U.S. Army PFC Brialynn Lanteigne provides security for a traffic control point in the Sabari District of Afghanistan, 28 January 2010. (U.S. Army, SGT Jeffrey Alexander)

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UNLEASHING DESIGN
Planning and the Art of Battle Command


Design is neither a process nor a checklist. It is a critical and creative thinking methodology to help commanders understand the environment, analyze problems, and consider potential approaches so they can exploit opportunities, identify vulnerabilities, and anticipate transitions during a campaign.

—FM 5-0, The Operations Process

With the publication of the most recent edition of Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operations Process, our doctrine is on the cusp of what is arguably the most significant change to our planning methodology in more than a generation. While our proven methods for conducting deliberate planning have changed little since being introduced, the world around us has experienced fundamental paradigm shifts that threaten to invalidate those traditional methods. Although our Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) remains an indispensable model for the problems posed by a bipolar security environment, it fails to provide the advanced cognitive tools necessary to solve the complex, ill-structured problems common to contemporary operations. The introduction of design in FM 5-0 addresses that gap in our doctrine, while providing a sound approach to address the challenges inherent to 21st-century conflict.

FM 5-0 defines design as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.” Unlike formal, detailed planning, design is not a process but an approach to organizing the higher-order, more conceptual activities of battle command. It is an iterative activity occurring throughout the operations process “before and during detailed planning, through preparation, and during execution and assessment.”

Why Design?

Design is not a function to be accomplished, but rather a living process. It should reflect ongoing learning and adaptation . . . it is dynamic, even as the environment and . . . understanding of the environment is dynamic.

—FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency

Army doctrine draws a fine distinction in planning, recognizing that it consists of two separate, but closely related, components: design, which
represents the conceptual component of planning, and detailed planning, conducted through formal processes such as the MDMP or the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP). Design is not a replacement for such processes, nor is it intended to replicate any of the established detailed planning steps. Instead, design complements traditional planning processes (see Figure 1). In an era when operations are typically affected by far more factors than at any time in our history, design offers the thinking tools necessary to develop a deeper understanding of the context of the situation, identify the underlying causes of conflict, and formulate flexible approaches to solve them.

Many of the concepts underpinning design are not new. For years, intuitive senior commanders have used the fundamentals of design to improve their understanding of the operational environment, form teams of select individuals to assist in providing analysis and advice, and leverage dialog and assessment to build learning organizations. The introduction of a doctrinal approach in FM 5-0 marks the codification of a design methodology that complements and reinforces the successful articulation of battle command.

Other models emerged in the past decade that promised to optimize our ability to formulate solutions to the complex, ill-structured problems becoming increasingly common. Effects-based operations (EBO) drew on complexity theory and closed-systems analysis to offer a holistic view of the operational environment in its constituent, interrelated parts. While the Air Force successfully implemented a model of EBO based on structural complexity, it was not well suited to the interactive nature of operations among the people. Systemic operational design (SOD) shares many of the same characteristics of design, but in application proved too complicated and staff-centric for most operational commanders. Though both EBO and SOD initially appeared to hold great promise, they were ultimately rejected. Building on the lessons from these earlier models, design offers a relatively simple methodology that can be applied at any level, in any situation.

The Goals of Design

The commander’s thinking, foresight, instinct, experience, and visualization are particularly important during the early design effort, when identifying the true nature of a complex problem and designing an approach to the solution will drive subsequent planning and execution.

—General James N. Mattis, U.S. Joint Forces Command

Broadly, design seeks to accomplish four distinct goals that are essential to transforming the conditions of the operational environment. These goals underpin the cognitive logic of the activities of battle command and are reflected in the reasoning that ultimately guides detailed planning. Individually, the goals of design are vital components to the effective application of operational art. Collectively, they are essential to mitigating the effects of complexity—uncertainty, chance, and friction—on operations in an era of persistent conflict.
Understand ill-structured problems. Persistent conflict underpins our view of the operational environment and presents a broad array of problems to commanders and their staffs in 21st century operations. Understanding these problems within the context of the operational environment—both their nature and their central characteristics—is fundamental to design and essential to success in an era of persistent conflict. In general terms, these range from simple, well-structured problems to complex, ill-structured problems.8

Understanding complex, ill-structured problems is essential to mitigating the effects of complexity on full spectrum operations. This understanding, achieved through collaborative dialog and analysis, facilitates learning and allows commanders to better appreciate numerous factors that influence and interact with operations. Assessing the complex interrelationships among these factors and their influence on operations is fundamental to understanding and enables the commander to make qualitatively better decisions.

Anticipate change. Rather than responding to events as they unfold, commanders and staffs use design to anticipate change in the problem and operational environment and manage transitions before they occur. Through the application of design, commanders and staffs consider potential decisions and actions, and assess possible operational approaches to determine how they contribute to achieving the desired end state. Design alone does not assure success in anticipating change, nor does it guarantee that friendly actions will improve the situation. However, design does provide an invaluable set of thinking tools to help commanders and staffs anticipate change and develop, innovate, and adapt approaches. Iterative, collaborative, and focused design offers the means to effectively anticipate change, increasing both the adaptability and agility of the force.

Create opportunities. The design methodology helps commanders set in motion the actions that allow friendly forces to act decisively and purposefully, shaping the situation as events unfold. The exercise of design is inherently continuous and proactive; it creates opportunities for success by setting the conditions for success before the onset of operations. It also facilitates mission command, ensuring that forces are postured to seize the initiative and, through detailed planning, consistently able to seek opportunities to exploit that initiative while concurrently safeguarding potential vulnerabilities. This ensures commanders act promptly as opportunities arise or leverage risk to create opportunities in the absence of clear direction.

Recognize and Manage Transitions. In an era of persistent conflict, our Army requires versatile leaders, critical and creative thinkers capable of recognizing and managing the myriad transitions necessary to achieve success. In a dynamic and complex situation, these include not just friendly transitions but those of adversaries as well as the operational environment. Commanders and staffs must possess the versatility to operate anywhere along the spectrum of conflict and the vision to anticipate and adapt to transitions that will occur over the course of an operation. Design provides the cognitive tools to recognize and manage transitions, identify and employ adaptive, innovative solutions, create and exploit opportunities, protect potential vulnerabilities, and leverage risk to advantage during these transitions.

Design and Battle Command

Given the inherently uncertain nature of war, the object of planning is not to eliminate or minimize uncertainty but to foster decisive and effective action in the midst of such uncertainty.

—FM 3-07, Stability Operations

The commander is the central figure in leading design. Utilizing both experience and understanding, his presence is essential for wise direction, sound judgment, and decision making throughout the operations process. His leadership and interaction with the staff is enriched with experience, knowledge, character, and intuition. Design supports his execution of battle command, providing a methodology that fosters the development of understanding in uniquely dynamic situations (Figure 2). Design underpins the cognitive expression of battle command, enhancing the commander’s ability to understand, visualize, and
It helps commanders and staffs develop a thorough understanding of the operational environment, frame the context of the situation, and formulate effective solutions to complex, ill-structured problems. It provides the thinking tools to generate change, shaping an existing situation into a desired objective or condition.

Successful exercise of design relies on effective and decisive leadership built on a foundation of active engagement and continuous dialog and collaboration. This facilitates parallel and collaborative planning and assessment, and supports the development of the shared understanding and visualization essential to leveraging the full potential of a learning organization. Through the design methodology, the commander and staff convert raw intellectual power into effective combat power.

Innovation and adaptation are vital to battle command and among the central tenets of design. FM 5-0 states that “innovation involves taking a new approach to a familiar or known situation, whereas adaptation involves taking a known solution and modifying it to a particular situation or responding effectively to changes in the operational environment.” Articulating battle command through design helps the commander lead innovative and adaptive work and guides the operations process. Design fosters continuous learning while facilitating the active dialog and collaboration critical to understanding and decision making throughout battle command.

Fundamentals of Design

Today’s operational environment presents situations so complex that understanding them—let alone attempting to change them—is beyond the ability of a single individual.

—FM 5-0, The Operations Process

At its essence, design provides the thinking tools to better understand and mitigate the adverse effects of complexity on full spectrum operations. According to research psychologist Gary A. Klein, in persistent conflict, where operations among the people are the norm, complexity is ubiquitous; uncertainty, chance, and friction are common to every operational environment. Simplicity is a key
to building a shared understanding of the situation, the problem, and the solution. Simplicity begins with a common frame of reference derived through continuous dialog and collaboration—central tenets of design. As with any activity, these tenets reflect the fundamentals upon which success depends. In design, the fundamentals help to counter the effects of complexity by encouraging commanders to exercise initiative, embrace risk, and seize opportunities.

**Apply critical thinking.** The effective exercise of design is deeply rooted in the fundamentals of critical and creative thought. Critical thinking derives from purposeful, reflective judgment and reasoning, and drives the continuous learning essential to adaptation in design. Creative thinking fosters innovation by capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas. In applying critical and creative thinking, continuous dialog and collaboration help to develop a shared understanding of the situation and the operational environment while improving upon the often-flawed nature of individual thought. Critical thinking involves asking appropriate questions, gathering relevant information, deriving sound conclusions, and effectively communicating the essence of those conclusions to others.

Critical thinking also helps distill the immense amounts of information and determine those elements of information that are most relevant to the situation. This is an important step in mitigating the risk associated with guidance that does not fully account for the complexities of the operational environment. Critical thinking helps to clarify guidance and enables commanders to achieve a mutual understanding of the current situation and the desired end state.

**Understand the operational environment.** Understanding is fundamental to design. It allows leaders to gain an appreciation for the dynamic nature of the operational environment to better visualize the effects of their decisions and actions on the operational environment. This fosters more effective decision making and better integration of military operations with the other instruments of national and international power. In an operational environment characterized by the presence of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners, such understanding is essential to success.

Developing understanding is a continuous process, facilitated through dialog, collaboration, and circulation. Understanding will never be perfect, but developing an appreciation for its incomplete nature helps identify both intended and unintended consequences that may result from, and undermine, well-intentioned efforts. This appreciation reveals the dynamic nature of human interactions and the importance of analyzing those factors that contribute to understanding. Leaders can gain this understanding by leveraging multiple sources and perspectives and consulting with varied sources of knowledge. Understanding allows the commander and staff to seek and address complexity before attempting to impose simplicity.

**Solve the right problem.** In recent years, our traditional, detailed planning processes have proven to be especially effective at problem solving, but not always the right problem. The effective application of design is often the difference between solving the problem right and solving the right problem. Design is essential to identifying and solving the right problem. Commanders and staffs use design to closely examine the symptoms, the underlying tensions, and the root causes of conflict in the operational environment. From this perspective, they can identify the underlying problem with greater clarity and determine how best to solve it with feasible plans and orders.

**Adapt to dynamic conditions.** Innovation and adaptation provide the flexibility that allows the commander and staff to adjust to the dynamic nature of the operational environment. In doing so, they capitalize on fleeting opportunities by quickly recognizing and exploiting decisions and actions that produce favorable results while dismissing those that do not. Leaders do not rely on being able to anticipate every challenge or opportunity; instead, they use continuous assessment, innovation, and adaptation to cognitively maneuver the complex, dynamic conditions of the operational environment. Assessment fuels innovation and adaptation and is crucial to the design methodology.

Adaptation demands clearly articulated measures of effectiveness, which in turn provide a means of gauging success and failure while revealing opportunities for innovation. Typically, this involves reframing the situation to align with new information and experi-
ences that challenge existing understanding. Through framing and reframing, design provides a foundation for learning and contributes to the improved clarity of vision vital to successful commanders.

**Achieve the designated goals.** The articulation of battle command through design is vital to success across the levels of war: As Klein states, “If the link between strategy and tactics is clear, the likelihood that tactical actions will translate into strategic success increases significantly.” Integrating and synchronizing sequences of tactical actions to achieve a strategic aim often proves elusive, and even more so with complex, ill-structured problems. Through design, commanders set in motion the cognitive activities that cement the link between tactical actions and strategic objectives. As understanding of the operational environment and problem improves, the design methodology helps to strengthen this link between tactics and strategy, promoting operational coherence, unity of effort, and strategic success.

**The Design Methodology**

Designing focuses on learning about an unfamiliar problem and exploits that understanding to create a broad approach to problem solving... Designers learn about the problem through discourse with the client in which the designer is constantly questioning his assumptions and probing the limits of his knowledge.

―TP 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design

In application, design consists of three distinct activities or spaces: framing the operational environment, which corresponds to the *environmental space*; framing the problem, which accounts for the *problem space*; and considering operational approaches, which determines the *solution space* (see Figure 3). These spaces represent the iterative, continuous activities that collectively produce an actionable design concept to guide detailed planning. Together, they represent an organizational learning paradigm that seeks to answer three basic questions:

- What is the context in which design will be implemented (the environmental space)?
- What problems should be addressed and what must be acted upon (the problem space)?
- How will the problem be solved or managed (the solution space)?

With the exercise of design, the commander and staff consider the conditions, circumstances, and factors that affect the use of capabilities and resources as well as those variables that bear on decision making. When initial efforts do not achieve the necessary understanding of behavior or events, commanders reframe their understanding of the operational environment and problem. This cycle of logical inquiry, contextual analysis, transformational learning, and synthesis is rooted in continuous dialog and collaboration. Dialog and collaboration are fundamental to design, providing opportunities to revise understanding or approaches
as the problem and the dynamic conditions of the operational environment continue to evolve.

Design is a nonlinear methodology, flowing freely between environmental framing and problem framing while concurrently considering operational approaches. No hard lines delineate individual activities. When an idea or issue is raised, the commander and staff can address it in the appropriate space, even if the idea or issue is outside the current focus. As they gain additional knowledge or begin a new line of questioning, they may shift their focus among the activities, building understanding and refining potential operational approaches to solve the problem.

Framing the Operational Environment

Framing involves selecting, organizing, interpreting, and defining a complex reality to provide boundaries for analyzing, understanding, and acting. It facilitates hypothesizing, or modeling that scopes the aspect of the operational environment or problem under consideration, providing a perspective from which complex, ill-structured problems can be better understood and acted upon.

To develop a more thorough understanding of the operational environment, the commander and staff focus on defining, analyzing, and synthesizing the characteristics of the operational variables. This helps to visualize and describe the groupings, relationships, or interactions among relevant actors and operational variables. It is an important learning activity that typically involves an analysis of the operational variables and an examination of the dynamic interaction and relationships among the myriad of other factors in the operational environment.

ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME: WHAT IS THE CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION?

Figure 4. Example environmental frame.
Environmental frame. The commander and staff develop a contextual understanding of the situation by framing the operational environment. The environmental frame underpins understanding within battle command, capturing the history, culture, current state, and future goals of relevant actors in the operational environment. It enables commanders to forecast future events and the effects of potential actions and decisions. The environmental frame explains the actors and relationships within the operational environment and evolves through continuous learning.

Within the environmental frame, commanders and staffs review existing guidance and directives, articulate existing conditions, determine the desired end state and supporting conditions, and identify relationships and interactions among relevant actors and operational variables. They analyze actors that exert significant influence within the operational environment, with the understanding that individual actors rarely share common goals.

End state and conditions. The desired end state consists of those conditions that, if achieved, represent the accomplishment of the mission. Since every operation should focus on a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable end state, success hinges on accurately describing those conditions. These conditions may be tangible or intangible. They may be military or nonmilitary. They may focus on physical or psychological factors. They may describe or relate to perceptions, levels of comprehension, cohesion among groups, or relationships between organizations or individuals. Ultimately, they form the basis for decisions that ensure operations progress consistently toward the desired end state.

Relevant actors. An actor is an individual or group within a social network who acts to advance his personal interests. Relevant actors within such a network may include states and governments; multinational actors such as coalitions, alliances, and regional groupings; and terrorist networks, criminal organizations, and cartels. They may also include multinational and international corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and other actors able to influence the situation either through, or in spite of, a legitimate civil, religious, or military authority.

Tendencies and potentials. In developing their understanding of the interactions and relationships among relevant actors, commanders and staffs consider tendencies and potentials in their analyses. Tendencies reflect the inclination of relevant actors to think or behave in a certain manner. Potential represents the inherent capacity for growth within a specific relationship. Tendencies and potentials are important factors for consideration since not all interactions and relationships support achieving the desired end state.

Framing the Problem

Problem framing involves understanding and isolating the underlying causes of conflict, identifying and defining the fundamental problems to be solved. Problem framing begins with refining the evaluation of tendencies and potentials and identifying tensions between the current and future conditions of the operational environment. Problem framing is used to assess the potential of the operational variables to foster (or resist) transformation and how environmental inertia can be leveraged to achieve the desired conditions.

The problem frame. The problem frame refines the environmental frame that articulates the actions that will achieve the desired end state. It identifies areas of tension and competition—as well as opportunities and vulnerabilities—commanders must address to achieve the desired end state. Tension reflects the resistance among, or friction between, individual actors. The commander and staff identify tension by analyzing and evaluating the tendencies, potentials, and trends within the context of the operational environment. They identify motivations and agendas among the actors, and social, cultural, and ideological factors that may influence them.

During problem framing, commanders and staffs seek to identify the positive, neutral, and negative implications of the natural tensions between existing and desired conditions. These tensions may be exploited to stimulate change and are thus vital to transforming existing conditions. Other tensions may undermine transformation and must be...
addressed appropriately. Tensions also arise from differences in perceptions, goals, and capabilities among relevant actors; they are inherently problematic and may foster (or impede) transformation. The analysis of these tensions, and the synthesis of the knowledge gained from such analysis, helps the commander and staff identify the underlying problem to be solved.

**Identifying the problem.** A concise problem statement clearly and succinctly describes the problem or problem set to solve. It illustrates how tension and competition affect the operational environment and articulates how to transform the current conditions to the desired end state. The problem statement defines the requirements for transformation, forecasting changes in the operational environment while identifying critical transitions.

**Considering Operational Approaches**

Activities within the solution space provide focus and set boundaries for identifying possible actions to transform the conditions of the operational environment. The staff considers how these actions support achieving the desired end state, and creates a conceptual framework or approach, linking potential actions to conditions. They also consider how to best orchestrate those actions to solve the problem within the context of the environmental frame.

The operational approach is a conceptualization of the actions that will produce the conditions that define the desired end state. In developing the operational approach, commanders and staffs evaluate the direct or indirect nature of interaction and relationships among relevant actors and operational variables within the operational environment. The operational approach helps commanders to visualize and describe broad combinations and sequences of actions to achieve the desired end state. As courses of action are developed and refined during detailed planning, the operational approach provides the logic that underpins the unique combinations of tasks required to transform the conditions of the operational environment.

**Operational initiative.** The commander and staff also identify specific actions that enable the force to seize and maintain the initiative. They seek opportunities to exploit the initiative and recognize the likelihood of unintended consequences or threats. The staff explores the risks and opportunities of action by identifying exploitable tensions, including the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the actors who oppose the desired end state. They can then formulate methods to neutralize those capabilities and exploit such vulnerabilities, essentially leveraging uncertainty against an adversary.

**Resources and risks.** While formulating operational approaches, the commander and staff also consider resources and risks. The staff provides an initial estimate of the resources required for each recommended action in the design concept. Creative and efficient approaches are essential to conserving and optimizing the limited resources directly controlled by the commander. Risks are identified and considered throughout design. The initial planning guidance addresses risk; it explains the acceptable level of risk necessary to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative and broadly outlines risk mitigation measures.

**Forging the Design Concept**

The design concept is the link between design and detailed planning. It reflects understanding of the operational environment and the problem while describing the commander’s visualization of a broad approach for achieving the desired end state. The design concept is the proper output of design, and includes—

- Problem statement.
- Initial commander’s intent.
- Commander’s initial planning guidance (including the operational approach).
- Mission narrative.
- Other products created during design (graphics, narratives, etc.).

The products created during design include the text and graphics of the operational environment and problem and diagrams that represent relationships between relevant actors and convey understanding to the planning staff. The problem statement generated during problem framing communicates the commander’s understanding of the fundamental problem that detailed planning seeks to solve. The initial commander’s intent and planning guidance articulate the desired end state, describing the potential actions in time, space, and purpose that link the desired end state to the conduct of full spectrum operations.
The mission narrative is the expression of the operational approach for a specified mission. It describes the intended effects for the mission, including the conditions that define the desired end state. FM 5-0 explains that the mission narrative “represents the articulation, or description, of the commander’s visualization for a specified mission and forms the basis for the concept of the operation developed during detailed planning. An explicit reflection of the commander’s logic, it is used to inform and educate the various relevant actors whose perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are pertinent to the operation.” The mission narrative is also a key step in the development of supporting themes and messages for the operation. As the articulation of the commander’s visualization of the mission, it is a vital tool for integrating information engagement tasks with other activities during execution.

Reframing

Reframing reflects a shift in understanding that leads to a new perspective on the problem or environmental frames. It typically involves significantly refining or discarding the problem statement that formed the basis of the design concept, and can stem from considerable changes in understanding the situation, the conditions of the operational environment, or the desired end state. Generally, reframing is triggered in one of three ways: a major event causes a significant or catastrophic change in the operational environment; a scheduled review reveals a major problem; or assessment challenges understanding of the existing problem and, thus, the relevance of the operational approach. Reframing allows the commander and staff to make adjustments throughout the operations process, ensuring that tactical actions remain fundamentally linked to the desired end state.

The operational environment is in a constant state of flux. Therefore, the problem frame must also evolve. Recognizing when an operation—or planning—is not progressing as envisioned provides the impetus for reframing. During execution, commanders choose to reframe when the desired conditions have changed, are not achievable, or cannot be attained through the existing operational approach. Conditions will invariably change during the course of an operation; such change is inevitable due to the interaction and relationships among relevant actors within the operational environment. Although organizations are strongly motivated to reflect and reframe following failure, reframing is equally important in the wake of success. Success transforms the operational environment and creates unforeseen opportunities to exploit the initiative. Recognizing and anticipating change is fundamental to design and essential to continuous learning.

Design represents the most significant change to our planning methodology in more than a generation. It provides the thinking tools that support the commander’s ability to understand, visualize, and describe, underpinning the effective exercise of battle command. Design supports this articulation of battle command, helping commanders to develop a thorough understanding of complex, ill-structured problems while providing a logic framework to generate change from an existing situation to a desired objective or condition. It derives success from innovation, adaptation, dialog, and collaboration; it provides the intellectual foundation that facilitates parallel and collaborative planning while supporting shared understanding, visualization, and learning across the echelons of command and among diverse organizations. In an era of persistent conflict, where the operational environment is as fundamentally dynamic as the human element that dominates it, design represents an intellectual paradigm shift that postures leaders for success in the 21st century. MR
2. Ibid.
4. Note: Design is closely related to, but not synonymous with operational design. Design sets the broad template for action, the operational approach; the elements of operational design are used to add definition and specificity to that template during detailed planning. While design is not process-oriented, the application of the elements of operational design is a focused process that results in actionable tasks and missions intended to produce the desired end state conditions and objectives.
6. FM 5-0 describes persistent conflict as "protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends." Persistent conflict is a central theme in both our Future Force Capstone Concept (TRADOC Pamphlet [TP] 525-3-0, December 2009) and our capstone operational doctrine, FM 3-0. In his white paper, The Army of the 21st Century, Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey Jr., draws on persistent conflict to frame the future operational environment.
7. A problem represents the difference between a current state and a future state. In planning, the problem is reflected in the difference between the conditions of the operational environment at the outset of operations, and the conditions present when the desired end state is achieved. Design is essential to determining the broad approach that will shape those conditions appropriately and thus accomplish the mission.
8. TP 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (Fort Monroe, Va: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 28 January 2008), 8-11. TP 525-5-500 includes a lengthy discussion of the three types of operational problems (well structured, medium-structured, and ill structured), with a particular emphasis on the complex, ill-structured problems that are central to design.
9. The “describe” activity within battle command lies at the confluence of cognition and action, reflecting the overlap between design and deliberate, formal planning.
10. FM 5-0, 3-1.
11. In his book, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, research psychologist Gary A. Klein noted that even as we develop advanced technological solutions to close the information gaps that cause uncertainty, other environmental changes will ensure that uncertainty remains central to our experiences. As a result, decisions will never be perfect, and the experience, judgment, character, and intuition of the commander become all the more important.
13. The operational variables (PMESII-PT) are described in detail in FM 3-0, chap. 1.
14. FM 3-07, 4-6.
15. FM 3-0 defines operational approach as “the manner in which a commander contends with a center of gravity.” This singular focus on a center of gravity limits the application of the operational approach in a fashion consistent with operations in an era of persistent conflict. FM 5-0 applies the operational approach in a broader context better suited to the future operational environment, where complex, ill-structured problems are the norm. This description of the operational approach ensures that it is framed by the commander and staff during design and not limited to center of gravity analysis during deliberate planning.
16. FM 5-0, 3-13.
17. Ibid.
Of the many lessons drawn from over seven years of wartime experience, one that stands out prominently is the critical need to improve our ability to exercise the cognitive aspects of battle command—understanding and visualizing.¹

— Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell

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**Field Manual 5-0**

**Exercising Command and Control in an Era of Persistent Conflict**

Colonel Clinton J. Ancker, III, U.S. Army, Retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Flynn, U.S. Army, Retired

Our Army, as part of a Joint interdependent force, continues to engage in full spectrum operations around the world. Several global trends—such as failing and failed states, resource demands, and proliferations of weapons of mass destruction—make it likely that future decades will be characterized by persistent conflict. Protracted confrontations among state, nonstate, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends appear certain. Whether reacting to natural disasters or confronting armed enemies, Army forces will continue to conduct operations in complex, ever-changing, and uncertain operational environments.

Operational experience and lessons, transformational changes, and recent revisions to Joint and Army doctrine now demand major revisions to Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *The Operations Process*. Of the many lessons learned from wartime experience since 2001, the need to improve our ability to exercise the “thinking” aspects of command and control stands out.² The 2010 edition of FM 5-0 represents a significant evolution in Army doctrine focusing on the cognitive aspects of command and control.

The revised FM 5-0 describes how commanders—supported by their staffs, subordinate commanders, and other partners—exercise command and control during the conduct of full spectrum operations. In operations, commanders face thinking and adaptive enemies, changing civilian perceptions, and differing agendas of various organizations in an operational area. Commanders can never predict with certainty how enemies or civilians will act and react or how events may develop. During execution, leaders must continuously anticipate, learn, and adapt to overcome the dynamics of changing circumstances and adaptive adversaries. The best outcomes require leaders to develop holistic understanding of the environment, frame problems, and
develop approaches to solve or manage those problems. From such understanding, leaders can develop simple, flexible plans that communicate their vision and intent by focusing on the results they expect to achieve. Commanders must encourage continuous collaboration across the force to better understand the situation as they adjust plans or reframe problems throughout the conduct of an operation.

Making the Manual
This revision of FM 5-0 began in parallel with the revision of FM 3-0, *Operations*, in 2006. As part of the development strategy for FM 3-0, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) staffed a series of issue papers to a broad audience of military and civilian organizations to stimulate debate and gain consensus concerning the Army’s direction for its capstone doctrine on operations. Topics ranged from the Army’s operational concept of full spectrum operations to the construction of the warfighting functions (intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, sustainment, and command and control). Feedback from these issue papers revealed gaps to include insufficient doctrine on assessment, a need to better describe how stability operations are integrated into full spectrum operations, guidelines for command post organization and operations, and an Army position on so-called “effects-based” operations. These shortfalls led to the development of Field Manual Interim (FMI) 5-0.1, *The Operations Process*, published in 2006. This interim field manual filled a significant gap in doctrine until the ideas in FM 3-0 and FM 5-0 could be fully examined, evaluated, and published. FMI 5-0.1 provided a basis for the command and control chapter of FM 3-0 as well as the foundation for the revision of FM 5-0.

During this period, the Army also examined concepts to assist commanders in understanding complex, ill-structured problems and ways to visualize approaches to solve those problems. Collectively known as “design,” several organizations—such as Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Army Concepts Integration Center, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the Army War College—explored ways to incorporate the theories and philosophy of design into practical application for military operations. In January 2008, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, *Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design*, captured the latest ideas of how design could enhance command and control. Simultaneously, SAMS developed and began teaching its “Art of Design” curriculum that addressed subjects ranging from the theoretical basis of design to practical application in operations through three formal exercises. Both the TRADOC pamphlet and the work from SAMS significantly influenced the incorporation of design into the Army’s doctrine on the exercise of command and control.4

With significant collaborative effort over the last three years, the Army developed and staffed three drafts of FM 5-0. The manual was also shared with the Joint staff, combatant commands, and selected interagency organizations, including the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development. CADD hosted three action-officer-level councils of colonels in an effort to synthesize and integrate over 3,000 comments from various organizations over three drafts to coalesce as much expert knowledge, thought, and experience as possible. The meetings provided a separate forum for fostering debate, gaining consensus, and resolving critical and important contributions from reviewing agencies prior to the TRADOC commander’s review and approval conference held in December 2009.

What is Changing and Why?
One of the first changes readers will note in the new FM 5-0 is its title. Changed from *Army Planning and Orders Production* to *The Operations Process*, the new title reflects significant modification to the material covered in FM 5-0. While retaining details of planning and planning products, the revised FM 5-0 expands the scope of the manual to include doctrine on the exercise of command and control throughout the operations process. This change is intended to better describe the dynamic relationship among all the activities of the operations process—not just planning.

The operations process is an organizational learning model consisting of the major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing for, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. Commanders drive the operations process through battle command. The activities of the operations process may be sequential—especially at the start of an operation. However, once operations
have begun, a headquarters often conducts parts of each activity simultaneously and cycles through the activities of the operations process continuously as the situation requires.

While simple in concept (plan, prepare, execute, and assess), the operations process is dynamic in execution. Commanders and staffs use the operations process to integrate numerous activities consisting of hundreds of tasks executed throughout the headquarters. Commanders must organize and train their staffs to think critically and creatively as they plan, prepare, and execute operations simultaneously while continually assessing progress.

The Army’s model for the exercise of command and control through the operations process is not new. The 2001 edition of FM 3-0 and the 2003 edition of FM 6-0 each addressed battle command and the operations process in detail. The 2005 edition of FM 5-0 described how planning fit within the operations process. What is new, however, is a greater emphasis of the commander’s role during the conduct of operations and a more detailed description of the interrelationships among the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners in the exercise of command and control. FM 5-0 now provides doctrine on the operations process as a whole, a chapter on design, and a chapter for each activity of the operations process. The appendices describe tactics, techniques, and procedures for organizing the headquarters to conduct the operations process, using the military decision making process (MDMP), conducting troop-leading procedures, and writing operation plans and orders.

Building on Full Spectrum Operations

The 2005 edition of FM 5-0 focused on offensive and defensive operations both in examples and in emphasis. To better account for full spectrum operations, the revised FM 5-0 incorporates the central idea of full spectrum operations throughout the manual. The new manual emphasizes the importance of understanding the civil aspects of the operational environment in relationship to the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time. FM 5-0 now stresses the fundamental that, during operations, commanders continually consider and combine stability tasks focused on the populations with offensive and defensive tasks focused on the enemy during planning and execution. It describes ways to develop plans for full spectrum operations using lines of effort and modifies the Army’s operation order to better account for civil considerations and stability or civil support tasks.

The chapter on execution describes how commanders use forces and other resources to mass effects at decisive points and times. It describes how commanders seek to seize and retain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success. Additionally, the command and control philosophy of mission command and acceptance of prudent risk is addressed in detail in the execution chapter and throughout the new FM 5-0.

Incorporating Design into Army Doctrine

We often fail not because we fail to solve the problem we face, but because we fail to face the right problem.

—Russell L. Ackoff

Full spectrum operations conducted within a population are effective only when commanders understand the issues within the context of that population. Understanding context and then deciding how, if, and when to act is a product of design and integral to the art of command. The revised FM 5-0 describes the practice of design throughout the operations process.

Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them. Design underpins the exercise of battle command within the operations process, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of understanding, visualizing, and describing. Design assists with the conceptual aspects of planning to include understanding...
the operational environment and framing the problem, visualizing a desired end state, and conceptualizing a broad operational approach to solve or manage a problem situation. Commanders describe their understanding and visualization in a design concept that drives more detailed planning. Design is practiced continuously throughout the operations process. As commanders learn during execution, they update their understanding, modify their visualization, and describe their visualization to modify plans. In some instances, commanders may go beyond modifying the basic plan. They may decide to reframe the problem and develop a new operational approach resulting in an entirely new plan.

The revised FM 5-0 devotes a chapter to design that describes the fundamentals of design and offers a design methodology. Design is also addressed throughout the manual to include chapters on the fundamentals of the operations process, planning, execution, and assessment. In addition, the revised appendix on the MDMP describes how design interfaces with the MDMP.

Other Changes

In addition to expanding the scope of the manual to include all the activities of the operations process and incorporating the concept of design, other significant changes in the new FM 5-0 include—

- Replacing command and control techniques and products based on the battlefield operation systems to the warfighting functions. This affects several areas, to include organizing the staff for operations and the formats for operation orders and their annexes.
- Emphasizing and accounting for how commanders use the five Army information tasks in shaping the operational environment.
- Describing how commanders organize their staff into command posts, command post cells, working groups, and boards to conduct the operations process.
- Updating the MDMP and operation order format to better account for design, full spectrum operations, the warfighting functions, and the five Army information tasks.

Fundamentals of the Operations Process

In addition to the principles of operations found in FM 3-0, the doctrine that FM 5-0 prescribes is built on six fundamentals:

- Commanders drive the operations process through battle command.
- Situational understanding is fundamental to effective command and control.
- Critical and creative thinking aids in understanding and decision making throughout the operations process.
- Commanders continually consider and combine tasks focused on the populations (stability or civil support operations) as well as those tasks focused on enemy forces (offensive and defensive operations).
- Mission command is the preferred method of exercising command and control.
- Continuous assessment enables organizational learning and adaptation throughout the conduct of operations.

Commanders drive the operations process through battle command. A key theme in the new FM 5-0 is the central role of the commander in the
operations process. While staffs perform essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, commanders play the most important role in the operations process through battle command. Battle command is the art and science of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations to accomplish missions.

The relationships among the activities of battle command and the activities of the operations process are dynamic. All activities of battle command occur in planning, preparation, execution, and assessment, but take on different emphasis throughout the conduct of operations. For example, during planning, commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing. During execution, commanders often focus on directing, leading, and assessing while improving their understanding and modifying their visualization.

One of the major changes to the Army’s model for battle command was the addition of the activity of “understanding” in the 2008 edition of FM 3-0. The new FM 5-0 emphasizes the importance of developing and maintaining understanding throughout the operations process. Commanders collaborate and dialog with superior, adjacent, and subordinate commanders, and other military and civilian organizations within the area of operations to build and maintain their understanding. They also circulate throughout their areas of operations as often as possible, talking to subordinate commanders, Soldiers, and members of other military and civilian organizations as they observe operations for themselves. Commanders continuously update their understanding as the operation progresses and adjust their visualization of the operation as required. Commanders use their running estimate and the running estimates of the staff and subordinate commanders to assist them with understanding and visualization.

Situational understanding is fundamental to effective command and control. Throughout the operations process, commanders (supported by their staffs, subordinate commanders, and other partners) seek to build and maintain their situational understanding—the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information and knowledge—to facilitate their decision making. Situational understanding is essential for commanders in establishing the situation’s context, developing effective plans, assessing operations, and making quality decisions during execution. Commanders and staffs must continually work to maintain their situational understanding and work through periods of reduced understanding as the situation evolves.

As commanders develop their situational understanding, they see patterns emerge, dissipate, and reappear in their operational environment. This helps them direct their own forces’ actions with respect to other friendly forces and partners, the enemy, the terrain, and the population. While complete understanding is the ideal for planning and decision making, it rarely exists. Commanders must accept they will often have to act despite significant gaps in their understanding.

Collaboration and dialog assist in building learning organizations and developing a shared understanding of the situation. Throughout operations, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and other partners collaborate and dialog actively, sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to better understand situations and make decisions. Collaboration is two or more people or organizations working together toward common goals by sharing knowledge and building consensus. Dialogue is a way to collaborate that involves the candid exchange of ideas or opinions among participants that encourages frank discussions in areas of disagreement. Effective collaboration and dialog leads to increased understanding of the situation to include the problem or problems at hand.

Critical and creative thinking aids in understanding and decision making throughout the operations process. To assist commanders in understanding and decision making, commanders and staff apply critical and creative thinking techniques throughout the operations process.

Critical thinking is purposeful, reflective, and self-regulating judgment to determine the meaning and significance of what is observed or expressed. Critical thinking involves determining the meaning
and significance of what is observed or expressed. It also involves determining whether adequate justification exists to accept conclusions as true, based on a given inference or argument. Critical thinking is key to understanding situations, identifying problems, finding causes, arriving at justifiable conclusions, making quality plans, and assessing the progress of operations.

Creative thinking involves creating something new or original. Often, leaders face unfamiliar problems or old problems requiring new solutions. Creative thinking leads to new insights, novel approaches, fresh perspectives, and new ways of understanding and conceiving things. Leaders look at different options to solve problems. Creative thinking includes using adaptive approaches (drawing from previous similar circumstances) or innovative approaches (coming up with completely new ideas.

Critical and creative thinking are fundamental to understanding an operational environment, framing problems, and developing operational approaches to solve or manage those problems.

Commanders continually consider and combine tasks focused on the populations (stability or civil support operations) and tasks focused on enemy forces (offensive and defensive operations). Military operations involve more than combat between armed opponents. Winning battles and engagements is critical but not sufficient for success. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to long-term success. Because of this, commanders continually consider and combine stability tasks focused on the population with offensive and defensive tasks focused on the enemy during planning and execution. For homeland security, commanders focus operations on civil support.

Mission command is the preferred method of exercising command and control. Because of the complex, uncertain, and ever changing nature of operations, mission command—as opposed to detailed command—is the preferred method for exercising command and control. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative, acting aggressively and independently within the commander’s intent. Prerequisites for effective mission command are the use of mission orders; full familiarity with the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations; and mutual trust and understanding between commanders and subordinates. FM 5-0 describes the philosophy of mission command as it applies to all activities of the operations process.

Continuous assessment enables organizational learning and adaptation throughout the conduct of operations. Assessment is a continuous activity of the operations process and a primary feedback mechanism that enables the command as a whole to learn and adapt. Assessment is also an activity of battle command. Plans are based on imperfect understanding and assumptions about how the commander expects a situation to evolve. Sometimes results fail to meet expectations or the situation evolves in a manner that was not anticipated, including unanticipated success. In these cases, the commander determines whether the results are due to a failure in implementing the plan (execution) or if the plan and its underlying logic were flawed. Continuous assessment helps commanders recognize shortcomings in the plan and changes in the situation. In those instances when assessment reveals minor variances from the commander’s visualization, commanders adjust plans as required. In those instances when assessment reveals a significant variance from the commander’s original visualization, commanders reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan as required.

The Way Ahead

As part of the effort to inculcate the doctrine in FM 5-0 across the Army, the Combined Arms Center established a doctrine, education, and training working group. The purpose of this working group is to reduce the period of time between doctrine production and its use by the generating and operating force. The Command and General Staff College is leading the effort to ensure topics in FM 5-0 are sufficiently addressed in both the officer and noncommissioned officer educations systems. The Combined Arms Center is leading the effort to ensure that training at the combat training...
centers is updated to include topics addressed in FM 5-0. The Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate is developing an FM 5-0 interactive media study guide to assist in the self-study of the operations process. In addition, the Combined Arms Center put together a mobile training team to inform and educate units across the Army concerning doctrine on the operations process.

The revised FM 5-0 resulted from a significant intellectual collaborative effort from across the Army. The revised manual provides a starting point for Army leaders in the exercise of command and control during operations. It establishes a common frame of reference and intellectual tools Army leaders use to plan, prepare for, execute, and assess operations. By establishing a common approach and language for conducting command and control, doctrine promotes mutual understanding and enhances effectiveness. The doctrine in this new manual is a guide for action rather than a set of fixed rules. While it provides an authoritative guide for leaders, it requires original applications adapted to circumstances. In operations, effective leaders possess the ability to spot when and where doctrine, training, or even their past experience no longer fit the situation, and then adapt accordingly. MR

NOTES

2. United States Joint Forces Command memorandum, subject: “Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational Design,” 6 October 2009. In this memo, General Mattis identifies the need to improve joint doctrine, training, and joint professional military education in the areas of critical and creative thinking, particularly as they relate to planning.
3. U.S. Army Field Manual-Interim (FMI) 5-0.1, The Operations Process and FM 3-0, Operations, clearly states that the Army would not adopt the joint concept of effects based operations (EBO). While aspects of the EBO concept (e.g., assessment techniques and ways to analyze the operational environment) have enhanced Army doctrine, the Army’s doctrine on command and control is based on the philosophy of mission command.
6. The 2001 edition of FM 3-0 and the 2003 edition of FM 6-0 discussed understanding as part of the commander’s visualization. The 2008 edition of FM 3-0 added “understanding” as an activity to the Army’s battle command model to emphasize this critical activity throughout the conduct of operations.
Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, U.S. Army, Retired

Military power today has a “moral” or psychological dimension, a public relations dimension, and, significantly, an electro-physical, cyberelectromagnetic dimension.1 The power of military forces to perform modern missions of all kinds is very much dependent on advantaging its own operations and disadvantaging the various kinds of adversaries it faces in the dimension shaped and bounded by modern communications, information processing, automation, and other rapidly evolving network applications. Just as other complex mission dimensions have their own logic and principles, so has this one.

What makes the cyberelectromagnetic aspect of existence a useful “dimension” is a crosscutting of science and causal logic. Making sense of this dimension for full spectrum operations, and maintaining an advantage in it, requires deeper and more specialized knowledge beyond current expectations. Its significance is changing the way we think about network-enabled military operations, and we must take a broader and more forward-looking view. The art of winning in the cyberelectromagnetic dimension requires deep expertise of a specific and new kind centered on the science of electro-physics, cyberelectronics, complex cyber-network behaviors, and how these relate to military tactics, operations, and strategy.2 Creating this marriage is one key to success, but we must also transform our varied approaches to this dimension into a systemically holistic one.

A Framework of Cyberelectromagnetic Contests
We can organize our thinking about the cyberelectromagnetic dimension into four systemic contests and the science and art prevailing in each:
- The contest between us and our adversaries over what side uses information- and technology-enhanced tools of command more effectively and more reliably (while at the same time applying the counter to it—defeating the other side’s effectiveness and reliability).
- The contest of creating and defeating “super efficient” defensive and offensive “integrated strike networks.”
- Warring with Internet empowered irregulars.
- The defense of vital local, regional, national, and global information infrastructures.
Winning the first two systemic contests requires a theoretical understanding of—

- The organizational impact of automation enhanced networks.
- The relationship between information and combat power.
- The theoretical logic underlying assuring the speed efficiency and integrity of our own networks.
- The theoretical logic of “network-centric” combat organizations.
- The theoretical logic for three different kinds of integrated strike networks.

Winning the last two of these four systemic contests requires a theoretical understanding of the reticular nature of the Internet. Attaining the best military outcomes also requires understanding how the Internet relates to operations at all levels. This discussion addresses applicable foundational theories for formulating a holistic perspective for gaining military advantage in these last two contests.

The Evolution of the Electron-enhanced Military

Since the beginning of warfare, command decisions have depended on knowledge resident in the commander’s brain, immediately acquirable by his own senses, or from those within voice contact. As warfare grew in scale and complexity, key decisions began to depend more on information that needed to make its way to the commander’s head from beyond his eyesight and hearing. Orders and instructions had to make their way back to elements of the command. Whatever the medium or method of transmission, information could be manipulated, distorted, interrupted, or otherwise attenuated on the way, thus affecting decisions and execution by operational elements. Enemy agents within eyesight or hearing could read uncoded visual and audible signals. Codes could be and were broken. Messengers and dispatches were captured, and systems of message transmissions were destroyed or disrupted. Genghis Khan’s 13th-century “Pony Express” system of couriers was the likely zenith of premodern military communication.

The first telegraph was set up in 1844, and the electron entered the stage as a military communication factor. President Lincoln could communicate almost instantaneously with General Grant in the Civil War. Encoding messages became necessary and routine, as were efforts to intercept messages, break codes, and cut telegraph lines. Electromagnetism was harnessed into the functioning of intelligence, battle command, logistical systems, and fire support. At this last point, the electron began to enhance combat functions and the power to influence operations.

When Marconi’s “wireless” radio invention enabled message transmission through the “ether” just before World War I, the possibilities for commanding far-flung and rapidly moving military elements exploded. By World War II, wireless messages made it possible to coordinate operations and logistics of rapidly moving columns and to provide key intelligence instantaneously. Without Marconi’s invention, combat power of tanks, trucks, motorized artillery, and aircraft would not have been nearly as dramatic. Signals intelligence and jamming radio signals were also born during this time, as was radar, the use of electromagnetic radio waves to detect moving objects. Radar also spawned “chaff” and other electronic countermeasures. By the mid-20th century, not only could electronic science provide very effective sensors, but also new computing ability replaced the human in the loop between sensing targets and aiming weapons.

The introduction of digital automation opened a third chapter in the story of military communications. At first, electronic computing enhanced the productivity of firepower, but gradually this new technology transformed all military functions and became an important enabler of everything military. By the 1970s computers were extensively deployed in fire control systems of artillery and air defense batteries, as well as in individual tanks and aircraft. By the early 1980s the U.S. armed forces were rapidly entering the “digital age,” and now we live in a world of information technology-enhanced networks of great variety and scope where even individual Soldiers use automated information systems.

The Internet has thus become an important channel for military command and staff information.
exchange at various levels of classification, providing text, voice, still images, and streaming video. Militaries today are heavily reliant on information technology and information systems to communicate, control forces, coordinate fires, gather and distribute intelligence, conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, and other military activities. Irregular adversaries, warring factions, and criminal cartels have access to many of the same technologies and the funds and entrepreneurial spirit to harness these kinds of capabilities. Being at the leading edge in these technologies is far less important than being most clever in adapting to unique conditions. How these technologies are integrated and employed in specific circumstances will greatly affect modern conflicts.

When the military intelligence branch was established in the late 1960s, the Army chose to establish electronic warfare detachments within military intelligence companies and electronic warfare companies within military intelligence battalions. The Soviets, on the other hand, took a more aggressive stance, establishing separate radio electronic warfare battalions and electronic deception units. They thought of these as weapons system organizations and shadow maneuver units. We thought of these as a hybrid between intelligence gatherers and weapons systems. Even when we formed “combat electronic warfare and intelligence” battalions, we combined intelligence and electronic warfare functions in the same unit. Our equipment tended to be multi-functional, as an economy, and we viewed it as military intelligence assets, even though, by doctrine, electronic warfare was coordinated by the operations officer.

...when we formed “combat electronic warfare and intelligence” battalions, we combined intelligence and electronic warfare functions in the same unit.
The paradigm of the 1980s and early 1990s, called Command and Control Warfare, focused on the tactical attack and defense of military infrastructures. The main emphasis was on command posts, the communications between them, and electronic sensors linked to command posts. This view was not wrong, it was just too limiting. It didn’t conceive of integrating the attack and defense of computer systems already widely deployed throughout military networks.

By the mid-1990s, thinkers in militaries everywhere wanted to conceptualize more broadly. Initially, they were looking through the lens of warfare among advanced states, and they saw militaries building networks of automated weapon systems and elaborate command posts filled with computers. Such visionaries saw militaries enabled by advanced communications and spy satellites; they saw modern nation states becoming as dependent on information infrastructures as the most advanced 20th-century states were on industrial and transportation infrastructures. Some even saw the state-controlled broadcast media of an enemy state as a worthy target of disruption and manipulation. Incorporating a new discipline of computer network operations appeared inevitable.

The U.S. military invented the notion of “information operations” (IO). Others used different but similar terms. The focus of IO eventually became dominating an “information domain,” achieving “information superiority,” and “decision superiority” by combining technical superiority and psychological operations in a mission statement: “influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking, while protecting our own.”

This way of thinking is naively overambitious and an awkward intellectual construct, one that combines very different psychological and cyberelectromagnetic dimensions. It conflates the causal logic of human and automated decision-making. Each is complex in different ways, and by focusing only on decision making, such framing is too limiting.

While “decision superiority” is one way to achieve operational advantage in this dimension, there are other ways to advantage our own operations while disadvantaging adversaries we may face. For instance—

- How do information technologies and the nature of the information they provide enhance combat power?
- What are useful systemic strategies and principles for safeguarding and securing our information-age technological advantages?
- What are useful strategies and principles for creating and defeating other-than-general-purpose command and control networks, such as highly efficient defensive, offensive, and protective “strike” networks?
- What are useful strategies and principles for denying stateless adversaries the unfettered use of the Internet to organize, recruit, propagandize, and attack?
- What are useful strategies and principles for denying state and stateless adversaries the ability to use the Internet to manipulate or destroy national and global civil information infrastructures?

**Automation-enhanced Networks and Combat Power**

Information technology-enhanced battle command can greatly increase combat power. Used effectively, information technologies empower the command and control structures of the force to deal with uncertainty, react to change, and recognize and exploit opportunities. They reconfigure processes and change the nature of work. The right combinations of information technologies can provide a commonly shared situational awareness, more real-time relevant information, automatic situation updating, and better planning aids. In modern forces, individual platforms can become less important than the “net work” that enables cooperative engagement tactics, facilitating high-tempo operations. The commander’s combined arms capabilities can thus be employed much more synergistically.

**Information and combat power.** That “information is power” has become cliché—the assumption is that more information leads to more power to influence things indirectly. Such conceptions are misleading. Understanding the logic and principles...
of how modern information capabilities can influence action is what matters. The relevant question is: how does information affect combat power? Combat power cannot be understood in absolute terms or quantities. It has meaning only in a relative sense—relative to that of the enemy—and has meaning only at the time and place where outcomes are determined. Leaders and the forces of their environment, to include the actions of the enemy, transform capability into a balance of relative power that influences outcomes.\(^3\)

Information relevant to the mission and internally consumed by the command contributes to mission success when it enables sound decisions, empowers force, informs maneuver, and provides protection. Likewise the lack of relevant information, or misinformation, can disadvantage the enemy, inhibit his force, disorient his maneuver, and make his forces vulnerable. More specifically, only relevant information informs pending choices and reveals new ones. Only relevant information empowers. In this way, relevant information affects mission outcomes in the physical dimension.

Information projected outward and well-informed public relations can also retain the support of home public sponsors of the mission and the people in the area of operations.\(^4\) Likewise, information projected outward and used by savvy commanders can intimidate, demoralize, mystify, mislead, and surprise adversaries.\(^5\) In both cases, adversaries and other publics do not make choices on the basis of the information willfully beamed at them. Instead, they make their choices through perceptions formed first on the basis of the command’s actions, then its reputation, and lastly its explanations or promises. In every such case, such perceptions are influenced from many other directions in many complex ways—by culture, education, and word of mouth from trusted members of society.

This complex milieu not only demonstrates the importance of relevance but also of relevance to specific functions and purposes. The way relevant information has to be fed to specific cells of the organizational body by capillaries of the circulatory system matters. This understanding demonstrates a vital two-sided contest for relative superiority in knowing what is pertinent in a given situation. In this milieu, depriving the enemy of relevant knowledge is as important as gathering such knowledge about the enemy. Being able to gain superiority in relevant knowledge is thus as much dependent on situational factors as it is on satellites, sensors, analytical processors, and staff efforts.

For example, before an ambush is sprung, only the ambusher knows what is truly relevant and thus has relative information superiority. Only seconds before the ambush is activated, those ambushed think they possess relevant knowledge, but in a well-laid ambush the shock of surprise results in complete disorientation. As the ambush evolves, relevant information transfers to well-prepared and well-trained defenders who can, assuming combat power shifts to their advantage, transition properly and defeat the ambush.

**Organizing for action.** Once situational factors are understood and taken into account, having the right technical tools makes the difference. Some information factors can contribute to the command’s fund of relevant knowledge, and others deduct from the enemy’s. Understanding that dynamic is enough to organize for action while expecting the unexpected. Concepts of operation that depend on certainty usually fail. Commanders who assume an informed degree of uncertainty, even when they believe they are well informed, are more likely to absorb and adapt new information and therefore succeed. Assuming “information superiority” should thus never be a prerequisite for action because it leads to acting from a posture of “certainty.” There is no way to be certain, ever, because one can never know what the enemy knows or thinks.

In all cases, commanders will need to make relative judgments of how well informed they are and act accordingly. The great advantage of being “well informed” is being able to act “deliberately.” The word “deliberate” in Army doctrine means the command understands the situation and the opportunities and difficulties it will encounter well enough to focus the bulk of its resources toward producing an optimized outcome quickly, keeping a relatively small portion of its force uncommitted for contingencies. Deliberate actions can generate the greatest impact, with greatest likelihood, in the least amount of time. An important byproduct of this condition is that the command can prepare for better optimized follow-on actions. The more that actions of a campaign are a chain of deliberate actions, the more swift the positive result.
The complexities of current mission contexts and the nature of our adversaries make becoming “well informed” very difficult. We therefore have to organize to avoid traps, enable rapid learning, and respond effectively to both unexpected difficulties and opportunities. “Hasty attack” and “hasty defense” are doctrinal terms that derive from an era when time in contact with the enemy was the prime cost of information. Modern technology can inform commanders well before they come into physical proximity to an enemy. Thus the term “fighting for information” came about. However, even in modern times, engagement can be a prerequisite for gaining relevant information, especially when fighting irregulars. Well-organized actions in such situations become more informed and deliberate as the engagement progresses.

In other words, how a command organizes its overall operations in its mission environment conditions how much relevant information it needs, and conversely, how much information it has conditions how rapidly and efficiently it can make progress. Army forces must operate competently on any point along the scale between being well enough informed to act deliberately and those more frequent cases when they need to engage without being well informed.

Recent improvements in command systems may not expand the likelihood that organizations will begin engagements in deliberate rather than hasty settings, but they should accelerate the transition from hasty to deliberate responses when the command is inevitably surprised.

**Complications and complexity.** The missions of modern military forces combine hidden complications and obscure complexity. Differentiating between these two kinds of impediments when seeking to become well informed is critical. The differences can condition not only how operations should be organized but also how modern information technologies can best help.

Complicated adversary systems may be well hidden, but they are separable from their environment and can be sensed using technical sensors from a standoff. Deduction and modern analysis can lead to understanding, but modern technical sensor systems linked to automated analytical tools and decision aids more easily accelerate learning about them. Thus deliberate actions against them are more likely today than in former times.

Complex systems, on the other hand, are made up of dynamic, interactive, and adaptive elements that cannot be separated from interaction with their environment. The elements of complex systems we care most about are human communities, tribes, towns, or countries. To make sense of such difficult to understand systems, we mentally impose logical structures, our understanding, over them. These creations of our mind may be in the form of conceptual maps or narratives, and these understandings should never be mistaken for reality. They may be the best basis for acting we have, but they are also hypotheses that require testing. Creating such hypotheses requires induction, abduction, and synthesis that computers are incapable of reaching or mimicking. The best way to test any hypothesis is by the scientific method of falsification. It takes more than stand-off technical intelligence to falsify our theories about complex human systems. It takes actual human interactions to learn about them. Such human systems are therefore difficult to understand well enough to engage deliberately, and modern technical sensor systems have difficulty accelerating the rate of appreciating them. Learning from “out of contact” is impossible, and thus deliberate operations are likely impossible. In such environments, learning while operating will most likely be as much the object of operations as gaining mission ends.

Production and appreciation of relevant information is as much an art as science. Because we can never banish uncertainty in any mission involving systems of human beings, the art of learning involves a skeptical testing of the logic underlying our framing of the mission problem in one part of our brains while we act decisively to solve it with the other. However, this practice and the skillful use of modern command and information systems can manage and mitigate uncertainty, and it can greatly accelerate recovery from surprise. While the operational payoff for being well informed has always been high, it is far higher for organizations equipped with modern information technologies because they can make much better use of the relevant information that exists under such conditions.

**The Logic of “Network-centric” Combat Organizations**

Exploiting the revolution in surveillance, fire control, precision munitions, automated analysis,
fusion of information, and data manipulation will lead to “network-centric” rather than “platform-centric” combat organizations. In the past, armies have been prudent to take platform-centric organizational design approaches because individual combat platforms tended to become isolated in the chaos of combat. Cooperative engagement tactics are universally valued, but, even so, it has been important to equip platforms so they can survive to fight without outside assistance. Equipping organizations so that each platform can survive in isolation means redundancy, and that translates into bulkier and heavier platforms.

In theory, if platforms can avoid isolation and maintain mutual support during a fight, then they can share some capabilities, and that translates into less overall bulk and weight for the same level of performance. The same principle applies to combat units at any echelon. Having a common operating picture and ultra-reliable communications could greatly enhance cooperative engagement tactics from the basic unit upward. This means that the combat power output of tactical organizations could increase dramatically, but it can also collapse when the network fails.

The potential for network-enhanced cooperative engagement tactics is now being introduced into the Army’s brigade combat teams, following the lead of Stryker brigades. However, passive armor is unlikely to become obsolete in ground units because it will be difficult to ensure covering fires, suppression, and active protection within the team during worst-case ground combat scenarios. When speed and rapid, decisive results are important, the potential for chaos and loss of mutual support will go up, and the value of passive armor will go up as well. Organizations originally based on platform-centric principles can be transformed into network-centric organizations by upgrading command and control, sensor suites, and munitions. Such upgrades may not reduce the bulk and weight of the organizations or change their appearance, but they will dramatically enhance their combat power (and, incidentally, increase cargo capacity).

Even though the Army’s Future Combat System brigades have been cancelled, they presaged ground combat organizations built from the ground up on network-centric principles. Surviving elements of the envisioned brigades, for instance the central networks, will still enter service in brigade combat teams as they become available. Planners envision a robust command and control network to reliably connect the many complementary platform components together. Such a network will greatly enhance teamwork, mutual support, and mutual protection under any conditions. However, the logic of network centricity remains sensitive to mission conditions that affect beyond-the-platform assistance and active defenses. These network-enhanced platforms will be more effective in some environments than others, so applying one kind of unit design to all missions is unlikely. Different designs may be necessary to work effectively in some conditions.

While modern complex environments may limit the absolute trade-off between traditional passive protection and the automatic active defenses of a network-centric system, beyond-the-platform external assistance will be more reliable than not having such a network at all. The various complementary capabilities distributed throughout the organization can combine to make the unit much more potent and much more survivable in a wide variety of tactical settings. Applying network-centric principles to all unit designs will have universal benefit.
**Integrated “strike networks.”** An integrated strike network is any network specifically designed to engage an enemy with lethal and destructive force. We face a major challenge that we need to understand far better than we do: how to build reliable integrated strike networks while understanding how to incapacitate and defeat those of a hostile adversary. The challenge is not only how to incapacitate and defeat current insurgent wireless networks, but also anticipated future enemies possessing technical savvy and ample resources.

Integrated strike networks have been with us for some time, if we only think of them that way. In the late 1980s the Soviets saw “strike complexes” as the next major military development. They meant the synergistic combination of sensors, connected to processors, connected to decision makers, connected to various lethal, destructive and suppressive weapons, served by robust networks, and tuned to a specific purpose.

Soviet theoreticians of the 1980s differentiated between “surveillance strike complexes” and “reconnaissance strike complexes” depending on whether the strike network served a primarily defensive or offensive aim. These are useful distinctions. The former, like integrated air defenses and artillery counter-fire systems, are passive or reactive. They automatically react to the initiative or intrusion of an adversary. The latter, on the other hand, are proactive. An active reconnaissance element of the strike network locates specific high-value targets based on available intelligence: for example, “Scud hunting” operations in the wars with Iraq. They can also be mobile, providing overwatch to advancing forces. Think of “shaping fires” operations in offensive campaigns. This theory is adaptable to irregular force applications as well. Improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers are really elemental building blocks of surveillance and reconnaissance complexes.

Under this rubric, the 1980s-era division artillery with its digitally linked batteries, automated fire control, networked radars, and other sensors was a strike complex that could be configured either as a “reconnaissance strike complex” or as a “surveillance strike complex,” depending on whether the mission was defense or offense. Similarly the integrated elaborate air defenses of industrialized armed forces are also “surveillance strike complexes.” The improvised explosive devices our Soldiers are encountering are relatively simple strike networks as well. So are the systems the Army has deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan to speedily counter mortar fire.

The power of integrated strike networks derives from the combination of the very short time from initial sensing to striking (making it more likely dynamic targets are engaged) and from the precision and potency of the strike.

A decade from now, the possibilities for various kinds of integrated strike networks will explode. Civilian wireless networks are rapidly expanding around the world, and both wireless technology and computer processors are being integrated in more commonly available devices daily. The very technologies most likely to proliferate soonest will prompt rational opponents fearing attack to defend from “urban web” defenses covered by integrated defensive strike networks. Savvy irregulars, for instance, will use rapidly proliferating technologies to deny access to large cities (or specific urban neighborhoods), jungle and mountain redoubts, and their base areas.

**Logical modes of strike networks.** Integrated strike networks can be organized to function in three different logical modes:

- **Reactive strike defensive.** Though highly effective, the logic of a “surveillance” or defensive strike network is relatively simple, consistent, and predictable. Any penetration of the area of surveillance of
a defensive strike network is immediately identified “friend or foe,” an engagement decision is made, the best available response is selected, targeting data is sent to the responding weapon system, the target is engaged, damage is assessed, and the cycle may repeat again if required. This entire “kill chain” can be automated, or it could contain human nodes as sensors or decision makers. Some elements could be very “low tech.”

The Army’s long-established and well-functioning counter-battery system integrates long-range radars, automated fire control, and firing batteries in “quick fire” loops. Well-planned defenses for most of the last century included such rudimentary defensive strike networks. Their sensors were forward observers or manned radars linked by radio or telephone to fire direction centers. These were further linked to aircraft or to cannons on the ground or afloat. The replacement of analog with digital technology greatly speeds the “kill chain,” and renders it far more efficient.

However, the more important point is that this concept has great potential at every level in and across the services. Theoretically, we could establish systems at every level to respond instantly to every recognizable hostile phenomenon. The science of automatic target recognition is advancing rapidly. This application of technology has the potential for strengthening defenses to a remarkable degree, especially in circumstances in which target discrimination is not a great concern.

**Proactive strike offense.** We should also expect our opponents to exploit this concept. All future offensive actions could be supported by offensive networks with reconnaissance elements initiating the kill chain. Such networks can be reliably keyed to finding and destroying specific key components of the enemy’s system of defense. Such proactive systems can also carry out deliberate ambush-like engagements with devastating effects on the enemy. The greatly expanded ability to acquire, track, and process more targets at greater ranges will make it possible for proactive offensive systems to strike many discrete targets that comprise the essential elements of an opposing military formation or functional grouping, all at once.

Equally important will be a planning mind-set that sees target sets in terms of their systemic significance. This mind-set merely requires the adaptation of the principles of “target value analysis” developed by the Army artillery school in the early 1980s. This approach to “deep battle” targeting was used to identify the highest payoff targets in a large force array based on our knowledge of enemy doctrine, the context of the engagement, and the mission of the friendly force.

There are great advantages to employing precision weapons in large numbers and within compressed timeframes. The concept of “time-on-target” artillery strikes is not new. The advantage of precision fires is greatest against unwarned enemy formations or fixed sites. Their effectiveness against mobile forces begins to degrade rapidly once the enemy is warned and begins to evade. Such evasion greatly increases the difficulty of subsequent targeting.

**Suppression.** Modern forms of suppression will also be important to integrate within offensive strike networks. In military parlance, “suppression” proactively degrades human actions and organizational functions of the enemy sufficiently to provide temporary advantages to the attacker. We will need to suppress the enemy’s capabilities when we can’t assure lethal effects or destruction, or when lethal and destructive means don’t serve our purposes. The success of close combat offensive actions in urban and fortified areas especially depends upon effective suppression. During the assault phase of such operations, Marine and Army infantrymen need it to survive while they close on enemy positions.

Today, ground combat forces depend mostly on the blast and flying steel byproduct of lethal munitions for close combat suppression. Precision lethal munitions are too expensive for suppressive fires. In the short run, high explosive “dumb” munitions (that are less expensive but are heavy) provide what is called “area coverage,” which indiscriminately causes great amounts of collateral damage in urban combat. If more scientific resources and funding were devoted to this important niche requirement, we could have suppressive munitions that greatly reduce collateral damage and the potential for casualties on both sides. By being more efficient, they could also consume less cargo capacity.

The shock of deliberate ambush-like (very compressed time frame) precision engagements described above also magnifies suppressive effects.
This would be even more so if suppressive munitions can be interspersed with precise ones. Thus the enemy could be presented with an overwhelming problem that would cause even more rapid and complete organizational collapse, allowing ground assault by smaller forces with fewer casualties.

**Reactive strike mobile protection.** Offensive operations also will depend on reactive protection systems. These are in essence a mobile variant of defensive strike networks. An ever-increasing danger for advancing air or ground maneuver is entering the effect zone of an enemy’s defensive integrated strike network. Any potential opponent could cover prepared defense at every echelon with difficult-to-spot sensors and hidden observers that are networked to indirect surface and air defense weapons.

A two-pronged approach is required to avoid unacceptable casualties when these kinds of defenses cannot be outflanked and there is insufficient opportunity to reduce these with standoff means only. Over-watching offensive integrated strike networks could find and dismantle the most vulnerable elements of the enemy system ahead of the advance. However, this will usually be insufficient and will need to be accompanied by a layering of reactive protection systems that are rapid counter-fire systems set to react immediately to defeat any source of missile, artillery, mortar, or rocket fire. Relatively close-in reactive protection from long-range, high-caliber, direct-fire systems is also possible. These can certainly be organized today to support attacking network-centric air and naval formations. These principles also apply to tactical combat formations on land.

One of the great dangers to mobile ground tactical units will be encounters with hidden dismounted infantry armed with simple anti-tank weapons, or direct-fire systems hidden in “keyhole” positions. In these cases both active and passive protection alone could be insufficient. Classical over-watch techniques using vehicular optics and direct-fire weapons also could be insufficient. However, combining these with a system of over-watch that is capable of sensing the first enemy shot, locating the source, and immediately engaging it with a combination of lethal precision and suppressive effects could be sufficient to limit casualties and permit more rapid advances. If the enemy came to understand that any shot fired at the friendly unit could result in an immediate and deadly response, he would be greatly deterred.

While some portions of these capabilities have been demonstrated in recent combat situations, we have also seen failures. Failures tend to be at the beginning and end of the “kill chain” (target identification and damage assessment) when human eyes are replaced with technical sensors and when firing decisions are based on inadequate discrimination. Reactive protection systems will also have problems finding the source of missiles without predictable trajectories—like cruise missiles. These are issues that will eventually be resolved, but so far we have been generous in funding “shooters” and far too miserly in funding the networking and sensing capabilities to make these systems reliable. The full potential of modern organizations can only be achieved when vital networks are functioning.

**Network speed, efficiency, and integrity.** This empowerment of modern military forces bears a price. Some are concerned that tactical wireless networks and global positioning systems can be jammed, communication services can be denied, precision munitions’ aim can be disrupted, and entire networks can fail when system-level databases are attacked or network control structures suffer hostile exploitation. New benefits incur new risks and vulnerabilities, but these are well worth bearing when the cost of mitigation is far less than the value of benefits.

Automation-enhanced networks cannot provide advantage if risks and vulnerabilities are not mitigated. There are many ways the enemy could impede the speed, efficiency, and integrity of our networks and information processing capabilities, and we could do the same to theirs. In fact, the force that doesn’t tend to both sides of this equation is at a disadvantage.

Assuring the speed, efficiency, and integrity of our automation-enhanced networks requires a holistic approach. It also requires a broadly assigned but
Assuring the speed, efficiency, and integrity of our automation-enhanced networks requires a holistic approach.

specific set of responsibilities with increased leader awareness and education. It thus will require a new and rigorous way of thinking. New and more functional rules are needed for a time when the power of a byte of information has a very short half-life. When information is pushed far forward, within a small window of time, and to a specific tactical element not normally privy to the product of highly classified sources, clarity and rigor are paramount. Networks and information processing capabilities are an obvious Achilles’ heel, and the challenges of safeguarding our communications and network processes, and thus our secrets, are rapidly increasing.

Operations security and information assurance are old problems made more difficult by operating amongst indigenous populations, in widely scattered deployments, and across great distances. Rapid appearance of newer technologies compounds associated difficulties. The Army has managed a challenging analog-to-digital transformation only within the last decade and while at war. Another major wave of change is already underway to replace the new generations of systems with leap-ahead technologies derived from the Future Combat System program’s advanced networks. These will replace voice radio and telephone services with “voice-over-Internet protocol” and add many useful web-based automated processes and services. Such advances depend on the reliability of billions of lines of software code.

Command attention, unit “SOPs” (standard operational procedures), “training to standards,” and strict adherence to discipline are the first lines of defense. The important disciplines of “operations security” and “information assurance” must become rigorously foundational habits and a matter of command interest at all levels. At the institutional level, the computer network defense side of computer network operations, and the science and art of signals security as it applies to the new communications technologies, will become higher priorities.

As new priorities enter into the design of command systems, they too must be robust and not prone to catastrophic failure. When systems fail they should fail “gracefully,” and according to a logical design that assures the reliability of core functions first. Thus, the systemic capabilities that enable self-defense in a crisis must be the most robust and least prone to fail. Next in importance are the systemic capabilities and attributes that enable mutual support within an integrated defense. Next would be assuring the ability to conduct limited offensive operations. Last in priority would be assuring the more ambitious capabilities that enable independent and “distributed” offensive operations.

In this schema, units at the lowest level are responsible for the least-sophisticated threats, and, as the levels of sophistication and difficulty increase, the responsibilities are echeloned upward. As reliant as the Army has become on its rapidly evolving and complicated information “system of systems,” and as tempting as their disruption is to adversaries, much institutional intellectual energy has been invested toward meeting this challenge. Issues of maintaining system reliability are as important in education and training as is the art of gaining the most benefit from them. A balance has to be struck between providing functionality and applying safeguards, and a healthy tension is needed between creative approaches and common-sense considerations.

Become Master Cyber-Soldiers

This transformational bargain is analogous in some ways to the transformation from foot- and animal-powered transport to modern mechanized forms of mobility. While the new modes of transport greatly empowered armies, they also introduced great new vulnerabilities. The price of that transformation was also significant: much greater and more elaborate logistical efforts requiring new kinds of knowledge, skills, discipline, and habits as well as new areas for command attention.

Addressing the quandaries of mechanization required understanding the logistical dimension systemically. While many observers of the First and Second Gulf Wars marveled at the display of modern information-technology enhanced operations, they should have been awed by the mastery
of modern mobility and logistics. General H. Norman Schwartzkopf’s “Hail Mary” maneuver, and General Tommie Franks’ two-prong dash for Baghdad could not have occurred before every commander in the chain understood what he had to do “systemically.” All the component actions and relationships had to be understood holistically—not only the integrated flow of parts and supplies but also the protection of the convoys in the flow and the supply discipline and preventative maintenance practiced by the maneuvering force. Commanders had to become “master logisticians.”

As difficult as the transformation to machine power was, the benefits were worth the price of making the system of transport robust and effective and learning how to operate, supply, and maintain it properly. The challenge of doing the same for this new form of 21st-century empowerment is no more daunting than it was for earlier habits of thought. It took time for understanding to sink in, and it likely will now again.

However, analogies can be more instructive by exploring the differences. Whereas the advantages of mechanized mobility were obvious, and primarily affected one major element of combat power (tactical and operational maneuver), the advantages of automation-enhanced networks are subtle and pervasive. This makes understanding how to gain advantage and mitigate risks all the more difficult.

Commanders must become systemically savvy masters of the craft in far less time.

Actual and potential adversaries are becoming practiced and ever-more clever in this field. Even though we now have the technical and tactical lead, we could fail to transform the knowledge we have at these levels into strategic advantages in future conflicts. We know how to design, install, operate, and maintain the most advanced automation-enhanced networks in the world, and we know how to defeat any extant integrated air defense system and military or governmental command and control system.

We also have world-class technical and tactical experts in designing, installing, operating, and maintaining automation-enhanced networks in electronic warfare, computer network operations, electronic and cyber-military deception, information assurance, and operations security. But we still think in terms of separate wireless or cyber-system attack and defend tactics. We separate the fields of experts who create and operate our advanced networks from the experts who destroy and manipulate the enemy’s. Realities of these emergent technologies demand that we elevate thinking now from narrow technical and tactical compartments to the operational art of thinking in terms of a systemic whole for full spectrum operations. Getting to that level requires thinking critically, creatively, and systemically about this contest.

Critical thinking in this dimension depends on paying close attention to the hard facts and new realities unfolding rapidly before our eyes. It also depends on identifying the currently relevant, definitive ways to achieve operational advantage in this dimension and constructing sound theories that sufficiently describe and explain the logic of cause-and-effect so as to predict and control outcomes to our advantage.

Constructing sound new theories for gaining advantage is also a matter of creativity. By understanding how we arrived at current ways of thinking—and challenging the categories, paradigms,
conventions, and definitions that currently pattern and trammel our thought—we can facilitate creativity. The real world of this dimension is changing very rapidly, and thus we should not be limited by outmoded ways of thinking, ones that may have been useful even ten years ago. The only purpose of such artificial mental constructs is to make sense of the real world. When old constructs are no longer helpful, we should abandon them and create more useful ones.

“Cyberwar” is a catchy term, but it lacks theoretical validity. It unnecessarily limits our reasoning to hidebound notions of tradition, suggesting old naval and airpower analogies of controlling or dominating a military “domain.” Conceptually separating what happens daily on the Internet from what happens in the kinds of networks I have addressed ignores their connection and would therefore be unrealistic and dangerous. Denying terrorists and extremists unfettered ability on the Internet is a high priority. The speed, ubiquity, and potential anonymity of Internet media make them ideal communication channels for militant groups and terrorist organizations.

Denying adversaries of whatever kind the ability to attack our Internet accessible national financial, transportation, power generation, and other information infrastructures in times of war is another national priority. Some thinkers in foreign lands advance the notion of “active defense” and even preemptive attacks attributable to others in case of threat. Others see such capabilities in their possession as powerful deterrents. There is no doubt that Army forces should play a part in defense of our strategic infrastructures and in counteroffensives against adversaries who attack them. MR

NOTES

1. It is useful to think of “dimensions” of operations when a specific set of ways to advantage operations share significant amounts of common causal logic and rest on a common scientific foundation. But unlike a “domain” such as air, land, sea, or space in which separate operations, or even campaigns, are conceivable, operations in a dimension are inseparable from the operation-as-a-whole.

2. Just as it is necessary to understand human psychology and human social behavior to succeed in the art of unifying physical and psychological impact, and that of keeping friends and winning allies, knowledge in these fields is crucial to this art. The first term, electro-physics, is the root science that defines this field. Cyber-electromagnetics is a term I prefer over “Cyber space” to cover the science that bounds and defines modern communications, including the Internet. Cyber space is a term that suggests a boundless dimension, like outer space. The modern system of communications called the Internet may seem boundless to the uninitiated, but it is not. And it can be mapped and understood. Moreover, the character of modern operations is so shaped by these sciences, and the enabling capabilities that stem from them that to not consider these a “dimension” would be limiting.

3. This conception of military mission relevant power, the ability to influence, is based on a model developed by the author in 1976 in a paper entitled “Understanding and Developing Combat Power.” This thought model was adopted by the U.S. Army in the 1982 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations. This useful theoretical construct was inexplicably dropped from U.S. doctrine about ten years later.

4. See “Keeping Friends and Gaining Allies” in the May-June 2009 Military Review for more detail on the theories for informing publics to maintain the support of those at home and gaining the support of those relevant to success in the area of operations.

5. See “Unifying the Physical and Psychological Dimensions of Operations” in the March-April 2009 Military Review. It articulates sound and useful theories for influencing the human decision making of actual or potential adversaries in the modern context.
The basic unit of counterinsurgency warfare is the largest unit whose leader is in direct and continuous contact with the population. This is the most important unit in counterinsurgency operations, the level where most of the practical problems arise, where the war is won or lost.

—David Galula in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

THE RECENT SHIFT in national concern from Iraq to Afghanistan and the increase in forces committed by the Obama administration have directed greater attention to the current problems in Afghanistan. United States forces and coalition partners are working on many fronts to secure a stable future for the country, but they face more than a few obstacles. At the macro level, the Afghan central government is weak and plagued by corruption and indifference to the plight of its rural constituency, yet without tribal accord, the government has no real chance of extending its reach to the rest of the country. The Afghan National Army, Police, and Border Police are increasing their numbers and improving their skills but, with the exception of a few exceptional Afghan National Army battalions, they are not yet capable of operating on their own. The poppy fields and drug trade in southern and eastern Afghanistan continue to flourish. The border with Pakistan remains porous enough for a resurgent Taliban to use it as its primary and most unfettered means of infiltration into remote rural sections of the country. These are just a few of the many problems for the government of Afghanistan and the U.S.-led coalition.

Many authors, strategists, and politicians have offered measured opinions and recommendations on how to improve the situation, but most agree that to fix these problems and allow Afghanistan to develop without the constant pressure of an insurgency, we must establish and maintain security and develop governance in the rural districts.

Completing these tasks may appear impossible to a casual observer of the conflict. Indeed, while fighting a growing insurgency, coalition casualties mount.
Historically, the rural population in modern Afghanistan has rejected all large-scale reforms attempted by a central government. Unfortunately, change acceptable to the tribes will simply not come from the center. Establishing security in this war-torn land is achievable only if we focus our efforts and resources at the district level, where the sub-tribes are culturally dominant.

Nowhere in Afghanistan is this more pressing than along the border of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is commonly accepted that the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other foreign fighters use the FATA as a safe haven from which to plan, resource, stage, and launch attacks in the border districts and deeper into Afghanistan’s interior. Since 2006, the number of foreign insurgents involved in the border fight has substantially increased, which strengthens the insurgency and decreases security. The struggle to secure this area has become the front line in the counterinsurgency fight and the coalition’s most important strategic task.

If we can establish security and stabilize the border provinces and districts in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the accompanying momentum may guide the rest of the country to a sustainable peace. The problem is that the insurgents are most effective in these rural areas, and limited troop levels make challenging them on a wider scale a confounding proposition.

I propose a fundamental shift in the way we think about fighting the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. To set the conditions for success, we need to engage tribal leaders and establish a district-level security architecture in which the district governor is the key leader elected by the shura. In conjunction, we need a bottom-up focus that places the coalition maneuver company commander where he can work closely with the district governor. Next, we need to redistribute critical assets now located at the provincial level down to the district level. Afghan security forces should be redistributed to districts and rural areas, and we should dismantle entities like the provincial reconstruction teams and reassign those assets to the maneuver battalions for use in the maneuver companies at the district level. Finally, we need to integrate native Afghan intellectual capital into our maneuver company operations to improve cultural engagement and provide expertise in critical development skills.

**Tribal Influence**

To create the environment for such advances, we begin by reinforcing the role of the tribes. We’ve taken the first steps toward establishing security when we recognize and embrace the prestige and broad power base of tribal elders and accept the influence of the mullahs. Invading armies throughout history have failed to understand the tribal structure that has always defined this nation. Breaking this troubling paradigm is the first challenge for a refocused U.S.-led coalition. We cannot engage just a handful of tribes for this mission. There is no one ruler in Kabul that can consolidate the loyalty of all tribes in Afghanistan. Rather, we must reach out to every sub-tribe in each of the 398 districts across the country. The real power and potential in Afghanistan exists among the local tribes in the rural areas.

Developing governance capacity at the district level is a low-level affair, but hugely important. Currently, provincial governors appoint district governors, often favored friends and acquaintances, not men of the people or even of the local tribes. The vast majority of provincial council members do not live in the provinces they represent. For this reason,
provincial councilmen are almost entirely irrelevant to their constituencies. The current flawed process of selection, rather than election, almost guarantees that the appointed district governor will be irrelevant as well. This method rarely yields a close connection with the elders—it must be changed to meet the cultural threshold of what is acceptable and suitable.

Everything of intrinsic value to Afghans is rooted in honor, reputation, and familial pride. The current method of selecting district governors is arbitrary and antithetical to the tribal culture and Pashtun traditions of selecting leaders. There should be no quibbling with a method that meets the demands of democratic traditions, eschews the non-inclusive self-selection modes of warlordism, and reinforces the real power and influence of Afghan communities—the shura of elders.

**Setting conditions for success.** Counterinsurgency forces routinely engage the leaders of the district sub-tribes, or shura elders, throughout Afghanistan. Once legitimate governors take office, the coalition must integrate them into the counterinsurgency effort. The key component for successful counterinsurgency efforts is the coalition maneuver company and its commander. A company commander is, in effect, the counterpart to the Afghan district governor. The tribal elders are not his counterparts; indeed, it is the responsibility of the company commander to ensure that the district governor maintains a close relationship with the elders and acts as the immediate interlocutor between them and the provincial government.

When these young commanders have proper direction and focus, they can identify where to channel resources and effort in a way no other counterinsurgent leader can replicate. Much of their insight comes from the weekly shuras in the district centers where they are often guests. District centers are the focal point for all government and economic activity and clearly places where counterinsurgent forces must have a significant presence. Coalition forces that have spent considerable time among the people understand that these district centers are the places that must become well-defended Afghan National Security Force bastions and political centers from which the district governors function. A district governor should conduct business with the full backing and strength of a sizeable Afghan police and security force operating from the district center. Where better to position Afghan forces in a rural Afghan counterinsurgency than among rural Afghans?

The vision for effective local government administration in Afghanistan includes the district center as the point of initiation for all Afghan-led political, development, and security operations. The district center is already a local nerve center—it must also become the security epicenter. This is the first fundamental change to effect across the country. There are six important steps to take in every district in every province:

- Tribal elders within a district shura must elect a district governor they trust.
- A well-trained police chief must be appointed and he should have no less than 30 police officers to maintain order.
- District centers must be reinforced with coalition support and funds for governance and economic activity (with a designated development stipend to facilitate reconstruction programming).
- Each Afghan district must have no less than one company of the Afghan National Army garrisoned at the district center; their mission must be to conduct counterinsurgency operations and their primary task must be to engage daily with the population.
- A point security force must be emplaced (Afghan public protection force of 30 guards) in each district that reports directly to the district governor and guards the district center and other sites at risk of Taliban attack (i.e., girls’ schools, bazaars, etc.).
- A district-level and native Afghan National Directorate of Security chief must be assigned and, through appropriate coalition oversight, a robust informant network developed to counter Taliban human intelligence efforts and provide early warning.

These six critical steps would set the stage for an immediate counterinsurgency advance because they focus exclusively on the protection of the Afghan people, the center of gravity in this war. The adoption of this district-centric approach places the execution of the war at the appropriate level.

**Blended security architecture.** Putting this strategic approach into operation demands a security architecture with an appropriate blend of command, control, coordination, and crosstalk among the key players. Figure 1 illustrates how the district-level structure might look. Establishing these baseline capabilities would empower district governors to
move beyond their understandable preoccupation with self-preservation and begin working for the people in the villages that comprise each district. The direct link between the district governor and the district shura is deliberate. The district governor should be answerable to the shura of elders that elect him to the office. This will require a paradigm shift and support for this method at the national level in Kabul.

Once these changes are in place in the districts, the governors will be in a much better position to counter Taliban intimidation. A great deal of credence is paid to the importance of governance and development in Afghanistan, but until there is an environment where the average Afghan feels empowered to resist the armed thugs that fill the ranks of the Taliban, the insurgency will continue to grow. We must integrate the district governor into the security architecture and support him over time to ensure sustained advances. Until this type of structure exists at the local level, no political official will enjoy credibility among the tribes. Stability in Afghanistan will emerge at the district level through a structure that reinforces cultural traditions and provides an armed force to underwrite the authority of a district governor elected by the district’s tribal elders.

Optimizing Afghan National Security Forces

The current number of coalition forces available in Afghanistan, even with the original 2009 surge of 21,000 Soldiers and Marines, is insufficient to combat the Taliban’s district offensives. The coming surge of 30,000 additional U.S. troops should address this shortfall, but it is not likely to change insurgent tactics or what up until now has been an effective strategy. Despite what the high number of coalition casualties since 2008 reflects, the Taliban and foreign fighters focus more on preventing cooperation and severing the link between the coalition force and local Afghans than they do on direct action against coalition forces. This adjustment in insurgent strategy was a matter of necessity. Because U.S. and other coalition forces have continually dealt significant blows to the insurgents in direct contact, the insurgents have turned to coercion, intimidation, and terrorism to send a clear message to the Afghan population—“coalition and Afghan security forces cannot protect you.” The insurgents reiterate this message in night letters with accompanying threats to the local population. Historically, the Taliban has targeted district governors, contractors, and coalition force base employees and their families. The Taliban has displayed a knack for attacking targets of opportunity. Increasingly, these targets have become Afghan security forces and Afghan Public Protection Force personnel. As an insurgent strategy, this approach is very effective in keeping counterinsurgent forces off balance and preventing the population from believing that things have somehow improved.

The center of gravity of this mission is protecting the Afghan people and assisting them in meeting their basic needs. This requires robust Afghan security resources at the local and district level, not at the regional level. This comprehensive effort
The Afghan National Security Forces living on large forward operating bases need to move into the rural districts...

should start with a more optimal distribution of Afghan National Security Forces.

The Afghan National Security Forces living on large forward operating bases need to move into the rural districts where the population is at risk and position themselves in the locations that can best facilitate constant engagement with the people. Only then can we effectively cross the pronounced cultural divide into the tribal areas of rural Afghanistan. In order for Afghan National Security Forces to become capable enough to meet this challenge, every single unit and detachment must formally partner with coalition forces. This will only lead to positive effects. Some of these changes are already underway.

Afghan National Army. With the current top-down approach, Afghan National Security Forces are often in general support at the provincial level with specific fixed site security responsibilities. We must change this relationship to make the district level the ascendant strategic focus. The Afghan National Army is growing steadily in capability. However, its soldiers are typically deployed in battalion-sized elements and centrally located. In fact, the rural areas generally do not benefit from the existing array of these forces in Afghanistan. We need to consider where they can achieve the most positive effects in counterinsurgency terms.

Optimally, one company of the Afghan National Army should be in each district and one coalition maneuver company should partner with it. These partnerships are necessary among the district governor, the district police chief, the Afghan National Army company commander and battalion commanders, and the coalition force company commander. Depending on the level of violence in a given district and the district’s size, it may well be feasible for one coalition force company to manage security in more than one district. In fact, in some cases one maneuver company could handle up to three districts, though there are obvious exceptions in larger districts. The commander would become the liaison to the district governors and have regular dealings with his counterparts. He would become the subject matter expert responsible for overall security and development in the districts. In this scenario, the primary task for coalition forces would be to achieve and maintain security, apply resources, help in reconstruction and development, assist the district governors in matters of governance, and increase capacity with partnered Afghan security forces. This would continue until the Afghans are able to do the work themselves. Until they reach that point though, coalition forces must take the lead to establish a secure environment and foster growth.

Each Afghan National Army battalion currently deploys to a major forward operating base intended as a launching pad to project force. However, these forward operating bases have essentially become shields from insurgent forces and impediments to maintaining contact with the rural populations. Ideally, one brigade-sized element of the Afghan National Army should deploy to each province in Afghanistan. In certain larger provinces (with more districts) or where the threat is substantially higher, up to two Afghan National Army brigades may be appropriate. Afghan National Army battalions should be distributed over a series of districts and address security in no more than three districts. At least one Afghan National Army company should have a headquarters in each district. A “company-per-district” strategy should drive refinements to the Afghan National Army battalion and brigade battlespace. Every Afghan National Army element—whether company, battalion, or brigade—should have a coalition force counterpart unit to facilitate training, drive combined operations, and provide reinforcement in extremis. The logical formula is coalition maneuver companies paired with Afghan National Army battalions, and coalition battalions paired with Afghan National Army brigades.

At the district level, Afghan National Army companies should conduct counterinsurgency operations partnered with coalition forces based out of district centers, rather than from forward operating bases. This partnership must encompass all operations, from patrolling to training to regular engagement and standard counterinsurgency operations. Although this proposal may appear overly
prescriptive, it is the only effective means to build a
genuine and lasting capacity in the Afghan National
Army and to strengthen the Afghan National Secu-


Afghan National Police. The Afghan National
Police suffer from a similarly poor distribution of
forces. Often the provincial police chief has only a
small pool of dependable Afghan police under his
control. This makes clear the dearth of well-trained
police available at this stage in the war. The police
also suffer from insufficient resourcing, ineffective
recruiting, and poor local training compared to the
army. Ideally, the police would have no less than
a platoon-sized force (30 police officers) in each
district to back up the district governor and provide
a credible deterrent to insurgents.

The appointment of an effective district police
chief is critical to this process. In many ways, the
mission of the Afghan National Police is more
complex than that of the Afghan National Army
because the police are responsible for enforcing
Afghan law. The police need to focus on maintain-
ing order, rooting out crime, and protecting the
district center. Indeed, they should serve as the
governor’s police force and operate out of a police
station adjacent to the district center to facilitate
their subordinate relationship to the governor and
his priorities.

The demand for manpower is a significant
issue. In larger districts, there might be a need
for satellite district centers and police stations,
and multiple checkpoints in between them and
the district center. Securing all these locations is
an incredible manpower drain. This role should
be shouldered by the Afghan Public Protection
Force, or a point security force, a brilliant inno-
vation already in place that keeps the Afghan
security force focused on its core counterinsur-
gency mission.

Innovation is an incredibly effective tool in a
counterinsurgency unless it distracts from funda-
mentals. However, when it comes to establishing
an overarching security structure, we must keep in
mind that interactions through representatives, by
either proxy or the Afghan Public Protection Force,
cannot substitute for direct and constant contact
with the population. The Afghan National Police
must partner with other forces to optimize effec-
tiveness and ensure direct contact with the Afghan
people as the conflict continues. The Afghan
National Police and Afghan National Army must
routinely work together. At a more fundamental
level, the seat of district-level government and
focal point of counterinsurgency efforts must be
both secure and dynamic.

Afghan Border Police. In districts along the
border with Pakistan, the Afghan Border Police are
charged with disrupting infiltration by the Taliban
and foreign fighters. However, the border police
are currently the most disorganized and least sup-
ported component of the security forces. Yet, in
some districts, the border police are supplement-
ing the Afghan National Police. The border police
should focus exclusively on operating border
combat outposts and checkpoints or they will
lose their relevance as a part of the larger national
security network. When coalition forces construct
a combat outpost, a joint team of coalition forces
and Afghan Border Police should initially operate
the outposts along the border. When the border
police are trained and strong enough, the coali-
tion forces can pull back and let them handle it.
The very nature of their mission requires that they
work closely with the Afghan National Army to
develop a sense of partnership and solidarity in
the counterinsurgency fight.

The last refinement to the development of
Afghan National Security Force capacity is the
command relationship of the coalition force train-
ers to the maneuver battalion task force. Trainers
must be responsive to the maneuver battalion and
company task force priorities, instead of either
developing their own independent priorities or
following those of a distant headquarters detached
from ongoing operations. Indeed, the coalition
force trainers must be woven into a direct sup-
port relationship with the maneuver company to

...interactions through representatives...cannot substitute for
direct and constant contact with the population.
reinforce the already existing lines of control. For the training mission to be effective, coalition force trainers must be answerable to the maneuver battalion task force commander. Otherwise, there will always be the potential and even likelihood to work at cross purposes. Coalition training teams not directly responsible to a maneuver battalion task force commander may plan and conduct independent operations completely unaware of the threat picture or ongoing operations that may impact their plans. This is the complex reality of the training mission as it is carried out in the midst of a violent counterinsurgency. Training the Afghan security forces will always be a task that is carried out inside the combat mission, and it should be subordinate to that mission, given the consequences of failure. Partnership with the Afghans must be constant (both on patrols and in training)—we need to build their capacity and take the requisite and valuable time to coach, teach, and mentor. The combat mission is led by the maneuver force, and it is only logical that the training mission not ever be separated from it. The relationship of all security enablers to the maneuver task force must be clear and direct. It follows then that the reconstruction teams should fit into the same command structure.

**Push Down Critical Assets**

Most important to this concept of reorganization in Afghanistan is empowering the company maneuver unit. We must meet the challenges unique to the Afghan counterinsurgency environment with new capabilities to lessen insurgent influence and provide a powerful advantage to the counterinsurgent. Key enablers and assets that perform more complex functions in the development realm have historically been distributed to the provincial and regional level. The value of these enablers at the district level is far greater, and the tactical impact is often immediate. These enablers have the potential to dramatically improve security and even achieve transformational effects.

To develop capacity at the district level we should consolidate certain critical assets at the maneuver company level. A maneuver company commander is the coalition lead at the local level for security, development, and governance. He is responsible for synchronizing the efforts of Afghan security forces and coalition enablers. If we keep development and security assets separate, efforts will be uncoordinated and fleeting at best, and damaging to district- and provincial-level counterinsurgency efforts at worst.

The provincial reconstruction team concept remains sound and still addresses a need that counterinsurgent strategists widely agree is imperative—building capacity and proceeding steadily along the development and governance lines of operation. Yet, eight years into the conflict, we must adapt the concept to the changed situation on the ground. The inefficiencies of the provincial reconstruction team model have become more apparent over the last three years. These teams need to be disassembled and the assets distributed to the district level to support counterinsurgency efforts in the rural areas and improve unity of command.

Provincial reconstruction teams are ill-equipped to address broader development and district-level governance challenges. Nearly all reconstruction teams are geographically separated from the rural sections of their assigned province, and they do not possess the capability to venture far beyond the population centers unless they plan their movements well in advance and operate in tandem with the maneuver
battalion task force. This is certainly no fault of theirs and would be the case regardless of how well a provincial reconstruction team functioned. Regardless of the wealth of talent infused into the teams, circumstances and conditions will always challenge them and put them at a disadvantage. The reality is that a provincial reconstruction team’s infrequent contact at the district level has the potential to render the concerted efforts it makes a distraction from the development plan a maneuver company may already be in the midst of implementing.

Provincial reconstruction team architecture and location is not the only problem with the teams. One imperative that we must address is the absence of true unity of command. By definition, establishing the hierarchy of command in a conflict environment requires clear lines of responsibility and authority that are not open to interpretation or dispute in the field. Units that fall outside of these command lines can become “orphans on the battlefield” and far more vulnerable to enemy attacks than a cohesive force that works through one commander. In a post-conflict environment, this may evolve to a looser structure where the objective is to achieve a cooperative—if not harmonious—effort. But when an enemy is actively threatening all lines of operation, the responsibility must be that of one military commander at the appropriate level in each battalion-level sector.

To address the existing problems of cooperation and coordination, we must abolish the stand-alone provincial reconstruction team and integrate its assets into the maneuver task force at the battalion level. This should remain a Joint and interagency effort, given the unique talents and perspectives each service and department brings to it.

In this case, a major or lieutenant commander, rather than a lieutenant colonel or Navy commander, would be the commander. Under these conditions, the existing civil affairs B-Team (the provincial reconstruction team project management section focused on brigade priorities) would then become part of the battalion civil affairs section to expand the maneuver battalion task force governance and development staff capabilities. The senior major would then become the seventh organic company level commander in the task force and the interagency representative advisor to the commander.

Instead of one internal civil affairs field team, there would be five developed for the maneuver battalion task force. One would work directly for each company level commander and become a formal part of their “company team,” while the senior major and civil affairs company commander would consolidate and be responsive to their requirements with the dual hat of battalion S9. This system would create an organic capability to draw on during company level maneuver operations and engagements with the district governors.

Integrating these assets would require significant development funding, but as General David Petraeus said early on in Operation Iraqi Freedom, development dollars are as important as bullets in a counterinsurgency. Adopting this decentralized and maneuver-fused approach to development would dictate that all provincial reconstruction team funding earmarked for a given Afghan province be diverted to the maneuver task force at the battalion level and subsumed into its overall development budget.

This integration would empower the battalion-level commander to focus on areas of concern, synchronize mission with maneuver priorities without additional coordination or competition (with a provincial reconstruction team), and push the funds down to the company level for development in the districts. This new capability at the maneuver company level would become one of the two cornerstone initiatives for the counterinsurgency in rural Afghanistan. The other and more potent initiative would be adding native Afghan staff officers with critical expertise to the maneuver company.

**Integrating Afghan Intellectual Capital**

Recent policy discussions about the need for a civilian surge of U.S. government agency personnel with development expertise overlook a central point—suitable candidates already exist in...
Afghanistan. We must reverse the flight of intellectual capital from rural areas to the cities. It is the rural areas where agricultural and innovative engagement expertise is most needed. Native Afghan cultural, agricultural, and communications experts are a powerful resource in this type of war. Each district requires certain assets and capabilities that native Afghan experts are in the best position to provide. While these experts would work for coalition forces, they would also be valuable for the district governor to use for governance and development purposes. In an agrarian society, these advisors would have a positive effect on the overall agricultural output in the district and help to develop a closer relationship between the population and local government.

Adding these key Afghan positions to a maneuver company headquarters would ideally have two predictable effects. First, it would produce a far superior product because these positions demand an in-depth understanding of cultural nuances that coalition forces can never possess. Second, the population’s negative perception of the Afghan government would ideally diminish as a direct consequence of the increased responsiveness to the people’s concerns and needs. And these effects would be felt none too soon, because most Afghans currently feel little connection with their government and lack confidence in its capabilities.

We should add three key Afghan positions to a company commander’s counterinsurgency team—a native cultural adviser, an agricultural adviser, and an information operations specialist. The addition of these three Afghan professionals has the potential to transform a plodding counterinsurgency effort at the district level into one that is vibrant and connected to the Afghan people. This small group of Afghan professionals would eventually become permanent members of the district governor’s staff. In the end, this effort would focus on what the local community and tribes value and would build capacity. The creation of these three key Afghan positions at the district level would provide the capacity for substantial counterinsurgency progress and set the stage for development of a district governor’s professional staff to sustain that progress after we leave. Figure 2 depicts how these three key positions and the Afghan National Security Force embedded tactical trainers would fit into the existing coalition maneuver company structure.

**Afghan cultural adviser.** In light of how critical culture awareness is in any counterinsurgency, and the vast challenge of grasping the nuances of tribal culture in Afghanistan, it is a wonder that the concept of assigning a native cultural adviser at the company level has not yet become formally established. A cultural adviser who is well educated and familiar with the sub-tribal structure and keyelders network in local areas of operation can work directly with a coalition company commander to prevent missteps that have negative effects on the operation.

The cultural adviser should advise the company commander on all matters concerning culture. In this capacity, the adviser would help coalition forces avoid pitfalls, understand cultural mores, and engage the population. Moreover, he could facilitate a close working relationship between the company commander and the district governor. A strong cultural adviser can help develop information operations messages to connect the district governor with the Afghan people. The adviser can take the governor’s vision and a commander’s intent—weave in Islamic principles, tenets of the Pashtunwali code and tribal history—and communicate with the population.

When I commanded Task Force Eagle in Afghanistan
from 2007 to 2008, we found ourselves tapping into the experience of the Afghan cultural adviser continuously. For example, in March 2008, an improvised explosive device killed four Afghan guards in the Bermel district of Paktika Province. The Afghan cultural adviser quickly created an information operations message condemning the attack. The message was so compelling that, for the first time, members of the local population conducted their own investigation, discovered the culprits and their location, and informed the Afghan district police chief, who arrested the terrorists responsible for the attack. This was not the first message crafted by the Afghan cultural adviser in the district, but it showed that consistent, compelling communication with the population can transform the environment. Developing civic pride is one thing, but working to improve every Afghan citizen’s quality of life is quite another.

**Afghan agricultural adviser.** The vast majority of Afghans in the rural areas, where the Taliban have historically enjoyed freedom of movement, are farmers. An enabler who possesses agricultural expertise has the potential to be a powerful counterinsurgent weapon. The most important economic indicators in most areas of rural Afghanistan relate to agriculture. Because Afghanistan is a largely agrarian society, an adviser with a degree in agriculture should work with the company commander at the district level to develop, plan and carry out agricultural initiatives.

Such an advisor can be a useful tool for the district governor and coalition forces in developing a close relationship with the population. He may run seminars and courses for the local farmers to help them produce larger crops, conduct assessments, advise local farmers on irrigation projects, and distribute agricultural humanitarian assistance. Participants in agricultural seminars may improve their farming operations and perhaps receive a tool-kit, wheat and corn seed, or fruit tree saplings upon graduation.

Task Force Eagle arranged agricultural seminars to help improve agricultural production. The seminars became so popular in Paktika province that we hired an additional agricultural adviser for each company in our battalion task force. In addition, locals requested an agricultural radio program be broadcast on the local radio station. Farmers began asking advisors questions by mail and during visits to the district center. Clearly, such seminars and other initiatives can help the local government win over the population. Creating an institutionalized Afghan capability that focuses exclusively on developing and distributing this sort of critical information is the next logical step to make this approach systematic.

**Afghan information operations specialists.** The most effective information operations in the Afghan war are conducted by Afghans and supported by coalition forces. For best results, we need to fuse coalition force and Afghan information operations. The company headquarters platoon should have an Afghan information operations cell composed of native Afghan experts familiar with the districts in question. One of the experts should be the advisor for the maneuver company commander, offering insights and proposing methods to “reach” the people most effectively. Another should work at the battalion level to coordinate battalion support for the company under the coordinating hand of the battalion fire support officer. At the company level, at least one Afghan specialist should program and announce radio material. The battalion-level cell should help create messages that resonate with the population and demonstrate that
the Afghan district government (district governor) and coalition forces (company commander) speak with one voice to the population. The district governor would have the lead in these efforts, and the coalition force commander would play a supporting role, offering ideas, pressing for action where appropriate, and adding a degree of quality control to the system.

The Afghan information operations specialists can produce leaflets, run the radio station (if available), and ensure that all communications with the populace are well thought-out and effective. These Afghan professionals can play a critical role as they inevitably become the voice of the district government to the population and help break the cycle of rumors and lies propagated by the Taliban through night letters and other forms of intimidation. They could conduct interviews with the district police chief, Afghan National Army commanders, or the district governor to assist in getting important messages out to the people. Local mullahs, loyal to the Afghan government, could run radio shows coordinated by the Afghan information operations team to challenge the inflammatory rhetoric put forth in radical madrasas and mosques across the border in Pakistan. In Paktika province, the Afghan workers that ran the mobile radio station (called a “radio in a box”) typically received over 500 letters a week from the local population in an overwhelmingly favorable response to the programming. The letters ranged from requests for programming to both pro-government and anti-Taliban poetry, essays, and songs designed to be read or sung on the air.

Adding positions for a native Afghan cultural adviser, agricultural adviser, and information operations specialist has the potential to provide formidable expertise to a counterinsurgency force. These Afghan experts might also advise on the best way to invest the development resources crucial to success in counterinsurgency operations. The possibilities to favorably shape the environment and create even greater opportunities to exploit are innumerable. Figure 3 illustrates relationships across a maneuver company’s sphere of influence. This model optimizes all assets and creates an atmosphere to unify effort at the company level.

The Power of the People

With the ongoing policy debate surrounding the war in Afghanistan, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that, in the end, the success of the mission is not dependent upon the actions of the Taliban. The mission depends first on the people of Afghanistan contributing to a more secure environment, then on a dramatically improved performance of the Afghan National Security Forces, and only then on our efforts as a coalition force. The mission to establish a secure environment in Afghanistan can succeed, but with modifications to the distribution plan for Afghan national security forces and refinements to the command structure of enablers and tactical assets already in the fight, the momentum will swing toward greater stability.

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**Figure 3. Proposed maneuver company counterinsurgency structure in Afghanistan.**
The mission depends first on the people of Afghanistan contributing to a more secure environment...

We must make President Hamid Karzai and his provincial governors see the value of empowering the tribal shuras to elect their own district governors. The voice of rural Afghanistan would then emerge. Indeed, district centers must become the security epicenters where Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police co-locate and support a district governor in the daily business of engaging the people and addressing their needs and concerns. Longer-term stability in Afghanistan depends upon the creation of a district-level structure built around the leadership of district governors partnered with coalition maneuver company commanders and a full complement of Afghan security forces.

The more urgent proposition is to redistribute Afghan National Army forces from forward operating bases into Afghan communities and rural areas to live among the people and partner with the Afghan National Police. This move alone would send a powerful message to the people and to the Taliban that the stability and future of the nation is in the hands of the Afghan people and protected by a unified security force. Although the signature elements of this reorganization proposal are Afghan led, coalition maneuver company commanders must partner with district governors and their Afghan National Army battalion commander counterparts to coordinate governance and security efforts.

Structures that worked well through the first several years of the war must evolve to this decentralized approach to countering the insurgency. An important feature of this restructuring plan is disassembling provincial reconstruction teams in favor of a company level construct that focuses on distributing robust development assets to the maneuver company and interagency advisers to the battalion task force level. We must expand the battalion-level development function to address the distribution of development teams to every maneuver company and empower them to manage more development funds and projects.

The cornerstone of this new tactical realignment of assets will be the integration of Afghan intellectual capital into maneuver companies to assume roles as both conduits and primary staff to their district governor counterparts as native Afghan cultural and agricultural advisers and information operations team specialists. They can provide a stronger capability to wage the counterinsurgency than has yet been at our disposal. Afghans must win this war, but an appropriate cross-fertilization of assets and capabilities will facilitate that victory. MR

Special thanks to Major Robert McChrystal (former commander of C Company, 1-503d Airborne, in Task Force Eagle) for his cogent contributions to this article and the many conversations that led to the effort to write this piece.

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A CCORDING TO FIELD Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, the “malleable situation following in the wake of conflict, disaster, or internal strife provides the force with the greatest opportunity to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.” Although this is entirely correct, that opportunity is by no means reserved to stabilization forces. Others can seize it, too. The removal of restraints in the aftermath of regime failure quickly leads to all kinds of opportunist criminal activities such as looting, score-settling, robbery, kidnapping, and sexual abuse. Although they considerably worsen living conditions of the population, criminals play but a secondary role in stability operations. They mainly create a broad desire for protection. Put simply, people look around for structures that can provide security, solutions to immediate problems, and hope for a better future. Armies, humanitarian organizations, militias, civil society groups, and resistance movements create such structures by seizing the opportunities provided by the malleable situation. As such, they are the main actors in stability operations.

However, the outcome of stability operations is not determined by decisive battle. The main actors compete with each other in an economy of power where popular support plays the role of currency. Therefore, the main question is how Western stability operations will fit with other actors’ plans and actions. One should not assume potential adversaries are disorganized or somehow incapable of carrying out complex operations. Subdued populations, diaspora groups, political extremists, or religious fundamentalists may consider the rupture of the existing social contract as a long-awaited opportunity to realize their vision or further their interests. Two basic strategies are open to indigenous actors confronted with the presence of stabilization forces after regime failure—collaboration or insurgency. The former strategy is no less dangerous than the latter, and a combination of the two in one conflict area is a potential nightmare.
An Enigma

Stability operations have always presented an enigma. Western military involvement can range from a hundred to several hundred thousand soldiers. Methods vary from bombing cities to distributing baby food. Some operations drag on for decades, claiming thousands of casualties, while others end abruptly after the media gives attention to the loss of a small number of soldiers. Few human endeavors differ so much in scope, size, and duration. Even more surprisingly, their outcome seems to be totally independent of these three variables. An American force numbering not more than 100 Soldiers was sufficient to end a deeply entrenched Marxist-Leninist insurgency in El Salvador. Conversely, 500,000 Soldiers and Marines were unsuccessful against a similar enemy in Vietnam. Understanding stability operations requires a thorough analysis of the objectives of troop-contributing nations on the one hand, and those of the indigenous actors—the collaborator and the insurgent—on the other.

Stabilization requires military involvement in an area plagued by conflict, disaster, or internal strife—this is all but self-evident. In virtually all cases, this involvement is preceded by intense political debates. Perceptions and expectations dominate these debates. Sometimes, they correspond with reality, but often they do not. Jon Western holds that “because rhetorical campaigns are such an integral part of mobilizing public and political support, there is a tendency to oversell the message. The constant temptation to manipulate and distort information frequently leads the public to develop unrealistic expectations about the nature or likely cost or efficacy of military intervention.” In practice, the debate results in a tacit contract between the armed forces, the government, the opposition, the media, pressure groups, and the electorate. The most important terms of the contract are justification, cost, casualties, duration, and conduct. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, concisely describes what happens when this contract is breached. “During stability operations, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties.” Because of political considerations, stabilization forces are severely hamstrung in their use of defeat mechanisms. Applying defeat mechanisms implies the use of lethal combat power. However, “political considerations guide stabilization efforts. Military forces and development agencies must remain constantly aware of the political environment and be prepared to change tactics accordingly.” Recent history shows that sociopolitical tolerance concerning the use of defeat mechanisms is highest at the outset of military operations, quickly decreases after stabilization forces firmly establish their presence in the area.

Upsetting the Balance of Power

The arrival of stabilization forces completely upsets the balance of power in the conflict area. Active enemy forces either comply with the resolutions that constitute the basis of the operation’s legitimacy—by withdrawing, disarming, or disbanding—or face destruction. The existing elite lose their privileges, while others see opportunities to claim their rightful place. Everyone has the choice to collaborate with the stabilization forces or not. Often, it is not the strongest party in the conflict that chooses to do so, nor the party with the largest constituency. The smaller the powerbase of an actor is, the greater the benefit—and therefore the incentive—to collaborate.

Generally, the collaborator cannot fend for himself. His emergence requires the presence of stabilization forces. He leverages defeat mechanisms used by these forces to establish his powerbase. Because he does not have to recruit or pay the military power he relies on, he can expand his power far beyond the level warranted by his constituency and tax base. Collaboration allows him to do business without paying the cost of doing business. One can easily imagine that this is an attractive situation. The American-backed South Vietnamese regime during the 1960s is a typical example. President Diem ruled “by favoring fellow Catholics, who made up only 10% of the population.”

Collaboration allows [the collaborator] to do business without paying the cost of doing business.
Since the stabilization forces are the best guarantee for the collaborator’s hold on power, he tries to perpetuate their presence. If he thinks he can succeed in this, there is no need for him to expand his constituency. An increased constituency simply dilutes power and wealth because scarce positions of influence in politics and the economy have to be shared with more people. Additionally, because the collaborator counts on the stabilization forces for military backup, he seems to strike from behind their cover, thus creating the perception that the former is a coward and the latter an accomplice. This is not a sound base for gaining popular support.

**Insurgent as Self-starter**

Unlike the collaborator, the insurgent is a self-starter. Galula holds that an insurgent emerges “by finding supporters among the population, people whose support will range from active participation in the struggle to passive approval.” Potential popular support is a prerequisite for the creation of an insurgent. Therefore, the party with the largest potential constituency is the most likely to start an insurgency. Yet, this is only half the answer to the question of how an insurgent comes into being. What prevents stabilization forces from defeating or destroying the emerging insurgent?

The insurgent escapes defeat mechanisms by complying with conditions that preclude their use. Joint Publication 3-0 introduced “restraint” as the 12th principle of Joint operations because, during stability operations, “restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment.” In practice, defeat mechanisms can only be used against active, enemy forces. Generally, the insurgent protects himself by splitting his organization into an unarmed, sociopolitical wing that complies with conditions triggering restraint and an armed, militant wing that hides amongst the population. To do this, the insurgent creates a constituency large enough to conceal and support a significant number of terrorist or guerrilla units. The insurgent’s unarmed wing is made up of organizations such as ideological newspapers, militant universities, trade unions, religious charities, and the like. Although these organizations trigger restraints on the use of force, they are far from harmless. Their activities range from organizing strikes and mass demonstrations to recruiting of terrorists and suicide bombers. Their infrastructure can conceal command centers, safe houses, and weapons caches. However, their main purpose is not to contribute to guerrilla or terrorist operations but to organize activities that generate popular support.

Since the stabilization forces are the strongest military party in the conflict, the insurgent tries to terminate their presence by making it impossible for them to abide by the terms of the sociopolitical contract that governs their commitment. Insurgents will do whatever it takes to erode national will, diminish popular support, raise doubts about an operation’s legitimacy, and maximize casualties, while simultaneously taking maximum advantage of restraints that hamstring stabilization forces.

Militarily, the insurgent is the weakest actor. Therefore, he can use his military weakness as an excuse for not restraining his own use of force. Stabilization forces and the collaborator must cope with being accountable to higher moral standards than the insurgent. To increase his military reach and impact, the insurgent tries to expand his constituency. The larger his constituency, the more fighters and terrorists he can conceal within the population. Exploiting the possibilities the revolution in communication technology offers, the insurgent even works to increase support for his cause outside of the conflict area. The omnipresence of the news media, the possibilities of the Internet, the abundance of political pressure groups, and especially the proliferation of diasporas in most Western capitals have greatly enhanced his possibilities to do so.

Huntington observes that “in controversies involving the homeland country or homeland groups in conflict with other states or groups over the control of territory, diasporas have often, but not always, supported the more extremist of their homeland colleagues.” Because diasporas often support the more extreme party in the conflict, the insurgent has the best chance to benefit from its wealth and influence. Increasingly, diaspora groups influence conflicts by raising funds for insurgents and by acting as political pressure groups in their host nation. A good example is the Irish-American pressure group, the Irish Northern Aid Committee. Cochran says that “the political capital of migrant communities is often overlooked by commentators who focus simply on the coercive potential
...the collaborator’s actions and goals are diametrically opposed to those of the insurgent, but also partially to those of the stabilization forces.

of diaspora groups and their capacity to fund violence through financial capital. The case of Irish-Americans is illustrative in this regard, as the Irish Northern Aid Committee’s political capital was at least as important to militant Republicans in Northern Ireland as their fund-raising power.”

In summary, the collaborator’s actions and goals are diametrically opposed to those of the insurgent, and partially opposed to those of the stabilization forces. Conversely, although the insurgent opposes the stabilization forces, many of his actions foster popular support. This undercuts the rationale of stability operations: that military intervention is necessary to help the people. The long-term effect is increasing popularity for the insurgent, declining popularity for the collaborator, and decreasing resolve of the stabilization forces. The resulting conundrum is the primary reason why stability mechanisms have to supplement defeat mechanisms.

Goals of Stability Operations and Insurgent Viability

Field Manual 3-07 outlines the goals of stability operations. “The immediate goal . . . is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. Long-term goals . . . include developing host-nation capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, legitimate and effective institutions, and a robust civil society.” These goals are unachievable without using stability mechanisms. However, the stabilization forces are not the only ones aware of this. In 2005, Timothy Haugh observed that while “U.S. tanks dashed across Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr and his vanguard of like-minded clerics reactivated mosques, deployed a militia, assumed control of regional Ba‘ath Party institutions, and prepared social services.” In short, this movement combined all four stability mechanisms—compel, control, influence, and support—and did so without hesitation to take maximum advantage of the malleable situation the coalition offensive created.

Al-Sadr’s reaction to the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime was so innovative that his “rise to prominence within the Shi’a community largely went unnoticed by the United States government.” His actions illustrate his firm belief that he could take control of the situation despite the presence of coalition forces. The ability of insurgents to exist and act inside an area that they share with stabilization forces and collaborators is a Palestinian invention dating back to the 1980s. Under Israeli occupation, the Palestinians developed a comprehensive approach based on “out-administrating, not out-fighting the enemy.”

Thomas Hammes describes this phenomenon in his case study of the 1987 Palestinian uprising. After the 1967 Six-Day War, the Israelis “provided a minimalist government to keep the territories quiet.” As a result, Palestinian resistance leaders created their own structures. Local service organizations “provided trash and sewer services, established sports leagues, provided medical care, drove out pimps and thieves, and expelled suspected Israeli collaborators.” In so doing, they created a popular support base from which they could launch armed attacks inside an area controlled by one of the most capable military forces in the world. The Palestinians started violent campaigns in 1987. Initially, they “forced the Israelis to the negotiating table and won concessions.” Later, continued combinations of the provision of essential services to the population and terrorist violence enabled Hamas and Hezbollah to force the Israelis out of the Gaza Strip and Southern Lebanon respectively. These were the first occasions the Israelis gave up land and Jewish settlements without concessions from their opponents.

To appreciate the novelty of the Palestinian approach, one has to consider the sacrifices earlier insurgents were willing to make to avoid coexistence with their enemy in the same area. When his base area in Jiangxhi was threatened during the Chinese Civil War, Mao Tse-Tung shifted his base to Shaanxhi. This feat is known as the Long March.
In other words, Mao chose to walk 6,000 miles rather than share an area with his enemies. In a similar vein, the Vietcong mobilized thousands of people to push heavily loaded bicycles up and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail because they could not sustain their resistance without a secure base area in North Vietnam. Conversely, Hamas and Hezbollah were at their best when they defied the Israeli occupation forces in the Gaza Strip and Southern Lebanon. 

Logically, one can expect that insurgents around the world will try to copy the Hamas and Hezbollah approach. Younes and Rosen remark that “through a ‘Hezbollah-like’ scheme, the Shi’ite Sadrists movement has established itself as the main service provider in the country...Not only do these militias now have a quasi-monopoly in the large-scale provision of assistance in Iraq, they are also recruiting an increasing number of civilians.” The implication for stability operations is that stability mechanisms have to be used in competition with the insurgent and that the insurgent is sometimes better at this. One must understand the conditions that enable the insurgent to gain popular support and conduct terrorist or guerrilla attacks in defiance of stabilization forces. Recent examples show that three main conditions must exist before the insurgent can adopt this approach:

- **Restraints on the use of force.** When the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood—a movement similar to Hamas—started an uprising, Syria’s president ordered the destruction of the city of Hama and the murder of thousands of its inhabitants. This convincingly proved that attempting an approach like Hamas or Hezbollah against a ruthless dictatorship was doomed to fail. Restraints are rather new in military history. However, the increased political awareness of Western electorates, the abundance of anti-war pressure groups, morality, and the omnipresence of the media now make it impossible for democracies to ignore them.

- **A large, undisturbed flow of foreign funds.** Insurgents used to finance their activities with the means available in the areas under their control. Revolutionary taxes, racketeering, and confiscation of crops were but three techniques used by 20th century guerrilla movements. It was impossible to implement vast social programs with such limited means. However, the fast development of international money transfer systems and the increasing number of people living in diasporas all over the world have made it possible to generate finances on a global scale. This enables insurgencies to spend more money on humanitarian policies than on terrorist attacks.

- **A period during which the insurgent can establish a dominant position in humanitarian assistance without hindrance by stabilization forces.** Western forces tend to underestimate the dangers of a movement that combines an extremist political agenda with large-scale humanitarian activities. Such a combination can create a nearly inexhaustible recruiting pool for an insurgency. A dominant role in humanitarian assistance also brings international respectability, the right to speak on behalf of the needy, and the ability to grant or withhold regular jobs in hospitals, schools, and charitable organizations. In short, dominating humanitarian assistance in a destitute area generates real power.
Trading Political Capital for Personal Interest

As early as possible, stabilization forces need to recognize movements that provide essential services and humanitarian assistance as a stepping-stone to violent resistance. Western intelligence now neglects them, as it did Al-Sadr’s organization. Stability operations must ensure that no movement—and certainly no extremist movement—dominates humanitarian operations. Stabilization forces should focus their intelligence efforts on money flows, market shares, and strategic aims of movements involved in humanitarian assistance. A system of registration and licensing should level the playing field for all peaceful humanitarian assistance organizations and exclude potentially violent ones. Because insurgents can now raise funds worldwide, measures to monitor and inhibit the transfer of money are indispensable. Matthew Levitt emphasizes that “the Achilles heel of terrorism financiers is not at the fundraising end, but at those key chokepoints critical to laundering and transferring funds. It is impossible to ‘dry the swamp’ of funds available for illicit purposes, but, by targeting key nodes in the financing network, we can constrict the operating environment to the point that terrorists will not be able to get funds where and when they need them.”

The above measures aim to diversify the humanitarian assistance landscape. They prevent extremist movements from capitalizing on such root causes of conflict as repression or social inequalities by establishing a dominant position in humanitarian assistance. However, they are insufficient because they do not eliminate those root causes. In the end, stability mechanisms have to convince the local population that stabilization forces are no longer needed. This means that the collaborator must step up efforts to include all segments of the population in his constituency. This is not something the collaborator does spontaneously. Involving all segments of society in the public affairs of a country comes at the cost of opening key political and economic positions to people not closely linked to the collaborators’s family, entourage, clan, or ethnic group. While the insurgent aggressively strives to increase popular support, the collaborator shows little to no initiative to do so. On the contrary, a collaborator sometimes seems to trade political capital for personal interest. In the power economy, such a collaborator behaves like a company that relies on state subsidies and an enforced monopoly to stay in business. Events following the 1993 Oslo Agreements illustrate this.

In the agreements, Israel agreed to the creation of the Palestinian Authority and a partial withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. Western governments seized this opportunity. They decided to contribute to the peace process by supporting the party that accepted the Accords—the PLO, led by Yasser Arafat—and by weakening the party that opposed them—the terrorist movement, Hamas. Donor contributions to the PLO-controlled Palestinian Authority even surpassed the amounts pledged. Because the international community put them in control of large volumes of financial aid, the PLO had to rely less on popular support to secure their hold on power. A small, corrupt, but extremely loyal elite took advantage of this situation. According to Ben Yishay, “There is general consensus that the Palestinian Authority’s heavy handed involvement in the market—including important commodity monopolies, corruption, and tight control over foreign investment, credit sources, and protected areas of the economy—essentially constituted a transfer of income from poorer groups to the political elite.”

The net result was that “the Oslo Accords initiated a new period of both centralization of political power and cooperation between the old elite social class and top Palestinian Authority officers, creating a conservative and anti-democratic ruling alliance.” Consequently, Palestinian confidence in Yasser Arafat plummeted from 87.1 percent in 1996 to about 25 percent in 2002. This laid the foundation for Hamas’s victory in the 2006 elections, the opposite of the intended results.

To ensure unity of effort, stability operations must compel the collaborator to co-opt people outside his family, clan, religion, or ethnic group. Stabilization forces must not let the collaborator cajole them into
Yitzhak Rabin, Bill Clinton, and Yasser Arafat at the Oslo Accords signing ceremony on 13 September 1993.

becoming a praetorian guard for a privileged elite. To pressure the collaborator, stabilization forces have to convey two clear messages to him:

● We will not do the fighting for you.
● We will stop supporting you, unless you secure popular support from all segments of society.

However, pressuring the collaborator is not without risk. Once the collaborator understands both messages and decides to expand his constituency, he faces a difficult period during which the most dangerous threat to his survival is not the insurgency, but his own entourage. On the one hand, individuals or factions within this entourage will dislike the idea of sharing power and wealth with representatives of other population groups. On the other hand, the population will be skeptical about the honesty of the collaborator’s intentions to share power. In such circumstances, a coup d’état is not unlikely. Therefore, stabilization operations include measures to convince not only the collaborator, but his large entourage as well.

The Example of El Salvador

The U.S. stability operation in El Salvador illustrates all dynamics described above. From 1979 until 1992, an armed conflict between a military junta and a communist insurgent group ravaged El Salvador. The United States committed six billion dollars, hundreds of humanitarian aid workers, and a military advisory group of between 55 and 100 soldiers for more than a decade to stabilize this smallest and most densely populated Central American country. Jones and Libicki hold that the country’s economic reliance on the export of coffee was one of the root causes that led to civil war. “Central to the evolution of El Salvador’s political economy was a class structure based on the coercion of agrarian labor. State political elites enforced repressive labor conditions and highly concentrated property rights on behalf of a small economic elite.”

At their high water mark, the “[insurgent movement] included more than 12,000 combatants, operated in all 14 provinces of the country, and controlled one-third of the country’s territory.”

Because of the threat of communist expansion, the U.S. government decided to intervene. “When President Reagan was sworn into office, his Administration began explaining to the American public the significance of the threat posed by the communist insurgency in El Salvador against United States national interests.” Deane Hinton, the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador from 1982 until 1983, concisely stated the American objective: “to make sure that the guerrillas and Communists didn’t take over El Salvador.” The junta was more than willing to collaborate to reach this objective. However, it was unclear whether this collaboration would help or hinder stability operations. “The Salvadoran armed forces had been their own worst enemy. Their continual abusive treatment and blatant human rights abuses of the citizens were seen as business as usual.”

Consequently, the regime soon was on the brink of collapse. “During the mid-1980s, public support was not in the hands of the civilian or military leadership. Without their support, the [Salvadoran] government remained in power only as long as the U.S. stayed involved.” American pressure on the junta was crucial to the operation’s success. “In October 1981, the U.S. Senate established conditions for continued U.S. aid to El Salvador. President Reagan had to certify twice a year that the Salvadoran government was making marked progress toward controlling the Salvadoran armed forces and their known death squad activity and other human rights violations.” While American politicians clearly conveyed the message that continued aid depended on democratization and respect for human rights, the military adversary...
group focused on influencing the junta’s large entourage. “Military Group advisors recognized that victory required the Salvadoran armed forces and the government to address the grievances of the Salvadoran people. A National Campaign Plan, written by advisors and passed to the Salvadoran armed forces in early 1983, was the first effort to move from chasing guerrillas to winning the support of the people.” This “national campaign plan” (NCP) was “a plan for victory, not just survival. The NCP was designed to fully integrate all elements of national power in order to achieve security in conjunction with development.” Implementing the plan required patience and determination. “Non-glamorous techniques were difficult to set in motion and even more difficult for the Salvadoran armed forces to maintain. But those types of techniques worked best when defeating insurgent force was the goal . . . Steps were taken in the right direction such as having the Salvadoran armed forces participate in local civic action projects. Those projects showed the people that the Salvadoran government was attempting to backup their promises of supporting the masses.”

The U.S. was equally adamant that the Salvadorean had to do all the fighting themselves. The advisors “were restricted from accompanying them on actual combat patrols.” Therefore, the Salvadoran government was never able to hide behind a cover of American combat power. This created and sustained a Salvadoran resolve to win the conflict.

Results were impressive. The Salvadoran armed forces evolved from an instrument of violent oppression to a force that operated among and for the people. The junta transformed to a democratically elected government. The best proof that stability operations in El Salvador were a success was the electoral victory of the governing party—the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA)—in the UN-monitored 1994 elections in which both the collaborator and the insurgent participated. “ARENA received 49 percent of the vote and 39 seats in the legislative assembly, the [insurgent] coalition received 25 percent and 22 seats.”

**Collaborator Dynamics**

FM 3-07 rightfully emphasizes that stability requires the development of a self-sustaining host-nation capacity to provide security, rule of law, and economic recovery. The basic problem of stability operations is that spontaneous indigenous responses to the arrival of stabilization forces are not conducive to the development of this capacity. The indigenous actor most willing to cooperate is often the least suited to fulfill this role. This collaborator generally has a limited constituency and no intention to expand it. For him and his elite entourage, continued reliance on Western military support is but a small price to pay for a position of power and wealth that otherwise would be unattainable. Conversely, the actor with the largest political constituency often prefers to gain power through an insurgency rather than to rely on an external power that demands him to give up his political agenda. The stabilization forces’ main challenge is to compel the collaborator to increase his political capital and to deny the insurgent the means to gain broad popular support for his cause. Therefore, stability operations have to include a series of measures aimed at the insurgent as well as the collaborator. The most important measure regarding the latter is to change the attitude and opinions of his large entourage through a sustained campaign of education and training of cadres. This measure allows western governments to increase
The stabilization forces’ main challenge is to compel the collaborator to increase his political capital…

political pressure on the collaborator without the risk of causing his entourage to oust him.

Stabilization force measures that focus on the insurgent relate to the fact that many insurgents start as movements that combine an extremist or fundamentalist agenda with large-scale humanitarian assistance. Therefore, stabilization forces have to focus intelligence efforts on money flows, market shares, and strategic aims of movements involved in humanitarian assistance to recognize such movements in an early phase. Subjecting humanitarian assistance activities to a process of registration and licensing, denying these licenses to extremist movements, and constricting the transfer of funds raised for them by diaspora groups are possible measures to prevent the insurgent groups from gaining a dominant position in the field of humanitarian aid.

If the stability operation is to be successful, stabilization forces must change the collaborator’s propensity to concentrate power in the hands of a small elite and deny the insurgent the means to generate popular support for his cause by exploiting the humanitarian needs of the populace. MR

NOTES

4. “A defeat mechanism is the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition… Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: Destroy, Dislocate, Disintegrate, Isolate,” FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 27 February 2008), 6-9.
5. FM 3-07, C7.
8. JP 3-0, V-27.
9. Examples of insurgent and/or terrorist movements with such a dual organization are: the Irish Republican Army (sociopolitical wing: Sinn Fein), the Basque terrorist organization ETA (sociopolitical wing: Herrie Batasuna), Hamas, and Hezbollah.
10. JP 3-0, IV-19.
15. FM 3-0, 6-10.
18. Ibid., 95.
19. Ibid.
24. “In May 1959, the North Vietnamese leadership created a logistics unit, called Group 559, for the purpose of expanding the traditional infiltration route to the south—the Ho Chi Minh trail.” The Vietnamese used this trail during the rest of the War to bring supplies from North Vietnam to the Vietcong in South Vietnam. Marian E. Vlasak, “The Paradox of Logistics in Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies,” Military Review (January-February 2007).
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Movements End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 64.
33. Ibid., 68.
35. Ibid., 9.
36. Ibid., 8.
37. Ibid., 23.
38. Ibid., 16.
39. Ibid., 24.
40. Thomas E. Miller, Counterinsurgency and Operational Art (SAMS Monograph, GGSC Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003), 48.
41. Cale, 25.
42. Ibid., 34.
43. Jones and Libicki, 75.
LAND POWER SUCCESS in stability operations will require inter-agency command structures at the operational level and the concurrent development of a more effective interagency “culture” for these missions. The future probability of military engagement in stability operations is high. Land power, broadly speaking, bears the brunt of the planning and execution of such missions.

Stability operations are military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure, reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Land power plays a leading role in stability operations, which concentrate on population control, security, and development activities. Military forces drawn heavily from the U.S. Army engage in stability operations to establish, safeguard, or restore basic civil services. They act directly and in support of government agencies. Stability operations often involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They lead to an environment in which the other instruments of national power can predomin ate.

The very definition of stability operations raises the problem of how to command and control endeavors that are by nature Joint, interagency, and often multinational. Since the U.S. government will continue to conduct stability operations, the U.S. defense establishment must develop a comprehensive view to integrate military land power with its interagency partners for these deployments. Although stability operations are an interagency and intergovernmental effort, challenges and shortcomings in coordinating and resourcing efforts across executive branch departments often result in the U.S. Army carrying a disproportionate burden in conducting these operations. While the Army will play a critical role in executing stability operations, and bear significant responsibility for planning in the pre-execution phase of stability operations, it will not be alone. During the planning and execution cycle, the Army is directly participating with organizations throughout the government to define the most appropriate and essential roles for the military and civilian agencies in stability operations.

Land power for stability operations is a holistic mix of capabilities drawn from the U.S. Army and a host of other federal agencies. A partial listing of these agencies includes the Department of State (DOS), the U.S. Agency for International Aid (USAID), the Department of Justice (DOJ),
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Department of Agriculture. Critical challenges are establishing unity of effort and command over such diverse institutions and structuring appropriate command organizations at the operational level for maximum effectiveness.

**Strategic Context**

A U.S. Joint Forces Command study on the future of warfare lends credence to the view that the future holds a high potential for instability due to demographic, energy, and climate trends. This *Joint Operating Environment 2008* report stated, “The next quarter century will challenge U.S. joint forces with threats and opportunities ranging from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons.” The analysis implies that U.S. military forces will engage in persistent conflict over the next quarter century.5

In this era of persistent conflict, rapidly evolving terrorist structures, transnational crime, and ethnic violence complicate international relations and create belts of state fragility and instability that present a grave threat to national security. Drivers of conflict (sources of instability that push parties toward open conflict) include religious fanaticism, global competition for resources, climate change, residual territorial claims, ideology, and the desire for power. While journeying into this uncertain future, leaders will increasingly call on stability operations to reduce the drivers of conflict and instability and to build local institutional capacity to forge sustainable peace, security, and economic growth.6

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission. The Department of Defense (DOD) must be prepared to conduct and support them across all activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.7 This mandate implies the need for substantial ground forces that can successfully execute the resulting contingency operations produced by such an unstable and volatile world. These land power forces must contain an integrated mix of civilian and military capabilities to address the core sources of instability and conflict.

**Unity of Command and Unity of Effort**

While the functions of command are eternal, the nature of command must evolve in scale and scope, given developments in technology and the mission. If the United States remains involved in stability operations, the Armed Forces, together with their civilian partners, must apply doctrinal principles that are applicable to these missions. Chief among these are *unity of command* and its interrelated concept of *unity of effort*.8

Unity of command is simple—for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. Cooperation may produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority is the most effective way to achieve unity of effort. The Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational nature of unified action creates situations where the commander does not directly control all organizations in the operational area. In the absence of command authority, commanders must cooperate, negotiate, and build consensus to achieve unity of effort.9

Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action.10 Uniting all of the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in stability operations requires collaborative and cooperative paradigms that focus those capabilities toward a common goal. Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in a stability operation. This is the essence of *unified action*: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.11
To this end, military forces have to operate with the other instruments of national power to forge at a minimum unity of effort through a whole-of-government approach. Regrettably, lack of true unity of command leads to inefficiencies, opportunity costs, and a less-than-holistic approach to a global counterinsurgency and other post-conflict missions. The correct command structure for stability operations is crucial. Unfortunately, political or agency considerations too often determine specific command structures. History abounds with command arrangements powered by these attributes.

The problems with the current American interagency process are complex. Most of today’s troubles arise from a gap created by a lack of either capacity or integration, or both, below the national level. So while the strategic policy level may have its integrative mechanisms, the operational and execution level are where the deficits lie. This operational level links the use of tactical forces, which include civilian agencies, to achieving the strategic end state. Major operations are not solely the purview of combat forces. They typically go forward with the other instruments of national power. Major operations often bring together the capabilities of other agencies, nations, and organizations. Unfortunately, current command arrangements are imprecise or cobbled together and do not fully address the situation at hand. Integrating the efforts of military and nonmilitary organizations in the interagency process to achieve unity of effort has proved elusive, allowing for unclear lines of authority and communication and leading to confusion during the execution of the operation. Given the challenges and complexities inherent in stability operations, military and civilian agencies must evolve to a more concrete unity of command approach that avoids the inefficiencies of consensus building and compromise found in a unity of effort model.

Organizational Mismatches

Typically, execution at the regional or local levels is fraught with problems, because the agencies representing the instruments of power organize themselves differently and there is no directive authority for implementation at the regional level. The DOD and the DOS, as the core players in stability operations, are representative of these problems. The former has six geographic combatant commands responsible for the various regions, but the latter’s regional organization is different. The State Department has six regional bureaus, but their boundaries do not match those of DOD. As an example, the U.S. Central Command commander must coordinate efforts with three regional State bureaus: African Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, and South and Central Asian Affairs, plus 27 country teams. Because most emergencies transcend national boundaries, the absence of a compatible operational framework between officials of the DOS and the geographic combatant commanders is a problem. Complications thus arise between the DOS (with its country teams) and the DOD (with its regional commands).

In addition, the resourcing and readiness of personnel are vastly different between the two organizations. As House Foreign Affairs Committee Acting Chairman Howard L. Berman pointed out, “There are only 6,600 professional Foreign Service officers today in the State Department. According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, this is less than the personnel of one carrier battle group and, allegedly, less than the number of active duty military band members.” Similarly, USAID today has less than 3,000 people essentially doing the contract management that outsources their entire development mission.

The Interagency Historical Record

In this light, an effective strategy to resolving a regional crisis depends on integrating all elements of power through the interagency process at the operational level to achieve unity of command and effort with clear lines of authority and lines of communication. The difficulty integrating military and nonmilitary actions at the operational level is a recurring theme. In a number of contingency operations undertaken over the past two decades, this lack of amalgamation has produced enough obstacles to meeting political-military objectives that military and interagency participants attempted a series of internal reforms, often to no avail. The following vignettes provide a sampling of the difficulties.

Somalia. In Operation Restore Hope (1992-1993), the human resource element came to the fore. A critical shortfall was that most civilian organizations did not maintain large staffs and were not...
equipped to conduct expeditionary operations. In Somalia, neither the DOS nor USAID had sufficient personnel in the region. For example, while Ambassador Robert Oakley and his staff remained fully engaged working with the military in Somalia, there were not enough civilian personnel to negotiate with the various factions or to assist local village elders in establishing councils and security forces. Army civil affairs teams had to assume those responsibilities to the detriment of other tasks.24

**Haiti.** For Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (1994-1997), military planning began in October 1993 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed U.S. Atlantic Command, now U.S. Joint Forces Command, to focus on a forcible-entry option.25 Working in self-prescribed isolation, the military planners did not have the ability to coordinate with other agencies. Already, other branches of government—the DOS, Treasury, Transportation, Commerce, Justice, Agriculture, and the CIA—were engaged in working some facet of the Haiti problem.26 The compartmentalization of planning prevented the interagency process from producing coordination and consensus, the two most necessary ingredients for unity of effort.

The month of September 1994 demonstrated that insufficient planning in the interagency process affected the strategic, operational, and tactical level of war. The “close hold” on information retarded mutual understanding of the operation by different agencies and even within individual agencies themselves.27 U.S. Atlantic Command went to the National Security Council to meet with the Haiti Interagency Working Group. During the meeting, one Army officer in attendance noted, “Many members of the working group stared in disbelief; not even their own people, who had known about the plan for over a year, had let the secret out.”28 As further evidence of insufficient coordination, during the meeting, Major General Byron, head of the U.S. Atlantic Command J-5 Plans Cell, asked the DOJ representative to explain how the DOJ was going to train the new Haitian police force, an earlier agreement in the Pol-Mil plan, only for the department to say it could not handle the mission.29 Similarly, at the execution level, the ad hoc nature of interagency arrangements also revealed themselves. In Cap Haitien, for example, representatives from the 10th Mountain Division and the Coast Guard collaborated closely, but as one observer noted, “We had our tents pitched next to each other, but the USAID tent was missing... There was no one to answer our questions about civilian assistance capabilities for 30 days into the operation.”30

**Afghanistan.** In Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001-present), interagency command and coordination improved, but many deficiencies remained. On the positive side, to facilitate coordination between the two organizations during...
pre-war planning sessions, the CENTCOM staff included a senior CIA officer that served as special advisor to the Commander. Also, the DOS and the military’s combatant commander for the region worked closely from the onset to secure basing and over-flight rights. Nevertheless, other agencies focused on reconstruction in a post-war Afghanistan played catch up, and many elements of the U.S. government were largely absent. For example, only a small handful of personnel from the U.S. Department of Agriculture deployed to Afghanistan, a country with both a critical demand for agricultural development and a significant capacity for such development—including the need to develop alternatives to the production of poppies, doubly corrosive because it both funds the Taliban and spreads drugs to other countries. And the United States has perhaps the best-organized and most successful agricultural extension service in the world! As this example shows, the Departments of Defense and State and USAID have been “at war,” but almost all the rest of the U.S. government has not been so engaged.

Iraq. Finally, Operation Iraqi Freedom (2002 to present) provides a host of pre- and post-conflict interagency command issues. As in Afghanistan, fears of widespread famine motivated civilian planners to pre-position relief supplies in Kuwait. Despite close coordination between USAID and the military in the month leading up to the war, the head of USAID, Andrew Natsios, could get neither the Pentagon’s permission to pre-position supplies thought necessary nor get release of funds for rebuilding Iraq. In the post-conflict phase, the friction and interagency fighting between the military’s Combined Joint Task Force-7 and the Coalition Provisional Authority reached extraordinary and costly levels.

The Proposals
Unity of command should not threaten any government agency’s independence; only a dedicated portion of each agency in direct support of stability operations should ever come under the authority of a unified commander. Under these circumstances, an enforcement mechanism would probably be necessary to compel agencies to attach competent people to centralized commanders or directors. While National Security Policy Directive-44 recognizes the need for interagency integration, it does not enforce unity of command. The executive branch should follow-up NSPD-44 with a presidential-level document requiring unity of command in areas undergoing stability operations. In doing so, it should dictate the various government agencies’ roles and responsibilities as well as the conditions under which any particular agency should assume overall direction. Such a step then needs pragmatic solutions that establish appropriate organizational models for interagency command, while augmenting liaison capabilities and developing professional education to foster a true “interagency culture” for stability operations.

Current Models for Interagency Command
As noted, in many respects, interagency efforts at the theater or field level are even more important than at higher levels of government. Interaction between military and nonmilitary activities needs to be seamless. As requirements for assistance with governance (including human rights), reconstruction, stabilization, and development increase, the requirement also increases for cooperation across institutional boundaries. Given the nonmilitary nature of most activities in stability operations, civilian command primacy would be the pragmatic goal to strive for. Several precursor institutional models already exist that partially reflect this precept and could evolve into true and institutionalized interagency command arrangements. These three precursor models are the classical embassy country team, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and provincial reconstruction teams. Such institutionalization would avoid tendencies to adopt ad-hoc approaches in operations short of war, including post-conflict transition.

Country teams. Until now, combatant commands on the strategic and operational level have had an institutional means, albeit incomplete, of...
synchronizing interagency actions ongoing in theater—the embassy country teams. Headed by the ambassador and composed of representatives of various agencies, it can provide specific recommendations on peacetime engagement or contingency responses. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning, refers to the role of the teams in contingencies. While providing an interagency perspective, country teams have inherent disadvantages. By definition, their focus is limited; commands may not have adequate staff to interpret competing priorities advocated by various teams in any region. Secondly, as senior government liaisons, DOS political advisors to military commanders represent only one of the many agencies on the country team, so the potential exists for biased priorities and misunderstanding. Lastly, because USAID does not maintain staff in every diplomatic mission, country teams do not offer an accurate representation of all ongoing or funded efforts.

This template would improve with the creation of a more robust team. In-theater U.S. country teams would need to be all-inclusive (including specialized agencies and organizations such as the CIA and U.S. Special Operations Command) to be able to share information and intelligence, have common communications protocols and systems, and put a premium on building and sustaining mutual confidence and respect. They should also continue to be headed by a senior diplomat.

The AFRICOM model. As an expert on African affairs in the United States, Dr. Dan Henk from the Air War College noted, the U.S. engagement with Africa has often reflected rather different approaches and intensities among DOS, USAID, and DOD. This often resulted in confusion about U.S. interests, objectives, and motives. To address this bewilderment, the DOD activated AFRICOM as one of its six regional military headquarters on 1 October 2008. Africa Command has administrative responsibility for U.S. military support to U.S. government policy in Africa, including military-to-military relationships with 53 African nations.

The command started with a greatly different organizational approach to its area of responsibility. The designers of U.S. Africa Command understood the relationships between security, development, diplomacy, and prosperity in Africa. As a result, AFRICOM reflects a much more integrated staff structure that includes significant management and staff representation by the DOS, USAID, and other U.S. government agencies involved in Africa. U.S. Africa Command also departed from the Pentagon’s traditional “J-code” organizational structure, a method of organizing a command for warfighting developed in the Napoleonic age. Furthermore, AFRICOM’s commander, uniquely, has a civilian deputy from the Department of State to coordinate the nonmilitary functions of the U.S. government in Africa.

Thus, AFRICOM, with its envisioned interagency character, should positively influence U.S. policy coordination in Africa and move toward greater interagency integration. Yet for several reformers, AFRICOM did not go far enough in establishing a true interagency structure. As Robert Munson suggested in his article on AFRICOM in Strategic Studies Quarterly:

My first proposal is for AFRICOM to be established from the beginning not as a military command with a few nonmilitary trappings but as a true interagency command. This command would have three equal main components: the military, a political element, and a section devoted to development. Despite the military title of “command” and the current focus of the Secretary of Defense on creating AFRICOM, we must refocus the effort to include all-important elements of foreign policy equally. If there were a better word to replace “command” in AFRICOM, it should emphasize the nonmilitary missions and deemphasize the military aspects. Perhaps one should begin with the organizational model of an embassy rather than a military organization.

Interestingly, he promotes a more country-team model on an enlarged scale. With this perspective in mind, the current AFRICOM can only provide an evolutionary step to greater interagency command and control structures under civilian agency leadership.

The provincial reconstruction team model. During the summer of 2002, U.S. officials developed the concept of provincial reconstruction teams to spread the “ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] effect,” without expanding ISAF
First established in early 2003, provincial reconstruction teams consisted of 60 to 100 soldiers plus, eventually, Afghan advisors and representatives from civilian agencies like the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture. These teams have the potential to become a model for future stabilization and reconstruction operations. Since their inception, they have proven effective in supporting the spread of governance and development in Afghanistan. Since then, 25 additional teams (11 U.S.-led and 14 non-U.S.) have deployed throughout the country, mostly small forward-operating bases in provincial capitals. The U.S.-led teams combine civilian and military personnel who focus on governance, development, and security. These civil-military teams work with the Afghan government, civil society, Afghan and coalition security forces, and the international community.

The provincial reconstruction team leverages all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to improve stability. However, the team’s efforts alone will not stabilize an area; combined military and civil efforts are necessary to reduce conflict and develop local institutions to take the lead in national governance, provide basic services, foster economic development, and enforce the rule of law. The team’s structure is modular in nature with a core framework tailored to the respective operational area. A typical team contains six Department of State personnel, three senior military officers and staff, 20 Army civil affairs advisors, one Department of Agriculture representative, one Department of Justice representative, three international contractors; two USAID representatives; and a military or contract security force (size depends on local conditions). The size and composition of the team varies based on operational area maturity, local circumstances, and U.S. agency capacity. Eleven of the 12 U.S. teams are military-led and have a handful of civilian officers—one each from State, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture. The civilians are equal members of the integrated command team and provide crucial skill sets that the military lacks—political reporting, cultural awareness, an understanding of civilian governmental structures, and a background in development. The military commander has final authority on all security matters, but the civilians take the lead on governance and development.

Nevertheless, the teams are only a tactical-level interim measure. They need a national or regional level interagency command framework. Yet, these provincial reconstruction teams provide a good starting point to develop the tools necessary to achieve political and military success in future missions, whether they involve counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, or even ungoverned spaces.
The Next Evolutionary Step

To have a true interagency command arrangement for stability operations, several elements are needed—an end to stovepiping, effective lines of authority, and civilian agency primacy. To the extent possible, stovepiping of different agencies must be eliminated, such as the current practice of requiring field-level missions to refer to higher levels in theater or to Washington for permission to take actions that either need to be decided upon rapidly or where local expertise should trump that at the parent level.56 Second, clear lines of authority must exist in the theater and in the field. Setting parameters and business rules can help build mutual trust.57 Third, civilian agency primacy would bring greater benefits when considering the nature of stability operations. The civilian Department of State and USAID have a long-term focus, train their personnel to work with foreign partners, and generally acquire better language skills than the military. Both agencies are comfortable in taking time to build personal relationships with other officials, and they tend to remain in the region longer, maintaining personal bonds and facilitating work between nations on a civilian basis.58 In contrast to military officers who are frequently reassigned, USAID officers spend much longer developing their expertise, often living in country for four or more years.59

In order to support these multilateral stability operations, commands need to be truly an interagency construct rather than just a military organization with a few actors from other agencies included for effect.60 I support the recommendation Jeffrey Buchanan, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight made in their Joint Force Quarterly article “Death of the Combatant Command: Toward a Joint Interagency Approach.” They propose establishing standing, civilian-led interagency organizations that will have regional responsibility for all aspects of U.S. foreign policy.61 These civilian-led interagency organizations would report directly to the President through the National Security Council, and their formal structure would include representatives from all major federal government agencies, including DOD, while dissolving the existing geographic combatant commands. Highly credentialed civilians, potentially with a four-star military deputy, would lead these institutions. Their charter would include true directive authority to all agencies below the National Security Council, with regard to activities in the assigned region—to include U.S. ambassadors and country teams.62

In the aforementioned AFRICOM example, the civilian commander of an advanced interagency AFRICOM would then be the U.S. ambassador to the African Union. Not only is this diplomat already representing the United States at the continental level, but he is also a civilian and would emphasize the American tradition of civilian control of the military. While the appointment of this diplomat to lead a partial military organization may call for congressional or presidential action and a change to U.S. laws, it is hardly a new concept since both the president and the secretary of defense, the two top leaders of the military, are civilians.63

Conclusions and a Precedent

The United States must make a quantum leap in establishing interagency command mechanisms if it wants to employ its land power effectively in future stability operations.64 The key difference between the hard slog to “Jointness” versus interagency operations is that the armed forces had a clear chain of command, with the chairman of the joint chiefs at the top to push through reform. For many federal agencies, the first common point of authority is the president. Congress or the president should find a way to cause the various agencies of the executive branch to pull together at the operational level during war and post-conflict activities to achieve unity of command.65

Only civilian leadership, with significant interagency experience, can evolve existing models like the country team, AFRICOM, and provincial reconstruction teams into truly macro-interagency command organizations capable of harnessing and projecting America’s “soft” power, arguably the most potent weapon in its arsenal, along with its military force.66 In addition to the current three models mentioned, a precedent does exist in the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support” (CORDS) program in Vietnam. The CORDS program in Vietnam integrated civilian and military efforts on a larger scale, with soldiers serving directly under civilians, and vice versa, at all levels.67 In fact the head of CORDS, Robert Komer, was deputy to the commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). He ranked third
at MACV, after General William C. Westmoreland’s deputy, General Creighton Abrams. This status gave him direct authority over everyone in his organization and direct access to Westmoreland without having to go through the MACV Chief of Staff. The Komer did not have command authority over military forces, but he was the sole authority over the entire U.S. pacification effort, “for the first time bringing together its civilian and military aspects under unified management.” The interagency integration at all levels was a most impressive feature. In addition to the military, the State Department, CIA, USAID, the U.S. Information Agency, and even the White House staff were represented at all levels within CORDS. Throughout the hierarchy, civilian advisors had military deputies and vice versa. Civilians wrote performance reports on military subordinates, and military officers did the same for Foreign Service officers.

The heritage of such an interagency “command” needs to permeate the current precursor models to create the next step—a true interagency command structure. Without this evolutionary process, the effective application of U.S. land power in future stability operations will remain haphazard—an outcome fraught with both risks and costs.

NOTES
7. Adapted from the thinking of Kevin D. Stringer in his article on the need for a supreme commander for the War on Terror, “A Supreme Commander for the War on Terror,” Joint Force Quarterly 44 (Spring 2007), 19-23.
13. Buchanan, Davis, and Wight, 90.
20. Buchanan, Davis, and Wight, 90.
22. Jones.
23. Hamblet and Kline, 93.
27. Kretschik, Baumann, and Fishel, 71.
28. Ibid.
31. Jones.
38. Kelleher, 105.
40. Kelleher, 105.
41. Hunter, Gnehm, and Joulwan, xii.
44. AFRICOM website, at <www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp> (30 January 2009).
47. Robert Munson, “Do We Want to ‘Kill People and Break Things’ in Africa? A Historian’s Thoughts on Africa Command,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2008), 97-110, specifically 100.
50. FM 3-07, F-1.
51. FM 3-07, Appendix F.
52. Rogers, Kemp, and Hope, 31-35.
54. Hunter, Gnehm, and Joulwan, xii.
55. Ibid.
56. Munson, 97-110, specifically 104.
58. Munson, 97-110, specifically 98.
59. Buchanan, Davis, and Wight, 94.
60. Ibid.
61. Munson, 97-110, specifically 104.
62. Ibid.
63. Munson, 97-110, specifically 107.
64. The “quantum leap” description is from Schnaubelt, 47-61, specifically, 59.
65. Schnaubelt, 47-61, specifically, 59.
Editor’s Note: Ms. Perry points out that the Department of Defense has recently relaxed its controls on certain social networking sites such as YouTube and MySpace, though commanders can still restrict access due to security concerns or bandwidth limitations.

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PHOTO: Soldiers use the computers at Forward Operating Base Yusufiyah, Iraq, 16 August 2009, to surf the internet. (U.S. Navy, Mass Communication Specialist 2d Class Edwin L. Wriston)

REMEMBER WHEN BEING SOCIAL meant sharing your favorite beverage with a friend at the local hangout or neighbors leaning over their backyard fence talking about everything from politics to the local football team? Those days are in the past. Communication has grown globally over the years; today’s technology opens a completely new way of sharing ideas, thoughts, and the latest on dit. Our Army has embraced the world of social media as the power of communication has taken a new turn. Typewriters, landlines, and beepers are communication tools of the past. A new generation of immediacy has created a firestorm of social media tools that encourage interaction and create dialogue at the click of a mouse.

Social media has had an undeniable effect on the way we live, work, and communicate throughout the world. Military leaders are recognizing the importance of social media and taking steps to incorporate change into their organizational cultures. This is partly due to the sheer number of users in the military community who are using social networking as a conduit to stay connected and tell their story. Facebook, a social networking website, has more than 250 million users with more than 120 million of them logging on at least once a day. Every minute, YouTube users upload 10 minutes of video and watch hundreds of millions of videos. Social media has introduced a whole new language, where complete words now become one letter and smiley faces and emoticons show emotion and feeling. This ever-evolving technology flourishes in a culture where time is precious and social interaction is unpredictable.

Social media computer concepts are not new and have in fact been around for over 20 years. The first online chat system surfaced in 1980 with CompuServe’s CB simulator. The simulator connected corporate America and cyberspace. In 1986, these services expanded to include Europe, and networking became a global application. The World Wide Web, not to be confused with the Internet, went public in 1991, and gave birth to the dot.com boom that enabled companies and organizations to reach a wider target audience. Today these same concepts have given organizations and individuals social networking websites such as MySpace, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, and other social networking avenues for information sharing.
The sheer number of Web 2.0 applications available makes it easier to communicate with family and friends from a distance. Perceptive military leaders are opening up their organizations to Soldiers, civilians, and family members with the use of social networking tools like Twitter and blogging. Town Hall meetings have taken on a new dimension, allowing more individuals to contribute to the forums in real time.

Senior Strategist for Emerging Media with the Department of Defense Jack Holt defines social media as an “environment outside of hierarchy, the democratization of publishing allowing everybody to have a voice . . . It’s outside the hierarchy and everybody has the opportunity to engage.”4 This understanding of social media, and a level of transparency that encourages a dialogue, has aided Department of Defense social media efforts.

Social Media in the Army

Social media is about having a conversation, interacting with your friends or followers, and developing relationships. On any given day internet users can Google the word Army and get over 228,000,000 website hits. The information is mind-boggling and not always official in nature. The Army’s initial efforts to establish a Facebook presence showed numerous web pages with no Army affiliation. Leaders worried who was telling the story and whether there was a valid government presence. Under the guidance of Major General Kevin J. Bergner, then Chief of Public Affairs, the Army stood up its new Online and Social Media Division at the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs in January 2009. The Army decided it was time to open up the lines of communication and further the conversation. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Arata, the director of Online and Social Media Division, says the Army’s presence in social media came about primarily because the Internet was the avenue where individuals were obtaining information about the Army. It is important that the Army reach across all generations and demographics, including Soldiers, when communicating with the public, so social media is a good avenue because they are not generational or demographically stigmatized.

The content the Army uses on its different social networking sites is almost always linked back to traditional Army websites, lending validity to the news. The goal is a conversation and dialogue-centric interchanges. Lindy Kyzer, a public affairs specialist with the Online and Social Media Division, says that the division has been able to use these sites to seamlessly incorporate the Army’s web image and facilitate dialogue that is attractive to visitors because users provide their own experiences and feedback.

Leaders at the highest levels are embracing social media and incorporating it into their basic operations. Currently there are no Department of the Army policies regarding social media; however, leaders must consider the following basic social media considerations:

- Presence. If you are not there to communicate your message, someone else will do it for you.
- Relevance. A presence in social media is necessary but not sufficient. The medium requires content that adds value. Explore the platform and develop a communications strategy.
- Prominence. As you develop your social media presence, consider how prominent you want to be and tailor your profile and participation accordingly.

Soldiers, civilians, and family members should remember two basic principles: operations security and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Army developed a set of best practices, which include basic rules of engagement, awareness, and regulations. Users should keep the Army’s image and good order and discipline in mind when engaging in social media.

Participating in social networking is an individual’s personal decision. Soldiers have the right to express themselves in a public forum; however, if they participate in a social networking site where they might be identified or associated with the U.S. Army, they must be very cognizant of how they represent their organization and the United States of America.

The possibilities are endless for online collaboration using web based applications.

Types of Social Media

The U.S. Army has an active presence on several social networking sites, including Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Flickr.

Leaders at the highest levels are embracing social media.
Facebook. Facebook is a social networking site that allows individuals to connect and share information with friends and family through profiles. In June 2009, Army Operations Order (OPORD) 09-01 directed bases to stop blocking Facebook and other social media from troops. Although the OPORD has limitations based on operational domain authority and application, the intent is clear: social media has enlisted in the Army. The Army utilizes the site as an information-sharing mechanism providing the latest military news. Facebook is also an effective platform for leaders to reach a wider target audience and address quality of life concerns and developments. Facebook’s basic principles are in keeping with the Army’s attitude of transparency and commitment to its greatest asset: people.

YouTube. YouTube is a forum that allows individuals to upload and share videos. Users can express themselves and share comments about other users’ creativity. Businesses also use YouTube as a teaching and training mechanism for employees and the public. The Army utilizes YouTube to communicate Army efforts worldwide to a diverse community. Senior leaders become visible in videos, inviting Soldiers to provide their feedback. The resulting dialogue and comments stimulate interest in the Army’s story. YouTube Army followers can watch videos of firefights on the streets of Iraq or U.S. troops assisting in humanitarian efforts. These videos tell the Army’s story through actual events played out on screen.

Combat camerapersons gather the footage broadcast on the Multi-National Force-Iraq YouTube site, sharing the sacrifices and commitment of our Soldiers with the world. This footage educates the user about a day in the life of a Soldier and is unlike footage from previous military actions that rarely reached the public. Subscribers obtain first-hand, real coverage that is truthful and insightful and catalogs the history of our military forces.

Recruiting takes on a new form with YouTube. Recruiters can reach a larger market with recruiting bites channeled through YouTube videos. According to the Army’s Accessions Command, “the videos posted to YouTube “are not propaganda.” They are instead an effort by the military to “participate in the YouTube community” and counter some of the “misrepresentations” of the Army and Army life found on the Web.” Leaders are telling the Army story while at the same time countering the critical perceptions that the public may have based on inaccurate data.

Twitter. Twitter is a micro-blogging website that allows users to send messages (140 characters or less) to a large number of users at one time, often answering the question “What are you doing?” Twitter allows you to be in control of how much information you release and who gets your information. It is an excellent source for commanders because it permits them to provide updates to their followers on the go. Users can link Twitter to their cell phones and send and receive messages from anywhere. The Army is using Twitter to reach their 15,000-plus followers by providing them links to stories and content placed on Army.mil.

Flickr. Flickr is an online scrapbook that allows you to post photos or videos for others to view. It gives you a place to store your photos, and it provides the general public with a window into your organization. They can not only view your photos but also make comments, add notes, or tag them.

Flickr allows the Army or any Department of Defense (DOD) organization to tell its story with pictures. Comments made on the photos provide DOD officials with insight into the minds of the general public and those viewing the albums. The use of Flickr has some basic rules of engagement:

- Don’t upload anything that isn’t yours.
- Don’t forget the children.
- Don’t upload content that is illegal or prohibited.
- Don’t vent your frustrations, rant, or bore other members.
- Don’t use your account to host web logos and banners for commercial purposes.

The list is not all-inclusive and subscribers should know and understand the rules prior to using this valuable resource. The Online and Social Media Division at the U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, which manages the Army’s Flickr site, advises its subscribers that—

- No profanity will be tolerated. Profanity in comments will result in immediate deletion.
- No personal attacks or derogatory remarks will be tolerated.
Any type of repeated spam messages may be deleted at the discretion of the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs.11

Seems like a lot of do’s and don’ts—but not really. After all, this is a community forum committed to informing the American people and our Soldiers about the Army in an environment that fosters excellence.

Social Media Strategies
When organizations and individuals understand the principles and benefits of social media applications, a bevy of opportunities present themselves when accurately strategized. Planning might include—

Your Strategy. Think about each platform before you decide to establish a profile and ensure it meets the needs of your organization. Just because the sites are out there doesn’t mean your organization needs to be on all of them.

Manpower. Will you have the resources to manage and maintain the sites? If you can’t commit to updating your social media sites at least once per week, or provide enough new content to keep users coming back, the platform is probably not a good idea for your organization.

Messaging. Social media is all about taking your identity or messaging and turning over control to your community. A Facebook wall and a Flickr comments stream are places for both positive and negative comments. If you’re not willing to lose control of the message and give some of the power to your community, using social media is not for you.12 But you should ask, “Can I afford not to become involved in this mainstream method of sharing my message?” Once an organization becomes committed to the effort, leaders should continue evaluating their programs and adjust fire when needed.

Not every site is for all organizations. Leaders must carefully analyze their organization to garner the biggest bang for their efforts. Leaders of over 80 military organizations are engaging their communities in dialogue. The Army.mil website provides critical resources on its “create for effect” page that offer users the means to duplicate the “look and feel” of the Army’s home-page. The site provides designer, developer, and content editor assistance to help create the correct Army representation for an organization.

This branding toolkit takes the guesswork out of presenting a well developed website, which is half the battle. A poorly planned website can quickly become a deterrent for subscribers. Do you have only minimum graphic skills? Not a problem. Basic users can navigate with many available templates.

Functional organization media sites are effective when principles that support the interest of the public and the organization are at the forefront of the organization’s goals. The key is empowering individuals to build relationships by communicating the real story. Social media becomes a marketing tool that shows our Army values to the communities in which we live and work. Communications media do not always have a feedback mechanism for the audience to discuss pressing issues; social media in the Army can change this by opening the communication channels.

Risk and Challenges
Change is not without risks and challenges. The implementation of social media has not been an easy step for the Department of the Army. Security is the primary concern for leaders when users exercise their right to express their opinion in a public forum. Protected information in the wrong hands is a detriment to our Armed Forces. Indeed, the seemingly harmless blog can cost lives.

The challenge has been balancing operations security with public awareness. Operations security is the protection of classified, sensitive, or need-to-know information, and the Army trains our Soldiers in such procedures. Social media presents new challenges that require all users to refresh themselves on the rules of engagement.

Some common information that our adversaries are looking for includes information about present and future U.S. capabilities, news about U.S. diplomacy, names and photographs of important people, the degree and speed of mobilizations, and leave policies.13

Without proper training, personnel can inadvertently release sensitive information on social networking sites. It’s also important for Soldiers to make sure their family members understand the importance of operations security and what they can and cannot post. Simply put, would you share your bank account and PIN number online? Government information is just as sensitive. If the information you shared made headlines, would you be happy about it? These two simple questions can help leaders educate their Soldiers on protecting our Nation’s resources while communicating their story.
Another concern is efficiency and how social media may distract from mission accomplishment. Operations Order 09-01 lifted security blocks and brought social media into the office instead of the corner store. Many users fail to understand that privacy settings do not protect a post. Regardless of the user’s intent, a level of responsibility is required when sharing information the world can now see, read, and copy at the click of a mouse.

Despite the risks and challenges, social media and open communication have the ability to make the Army stronger. The Army has taken an active role in establishing a positive social media presence. Trust enables leaders to open up their organizations to social media, and training provides confidence in the rules of engagement that govern social media use. A crisis plan is important. However, because even the best-laid plans can encounter problems, not formulating a program based on risk allows others to tell our story with preconceived notions and inaccurate data.

Being social still means chatting with family, friends, and neighbors. Technology has just expanded your favorite hangout or backyard meeting place to include the world. Web-based applications that share, articulate, and manage information with an active presence place the Army’s social media program on point. Soldiers have a story to tell, and the public wants to hear it—not only what is important, but what shapes officers’ and Soldiers’ lives as they defend this Nation and democracy.

NOTES
5. L. Kyzer, telephone interview, 3 September 2009.
7. Ibid.
In Defense of After Action Reviews: 
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF SMALL UNIT COPING

Major Ronald J. Whalen, U.S. Army

Now none of this calls for an expert trained at length in such briefing, or for special training in conducting such interviews. Any company officer who has the respect of his men and a reasonable amount of horse sense can do it. If he is fitted to lead them in battle, he is fitted to lead them in re-living the battle experience.

—S.L.A. Marshall

EXPOSURE TO COMBAT-RELATED trauma represents a significant challenge to individual and unit-level coping. The Army has developed two distinct interventions to foster unit-level coping among Soldiers exposed to combat trauma—the “after action review” (AAR) and the psychological debriefing. In their conceptually pure forms, the AAR constitutes a problem-focused intervention, while the psychological debriefing comprises an emotion-focused intervention. Both strategies trace their origins to a common source—the historical debriefing methods used by S.L.A. Marshall during World War II.

In the following pages I argue that this dichotomous approach to unit-level coping is both false and counterproductive, especially when the trauma is a result of enemy actions. To the extent that small-unit leaders insist that AARs be devoid of emotion-focused coping, emotional ventilation, or expressions of disruptive emotions like anger, guilt, or shame, to that extent they limit the AAR’s potential contributions to enhanced unit coping, performance, and cohesion. Conversely, to the extent that psychological debriefings stifle all discussion about operational-lessons learned and thoughts that improved emotional coping may be logically linked to improved tactics, techniques, and procedures, to that extent they can undermine the full learning potential of this post-trauma intervention.

Finally, while present-day Soldiers may have volunteered to join the Army, they are not free to quit should they doubt their coping abilities. Neither are they free to refuse the orders of unit leaders and medical providers to receive psychological debriefings following exposure to combat trauma. Proponents of psychological debriefings argue that, given known risks for mental health problems among Soldiers exposed to combat (depression and post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD]), it is only right and natural to require their attendance at unit-level psychological debriefings. I argue that psychological
interventions with, at best, ambiguous benefits like those associated with debriefings should always be voluntary. However, small-unit leaders should conduct AARs regularly, but especially after enemy contact and exposure to combat-related trauma, to improve tactics, techniques, and procedures; promote coping; and when necessary, provide reasonable outlets for emotional ventilation, even when unit leaders are the target of such ventilation. By cordonning off emotion-focused coping from problem-focused coping, or worse yet, by stifling any discussion of what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve weaknesses by refusing to conduct an AAR altogether, unit leaders and psychologists are short-circuiting necessary feedback loops between Soldiers and their leaders, and promoting a false dichotomy in coping.

Organizational Learning the Army Way

The U.S. Army has a rich tradition of extracting battlefield lessons to improve current combat operations. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) now serves as the Army’s primary distiller of operational best practices, with the intent of disseminating these lessons Army-wide in near real-time to save lives and accomplish the mission.

Since the 1970s, the AAR has been the centerpiece of organizational learning throughout the Army and serves as a template for more formal reports submitted to CALL for publication. Unit leaders use the AAR to identify training- and combat-related lessons learned to improve unit performance and survivability on the battlefield.

Ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are producing a wealth of organizational experience and “best practice” recommendations. Among the practices being validated by CALL and social scientists alike is leadership commitment to organizational learning. Indeed, Smith and Hagman found that unit leader effectiveness and learning environment were the best predictors of cohesion. Unit cohesion, in turn, is thought to play a critical role in promoting adaptation to combat stress.

Similarly, combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have afforded Army Medical Department (AMEDD) researchers an opportunity to extend previous research on the use of psychological debriefings, only this time under combat conditions. Like AARs, psychological debriefings typically ask unit members to reconstruct what happened to—

- Promote ventilation of trauma-related emotions.
- Encourage disclosure of personal examples of physical, emotional, and/or cognitive reactions to trauma.
- “Normalize” Soldier reactions by educating them about common trauma responses.
- Instruct Soldiers on self- and buddy-aid strategies to promote individual coping.
- Advise Soldiers on when and where to seek additional help should clinical services be required. By demonstrating individual and group-level benefits from psychological debriefings (fewer Soldiers screening positive for post traumatic stress disorder, or increased cohesion among unit members who received debriefings), AMEDD researchers hope to both validate this intervention in a combat environment and put to rest any ethical questions surrounding the mandatory exposure of potentially traumatized Soldiers to psychological debriefings.

After Action Review and Small Unit Coping

We should have known all along that this was the case—that the truth of battle had never been known in full before. Soldiers have never in the past sat down and straightforwardly rebuilt the various parts of their collective experience, even after they have been in sudden death action as members of the same squad of no more than ten or twelve men. Inertia, and often reluctance, stop them from any private inquiry and they are not under any military requirement to do it. Thus the most valuable part of the lessons which can only be learned in bloodshed becomes lost to an army. Each personal experience is sharply etched against a vague and faulty concept of how things went with the group as a whole. The fighting men do not know the nature of the mistakes which they made together. And not knowing, they are deprived of the surest safeguard against making the same mistakes next time they are in battle.

—S.L.A. Marshall

The AAR is an organizational learning tool intended to help Soldiers and small units evaluate and improve their task performance. By guiding unit members in a professional discussion of what
happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve weaknesses, the review allows unit members to discover critical learning objectives. To the extent that such a guided discovery process can help unit members identify with and commit to these learning objectives, AARs have been shown to enhance unit cohesion.

Unit leaders typically conduct AARs in the presence of cadre who evaluate the unit’s performance relative to Army training standards. At platoon level and below, reviews are more often informal in the sense that they require little prior planning and are not likely to be recorded in any systematic way. For echelons above platoon level, reviews are a more formal affair requiring greater degrees of planning and preparation and are typically recorded for historical organizational reference.

Systematic use of AARs has historically been confined to major training events such as brigade-level training at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. However, its usefulness is not restricted to a formal training environment. Indeed, Training Circular 25-20, *A Leader’s Guide to After-Action Reviews*, encourages their use in combat as well:

The AAR is one of the most effective techniques to use in a combat environment. An effective AAR takes little time, and leaders can conduct them almost anywhere consistent with unit security requirements. Conducting an AAR helps overcome the steep learning curve that exists in a unit exposed to combat and helps the unit ensure that it does not repeat mistakes. It also helps them sustain strengths. By integrating training into combat operations and using tools such as AARs, leaders can dramatically increase their unit’s chances for success on the battlefield.

More recently, the Army has directed brigade-size elements and larger to submit a compilation of lessons learned throughout a given deployment to CALL for analysis, dissemination, and integration into CALL products. In addition, as part of an institutional effort to foster a culture of learning and to share critical lessons, the Army has stipulated that all of its members, including Soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, and Army contractors, will collect and submit relevant observations, insights, and lessons learned during military operations, either indirectly through organizational AARs or directly to CALL. The Army Lessons Learned Program identifies and addresses systematic problems within the Army and, using analytical products and information from current operations, training exercises, and combat developmental and experimental programs, helps commanders train their units for full spectrum operations. Despite CALL’s recent recommendation that unit leaders conduct reviews after every combat mission, there is no requirement that they do so. In the event of a serious incident like the loss of a U.S. Soldier to an improvised explosive device or the fatal shooting of an Iraqi citizen, U.S. military key leaders are required to submit a report that accurately describes what happened. However, generating a serious incident report may or may not involve using a review among all unit members to arrive at a shared understanding as to what happened. Key military leaders frequently generate this report on their own to spare Soldiers the pain of rehashing traumatic events.
No doubt, within an organization as big as the U.S. Army, there will be considerable variance in the use of AARs. Captain Morris K. Estep offers a powerful example of how AARs can be used to improve both battlefield performance and psychological coping:

Upon return to the FOB [forward operating base], we always conducted an after action review to review the enemy’s methods and develop a learning environment within the platoon. Each soldier in the platoon reviewed how we defeated the enemy’s tactics and what worked well and what did not work well for us. Each soldier in the platoon talked about his experiences and perspectives during the ambush. This not only relieved the anxiety and apprehension of being shot at, but it also revealed key details of the fight that could be determining factors in the platoon’s success. The platoon AARs allowed us to adapt our strategy to the constantly changing battlefield. In short, the speed and violent execution of our counterattack battle drills were worthless, if we did not adapt quickly to the enemy methods.17

The benefits of integrating both emotion-focused and problem-focused coping are intuitively appealing and merit further study. Given such testimony, it is tempting to insist that all unit leaders conduct reviews after every combat mission. Leaders are required to do so after conducting significant training events at the National Training Center in California and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana. However, mandating a review after every mission risks sabotaging Soldier commitment to learning.

Strange Bedfellows: AARs and Post-Trauma Debriefings

Both AARs and post-trauma debriefings trace their origins to the historical debriefing methods developed by Marshall. All surviving unit members of a recent battle were gathered together and guided through an oral reconstruction of battlefield events for the purposes of generating an accurate historical record. While it was never Marshall’s stated purpose to identify key elements of unit performance, his description of the role unit cohesion plays in sustaining combat motivation among U.S. Soldiers as a result of his debriefing method remains among the more lasting contributions of his work. As Marshall wrote:

I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed presence of a comrade. Men fight because they belong to a group that fights. They fight for their friends, their “buddies.” They fight because they have been trained to fight and because failure to do so endangers not just their own lives, but also those of the people immediately around them with whom they have formed powerful social bonds.18

Like Marshall’s historical debriefing, AARs and psychological debriefings begin by reconstructing what happened.19 All unit members involved with the mission are to be present and all are encouraged to share their recollection of what happened, individually. By doing so, leaders and debriefers alike strive for a shared or collective appreciation of what happened and what every unit member was doing while events unfolded.

From a tactical standpoint, such a dissection of events will often identify misperceptions about what happened, what others were doing as events unfolded (e.g., higher headquarters initially tried to scramble ground evacuation assets before calling in an air evacuation of wounded), and distortions of personal responsibility (e.g., “If only I had . . . , SGT Jones might still be alive today!”). From a psychological standpoint, such a shared reconstruction of events can short-circuit negative outcomes (e.g., survivor guilt) in a way that years of therapy may never be able to accomplish. Unit medics, for example, are especially vulnerable to distortions of personal responsibility. For example, it may help when a unit medic can hear salutations of his heroic efforts from the very infantry Soldiers he supported, despite his unsuccessful and ill-fated attempts to revive their

The benefits of integrating both emotion-focused and problem-focused coping are intuitively appealing...
comrade. Such testimonials are more likely to have an immediate and persuasive effect on the medic than any impartial therapist’s unconditional reassurance or Socratic challenge. Conversely, ignoring flawed medical evacuation procedures is unlikely to inspire confidence in unit leaders or reduce soldier anxiety, no matter how proficient their use of emotion-focused coping techniques (e.g., diaphragmatic breathing).

However, after reconstructing what happened, reviews and psychological deb briefings diverge rapidly. Unit leaders facilitating an AAR are primarily interested in tactical lessons learned to sustain or improve performance (i.e., problem-focused coping), while psychological debriefing facilitators (typically mental health providers) are not likely to have the technical expertise to pursue operational lessons, even if they wanted to. Instead, psychological debriefing facilitators encourage unit members to disclose personal examples of their reactions to trauma in order to help personalize teachings about the common or “normal” features of such reactions (i.e., emotion-focused coping). By doing so, debriefing facilitators are hoping that accurate information and recommended coping techniques can prevent or moderate negative mental health outcomes caused by inaccurate information and a reluctance among unit members to discuss their emotional reactions to trauma (e.g., “I seem to be the only one still grieving SGT Jones’ death, I must be weak.”). Barring the prevention of aberrant trauma reactions, debriefing facilitators offer guidance on where Soldiers can find counseling services, should additional coping assistance be required.

Psychological debriefing proponents fail to elaborate on why any discussion of operational lessons learned is forbidden, though lack of operational subject-matter expertise among debriefing facilitators would be a good reason to avoid this topic. Similarly, certain assumptions about the degree to which units make use of AARs and related problem-focused coping seems implicit in the argument for psychological debriefings as a separate and distinct intervention. One such assumption might be that despite the regular use of problem-focused coping strategies (e.g., AARs) by small units, Soldiers continue to report post-trauma mental health problems that could benefit from a unit-level intervention targeting emotion-focused coping. However, because there is no requirement for unit-level AARs, such assumptions are tenuous at best.

Key Points

In their conceptually pure forms, AARs and psychological debriefings are distinct approaches to improve coping with unit combat stress; AARs promote coping with unit-level stress by identifying tactics, techniques, and procedures to sustain or improve (problem-focused), while psychological debriefings educate Soldiers about common reactions to trauma and offer self- and buddy-aid tips in the hopes of preventing debilitating combat stress reactions (emotion-focused). Either intervention may cross conceptual lines to include aspects of both problem- and emotion-focused coping, but psychological debriefings avoid this as much as possible. Indeed, their ground rules explicitly state that any discussion of operational lessons learned is forbidden. Instead, debriefings facilitators exclusively target emotion-focused coping given their theoretical assumptions that the failure to express or vent such emotions contributes to trauma-related mental health problems.

However, the evidence in favor of psychological debriefings is far from clear. Again, while such interventions may offer important information on emotion-focused coping or improve Soldier perceptions of organizational support, my argument is that integration of problem- and emotion-focused coping is the more meaningful alternative to psychological debriefings.

Perseverance Despite Evidence

While we recognize that there are work systems and organizations whose culture makes mandatory participation in some form of early intervention acceptable (e.g.,
the military), and that this can improve morale and well-being in the work-place after exposure to trauma, it appears that the costs of mandatory attendance outweigh the benefits for the individual.

—Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice

Our results are consistent with prior RCTs [Randomized Control Trials] of debriefings in that there were no clear effects associated with CISD [Critical Incident Stress Debriefing], relative to no intervention; however, there were not strong negative effects either. The CISD was not more distressing or arousing than an intervention designed to teach individuals about how to manage stress.

—Journal of Traumatic Stress

Despite growing opposition to the use of psychological debriefings within the academic community, the Army continues to insist on their usefulness. Indeed, even a jointly drafted post traumatic stress disorder clinical practice guideline developed by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and the DOD recommended against the use of psychological debriefings “as a viable means of reducing acute post traumatic distress . . . or progression to post traumatic stress disorder,” and warned that “Compulsory repetition of traumatic experiences in a group may be counterproductive.”

In a commentary on why it might be that the mandatory use of psychological debriefings in the military has persisted despite calls for alternative interventions (e.g., “psychological first aid”), clinical psychologist Brett T. Litz offers the following:

It is instructive to ponder why it is difficult to convince care providers who feel strongly about the usefulness of CISD to consider the consensus of the academic community. To gain traction as a set of strategies that can be applied outside of disaster contexts (e.g., in the military), especially in contexts where care providers are scarce, proponents of PFA [physical fitness assessment] will need to win over various helper communities (e.g., clergy, social workers, nurses, etc.). Critical incident stress debriefing is appealing because it is cogent and uncomplicated (e.g., the strategies are intuitive, logical, relatively easy to learn, and easily communicated), and the organization is egalitarian (disciplines without much formal mental health training can be certified, e.g., clergy). The model respects and honors work cultures (e.g., peers’ co-lead groups), it is well-integrated into work cultures (e.g., the model and the language system is inculcated into policy and procedures), and it instills confidence in management (e.g., the model underscores the normality of distress and the expectation of returning to duty after debriefing, employees who attend the groups appreciate them).

Having secured an institutional beachhead in advance of sound science, proponents of mandatory psychological debriefings within the military have come to depend on the very organizational support they helped create by overselling the benefits of psychological debriefings to unit commanders in the 1990s. In the absence of evidence that psychological debriefings prevent mental health problems like PTSD, military researchers point instead to gains in unit cohesion, morale, and perceptions of organizational support secondary to this intervention.

A captain briefs a group of Airmen prior to conducting a combat-stress therapy scenario, Joint Base Balad, 20 August 2009. The expeditionary security forces conduct operations outside the wire, and the briefings are an effort to improve mental resiliency to combat-related stressors.
For example, a trial published in the *Journal of Traumatic Stress* compared the most prevalent form of psychological debriefing—critical incident stress debriefing—to either a stress management class or no intervention at all by randomly assigning platoons performing six-month peacekeeping duties in Kosovo to one of the three treatment conditions. While perceptions of organizational support (“My organization really cares about my well-being.”) were highest among Soldiers who had received CISD eight or nine months after their deployment, they were not significantly higher than the other two treatment conditions (i.e., a stress management class or no intervention). Similarly, there were no significant improvements in mental health outcomes (PTSD, aggression, depression) among CISD participants relative to the other two treatment conditions. Notable, however, was the lack of evidence suggesting CISD was counterproductive; that is, Soldiers who were required to relive a traumatic event as part of the CISD intervention did not demonstrate a significant worsening of symptoms relative to the other two treatment conditions.

Based on their findings that (1) CISD was well received by Soldiers; (2) perceptions of organizational support, while not significantly different, were nonetheless greater among CISD participants; and (3) mandatory use of CISDs failed to demonstrate harmful effects, Adler and colleagues have called for further research on the use of psychological debriefings with Soldiers serving in Iraq or Afghanistan. However, as previously discussed, the research paradigm used by Adler and colleagues compared two forms of emotion-focused coping interventions (CISD vs. stress management) to no intervention at all among platoons with low levels of potentially traumatic exposure rates relative to those seen among Soldiers serving in Iraq or Afghanistan.

An organizationally more meaningful comparison would be between problem-focused versus emotion-focused coping (e.g., AARs vs. CISDs). Better yet, compare a combined problem- and emotion-focused intervention (e.g., the “after action debriefing” [AAD] where operational and emotional lessons learned are sought with equal rigor by unit leaders) to any gains seen among Soldiers receiving psychological debriefings led by mental health officers.

In-theater equivalents to the event-driven (e.g., loss of comrades during a combat operation) and time-driven (e.g., mid-tour) psychological debriefings are easily accommodated by the AAR format. Just as psychological debriefings hope to increase knowledge of combat stress reactions and impart ways of improving self- and buddy-aid based on exposure to a particularly traumatic event and total time in theater, the routine use of AARs (or AADs) could similarly adopt event- and time-driven triggers for execution. By having unit leaders (versus mental health officers) impart self- and buddy-aid coping strategies as well as describing where additional counseling services can be found, use of such coping strategies and counseling services may increase as a result of such an endorsement. Conversely, reductions in unit-level stigma concerning the use of mental health treatment services is reasonably implied by having unit leaders play a more central role in helping Soldiers cope with both the operational and psychological aspects of potentially traumatic events.

A potential confound factor in the research design proposed above would include the Hawthorne effect, whereby recipients of psychological debriefings may report higher levels of perceived organizational support as a result of outside subject-matter experts (e.g., the brigade behavioral health officer) being called in to render services above and beyond those offered by leaders organic to the unit. Such confounding effects would likely disappear should these same outside experts be invited to attend AARs conducted by small-unit leaders following a potentially traumatic event. Koshes, Young, and Stokes offer reasonable guidance on the role that mental health personnel might play in support of unit-level AARs (or AADs):

Mental health personnel, chaplains, and other trusted outsiders who were not participants in the event would attend only by invitation,
and purely as observers. Furthermore, combat stress control/mental health personnel should always be notified whenever serious psychological trauma has occurred in a unit. They can assist command in assuring that the after-action debriefing process is done correctly. The mental health personnel might intervene subtly during the processes only if they saw that the AAD was ending without having reached a generally positive outcome on issues of guilt, blame, anger, or other disruptive emotions. More often, they would be available to the team members afterwards, who would know that they now shared comprehensive knowledge of the event. Note that the role for mental health personnel is greatly diminished in unit-led AARs or AADs relative to the psychological debriefings they facilitate. Mental health personnel who might feel diminished as a result should consider the potential benefits from having unit leaders conduct AARs that include both problem- and emotion-focused coping (elsewhere called AADs). One such benefit would have to include greater self-sufficiency and operational flexibility should, for example, continuous offensive operations delay the timely application of psychological debriefings and generate resentment over unfulfilled “treatment” expectations among Soldiers exposed to potentially traumatic events.

Finally, if the history of combat psychiatry teaches us anything, it is that combat stress treatment principles are frequently forgotten in times of peace and slowly revived in times of war. The years following World War II saw an increased emphasis on doctrine and the institutionalization of lessons learned across every military discipline, and Army psychiatry was no exception. The early adoption and present-day popularity of psychological debriefing methods owes its continued use to the critical role doctrine plays in shaping a professional Army. Similarly, methods of developing problem- and emotion-focused coping at the small-unit level need to be more consistently anticipated and rehearsed as part of leader development curriculum if we are sincere about changing cultural attitudes concerning combat-related mental health problems and their treatment.

An “all-volunteer” Army deserves reexamination of the psychiatric treatment principles first developed in the total wars of World War I and World War II, when unprecedented numbers of draftees were required and different norms applied (given a draftee’s motivation to serve and the appropriate levels of coercion required to induce this service). Post-trauma interventions like mandatory psychological debriefings, while lacking evidence of an aggregate negative effect, do a certain injustice to the all-volunteer spirit.

Military leaders and mental health providers can ill-afford to do nothing in the wake of combat-related trauma. The field of trauma research has progressed sufficiently to make the mandatory application of psychological debriefings appear anachronistic, heavy-handed, and paternalistic. The organizational research surrounding the use of AARs to help foster a culture of learning requires that unit leaders guide their Soldiers through a reliving of battlefield events to improve task performance and survivability. The need for leaders to do so is unquestioned, and the literature describing the potential performance and psychological gains for having done so is compelling. By helping small-unit leaders become more proficient in facilitating a professional discussion of what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve weaknesses, Army mental health providers can help mainstream trauma reaction knowledge and effective coping strategies that respect both operational and emotional lessons learned.

Military leaders and mental health providers can ill-afford to do nothing in the wake of combat-related trauma.
NOTES

12. Ibid. See also, Morrison and Meliza, 1999.
15. Ibid., 1.
19. Adler, Litz, Castro, Suvak, Thomas, McGurk, Wright, and Biese, 2008. See also, Koshes, Young, and Stokes; Morrison and Meliza, 1999.
23. Litz, Gray, Bryant, and Adler, 2002: 504.

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CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED crime undermine counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts by delegitimizing state institutions in the eyes of host nationals. To some in the U.S. military, however, these dynamics may seem to be beyond the military’s resources and solely the responsibility of civilian and host country agencies. This article offers a framework through which every level of the military can better understand illicit behavior and develop a plan to attack it. The framework uses military resources efficiently, but recognizes that only the military may have the strength and reach to influence some of the factors that give rise to illicit behavior in post-conflict environments. It breaks down the factors influencing illicit behavior into three targets that can serve as focal points for military operations—opportunities, risks, and rewards. These are the primary areas of consideration of those deciding to pursue illicit behavior. The military must seek to reduce opportunities for illicit behavior, increase the risks of partaking in it, and minimize its potential rewards. In so doing, it can more effectively deal with the various illicit activities that plague stabilization environments and undermine broader counterinsurgency efforts.

A Framework for Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime

Targeting opportunities, risks, and rewards allows policymakers to develop a comprehensive strategy to fight corruption and organized crime. It also enables provincial commanders to formulate localized plans to address illicit behavior in their areas of responsibility.

Defining the problem of illicit behavior. The literature on corruption is rife with prolonged definitional debates. The only useful understanding of corruption, however, is one that helps efficiently direct limited military resources towards achieving clear objectives in combating it. Corruption and organized crime, which I will refer to together as “illicit behavior,” threaten to undermine key governing institutions, and therefore the entire counterinsurgency effort. Consequently, the military must focus its resources on attacking illicit behavior that undermines security organizations, key public service agencies, and economically essential industries. This understanding requires further elaboration.

Civil conflict often leads to the breakdown of state and social institutions. Entities that individuals might rely on to provide basic services such as security, water, electricity, or education often disintegrate as violence...
escalates. The process of stabilization involves rebuilding institutions around which society can shape its activities and upon which individuals can rely to enable their well-being. However, vacuums created during conflict and rebuilding often empower groups that undermine the success of new institutions by pursuing their own illicit activities and alternative power structures.

Frequently, during conflict, as established institutions break down, individuals form alliances capable of delivering both licit and illicit products and services. While some are concerned with importing food, water, clothes, or other necessities, many exploit the situation by dealing in guns, drugs, human trafficking, and other improprieties. Not infrequently, the same organizations that control transportation conduits also control regional relationships. In such an environment, organized criminal groups focused on profiteering build strong power bases, allowing them to exert control after the peace. To maintain this power, organized criminal groups must develop “hand-in-glove” relationships with corrupt politicians. Such relationships ensure immunity from government aggression, enrich compromised officials, and provide access to additional public resources. In the words of one commentator on post-conflict Bosnia, “Key players in the covert acquisition and distribution of supplies during wartime have emerged as nouveau riche ‘criminal elite’ with close ties to the government . . .” These actors have an interest in perpetuating a parasitic relationship with government institutions. In other words, such actors have incentives to behave the way they do. Understanding those incentives is critical to attacking them.

The parasitic relationships that develop often prevent government institutions from sufficiently performing their intended functions. For example, compromised police forces may fail to fully investigate crimes, or officials in key government-run industries may sell or divert products for their own gain. The public, watching this process and experiencing the lack of services that they need and expect, lose faith in the government. The government, in turn, loses its legitimacy, while insurgents gain support by providing institutional moorings, perverse though they may be, for the populace. In this way, illicit behavior undermines all efforts to stabilize a society.

Understanding how illicit behavior causes systemic damage is essential to defeating it. As the behavior corrodes the system of governing institutions, it also undermines the expectations of the populace. This dynamic suggests that the target of military activities should be areas where such illicit activities impact standards of living and trust in public institutions. Focus should center on those institutions that bear directly on the most basic public needs: security organizations, key public service agencies, and economically essential industries. Yet, in a foreign environment, identifying threats to these core institutions is a complex challenge requiring properly focused analysis.

**Defining the target of illicit behavior.** The key to identifying threats lies in understanding the expectations of the populace. Security assistance forces must understand how the local populace expects these core institutions to provide security and services in a fair manner. In states in conflict, it may be difficult to develop a unified picture of such expectations. Yet, Soldiers can attempt to bring key leaders together to develop the standards that will dictate the behavior of relevant officials and guide the military’s awareness for when action is necessary. In Baghdad and Kabul, the commanding general and ambassador will have to meet with leaders of key political or sectarian groups, and expectations may best be represented by the passage of legislation prohibiting certain actions. In provincial Afghanistan, the commander may work with a tribal shura, or council, to identify expectations such as the types and quantity of services the local population expects. Because they provide clear benchmarks against which government performance can be measured, these expectations help expose the individuals and groups subverting those expectations.
When security forces have succeeded in understanding local expectations, they can then pursue a range of activities to attack illicit behavior in areas most relevant to the public. The definition of illicit behavior, thus, depends on the regional and cultural variables in which the Soldier finds himself. Comprehending the populations’ concerns regarding standards of living and public trust will help security forces focus on the proper “red lines” when public officials and private actors have violated social expectations. Focusing on security agencies, key public service entities, and revenue-generating industries will ensure that the military’s resources go to those areas where efforts will be most positively felt by the populace.

Given these dynamics, then, how does the military begin to build the actual framework used to attack illicit behavior?

**Focus on the incentive structure.** Because it is dealing with limited resources while fighting insurgents and terrorists, there are limits to the military’s policing potential. Yet, it would be imprudent to confront illicit behavior, but achieve no lasting effect beyond what the military’s provisional presence in the area would permit. Military power must work in a way that tips the balance of power in favor of those who are willing to work honestly, according to established standards, and through governing institutions. In short, security forces must construct an approach that changes the incentive structure. They must support honest behavior that reinforces legitimate government institutions and provides those institutions the space to develop.²
The following framework is intended to complement the military’s focus on primary counter-insurgency activities, while providing flexibility to commanders to adapt to the environments in which they find themselves. Treating the three key aspects of the incentive structure as critical operational objectives can also permit commanders to frame activities in a way more familiar to Soldiers’ traditional training.

Understand Opportunities, Risks, And Rewards

Any individual—government official or civilian—will consider the available opportunities, and their risks and rewards when deciding whether to pursue illicit behavior. The military must develop intelligence requirements that help it understand the essential aspects of such decisions:

- Where do the key opportunities for profit exist?
- What are the most significant risks if those opportunities are pursued?
- What rewards are possible if attempts to profit are successful?

The goal should be to shape an environment that affects the way individuals weigh those factors, encourages choices that support established social expectations, and reinforces strong government institutions. The three sections below describe opportunities, risks, and rewards in greater detail.

Opportunities. Illicit behavior occurs where opportunities for it exist. Weakly institutionalized states offer just such opportunities, but only opportunities that can be converted into cash or some item of value are normally worth pursuing. Therefore, security forces must look to those activities in the region that present the greatest potential to produce value.

Value can come in a variety of forms. In 2007, for example, certain influential Afghans were said to have been stealing land at the rate of 0.8 square miles a day and then illegally selling it for a profit. People can also be valuable. Kidnapping rings, sometimes complicit with local police, became common in post-war Iraq. Smuggling evades government tariffs and capitalizes on critical pathways used for trade and insurgent and terrorist activities. In 2004, for example, the Iraqi government halted the illegal movement of 2,200 tons of oil and fuel products, 23 tons of minerals, 3,350 antiquities, and—even 13,039 “tasty” sheep. Finally, reconstruction funds that are frequently handed out in a rush to achieve some development can also provide substantial opportunities for illicit activity.

The military must focus, then, on any item that offers value, however defined, in order to identify salient opportunities for illicit behavior. To understand what opportunities are already being exploited, it must employ intelligence to identify activities for what they really are in the local context, rather than what they may seem to be in the shadow of an insurgency. For example, rather than being irrational terrorist acts, some attacks on Iraqi oil pipelines were meant to divert oil movements to trucks and increase the opportunities for “diversion, theft, and smuggling.”

Analysis has also identified attacks on UK forces as the work of criminal groups resisting the closure of smuggling routes. Violence can also be used to beat out competitors, and government institutions can be infiltrated to give such activities a semi-legitimate gloss. Such infiltration has been apparent in the Iraqi Interior Ministry in the past. Simply writing such activities off as the actions of terrorists or insurgents bent on chaos misses a larger picture that can inform more effective military operations.

What are the main motivations of the actors and what avenues will they have to pursue those motivations?

Different opportunities may also appeal to different actors depending on their status in the region. Intelligence analysts should, therefore, seek to develop a critical node of key economic and political actors that captures their origin, motivations, relationships, and capabilities. For example, a political official appointed to an Afghan province, but not from the province, may consider short-term opportunities for gain.
differently than an individual from the province, who has risen to power there and intends to stay.  

**Risks.** Some risks apply to individuals regardless of their position or the opportunities they may be pursuing. Perhaps the greatest risk for many illicit actors is confrontation with the state. What is the likelihood, for example, of facing investigation, arrest, trial, and imprisonment? Until 2007, coalition officials in Iraq seemed unwilling to target crime, feeling that doing so was predominantly an Iraqi responsibility. Asked about looting in 2003, a British military spokesman replied, “Do I look to you like I’m a policeman?” Whatever the variables under consideration by coalition forces were at the time, the prevailing approach certainly did little to impede illicit actors. Arguably, the greatest tool to dissuade potential illicit behavior was taken off the table.

Another type of risk involves the shame and disgrace that can attach to persons publicly implicated in illicit behavior. To some extent, the orientation of the individual will be more relevant here. An outsider may be less concerned with his reputation, whereas someone from the region may be very sensitive to it. The military can strengthen such concerns by encouraging the future orientation of a populace. As one observer notes—

> In war the future is cheap, the present is everything, and rules and norms are either non-existent or are treated wholly opportunistically; in peace we have to try to change that so that the future begins to matter, and alongside the future, people’s reputation, their standing, their legitimacy and hence the propriety of their conduct.

Development of expectations can ignite this focus on the future. Where the security forces can convince the population to focus on the future by discussing its expectations, reputations will become more critical, and efforts to publicly expose illicit actors will be more effective.

Many risks depend upon the types of activities being considered. If an official or individual is embezzling money, are there regular audits? If they are smuggling oil, drugs, or even licit goods, how easy is it to get them across the border undetected? In short, what are the practical challenges they face that could lead to capture, exposure, or the inability to realize much of a reward?

**Rewards.** If opportunities are about the ability to access money or valued items, rewards are about the practical avenues to actually maintain control and enjoy them. If it is difficult for an official or individual to realize any gain from his activities, he will more cautiously weigh whether the opportunity is worth the reward. The critical question is motivation. Are you dealing with an official who simply wants money, a larger house, or other material goods? Are you dealing with an individual who wants to distribute resources to maintain a position of authority and influence in society? What are the main motivations of the actors and what avenues will they have to pursue those motivations?

Unless such actors feel comfortable hiding their ill-gotten gains under a mattress, they must employ some method of storing the wealth they have accumulated. This could include traditional banking services, the *hawala* dealers commonly found throughout Afghanistan and the Middle East, or the conversion of cash into other goods of value.

Many countries have financial oversight laws that require transactions of a certain magnitude to be reported to specialized units at a central bank. Such banks, if the proper relationship can be established, might provide a valuable source of information on the financial activities of illicit actors. Essentially, any area where money is forced into a formal system presents opportunities to closely audit and constrain the rewards of illicit activities. The same is true for *hawala* dealers—also referred to as money service providers. Though *hawala* dealers often operate outside formal financial systems throughout the Middle East and Asia, they are sometimes regulated. In Afghanistan, for example, *hawala* dealers are obligated to obtain government licenses. Understanding these requirements should allow military intelligence analysts to develop a picture of who is moving money and how they are moving it.

Yet, wealth is not always accumulated or stored monetarily. Illicit actors may attempt to obtain control over other resources either to convert them into money or distribute them to maintain
Afghan commandos and coalition forces search for weapons and other items during a joint mission to arrest a weapons dealer in a village near Jalabad, Afghanistan, 12 September 2007.

influence. The Mahdi Army, for example, used the Iraqi Ministry of Health to divert pharmaceuticals that were intended for the general public. As noted above, land can also provide a place to store wealth and be a source of power.

The military must understand who controls various resources such as land, minerals, and tangible property. How did they obtain such property? What are they doing with it? Answers to these questions can indicate the reward incentives that help shape the illicit actors’ decisions and thus point to the ideal targets of military operations.

Intelligence. Intelligence plays a fundamental role in the way the military attacks opportunities, risks, and rewards. COIN luminaries like Brigadier General Kitson argued for the importance of integrated intelligence systems long ago. Such systems are equally critical today to effectively combat illicit behavior. Essential intelligence includes relevant social structures, biographical information, leadership analysis, and “criminal association” (critical node) analysis.

Analyzing this intelligence through the lens of opportunities, risks, and rewards will indicate actions the military can pursue to attack illicit behavior. The ideal actions will vary, depending upon the military’s resources, the geographic environment, and local characteristics.

Tipping the Balance: Applying the Opportunities, Risks, Rewards Framework

As mentioned earlier, reaching common ground with influential locals about their expectations for public institutions is an essential step in attacking illicit behavior.
The military can also make it difficult for illicit actors to ... enjoy the hard currency they obtain...

expectations will assist the military in identifying those actions that pose the greatest threat to public trust and public services. To attack illicit behavior based on well-developed intelligence, the military can pursue measures to reduce opportunities for illicit behavior, increase the risks associated with it, and minimize the gains achieved from it. Though in some cases activities targeting each incentive area may overlap (affecting opportunities and risks, for example), in practice, clean conceptual distinctions are unnecessary. Commanders have to develop some coherent system for conceiving of the opportunities, risks, and rewards, and execute a systematic approach toward reducing opportunities, increasing risks, and limiting rewards. The military need not execute all activities. It can also realize substantial gains by identifying areas where civilian or other expert assistance can be valuable. Yet, because they have a far more expansive presence throughout conflict zones, military commanders are in the best position to digest intelligence and coordinate the fight against illicit behavior.

Reducing opportunities. The military can reduce opportunities through a carrot and stick approach. Such an approach could focus on conditioning monetary or other support on certain behavior, enabling closer oversight of the local government and private sector, and encouraging licit opportunities for individuals who may otherwise rely on illicit ones.

For example, any aid program aims to dispense aide quickly when necessary, but not so quickly that its expenditure cannot be overseen effectively. Military policymakers, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and other spending authorities can incorporate requirements local officials must meet for disbursements to occur. Such requirements at the strategic level can involve the adoption of simple, but broadly applicable controls and checks on how money is spent. Battalion level commanders can perform a similar function by requiring proof of expenditures and evidence of receipt and control by local governing institutions. While it may be tempting (and at times, necessary) to get money out the door quickly, even remedial conditions on the release of such funds may force recipients to carefully consider how they use them.

Actual controls and checks performed by a variety of different agencies, including local government agencies, contracted civilians, or (in the earliest stages of stabilization) the military itself, should be closely tied to such conditions. Local government agencies may be well intentioned but not have the resources to visit certain parts of the country. Expanding their reach may be a simple but effective way of showing the presence of a central authority. Contracted civilians can also be effective working alongside locals who they can simultaneously train in audit and oversight responsibilities. Finally, the military should keep checking on projects its funds are supporting.

Illicit behavior also occurs because conflict environments greatly diminish the opportunities available for legitimate pursuits. In the past, the U.S. government has developed programs to provide livelihood alternatives. Yet, such enterprises pose substantial difficulties. In Afghanistan, for example, many farmers grow opium because they have become indebted to powerful warlords who require it as a form of debt repayment. In such a situation, providing sustainable job alternatives is not as simple as handing out seed or paying off debts. Variables such as irrigation, distance from markets, and other factors also determine what farmers can profitably grow. Alternative livelihood programs often require substantial planning that integrates a profound understanding of local dynamics that can only be achieved through engagement with the local population itself. Still, one option for limiting illicit opportunities is enabling licit opportunities through properly structured alternative livelihood programs.

Reducing opportunities for illicit behavior may be the most complicated aspect of fighting such behavior. It requires the deepest understanding of the region and how numerous variables interrelate. Though such efforts should still be pursued, security forces can likely have a far
more substantial impact by increasing the risks of illicit behavior.

**Increasing risks.** The most significant risks for illicit actors are capture, imprisonment, public exposure, and shaming. The military can substantially raise such risks by aiding law enforcement operations, supporting greater public transparency efforts, and encouraging civil society involvement against and awareness of illicit behavior.

The failure to properly support law enforcement functions is the most substantial mistake any stabilization program can make. Whatever authority is established in the country, the first step in stemming the growth of a criminalized economy lies in achieving early, visible victories over illicit actors. Such victories send clear signals that authorities will not tolerate illicit behavior. The greatest cautionary potential available to the military rests in the actual arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment of illicit actors. Operation Honest Hands, the U.S.-Iraq effort to clean up rampant corruption at the Bayji refinery, offers an excellent example of such activities. During that operation, U.S. and Iraqi officials maintained an active presence in the refineries and arrested anyone sufficiently implicated in wrongdoing.

Since provincial prosecutorial resources may be sparse, the military can also consider ideas such as supporting a centrally located, roving prosecution team. Such a team could develop expertise in the racketeering and conspiracy operations of large criminal networks, and can act as a powerful resource to attack such organizations.

The military can also encourage public oversight of governing institutions. It should pressure officials to make public budget, public service, and project information widely available. Innocent government officials would have no reason to fear such disclosures. The U.S. can then withhold support or incite pressure by influential locals when host officials resist such disclosures.

The military can further assist public awareness and oversight of governing institutions by conducting surveys on the quality of services like sewage disposal, water, electricity, and trash removal to measure government performance. The military can then provide public venues where such results are displayed and wherein host officials have to answer for those results.

While raising the risks through detention, prosecution, and public exposure are likely to have the most substantial impact on illicit actors, depriving them of the fruits of their labor could also play a significant role in dissuading them from pursuing ill-gotten gains.

**Minimizing rewards.** The military can deprive illicit actors of their profits through a variety of techniques. Moreover, cooperation with civilian agencies with an expertise in the relevant areas can often enhance the effectiveness of reward-minimization techniques.

Patrols to interdict the flow of insurgent supplies also close off traditional routes for smuggling. Broadening the scope of patrol targets to include resources exploited by local illicit actors (found through the “opportunities” analysis) may prove effective. However, such disruption also poses a substantial threat to military forces. It may incite violent responses from illicit profiteers as well as insurgents and should be carefully planned.

The military can also make it difficult for illicit actors to store, move, or enjoy the hard currency they obtain by helping oversight agencies license banks and hawaladars and identify those operating without a license or not reporting information properly. It can also do the same with commodities or other alternative value stores. For example, it can facilitate NGO programs like Land Titling and Economic Restructuring in Afghanistan, which created official land registries under contract with the U.S. Agency for International Development. It can also support similar efforts by civil society transparency organizations, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Organization, which works to improve metering and other mechanisms for keeping track of oil, gas, and mining resources.

Military and civilian agencies may need to coordinate the participation of organizations that increase government transparency at the highest levels. However, alternatives may also exist for operating transparency initiatives on a local level by simply doing things such as making the local budget and project lists publicly available to all and holding public disclosure meetings.
Achieving Maximum Impact

Several years of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have made clear that sustainable reconstruction and stabilization efforts require the military to find a way to attack illicit behavior. Because attacking such behavior head-on may drain limited military resources and distract from vital elements of the counterinsurgency mission, the military needs a framework that complements its normal operations and efficiently achieves a maximum impact. The opportunities-risks-rewards framework can coexist with counterinsurgency operations in a way that shapes incentives for people to act honestly and reinforces government institutions, so that such honesty and strength can do the bulk of the work of improving the system.

Constraining potentially lucrative illegal activities will likely elicit one of two responses. The ideal response is for individuals and groups to back down and pursue licit activities that are more profitable, simply because the costs of illicit activities have grown too high. A second response might be that illicit actors will react violently to protect their terrain, in which case they may become enemy combatants and expose themselves to the types of traditional solutions the military knows best.

While the proposed focus on reducing opportunities, increasing risks, and minimizing rewards does involve some functions beyond the normal scope of traditional military operations, commanders should remember that shaping incentives does not require substantially different tools than the military already possesses. It simply requires strategic decisions about how to employ intelligence and deploy resources in a way that can affect incentives. Put simply, you don’t have to capture every bad guy to attack illicit behavior. The goal is not to clean the slate, but simply to tip the balance in favor of honesty and good government.

NOTES


5. Underkuffler and Mark Philip use this concept with respect to corruption, but I am expanding it here for our purposes. See note 1, and Mark Philp, “Peacebuilding and Corruption,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3 (June 2008): 310-27.


7. Ibid., 323.

8. More will be said on this topic in note 10.

9. Rose-Ackerman, 86.


14. Rose-Ackerman, 67.

15. Williams, 122.


17. Rose-Ackerman, 68; Louney, 427.

18. Louney, 427.

19. Philip makes the distinction between roving and predatory bands that gives rise to this idea. Philip, 320.


21. Smith, B01.


23. Philp, 324.

24. Ibid.


26. Williams, 121.


31. Philip, 324.


33. Those interested in these dynamics should consult the extensive work of the socio-economist David Mansfield, who has performed elaborate research in this area. See: <http://www.davidmansfield.org/> (7 November 2009).

34. Rose-Ackerman, 86.


37. Sewage, water, electricity, and trash (SWET) is only an example of a potential tool for gathering information, and not a sweeping solution to answer all questions. For an argument that SWET alone is insufficient, but must be utilized in conjunction with other tools, see Major Dawson A. Plummer, “Examin­ing the Effectiveness of SWET and Sons of SWET in OIF” (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2006-2007), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470921&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (5 November 2009).


INVESTING IN STABILITY

The Need for Intelligence Preparation for Economic Operations

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PHOTO: A Soldier assigned to Bravo Company, Task Force Gladius, 82d Airborne Division, provides security during a meeting with locals about their winter needs in the Kapisa province of Afghanistan, 4 November 2009. (U.S. Army, SPC Matthew Freire)

In Counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping (United Nations Chapter VI and VII missions), and myriad operations other than war, force is a necessary but not a sufficient instrument for mission success. The reason? As Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, notes, the local population is the “critical center of gravity of an insurgency” (and operations other than war missions as well). Taking a comprehensive approach to the local population’s concerns and quality of life is vital to obtaining the political gains necessary to end an insurgency. Providing “basic economic needs” and maintaining infrastructure are important parts of the mission.

It is often difficult for commanders to determine the best use for the development assets and resources at their disposal. Blindly throwing money and people at a problem is not a viable solution because the force rarely achieves the level of impact commanders seek, and in a world of scarce resources, more problems exist than there are assets to throw at them. Like battlefield operations, economic operations require the commander to develop and choose a course of action with its own unique requirements and risks. The Army needs to practice intelligence preparation for economic operations using “economic operations intelligence cells” that enjoy the level of dedicated support the Army gives to battlefield intelligence.

Economics and Security

A mutually beneficial relationship exists between a population’s economic well-being and a security force’s protection of it. If a local security force improves the economic condition in its area of operations, the population benefits and responds by helping the security force. As it receives more cooperation from the people it protects, the security force can better combat violent elements in the area. As the security situation improves, the local populace will be more willing to make long-term financial decisions and invest capital to spur economic growth. Because increased economic growth depends on the protection provided by the security force, the population becomes less tolerant of violent elements threatening its investments. When people increasingly turn to the security force to neutralize violent actors, the local economy eventually becomes stable enough to support its own security institutions.
This virtuous, upward spiral can also work in the other direction—as a vicious, downward spiral. The people can blame a stagnant economy or deteriorating quality of life on a security force if they think it is unable to deal with violence. This state of affairs forces the security force to expend more resources to achieve the same levels of security a smaller force provides when the population cooperates with it. When people hoard their money and flee an area instead of investing in it, the wealthiest and the most talented soon take the resources and skills necessary to rejuvenate the local economy to more stable areas, thereby making recovery all the more difficult and expensive.

Where and How to Invest?

Military economic operations are an investment in the commercial sense. Just like his counterparts in civilian commerce, the military commander seeks the maximum return on his investment. However, he measures his return on his investment not in dollars, but in physical and economic security, which are often difficult to quantify. The commander knows the local population’s future quality of life depends on the presence of the commander’s force and its successful completion of its mission.

When commanders select an investment strategy, they must choose between quick-impact projects and long-term development projects and estimate the economic impact their assets will generate given the investment opportunities available.

Economic projects prove a force’s commitment and staying power. Quick-impact projects can improve the quality of life in an area in a way that is immediately noticeable by the inhabitants. A quick-impact project’s timeline is usually two weeks to several months, depending on the size and complexity of the project; to keep the project in line with the deployment schedule of military units, it rarely exceeds a year. Traditional impact projects include school construction, irrigation improvement, well drilling, agricultural seed aid, small business loans, and medical and dental exams. These projects garner immediate support for the security force from the inhabitants, build momentum, and advance the economic/physical security upward spiral. Bursts of activity at the start of the operation can make the security force mission easier in the end and reduce the cost and the time it takes to complete the mission.

On the other hand, quick-impact projects do not address structural deficiencies in the local economy, so total mission time can increase if the security force’s short-term economic stimulus leaves behind a fragile local economy and a population under attack by insurgents. Long-term development projects may not have an immediate impact on the population that generates intelligence leads and goodwill, but they can bring about long-term employment opportunities and a deeper and richer empowerment of the marketplace. They usually have a one- to five-year time horizon and include more complex and expensive projects, such as the installation or rehabilitation of sanitation systems, power generation plants and grids, telecommunications networks, and port facilities. While conventional military planners prefer not to be bogged down in long-term development projects, experience shows that quick-impact projects and long-term projects reinforce each other’s effects. The composition of the project and the timing of its completion are the critical factors.

Experience significantly influences the capabilities that go into designing a security force’s economic operations. Because of the experiences of the French in Algeria, the British in Oman and Malaysia, and the United States in Vietnam, most Western militaries think of economic development as road construction, rice-paddy irrigation, school construction, well drilling, seed and livestock distribution, and the like. However, the economic imperatives that drove choices then were only appropriate in those times, economies, and cultural contexts.

Building schools in an agricultural area ravaged by poverty and war is not a good idea. Such schoolhouses will remain empty if parents do not...
allow their children to attend school because their families’ survival depends on the child working elsewhere. Yet, the local population may greatly appreciate water wells and irrigation systems that provide a dependable source of water. Schoolhouses may be feasible once the population has progressed beyond a subsistence and survival mind-set.

In addition, the manner in which the force undertakes an economic project can have unexpected consequences. Building in an unfamiliar place may involve construction techniques that are unknown locally. Western engineering units are used to working with concrete, while local populations in the more isolated areas of Afghanistan use all-stone construction. Adapting building plans to suit the region can shorten the time it takes to complete a project, increase the number of available subcontractors to do the work, and reduce the number of unemployed men who might join an insurgency for financial reasons.

**Evaluating Investments**

The commander’s investment strategy should link resources to identifiable, if fleeting, investment opportunities that fit within a comprehensive approach, but he must make the best use of his available resources and quantify the risks he can expect. The economic operations intelligence cell must identify a baseline of existing economic activity, structures, and norms before generating investment strategies and presenting them to the commander. Like any civilian economic intelligence unit that tries to analyze market mechanisms to establish prices, the cell must determine how individuals, households, and local businesses allocate their resources in a market environment. An economic operations intelligence cell must understand what drives demand for certain items, and determine how local businesses can meet this demand. This information has serious implications for the local security force. For example, Baghdad’s bread bakers are not only food distributors but also retail bankers providing financial services for the city’s inhabitants. Terrorist targeting of bakeries, their employees, and their flour distribution trucks alters the population’s thinking about the availability of their bakery products. Residents associate the absence of bread with the ineptness of coalition forces, because they know they “at least had bread when Saddam was in power.”

**Residents associate the absence of bread with the ineptness of coalition forces...**

Economic operations intelligence cells must deal with geographic areas that are, or have been, under the strain of conflict, sometimes for decades, and whose market system is so damaged and inefficient that development approaches that work well in stable economies do not achieve a lasting effect. For example, looting has sometimes made facilities built by security forces useless. Instead of resisting the destruction of facilities that benefitted their community, local residents decided to join in the looting themselves because they expected their neighbors to do so and believed terrorists might completely destroy the facilities during their next attacks.

An economic operations intelligence cell should survey an area of interest and ask—

- How does the local population gain access to financial services?
- What goods and services are essential to the survival, spiritual well-being, and morale of the local population?
- In what areas of economic activity is the local population superior to other areas?
- What are the number, size, and product offerings of local business entities?
- What is the nature of the competition between the local business entities?
- What is the level of unemployment?
- What is the state and talent of the local skilled and unskilled workforce?
- How do products, people, and capital move about in the area of interest?
- What is the condition of state-provided services and infrastructure?
- What expectations does the local population have regarding the future performance of the economy?
- If the force has been in place for some time, have the people been disappointed in any way that has eroded trust in future projects and programs?

Once the economic operations intelligence cell has a baseline on the economic situation, it must deter-
mine the business opportunities that exist and decide which to exploit with development. Unfortunately, a security force may arrive on scene with an asset mix that is inappropriate to the circumstances on the ground. Commanders often make the mistake of letting such assets go ahead and do what the security force is trained to do because they think the force will be unproductive if they do not. This is a platform-centric approach to economic operations. However, the situation calls for analyzing intended outcomes.

If the commander desires to build a security checkpoint to protect the approaches to a market place, how much does it really matter if he builds it out of stone or concrete? If we can do it faster and cheaper using local subcontractors, why should we divert organic engineering equipment from other projects that need concrete? By moving to a results approach to investing, the economic operations intelligence cell discovers the economic impact of the project over the entire life cycle of the finished good. It avoids projects that only provide temporary jobs and contribute nothing to the rehabilitation of local market mechanisms.

Much of U.S. military doctrine in the 1990s focused on leveraging existing development assets held by other agencies of the government, foreign governments, international government organizations, and private volunteer organizations. This was a compromise between acknowledging that peacekeeping and nation-building activities were a rising national security concern and the institutional imperative to remain focused on winning high- and medium-intensity conflicts despite the shrinking defense budgets of the post-Cold War era. Because of what has been called the Vietnam syndrome (reinforced by the Somalia experience), the Army believed that any long-term commitment in foreign endeavors would be politically unacceptable. Hence, militaries focused on rapidly deploying to trouble spots to deliver humanitarian assistance and conduct quick-impact projects if necessary, and then turning the areas over to other agencies, international government organizations, private volunteer organizations, and local entities.

This system turned out to be wholly inadequate in Afghanistan and Iraq. When violent activity was ongoing, international government organizations and private volunteer organizations were reluctant to deploy to areas that needed them most. If they did deploy there, they refused to cooperate with the military for fear of supporting policies unpopular with the locals and/or their financial backers. U.S. agency employees with unique skill sets were unable to meet the challenge. Personnel from the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture were too few in number to respond to the people’s needs. Provincial reconstruction and civil affairs teams and engineering units became prime contractors, even though many of them had never trained for such assignments.

The economic operations intelligence cell should help the local commander identify where deficiencies exist and determine how to mitigate them. A commander normally has four investment strategies from which to choose:

- Investing in companies. The commander can choose to stimulate local marketplace actors through business loans, grants, or guaranteed business service contracts. Sometimes businesses exist in depressed areas, but they lack the capital to undertake operations without cash advances or payment guarantees. A stimulus allows a company to purchase durable and consumable goods, pay operating expenses, and fund expansion so consumers can start purchasing goods and services from the reinvigorated company, which will then hire more employees who in turn will spend their pay in the local economy, creating a ripple effect of prosperity.

- Investing in infrastructure. Investing in infrastructure rejuvenates public services and utilities, allowing many economic activities to resume. Electric and water services are normally the most pressing and difficult services to implement. Many businesses and industrial activities require electricity and water to run their equipment and carry out their operations. Without electric and water services, businesses must choose expensive power generation alternatives or shut down because they do not have access to large amounts of water. Road construction is economical and easy to implement, and experience in Afghanistan demonstrates that pound for pound, it has the most impact. Trade and stability followed the road
construction teams in Afghanistan as they opened up once isolated towns to the rest of the country.

- **Investing in people.** In some places where consumer demand exists and producers are operating, a lack of skilled labor prevents economic activity and growth. Implementing training programs can help provide businesses with employees, who then turn into consumers with money to spend. This can be difficult in areas with low literacy rates and jobs requiring several months of dedicated special training. The medical and information technology fields have proven to be the most challenging in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- **Investing in security.** We must not forget that security offers financial benefits to a community under attack from violent organizations. Resources diverted to security are useful as an insurance policy. When called upon, they will prove their worth. In agricultural communities, building a blast-hardened retaining wall around a grain silo will prove more beneficial to the community than building a wall around a schoolhouse. While it is unpopular to say so, we need to put the values of the local community and the immediate needs of the existing economic system first, so that more advanced activities like education can become feasible later.

The commander may use the assets available to him to pursue any or all of these strategies or elements. The economic operations intelligence cell should first evaluate the deficiencies of the community’s economy and prioritize the needs of the population to determine an investment strategy and how to implement it. The next step is to determine which of the commander’s assets have the best probability of success in implementing the strategy. Then the economic operations intelligence cells must manage risk by identifying the probabilities of success and the costs and sources of potential failure. For example, it might identify the need to build a structure and determine that an engineering unit could perform the task with a high probability of success, but the lack of local concrete production capacity might prolong engineer work on the project for months, prevent engineers from working other projects, and delay the project’s benefits for the local population. The cell should recommend using an alternative construction material, stone, which enables the engineering unit to outsource the work to local, out-of-work subcontractors. While the risk of project failure can increase because the prime contractor, the engineering unit, is unfamiliar with the technique, we gain the benefits of increased local employment, faster project completion, and the availability of more engineers for other projects.

Of course, we will have to ensure that completion of the project does not depend on the use of concrete. It is the commander’s decision to make, but if an economic operations intelligence cell makes him aware of the alternatives available, he will make a better decision.

In the March-April 2008 issue of *Military Review*, Colonel Patrick Donahue and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fenzel examined Combined Task Force Devil’s economic operations in Afghanistan. They
Task Force Devil…served in the capacity of an EOIC, coordinating…provincial reaction teams…

Described the value-added as the task force identified economic problems on the ground, assessed available development resources, and used a systems approach to leverage the projects of other international government organizations and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The Task Force Devil staff served in the capacity of an economic operations intelligence cell, coordinating the work of provincial reaction teams in the area and developing project timelines to achieve synergies and push important initiatives forward. By taking the lead in this way, Task Force Devil was able to attract other development entities to the area by demonstrating that there was goodwill on the ground and that development projects could be completed effectively.3

Building Capability

Intelligence preparation for economic operations is not an additional burden on a commander’s staff, but a value-added product we neglect at the commander’s risk. It is up to the commander to decide if an economic operations intelligence cell should be an informal institution retained in his staff or a more formal entity like an information operations cell. In most current operations, commanders will find that they just do not have the personnel at hand to develop large, independent EOICs. We should not treat an EOIC like a stand-alone function, but incorporate personnel from all the staff elements and provide input to them. What makes intelligence preparation for economic operations unique are the collector’s skills in providing the right kind of data to the economic operations intelligence cell and the analyst’s skills in creating a worthy investment strategy.

Deployed U.S. military units already conduct patrols for security and intelligence collection. Many units conduct human terrain mapping missions, and specialized mixed units possess skills in civil-affairs, human intelligence, psychological operations, and medical services. They can project security, collect information, and deliver soft-power effects.4 We can add an economic intelligence collector to these patrols at a low cost and give him a list of information requirements, many already needed for human terrain mapping. His skills would be similar to those of a general contractor, insurance appraiser, or financial manager. He could analyze facilities, infrastructure, local businesses, and potential subcontractors and assess the economic viability of a business plan. Because such skills are more prevalent within the civilian economy, National Guard and Army Reserve units may have Soldiers with the requisite experience who might be of great value in an intelligence collection role. The United Kingdom’s 28 Engineer Regiment has already put this concept to the test with great success with its development and influence teams in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.5
Much of the analysis to develop an investment strategy recommendation is the result of leaders and Soldiers using common sense after encountering glaringly evident deficiencies in areas of extreme economic neglect. The economic operations intelligence cell needs the expertise to perform financial risk management of investment strategies, assess their costs and probabilities of success, and summarize their findings in a logical and presentable format for the commander. Existing information technology infrastructure allows these cells to reach back to specialists in other agencies and leverage their expertise to create even better assessments. While such reach-back is not as valuable as having an economic adviser on site, it is a low cost, technically achievable, and rapidly executable solution.

In sum, an economic operations intelligence cell brings to the decision-making process an analysis that yields better returns on investment than unguided choices—and not just in economic matters.

Moving Forward

Using hard- and soft-power instruments in areas of degraded or collapsed social and economic stability is a daunting task even for those trained to do it. The contemporary security environment compels commanders to go outside their comfort zones. Commanders are investors with limited resources trying to get a maximum return on their security investment. If the commander invests his assets properly, he can build momentum on the economic front to help him achieve his security mission. Doing so will stimulate additional economic development. If the commander does not invest his assets wisely, the local economy may worsen, making the security mission difficult or untenable.

Economic operations are increasingly important as a force multiplier in the current operating environment. Using intelligence preparation for economic operations and establishing economic operations intelligence cells is an operational and tactical imperative. Just as it is inconceivable to launch an infantry assault without gathering and processing battlefield intelligence, it should be inconceivable to begin development projects without economic intelligence. If a commander does not use such intelligence to help him make economic development choices, he runs the risk of wasting time and money on projects that are temporary successes but not long-term achievements that reduce or eliminate the need for a security force presence.

While there may be a learning curve, institutional knowledge exists within the government, particularly in the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of State, and other knowledge is available for no charge on the Internet. It is increasingly evident that units using economic analysis improve the security environment and quality of life in their areas of operations more than units that do not. Commanders who begin implementing intelligence preparation for economic operations programs will soon come to wonder what they would have done without this capability. MR

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2. Ibid., 2-2.
Due to the “irregular” challenges of the War on Terrorism and involvement in peacekeeping, nation building, and humanitarian aid around the world, each branch of the U.S. military has created special centers to promote the study and advancement of intercultural effectiveness. Each center has developed key concepts and ideas for teaching intercultural effectiveness training. However, a gap is growing between the two primary components necessary for intercultural effectiveness—cross-cultural competence and foreign language. While language proficiency is a necessary component of intercultural effectiveness, the services consider it of secondary importance and not as crucial as cross-cultural competence. Cross-cultural competence is considered a broader, more generalizable skill set than the time-extensive, perishable skills of language proficiency. Because of this tendency, the military is prescribing and implementing virtually separate training paths for teaching language and teaching culture.

Army Definitions of Culture and Intercultural Effectiveness

The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center defines culture as a “dynamic social system,” containing the values, beliefs, behaviors, and norms of a “specific group, organization, society or other collectivity” learned, shared, internalized, and changeable by all members of the society.1

The TRADOC Culture Center further promotes the development of “cultural capability” throughout the Army through an “overarching, coherent, and connected strategy” of training and education that should integrate various organizations in the Army and Department of Defense. “Cultural capability,” which I have termed “intercultural effectiveness,” is the end result of developing cross-cultural competence and regional competence in Army personnel. Cross-cultural competence refers to a culture-general skill set that includes awareness of one’s “self” in the context of culture, an open mind towards and appreciation of diversity, and the ability to apply “culture analytical models” to any region. Regional competence refers to the culture-specific aspects of any given culture as determined by mission objectives. Language proficiency falls into the category of regional competence.
According to the TRADOC Culture Center, cross-cultural competence represents knowledge that is more durable and more easily attainable, while language proficiency is perishable and time-intensive to attain and sustain. In addition, the TRADOC Center believes, the skill sets from language proficiency are not as easily transferable from one region to another as those of cross-cultural competence. Because of this belief, training to promote cross-cultural proficiency has a higher priority than regional competence (including language training) in the Culture Center’s plan.

At West Point, the newly created Center for Languages, Cultures, and Regional Studies takes a broader approach. While accepting TRADOC’s fundamental definition of culture, the Center for Languages, Cultures, and Regional Studies looks at language, culture, and the knowledge of regional dynamics as vitally interrelated and equally important aspects of intercultural effectiveness. Such effectiveness requires a skill set that encompasses language study and the cultural awareness it engenders, as well as cross-cultural competence through language and other cultural training, and knowledge of regional dynamics and how such knowledge relates intrinsically to both the culture and language. The center further defines cross-cultural competence as “the capacity to generate perceptions and adapt behavior to cultural context.” It is currently piloting a standardized test of cross-cultural competence on cadets participating in West Point’s Semester Abroad Program.

Marine Corps Cultural Definitions and Intercultural Effectiveness

The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), which has published its own training book on the topic of operational culture, has also developed a practical approach to defining culture and implementing cultural training into its training infrastructures. In its discussion of culture, the USMC’s Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning limits its definition of culture to just those elements that are “relevant to military missions” and those that Marines can apply to the military domain “in a way attuned to the operational needs of Marines.” Based on the writings of cultural anthropologist Ward Goodenough, who defines culture as a set of norms and behaviors that one can “switch into, or activate, given the group they are in for any given purpose,” the Marines have adopted a concept of culture that includes only that portion that is “operationally relevant.” They further support this limited view of culture with the assertion that, academically speaking, “Much that is culture is outside the concerns of a warfighter.”

This pragmatic view of culture dictates that the Marines further “operationalize” culture into five specific cultural domains that make up the bulk of what is “operationally relevant” for the USMC. These five domains include the physical environment, the economy, the social structure, the political structure, and belief systems.

In sum, the USMC has put forth a definition of culture that, by necessity, is limited to only those elements of culture that are easily operationalized and militarily relevant to the warfighter. Language and language training receive no mention whatsoever in the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning publication.
Air Force Definitions of Culture and Intercultural Effectiveness

The U.S. Air Force (USAF), under the guidance of the newly founded USAF Culture and Language Center, has chosen to define culture in the practical framework of the USAF Cross-Cultural Competence Project. In succinct yet somewhat academic terms, the Air Force Culture and Language Center defines culture as “[t]he creation, maintenance and transformation across generations of semi-shared patterns of meaning, sense making, affiliation, action, and organization by groups.” In broader terms, the center operationalizes culture to include “core domains” of a culture such as family and kinship, religion and spirituality, time and space, gender, politics, history, language, and economics, all mostly shared and dynamic (changing over time). The center has also adopted a multi-level concept of culture that includes a “surface” understanding of culture (i.e., outward behaviors); a “middle” understanding (i.e., the physical, social, symbolic worlds); and a “deep” understanding (i.e., beliefs, values, assumptions).

With this understanding of culture, the center then defines cross-cultural competence as “[t]he ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively act, to achieve the desired effect in a culturally complex environment—without necessarily having prior exposure to a particular group, region, or language.” Because culture is considered more “quickly learned” and more “easily transferable” than language or regional knowledge, the Air Force gives culture—as a combination of general knowledge, skills, and attitudes—more priority as a training objective than language and regional knowledge. The Air Force believes all Airmen need the former and only some Airmen need the latter, which are “culture-specific.” While the Air Force encourages separate training paths for culture and language, it promotes both paths as “complementary.”

Should We Separate Language and Culture?

While the reasoning that gives culture priority over language is clear, it is crucial to see the broad interrelatedness of language and culture to understand the road ahead and answer the question, “Should we separate language and culture in our training programs?”

While many considerations may be promoted as the keystone of understanding culture, human communication is by far the most fundamental. Culture stems from our ability to communicate and form societies from which cultures spring. Language “expresses, embodies, and symbolizes” cultural reality. Language is the cornerstone on which we form culture and the primary medium by which we learn culture and transmit it from one generation to the next.

In that regard, language is vitally and inextricably linked to every aspect of culture. Language allows a society to categorize the physical world and the world of experience. Language is a fundamental element not only of individual identity and self but also of national identity. Language gives structure to individual thought as well as to the collaborative and collective thought processes of a society.

Language and culture are inherently interrelated and interdependent. Without language, we cannot fully realize, understand, or transmit culture to future generations, and any definition of culture is incomplete without understanding the role of language in its genesis, development, and moment-by-moment expression.

...language is vitally and inextricably linked to every aspect of culture.

Should We Give Language Lower Priority in Culture Training?

In most branches of the military, the philosophy behind culture training programs is based on the idea of “big ‘C’ Culture; little ‘l’ language.” In other words, we give culture more importance in our training programs and make language a “supporting effort.” This frequently leads to the development of separate training paths for each. However, given language and culture’s strong interrelatedness and interdependency, the importance of knowledge of a foreign language in intercultural effectiveness should be clear. Without a strong focus on language training in our cultural training programs, our Soldiers’ effectiveness in intercultural interactions will be limited.
The goal of language training is not a singular one, as some believe. One goal of language training is to achieve operational proficiency in that language; this is arguably a long-term goal. Nonetheless, an operational language proficiency will facilitate the ability to observe cultural elements more than cross-cultural competence alone, and will give the proficient user the ability to effectively interact with and within a culture. Training in the durable, transferable “cultural universals” might be enough if we only want our Soldiers to be “observers” of culture. Goodenough’s definition of culture seems more appropriate, in my view, as a functional doctrine for cultural anthropologists and other social scientists who primarily observe culture for the sake of research, but do we want our Soldiers to be little more than observers of a culture? Language proficiency will provide our Soldiers the ability to go beyond simple observation and will equip them with the skills to interact with cultural players and understand operationally relevant cultural realities.

Moreover, language proficiency is not necessarily the primary goal of language training. The language learning process itself facilitates the development of character traits that promote intercultural effectiveness in any cultural setting. In some self-report studies, some Americans perceive language proficiency as less important than other factors in their ability “to adjust” to a new culture while working abroad. Other studies, however, show that acquiring a language especially through study abroad and immersion training promotes more overall empathy for other cultures in general. Furthermore, the process of language socialization that takes place in immersion settings promotes the ability to construct a new cultural identity in a foreign culture. Such an ability leads to more flexibility and effectiveness in intercultural interactions. Indeed, The U.S. Army Study of the Human Dimension in the Future (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7-01, 2008) states, “Developing such an understanding [of culture] will require an increased emphasis on language training and proficiency, the acquisition of which increases socio-cultural awareness.”

Thus, language study is a unique learning endeavor that can improve the intercultural Soldier’s abilities in four areas: attitude, knowledge, skills, and critical cultural awareness. The intercultural attitudes that language learning promotes are curiosity, openness, and the “willingness to suspend disbelief about other cultures and belief about one’s own.” Knowledge is not simply knowledge about another culture or even culture in general, but rather knowledge of how social groups and identities within a culture relate to and interact with each other. Such knowledge will allow the interculturally effective Soldier to understand motivations, social constraints, and traditions of interaction within a culture. Language learning helps develop skills to seek out and discover the expectations of speakers in any given interaction and to apply that knowledge to avoid misunderstandings and pursue goals with appropriate tact. Furthermore, this skill set is not necessarily region-specific. The Soldier can transfer these skills to other cultures and employ them even through an interpreter in regions where he may not possess language proficiency. Finally, the interculturally effective Soldier employs a critical cultural awareness of his own values and how they influence his views and interpretations of other people’s values. The process of learning a language demands...
an element of self-reflection and self-knowledge that such awareness brings about. Therefore, we should not categorically assign foreign language to the domain of region- or culture-specific knowledge. While language study does involve a specific language and often a specific region, many benefits gained from this pursuit are applicable in other cultural settings outside the language’s region of use.

Conclusion
We must bring language training back into focus as an “equal partner” with culture training and make it a key component of our culture training initiatives. Language training currently plays a secondary role in interagency culture programs, most of which view culture as an object of study and teach easily transferrable knowledge using analytical models of cultural universals. While some of these analytical models include communicative norms, they do not stress the importance of interactional nuances of a society or the key role of language in a culture. The process of learning a foreign language uniquely facilitates the development of character traits a warfighter needs for effective intercultural interactions. Whether these interactions occur in the foreign language (by more proficient learners) or through an interpreter is of secondary importance. The attitudes, knowledge, skills, and awareness are transferrable, relevant, and applicable in culture-general contexts.

While undoubtedly necessary, cross-cultural competence training emphasizing cultural universals and militarily relevant cultural elements should not have priority over language training. Language and culture training should not follow separate paths of development. If the two endeavors are complementary, then why separate them and focus on them individually? With so many resources dedicated to developing intercultural effectiveness, why have we diminished the importance of one of the best training endeavors we have for fostering such effectiveness? Language should be viewed as inextricable from culture and given equal priority in our current culture training programs—not necessarily with the goal of producing an operational level of proficiency but because the process of learning a foreign language enables a more subjective cross-cultural sensitivity, awareness, tolerance, and understanding.

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4. The Intercultural Development Inventory developed by Hammer Consulting, LLC. See endnote 3 above.
THE MARSHALL APPROACH
The Battle Command Training Program and 21st-Century Leader Development

Colonel Richard M. Cabrey, Colonel Mark E. McKnight, and Lieutenant Colonel David S. Cannon, U.S. Army

Remember this: the truly great leader overcomes all difficulties, and campaigns and battles are nothing but a long series of difficulties to be overcome... the real leader displays his quality in his triumphs over adversity, however great it may be.

—General George Marshall

Perhaps the most important thing an army can do to prepare for war in an era of persistent conflict is develop agile and adaptive leaders capable of engaging across the spectrum of conflict and who are equally at home on the tactical battlefield, the strategic headquarters, or the halls of government. This is no small task and can only be accomplished with a combination of education, training, and experience. It cannot happen by accident. A career that encompasses all the requisite components should be deliberately cultivated in officers with promise. The obvious historical example of the application and product of this kind of leader development was General George C. Marshall: chief of staff of the Army during World War II, rebuildor of postwar Europe, secretary of defense, secretary of state, and Nobel Peace Prize winner. His credentials as both Soldier and statesman are sterling.

What was unique about his career path that prepared General Marshall for the extraordinary challenges of his generation? From the outset of his career he was consistently exposed to a level of leadership and training above the grade in which he was assigned. He was known for his organizational expertise, ability to identify and groom leaders, and forming and sustaining relationships with civilian leaders. Marshall was a product of a diverse series of assignments that included serving as an aide-de-camp and chiefs of staff at division and above and at various tactical and training commands.

The BCTP Assignment

Where do you find the opportunity in today’s high- tempo environment to build on existing education and develop an appreciation for the complexities of leadership at the next level of command and beyond? One assignment that stands out in its ability to afford an officer the opportunity to grow and develop is the Combined Arms Center’s Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). BCTP has the mission to develop current, relevant, campaign-quality, Joint, and expeditionary battle command instincts and skills in senior commanders. BCTP does this at all levels—Army service...
component command, corps, Joint task force, division, and brigade. An assignment to BCTP offers a unique, professionally broadening experience that encompasses three broad categories: professional study, exposure to multiple echelons of command at brigade and above, and mentoring by the Army’s senior leadership.

Having the time to conduct professional study and inquiry is essential to leader development. BCTP provides that in several ways. First, it is a place to become intimately acquainted with current Army doctrine. Second, it exposes officers to Army training methodology and exercise design. Third, it provides officers an opportunity to complete an advanced degree. And finally, it allows officers to remain engaged with units deploying to combat by conducting theater reconnaissance with deploying units and participating in battle command seminars linked to theater commanders. Let’s look at each of these developmental opportunities in turn.

**Doctrine**

Between World War I and World War II, General Marshall was instrumental in reviewing doctrine and capturing the lessons learned from directing the publication of *Infantry In Battle* in 1939, the main reference used to train Infantry Officers during World War II.2 An assignment in BCTP affords the opportunity to review existing doctrine and review and contribute to emerging doctrine and practices. Each operations group provides a robust certification program designed to produce an observer trainer who is grounded in current doctrine and able to lead discussions with our senior officers in brigade to Army service component command formations. Resident at Fort Leavenworth, the intellectual center of the Army, BCTP shares a close relationship with the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD). In every exercise, officers from CADD accompany an operations group to view and develop the latest doctrine from observations of current practices. BCTP officers routinely review draft doctrinal publications to add insights gained from the multiple exercise experiences. This immersion in doctrine is a key component in the development of a BCTP officer. However, it is not just Army doctrine that is studied. Officers in BCTP are continuously involved in professional forums through the Battle Command Knowledge Network and publication in professional journals.

**Training Exercises**

Developing mission rehearsal exercises or warfighter exercises is a time-consuming endeavor that requires continuous study of the operational environment, understanding of commander’s training objectives and end state, and an agile and creative thought process geared toward developing a training strategy that achieves the end state. The standard model for a mission rehearsal exercise entails a “5-2-5” structure: five days of exercise, a mid-exercise after-action review and two-day pause, and then five additional days of exercise. This sequence does not include planning and intelligence scripting conferences required to plan, prepare, and execute the exercise. These planning conferences are another opportunity for professional interaction. With the Unified Endeavor series of exercises, the Joint Warfighting Center out of Suffolk, Virginia, has planning and execution oversight. These conferences afford BCTP officers a unique experience in developing a working relationship with our sister services. This “Jointness” adds to the officer’s education and experience and builds a foundation for Joint tours in the future.

**Advanced Degrees**

In the process of designing exercises, BCTP officers are fully exposed to the concept of a “training strategy.” BCTP officers witness the evolution of the unit’s training objectives. Additionally, they help design the exercise that will assist the commander in achieving his objectives and end state. Participating in this process for multiple commands adds to the education of future battalion and brigade commanders in the art and science of training.

Throughout his career, General Marshall was able to take advantage of assignments that allowed him to advance his education. After serving in the Philippines and the United States, he attended and graduated with honors from the Infantry-Cavalry School in 1907 and the Army Staff College in 1908.3 Similarly, officers assigned to BCTP are afforded an opportunity to complete an advanced degree. A predictable training calendar—coupled with a plethora of on-line and resident graduate-level degree programs—provides officers an opportunity to take courses while performing their duties. Every spring and fall, numerous officers assigned to BCTP earn their advanced degrees.
Engaging With Units

Observing how units perform full spectrum operations offers another aspect of education and inquiry. Although almost every officer assigned to BCTP has been deployed in support of current operations, it is a rare experience to be able to observe a unit deployed or in the process of training to deploy. Our observer trainers routinely accompany deploying units on leader recons to ongoing conflicts. They have access to all warfighting functions and staff processes. A leader’s recon is one of the best methods to not only see how a unit operates but also to develop a situational understanding relevant to realistic training events for units participating in a mission rehearsal exercise. Within an operations group, the observer trainers break down by warfighting functions. Each warfighting function chief attends battle rhythm events with his or her counterpart on the division or corps staff on these leader’s recons. In many cases, they see how the officers interact with the division’s senior leaders. They witness, firsthand, battle command executed at a level where their peers have likely only read about.

As with General Marshall’s experiences, BCTP officers are similarly exposed to varied Army formations. During a single year in BCTP, an officer has the opportunity to participate in exercises at every level of command from brigade to Joint task force. A common pattern could include at least two division-level mission rehearsal exercises, a corps mission rehearsal exercise, a division warfighter exercise, an Army service component command exercise and a Joint task force exercise involving the divisional headquarters as the Joint headquarters. In every mission rehearsal exercise, there is at least one embedded multi-functional or sustainment brigade. In the last division warfighter exercise, BCTP also trained a combined aviation brigade, a fires brigade, and a sustainment brigade all in a multinational environment. The exposure to these levels of command in our Army cannot fail to register the complexities that come with all aspects of a senior level headquarters. At the division level and above, a headquarters is capable of planning along three horizons simultaneously. As doctrine provides a sound basis for operations, these higher-level command formations depart comfortably from prescribed doctrine to evolve into organizations that enable their battle commanders to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess.

There are few other assignments where an officer has the opportunity to experience this practice in multiple iterations, learning the nuances of personality and leadership. Where else in our Army do we provide an officer with an environment to learn about future assignments at the next level?

Mentoring

Potentially the greatest benefit of an assignment to BCTP is the opportunity for mentoring from senior Army leaders. Mentoring can come from several directions. An assignment to BCTP opens a window and exposes an officer to several new sources of mentoring. A large grouping of senior leaders is common to every exercise. Throughout the life cycle of an exercise, officers are continuously interacting and developing relationships with senior officers. BCTP is famous for the pool of senior mentors who have assisted in training division and corps commanders for the last two and a half decades. Each exercise will also have an exercise director, normally appointed by the U.S. Army Forces Command commander, as the senior two- to three-star level officer who helps guide the exercise design. He ensures that, as the mission rehearsal exercise unfolds, systems and organizations are built to support the training audience in achieving their training objectives. Interaction with the commanding general and his deputy commanders and the senior staff in the training unit also offer insights and opportunities. Finally, there is the often-overlooked experience of mentoring from peers that occurs on a daily basis.

The BCTP is supported by a group of senior mentors who team with the operations groups. The senior mentor is a key player in the evolution of a formation as it moves from notification for a deployment through their mission rehearsal exercise and beyond. The senior mentor, in coordination with the operations group commander and his team, works closely with the training audience headquarters in developing the plan, the “road to war.” The senior mentors, all retired senior generals, have commanded at every echelon in our force up through corps. During the conduct of an mission rehearsal exercise or warfighter exercise, the entire operations group meets daily with the senior mentor to discuss the challenges and successes of the training audience. The senior mentors, with their knowledge
base and experience, help frame observer trainer observations in the context of battle command. The senior mentors are also a tremendous resource for officer professional development. Usually one of the senior mentors will host a development event for the operations group at the conclusion of the exercise. These events are rare opportunities to gain insights from senior leaders with well over 30 years of experience.

No other assignment provides an officer the first-hand opportunity to observe and learn battle command at the highest echelons. Officers in BCTP observe the actions and leadership of senior officers, learning how they interact amongst themselves and their staffs. With the complexity of the current operating environments, unit staffs are being asked to expand their work in warfighter functions to include the myriad tasks associated with stability operations. Such complexity benefits from oversight by flag officer expertise. Observer trainers witness the “describe and direct” aspects of battle command at the highest echelons.

An operations group consists of officers who are experts in their particular warfighting function. Much like the environment in an intermediate-level education or a senior-service classroom, the peer-to-peer interaction across warfighter function experiences is a key component to building a professional officer. As officers in a particular warfighter function grow in their specific field—doctrinally and through studying tactics techniques and procedures—they find themselves routinely interacting with the other warfighter function members of the operations group. As they develop exercise design scenarios and track staff actions during the execution of the mission rehearsal exercise, such growth occurs. Cross-fertilization of the branches and warfighter function continues to build professional development at a higher level of understanding than most other assignments.

BCTP Benefits

The goal of a two- or three-year assignment at BCTP is a broadly educated officer who returns to warfighting formations well versed in the most current doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and with a better understanding and appreciation of how our Army trains and fights. The BCTP worldwide mission provides an officer the opportunity to experience various stateside and overseas locations as well. BCTP families enjoy the work predictability and have the time to enjoy participating in the varied activities the Army’s premier installations and communities offer. A BCTP assignment provides the Army with an officer possessing unique knowledge and experience for future growth. The professional development derived from being securely grounded in doctrine, yet able to work easily in a Joint, multinational, and interagency environment is exactly what our senior leaders are asking for in our current capstone manuals. Commanders recommend a BCTP assignment to those officers who possess the potential for service at the highest echelons, similar to how General Marshall identified and groomed the leaders that led the nation through World War II. The mentoring available to an officer in BCTP is nearly limitless. An officer assigned to BCTP has access and constant interaction with operations group commanders up to our Army’s most senior recently retired officers.

At the turn of 20th century, then Lieutenant Marshall was commanding an outpost on an isolated Philippine Island. He was not aware of the challenges he would encounter and the impacts his career would have on our nation and the free world. His career was unique in the sense that he was exposed to senior officers and a constant forum for professional development during the early stages of his career. The opportunities for development in BCTP are not exactly those that General Marshall experienced, but they provide a Marshall-like experience that cannot fail to develop our leaders for the future.

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To regard thinking as a skill rather than a gift is the first step towards doing something to improve that skill.

—Edward de Bono, Practical Thinking

Nearly every contemporary article on operational “design” addresses the question, “Why design?” This article discusses “how to design” instead and addresses the concepts of design needed for that enterprise. We base this discussion on the educational experiences gleaned from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and observations during involvement in the Army’s Unified Quest 2009 exercise. Our ideas are underpinned by a broad theoretical, philosophical, historical, and doctrinal education at SAMS and by discussions with staff officers from Army component commands.

Central to the debate over design is the integration of its philosophy and capability into military command and control practices and Army culture. Design aids in understanding, visualizing, and describing complex situations and has tremendous potential to help the Army contend with the challenges of the 21st century in a more comprehensive way. Applying the tenets listed in field manual (FM) 6-0, Mission Command, this article aims to move forward by answering the questions “How does one incorporate design into a unit?” (command) and “How does one lead design?” (control).

Moving from Theory to Practice

Design is a part of Army doctrine now and will to expand in the future. There are references to campaign design as far back as the 1980s in FM 100-5, Operations. Recently, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) codified design, including sections in FM 3-0, Operations; FM 3-07, Stability Operations; FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency; and TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design. Several military officers and theorists have written on design, and this discourse has further developed involved concepts. Such articles have contributed to an evolutionary process resulting in the drafting of Field Manual Interim (FMI) 5-2, Design. While still under refinement, design has gained traction. SAMS, Army Central Command, and Special Operations Command are among the organizations currently using design to manage and solve complex operational problems.
**Command and culture.** The first conception of design is that it is a nuanced cognitive approach and adaptive leadership model that helps to define, frame, and manage complex problems. Successful employment of design will require a shift from the current power leadership model and culture in the U.S. Army, which is optimized to address technical problem solving. Design requires a more open and collaborative command culture, one that is adaptive and more capable of contending with the complex challenges that we are encountering in the contemporary operating environment.\(^1\) The Army defines design as “an approach to critical and creative thinking that enables a commander to create understanding about a unique situation and to visualize and describe how to generate change.”\(^2\)

The commander is central to the design approach and must create the right unit culture to allow a free and open exchange of ideas without fear of reprisal. Military commanders expecting to employ design methods should create a framework for iterative learning within the unit and lead the learning. Leading the learning is the essence of orchestrating adaptive work in complex problem management. Application of design theory to the art of command is difficult, as both design philosophy and the art of command are nuanced intangibles. Incorporating design leads to harvesting the corporate intellect of an organization because it involves sharing understanding. A culture of critical and creative thinking is necessary.

**Design team to harvest corporate intellect.** The challenges in contemporary conflicts are complex and eclipse the intellectual capability and development of any one commander. Therefore, commanders today must understand how to lead organizational learning in combat. FM 6-0 recognizes that “mission command can only work in an environment of trust and mutual understanding.”\(^3\)

By position, commanders possess the authority to make decisions, and their leadership determines how effectively subordinates execute those decisions.

Because of the commander’s authority and experience, he naturally possesses a broader understanding than the individual staff officer. The commander sees and understands the battlefield better, and he must share information and actively contribute to creating solutions.\(^4\) Design processes help harness the creative energy and intellect of the entire organization to help identify and set problems. Commanders do this instinctively when they hold huddles with subordinate commanders or key staff, and design seeks to codify and increase the number of such adaptive unit learning opportunities. Commanding in complex environments requires intellectually agile leadership competent enough to guide adaptive work over time. Design is a tool that can help to enhance adaptive leadership and decision making. FM 3-0 states, “Understanding is the basis of the commander’s visualization.”\(^5\)

However, the only method for gaining understanding in FM 3-0 is battlefield circulation and reliance on the commander’s education, intellect, experience, and perception. Design offers further methods to gain understanding.\(^6\)

The U.S. Army is among the most commander-centric armies in the world, and it expects competent leadership from commanders.\(^7\) However, changes in the complexity of mission expectations suggest the commander must create new mechanisms for learning. Design’s cultural shift toward broad creativity reduces the emphasis on individual achievement and power leadership to an approach that gives the adaptive work back to the stakeholders (unit members) for problem identification, management, and solving.

**Practicing Design as the Commander**

The designing commander’s responsibility is to manage the learning of the organization. Commanders should encourage officers to continue their education and challenge themselves and their assumptions critically and continuously. Commanders should challenge junior officers intellectually and encourage them to be self-educating, critical thinkers. Given the right command climate and education, junior officers can offer fresh perspectives, and they should learn to think critically through the study of history, geography, culture, social sci-
ence, philosophy, and engineering. Such education facilitates organizational, iterative learning.

A design strategy is similar to a planner’s “plan to plan.” However, an important component of design philosophy encourages staff officers to question their understanding of the commander’s guidance and clarify limits of tolerance. This is a cultural reverse for the Army’s power culture, and continuing to challenge descriptive guidance will be difficult for any design team. The time compression and “rush to decision” of normal Army staff work in traditional command climates is rooted in the “power leadership model.” That model is counterproductive because it actually reduces understanding in complex environments. It reflexively eliminates the number of options ultimately available to the command.

**Control.** A major element of design is control. Successful design work requires broad freedom of action and a flexible task organization. Subordinate stakeholders must be given the space to explore and discover problems on their own terms. This requires great freedom of action and is analogous to mission command’s concept of control. The Army defines control as—

“The regulation of forces and battlefield operating systems to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. It includes collecting, processing, displaying, storing, and disseminating relevant information for creating the common operational picture, and using information, primarily by the staff, during the operations process.”

In this context, the discussion of controlling design must account for the structure, the methodology employed, and the methods available for use within that methodology. All these elements comprise the “how” of design as an act.

**Design structure and methodology.** Structure in mission command “determines interactions among the elements of the organization, whether units or individuals.” Structure in design involves determining a methodology that gives an operable framework and enables group contribution, which is required for developing corporate, shared understanding. Understanding the methodology allows for design team flexibility in the form of a strategy to manage the work as well as the sizing of the design team as learning occurs and the situation evolves.

Because design must produce something other than a new frame of mind, methodologies are important. Many design theorists have debated over the appropriateness of a design process. Understanding the methodology of design is commonly a matter of scale. At some level, there is a logical progression of things that must occur during design and a commonality of action and cognition. Many who embrace design resist the acceptance of an overarching methodology, which is related to the fear that design will become a process instead of an approach. Education in design theory and history reveals that there are dozens of operable methodologies in design, which address everything from fashion design to engineering design. A common understanding and language to adopt a design methodology is important. To that end, the Army published a broad, but useful and operable, methodology in the “Issue Paper on Design.” This methodology is broad enough to allow for a variety of design strategies and the application of different methods, a cognitive framework that enables common language.

**Divergence, transformation, and convergence.** The design team leaders must transition design teams among three cognitive stances to create a design. SAMS proposes a three-part methodology. It proceeds from an understanding of the environment to framing the problem inherent in that environment, and it then communicates that understanding through a design concept. These three phases (divergent, transformative, and convergent) follow design theory articulated by the Design Research Society in London.

Divergence occurs when a team receives guidance and begins by tearing apart a problem or situation to develop a more complete understanding. Divergence includes asking questions and creating an understanding of the operational environment by looking at known facts and assumptions with skepticism. In this divergent phase, it is important not to limit the expertise to the field that seems most applicable. Divergence seeks transformation. Transformation is the spark of insight, which illuminates the way forward for the designing organization. It is common for teams to become stuck in the divergent phase because they lack or have not developed the creative spark that will form the solution.
The transformative phase starts with a mass of divergent information and contrasts it with the current problem understanding to determine possible outcomes. The design team is ready to move forward from the transformative phase to the convergent phase in the form of a “design concept” once a series of unifying ideas and concepts have been developed and agreed upon.

The convergent phase is the one most familiar to the Army culture. In convergence, the design team must be intentionally reductionist and cast aside much of the information and products created during design creation to converge on a product and a singular understanding of a situation. Lacking any one of these cognitive phases, a design will not be complete. As Brigadier General (Retired) Wass de Czege states, “All people individually reason informally in similar fashion, consciously or not.” He began to explicate the Army’s current methodology in his discussion of meta-questioning, creation of strategic logic, and then concept narrowing.

The ability to lead a design team through the cognitive stances of design is central to the concept of design control. Applying a loose structure or methodology to the design will aid in that difficult endeavor.

**Design methods.** In his book *How Designers Think*, Bryan Lawson calls design methods the “tactics of design.” The details of these methods are beyond the scope of this article. SAMS currently educates students on the theory and application of these creativity techniques as part of its design education. Field grade officers conducting design should study a few of these methods to enhance their creative ability. Two of the most commonly used design methods in the Army are “the narrative” and the use of “framing and reframing.”

**Team composition.** Many officers, when exposed to design, ask “At what level can this be accomplished?” and “How many people?” If design is considered a cognitive endeavor, it can be done at any level. However, for controlling design as an applied methodology, we can start to consider the proper composition of a design team. In fact there is no set size for a design team. Many design methods require a small group of four to six to understand a complex situation. On the other end of the spectrum, several authors believe that more is better. According to the social psychologist A. Paul Hare, writing about small groups in 1962, the design team leader must manage the five characteristics of a design team: group interaction, group goals, group norms, group direction, and the limits of group activities. The leader’s ability to manage these characteristics and still generate creative designs will determine the design team’s size.

The key to understanding design team size is an awareness of the different types of designers. There are three classes: core designers, proximate designers, and nondesigners. The core designers are permanently working on the design. Proximate designers are introduced, especially during divergence, to add to the multi-disciplinary view and assist with creativity. Patrick Feng identifies the third category, which are non-designers (clients, stakeholders, and other socially relevant groups and subject matter experts).

Organizing the team is highly context-dependent and optimal organization may frequently change, based on which parties are present and the methods employed. Most traditional design authors recommend a core team of four to six designers; however, the leader must account for which design methods the team will apply. For example, brainstorming theory recommends 5 to 15 people. The key point is that understanding the different types of designers, the amount of mental agility required, and the context will allow the core designers to determine how much help from proximate or non-designers they can manage.

**Use of the narrative.** As the design team synthesizes information, knowledge, and understanding, there will commonly be a loss of knowledge. Dedication of a staff officer to create a written narrative and graphic representation of the environment during discussion creates a point of unification. The written narrative and graphic products produced in a design effort will evolve and should address the environmental frame, the problem frame, and the design concept. These representations change form as the design transitions from understanding the environment and
problem to solution development. The narrative becomes an essay, logically linking the guidance, the environment, the problem, and the areas for intervention in the form of a design concept. The narrative should capture deductions. For example, opportunities for intervention, dilemmas, tensions, and theories should all be captured in a narrative. This forces logic and sequence into the deductions of the design team. The narrative captures knowledge, serves as a tool to achieve shared understanding, and provides an anchor for further exploration and future exploitation. It may also either demonstrate the completeness of logic or reveal inconsistencies within the design writ large.

Framing and reframing. According to Martin Rein and Donald Schön, a frame is “a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon.” Framing a problem creates boundaries that control the information and can spark creativity. A “cognitive frame” is a theory that necessarily scopes the portion of the environment under consideration and defines the problem. As one author notes, “The choice of a conceptual frame will bring certain issues into focus while deliberately blurring distracting peripheral issues, and leaving most issues out of the frame entirely.” Framing a complex problem is both natural and necessary before a design team can begin to develop a design concept to mitigate a situation.

A “reframe” is “restarting the design after discarding the hypotheses or theories that defined either or both the environmental frame or the problem frame.” A “refinement” of the design concept that does not require a complete reexamination of the underlying theory is not a reframing. The decision to reframe or refine may come from the commander or from the design team when they reveal that one of the reframing criteria demands a fundamental change in approach or when they simply want to explore the problem from a different perspective. Once the designing leader determines his operational approach, he should monitor the situation and make refinements to the approach if required during the campaign. If the situation eclipses the commander’s limits of tolerance or refinements can no longer correct the discrepancy, or refinements are required repeatedly, a reframe is in order.

One component of knowledge management is the development and tracking of reframing criteria. Reframing criteria can alert the commander that the understanding that defined the environmental frame or the problem frame itself has changed and is now incorrect. When designing, the design team should track theories of understanding and action in their narrative. Additionally, they should explicitly define what changes in the situation will require reframing. Things that would prove a theory of understanding false, which are predictable, are reframing criteria. The definitions of “reframing” and “refinement” are critical to managing information during design. Organizing a segment of the staff for tracking and displaying reframing criteria may reduce inappropriate assumptions and theories. The officer who undertakes design should incorporate organizational learning and reframing criteria into design strategy.

Communications. Currently, the Army is carefully considering how to codify the outputs of design. Obtaining shared understanding from any product, graphic, or narrative presents significant communications challenges. Therefore, the interface between designers and planners should be a continuous process, not merely a product exchange. Accurately sharing information requires adjustment
of our existing communications channels and feedback mechanisms already in mission command. This process should include multiple interfaces during the different phases of the design (exploration of the environmental space, problem space, and creation of the design concept). The medium for these interfaces should be discourse, graphical representations, and narratives presented during design formulation.27

Achieving understanding among multiple actors requires a shift in how we communicate in the Army. This shift requires an increase in the communications channels and feedback mechanisms addressed in FM 6-0. PowerPoint briefings, written narratives, and even the design concept will not adequately share understanding. The commander must take responsibility for his own understanding and for developing the understanding of the design team and his unit. Therefore, the communication between the design team and the commander should be an evolving and continuous process tailored to the context, not a single product such as a briefing, narrative, or campaign directive. This requires the commander to consider blending the command and staff communications channels as FM 6-0 implies.28 Transmission of the understanding from the design team to the commander, and vice versa, requires the Army to creatively engage multiple forms of communications beyond briefings and orders to increase understanding and harness organizational intellect.

Design-plan interface. Understanding the design-plan interface as a continuous process, instead of a product, also requires an increase in feedback mechanisms. FM 6-0 calls for multidirectional information exchange, while design calls for multidirectional exchange of understanding, which represents an increased challenge.29 The Army’s transition from planning to execution occurs during troop leading procedures. As plans are passed on to subordinate units, a variety of means, from warning orders to parallel planning, allow the planners to inform the executors. Similarly, the interface between the design team, planners, and commander should be a series of fluid interactions tailored to the situation. While this will be less process-intensive than troop leading procedures, it should be just as rigorous in application and must be scheduled in unit battle rhythms.

Industry describes these engagements as the “design charrette.” The “charrette” (an architectural) is a meeting of core designers (the core design team of four to six skilled designers), proximate designers (members of the staff included in the design or others involved in the design), and nondesigners (individuals who provide input to the design, such as subordinate units, other stakeholders, or subject matter experts). The charrette participants create a shared understanding of a situation at one moment in time and record that understanding in both graphic and narrative format. Multiple charrettes over time enable the commander and staff to move toward a more enduring shared understanding recorded in an environmental frame, problem frame, and in the design concept.

**The design concept.** The design concept should include the concept of the environment, the problem, the logic of moving toward a desired end state, the operational approach, and implications for further planning and actions.30 It should also include reframing and validation criteria for the theories and assumptions inherent in the current understanding. Finally, as the Army issue paper on design states, “Along with these deliverables, the commander provides his or her initial planning guidance given the implications of the design for employing the force.”31 Acceptance of a format provides a concrete point of interface between the designers and the planners. However, the design concept should not stand alone, and iterative charrettes will communicate that understanding.

**Recommendations**

Examining design theory and methodology through the lens of FM 6-0, *Mission Command*, reveals several areas where the U.S. Army can improve its ability to discover, understand, and manage complex problems. While the commander remains central to design, planning, and action, he and the staff have to attain the same level of deep understanding of ideas to achieve the best outcomes.

The debate of “whether we will design” is no longer central. Intuitively, we will design, regardless, but the formal management framework inherent in designing...
Intuitively, we will design, regardless, but the formal management framework inherent in designing approaches for complex situations will help achieve the best outcomes...

The Army will continue addressing the world’s complex problems. Design as a methodology is in U.S. Army doctrine, along with other decision processes. As military professionals and stakeholders, we have a duty to hone the design skills as we fight and win the nation’s wars. **MR**

**NOTES**

4. The need to reflect on events as they occur is as important in the military as in any profession. People tend to get caught in the action, and leaders must get above the fog of war to be able to see and address the entire problem. Ronald A. Heifetz and Martin Linsky, Leadership on the Line (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 51.
5. FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, February 2008), para. 5-16 and 5-17.
6. Ibid. para. 5-11.
8. FM 6-0, 3-1.
9. Ibid.
10. Page developed a seven-step process which focused initially on analysis and then moved through a rigid process of evaluating different options with established criteria to minimize trial and error learning. Christopher Jones, Design Methods (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1992), 149-55.
12. In fact, the inclusion of multiple disciplines and organizations will often aid the divergent phase of design. Lawson notes, “It is interesting that some of the most famous inventions of modern times were made by people who had not been specifically trained to work in the field in which they made their contribution.” Bryan Lawson, How Designers Think (New York: Architectural Press, 1998), 10.
15. Too many sources to list can be found in Opron Jones (1976), A. Paul Hare (1962) is probably the earliest work. Recent work would be in Stumpf and McDonnell (2002).
16. Lawson, several places, but note his design model on page 106.
19. As developed by Alex Osborn in 1941.
20. Narrative and discourse are well defined in Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 17.
25. Ibid.
27. Charrette is a phrase common in design theory, and is a meeting of key stakeholders to share understanding and advance a design.
28. FM 6-0 indicates that of the command communications channel: “Commanders and authorized staff officers use them for command related activities.” FM 6-0, 3-18.
29. Ibid.
31. Ibid.

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OF LATE, there has been a good deal of speculation that in coping with Afghanistan, there are lessons to learn from our Vietnam experience. An interesting example of this evincing considerable research is the article, “Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template” in the 2009 November/December Military Review, by two scholars, Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason. The authors seem to have derived their views on Vietnam largely from reading material published long after the war. My views are somewhat in variance with theirs and are based on my having been directly involved in the Vietnam War and its aftermath continuously from late 1965 to early 1976, from the rice paddies to the White House, including 20 months “in-country.” (Later, while on the faculty of Georgetown University, I also did considerable research on Vietnam.)

Popular Misconceptions about Vietnam

As do most commenting on the Vietnam War, the authors of “Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template” suggest that the war, as we and the South Vietnamese fought it, was, a priori, unwinnable and that numerous parallels exist between it and the current war in Afghanistan. However, Johnson and Mason do note important structural differences. Where I think they soon go astray is in their assessment of the enemy in Vietnam. For example, they describe the Viet Cong as “poorly equipped guerrillas,” but this was true only in their early operations. Before long, the Viet Cong were in some ways much better equipped than the South Vietnamese they were fighting. For example, for far too long, slightly built South Vietnamese troops had to carry heavy U.S. semi-automatic M-1 Garand rifles left over from World War II and Korea while Viet Cong forces soon armed themselves with reliable, highly effective, fully automatic Soviet AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifles. In this regard, the Viet Cong were even better armed for a while than U.S. troops were.

More dubious is the authors’ assertion that “the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC) were not fighting for communism. They were fighting for Vietnam,” a sense we simply did not get at the time. This assertion is no doubt related to the widespread and persistent myth that...
Ho Chi Minh was really more of a “nationalist” than a Communist. In 1930, the Soviet-controlled Communist International (Comintern) sent trusted agent Ho Chi Minh to Hong Kong to found the Vietnamese Communist Party. In mid-1946, Ho’s Communist forces joined the French in crushing genuine nationalist groups that were both anti-French and anti-Communist; hundreds of their leaders were executed at Ho’s behest. Ho abhorred nationalism and always considered himself an internationalist Communist. In 1951, Ho declared in *Selected Works* that “Genuine patriotism is . . . part and parcel of internationalism.” Through large-scale executions, proscriptions, and brutal control, Ho established in North Vietnam a tightly controlled Communist entity devoted to extending Communism throughout Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. As did the Viet Cong, all units of Ho’s “Vietnamese People’s Army” had political officers to ensure the ideological purity of troops already indoctrinated in Communism throughout their school years. You may be sure that the soldiers in this North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong were well aware that they were fighting to extend Communism to South Vietnam. Of course this was also coupled with the patriotic appeal to unify all Vietnam. But as North Vietnam leader Pham Van Dong declared in 1960, “The Communist is the most genuine patriot.” We were absolutely justified in regarding the war as one against Communism. This was most certainly proven when Hanoi’s victory in 1975 resulted in the imposition of Communism on what had been a remarkably free South Vietnam.

This *Military Review* article is also off the mark in comparing external assistance to our foes in Vietnam and Afghanistan. There is a vast difference between the very limited (if any) support the Taliban allegedly has been receiving from Pakistan and from “wealthy Saudis” and the massive amount of military supplies North Vietnam received from the Soviet Union and China, including, tanks, long-range artillery, rockets, and sophisticated surface-to-air missiles.

The authors of “Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template” make much of the role corruption played in thwarting our objectives in Vietnam by contributing to the South Vietnam government’s lack of legitimacy. It so happens that corruption was (and is) endemic throughout the developing world and even, at times, in much of the developed world. To have expected South Vietnam to be an exception was unrealistic. In fact, corruption was considerably more widespread in North Vietnam than in the South, giving lie to a common assumption that there was something morally pristine about the highly disciplined North. In fact, the problem of corruption had become so acute in the North that, in 1967, Ho Chi Minh himself felt compelled to go on the radio and inveigh against this troublesome plague.

I alluded to the high desertion rate of South Vietnamese (ARVN) troops. This was indeed a serious problem. However, most of those who deserted did so out of homesickness or because of low morale due to poor leadership. It is noteworthy that territorial forces, the “Ruff-Puff” Regional Forces and Popular Forces, which did as much fighting and dying as the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) did, had a relatively low desertion rate because these troops were defending their homes, their villages, and their hamlets. In any case very few ARVN deserters ever went over to the enemy side. However, by 1967, some 75,000 NVA and VC troops had defected to our side. Our military put some of these to good use, especially by the Marines, whose Kit Carson Scouts performed extremely well and proved to be exceptionally loyal. I have long felt that we made a fundamental mistake by not forming small units of enemy defectors with sapper and guerrilla experience and inserting them into enemy territory to attack enemy bases and lines of communications that, alas, remained largely neglected by our forces.

I got this idea from a senior VC defector who had been a regimental commander and was bitter because he was passed over for promotion because he got a local girl pregnant. He said that everyone he knew on his side wondered why we never staged ambushes along their LOCs or attacked their bases...
with ground troops. In other words, we were giving them a free ride in much of the country. Unfortunately, I could never sell my idea to either U.S. or Vietnamese generals. I still believe that this program could have, early on, changed the course of the war by tying down large numbers of enemy troops in defensive roles and at very low cost. At this time, we were spending $1 billion a month (in 1966 dollars) on the war. I have heard it said that when one has too many resources, one is less resourceful, and that was certainly the case in Vietnam.

**Important Lessons of Our Vietnam Experience**

I can best illustrate my views of the lessons to learn from Vietnam by providing a broad review of the war. Our most fundamental mistake of the war was encouraging the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Diem had done a masterful job of neutralizing or destroying the various political factions that were dividing and debilitating South Vietnam. I once read a captured 1959 report from the leading Communist cadre in the South, which described a badly decimated Communist organization struggling to exist as the result of depredations imposed by Diem. The Party was determined to reverse this situation by going on the offensive. This manifested itself in intensified terrorist attacks in the South in early 1960 followed by the infiltration of several hundred NVA troops each month into South Vietnam. Then there was formation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) in late 1960, which was in line with the practice of forming Communist-dominated fronts in accordance with a 1935 Comintern decision to form popular fronts as innocuous disguises of Communist control. The Viet Minh and later the Lien Viet front were North Vietnamese examples of this.

The NLF was touted by Radio Hanoi on 3 February 1961 as a grouping of “various political parties, peoples groups and religious and patriotic personalities.” Hanoi steadfastly denied having any ties to the NLF or that it was in any way Communist controlled. This ruse deceived many in the West, but fewer in Vietnam. I even had Embassy colleagues who believed that the NLF actually existed as an independent force and could be enticed to split from Hanoi. We captured millions of pages of documents from the enemy side and those relating to the NLF were all purely propaganda recommendations and never indicated that the NLF had any real authority or operational responsibilities. Simply a facade, for all practical purposes, the NLF really did not exist, although it continued to be the label most in the West applied to the enemy in the South. With Hanoi’s victory in 1975, the NLF pretense was dropped and it disappeared. (Also Hanoi’s Vietnam Workers Party reverted to Vietnam Communist Party.)

**Diem’s downfall.** Diem’s strategic hamlet program brought “good control in the countryside” according to Ambassador James. D. Rosenthal, a very observant junior Foreign Service officer stationed in the most exposed Northern provinces of South Vietnam in 1962 and 1963. The strategic hamlet program had critics, however, and Diem himself was not very popular. American officials described him as an autocratic “mandarin,” aloof and difficult to deal with. His final undoing was his somewhat inept handling of Buddhist demonstrations in May 1963. The demonstrations were
politically, not religiously, motivated. Although he was resented by many of the Buddhist majority for being Catholic, Diem by no means oppressed or persecuted Buddhists. Indeed, he had had a number of Buddhist pagodas erected. His suppression of these essentially political demonstrations led to the widely publicized self-immolations of Buddhist monks that shocked Western public opinion. Here, the U.S. media succeeded in putting Diem in the worst possible light. This was the beginning of the great and baleful influence our media was to have on U.S. political and public opinion toward Vietnam for the next 12 years and which, as we shall see, contributed mightily to the ultimate Communist victory in 1975.

This influence led to the ill-fated U.S. support of Diem’s overthrow on 1 November 1963, which resulted in the murder of both Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. The murders totally surprised and shocked those Americans who had been supporting the coup plotters. Diem’s overthrow led to prolonged political instability in Saigon and elsewhere and resulted in the disintegration of his pacification programs in the countryside. In 1964, seven succeeding governments rose and fell in Saigon, all of which were far worse and less capable than Diem’s government and generally unpopular. All this greatly encouraged the Communist side who soon took advantage of the chaotic situation.

Because we openly encouraged Diem’s ouster, Vietnam now became our responsibility. We had essentially “bought the war.” This is why we old Vietnam hands always become alarmed at suggestions we oust or neutralize Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai. The disastrous overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem is certainly one salient lesson we should have learned from our Vietnam experience.

Encouraged by the instability Diem’s ouster created, the Communist side went on the offensive, and in 1964, it began a serious infiltration of NVA troops. The military situation deteriorated, and U.S. installations were attacked. This led to retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam, and in March 1965 the introduction of the first U.S. combat units: Marine battalions. When I arrived in Saigon in late 1965, the city was in a virtual stage of siege. One couldn’t go one click (1 km) outside of the city limits without risking being shot at. The city itself seemed awash with VC terrorists. In the some twenty months I was quartered in a residential part of the city, about three dozen civilians were killed within three blocks of where I lived, many as the result of rocket attacks. Nevertheless, I was struck by the degree of freedom everyone seemed to enjoy when it seemed to me that the constant threat of Communist attack warranted the establishment of martial law. Also, I was impressed that VC terrorist suspects enjoyed reasonably fair trials and some were even acquitted for lack of evidence. Successive governments left much to be desired and too readily turned a blind eye to corruption and incompetence, but they were not in the least oppressive.

On the other hand, the VC clearly relied on terror to gain popular allegiance. This was graphically brought home to me shortly after I arrived when we got word that VC cadres in a hamlet close to Saigon had just assassinated two young women, one a nurse and the other a teacher, simply because they represented a government presence. From 1964 to 1967, over 6,000 hamlet chiefs, schoolteachers, nurses, and social workers were assassinated for the same reason—to coerce villagers into allegiance to the VC. While it may not always have had “legitimacy” by American standards, the government of South Vietnam managed to function somehow and at least the populace never feared it. It seemed significant to me that whenever people fled from the countryside to escape a natural disaster or war, they always fled to areas controlled by the government of South Vietnam, never to VC-controlled ones.

The Tet offensive. By the time I left Vietnam in late August 1967, things had considerably improved, despite all the mistakes and shortcomings which plagued our war effort and that of the South Vietnamese. Indeed, our side was finally beginning to win the war. This fact was reflected in statements by President Johnson and our top officials in Vietnam indicating that there was “light at the end of the tunnel.” This is why the notorious
“Tet Offensive” had such a shattering and lasting impact on the American public and its leaders and ultimately helped ensure a Communist victory.

For Vietnamese, Tet, or the Chinese New Year as some termed it, was Christmas, New Year’s Eve, and a birthday celebration rolled into one event. People bought new clothes, exchanged gifts and prepared choice dishes to celebrate this very special occasion. There was usually a truce in the fighting on this day, and troops were on leave. When the Communist side, mostly VC troops and cadre, launched a surprise massive attack on the night of 30-31 January 1968, it came as a major shock to all. Most shocking was the ability of Communist forces to attack 34 provincial towns, 64 district towns, and all autonomous cities, including Saigon, where they actually entered the grounds of our embassy, an especially shocking event. (U.S. media wrongly reported that VC had actually entered the embassy.) U.S. media, especially TV, graphically brought scenes of destruction and disaster home to Americans, and they made a lasting impression. This was a shattering antithesis of “light at the end of the tunnel.”

The avowed purpose of this concerted attack was to foment and support a general popular uprising. This planned “Great Uprising” never got off the ground. Instead, the vast majority of the South Vietnamese people staunchly supported the South Vietnamese government; people and their armed forces at all levels resisted and fought back with courage and determination, often at risk to their lives. This was certainly a dramatic recognition of the South Vietnamese government’s legitimacy, if ever there was one, and negates one of two reasons Johnson and Mason say Vietnam was lost: “The inability to establish legitimacy of governance which the rural population would prefer to an alternative to the National Liberation Front (NLF) enough to risk their lives for.” This massive offensive was thoroughly crushed countrywide, and the VC suffered a catastrophic defeat from which it never fully recovered.

**Media bias.** However, the media scarcely reported this critically important fact. The media remained wedded to the proposition that the Tet Offensive was an unmitigated disaster that proved the war could not be won. Walter Cronkite, who made a quick trip to Vietnam in late February 1968 after the Tet Offensive had been roundly defeated and VC all but neutralized, disregarded on-the-spot briefings he received to this effect. He returned to the United States, and in a 27 February broadcast, described the Tet offensive as an American defeat and recommended we negotiate our way out of the war. President Johnson, after viewing this broadcast reportedly declared, “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost middle America.” Thus, even though the enemy was thoroughly defeated in Vietnam, thanks to U.S. media, the enemy won the war where it most counted—in the United States.

This brings me to the critical role the media played in Vietnam. While I was “in-country” I generally found that what our correspondents were reporting back to the United States bore little resemblance to what I was actually experiencing on the ground. I have had several correspondents tell me that their editors wanted only negative reporting and when they tried to report any positive event or development their material inevitably landed in a waste paper basket or on the floor of a TV cutting room. So they gave up trying. The best description of the perverse role played by U.S. media can be found in what I consider to be the best of all books on the Vietnam War, *Vietnam at War, The History 1946–1975*, by Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, U.S. Army (Retired) (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1988) from which I will now freely quote (pages 487-489):

“One correspondent with several years experience in Vietnam, Robert Elegant [whom I personally knew and greatly respected], who scathingly reproached his colleagues not only for their misleading reports, not only on the Tet offensive, but on the entire war, wrote, ‘. . . never before Vietnam had the collective policy of the media—no less stringent term will serve—sought by graphic and unremitting distortion—the victory of the enemies of . . .”
One of most egregious examples of media delinquency in Vietnam reporting was blatantly ignoring the horrendous Hue Massacre...

the correspondents own side . . . ‘[T]here was the herd instinct. Most correspondents reported the war negatively because the other newsmen covered it that way ‘[W]hy was the press . . . so superficial and so biased?’ he writes, ‘Chief among many, I believe, the politicization of correspondents by the constantly intensifying clamor over Vietnam in Europe and America. The press was instinctively “against the government” – at least reflectively, for Saigon’s enemies.’ The television coverage of the Tet offensive revealed the awesome power of that medium to influence national events. On 18 July 1982 Tom Wicker, the columnist appeared on . . . [a] television program with . . . panelists [David] Brinkley, Sam Donaldson and George Will. This group, widely variant in ideological outlook, unanimously agreed that it has become impossible for a nation to fight a war if the blood and carnage of the battlefield appears nightly on the country’s television screens. George Will cited the Battle of Antietam in the American Civil War as an example, saying, ‘if the North could have seen that battle in living color, it would have elected McClellan president, and we would be two nations today.’"

The Hue Massacre and My Lai. One of most egregious examples of media delinquency in Vietnam reporting was blatantly ignoring the horrendous Hue Massacre carried out during the Tet Offensive. NVA and VC forces seized the old imperial capital Hue in northern South Vietnam on January 30, 1968, and held it for 26 days. In that time, cadres with clipboards of previously prepared lists of Hue’s “class enemies”—civil servants, community leaders, and policemen and their families—went about arresting those on the list, nearly 6,000 of whom simply disappeared and were no doubt executed. After Hue was liberated, a mass grave containing some 3,000 bodies, including two Catholic priests, was found. There is reason to believe that most were buried alive since there were no wounds on these bodies. The New York Times, which had the largest news bureau in Saigon, did not even cover this gruesome discovery but simply carried a wire service report. In all, this, at best, rated only one-day’s coverage. An acquaintance of mine told me of a visit to the mass grave. A TV crew was present, but it didn’t bother taking any footage because the correspondent in charge “didn’t want to produce any anti-Communist propaganda.” (I’m not making this up.) On 16 March 1968, a unit of the Americal Division sweeping through the hamlet of My Lai rounded up nearly 200 unarmed women, old
men, and children and shot them all in what the world came to know as the My Lai massacre. The division wrongly and stupidly covered this up for about a year. When the story of this atrocity finally leaked out, the media went into a prolonged feeding frenzy of accusations. Eventually the officer in charge of the offending unit, a First Lieutenant William Calley, was sentenced by a court martial to life imprisonment at hard labor, although he was paroled in 1974.

After I returned to the State Department, I frequently gave talks on Vietnam to a variety of groups, most of which were hostile to our presence there. On each occasion, I would ask the audience how many had heard of the Hue Massacre. Invariably, not a single hand would go up. When I asked how many had heard of the My Lai Massacre, all hands would go up. The former case represented Hanoi’s policy, which it publicly justified, carried out systematically under orders, and it symbolized what the war was all about. The latter case was a tragic aberration perpetrated in blatant defiance of our laws and military policy. This distinction mattered little when it came to media coverage of the two events. This is another Vietnam lesson to learn: our own media are capable of becoming a force multiplier for our enemies.

Pacification and legitimacy. With the effective elimination of the Viet Cong, pacification proceeded apace. By the end of 1968, 76 percent of villages in South Vietnam were declared “relatively secure,” which augured well for the success of pacification. In 1969, a bicycle race took place from the north end of the country clear down to the south end. This would have been unimaginable prior to Tet. By the end of 1969, thanks to active American and Vietnamese pacification programs, 92 percent of the population and 90 percent of the villages and hamlets were pronounced secure or relatively secure. President Thieu had, in April 1968, organized the Peoples Self-Defense Force ultimately joined by four million, equipped with some 600,000 weapons. This was clear proof of Thieu’s confidence in the loyalties of the people and clear evidence of the government’s legitimacy. The pacification program reached its culmination in one of the most successful land reforms in history, the “Land to the Tiller” program, which Thieu initiated in 1970 and resulted in nearly all who farmed owning their own land. (This very positive development was, of course, ignored by U.S. media.) Throughout the countryside, this substantially strengthened political allegiance to the government, further enhancing its legitimacy. Decisive attrition of VC strength resulting from South Vietnamese and U.S. military actions was the primary factor in protecting the people and isolating them from the VC, thus making pacification possible.

In retrospect, I believe that one of the major mistakes we made in Vietnam was our failure to capitalize on this pacification by beginning the Vietnamization process earlier. As soon as the situation had stabilized in 1966, we should have devoted considerable resources to training officers and noncoms and to upgrading the weapons and other equipment of South Vietnamese forces, both ARVN and the “Ruff-Puff.” At the time, the condescending attitude of most who served in Vietnam was “stand aside, you little guys, and let us experts do the job.” I must confess that I was among those who felt that way.

Of course, the Vietnamese who had already been fighting for some years were only too happy to comply. The short one-year tours of duty also militated against our devoting time to Vietnamization. There was too much else that had to be accomplished in that short time. It was not until 1968 that we began a serious effort to re-equip and improve the effectiveness of the ARVN and plan for Vietnamization. In 1969, President Nixon implemented the program and began withdrawing U.S. troops that summer. ARVN forces increased their combat operations significantly and were doing well.

This was exemplified by its performance in the April-May 1970 combined operations against Communist sanctuaries in previously off-limits Cambodia. However, a later ill-advised incursion into Laos without American support, Operation Lam Son 719, ended in a well-publicized disorderly withdrawal and inordinate casualties. Though the NVA suffered even more substantial losses, that was never reported.

By 1972, all U.S. ground forces, except for advisors, had been withdrawn from South Vietnam. In that year, U.S. forces suffered 200 killed in action as opposed to the previous annual average of 7,000. However, we still provided significant air, naval and
logistics support. With Viet Cong forces defeated, Hanoi decided, in 1972, to test Vietnamization by launching its largest conventional offensive of the war. This “Easter Offensive” employed the equivalent of 23 divisions equipped with hundreds of Soviet supplied tanks, long-range artillery and rockets, surface-to-air missiles, and other modern weapons. South Vietnamese ground forces—ARVN (Army) and Marines—with absolutely crucial U.S. air, naval and logistics support, stopped the offensive and launched counter offensives, inter alia, recapturing the enemy’s strongest position, Quang Tri, which was very near North Vietnam itself.

If they couldn’t hold Quang Tri, they probably couldn’t have held anything else. This offensive cost North Vietnam about 100,000 killed in action, twice the number of KIAs U.S. troops suffered in the entire war. It had to scrape the bottom of its manpower barrel to launch this offensive. After Hanoi’s 1975 victory, a former top commander in the South, General Tran Van Tra, revealed in the Party organ Nhan Dan that, in effect, his troops were on the ropes and close to defeat by 1972. As former CIA Director William Colby wrote in his 1983 book Lost Victory, “On the ground in South Vietnam the war had been won [by the fall of 1972].”

Unfortunately, we in the White House did not fully appreciate this fact. CIA analysts had, since the Tet Offensive, been convinced that the war was unwinnable, and that conviction no doubt accounted for their neither flagging nor appreciating this effective defeat of the enemy. After serving two years in the “intelligence community” in State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, I became thoroughly disillusioned by the politicization of intelligence analysis. In both CIA and State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, analysts had a distinct bias, which harmfully skewed their judgment. At this time, I was Henry Kissinger’s expert on the enemy, but I came to believe we were ill-served by the CIA. A true picture of what had actually happened did not exist.

My own judgment was impaired by having early on been caught directly in the path of the Easter Offensive on a fact-finding mission. Being continuously on the receiving end of heavy Soviet ordnance for days did not make me optimistic about the outcome. Also, the American advisors I initially talked to were, wrongly as it turned out, just as pessimistic.

Kissinger’s eagerness to end the war through negotiation resulted in our snatching defeat from the jaws of victory by prematurely concluding the Paris “Peace Accords,” which unfortunately left North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam and an ill-advised “ceasefire in place.” As North Vietnamese General Van Tien Dung cogently wrote in Nhan Dan in 1976, “The [Paris] agreement represented a big victory for our people and a big defeat for the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys.”

After this, Congress reduced U.S. military aid to South Vietnam by nearly 70 percent. On 4 June 1973, its Case-Church Amendment banned all U.S. military operations in Indochina. This decisively ensured South Vietnam’s defeat in 1975. As Van Tien Dung said, “The decrease in American aid made it impossible for Saigon troops to carry out their combat and force development plans.” As Dung put it in his book Great Spring Victory, (cited in Davidson’s book mentioned above) “Nguyen Van Thieu was forced to fight a poor man’s war. Enemy firepower had decreased by nearly 60 percent… its mobility was also reduced by half.” We had shamelessly betrayed our ally.

I conclude here with the primary lesson to be learned from Vietnam: public support for any military enterprise abroad is essential. Our government unfortunately did a very poor job of explaining the Vietnam War to its people and of countering negative media reporting about it. We are simply going to have to do better than this in defending our involvement in Afghanistan. MR

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Efficacy or Justice?
Overturning the Ban

Lieutenant Colonel Allen Bishop, U.S. Army, Retired

Justice is the great interest of man on earth. Wherever her temple stands, there is a foundation for social security, general happiness, and the improvement and progress of our race.

—Words inscribed on the Department of Justice building, Washington, D.C.

THAT A SERVING OFFICER can not only publish but also win an award for an article calling on the National Command Authority to end the 1993 ban against openly gay persons in the military is a substantial sign of change. Air Force Colonel Om Prakash’s essay “The Efficacy of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’” appeared in Joint Force Quarterly this last October. The essay had previously won the 2009 Secretary of Defense National Essay Competition. To many this seems like a significant move forward toward social justice. I join those who salute Prakash’s achievement. His article makes a welcome contribution to the public conversation on this important topic, but I don’t think the article puts the case in the best light. By framing the debate over gays in the military in terms of “efficacy,” Prakash adopts the general tone of the national conversation on Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in recent years. Nathaniel Frank’s 2004 op-ed in the New York Times was, perhaps, the first to cast the conversation in terms of lost money by noting the military was kicking out expensive and scarce Arabic linguists because they were gay. Many others took up this line of reasoning. And Prakash is right to remind us that some 12,500 persons have been discharged under the law and that this hemorrhage of talent constitutes a considerable expense in both “personnel and treasure,” which it does. However, the most compelling reason for overturning the ban is not efficacy, but justice.

Efficacy

Prakash quotes an unnamed general who says, “Experiments within the Army in the solution of social problems are fraught with danger to efficiency, discipline, and morale.” This statement rather neatly sums up objections to overturning the ban. Senior leaders have reflexively cried “Wolf” about gays in the military since the idea gained public attention, and it has seemed obvious to most of them that permitting openly gay citizens in the uniformed ranks would so undermine good order and discipline that the military’s ability to defend the Nation would be in doubt. Prakash tells us that the research shows this isn’t so, and he points out that many principal U.S. allies around the world—Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Israel and others—already
...the most compelling reason for overturning the ban is not efficacy, but justice.

permit gays to serve openly in the military, and this has caused scarcely a ripple in military society and military effectiveness. However, the reflexive resistance of American leaders has held sway. We have allowed the debate to be framed on military terms alone, and we have trusted unexamined judgments.

Observers often note that democracy is inefficient, so much so that one can sometimes wonder who government “of the people, for the people, and by the people” was a good idea in the first place. Then we compare democracy to other forms of government and see that it places great value on an individual citizen’s right to frame his own plan of life, to choose what seems best to him. And this ability to choose, to live in liberty, emerges as the great trumping ideal, and we decide, after all, that democracy is effective. It follows, then, that a military serving a democracy will recognize that efficiency cannot be its ultimate ideal.

The argument that focuses on the efficiency of gays in the military is wrong on two counts. First, as Colonel Prakash notes, the research shows that it is false to claim that gays in the ranks undermine “good order and discipline” and, second, even if that were true, we would lose much liberty in order to save some military effectiveness, a poor trade involving the disenfranchisement of some citizens.

Many have rightly taken offense when seeing what ought to be a discussion about “liberty for all” turned into one about “efficacy.” Prakash does us a great service in pointing out that the arguments against efficacy are themselves flawed. Read his piece; it is worth the time.

Why has the effectiveness argument been foremost in the public discourse? Why did advocates decide not to take on the prejudice beneath the cry of wolf? I suspect it is because this line of reasoning gains traction against prejudice by putting the debate in the less emotional terms of lost money and personnel. However, if we win the argument on this ground, we do so at liberty’s peril, and the victory will be a hollow one.

Liberty

In 1859, John Stuart Mill published a slim volume entitled On Liberty. In the introduction, he tells us that the question of “where to place the limit . . . between individual independence and social control” is “the principal question in human affairs.” Mill adds, “The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection.” Mill placed particular respect on individual human beings. An early social reformer, he was one of the first prominent men in English society to advocate for women’s rights. Women, he saw, were human beings, and that was argument enough in his view for fair and equal treatment in courtrooms, parlors, and bedrooms. In seeing that meaningful reform depended on the force of law, he introduced a principle declaring, “The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”

Mill’s principle should be clear, but some fears are so overwhelming as to be beyond reason’s reach. Americans are used to disapproval of many of their private choices. For instance, we might think
that our next door neighbors’ choice to “max out” multiple credit cards is imprudent or even immoral. Similarly, we may think that our neighbors across the street are too liberal with their teenage children, that they drink more than they should, that our co-workers are too pushy with their evangelism in the workplace, and so on. However, we usually recognize that their private lives are their private business, and that we are better off tending our own affairs while others do the same. Homosexuals, whoever else they may be, are human beings. They are citizens, and what they do in privacy is no concern of ours so long as it does not cause us harm. What they do is not so alien as to be outside the range of normal experience. Why, then, all the Sturm und Drang, all the storm and stress? We permit and pass over with hardly any comment many controversial habits in diet, religious practice, drug use, games of chance, various forms of aesthetic expression, and sexual congress between men and women. What is it about homosexuality that is so out of bounds for so many high-functioning, educated, and otherwise fair-minded people?

The great irony involved with the military’s rejection of gay and lesbian persons is that it is the special duty of the military to protect liberty. By what logic can an institution expressly dedicated to the protection of liberty carry out wholesale attack on that same liberty as a matter of law? We all recognize the sacrifices that military personnel make, and because they do sacrifice, we rightly afford them honor and privilege in public life. No one should argue that these privileges come with certain conditions, especially the requirement to accept tacit condemnation.

Some people do not like homosexuality, and that is fair enough. One need not alter his aesthetic and social choices in life to recognize the essential humanity of others. Americans have prided themselves on recognizing the universal right to private liberty, and they have been compassionate toward those they cannot abide socially. If one wishes to deny others their basic rights, then one must “show cause” in terms of “harm done to others.”

From Efficacy to Liberty and Justice

That our public discourse in the debate about homosexual service in the military has largely turned on the “inefficiencies” and “the lost combat power” caused by the gay exclusion is disappointing. Lots of op-ed ink has been spilt on the question of how many gay people were kicked out of the service, say, in the last year or in the run-up to the Iraq war. The writers then tell us how much money it costs to train those extremely rare Arabic linguists while going on to tell us that national defense suffers from this shortsightedness. Such observations miss the moral point. They amount to a category mistake by implying that, because we happen to need Arabic-speaking military personnel, we will permit gays to serve in the military. Such logic implies that one can die for his country without expecting any but the minimum public honor.

Some will claim that this puts the case too strongly, but one wonders what level of polite discourse is suitable to the denial of justice. Homosexuals are people and citizens just like straight people. They vote. They have social security numbers. They are not felons. Their only shortcoming is that, in the minds of increasingly fewer people, they are sinners. Even if one believes they are sinners, the harm done would be only to themselves and not to others, not to society, not to the military. When we ask Soldiers who happen to have different sexual practices to surrender their dignity for the privilege of serving, we use them to meet our collective need instead of acknowledging their common humanity. Using them in this fashion, we take the sacred while giving the profane.

As Prakash points out, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law requires homosexual citizens serving the common defense to lead split lives. It denies them the integrity essential to their sense of themselves. The policy itself seems nonsensical to some, as it both permits and denies people to be gay. It says, you can “be” gay, but you cannot “act” gay. You can be what you are, but you cannot act as if you are who you are. It makes no sense. It is, root and branch, bad policy. And it is bad precisely because it caters
to the prejudice that supposes gays in the ranks lead to inefficiency while restricting the liberty of these citizen-soldiers as a matter of public law.

Instead of crunching the numbers and talking about “measures of effectiveness,” we ought to be talking about the meaning of liberty, about forming a more just and perfect society. We have stooped to the “measures of effectiveness” argument because we think it gives us a wedge against conservative politics and the moral lethargy of tradition. The impetus for the rationale may gain some ground, and it will give some cover to moderates in the Congress and elsewhere who are aware that homosexuals are people after all but who don’t have the courage to say this to their constituents. In adopting such a posture, we risk surrendering to mob rule, common prejudice, and the tyranny of the ballot box.

Prejudice is widespread and common, and it does bear on the ballot box, but it is still prejudice. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., has already taught us about the tyranny of the majority. Just because there are more white people than black people does not mean that the white people can carry out their unanalyzed prejudices even if they can muster the votes. The prejudice against homosexuals will yield to liberty’s reason and analysis just as the prejudice against skin tone has. The great thing about America is that it does respect both liberty and reason.

The first duty of the law is to preserve liberty, to prevent harm to others. America’s story is the story of a government dedicated to the idea of liberty and justice for all. We have made mistakes. We remain imperfect, but we are moving toward justice. The gay ban will fall, and ultimately, it will fall without regard to efficacy. It will fall because it is wrong for our Nation to practice institutional and legal prejudice against its own people.9

NOTES
3. Ibid, 89.
4. Ibid, 93.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. I have met Nathaniel Frank. He is a decent man. He may have put forward the idea of efficacy, but he did not put it forward because he thinks efficacy is more important than liberty. He put it forward out of sheer frustration while watching his country do positive harm to the group of citizens we call gay. Frank knows perfectly well that liberty is precious. I make this note because I do not want to distort his view on principles.

The Pat Tillman story has been told before—perhaps no better than in the pages of Sports Illustrated. Anyone who saw the Tillman cover photo depicting him with his long hair flowing in the red uniform of the Arizona Cardinals, with a subtitle “An Athlete Dies a Soldier,” would likely never forget the image. Tillman’s story was one of sacrifice, both monetarily when he joined the Army, and then mortally when he lost his life in combat alongside his fellow rangers in Afghanistan.

Jon Krakauer, famous for books and articles on mountaineering and experiences of wilderness solitude, focuses on three main areas in this book: a detailed narrative of the platoon’s actions leading to Pat Tillman’s death, an exploration of how the Army tried to hide the circumstances of that engagement, and a biography of Tillman’s formative years (how he became the kind of man who would walk away from millions of dollars in order to soldier).

In the introduction, Krakauer suggests that Pat Tillman was a human Rorschach test. Those on the right saw him as an “exemplar of Republican values,” while those on the left viewed him as a sort of caveman who joined the Army for no better reason than to kill Arabs. Krakauer rightly claims that there was much more to Tillman than simple caricatures, but such a claim hardly constitutes a stunning insight. People are innately complex, and any attempt to sum up the whole of a person in a sound bite is pointless.

The author frequently explores Tillman’s fascination with overcoming personal challenges. Though he was undersized for a professional football player, Tillman was still a large man, seemingly too large to compete in either a marathon or a triathlon, yet he completed both. Krakauer’s point is that Tillman always sought a challenge, particularly those of an individual, physical nature. There are several instances in the book where Tillman assumes great personal risk in diving and climbing. In fact, these happen so frequently that one could conclude that Tillman’s fascination with adrenaline-inducing experiences as well as overcoming personal challenges might have contributed as much to his decision to join the Rangers as his stated sense of duty.

Whether Krakauer is right or wrong in his contentions is debatable, but his claims are often not particularly convincing for two reasons. First, he demonstrates bias by dedicating an entire chapter on the contested 2000 presidential election, claiming it was stolen. He attacks Bush and his administration often enough to make one wonder if the author is motivated more by passion than fairness. Second, throughout the book Krakauer employs a questionable method of attribution. Rather than precise notes linked to a bibliography, he offers general comments on his sources for each chapter. For example, he usually notes that his main sources were interviews with a particular person and leaves it at that. Such a form of referencing sources is imprecise and does not allow readers to check his facts.

Krakauer does superb work in telling the story of Tillman’s death. His descriptions of the platoon’s actions are precise and detailed, at times disturbingly so. For example, he vividly describes the extent of Tillman’s injuries as well as the awkward recovery of the body from the high ground back to the platoon area. Some of the descriptions are nauseating, but they are neither gratuitous nor voyeuristic. Rather, the author provides the precision necessary to truly capture the extent of the tragedy, the horror of the moment.

Krakauer is less effective in making a case that the cover-up was orchestrated for political purposes at the highest levels of government. He cites messages written by then-Major General McChrystal, commander of Joint Special Operations Command, to his superiors that warn of the likelihood that Tillman was killed by friendly fire, yet the author’s suggestion that the cover-up was skillfully orchestrated is not convincingly proven. Much of the situation was ugly and without doubt poorly handled, but the claim that it was carefully designed is debatable. One must remember that Tillman was killed on 22 April 2004 and his ashes scattered in the Pacific Ocean on 28 April.

Further, Kevin Tillman, Pat’s brother, was a member of the same platoon, and nobody in the unit wanted to tell Kevin that his brother had been killed by friendly fire. Six days pass quickly, and it seems possible that nobody wanted to make public the nature of a hero’s death on the eve of the memorial ceremony. Krakauer may be right about an intentional cover-up, but he doesn’t provide the needed evidence to prove the claim that the motivation was insidious rather than compassionate.

The author discusses many other painful topics: the Tillman family’s self-serving actions after Pat, at the age of seventeen, beat another young man savagely and continued the attack long after the victim was unconscious; the indifference demonstrated by the apparently panicked members of the Ranger platoon as they engaged targets without properly identifying them; rumors that Tillman was assassinated by members of his unit, which Krakauer denies; the loss or intentional destruction of key evi-
dence (Tillman’s bloody uniform and personal journal); the investigating officer’s public claim that the Tillman family, being atheists, would forever be unable to find comfort; the Soldier who actually shot Tillman writing an inept letter questioning his subsequent dismissal from the Ranger Regiment.

In the end, the focus on what made Tillman tick is the book’s strength. What made him leave the NFL for the Army? Why was Tillman so taken with the transcendentalism of George Bernard Shaw, finding significance in the belief that “nothing is at last as sacred as the integrity of your own mind”? A thoughtful man, Tillman questioned authority while working in professions that demand compliance, excelled in a team game despite an innate tendency to be a loner, and seemed indifferent to both fame and wealth in a world where both are coveted. While not always successful, Krakauer explores many fascinating contradictions in a book that is certainly worth reading. That said, one must keep in mind his rather apparent mistrust of both the government and the military chain of command.

LTC James Varner, USA, Retired, Platte City, Missouri


Tariq Ali’s latest work is simultaneously enlightening, befuddling, and erratic. A long-serving London-based journalist as well as editor of the New Left Review, Ali is a keen and highly opinionated observer of Pakistani politics and international affairs. He describes Pakistan as a dysfunctional state rather than a failed one and cautions that his former homeland may be closer than ever to careening out of control. Although his work is hardly a model of discursive reasoning, Ali largely focuses on three broad concerns: America’s toxic interference in Pakistan’s affairs, Pakistan’s internal political disarray, and the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan. At its best, his commentary is highly discerning and brings to light various aspects of Pakistan’s many challenges.

The book’s title (perhaps containing a veiled allusion to U.S. air strikes) implies that Pakistan’s hazardous relationship with the United States has compounded Pakistan’s difficulties. Ali tells how American foreign policy, by virtue of the sheer magnitude of U.S. wealth and power, has distorted not only Pakistan’s policies but also Pakistan’s very history. During and even after the Cold War, U.S. leaders tended to base their decisions on Pakistan on short-term strategic concerns. By choosing to base U.S. relations with Pakistan on cooperation with that country’s generals, the United States made the military an increasingly dominant force in Pakistani society. By deliberately overlooking Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons in exchange for cooperation in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the U.S. opened the door to current apprehensions about the control and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Ali explains that from its birth in 1947, Pakistan has suffered from ineffectual leadership. Civilian politicians have been notoriously corrupt and inept, and military despots have performed no better. Ali asserts that Leavenworth-educated General Zia-ul-Haq, to whom the United States turned for aid in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, authorized the Inter-Services Intelligence to turn Islamic extremists loose to wield increasing influence in the Pakistani army, as well as in that country’s social and political life.

Despite his disdain for the Taliban, Ali has little use for the American-led war in Afghanistan. He considers President Hamid Karzai a “quisling” and an impediment to progress. Moreover, he sees no end to the current war except through negotiated arrangements with all of that country’s neighbors, including Iran.

Ali has a dim and decidedly leftist appreciation of American society and politics that shades his analysis of some events, but even so, there is much to gain from reading Ali’s book. Ali knows many of Pakistan’s political leaders personally and has an amazing network of contacts. He laces his text with colorful and telling anecdotes and personal sketches of key figures. These features to some extent compensate for the author’s occasionally disjointed narrative. In sum, while the conscientious student of South Asian affairs should not rely on this book alone, it is nevertheless a valuable supplement to the works of Ahmed Rashid and others.

Robert Baumann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Nuclear proliferation lies at the heart of many current international issues, including the invasion of Iraq and the confrontations with Iran and North Korea. Despite strenuous efforts by the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, additional governments (and potentially nonstate actors) continue to obtain both fissionable material and technical knowledge.

Nuclear weapons designers Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman have attempted to trace the path of proliferation from the 1930s to the present. In the process, they not only describe the governmental decisions behind the spread of nuclear weapons but also explain many of the technical issues related to weapons design and safety. In addition, Stillman recounts the unusual access he gained to both the Soviet and Chinese nuclear programs during the 1990s.

The authors stress the often-overlooked realities of proliferation, such as the role of early computers in calculations for the original hydrogen bombs or the flow of knowledge that occurred when physics graduate students returned to their home countries after studying abroad. They also describe how miscalculations caused fatal accidents in U.S. and Soviet nuclear tests during the 1950s.
In addition, *The Nuclear Express* describes governmental actions that have produced one new nuclear power every five years since 1945. With regard to the long-standing debate about Soviet espionage, the authors allege that an unnamed employee of the American hydrogen project gave the Soviets the key design concept of radiation implosion. They also describe how, despite all its denials, China continues a voracious program to obtain technical information from the United States.

The two authors describe in some detail the manner in which France provided critical help to the Israeli nuclear program until Charles de Gaulle halted this cooperation, and they allege that Lyndon Johnson and other American officials knowingly accepted Tel Aviv’s deceptions concerning its weapons program. Israel later gave technical assistance to the South African search for an A-bomb in return for uranium ore and testing facilities. Reed and Stillman assert that China has been the key actor in helping Pakistan, North Korea, and perhaps other states develop their own nuclear weapons. Of course, no history of nuclear weapons would be complete without discussing the role of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.

Some readers may question the book’s conspiracy theory approach and the speculative nature of the authors’ account of recent nuclear transactions. However, overall, this is a refreshing and informative review of proliferation issues and well worth reading by anyone concerned with them.

**COL Jonathan M. House, USAR, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Some 30 years ago, an expert on World War II wrote that historians would have to rewrite their stories of that conflict because of then-newly released information about Ultra, the allied breaking of German radio traffic codes. Based on Matthew Aid’s excellent history of signals intelligence and the National Security Agency (NSA), one might have similar thoughts about the history of national security policy after World War II.

Take for example the defense of the Pusan Perimeter during the Korean War. Historians have long noted the uncanny ability of the Eighth Army’s commander, Lieutenant General Walton “Johnnie” Walker, to anticipate the focus of enemy attack. “Uncanny” means “mysterious” and Aid uses newly declassified documents and direct contacts with retired Eighth Army general staff members to demystify the event. He documents U.S. intelligence penetration of North Korean army radio traffic.

Unfortunately, U.S. intelligence did not decisively penetrate the plans and operations of the Soviet Union’s next client. North Vietnam practiced security and radio traffic discipline far more thoroughly. True, signals intelligence provided tactical information about the size and location of enemy units. However, neither the NSA nor anyone else gave much warning about the Tet Offensive in 1968.

Aid makes clear that the NSA has a mixed record, something one could say about every national security agency. Confederate major general George Pickett famously said that the Yankees had a lot to do with the defeat of the Confederacy, and Aid points out that enemy message traffic differs substantially in its penetrability. Soberly, he concludes that the latest technology (the plethora of cell phones and fiber-optic cables) is likely to exceed NSA capability for the foreseeable future. This is not comforting to a country that can not attribute some of its greatest military victories—such as Normandy and Pusan—to signals intercepts. However, data acquisition will not save us from great policy failures, such as The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the invasion of Iraq. Aid quotes a senior analyst talking about “many policy makers . . . persuaded of [their] own ability to analyze things correctly . . . This is a congenital disease among high-level policy makers.”

Some 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu wrote that all war planning and military operations should begin with knowledge of ourselves and of the enemy. Aid’s book on the National Security Agency and signals intelligence should be on the reading list of every serious student of national security.

**Michael D. Pearlman, Ph.D., Lawrence, Kansas**

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What if someone took the plot of the 1997 motion picture *Wag the Dog* so seriously she decided to write an academic study of the news media based on the movie’s intended tongue-in-cheek premise—and publish the results in a book? That’s apparently what Deborah L. Jaramillo does in *Ugly War, Pretty Package: How CNN and Fox News Made the Invasion of Iraq High Concept*.

The book posits that media moguls treat news as if it were “a narrative,” embellishing reality with production techniques that emulate film industry slickness while serving agendas that may not always include reporting news as unvarnished truth.

Simply put, according to Jaramillo, TV news stories, produced as “packages,” do not deal with news as much as they promote narratives or story lines aimed at drawing audiences who will boost the networks’ commercial bottom lines.

However, instead of *Wag the Dog’s* bogus, trumped-up war in Albania, *Ugly War, Pretty Package* focuses on the actual 2003 invasion of Iraq, which ironically some critics and international observers with 20/20 hindsight now agree really was a trumped-up war based on false intelligence about Iraq’s nuclear capabilities.

Jaramillo points to what she refers
to as “The Spectacle of Telesed War” to support her thesis that “CNN and Fox News plainly used coverage of the 2003 war to advance their commercial aims by adhering closely to the war’s marketable concept. Armed with this concept and a simple story spread by the Bush administration and the Department of Defense, the two networks marketed the war narrative for commercial ends.”

The author admits she draws on her own background in the motion picture—not news—in gathering her research, which she thoroughly documents. However, when a nonjournalist views a journalistic issue through her own show-biz prism, it is inevitable that some of the resulting light thrown on that issue reflects the realities she knows from her own world.

Readers venturing into the world of Ugly War: Pretty Package would be well advised to keep this in mind as they navigate their way to where the truth surrounding media coverage of a real war really lies. And fair warning—it may not always be in the eye of the beholder.

Carol A. Saynisch, former CBS News journalist, Steilacoom, Washington

EMPTY CASING: A Soldier’s Memoir of Sarajevo Under Siege
Fred Doucette, Douglas and McIntyre Ltd., Vancouver, 2008, 228 pages, $18.95.

Empty Casing: A Soldier’s Memoir of Sarajevo Under Siege is not just another Balkan War book. Fred Doucette, an experienced infantryman who served 32 years in the Canadian Armed Forces, has written a poignant, often disconcerting book about the effects of war on the human mind. Doucette uses his own experience while a member of a United Nations Military Observer Team in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 to examine the effects of traumatic operational stress and makes a great contribution toward understanding post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from a soldier’s perspective. The book focuses on two main themes: that civilians as well as combatants can suffer traumatic stress injuries, and that PTSD is treatable.

Doucette describes the hostile environment of Bosnia in 1995 and recounts events that occurred during his deployment, including running from Mount Igman to Sarajevo to link up with his UN mission observer team, performing his missions and daily activities, and interacting with the Mehmebegovic family and other Bosnians who remained in Sarajevo.

Doucette easily moves from strategic, operational, and tactical perspectives to the tactical level, where he is most effective vividly describing the horrific sights, smells, and frustrations he experienced. Doucette provides insight into the emotions and dilemmas he struggled with every day. He describes how his brain automatically “switched” into survival mode following a near-fatal mortar attack and how he had to be hyper-vigilant to complete the mission. These descriptions provide the context for the internal battles he experiences later.

The last and perhaps most important part of the book examines how Doucette’s experiences in Bosnia adversely affected his mental state, his social and family life for over five years, his diagnosis, and his subsequent treatment. Doucette reflects that when he appeared to have reintegrated back into society, he was actually battling “demons” on three levels—the individual level, where he measured himself against the norms of being a tough, strong, disciplined infantryman who was not allowed to show weakness; and the human level, where understanding, compassion, and the value of life (not destruction and cruelty) were the norms. These conflicts fueled his anger and depression and the terror he associated with flashbacks he called “war porn.” Properly diagnosed with PTSD in 2001, Doucette found relief after he began treatment and eventually become a peer counselor for Canada’s National Defense Operational Stress Injury Support program.

Empty Casing’s maps and photos enable the reader to visualize the horrific environment and conditions of the conflict. The book is relevant because military and civilian personnel from many nations, returning to or escaping from the stressful and horrific environments of conflict, may be suffering from operational stress injuries. Whether you agree with the author’s reasoning and perspectives or not, the book is of enduring value. It offers hope and encouragement for other soldiers suffering from PTSD and their loved ones.

LTC Edward D. Jennings, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


On Hallowed Ground is an engaging historical narrative that covers Arlington National Cemetery from the American Civil War to the War on Terrorism. Robert Poole begins the story with Robert E. Lee’s family evacuating their Arlington estate and Union forces seizing it. As casualties escalated, the dead soon overwhelmed Washington’s mortuary resources. Out of necessity and retribution, Montgomery Meigs, head of the Quartermaster Corps, systematically turned Lee’s estate into a cemetery. Lee never regained his property, and the site evolved over the post-Civil War years from a Union shrine into a symbol of national reconciliation.

As the national culture changed, so did Arlington. Ostentatious Victorian funerary art gave way to simple marble headstones. Architects and city planners, seeking to restore the estate and city to its intended simplicity, interred the city’s planner, Pierre L’Enfant, on a hill overlooking the National Mall. Casualties from Cuba and the USS Maine bore witness to the country’s growing international role. Astounding technological changes transformed the military but increased the 20th century’s death toll.

Advanced identification methods ensured that casualties would not
remain forgotten. In World War I, those improvements allowed for the identification of all but a small percentage of the casualties. In honor of their sacrifices, one of those unknowns was transported amid great pomp to his final resting place in Arlington. Although his monument remained incomplete for a decade, the Unknown Soldier became the national symbol of American sacrifice. In the following decades, Arlington saw the tragic Bonus March, the construction of the Pentagon nearby, and the burials of casualties from World War II and Korea.

In 1963, the nation laid President John F. Kennedy to rest within the shadow of Arlington’s Greek Revival mansion just as the ancient Athenian democracy buried its leaders in a place of honor. Because of this public attention, the site became a place of pilgrimage, and burial requests increased dramatically. However, the site suffered politicization when the Reagan administration pushed to include a Vietnam monument. The poorly executed process resulted in the enshrinement of remains that were later disinterred and identified. Today, Arlington continues to honor past sacrifices while paying tribute to the casualties of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Written in a vigorous style and accessible to a broad audience, On Hallowed Ground makes a valuable contribution to the preservation of our national heritage. Poole gives voice to Arlington’s silent monuments so their stories will not be forgotten. He tells the stories in vivid detail, seamlessly weaving together the national narrative with vignettes about those who lived, worked, or were laid to rest at Arlington. He also includes the history of Arlington’s traditions and controversies and a helpful notes section for further study. This book is highly recommended as a narrative history and as a sobering reminder of our obligation to honor those who paid freedom’s price.

1LT Jonathan E. Newell, USAR, Amherst, New Hampshire


In his latest work, Robert Kagan offers a riveting picture of the unanticipated eruption of conflicting forces during the post-Cold War era. The book’s title, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, alludes to Francis Fukuyama’s more optimistic work on the post-Cold War era, End of History and the Last Man. The book is certain to captivate, intrigue, and inform serious scholars and students of contemporary international relations. Kagan is a serious and gifted writer who has the uncanny ability to illuminate complex issues and give the reader an experience of simplicity without understating or diminishing the significance of his points and ideas. Unfortunately, Return of History is not a seminal work because its conclusion is disappointingly unoriginal.

Kagan uses the first half of his book to present a compelling view of the post-Cold War world, asserting, “The core assumptions of the post-Cold War years collapsed almost as soon as they were formulated.” Kagan argues the “struggle for status has returned” among states. He writes that during the Cold War the “bipolar order suppressed the normal tendency for other great powers to emerge,” which delayed the emergence of the China, India, and Japan we see today. Kagan contends that, as during the 19th century, a new international system of liberalism versus autocracy has reemerged. The tension between radical Islamist and modern secular cultures is the other “great conflict in the international system today.” Kagan’s wise and deliberate consideration of the “struggle between modernization and Islamic radicalism” is another striking aspect of his book. He persuasively argues that resurgent nationalism and the struggle for status are the two powerful forces at play in the contemporary international system, which yields The Return of History and the End of Dreams.

After positing this theory, Kagan examines the contemporary autocratic states of Russia, China, and Iran and their existing political systems. Kagan highlights the ever-mounting political incompatibilities, both domestic and foreign, between these states and the West. He emphasizes that “the new era, rather than becoming a time of universal values, will be one of growing tensions.” One particularly compelling point Kagan makes is that “the world’s democracies do not regard their own efforts to support democracy and Enlightenment principles abroad as an aspect of geopolitical competition, because they don’t see ‘competing truths,’ only ‘universal values,’” a point of view that works to the detriment of the West in geopolitical competitions.

Unfortunately, as Kagan’s work draws to a close, it takes a sharp turn into the realm of the unremarkable. He sets forth an idea that essentially translates to “Yes, things are bad, but imagine how much worse they might be.” He asks, “Might not even a flawed democratic superpower have an important role to play?” In the end, he offers a “Concert of Democracies” as a possible solution to instability, and simply reminds us that the U.S. defeated fascism in the 1940s and communism in the 1990s. He then offers the not exactly breath-taking prediction that “the future of the international order will be shaped by those that have the power and the collective will to shape it.”

LTC William J. Maxcy, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


John Adams’ If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War is fiction that provides an insightful analysis of World War II strategy and operational art in the Pacific from the perspective of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theories of sea power, which all officers in the
opposing navies of U.S. and Japan had studied as required reading in their Naval War Colleges. Mahan’s principles served as the basis for both the U.S. Navy’s War Plan Orange and Japan’s strategic decision making.

Adams examines how well actual strategic and operational decisions would fare had Mahan assigned them a grade. Some admirals, notably Ernest King, U.S. chief of naval operations, come to the top of the class; others, such as the highly intelligent Yamamoto, receive failing grades for their inability to follow through on strategic concepts. Despite this “cute” literary conceit, the book is a serious work of scholarship supported by extensive notes and bibliography. I have two minor quibbles. The editor should have caught many typos and could have eliminated some redundant passages, shortening the book by 50 pages.

Read this book with a detailed atlas of the Pacific Ocean (and a glass of your favorite grog). Adams discusses many important themes: the causes and consequences of the famous “two-pronged American Pacific strategy,” the roles of reconnaissance, technology, and air power versus surface gunnery, the significance of island bases, submarine warfare, and the fundamental importance of logistics. Mahanian principles such as maintaining “a fleet in being,” decisive battles versus raids, and the role of blockade are all discussed in depth as are the importance of having intelligent and courageous leaders and a well-trained crew. The author makes liberal use of alternative scenarios and “war gaming.” Adams recognizes the benefit of hindsight and emphasizes that admirals had to deal with the “crushing” weight of making life or death decisions under enormous time pressures and with incomplete information.

If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War is a must read for students of World War II in the Pacific and all those interested in naval and military strategy. Army officers, in particular, will gain a better understanding of the challenges faced by their naval brethren. Students of strategy will ask themselves whether a particular battle, or even an entire operation, served to advance national military strategy or simply occurred as a function of inertia, unimaginative thinking, or a commander’s egotism.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., USAR, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Stanley Coleman Jersey’s Hell’s Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal is a detailed history of the island-hopping campaign in the South Pacific during World War II that examines the strategic importance of the Solomon Islands while providing a detailed narrative of the struggle for Guadalcanal and neighboring islands. The book begins with events such as the Australian administration and defense plans for the islands that preceded the six-month struggle for Guadalcanal. Jersey details Japanese operations designed to seize the resource-rich area and create a defensive bastion with which to interdict allied shipping though the South Pacific and isolate Australia. The author focuses on the brutal conflict for Guadalcanal. Some historians have termed the conflict a more decisive turning point than the naval battle at Midway some two months earlier.

Jersey’s research spans more than 40 years, beginning with his experience as a World War II veteran in the South Pacific. He tells the story from view points of Americans, Japanese, Australian, and even native Guadalcanal inhabitants. Literally thousands of official archival documents such as battle orders, campaign reports, official correspondence, and officer’s logs support his conclusions. Jersey presents the common Soldier’s view through information gleaned from private diaries and interviews of more than 200 veterans of the campaign. His research presents a more in-depth view than most previous accounts.

Hell’s Islands' myriad details add depth and clarity to the study, but the book has one considerable drawback. As with other earlier works, Jersey gives far too much attention to the initial phase of the American campaign. The U.S. Marines had wrested control of Henderson Field from the Japanese and then held it against determined counterattacks by the Japanese at “Bloody Ridge” and “Lunga Point.” While the Marines’ heroic struggle certainly bears great merit in the overall story of the campaign, Jersey unfortunately dedicates only one chapter to the offensive operations conducted by the U.S. Army’s XIV Corps. Almost in passing, the book presents the offensive battles to take Mount Austen and the Gifu strongpoint and clear the island, leaving the reader to wonder if the Army contributed much at all to the campaign’s outcome.

Despite this flaw, Hell’s Islands provides a credible addition to the literature on the Guadalcanal campaign. The book’s detail about the prewar settlement and defenses provides key background information that adds to the readers’ comprehension of the strategic context. Furthermore, the author’s attention to detail adds to our understanding of how to conduct joint military operations successfully against a tough and determined foe in a most inhospitable environment. Hell’s Islands is a useful work not only for the casual reader but also the serious student of military history.

Dan C. Fullerton, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The Box from Braunau: In Search of My Father’s War chronicles a daughter’s quest to learn about her father’s experiences during World War II. In her efforts to understand the events and times that shaped her father’s life, she reveals a tremendous amount of information about him, his experiences, and valuable military history. The mystery surrounding a small aluminum box her father kept from the war drove Elvin
to conduct her research. The box was handmade with an engraving of a man and woman surrounded by flowers and inscribed “1944 Braunau.”

Elvin discovers that her father, First Lieutenant William Elvin, served as a platoon leader in E-Co, 2d Battalion, 318th Infantry Regiment in the 80th Infantry Division. She chronicles her father’s experiences in heavy, sustained combat in France. She covers these experiences in detail and relates them to the broader context of the ongoing campaign.

Elvin describes her father’s second life-altering event: the liberation of the Ebensee Concentration Camp in Austria. She provides descriptions of this horrific camp from numerous perspectives and discovers that it was at this camp that a grateful former prisoner gave her father the engraved handmade box he had kept for so many years. The man who had gone to great lengths and risk to make and hide the box had it inscribed with the name of the nearby town of Braunau, which ironically was also the birthplace of Adolph Hitler.

_The Box from Braunau_ is well written. The reader will find it excellent not just for its contribution to World War II history but also because it provides insight into how a man’s daughter could piece together the events that shaped her father’s life and gave her an understanding of how her own life was shaped by them as well. I recommend the book, as it provides an understanding of the impact that these kinds of experiences can have on not only those who have experienced combat but also on their family members.

**LTC Thomas G. Meara, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**DEFENDERS OF FORTRESS EUROPE: The Untold Story of the German Officers During the Allied Invasion**


Experiences tell me there is more than meets the eye when it comes to defining the success or failure of revered military leaders such as Alexander the Great, Bonaparte, Lee, Grant, Montgomery, Patton, McArthur, and Rommel. Influences beyond one’s control, frequently in the form of actions taken (or not taken) by superiors and subordinate leaders, often provide the critical act that seals their place in history. Samuel Mitcham provides a superbly researched account of the second- and third-level leaders of the German Army in 1944.

_Defenders of Fortress Europe_ follows German army leaders as they prepare for the Allied landings on 6 June 1944. The reader takes a riveting journey through the tough fighting in hedgerow country, the Allied breakout and eventual taking of Paris, the German retreat, and the surrender in the west. The book discusses the more famous officers such as Rommel, Guderian, and Model, but they are not the centerpiece of the book. They provide context and a familiar point of reference to introduce lesser-known subordinate officers. The author traces each officer’s early family life, his experiences in World War I, and how he spent the interwar years and progressed through the ranks of Hitler’s war machine. The officers suffer tactical defeats, lose operational momentum, and slowly lose hope as their government crumbles.

I recommend _Defenders of Fortress Europe_ to military professionals and to those interested in understanding the German army’s inner-workings during the final days of World War II.

**COL David L. Blain, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**D-DAY: The Battle for Normandy**


In _D-Day: The Battle for Normandy_, Antony Beevor presents a picture of this all-important battle from three levels—tactical, operational, and strategic. The book’s scope of time is far more encompassing than just “the longest day.” However, I believe Stephen Ambrose’s _D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climatic Battle of World War II_ better addresses the Soldier and unit aspects of the fight for Normandy. Readers will appreciate Beevor’s discussion of Allied strategic and political challenges and will be intrigued by the political and national motivations that drove the Allies to get onto the Continent. Officers must be aware of a nation’s global vision and foreign policy before going in.

Was the race to Paris not only for liberation, but also to ensure that a civil war did not erupt between the de Gaulists and the communists? Did the French conveniently choose to ignore Britain’s bankruptcy supporting the exiled French government and the second front, or the United States providing everything (uniforms, equipment, armor, and food) for French soldiers conducting their liberation? In cold, calculating terms, did the Allies view this as just one more task to accomplish, another hurdle to jump before realizing national interests and future visions?

The Germans thought of the future as they fought a losing war: Do we fight to the end or make a peace agreement with the Allies and continue the war with Russia? Who was responsible for slow reactions or the inability to place German forces at critical junctures? Did the Allied unconditional surrender demand influence Germany to launch desperate, ill-conceived, and poorly executed operations to stem the overwhelming offensive? Did the Hitler assassination attempt, were surviving German generals inhibited because subordinate fanatics might turn them in at the slightest hint of defeatism or disgruntlement?

Beevor’s nonjudgmental analysis of decisions and indecisions at divisional, corps, and army level allows for lessons learned and conclusions without prejudice. On the downside, the book’s maps were less than adequate in detail and scope and poorly placed for the reader’s reference.

**LTC David A. Moeller, USA, Retired, Roswell, New Mexico**

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**WORLD WAR ONE: A Short History**

Over the last several years, a number of books have been written about World War I, many of which have increased our understanding of the war and put to bed some of the more egregious myths that have emerged over the years. Against that backdrop, Norman Stone’s *World War One: A Short History* is a step backwards.

Stone’s approach is conventional. He begins with an explanation of the outbreak of the war, follows with a chapter on each year of the war, then finishes with a brief summary of the aftermath. He talks about the differences between the fronts, which helps in understanding why the fighting, in the main theaters, was so different in character. He captures the German High Command’s denial of the true state of affairs toward the end of 1918.

The reader might get the impression the Allies were a bunch of duffers who stumbled around in a fog until enlightened by the Germans. For example, when discussing the German attack at Caporetto in 1917 and the March offensive of 1918, Stone states that these were “displays of panache of which the plodders on the Allied side were utterly incapable.” The claim ignores the Allied offensives of 1918, which might not have been spectacular, but which did result in the collapse of the German Army: something rather more than mere panache.

In addition, there are a number of minor, but annoying, factual errors. For example, there is a clear implication that the Germans of 1918 had adopted the “new weaponry” of light machine guns and rifle grenades, but that the Allies had not. In fact, the rifle grenade was first widely used by the French, and both they and the British had light machine guns. Stone notes the Allies introduced tanks and developed an early form of blitzkrieg, although this does not stop him from claiming that Germany was leading the technology race.

Lest this review become no more than a laundry list of complaints, let me simply say that all of this is disappointing, especially given the excellent work that Stone has done in the past. If one is willing to accept obvious bias, then Stone’s book is a good overview of the war and worth reading. However, a better choice would be Keith Robbins’ *The First World War* or Stokesbury’s *A Short History of World War I.*

**Nicholas Murray,**

**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


Russell McClintock’s *Lincoln and the Decision for War: The Northern Response to Secession* is a compelling book that casts new light on the problems facing President Lincoln and his administration in a time of political and social turbulence. The book focuses on issues and personalities that drove Northern and Southern leaders into their fatal split. McClintock carefully weaves together the challenges facing the newly victorious Republicans and the Democratic party, both riven by factional interests. McClintock tells the story not in terms of special interests but chronologically, allowing the reader to see how the road to war unfolded, despite the efforts of many to “preserve” the Union after Lincoln’s election.

*Lincoln and the Decision for War* chronicles Northern tensions and the national mindset as the U.S. groops for a political solution short of war. Most histories of this period focus on what the South chose to do and what actions it undertook to build a new nation state. McClintock integrates several divergent political crises into his book. The reader may be surprised to learn that many Northerners were ready to allow the South to secede, perhaps because Lincoln lacked constitutional authority to negate this action.

Others simply wanted the South and its peculiar institution to be gone, and here was an easy way to excise a cancer from the Union. Then there were the issues surrounding the Southern Unionists who wanted to preserve the nation at any political cost. Add the Democratic Party into this mix and one begins to understand the complete volatility of the situation. It seems that both Lincoln and Douglas were not at the top of their game during this period, although I am inclined to give Lincoln more leeway because he was in the process of organizing a new administration.

The reader will be surprised how the public and the media dealt with Abraham Lincoln’s election and the South’s response. New alliances came and went as public opinion began to influence the choices of political actors. Lincoln found it hard to come to a decision quickly about how to handle the national crisis.

McClintock contributes greatly to Civil War scholarship and perhaps even helps Army officers understand the current political climate. The use of letters and diary entries from Americans from all walks of life shows that McClintock has truly mastered his subject. I highly recommend this book.

**LTC Robert G. Smith, USA, Germantown, Maryland**


Rod Andrew’s biography of Wade Hampton, III, fills a large gap in both Civil War and Reconstruction history. In *Wade Hampton: Confederate Warrior to Southern Redeemer,* Andrew explains how post-war period leaders such as Hampton were able to keep a hold on their Soldiers and fellow citizens. Andrew balances Hampton’s story with themes of chivalry, honor, paternalism, and Hampton’s difficult fight for vindication of the war-shattered South.

Andrew introduces Hampton’s large clan and shows how that diverse group shaped Hampton’s personality during his formative years and his actions later as a man and a leader. The book’s footnotes detail the complexity of South Carolina’s wartime politics and describe how the tension between
Virginia and the Deep South states affected Hampton’s efforts to obtain replacements of Soldiers, horses, and equipment for his regiments. Hampton struggled throughout the war to obtain needed support and recognition for his Deep South cavalry units. Andrew also shows how Confederate leaders Robert E. Lee, J.E.B. Stuart, and Jefferson Davis dealt with the competent and charismatic Hampton.

Hampton felt personal responsibility toward all South Carolinians (black and white), which led him to espouse a resurgent Democratic party that re-enfranchised former Confederates including (in a somewhat limited fashion) black voters. Hampton sought ways to redeem the South and vindicate its historic wartime struggle. It is in the role of “vindicating” that Hampton is less understood, and Andrew corrects this fault. He depicts Hampton as a forceful political leader with the finesse not to resort to counter-violence. Andrew completes the picture of Hampton’s life as a “patriarch,” conservative post-war political leader, and “champion of South Carolina.”

The book is an authoritative biography of an interesting man that will well serve serious students of Southern history, the Civil War, the Reconstruction era, and Wade Hampton.

COL Darrell L. Combs, USMC, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


We know Robert Rogers, the master of early American frontier warfare, as the founding father of the U.S. Army Rangers. “Rogers’s Rules of Ranging”—the 28 maxims Rogers required his rangers to memorize—encapsulate the tactical methods of his unique, highly effective form of warfare. The rules still serve as a guide for today’s Army Rangers.

In War on the Run: The Epic Story of Robert Rogers and the Conquest of America’s First Frontier, John F. Ross argues that Roger’s Rules represent something much more significant in America’s history of warfare. Ross’s epic biography establishes Rogers’ unique ranging techniques as the nucleus of the hybrid form of warfare that evolved as a key to American victory during the Revolutionary War.

Ross draws from Rogers’ journals and contemporary sources to produce a well-researched and documented history. His experience as an outdoorsman adds to the narrative and enables him to augment his archival research with observations gained from walking and kayaking much of the same terrain Rogers covered. Ross’s personal exploration and detailed geographic and meteorological research conveys the severe climatic conditions and harsh terrain that confronted the rangers who were outfitted with only snowshoes, rudimentary boats, and the most basic of survival equipment.

Ross describes Rogers’ near-conviction for counterfeiting, his constant troubles with debt, his eventual allegiance to the Tories, and his espionage skills (which led to the capture and execution of Nathan Hale). The author details ranger operations during the conflict between the British and the French and their Indian allies. He also describes the tension between advocates of traditional and irregular forms of warfare and the support required from key British leaders to enable the creation and growth of ranger units. His discussions about organization and training for irregular war are as relevant today as they were then.

Ross has restored Rogers to his proper place in history, describing not only his efforts in developing ranging tactics and organizations, but placing these achievements in the larger context of military history. War on the Run is a fascinating and enjoyable book.

LTC Mark Calhoun, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In The War Man: The True Story of a Citizen-Soldier Who Fought from Quebec To Yorktown, Robert A. Mayers takes an ambitious approach to uncovering the service record of a New York Continental Soldier in the Revolutionary War. While personal narratives of Soldiers from the Revolutionary War are not unheard of, they are uncommon, and Mayers surprisingly chooses an uncommon subject in John Allison.

Born in Haverstraw, New York, in 1754, Allison was the son of Joseph Allison, an affluent landowner and Seven Years War veteran and an early supporter of resistance to Crown policies. In 1775, Allison enlisted in Captain Robert Johnston’s Company of the 3d New York Regiment Continental Line and served through the end of the war. Literate, affluent, and from a prominent family, Allison was anything but typical.

Allison failed to leave a written record of his service except for his pension application, filed with the Orange County magistrate in 1818. Mayers, a descendant of Allison, turned to 19th-century county histories, genealogies, and living historians to flesh out Allison’s narrative.

Mayers details the demographics of Allison’s company, tracing Allison’s service through the collective record of Johnston’s company. With this type of history, speculation is inevitable, and Mayers resorts to it from time to time.

At times, Mayers confuses the different types of service. His use of the term “minuteman” to describe all members of the militia becomes problematic, as does the intrusion of modern military terms describing the battles in which Allison engaged. Analysis is also sometimes lacking: Mayers does not go into much detail about how demographics, training, and equipment might have affected combat effectiveness. However, this is more than understandable, as War Man is a narrative of one man’s service during the Revolutionary War.

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The sections narrating Allison’s service at St. Johns, the Battles of Forts Clinton and Montgomery, and the 1779 Wyoming campaign are illuminating. The book’s maps and appendices are most useful, and readers contemplating a tour of military sites along the Hudson may appreciate Allison’s recapitulation of some of the operations in which he was engaged. Historians, enthusiasts of local history, and students of military history interested in the Continental Army’s northern operations will value War Man.

Joseph A. Seymour, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

Letters to the Editor

Colonel Mike Redmond (UK), chief, Stability Operations Division, Strategy, Policy, and Plans Directorate of Headquarters, Department of the Army (G-3/5/7)—I found the article “Forward in Africa” (January-February 2010, Military Review) by MG Garrett, COL Mariano, and MAJ Sanderson of U.S. Army Africa to be both a comprehensive and insightful piece on the very real challenges that USAFRICOM and the U.S. Army in Africa face in implementing an ambitious yet necessary engagement strategy in this most important region. The issues faced by this nascent command to sustain a persistent and sustained engagement are reflected in other combatant commands and offer useful lessons for all. When Army commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan abate, the demand for trained and ready forces to build partner capacity will remain significant. Even when forces are allocated to conduct such operations, the requirement for complementary levels of effort across the entire security sector of a partner nation in order to permit the evolution of sustainable security institutions remains.

A recent Security Sector Reform White Paper, jointly published by the State Department, Department of Defense (DOD), and U.S. Agency for International Development, highlights the need for a comprehensive approach to this endeavor. This serves to make all practitioners more receptive to the roles that diplomacy, development, and defense play in building our partners’ security institutions. Recent speeches by the secretary of defense, ongoing revisions of a number of Joint publications, and the production of Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, acknowledge that interagency cooperation, conflict prevention, and imbuing partner nations with the capacity to secure themselves, govern their people, and evidence willingness to operate as partners across the spectrum of conflict represent the new paradigm of our engagement.

Three small but important issues are worth addressing:

- In September 2009, DOD Instruction 3000.05 replaced the DOD Directive issued four years previously. The new instruction defined stability operations and indicated that these are a core military mission. It also outlines the direction not only for the services with regard to developing capabilities, but also for the combatant commands to incorporate the related tasks and considerations into the respective theater campaign plans. To assist in this work, the Army has appointed the commanding general, Combined Arms Center, as its proponent for stability operations and security force assistance (SFA).
- The principal focus of Army campaign plan (ACP) major objective 8.6, “Adapting the Army for Building Partner Capacity,” lies in identifying and executing adaptation of the Army institutions that assist the operating force in the conduct of operations to build partner capacity. Although this has a direct bearing upon the construct, training, and delivery of such effort, which lies predominantly with the operating forces, ACP 8.6 seeks to address how the generating forces are best structured to support this effort. Subsequent work will explore in greater depth the requirements of the various Army service component commands (ASCCs) and the manner in which operating and generating forces (individuals, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and programs) are identified, prepared, and made available to meet this mission set. The ongoing efforts of U.S. Army Africa and all ASCCs will prove critical to informing this project, and they form essential partners in development and execution.
- The Army approach to delivering SFA by the operating force uses a combination of special operations forces (SOF) and general purpose forces (GPF) assigned through the global force management process via the Army force generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. In the case of GPF, the modular brigade is the principal means for the tactical delivery of security force assistance. It demonstrates the versatility, agility, and flexibility of the GPF and makes full use of the robust inherent command and control structures therein. The modular brigade can be adapted to specific missions, augmented with specialist expertise by elements from the generating forces, and trained within the ARFORGEN cycle to deliver the required effect in accord with SFA demands. Brigades allotted the mission to provide SFA, either as a formation or through the provision of subor-
coordinate elements, remain capable of reconstituting to conduct full spectrum operations as required. The Army strategy is to adapt existing brigades to conduct SFA missions and return these to their standard design in the “Reset” phase of ARFORGEN, not to build permanent SFA formations. The terms “advise and assist brigade” (AAB) and “modular brigade for security force assistance” (MBSFA) have been used in operational theaters to differentiate between formations that have been augmented and adapted to conduct SFA and security operations from those that have not. The level of augmentation and adaptation for any formation to conduct SFA will be driven by the mission. To support this effort the Army has established a permanent SFA training formation (162d Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Polk, Louisiana) to prepare individuals and units assigned this mission.

We Recommend


While women are officially barred from combat in the American armed services, in the current war, where there are no front lines, the ban on combat is virtually meaningless. More than in any previous conflict in our history, American women are engaging with the enemy, suffering injuries, and even sacrificing their lives in the line of duty.

From the Publisher


It was 1942 and Adolph Hitler had the world clenched in his fist. As the war dragged on, a few Jewish refugees in the U.S. Army made the dangerous decision to make the fight against Hitler personal and joined the newly formed Office of the Strategic Services.

They Dared Return is the true story of these brave Jews who became spies for the Allies.

From the Publisher


Bestselling author and combat veteran Dick Couch examines the importance of battlefield ethics in effectively combating terrorists without losing the battle for the hearts of the local population. A former Navy SEAL, Couch warns that the mistakes made in Vietnam forty years ago are being repeated in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that the stakes are even higher now. His book takes a critical look at the battlefield conduct of U.S. ground-combat units fighting insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.

From the Publisher
Birrer-Brookes Award

Sponsored by the United States Army Command and General Staff College Foundation, the Birrer-Brookes Award recognizes the author of the “most outstanding thesis” from each graduating Master of Military Art and Science degree cohort of the Command and General Staff School. The name of the award honors the contributions to CGSC of Dr. Ivan Birrer and Dr. Phillip Brookes. Dr. Birrer nurtured the concept of a Master of Military Art and Science degree for CGSC from its initial proposal in the early 1960s through its formal authorization in public law in 1974. Dr. Brookes took over the helm of the program in 1978, guiding it through the process of growth and maturation until his retirement from the College in 2003. The Faculty thesis committee chairpersons submit nominations for the award to the CGSC Graduate Faculty Council, which in turn forms a panel of scholars to review and rank the nominated theses. Each winner receives a specially engraved CGSC chair courtesy of the CGSC Foundation. The first recipient of the Birrer-Brookes Award was Major Egil Daltveit from Norway, a member of the 2007-02 CGSS cohort.

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<tr>
<td>2007-02</td>
<td>Major Egil Daltveit, Norway:</td>
<td><em>March 2004 Riots in Kosovo: A Failure of the International Community</em></td>
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<td>2008-02</td>
<td>Lieutenant Commander Jason Pittman, USN:</td>
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<td>2009-02</td>
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The Birrer-Brookes Award winning thesis for each academic year along with the other nominees are all available through the Combined Arms Research Library at the following link: http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/contentdm/mmas.htm
ANNOUNCING the 2010 General William E. DePuy
Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

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While commander of the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from 1973 to 1975, General William E. DePuy established the first Army-wide standards for individual and collective training and education. This year, we seek ideas to continue his vision of educating leaders at all levels to creatively respond to future unknown conditions, threats, and resources. Submissions should be original, well-researched essays 3,500–5,000 words long.

★ Contest closes 28 June 2010 ★

1st Place $1,000 and publication in Military Review
2nd Place $750 and consideration for publication in Military Review
3rd Place $500 and consideration for publication in Military Review
4th Place $250 and consideration for publication in Military Review
Honorable Mentions $100 and consideration for publication in Military Review

For more complete information on how to submit an entry, go to http://militaryreview.army.mil

Soldiers of the 3-14 Infantry Battalion, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, provide suppressing fire during a combined arms live fire exercise at Fort Drum, New York, 5 May 2009. (Ralph Dayton photo)
U.S. Army PFC Brialynn Lanteigne provides security for a traffic control point in the Sabari District of Afghanistan, 20 January 2010. (U.S. Army, SGT Jeffrey Alexander)

Field Manual 5-0: Exercising Command and Control in an Era of Persistent Conflict  p33
COL Clinton J. Ancker, III, U.S. Army, Retired, and LTC Michael Flynn, U.S. Army, Retired

NetWar: Winning in the Cyberelectromagnetic Dimension  p20
Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, U.S. Army, Retired

The Maneuver Company in Afghanistan: Establishing Counterinsurgency Priorities at the District Level  p33
Colonel Michael R. Fenzel, U.S. Army

Political Capital and Personal Interest  p45
Lieutenant Colonel Erik Claessen, Jr., Belgian Army

FEATURE: Unleashing Design  p2
Brigadier General (P) Edward C. Cardon and Lieutenant Colonel Steve Leonard, U.S. Army

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