek effort to withstand communist aggression.”\textsuperscript{123} Clearly, by making unity of effort a top priority and by pursuing a holistic SSR approach while still refraining from employing U.S. combat troops, the United States would begin to apply the full measures prescribed by the American SSR Theory.

On December 31, 1947, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal established the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group, or JUSMAPG.\textsuperscript{124} On February 5, 1948, General Eisenhower appointed former World War II corps commander James Van Fleet as JUSMAPG’s new director and offered him a third star as a Lieutenant General.\textsuperscript{125} Eisenhower clearly thought Van Fleet a top-notch officer, telling Griswold that Van Fleet was “one of the outstanding aggressive fighting corps commanders of the campaign in Europe.”\textsuperscript{126} Eisenhower offered Livesay the opportunity to stay in Athens as Van Fleet’s deputy, but Livesay refused.\textsuperscript{127} On the civilian side of the house, illness forced Ambassador MacVeagh to return to the United States in October 1947, leaving Governor Griswold as the de facto overall leader of the U.S. mission.\textsuperscript{128} While Griswold stayed on in Athens for several more months, the Truman Administration actively searched for a replacement to assume overall leadership of the Embassy and AMAG. In May 1948, the State Department selected long-time diplomat and international commerce expert Henry F. Grady as the next U.S. Ambassador to Greece.\textsuperscript{129} Grady was to have absolute oversight

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 6.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Department of State, Editorial Note, \textit{FRUS 1947}, 480.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Marshall to AMAG, telegram, January 26, 1948, \textit{FRUS 1948}, 37.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Department of State, Footnotes to Marshall telegram, \textit{FRUS 1948}, 37.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Lovett to AMAG, telegram, \textit{FRUS 1947}, 417.
\item \textsuperscript{129} McGhee to Lovett, memorandum, May 19, 1948, in \textit{FRUS 1948}, 88.
\end{itemize}
of all U.S. activities in Greece. With new leaders, additional resources, and a new mandate for a broader approach, the United States set the conditions to perform successful SSR in 1948.

1948–1949: Achieving Success in Greece

U.S. efforts in Greece in 1948 and 1949 focused on unifying efforts and synchronizing them along economic development, governance, security force development, and military operations lines. Specifically, by adding a focused military planning and advisory line of effort and by more aggressively pursuing the specific objectives in Porter’s 1947 report, the U.S. mission began to fully implement SSR to achieve long-term success in Greece.

Since most literature about the Greek Civil War focuses solely on military operations, the story of America’s unified approach in Greece has yet to be fully told. First, this subsection revisits the diagram from Figure 2 to describe the how the U.S. changed its approach in January 1948 to build upon Porter’s initial vision and fully implement SSR. Second, this subsection summarizes the military events of the war in 1948 and 1949 yet it avoids operational details because similar accounts exist in several other works. Third, and most importantly, this subsection highlights the economic and governance efforts in 1948 and 1949 that are so often overlooked. Overall, this subsection demonstrates how the U.S. mission was able to achieve its goals by early 1950 by unifying its efforts within a holistic approach.

Upon reorienting its efforts in early 1948, the United States more closely aligned its work with the vision laid out in Porter’s April 1947 report, albeit with a more robust military component. The first refinement is a more detailed security assistance line of effort. Specifically, the major objectives within the security assistance line of effort included the establishment of a supply distribution and storage system; the establishment of a professional and offensive ethos; the establishment of the National Defense Corps; the establishment of a training system; and the

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130 Ibid., 89.
transition of logistics systems, new equipment, and operations to the GNA. Van Fleet requested the authorization and funding of a 50,000-man Greek National Defense Corps (NDC) to relieve the GNA of its static defense responsibilities and allow the GNA to pursue offensive operations.

The second major refinement was the addition of a line of effort to advise the GNA in a new military campaign. Gen. Van Fleet designed his new line of effort—which this paper calls “conventional operations”—in collaboration with the Greek Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Dimitrios Yiadjis. Van Fleet and Yiadjis intended their new offensive campaign to begin in the spring with small-scale clearing operations to build Greek confidence followed by decisive operations to isolate and destroy guerilla strongholds in the Vitsi Mountains in the fall.

Figure 5 (on the next page) depicts the two newly refined lines of effort. In actuality, the military campaign lasted two years instead of one—and, the sequence of operations within the actual campaign differed from Van Fleet’s original plan. Nevertheless, by late 1949, the U.S. mission in Greece had achieved nearly each objective along all lines of effort. Consequently, communist forces had been forever defeated in Greece with only material and advisory support from the United States.

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133 Jones, A New Kind of War, 160.

134 This section provides only a thumbnail sketch of the military campaign from 1948 through 1949. There are several sources for more detailed accounts. In his 1989 book, This Kind of War, Howard Jones provides a thorough account of events. The most concise retelling is available in Abbott, The Greek Civil War.
Figure 2. Full Security Sector Reform efforts begin in early 1948 (refined security efforts highlighted)
From April to May 1948, Greek forces conducted Operation Dawn, which temporarily cleared DSE elements in the Roumeli region north of Athens and reopened the main lines of communication between the Greek capital and the rest of the country. From June to August 1948, Van Fleet deviated from his original plan and pushed the Greeks to attack DSE commander Markos Viafides’ headquarters in the Grammos Mountains. This operation, called Operation Crown, ended with significant DSE casualties, but allowed Markos to flee to the nearby Vitsi Mountains. From August through September 1948, the Greek Army conducted Operation Vitsi, but were repelled by Markos’ forces. Markos retained Vitsi and declared victory for the duration of the winter, forcing leaders in the United States and in Greece to cope with the reality of one more fighting season.

Figure 6. Greek Campaign Against the DSE, Spring 1948 through Fall 1949. Prepared by the author.

138 Ibid.
In January 1949, the Greek General Staff appointed General Alexander Papagos, an aggressive officer remembered for his success against the Italians in 1941. Under his leadership, the Greeks defeated a large DSE force in the Peloponnesus in January as part of Operation Pigeon. After Operation Pigeon, Markos had a falling out with his political boss, Nikolaos Zachariades, about how to employ his forces. On January 27th, Zachariades relieved Markos. Nevertheless, the DSE’s loss of the Peloponnesus (recognized as Greece’s “sacred homeland”) severely reduced popular support for the guerillas. And, as a result of a dispute between Marshal Josep Tito and the Kremlin, Yugoslavia began to seal its border with Greece, eliminating one of the DSE’s key sanctuaries. Then, between April and July 1949, Greek Government forces defeated several thousand guerillas in central Greece with a hammer-and-anvil operation named Rocket. In August 1949, the GNA launched Operation Torch, a brilliant deception campaign that allowed Papagos to seize Vitsi in just five days and eject the guerillas from their final stronghold in Grammos. Noting the Greek Government’s success in clearing the DSE from Greece, and wanting to prevent the Greek Army from pursuing the guerillas into Albania, Albanian leader Enver Hoxha agreed to seal his border. Although leaders talked of a negotiated settlement in Greece facilitated by the Soviets since spring 1949, Greek military successes severely disrupted the rebel leadership’s ability to assemble increased resistance. Since only about 800 fighters remained in Greece instead of fleeing to the north, the Greek

140 Jones, A New Kind of War, 187.
142 Jones, A New Kind of War, 190.
143 Abbott, The Greek Civil War, 32.
144 Ibid., 30–33.
145 O’Ballance, The Greek Civil War, 194.
146 Jones, A New Kind of War, 204.
147 Abbott, The Greek Civil War, 36.
148 Ibid.
149 Jones, A New Kind of War, 212.
Government was able to end offensive operations and allow low-level fighters to peacefully reintegrate.\textsuperscript{150} At this point, since the DSE lacked any meaningful way to assemble additional resistance in Greece, most observers recognize late 1949 as the end of the conflict.

Despite the significant military success in 1948 and 1949, perhaps the most significant progress during those years was non-military. In fact, AMAG moved aggressively along each economic and governance line of effort and, by March 1948, had achieved what Truman called “limited but measurable success.”\textsuperscript{151} Indeed, in its first quarterly report to Congress since reorienting its efforts, AMAG specifically addressed nearly every objective along the lines of effort shown in Figure 5 above. For example, regarding the agriculture and fishing line of effort, AMAG reported an increase in fishing fleet capacity due to the installation of refrigeration, the drainage of 100,000 acres of farmland, and the increase of agricultural production to 85 percent of pre-war levels from nearly 60 percent in 1947.\textsuperscript{152} Other significant objectives achieved included the drafting of civil service reform legislation, the establishment of a labor dispute management body, the establishment of effective rent controls, the announcement of a balanced budget proposal, the implementation of inflation control measures, and the lifting of the olive oil embargo,\textsuperscript{153}—each a specific objective in the Porter report. In a subsequent quarterly report from late 1948, Truman cited similar details, claiming that non-military efforts significantly contributed to the momentum of military gains.\textsuperscript{154} By mid-1949, the U.S. mission in Greece saw

\textsuperscript{150} Jones, \textit{A New Kind of War}, 221.

\textsuperscript{151} Harry S. Truman, \textit{Third Quarterly Report to Congress on Greek-Turkish Aid: January–March 1948} (May 12, 1948), \url{http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestopstudy_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/1-1.pdf#zoom=10} (accessed October 18, 2011), 7. Hereafter referred to as the \textit{Truman Quarterly Report #3}.

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Truman Quarterly Report #3}, 47; 45; 25.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 34; 38; 24; 25; 23; 39.

\textsuperscript{154} Harry S. Truman, \textit{Fifth Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey: July–September 1948} (December 6, 1948), \url{http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/2-8.pdf#zoom=100} (accessed on October 18, 2011), 12. Hereafter referred to as the \textit{Truman Quarterly Report #5}. 
progress along all lines of effort, reporting, “growing confidence in the [Greek] Government,” “increasing military effectiveness,” and, most importantly, declaring inflation “arrested.”\textsuperscript{155}

U.S. success in Greece by 1950 was remarkably evident. In May 1950, President Truman sent letters to MacVeagh, Grady, Griswold, and Van Fleet personally thanking them for the “success,” calling it a “significant achievement of American foreign policy,” and nothing less than a “victory.”\textsuperscript{156} In a 1952 report, the State Department noted that, by 1950, “internal security had been established.”\textsuperscript{157} Of note, when remnant guerilla forces attempted to mount an uprising in July 1950, the GNA suppressed the uprising without any significant external assistance.\textsuperscript{158} As another sign of success, the GNA even proved capable of deploying a 1,200-man force to participate in the Korean War.\textsuperscript{159} Yet, while the military successes in the Greek Civil War are important, any story that focuses solely on the military aspects of the campaign is incomplete. Indeed, the military successes might not have amounted to much at all if the U.S. mission in Greece was not able to unify its efforts and create complementary successes across a broad range of efforts.


\textsuperscript{157} U.S. Department of State, untitled report of January 4, 1952, 1, in folder 5, box 1, Paul A. Porter Papers.


Evaluation of the Greek Case

In contrast to 1947, the efforts of various U.S. agencies in Greece in 1948 and 1949 were better unified, and consequently, more effective. This raises the question: how did the U.S. mission in Greece unify its efforts and successfully reform Greece’s security sector?

Did AMAG Organize Itself to Accomplish the Mission?

By 1948, AMAG and JUSMAPG were keenly oriented toward performing the necessary functions to achieve success and their efforts were well integrated. The U.S. mission to Greece achieved mission-focused organization in two important ways. First, AMAG organized itself to address the requirements identified by the 1947 Porter assessment. By organizing itself in a non-standard way to ensure form followed function, AMAG was much more effective than it would have been if it organized itself into traditional staff sections. Second, U.S. civilian and military elements in Greece achieved a remarkable degree of integration. In fact, the real success story of the U.S. mission to Greece might be less about Van Fleet’s military operational advice and more about how the military and civilian agencies worked together to achieve economic and governance objectives.

First, a large part of AMAG’s success story was its ability to ensure its form matched the functions it needed to perform. According to an AMAG organizational chart from June 1948 (see Figure 7 below), AMAG had organized itself to mirror the lines of effort in the Porter report. The agriculture, industry, reconstruction, government administration (the Civil Government Division), and foreign trade (Commerce and Supply Division) lines of effort each had a dedicated division. The economic policy line of effort mentioned in the Porter report, perhaps because of its importance, resided within both the Labor Division and with the office of the Economic Advisor.

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160 American Mission for Aid to Greece, A Factual Summary Concerning the American Mission for Aid to Greece (Athens, Greece, June 15, 1948), 21.
who was on the Chief of Mission’s personal staff. The Public Finance division performed the revenue and expenditure lines of effort in the Porter report. Of course, the military lines of effort resided with the USAGG (and later JUSMAPG.) The additional functions, including public health, welfare, and aid distribution supported the other lines of effort. The alignment between the lines of effort in the original Porter report and AMAG’s organization is truly remarkable evidence that form followed function.

Figure 7. Chart depicting AMAG Non-standard Organization, from The American Mission for Aid to Greece, courtesy of the Truman Library

Second, evidence suggests that the military efforts of JUSMAPG were well-integrated within AMAG’s approach. Referring to the previous friction between MacVeagh and Griswold, one official rightly noted, “coordination without a coordinator is not to be expected.”161 Consequently, in October 1947, the President made clear that, upon Ambassador Grady’s arrival,

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he alone would be the senior U.S. official in Greece and would serve as the AMAG Chief of Mission. More telling, however, is how AMAG and JUSMAPG worked together. For example, in one instance, the military decided against buying wool uniforms because the Embassy warned that the purchase would place undesirable inflationary pressure on clothing prices due to the unusually low wool supply in 1948. On another occasion, the Embassy procured cold storage and distributed refrigerated trucks in locations that would benefit both the fishing industry and the Greek Army food supply system to achieve a dual benefit. In fact, the Embassy sought dual purposes in many projects to include prioritizing road reconstruction to facilitate planned military operations and rebuilding a tire re-grooving plant to support civilian industry and Army maintenance requirements. One possible factor in producing this high degree of integration could have been that the Embassy assigned a significant number of military personnel to non-military efforts and offered up several of its own civilian employees to work in JUSMAPG. By developing projects that achieved both military and non-military effects and by frequently cross-assigning personnel, AMAG was able to achieve remarkable integration.

Clearly, by forming its offices after identifying critical requirements and by integrating its efforts under one unitary leader, AMAG was able to achieve mission-focused organization. In doing so, AMAG ensured that form followed function—a significant achievement in a challenging bureaucratic environment. Nevertheless, true unity of effort requires much more than unity of command and organizational integration. The next key criterion for unity of effort that

166 Truman Quarterly Report #7, 19.
this study considers, shared vision, helps ensure that all agencies have a clear understanding of what the unified commander wants and how to achieve it.

Did the U.S. Agencies in Greece have a Shared Vision?

Among the various U.S. agencies in Greece, shared vision did exist, and, this shared vision was perhaps the most important component of U.S. efforts there. Specifically, the U.S. leaders in Greece did five important things to develop and sustain this shared vision. First, since the military and civilian agencies both focused on using the 1947 Porter report to guide their efforts, employees had a shared understanding of the tasks needed to achieve USG goals. Second, since their objectives were focused and realistic, employees knew which tasks were important and which ones were not. Third, the U.S. mission in Greece phased, sequenced, and inter-linked its objectives, enabling people working along one line of effort to see how their work affected those working along another. Fourth, the U.S. mission in Greece evaluated its progress over time, using one set of shared civil-military metrics. And fifth, all U.S. agencies in Greece shared the same overarching vision; subordinate agencies did not create their own. In fact, when tensions arose between Grady and Van Fleet, this shared vision did much to mitigate the effects of friction.

First, the U.S. Embassy in Greece and AMAG worked aggressively toward achieving specific objectives in the original Porter report. Not unlike how AMAG aligned its divisions to the specific objectives and lines of effort in the Porter report, AMAG’s quarterly reports to Congress spoke specifically to each line of effort.\(^{167}\) Information that did not address a specific objective or line of effort in the original Porter report rarely appeared in the quarterly reports. The fact that the reports focused so keenly on the Porter objectives and the fact that they disregard

\(^{167}\) For example, the Truman Quarterly Report #3, which was prepared by AMAG, included sections on military assistance, public finance, commerce and supply, administration and public welfare, agriculture, and reconstruction—each specific lines of effort in the Porter report and each specific divisions within AMAG.
extraneous information suggests that employees did the same, and that they had a precise understanding of the specific tasks needed to achieve U.S. goals.

Second, the fact that the U.S. mission in Greece set focused and realistic objectives indicates that employees did not waste their time performing superfluous tasks. In other words, the U.S. mission in Greece did not set out to do everything, nor did it seek to do everything perfectly. In being focused, the U.S. mission in Greece chose to either not address certain issues, or at least to address certain issues indirectly. For example, while the issue of land reform was certainly one driver of instability in Greece, the U.S. mission in Greece chose to address agricultural production instead—which was an even greater driver of instability. Paul R. Porter (who administered the Marshall Plan in Greece from 1949-1950 and who should not be confused with Paul A. Porter, the author of the important 1947 report) described how “land reform was not a problem” and how the U.S. leaders made a conscious decision to prioritize the production of rice to quickly generate output.168 As another example, Paul R. Porter described how U.S. officials shied away from getting entangled in reforming how the Greek Government chose its religious leaders, stating that they had to stay out of many issues and “stick to the essentials.”169

In being realistic, the U.S. mission in Greece understood that it would have to settle for less-than-perfect to achieve its objectives. For example, in a letter dated December 1949, Ambassador Grady wrote, “the key…is not to be too ambitious,” and that the U.S. mission in Greece must “cut [its] suit from the cloth we have.”170 The U.S. mission in Greece also sought to ensure that the GNA was not perfect, but “sufficient to get the job done.”171 For example, at one point, when the Greeks asked for additional trucks, the U.S. mission in Greece chose to buy

171 Birtle, The Counterinsurgency Advisory Experience, 54.
mules instead because they were less expensive and because they would be more appropriate for mountain operations. Indeed, the declassified U.S. Army Group–Greece history noted, “no consideration was given to the natural national aspiration of the Greek Government for a large and permanent armed forces” because the goal was merely to “assist the country in meeting an existing situation.” Clearly, by focusing efforts toward realistic objectives, the U.S. mission in Greece would be able to achieve more success with limited resources.

Third, the existence of phased, sequenced, and inter-linked objectives suggests that people working along one line were aware of how their work affected the work of others along another line. Van Fleet’s campaign plan for 1948 and his plan as executed in 1949 are excellent examples of the use of phasing to consolidate gains in one effort before proceeding to the next. Yet what many case studies on the Greek Civil War fail to recognize is how governance and economic development efforts were similarly phased and sequenced. For example, Paul R. Porter noted that U.S. leaders knew that security improvements would pave the way for many development projects. More specifically, however, in his third quarterly report to Congress in May 1948, Truman described how the United States sought to control inflation and establish the foundation for subsequent progress in agricultural production. Truman continued, stating that there would be further efforts to exploit progress in agricultural production by establishing trade agreements and by improving the Greek Government’s ability to manage its budget.

Importantly, U.S. leaders also recognized that activities along each line of effort were interlinked. For example, the case overview described how military success in Operation Rocket in July 1949 increased popular confidence and bolstered U.S. efforts to improve governance;

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175 *Truman Quarterly Report #3*, 8.
176 Ibid.
however, in his seventh quarterly report to Congress, Truman described how the psychological benefits of the military situation also helped relieve inflationary pressures.  

Economic improvements also supported military efforts. For example, the U.S. mission in Greece prioritized the construction of certain roads to facilitate ground operations. Interestingly, Governor Griswold described how, in June 1948, GNA successes against the communists stoked infighting among the non-communist political parties. Griswold went on to describe how the Embassy took parallel governance efforts to mitigate the risk of instability as these operations continued. In a letter to Secretary Marshall, Griswold noted that “[e]conomic, political, and military questions are all interrelated here and are inextricably interwoven.”

Fourth, by employing elegant and consolidated metrics to monitor their progress, both civilian and military employees at the U.S. mission had a shared understanding of overall mission progress. For example, officials simplified their description of inflation, agricultural output, and industrial output by reporting them against baseline 1938 levels to ensure that those who were not economists could understand them. Other measures were similarly elegant. For example, officials reported road construction as a simple percentage of roadway complete compared to roadway projected. Perhaps more important, however, was the fact that there was only one set of metrics—JUSMAPG did not have a separate set of their own. In fact, all reports went through

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177 Truman Quarterly Report #7, 1.
179 Griswold to Henderson, memorandum, June 24, 1948, FRUS 1948, 112.
180 Ibid.
182 Truman Quarterly Report #3, 24.
183 Ibid., 33.
the Embassy. Additionally, the measures they chose were meaningful. For example, by monitoring the trends of the number of people who traveled on the roads between cities and rural areas, officials could determine if security improvements were improving the population’s freedom of movement and economic activity.

Fifth, a strong shared vision mitigated the risk that personality clashes would jeopardize unity of effort. Indeed, Lt. Gen. Van Fleet was at least as recognizable to the Greek media and Greek people as Ambassador Grady was, and Van Fleet maintained his own close relationship with the Greek political leaders. As a result, friction sometimes arose between Van Fleet and Grady. For example, in late 1948, Grady became frustrated with Van Fleet over his generous aid distribution practices and this fact became public knowledge. Nevertheless, observers in Washington noted that the U.S. mission was getting results because all parties were still working toward the same overarching purpose. Indeed, a visiting State Department official noted that giving the Ambassador overall responsibility did much to improve the situation from the way it was in 1947 when USG agencies in Greece were “almost constantly perplexed.” And, unlike the situation with Griswold in 1947, Van Fleet continued to forward his correspondence to Washington through the Ambassador no matter what tensions arose—another example of how common overarching purpose mitigated any friction that might have arisen.

In sum, the U.S. in Greece established a strong shared vision in at least five ways. First, the U.S. worked along the appropriate lines of effort which were aligned with the lines in the

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184 There were no separate reports from each department, in contrast to the most commonly seen practices today. In this case, the President endorsed each report before forwarding to Congress. See Truman Quarterly Report #3 1.
185 Wittner, American Intervention, 177.
186 See Abbott, The Greek Civil War, 15. According to Abbott, Van Fleet logged 173 site visits in the three months between April and June 1950; Walmsley, U.S. Military Advisors in Greece, 57.
187 Jones, A New Kind of War, 189.
188 Henderson to Marshall, diplomatic cable, January 9, 1948, FRUS 1948, 10.
189 Walmsley, U.S. Military Advisors in Greece, 47.
1947 Porter report. Second, the U.S. established focused and realistic objectives to avoid superfluous work. Third, the U.S. phased, sequenced, and inter-linked their objectives to bridge the divide between military and non-military efforts. Fourth, the U.S. evaluated the achievement of those objectives with shared metrics. And, fifth, the U.S. ensured that all agencies understood the overarching shared vision.

Did Agencies Place the Interests of the Overall Mission Ahead of Their Own?

This case study found that selfless cooperation in Greece existed to a large degree. At least three examples show how an official set aside his parent agency’s interests to pursue the interests of the interagency mission in Greece. While it is unclear if these examples arose from a genuine spirit of cooperation, or merely from a sense of distance from Washington that probably existed at the time due to limited communication technology, these examples are nevertheless quite informative.

In the first example, Van Fleet set aside his interest in an expedient end to the insurgency to accommodate the Ambassador’s governance interests. In January 1949, certain members in the Greek and U.S. governments leaned toward setting the conditions for General Papagos to establish himself as the head of an authoritarian regime.190 Clearly, Van Fleet understood the benefits to his military mission by having a more powerful Greek partner who could at last bring effective leadership to the Greek military campaign. Indeed, in 1948, Van Fleet was instrumental in persuading Greek leaders to bring back Papagos, the former hero of the 1940 Greco-Italian War. Nevertheless, Van Fleet is unusually silent in the January 1949 discussions about Papagos. In this example, it appears that Van Fleet set aside his interests of having a strongman leader bring about an expedient military solution and deferred his interests to Ambassador Grady’s interests in promoting a more representative regime.

190 Jones, A New Kind of War, 194.
In the second example, Grady set aside his interests in having positive diplomatic
relations with Britain in pursuit of Van Fleet’s military interests. In the spring of 1949, the head
of the British Military Mission, Maj. Gen. Down, wanted military operations to focus in northern
Greece and Greek Macedonia.\footnote{Jones, A New Kind of War, 184.} Preserving positive relations with the British in Greece was
important in those days, since the U.K.’s presence in Greece—albeit small—was critical to
portraying a unified Western front against communism. Nevertheless, Grady set diplomatic
interests aside to back Van Fleet’s plan to put off operations in northern Greece and clear the
Peleponnesus instead.

In the third example, Grady resisted calls from the State Department to pursue a
negotiated settlement to the conflict. In the summer of 1949, the Greek Government achieved
significant success in Operation Rocket, accumulated increased popular support, and saw the
disappearance of a key guerilla sanctuary. Yet, rather than succumbing to several calls to seek a
negotiated settlement (including one from White House Chief of Staff Dean Rusk), Grady instead
put his faith in Van Fleet and his plans for Operation Torch.\footnote{Ibid., 212.}

Each of these examples suggest that, on several occasions, State and Defense Department
officials set aside the parochial interests of their agency in favor of the interests of the overall
U.S. mission to Greece. Nevertheless, these examples are far from conclusive. And, it is equally
possible that the mere dearth of modern information technology contributed to a perception
among U.S. officials in Greece that, instead of either the Pentagon or Foggy Bottom, the U.S.
Embassy in Athens was their true home. In any event, however, these examples illustrate the fact
that setting aside parent agency interests in favor of interagency cooperation in the field might
sometimes generate positive results.

\footnote{Jones, A New Kind of War, 184.}
\footnote{Ibid., 212.}
Summary

The U.S. response to the Greek Civil War in 1947 is an excellent example of the successful application of the American SSR Theory because the U.S. succeeded in helping a host nation to defeat a lingering insurgency through unified interagency efforts without combat troops. While most accounts of the Greek Civil War focus on the military aspects of the U.S. effort in Greece, this case study demonstrates that the military advice and planning were necessary but insufficient to achieve long-term success. Indeed, the complementary economic and governance lines of effort were truly the main efforts. Since the USG successfully unified its efforts by establishing a mission-focused organization, by fostering a shared vision, and by ensuring selfless cooperation, it was able to achieve an effect that was truly greater than the sum of its parts.

The Greek Case’s Implications for Post-Transition SSR in Iraq

Despite lingering conflict in Iraq, President Obama described in a recent speech how he intends to establish lasting peace and security in Iraq through unified governance, economic, and security cooperation efforts, without the use of U.S. combat troops. As it did in Greece, the U.S. is once again trying to apply the American SSR Theory to finish off an insurgency. And, according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Stuart Bowen, Iraqi Security Forces have their hands full. As Bowen put it, Iraq “remains imperiled by roiling ethno-sectarian tensions and their consequent security threats.”

Historians Kim and Fred Kagan noted that the two principal challenges in Iraq remain the tenuous security situation and the worrisome political situation. Clearly, the Iraq today bears strong resemblance to 1947 Greece.

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193 Obama, Responsibly Ending the War In Iraq, 2.
195 See Kagan and Kagan, “A New Mirage in the Iraqi Desert;” the Kagans specifically state that securing long-term U.S. interests in Iraq will require meeting the two “basic conditions” of Iraqi control of its territory and Iraqi political reconciliation.
The OSC-I within the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad is well aware of these challenges, having noted, “Iraq remains a bureaucratically difficult and semi-permissive environment.” As formidable as these challenges might be, the Greek case suggests that there is a third and even greater challenge for the U.S. Mission–Iraq (USM-I): the challenge of achieving the remarkably high degree of unity of effort that a State-led, post-transition SSR mission requires. Clearly, this transition marks a drastic change from the past ten years. As Lt. Gen. Caslen’s predecessor, Gen. David Petraeus, once said, big changes often begin with “getting the big ideas right.” The Greek case demonstrates that developing strong unity of effort is among the biggest of ideas.

The formative months ahead at the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad provide an opportunity to ensure the big ideas are indeed right. In fact, in a recent interview, former Undersecretary of Defense Flournoy told reporters that the nature of the long-term U.S.-Iraq security partnership has yet to be fully defined and that bilateral discussions on these important issues will take place in the months to come. Undoubtedly, these discussions will drive future USM-I requirements.

This study indicates that there are at least three implications from the Greek case that USM-I leaders should consider as it shapes the future U.S.-Iraq relationship. First, the Greek case reinforces the importance of using a thorough assessment to guide SSR efforts. Second, the Greek case shows how U.S. military efforts must be extraordinarily well-integrated with Embassy efforts, and that they must be oriented toward the key issues identified in the assessment. Third, the Greek case demonstrates the importance of identifying specific objectives and measuring progress toward those objectives—especially regarding non-military efforts.

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First, as the U.S. Embassy and OSC-I embark upon their new missions, they should do so guided by a good assessment. This study discovered how the Paul A. Porter assessment guided U.S. efforts in Greece. For Iraq, such an assessment already exists. The 2002 Future of Iraq assessment is strikingly similar to Paul A. Porter’s 1947 assessment and it could prove equally useful, if updated. From July 2002 through April 2003, the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs convened a series of working groups composed of a diverse group of Iraqi experts. The Near East Bureau produced a classified 1,200-page assessment with specific recommendations along 12 distinct post-invasion lines of effort. Much of this assessment has now been declassified and is available on the web. Like the Porter assessment, the Future of Iraq assessment did not recommend all-encompassing nation-building; rather, it focused on key objectives along critical lines of effort. For example, the economy and infrastructure report identified six essential objectives including the establishment of a foreign investment outreach entity and the cessation of certain central bank policies that exacerbated inflation. Likewise, the oil and energy report recommended decentralizing the oil industry and identified the specific pipelines, refineries, and oil facilities that required rehabilitation to generate Iraqi self-sufficiency most quickly. The Greek case shows how an assessment like this might prove invaluable in

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200 See Hassen, *New State Department Releases on the ‘Future of Iraq’ Project*, 1. Specifically, the report grouped its recommendations into the following 12 categories: water, agriculture, and environment; public health and humanitarian needs; defense policy and institutions; economy and infrastructure; transparency and anti-corruption; education; transitional justice; democratic principles and procedures; local government; civil society capacity building; free media; and oil and energy.


unifying USG efforts and helping a host nation defeat an insurgency. By revisiting and updating the Future of Iraq project, USM-I might reap similar benefits.

Admittedly, resurrecting the Future of Iraq project could invite skepticism. In late 2003, opponents of the Iraq war cited portions of the then-classified report to highlight the report’s recommendation to keep much of the Iraqi Army intact. In doing so, opponents argued that, by disbanding the Iraqi Army, the Bush Administration had failed to heed the report’s recommendations and, therefore, mishandled the war. To ensure that any new effort to develop a Future of Iraq-like assessment is not marginalized by these kinds of potentially distracting discussions, the updated assessment should proceed along under a different name.

Second, USM-I should ensure that its civil-military efforts are extremely well-integrated and oriented toward the requirements identified by the assessment. It is clear to all U.S. military personnel in Baghdad that their boss, Lt. Gen. Caslen, reports to Ambassador Jeffrey. Yet the Greek case shows how unity of command in itself is not enough to generate true unity of effort—where the whole effort is greater than the sum of individual agency efforts. OSC-I’s draft mission statement and lines of effort (see Appendix) indicate that OSC-I is off to a good start in nesting its efforts with those of the Embassy. Nevertheless, there is always room for improvement, and the Greek case could help identify additional opportunities for improved cooperation. For example, the OSC-I describes several Iraqi Security Force (ISF) modernization objectives, including Foreign Military Sales equipment procurement, sustainment, and facility improvement. The Greek example of overlapping economic development efforts at the military truck tire


204 Hassen, New State Department Releases on the ‘Future of Iraq’ Project, 1.

205 Lopez, “The Office of Security Cooperation Maintaining a Presence In Iraq.”

manufacturing plant is informative. OSC-I and the Embassy should look for every opportunity to similarly integrate ISF modernization objectives with economic development objectives.

As another example, OSC-I stated that its “deployed site activities [must be] aware of, and contributing to USM-I and CENTCOM objectives.” Yet, the Greek case prior to 1948 shows how simply being contributing to the efforts of others might not be enough. The Greek case demonstrates the importance of having Embassy and military leaders constantly collaborate to develop specific lines of effort and objectives in a common setting and publishing them in a common document. USM-I and OSC-I leaders should consider organizing their staffs to match the specific lines of effort identified by an assessment, as AMAG did in Greece. Although current USM-I and OSC-I organization tables were not publicly available at the time of publication, this could involve significant reorganization. Yet, by overlapping civil-military efforts, by developing a common approach toward common objectives, and by ensuring form follows function, USM-I can maximize its ability to unify efforts and generate lasting results in Iraq.

Third, the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad and OSC-I should develop shared metrics. In the Greek case, the U.S. Embassy–Athens consolidated input from the civilian and the military sides and submitted one quarterly report. The case study demonstrated how ensuring that U.S. civilian and military personnel in Greece used the same set of metrics became a key enabler of unified effort. In contrast, Congress has been receiving at least three separate reports on Iraq: one from State, one from DoD, and one from SIGIR. Although Congress is responsible for dictating the reporting requirements, finding a way to consolidate reports to meet all of Congress’s needs could go a long way toward further improving interagency unity of effort. And, while there is no evidence in open sources that suggests Congress is revising its reporting requirements, it is highly

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likely that it is, given the profound shift of the mission in Iraq. If USM-I were to produce an updated assessment that oriented efforts as clearly as the Porter assessment did in the Greek case, then it is easy to imagine how appreciative Congress might be as it develops its new reporting requirements.

Undoubtedly, after years of war, the men and women at the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad and OSC-I are well-prepared to tackle the challenge of interagency cooperation. Nevertheless, the case of the U.S. response to the Greek Civil War suggests that unifying interagency efforts is among the essential ingredients to a successful State-led effort to conduct SSR and to defeat a lingering insurgency without any combat troops on the ground. And, as seen in the Greek case, the degree of unity of effort needed to succeed is extraordinarily high. That said, the Greek case’s implications for Iraq are particularly important. By updating the 2002 Future of Iraq assessment, USM-I can develop a shared civil-military understanding of the lines of effort and objectives that both U.S. Embassy–Baghdad and OSC-I must pursue. By developing their lines of effort and objectives together in a common setting on a common document, both the Embassy and OSC-I can ensure they are oriented and organized to get the most our of their efforts. And, by developing a set of shared metrics, USM-I can further improve unity of effort and develop a consolidated report that could facilitate, among other things, improved Congressional oversight.

**Conclusion**

Neither Ambassadors MacVeagh or Grady nor General Van Fleet went on to achieve great fame; nevertheless, their efforts in Greece were extremely consequential, ensuring that Greece would never again fall under Soviet influence. In 1948, President Truman called upon MacVeagh once again to serve in a critical post in Lisbon during the formation of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1951, the Army sent Van Fleet to Korea where he led the Eighth U.S. Army to several stunning military victories. Although none of them sought the limelight, it is clear that MacVeagh, Grady, and Van Fleet were exceptional leaders of their time and their actions are truly worth emulating. In Greece, their ability to unify the efforts of their organizations—arguably unlike any U.S. interagency effort before or since—enabled the U.S. to defeat a residual insurgency without the commitment of a single U.S. combat trooper.

This paper began with the question: how can military leaders best support USM-I in a post-transition environment to successfully perform SSR and to achieve long-term U.S. objectives in Iraq? This study found that an extraordinary level of unified effort is the key. Under these circumstances, military leaders can work with their civilian counterparts to sharpen their shared understanding of the situation, nest their efforts within those of the Embassy, and integrate their efforts through the establishment of well-defined objectives and metrics. Informed by the Greek case, this paper specifically recommends that the U.S. Embassy and OSC-I update the 2002 Future of Iraq assessment, develop common lines of effort and objectives based on that assessment, and develop specific metrics to monitor and to help maximize their efforts.

The implications of this study are not necessarily limited to Iraq. By the end of 2014, international efforts in Afghanistan will also be civilian-led, despite the fact that the U.S. Embassy-Kabul and the international community will likely have much more work to do. Given Afghanistan’s unique regional context and the unique features of its government, the Greek case might be less relevant there. Applying this case study’s method might derive useful lessons for Afghanistan beyond 2014; however, to ensure the lessons are relevant, much care would need to go into selecting an appropriate historical case.


Also, since unity of effort is essential in any U.S. foreign policy endeavor, applying the three analytical criteria in this study to other historical cases could generate additional implications. For example, examination of the 2010 U.S. relief operation in Haiti using the three analytical questions in this paper could provide lessons for future humanitarian assistance missions. Also, an examination of the overthrow the Gadhafi regime in Libya in 2011 using the framework in this study might generate lessons for similar future operations.

Additionally, a deeper study of the case of Lt. Gen. Van Fleet and the activities of American operational advisors in JUSMAPG could offer useful insight for OSC-I personnel in the future. Although OSC-I does not officially provide operational advice, reports of continued violence in Iraq suggest that OSC-I might have to. SIGIR’s report recognized this, noting that although “the current mission of OSC-I is largely confined to the [Foreign Military Sales] caseload, …future U.S. government-[Government of Iraq] negotiations may set new parameters.” If the United States were considering expanding OSC-I’s role in some way to provide operational advice, a closer look at the roles and responsibilities of JUSMAPG personnel in Greece and what they did in the field might offer important lessons from historical precedent.

Regardless, amid growing resource constraints, interagency cooperation will increasingly be an essential component of future U.S. endeavors. Although some have claimed that the problem of unifying effort is a new one, history reveals that the problem is not new at all. Indeed, the Greek case demonstrates how history can be an important guide. Although Iraq is a far less dangerous place than it was years ago, security remains tenuous. And, although the U.S. continues to send its very best to Baghdad to solidify the gains so many have fought so hard to produce, this paper humbly offers a sliver of perspective that might help them along the way.

210 Some interpretations of SIGIR’s most recent report suggest that, since the ISF are so busy contending with insurgents, security cooperation alone might be insufficient. See Burns, “Pentagon Prepares for New Military Talks with Iraq.”

211 SIGIR, Quarterly Report, 48.
Appendix

The document below, dated December 3, 2011, is an unclassified point paper produced by the OSC-I staff requesting Lt. Gen. Caslen’s approval of the OSC-I mission statement and lines of effort. At time of publication, an approved OSC-I mission statement was not available in open sources.

Point Paper
On
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) Strategic Plan

Background

Following eight years of conflict and progress, the United States and Iraq are entering a new relationship. Specifically, under your direction and that of the US Embassy, OSC-I will stand up and usher in a long term commitment to security cooperation like many nations around the world. However, many challenges unique to Iraq still exist. Iraq remains a bureaucratically difficult and a semi-permissive environment—both capable of severely hampering progress.

Discussion: Proposed OSC-I Strategic Plan Mission Statement and Lines of Effort

Draft mission statement for approval: The Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq, in coordination with USCENTCOM and USM-I, conducts enabled Security Cooperation activities to build partner capacity in support of the developing strategic partnership with a sovereign, stable, self-reliant, and regionally-integrated Iraq.

OSC-I’s Proposed Lines of Effort (LoE):
- Modernize the ISF
- Train the ISF
- Professionalize the ISF
- Integrate Regional Activities.

Each line of effort has objectives that define the LoE.

LoE’s:

a. Modernize the ISF. Involves the fielding of equipment primarily through the Foreign Military Sales program. Pure FMS programs, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Iraq Security Force Fund VII (ISFF VII) allow the Iraqis to address key capability gaps in Iraqi Service Components, Ministry of Interior (Police), and Counter Terrorism Service. Additional objectives in this LoE: are sustainment and facilities which are linked to the equipment being fielded.

b. Train the ISF. Focuses on improving ISF institutional, operational, and interagency training. Institutional training is at the basic, intermediate, and advanced levels across cohort, as well as in functional and specialty areas. Operational training focuses on FMS delivered training, but can be expanded in the future to address the combined arms and joint levels. Significant resource shortfalls in this area require non-traditional solutions and support to achieve even modest objectives.

c. Professionalize the ISF. Develops the discipline and competencies in all officer, warrant, and enlisted personnel required to conduct military operations. This includes development of a professional military ethic, improved doctrine written and promulgated,

Col Fleck/OSC-I J5/1318-239-5805/1mf/3 Dec 11
improved PME across cohort and through echelon, and improved organization processes and systems at the ministerial and enterprise level.

d. **Integrate Regional Activities.** Focuses on mission command ensuring staffs and deployed site activities are aware of and contributing to USM-I and CENTCOM objectives. Further, emphasis is placed on fostering strong mil-mil ties and supporting CENTCOM's regional architecture through support of regional exercises, strategy, and planning efforts.

**Recommendation.** Approve OSC-I Mission Statement and Lines of Effort.
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