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**The 2011 US National Strategy for Counterterrorism maintains the focus of the United States on pressuring al-Qaida's core, while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity. The strategy states that the US is engaged in a broad sustained, and integrated campaign together with the concerted efforts of allies, partners and multilateral institutions. Beyond al-Qaida, other foreign terrorist organizations threaten US national security interests. These groups seek to undermine the security and stability of allied and partner governments. Building strong enduring partnerships based on common understandings of the threat, the local culture, and common objectives is essential to every one of the strategy's overarching counterterrorism objectives, and the US endeavors to do so in the southern Philippines. In a remote province of the Southern Philippines, the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) has been working to support US national strategy in a whole-of-government approach fully partnered with the Government of the Philippines (GRP). The task force performs security assistance activities and foreign internal defense (FID) to combat the violent extremist organizations (VEOs) Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyah, Moro Islamic Liberation Front and other groups in the area while working with USAID and other organizations to improve conditions, governance, and development in Mindanao. This dissertation is based on field work conducted in the southern Philippines to explore and compare how members of the US military, Philippine military and police, and populace of Mindanao understand Islamic beliefs and values, using anthropological research methods. This will shed light on the degree to which the task force shares an understanding of the local culture with its partners and populace and where any divergence of understanding may lie. This will better enable USG personnel to discern the cultural implications when engaging Muslim populations in the Southern Philippines during irregular warfare or security assistance activities and inform capacity-building development and diplomatic efforts.**

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
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DISSERTATION

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# Understanding and Engaging the Muslims of the Southern Philippines

Diana L. Dunham-Scott

This document was submitted as a dissertation in June 2012 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of John Peters (Chair), Dick Hoffmann, and David Kennedy.



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## **Abstract**

The 2011 US National Strategy for Counterterrorism maintains the focus of the United States on pressuring al-Qaida's core, while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity. The strategy states that the US is engaged in a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign together with the concerted efforts of allies, partners, and multilateral institutions. Beyond al-Qaida, other foreign terrorist organizations threaten US national security interests. These groups seek to undermine the security and stability of allied and partner governments. Building strong enduring partnerships based on *common understandings* of the threat, the local culture, and common objectives is essential to every one of the strategy's overarching counterterrorism objectives, and the US endeavors to do so in the southern Philippines.

In a remote province of the Southern Philippines, the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) has been working to support US national strategy in a whole-of-government approach fully partnered with the Government of the Philippines (GRP). The task force performs security assistance activities and foreign internal defense (FID) to combat the violent extremist organizations (VEOs) Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyah, Moro Islamic Liberation Front and other groups in the area while working with USAID and other organizations to improve conditions, governance, and development in Mindanao.

This dissertation is based on field work conducted in the southern Philippines to explore and compare how members of the US military, Philippine military and police, and populace of Mindanao understand Islamic beliefs and values, using anthropological research methods. This will shed light on the degree to which the task force shares an understanding of the local culture with its partners and populace and where any divergence of understanding may lie. This will better enable USG personnel to discern the cultural implications when engaging Muslim populations in the Southern Philippines during irregular warfare or security assistance activities and inform capacity-building, development and diplomatic efforts.

## **Summary**

### **Understanding and Engaging Muslims in the Philippines**

The 2011 US National Strategy for Counterterrorism maintains the focus of the United States on pressuring al-Qaida's core, while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity. The strategy states that the US is engaged in a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign together with the concerted efforts of allies, partners, and multilateral institutions. Beyond al-Qaida, other foreign terrorist organizations threaten US national security interests. These groups seek to undermine the security and stability of allied and partner governments. Building strong enduring partnerships based on *common understandings* of the threat, the local culture, and common objectives is essential to every one of the strategy's overarching counterterrorism objectives, and the US endeavors to do so in the southern Philippines.

In a remote province of the Southern Philippines, the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) has been working to support US national strategy in a whole-of-government approach fully partnered with the Government of the Philippines (GRP). The task force performs security assistance activities and foreign internal defense (FID) to combat the violent extremist organizations (VEOs) Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyah, Moro Islamic Liberation Front and other groups in the area while working with USAID and other organizations to improve conditions, governance, and development in Mindanao.

This dissertation is based on field work conducted in the southern Philippines to explore and compare how members of the US military, Philippine military and police, and populace of Mindanao understand Islamic beliefs and values, using anthropological research methods. This will shed light on the degree to which the task force shares an understanding of the local culture with its partners and populace and where any divergence of understanding may lie. This will better enable USG personnel to discern the cultural implications when engaging Muslim populations in the Southern Philippines

during irregular warfare or security assistance activities and inform capacity-building, development and diplomatic efforts.

Cultural domain analysis revealed the richness of perspectives about Muslims in the research population. The large range and diversity of characteristics that people use to discuss Muslims and Islam in the Philippines describe a very unfamiliar cultural domain with a vastly different ethnic context than Iraq or Afghanistan. The analysis suggested stark differences in point of view between the different stakeholders in the area—local Muslims view themselves primarily in terms of their tribal/ethnic identity while JSOTF-P members view Muslims mainly through the lenses of sectarian orientation, religious extremism/moderation and violence.

Cultural consensus analysis did find that major stakeholders in the Southern Philippines do not share a common understanding of the culture. This could be an impediment to a proper intelligence estimate of the situation when planning any kind of operation, whether a raid, a training event, a community engagement or development project. We cannot necessarily rely on what our AFP partners tell us; they also lack expertise on the culture. We have disconnects within and between major stakeholders where we should have a “three-legged stool.” This disparity in viewpoints is very important for the task force to be aware of and to manage properly. Conversely, our partners in the military, law enforcement and community leaders should be aware of how others perceive them.

The good news is that key stakeholders do appear to have a degree of shared appreciation, or homogeneity of views and high levels of cultural knowledge. There are culturally knowledgeable members of the JSOTF-P of all ranks and educational levels, and there is significant concordance with the Muslim respondents. The PNP in particular, having many members from local communities, has cultural expertise which we should leverage. This would better enable USG personnel to discern the cultural implications when engaging Muslim populations in the Southern Philippines during irregular warfare or security assistance activities and inform capacity-building, development and diplomatic efforts.

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## **Acronyms**

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
AQ	al-Qa'ida
BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
CT	Counterterrorism
DOD	Department of Defense
COIN	Counterinsurgency
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JSOTF-P	Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines
MILF	Moro Islamic Freedom Front
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
PNP	Philippine National Police
RP	Republic of the Philippines
SC	Strategic Communications
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
VEO	Violent Extremist Group
WESMINCOM	Western Mindanao Command (AFP)



## **Chapter 1: Introduction, Policy and Research Questions, and Policy Relevance**

### **Introduction**

For more than a decade, the United States has been in a war to disrupt, defeat, and dismantle al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States emphasizes our international partners and specifically states that the US must work with partner nations and engage Muslim communities. The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism also emphasizes our partners and recognizes the importance of theaters outside Afghanistan; the strategy:

*...maintains our focus on pressuring al-Qa'ida's core while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our resilience. At the same time, our strategy augments our focus on confronting the al-Qa'ida-linked threats that continue to emerge from beyond its core safehaven in South Asia. Beyond al-Qa'ida, other foreign terrorist organizations threaten U.S. national security interests. These groups seek to undermine the security and stability of allied and partner governments...*<sup>1</sup>

The Philippines is a critical US partner in Asia and has experienced Muslim-separatist insurgency and jihadist terrorism for decades; US military forces conduct a foreign internal defense mission to assist the government of the Philippines defeat these threats. Building strong enduring partnerships based on *shared understandings* of the threat and common objectives is essential to every one of the strategy's overarching counterterrorism objectives, and the US endeavors to do so in the southern Philippines.

### **The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review also echoed the NSS:**

*...we must expect that for the indefinite future, violent extremist groups, with or without state sponsorship, will continue to foment instability and challenge U.S. and allied interests.*<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> National Security Strategy of the United States, the White House, Washington D.C., 2010, p. 20

[http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\\_viewer/national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review, United States Department of Defense, February 1, 2010, [http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR\\_as\\_of\\_12Feb10\\_1000.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf)

The QDR details key objectives with respect to building the security capacity of partner states; the complexity of unifying many tools of statecraft and working closely with our partner means that a high degree of cultural understanding is required:

*Preventing the rise of threats to U.S. interests requires the integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense, along with intelligence, law enforcement, and economic tools of statecraft to help build the capacity of partners to maintain and promote stability. Such an approach also requires working closely with our allies and partners to leverage existing alliances and create conditions to advance common interests... Operating in partnership with host nation security forces and among local populations puts a premium on foreign language skills and regional and cultural knowledge. Today's operating environment demands a much greater degree of language and regional expertise requiring years, not weeks, of training and education, as well as a greater understanding of the factors that drive social change...<sup>3</sup>*

The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) is operating in this complex environment in Mindanao and requires an evolving and sophisticated understanding of the socio-cultural terrain to continue to succeed. Building the capacity of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP), one of the task forces' main efforts, requires a *shared understanding* of that socio-cultural terrain and the threat from violent extremism. Hence this research is a multifaceted effort to understand what it means to be Muslim in the Southern Philippines.

### **Special Operations Forces in the Philippines:**

The US efforts to combat violent extremism in Southeast Asia are not as well known to the public as the developments in Iraq and Afghanistan occurring up to 2012, and the story in the Philippines is in stark contrast to those difficult campaigns. In the Philippines, the entire US effort has been tiny and indirect; the US role is strictly a non-combat one to train, advise and assist the national forces of the Philippines. The present

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<sup>3</sup> 2010 QDR, p. v

circumstances provide a case, so to speak, for the strategic approach to strengthen partners, engage Muslim communities and use every tool of national power in a coordinated effort to eradicate extremist networks, eliminate safe-haven and improve governance.

The government of the Philippines is engaged in counterinsurgency (COIN) against violent extremists, but the US is not; US forces are conducting foreign internal defense (FID) under strict and prudent restraints:

*Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.*<sup>4</sup>

The FID mission is executed by the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) with approximately 600 men and women and a budget of some \$52 million a year;<sup>5</sup> in contrast, the Iraq war cost over \$100 billion a year and required more than 180,000 troops at its peak in FY 2008, and the Afghan operations costs about \$2 billion a week and as of December 2011, involve more than 94,000 troops.<sup>6</sup> Figure 1 depicts the Philippines and the remote province of Mindanao, where the JSOTF-P is headquartered with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Western Mindanao Command (WESMINCOM) in the city of Zamboanga.

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<sup>4</sup> Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010, downloaded from the Joint Electronic Library at

[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jointpub\\_operations.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm) as of 20 March 2012

<sup>5</sup> Max Boot and Richard Bennet, "Treading Softly in the Philippines: Why a low-intensity counterinsurgency strategy seems to be working there." *The Weekly Standard*, January 5-January 12, 2009, Vol 14, No. 16

<sup>6</sup> According to the Brookings Institution statistical summaries; the Iraq index may be found at <http://www.brookings.edu/search.aspx?doQuery=1&q=iraq%20index> and the Afghanistan index at <http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx> as of 19 Mar 2012.



Figure 1. Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago are the home of Muslim separatist insurgencies and al-Qa’ida affiliated extremist groups. JSOTF-P is headquartered in Zamboanga. (Map courtesy Worldatlas.com)

The JSOTF-P mission is notable in that it has succeeded to date with a minimum cost of American lives and treasure while preventing developments that could have required a large-scale military intervention.<sup>7, 8</sup> The Southern Philippines has experienced a regional

<sup>7</sup> Seventeen service members have lost their lives since 2001, of which 14 were in non-combat related accidents and incidents. See Jim Michaels, “Philippines a model for counterinsurgency,” USA Today, 30 March 2011

<sup>8</sup> Per JP 3-22, p. 83, “From an SOF perspective, FID efforts are successful if they preclude the need to deploy large numbers of US military personnel and equipment.”

separatist Moro (indigenous Muslim) insurgency since the early 1970's which was initially led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MNLF negotiated a peace to gain limited political autonomy for Muslims in Mindanao in 1996, but the conflict has been continued by a more Islamist-oriented splinter, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF split from the secular MNLF coincided with global emergence of other Islamic fundamentalist movements world-wide, and altered the tenor of the conflict. Pan-Islamic militancy rendered Mindanao into a bastion of Islamist terrorism in beginning in the 1990's.<sup>9</sup>

Abu Nidal and the Palestine Liberation Organization were already funneling money into the Philippines when Osama bin Ladin built a support network for his operations there. Al-Qa'ida money directly facilitated the creation of the Abu Sayyaf group; Filipinos with experience fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan formed the initial cadre. Abu Sayyaf leaders envisioned a pure Islamic state independent from the Republic of the Philippines, based on Wahabbist Salafi precepts, and was far more radical than the MNLF or MILF.<sup>10</sup> Abu Sayyaf immediately established itself as a significant local terrorist entity with global jihadist ties, conducting kidnappings, beheadings, bombings, assassinations and extortion.<sup>11</sup>

The Philippines were poised to become a major al-Qa'ida safe haven; in the mid-1990s, top leader Khalid Sheik Mohammed and his nephew Ramzi Yousef used the island nation as a planning base for Operation Bojinka, the first (but failed) 9/11-style airliner plot; they had already perpetrated the 1993 World Trade Center attack.<sup>12</sup> Al-Qa'ida ultimately

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<sup>9</sup> Peter Chalk, "*Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh*," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 24:4, 241-269, 2001

<sup>10</sup> Peter Chalk, "*US Security Assistance to the Philippines: A Success Story Against Terrorism*," *CTC Sentinel*, 15 February 2008, Vol 1 Issue 3, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, [http:// www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/u-s-security-assistance-to-the-philippines](http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/u-s-security-assistance-to-the-philippines)

<sup>11</sup> Andrew Tan, "*Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: persistence, Prospects, and Implications*," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 23:4, 267-288, 2001

<sup>12</sup> Background available on FBI website

[http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom\\_02260](http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_02260); Yousef was captured in Pakistan in 1995 but KSM went on to mastermind 9/11.

decided to focus its support operations in the Sudan and then Afghanistan, but the Philippines continued to be plagued by global jihadism as the al-Qa'ida affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) found safe haven in Mindanao and collaborated with Abu Sayyaf and MILF.

The precipitating event for US involvement in the southern Philippines was the Burnham kidnapping on the resort island of Palawan, considered relatively safe because it lay 300 miles from Basilan and Sulu, the home islands of Abu Sayyaf. In May 2001, Abu Sayyaf crossed the Sulu Sea in small open boats to kidnap twenty tourists, including three Americans, Guillermo Sobrero and Martin and Gracia Burnham, a missionary couple. US Special Forces deployed to assist in the ongoing operations to find the captives in early 2002; Mr. Sobrero had been beheaded. Mr. Burnham was shot and killed during rescue operations conducted by Philippine forces in June 2002, but Mrs. Burnham survived.<sup>13</sup>

This small element of Special Forces was invited to remain in the country and eventually established the JSOTF-P. The FID/indirect approach methodology, nicknamed “By, With and Through,” was inculcated as relationship building, reinforcing legitimate institutions, building host-nation security force capabilities, sharing intelligence, conducting civil-military programs, and promoting local good governance.<sup>14</sup>

Between 2001 and 2012, most of the key Abu Sayyaf leaders have been killed and militant strength has been reduced from about 1,200 to less than 400.<sup>15</sup> Abu Sayyaf is said to have devolved into a criminal gang with little ideology remaining<sup>16</sup> and is

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<sup>13</sup> A superb account of the kidnapping by Mark Bowden is “Jihadists in Paradise,” *The Atlantic*, March 2007

<sup>14</sup> LTC Brian Petit, “OEF Philippines: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID,” *Special Warfare*, January-February 2010

<sup>15</sup> Armed Forces of the Philippines, “Internal Peace and Security Plan: Bayanihan” copy obtained by the author from the AFP general staff in Manila in October 2011.

<sup>16</sup> This was remarked to the author by several individuals on the JSOTF-P staff, by members of the Armed Forces Philippines and civilian populace during interviews May-June 2011.

increasingly isolated because MILF has now entered into serious peace talks with Manila and publicly denounced terrorist tactics. With intelligence support from JSOTF-P, Philippine forces have also decimated the ranks of JI leaders and key operatives in the Sulu Archipelago.

In early 2011, the Philippine government announced that sufficient progress had been made in Mindanao to begin implementation of a new 5-year internal security plan which would emphasize economic development and prepare the Philippine National Police to assume responsibility for internal security from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.<sup>17</sup> The strategy is designed to finalize a peace accord with MILF and isolate Abu Sayyaf and JI from internal and foreign support and defeat them.<sup>18</sup> The United States will remain a key enabler during this next 5-year phase; the emphasis on human rights, governance, security sector reform and economic development will require ever more nuanced engagement and sophisticated understanding of the human terrain.

In summary, in the global campaign against violent extremist organizations, the U.S. strategy is to employ a mix of military power, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy and development in direct (e.g., counterterrorism) and indirect (e.g., FID) efforts. These activities require an understanding of the beliefs and motivations of adversaries and allies to be successful. Fostering an environment inhospitable to violent extremists and working with and through local partners requires detailed understanding of all the groups involved and potentially difficult choices, especially with regard to the motivations of those who may be supporting violent extremists or very vulnerable to them. These may include communities regarded as moderate but with specific grievances or political objectives. The definition of who would be a suitable “local partner” is not provided in the national security or strategies. This is left to the discernment of the agencies operating on the ground.

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<sup>17</sup> Armed Forces of the Philippines, “Internal Peace and Security Plan: Bayanihan” author obtained paper copy from an AFP officer.

<sup>18</sup> The RP is also struggling with a Communist insurgency in the north, but the US is prohibited from involvement with those operations. The communist insurgency is not considered in this dissertation.

The work of the JSOTF-P, heretofore a successful model for defense cooperation and support for a nation facing insurgents, terrorists and lawless elements, will be to sustain that careful discernment and continue a most discreet application of influence and assistance. The author focuses this study to support the mission of the JSOTF-P.

## **Policy Question**

*Do security assistance stakeholders share a common understanding of the Muslim populace in the Southern Philippines?*

This dissertation will explore and compare how US Department of Defense (DOD) policy stakeholders and Muslims in the Southern Philippines understand Islamic beliefs and values, using qualitative and quantitative anthropological research methods. This will improve DOD understanding of the culture of our partners and the populace.

## **Dissertation Question**

How can we map the beliefs about Islam and Muslims of stakeholders in the southern Philippines to better understand the perspectives of our partners and the populace and be more effective during engagement?

## **Research Phases, Methodologies and Questions**

### **Mixed-Methods Approach:**

The dissertation uses qualitative and quantitative methods commonly used by anthropologists to investigate beliefs, values, and cultural models (Bernard 2006). Beliefs refer to what people think the world is like and values refer to their guiding principles of what is right or moral. Beliefs and values are incorporated into mental models that individuals hold of how things work; when these mental models are widely shared, they are called cultural models. (Kempton, Boster et al. 1996)

In Phase I of the research, semi-structured interviews were used to discover the range and central tendency of beliefs about Muslims and Islam held by JSOTF-P personnel and members of the Philippine armed forces and local populace in several locations in Mindanao. Standard qualitative research methods were used to analyze the texts, describe these beliefs and compare the views of different stakeholders. In Phase II of the research, the data collected in Phase I was used to create an instrument to measure the degree to which different groups share understanding of Philippine Muslims, using the quantitative method of cultural consensus analysis, developed for anthropologists in

1986 by A. Kimball Romney et al.(Romney, Weller et al. 1986). Principal components analysis is used to compare the responses of three key sub-groups—members of JSOTF-P, Philippine Muslims and Philippine Christians.

If we find that different groups of people hold different cultural models, then we can say they will likely formulate policies or react to them in very different ways. If we find a divergence in understanding of Islamic culture in the Philippines between different policy stakeholders, then policies and communications involving our partners and Muslim communities may not be as effective as would be hoped.

### **Phase I: Cultural Domain Analysis**

- What is the range and diversity of characteristics that people use to describe Muslims?
- To what degree do people agree about these characteristics?

### **Phase II: Cultural Consensus Analysis/Principal Components Analysis**

- Do major stakeholders in the Southern Philippines share a common understanding of the culture? How similar or different are groups from each other?

The purpose of Phase I is to gain an understanding of beliefs about Muslims and Islam in the region, form preliminary comparisons of the stakeholders, and guide the data collection for Phase II. In Phase II, respondents' answers to a questionnaire will be analyzed to determine whether or not there is *cultural consensus*—or shared understanding; patterns of agreement and disagreement will be explored using principal components analysis. The dissertation will test the hypothesis: that *JSOTF-P personnel, their partners and Philippine Muslims diverge significantly in their conceptions of Islam and the local culture.*

## **Policy Relevance**

The research will be useful to the US DOD (specifically, the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines) and is relevant to the entire 3D (defense, diplomacy and development) efforts of the US government in Mindanao, in particular:

- Working with partners, leaders and communities of Mindanao during security cooperation and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) efforts to combat violent extremism
- Training, advising and assisting the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP)
- Conducting Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
- Planning strategic communications, Information Operations (IO) and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to counter extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that extremists exploit
- Identifying Muslim leaders and public intellectuals that are striving to counter the extremist narrative, promote better governance and support the peace process
- Working with leaders and communities during humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) efforts

## **Contribution to the Literature**

There is a dearth of current, field-based anthropological literature on the people of Mindanao. During and after World War II, anthropology made substantial contributions to the US war efforts, especially in the Pacific where commanders were faced with cultures that were very alien to them. By the late 1940's almost half of all professional anthropologists were employed in some war-related government capacity, but the contributions of anthropology to military operations essentially disappeared in the early 1950's (with the notable exception of special operations forces (SOF)). In the years prior to US involvement in Vietnam, the profession enjoyed tremendous growth in the academic sector, but during the conflict, controversy over the use of social scientists by

the intelligence community contributed to the near-extinction of these collaborations with the military and intelligence agencies.<sup>19</sup> Concurrently, the Army purged nearly everything to do with irregular warfare or insurgency, and presumably the need for cultural considerations, with the notable exception of the Special Forces. Special Operating Forces (SOF) have long specialized in irregular and unconventional warfare, and have emphasized the need for the force as a whole to complement its lethal capabilities with a soft approach that depended upon effective engagement with a local population.<sup>20</sup>

When the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was appointed as the supported or lead command for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in 2005, the U.S. military shifted its emphasis to irregular warfare. USSOCOM and the SOF have put their brought an appreciation of the leveraging power cultural competency can bring to the fight.<sup>21</sup> The general purpose forces quickly followed suit with the re-birth of counterinsurgency doctrine in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* in 2006; the field manual emphasizes the role of cultural knowledge and specifically mentions the need for anthropology in its chapter on intelligence.<sup>22,23</sup>

After 9/11, and particularly after the insurgency ignited in Iraq in 2004, cultural intelligence was urgently needed by the military and intelligence communities. The CIA started recruiting social scientists in 2005 and in 2007 the Army launched the Human Terrain Teams from a pilot project into a \$40 million program to embed four- or five-

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<sup>19</sup> **Erve Chambers**, “Applied Anthropology in the Post-Vietnam Era: Anticipations and Ironies,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 1987, 16: 309-37

<sup>20</sup> Special Forces Groups are regionally oriented and house specific cultural knowledge in each group; 1<sup>st</sup> Special Forces Group is responsible for East Asia and has provided forces and leadership to the JSOTF-P since its inception; task force command responsibilities currently alternate with Navy SEAL officers.

<sup>21</sup> Jessica Glicken Turnley, “*Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF are.*” JSOU Report 11-1, The JSOU Press, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 2011

<sup>22</sup> Charles R. Morrison, “*Converting the Unknown to the Known: Misconceptualizing Culture.*” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, January-March 2010, United States Army TRADOC

<sup>23</sup> Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, United States Army, 2006

person groups of scholars — including anthropologists, sociologists and social psychologists — with all 26 U.S. combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>24,25</sup> Human Terrain Teams employ social science methodologies, including cultural domain analysis, but have not to date been deployed to the Philippines; they have operated in support of United States Central Command (CENTCOM) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the SOF community has always maintained cultural proficiency in the countries where they operate, and both SOF and general purpose forces have increasingly included cultural information in their intelligence assessments post 9/11, these studies are driven by command imperatives and access to the material is often limited; these materials were generally not available for this research.

Dangerous security conditions in Mindanao have greatly hampered academic research and news-gathering, particularly on the islands of Basilan and Jolo; it is extremely hazardous to perform field research on the peoples and groups of Mindanao, and there is very limited current information on the tribes.<sup>26</sup> According to Rommel C. Banlaoi, there is still ignorance on the most basic aspects of Abu Sayyaf's exact origin, ideological inclination, organizational structure, leadership dynamics, operational capabilities and recruitment strategies.<sup>27</sup> Thomas Kiefer's ethnographies of the Tausugs in the late 1960's and early 1970's remain a benchmark source for understanding the insurgents today,<sup>28</sup> even though ASG emerged much later in 1989-1990. Eduardo Ugarte's 2008 case studies of ASG's alliance systems were based on Kiefer's work and analysis of current media reporting, but he did not perform field work in the archipelago. Ugarte

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<sup>24</sup> Ken Stier, "Anthropologists on the Front Lines," Time US Online, 11 Dec 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1693592,00.html#ixzz1wyEtY8bM>

<sup>25</sup> Steve Chill, Lieutenant Colonel USMC (retired), "One of the Eggs in the Joint Force Basket: HTS in Iraq/Afghanistan and Beyond,"

<sup>26</sup> Eduardo F. Ugarte, "*The Lost Command of Julhani Jillang: An Alliance from the Southwestern Philippines*," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 32:4, 303-321, 2009

<sup>27</sup> Rommel C. Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism," in Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar, eds., *Southeast Asian Affairs 2006* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p. 247.

<sup>28</sup> Thomas M. Kiefer, "Institutionalized Friendship and Warfare among the Tausug of Jolo," *Ethnology*, Vol 7 No 3, July 1968

argued that the ASG, whose members are primarily Tausugs, still utilize a tribal alliance system described by Kiefer, although he says there is a “sheer dearth” of primary material and admits that the nature of ASG’s makeup remains largely unknown.

A 2009 Naval Post Graduate School thesis addressing counterinsurgency operations on Jolo also cited Thomas Kiefer. Herbert Daniels combined historical perspectives on the Tausugs and the ASG with analysis of the literature on adolescent males to present strategies to reduce recruitment by extremists; the author was able to obtain information from Tausug sources because he was a US Army adviser to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and therefore was himself armed and able to travel and work accompanied by armed security. Daniels’ thesis contributes recent information about Tausug culture – explaining how young Tausugs on Jolo are encouraged to be hot-blooded, adventuresome and violent, and to readily assist friends and kinsmen needing aid –hence the lure of joining groups like the ASG. Crime and banditry, provided they are perpetrated outside the immediate community, confer status on young men and provide excitement; the ASG’s involvement in so many profitable criminal enterprises makes the organization a source of income. A key finding is that many Tausugs view themselves as Tausugs first and last, and not as Filipinos, and in fact hold the central government responsible for the poor conditions in the archipelago. Young men feel no remorse for their illicit activities because they are taking from people that they view as responsible for their situation, and that includes Christians and foreigners.<sup>29</sup>

The Moro rebellion has been the longest and most persistent in the region since the 1970’s, and Mindanao has a long history of violence. Andrew Tan explains that the Moros first resisted the Spaniards, who arrived in 1565, and were never subdued; they subsequently resisted the hand-over to the US after the Spanish-American War in 1898. The US crushed resistance with a brutal campaign to pacify Mindanao.<sup>30</sup> Colonel

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<sup>29</sup> Herbert A. Daniels, “No Child Left Behind: COIN Strategies To Deny Recruitment of Adolescent Males in the Southern Philippines,” Naval Post Graduate School, December 2009

<sup>30</sup> Andrew Tan, “*Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications*,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 23:4, 267-288, 2000

Ricardo Morales, Philippine Army, examines factors which contribute the length of the insurgencies in the Philippines.<sup>31</sup> He cites Philippine scholar Samuel K. Tan's work on the Bangsamoro people which explains that Mindanao has a long history of violence. Intra-tribal disturbances were struggles for supremacy or status among the leaders of local society; inter-tribal encounters were over control of resources for group security. The blood feuds and vendettas that exist to this day in Mindanao, called *rido*, are residual evidence of this historical practice. These eventually transformed into rebellion against central authority, first against the foreign colonizers, then against a government composed of other Filipinos.<sup>32</sup> According to Morales, the Moro rebellion was caused by economic, political and social marginalization of the earlier inhabitants of Mindanao as a result of the continued migration of Christians which created friction between the new settlers and the Muslims. The number of Christian migrants in Central Mindanao soared from .7 million in 1948 to 2.3 million in 1970, displacing Muslim landowners and precipitating the beginning of armed rebellion. The grievances are still salient today.

A 2009 RAND assessment of the terrorist threat in SE Asia provides historical context and causal factors for the militancy in Mindanao, detailing the main grievances and policy failings of the central government and corruption of the ARMM which leave the province in substantially no better condition than when the MNLF insurgency ended in 1996.<sup>33</sup> The MILF rejected the 1996 autonomy agreement with aspirations for complete independence and institution of Sharia rule. In addition to this ideological split, it is noted by Chalk, et al that while the MNLF is comprised mostly of Tausugs and is strongest in the Sulu Archipelago, MILF is predominantly comprised of Maguindanao and Maranao people, who are mainly in the provinces of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur, on northern Mindanao island. MILF has adopted a less Islamist stance since the beginning of a truce in 2001 with respect to the negotiations, but the rhetoric of obligation of jihad is still used

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<sup>31</sup> Ricardo C. Morales, Colonel, Philippine Army, "Perpetual War: the Philippine Insurgencies," Naval Post Graduate School, 2003

<sup>32</sup> Samuel K. Tan, The Bangsamoro Struggle. UP Forum Online. Official Publication of the University of the Philippines, Tomo 1, Blg. 7, May/June 2000.

<sup>33</sup> Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau, and Leanne Piggott, "The Evolving Terrorist Threat to SE Asia, A Net Assessment," 2009 RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA

in recruiting young men who are raised in a traditional warrior culture. Other themes that motivate support for MILF are reclaiming Muslim lands and addressing repression, poverty, marginalization and social exclusion. Members are offered clothing, housing, employment and “upward mobility.” With respect to the support of the populace, the RAND report notes that the ability of MILF to resist counterinsurgency efforts for more than 30 years suggests that the movement has a strong base. The future prospects of Mindanao very much depend on the successful outcome of the peace talks with the MILF; a positive conclusion, it is hoped, will isolate remaining radicals in Mindanao and permit the AFP to eradicate remaining ASG and JI irreconcilables on Basilan and Sulu.

This study is a new contribution based on field work conducted in 2011 in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, with the support of the JSOTF-P. It is a mixed qualitative and quantitative exploration designed to understand the human terrain in the context of ongoing FID efforts by US special operations forces. It was not driven by short-term command imperatives, but it seeks to redress the “sheer dearth” of primary material available to satisfy a critical shortfall of basic research on the Muslims of Mindanao.

In this dissertation, we will use cultural domain analysis to discover not only what people believe about Philippine Muslims, but how people may be fitting information about Islam into their pre-existing views and forming cultural models. If we find that these models diverge between laymen and experts (i.e., Muslims)—and many policymakers who are essentially laymen with respect to understanding Islam—then we have a basis for understanding how the US engagement effort might be made more effective.

Cultural consensus modeling and principal components analysis will be used to show in a mixed-methods approach the degree to which different groups share the same model of what it means to be a Muslim in the Philippines. If policy stakeholders and Muslims hold differing understanding of Muslim’s beliefs and values—then communication, and thus, engagement efforts could be impeded. This work will diagnose the areas of agreement and disagreement to improve engagement.

## Chapter 2: Phase I, Cultural Domain Analysis

*“Culture, or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” Sir Edward Burnett Tyler, 1871<sup>34</sup>*

### Exploration: Discover, Describe, Compare

According to H. Russell Bernard, cultural domain analysis is the “study of how people in a group think about lists of things that somehow go together.” (Bernard 2006) The goal of this methodology is to understand how people in different cultures interpret the content of domains differently; in our case, we wish to discern differences in beliefs about Muslim culture in the Philippines. The study of a cultural domain is not about exploring people’s preferences (do you prefer bananas or mangoes?) but about things that exist and somehow go together (e.g., in the domain of “fruit,” lemons, oranges and grapefruits are citrus fruits, while apples and pears are not) (Bernard and Ryan 2010). Hence the content of a cultural domain is in principle shared; the degree to which it is shared is an empirical question (Borgatti 1998). In anthropological research, semi-structured interviews are used in the exploratory stage to discover the content and boundaries of the cultural domain being studied. Interviews are used rather than focus groups to maximize participant response variance and elicit complete and independent responses. Semi-structured interviews allow informants to explain their beliefs and values in their own words.

The first step is to define the cultural domain of interest. This is done by the respondents, not the researcher, to ensure the research captures the knowledge and beliefs of the people being studied, and does not inject the researcher’s own beliefs. The most useful

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<sup>34</sup> Sir Edward Burnett Tyler, “Primitive Culture: Researches Into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom,” 1871. E-book version downloaded from Google Books  
[http://books.google.com/books/about/Primitive\\_Culture.html?id=AucLAAAIAAJ](http://books.google.com/books/about/Primitive_Culture.html?id=AucLAAAIAAJ) as of 5/27/12

general technique for defining a domain is the free-listing task. (Weller and Romney 1988) The interview begins by asking the informant to list as many “kinds” of the thing being studied as he or she can; in this study, informants were asked to free-list “kinds” of Muslims.

The researcher then elicits more information to discover beliefs about the things listed using open-ended questions to encourage paragraph-length answers. One does not assume beforehand what the beliefs and values might be; for example, one would only supply labels such as “moderate” or “extremist” when asking informants for clarification—for example, if moderates are not mentioned explicitly during free-listing, one might probe the informant for his or her views on moderation. The interview guideline is shown in Figure 2; the actual flow of the interview depended on the informant and determined the exact follow up questions.




Figure 2. Interview Guidelines

### Phase I Sampling Strategy

In this first, exploratory stage, the purpose of sampling was to capture the range and the central tendency of beliefs, rather than obtain classic parameter estimates, thus statistical sampling was not performed. The sample was eclectic—small and non-random,

deliberately not representative, but useful for probing the structure and limits of beliefs about Muslims and Islam. This sampling approach distinguishes ethnography from social and behavioral research which judges the reliability, validity and generalizability of findings by reference criteria from classical statistical theory. W. Penn Handwerker and Daniel F. Wozniak addressed the criticism that cultural data collected by convenience sampling might not be reliable and valid as follows (Wozniak 1997). Ethnography is the process that seeks to document what people believe, feel and do in the context of their culture; ethnographic data by their nature are not independent. Cultural data comes from questions like “What does it mean to be a conservative Muslim?” and “How do you distinguish Tausug people from Yakans?” In ethnography, the answer is *necessarily* related to the answers that other people will give who share the culture. However, answers to questions like “How old are you?” or “Where do you live?” have no necessary relationship to answers given by another person. The authors demonstrated in their paper that the simple random sample accurately gave estimates of known population parameters, and non-probability (convenience) samples did not; while, for cultural data, the two sampling schemes yielded identical results.

In this phase of the research, the sample included members of the JSOTF-P, of the Philippine armed forces, and local populace (Muslim and Christian). Informants from the JSOTF-P included both Philippine civilian employees and military members. Respondents were chosen from various organizational levels and ranks. Informants from the AFP included officers and enlisted men. Members of the populace included both Christians and Muslims from different areas of Mindanao. Due to adverse security conditions in Mindanao, the author could not travel without armed JSOTF-P escorts, and access to certain communities was often infeasible due to ongoing AFP offensive operations. In Phase I, the author was permitted to conduct interviews in several locations in northern Mindanao, at JSOTF-P headquarters, at WESMINCOM headquarters, and in the residential areas of the WESMINCOM base.

A snowball sampling strategy was used to find informants. Individuals from each community of interest were contacted and asked for interviews. Then, these individuals

were asked to recommend more informants. Table 1 shows the sample of 30 informants; for the free-listing method, a sample size of 20-30 is typical.<sup>35</sup>

<b>Country/Religion</b>	<b>Agnostic</b>	<b>Christian</b>	<b>Jewish</b>	<b>Muslim</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
Republic of Philippines	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>
AFP Member	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Civilian	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>
United States	<b>1</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>19</b>
USA	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>11</b>
USAF	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>
USN	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>30</b>

**Table 1. Phase I Sample.**

### **Phase I Data Analysis**

There are a number of things that can be observed and inferred from free-listing data. The core central concepts of a cultural domain are the items most salient to the respondents and the periphery, given by less salient items, provides the boundary and shows the diversity in the domain. The importance or saliency of an item is inferred from the position of an item on a list, and the number of different lists it appears on. People tend to mention things that are more salient right away, and the more people that mention a thing, the more salient it is. These two indices of salience tend to be highly correlated. The boundary of the domain may be inferred when the list changes very little as more people are interviewed. While practically speaking we could continue to find more items in the domain, what typically happens is the list will trail off to things that only one

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<sup>35</sup> Interviews are conducted until no new information is obtained; Susan Weller notes that 20-30 interviews are usually sufficient with a coherent domain (Weller, 1988). If more interviews are needed, they will be done.

person mentions—things that are not very salient. As more people are interviewed the list becomes stable and the order of things tends not to change.

Items are tabulated by counting the number of informants that mentioned each thing, and ordered in terms of frequency of response. If the domain is coherent, if the researcher used adequate probes and encouragements with the informants, and if the domain is not too small, then usually the most frequently mentioned item on the list will have been mentioned by a majority of the sample. There is no fixed rule about how many of the free-list items to use in the ongoing study; generally the list will be too long to use all of the items. The most frequently mentioned items receive priority, but less-mentioned items can be used to insure variety.

The raw data from the free-list task is displayed as overall frequency of mention in Figure 3. The overall frequency distribution is characteristic of a domain that is not highly shared but the classic scree shape shows the core and periphery of the domain; the core items are above the “elbow” in the curve, and the periphery items are below the elbow. If a domain is highly shared across a culture, we typically see a small group of items that most individuals (e.g., >70%) mention; a slightly larger group of items that some people (e.g., 40-69%) mention; a still larger group that only a few people (e.g., 10-39%) mention; and the largest group that few individuals (e.g., 1-9%) mention. These items represent the core and periphery aspects of the domain (i.e., those items that are more and less typical or important), items mentioned most often belonging to the core, and the items mentioned least often belonging to the periphery. In contrast, domains that are not shared have a different distribution. In these cases, we rarely find items that are mentioned by most people; instead, we find that the most salient items are rarely mentioned by more than 30% or 40% of the sample.(Bernard and Ryan 2010)

In Figure 3, the most salient items are labeled, e.g., “Tausug” was mentioned by 37.5% of respondents; Tausug, Maranao, Yakan, Maguindanao, Sama, Badjao and Iranon are

Philippine ethno-linguistic (tribal) groups known to the respondents.<sup>36</sup> Sunni and Shia are Islamic sects; Philippine Muslims are nearly all Sunnis. So the “kinds” of Muslims most salient to the respondents are the tribal identities and sects, then violent and extremist ones. Interestingly, conservatives and fundamentalists receive equal mention along with fanatics and moderates, Iraqis and Afghans, and those who are part of the separatist groups MNLF and MILF. The periphery items, too numerous to label, are circled in red and presented in Table 2. Typical of a free-list task, there are many items mentioned by only one or two people. Thirty interviews were performed; the same core items were appearing and no significant new information was being obtained, so data collection for this task was completed.

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<sup>36</sup> Members of the various Moro ethnic groups may be found all over Mindanao, but the Tausugs, Sama and Yakan peoples mainly live in the Sulu Archipelago; the Maguindanao, Maranao and Iranon live in distinct locales on the main island of Mindanao. (McKenna, Thomas M. *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft0199n64c/>)



<b>These items mentioned by two persons only:</b>	<b>These items mentioned by one person only:</b>			
<b>non-violent</b>	<b>uneducated and illiterate</b>	<b>animist</b>	<b>Calagan</b>	<b>Islamic</b>
<b>Sufi</b>	<b>unsophisticated and illiterate</b>	<b>Sangil</b>	<b>converts</b>	<b>Iranian</b>
<b>peaceful</b>	<b>progressive</b>	<b>Subayon</b>	<b>convert</b>	
<b>fundamentalist</b>	<b>African</b>	<b>unconquered</b>	<b>nice ones</b>	
<b>radicals</b>	<b>regular Muslim</b>	<b>bad</b>	<b>mainstream</b>	
<b>militants</b>	<b>those who do bad things</b>	<b>extreme fundamentalists</b>	<b>Mapulin</b>	
<b>practicing</b>	<b>Tablighs</b>	<b>extreme versions</b>	<b>liberal</b>	
<b>non-practicing</b>	<b>violent extremists</b>	<b>every-day normal ones</b>	<b>lawless elements</b>	
<b>Samal</b>	<b>violently missionary</b>	<b>Davonigno</b>	<b>Muslim lite less strict</b>	
<b>non-extremists</b>	<b>populace</b>	<b>from Jolo</b>	<b>Arab</b>	
<b>poor</b>	<b>strict ones</b>	<b>extremist-fundamentalists</b>	<b>mellows</b>	
<b>uneducated</b>	<b>true believers</b>	<b>friendly</b>	<b>mean ones</b>	
<b>devout</b>	<b>true Muslim</b>	<b>fighters</b>	<b>fundamentalists</b>	
<b>educated</b>	<b>similar to Westerners</b>	<b>from Tawi</b>	<b>in-between ones</b>	
<b>westernized</b>	<b>Sobayan</b>	<b>Bedouins</b>	<b>Indian</b>	
<b>Wahhabi</b>	<b>sophisticated and educated</b>	<b>believers who follow the Koran</b>	<b>hypocrites</b>	

<b>wealthy</b>	<b>regular populace</b>	<b>Bangsamoro</b>	<b>Kurdish</b>	
<b>terrorists</b>	<b>traditional</b>	<b>criminals</b>	<b>kind Muslims</b>	
<b>Filipino</b>	<b>rogue</b>	<b>criminal</b>	<b>Indonesian</b>	

**Table 2.** Items mentioned by one or two people when asked to list “kinds” of Muslims.


We can compare the responses to the free-list task by sub-group. JSOTF-P members and Muslims differ markedly in their responses, as shown in Figure 4. The distribution of responses for Muslims indicates that this domain is widely shared across the culture, meaning that these are items shared by most people in the Muslim sub-group. Muslims mention the most prominent Moro tribes first, then “conservative” and then the Sunni and Shia sect. The tribe “Iranon” is mentioned, then uneducated/educated. Violence and radicalism is mentioned at a lower frequency. Ethnic or cultural identity is very salient to the residents of Mindanao; both Christians and Muslim respondents mentioned that the Moro peoples’ cultural practices, dialects and personalities vary amongst the tribes. However, almost all Muslims in the Philippines are of the Sunni sect; respondents often said that there is only “one” kind of Islam in the country, so it is not surprising that sect is not very salient to the respondents—it is more or less assumed that people are Sunni. It is interesting, however, that the Wahhabi sect is mentioned. Wahhabis are evangelical fundamentalists originally from Saudi Arabia that some respondents said are promoting radical teachings in the Philippines. It would be important for the task force to know how prevalent the sect is and what kind of influence they have on the populace.

The distribution for JSOTF-P indicates that this is not a widely shared domain, bearing in mind that these are the raw responses and there are many synonymous terms in the free-list data. In contrast to the Muslim respondents, JSOTF-P members mentioned the Sunni and Shia sects first then “violent” and “extremist.” The related term “fanatics” and its opposite “moderates” appear next along with “Iraqis” and “Afghans.” Sunni-Shia tension and violence were very critical to understand in Iraq, and less a factor in Afghanistan, but nevertheless a consideration; it is likely that this is one reason service members mention the sects so often. It is interesting that Iraqis and Afghans appear more

salient to the task force members than the local tribes; many of the members have served multiple tours in the CENTCOM theater, and certainly those experiences were formative. Given that Moro separatist and jihadist violence has killed over 100,000 people<sup>37</sup> and is having an enormous and deleterious impact on the development of Mindanao, one wonders why extremism and violence do not seem as salient to our Muslim respondents as to our JSOTF-P respondents. Possibly there was reticence to list those unpleasant aspects to an outsider during a very brief interview. These topics were discussed in the follow-up questions to the free-list exercise.

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<sup>37</sup> Andrew Tan, *op.cit.*



**Figure 4.** Comparison of free-list task responses between JSOTF-P members and Muslim Filipinos. Vertical scale is frequency (percent of responses); horizontal scale is item.

### **Thematic Categorization of the Free-list Responses.**


It is useful to examine raw data from a free-list task, but a common problem with the raw data is that many of the responses are synonymous. So in this data set, after correcting for spelling errors and plural versions of terms, the true frequency count for an item like “Shia” is simple to determine. But, for example, there are many terms used to express the characteristic of being violent in some sense (e.g., violent, bad, fighters, militant, mean, lawless) and extremist (e.g., extremist, fanatic, fundamentalist) and respondents

may combine and conflate violence, extremism, conservatism and religiosity (e.g., they mentioned violent extremists, violently missionary, extremist fundamentalists) as they struggle to describe this complex construct. So frequency analysis of the raw data may underrepresent the true saliency of certain constructs. The next exploratory step is to group the ninety-seven free-list responses into thematic categories.

The responses were grouped into the following nine themes; in parentheses are typical and rarer exemplars (typical...rarer). The entire table is presented in Appendix 3. In this coding, the categories of “extremists” and “moderates” are used provisionally, recognizing that those terms are themselves multi-dimensional and subject to interpretation:

- Philippine Tribal/Ethnic (Tausug, Yakan...Bangsamoro)
- Other Tribal/Ethnic (Bedouin...Kurdish)
- Sect (Sunni, Shia, ... Sufi, Wahhabis)
- Extremists (extremists, violent ... jihadists, “lawless elements”)
- Moderates (moderates, westernized...progressive, “every-day normal ones”)
- Geographic reference (Iraqi, Afghan...African, “from Jolo”)
- Religiousness (conservative, devout, “strict ones,” ... “true believers” “violently missionary” )
- Wealth (wealthy, rich, poor)
- Education (educated, uneducated)

Figure 5 shows the frequency distribution of the free-list items when binned into these categories. The JSOTF-P and Muslim respondents are in even more sharp contrast than the raw data indicated, and consolidation of the many synonyms for violence/extremism and non-violence/moderateness gives a different sense of salience.



**Figure 5.** Free-list responses binned into categories. (Vertical scale is percent of responses)

Figure 5 illustrates that nearly all of the JSOTF-P respondents mentioned characteristics associated with extremists (e.g., violence, fighting, fanatics, and fundamentalists<sup>38</sup>) while less than half of the Muslim respondents did. The next most salient kind of Muslim for the military respondents was the “moderate” kind (e.g., non-violent, nice, westernized) but less than a quarter of the Muslims characterized their culture that way. The most salient “kinds” of Muslims for Muslim respondents remains the tribal identities, followed by aspects of religiousness (e.g., devout, conservative, strict). Interestingly, religiousness appears equally salient to both groups of respondents; people were expressing both the depth of religious commitment (e.g., devout and the quality of it, e.g., evangelical).

<sup>38</sup> Recognizing that not all religious fundamentalists are violent, it was nevertheless clear during these interviews that respondents were in fact using this term to refer to violent or militant individuals in the Philippines

This binning does demote sect (Sunni and Shia), which appeared most salient for the JSOTF-P respondents in the raw data, because the inclusion of the many synonyms for violence and extremism promoted the “extremist” category. Education (e.g., literacy) was more salient for the Muslim respondents, who associated illiteracy and lack of sophistication with violent radicalism. JSOTF-P members made reference to country or region of origin and non-Philippine ethnic groups; the resident respondents apparently assumed that we were asking about Filipinos only. Both groups did mention wealth and poverty, as in “wealthy Muslims” or “poor Muslims” as “kinds” of Muslims.

This categorization is exploratory; it begins to indicate that the respondents have very different perspectives. The large range and diversity of characteristics that people use to discuss Muslims and Islam in the Philippines describe a very unfamiliar cultural domain with a vastly different ethnic context than Iraq or Afghanistan. The data from the free-list task suggests stark differences in point of view between the different stakeholders in the area—local Muslims view themselves primarily in terms of their tribal/ethnic identity while JSOTF-P members view Muslims mainly through the lenses of sectarian orientation, religious extremism/moderation and violence. Further analysis will shed light on how their beliefs may be impacting decision-making and interaction with their partners and populace. Qualitative analysis of the semi-structured interviews is presented next to uncover key dimensions of beliefs about Muslims and Islam.

### **Thematic Analysis of Interviews**

During the free-list task, informants received follow-up questions about the “kinds” of Muslims they mentioned; for example, if someone mentioned that “extremists” are a type of Muslim, follow-up questions probed what they meant by that. To discover the key dimensions of informant beliefs about Muslims and Islam, text from the interviews<sup>39</sup> was analyzed to refine the major themes discovered during the free-list exercise and to find more themes or sub-themes. The techniques described by Gery Ryan and H. Russell

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<sup>39</sup> Interviews were not recorded; informants seemed much more comfortable with note-taking. The field notes were transcribed each day that interviews were conducted as soon as possible after the interview. The field notes were written in the vernacular of the speaker.

Bernard in the anthropology journal *Field Methods* were used. Basically, as Ryan and Bernard termed it, a theme is found when one can answer the question, “What is this expression an example of?” (Ryan and Bernard 2003) Thus in this research, themes were induced from the data; no a priori themes were applied to the texts. The themes were kept to a manageable few which seemed most relevant to the research, built into a hierarchical codebook, and finally, linked into cultural models (the beliefs, values and practices shared by members of a group.)

The text-analysis software, QDAMiner, was used to expedite open coding of the interview field notes.<sup>40</sup> The notes were studied while looking for:

- Frequently used words
- Indigenous phrases
- Metaphors and analogies
- Grammatical transitions
- Missing data (things not said, topics avoided)

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<sup>40</sup> QDAMiner is a mixed methods qualitative data analysis software package for coding, annotating, retrieving and analyzing small and large collections of documents and images, owned by Provalis Research; see <http://www.provalisresearch.com/QDAMiner/QDAMinerDesc.html>

## Themes and Subthemes

The thirty semi-structured interviews provided extensive content about Muslims and Islam in the Philippines. Eleven main themes were identified using qualitative analysis: *Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)*, *Violence*, *Extremism*, *“Regular” Muslims*, *Religiousness*, *Drivers of Violence*, *Morality-Corruption*, *Education*, *Wealth*, *Geographic References*, and *Tribes*. The themes of *Morality-Corruption*, *Education* and *Wealth* received comparatively minor mention in the interviews, but contain important linkages to violent extremism; those themes are woven throughout the material and will be discussed as they appear. The theme of *Geographic References* will not be discussed further; the key finding about geography in the interviews was that the JSOTF-P members often referred to their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan when asked about Muslim culture, and generally did not express detailed knowledge about Mindanao.<sup>41</sup> Information about the tribes is contained in the discussions of the other themes, so that theme also will not be discussed separately. A key finding about the tribes is that while the locals referred to them instantly and almost universally when asked about Muslims in Mindanao, most JSOTF-P members did not. This means that fundamental information about the human terrain is not salient to the task force members.

The following is a discussion of the themes and sub-themes, shown in Table 3, including the frequency distribution by nationality and religion and tables of sample quotations including typical and rarer exemplars. This content is presented in some detail because our respondents use differences in language that seem subtle but in actuality signal important linkages as well as potentially important divergences in view. The tables of quotes for sub-themes are available in Appendix 6.

The linkages are important because they indicate the cultural models that people hold, and those influence how people will perceive and filter policy. The language used by the

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<sup>41</sup> Most members of the JSOTF-P staff are not special operations forces (SOF) and do not have specialized regional training. I want to be clear, though, that the Special Forces (Army SOF) do have a great deal of savvy about the Philippines, but I did not have opportunity to go into a lot of the nuances of how the security situation varied by district with them or the locals.

task force is of utmost importance. Language mistakes could render engagement and influence activities ineffective, whereas effectively using the language that the populace uses might resonate with them. This chapter should be a very useful reference for members of the task force and anyone interested in engaging this populace, especially those working in intelligence, Public Affairs, Strategic Communications, Civil Military Operations, and Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

This analysis will reveal that who qualifies as a religious extremist, who is a militant (or even if those are really different things) and who may primarily be criminal is not so easily distinguished in the Philippines. Religion, power, money, grievances and violence are not to be so neatly divided, and these elements appear throughout the interviews in complicated relationships—an ecology, if you will. This subject merits its own very detailed ethnography; this dissertation can only begin to uncover the signposts of what would be most valuable to study first.

Major Themes	VEOs	Violence	Religiousness	"Regular" Muslims	Extremism	Drivers of Violence
<b>Sub-themes</b> (Less Common)	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)	Mean	Many Cultures-Only One Islam	Democratic-Liberal-Progressive	Lawless	Anti-US
	Al Qaeda (AQ)	Beheading	Convert	Middle/In-between	Islamist	Sectarian
	Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	Bad	Devout	Non-Violent Peaceful	Fundamentalist	Defensive
	Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)	Fighting	Sharia	Support Extremists	Rogue	Revenge
	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	Suicide bombers	Convert (verb)	Majority	Fanatics	Tribal/Cultural
	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	IED	Less Strict	Moderate	Jihadist	Grievances
		KFR	Practicing	Normal-Regular-Mainstream	Terrorist	Separatism
		Violent	Conservative-Strict-Pious-Traditional	Friendly-Nice	Militants	Money
				Muslims are like us/Westernized	Radical	Islam inherently violent
					Extremist	Islam Distorted People are misled

Table 3. Major Themes and Sub-Themes extracted from the semi-structured interviews. Sub-themes which are more common are lower in the column.

*Theme: Violent Extremist Organizations*

VEOs	<i>JSOTF-P (Christian, Jewish or Agnostic; 19 cases)</i>	<i>Philippines (Muslim; 8 cases)</i>	<i>Philippines (Christian; 3 cases)</i>
<b>Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)</b>	1	2	1
<b>Al-Qa’ida (AQ)</b>	2	2	
<b>Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)</b>	4	5	1
<b>Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)</b>	5	4	
<b>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)</b>	5	7	1
<b>Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)</b>	6	5	1

Table 4. Count by case (interview) of the *violent extremist organizations* discussed by the respondents.

Table 4 lists the main violent extremist organizations discussed in the interviews, showing the number of cases (each interview is a case) in which the particular VEOs were mentioned at least once; Table 22 in Appendix 6 shows typical and rarer quotes.

According to Kathleen Meilahn of the Naval Post-Graduate School, violent extremists fall in to one of the following categories: insurgents, militia, global totalitarian radicals (such as al-Qa’ida ), religious nationalists (such as the Taliban), and their associated

volunteers (foot soldiers). Violent Extremists are individuals who have been radicalized. (Meilahn 2008) In the Philippines, we have representatives of all of these categories except the global totalitarian radicals, al-Qa'ida<sup>42</sup>. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are regional al-Qa'ida affiliates operating in SE Asia; the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) were once insurgents and still are religious nationalists with violent “rogue splinters;” the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Front (BIFF) are active insurgents and religious nationalists; Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) are putatively jihadist/religious nationalists, at least in their public stance. There are numerous illegal militias reporting to a plethora of actors both Muslim and Christian, including various elected officials and clan leaders. Some of the militia may be radicals but some may simply be clan or personal foot-soldiers. These militias were mentioned by various respondents as “goons” but details about them are beyond the scope of this research. The militias are ubiquitous and are terribly dangerous and deleterious to good governance.<sup>43</sup>

The militias and the other VEOs are part of an ecology of *de facto governance*, which competes with or substitutes for *de jure governance*. In Mindanao, weak legitimate governance means that security is privatized by the wealthy and rule of law is suborned by money, connections and by rule of armed power. A few elite families control most of the wealth and elected positions; members of the elected government *themselves* use and manipulate both the official and unofficial elements of governance. “Without guns, you are nobody,” say the locals.

#### **BIFF:**

The BIFF is a recently splintered faction of the MILF which broke away after the MILF decided to enter peace negotiations; one could argue as to whether they are “really” separate from the MILF, or a strategic move by MILF to keep pressure on Manila while the peace talks are ongoing; one Muslim respondent opined that the split was political, not ideological or religious. There are very interesting power-dynamics in Mindanao

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<sup>42</sup> So far as the author is able to determine at the unclassified level, there are no AQ operatives in the Philippines.

<sup>43</sup> Eduardo F. Ugarte, “*The ‘Lost Command’ of Julhani Jillang: An alliance from the Southwestern Philippines*,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 32, 303-321, 2009

that were hinted at by the locals. In the aftermath of the Ampatuan massacre, in which 57 election opponents, families and members of the press were ambushed and massacred by Ampatuan clan militia,<sup>44</sup> there may have been a local power & money vacuum that was filled by the MILF-BIFF split. This quote refers to the private militia (“followers”) of the Ampatuan clan going over to the BIFF:

*“You know Ampatuan? The massacre? He the ruler of all Mindanao, he killed political opponents and reporters. He was MNLF before. Now (he is under arrest) all his go to Kato, to the **BIFF**. We believe the current governor supports the **BIFF**, he is Toto, Magunadato. Kato has more followers now, former followers of Ampatuan. Why? Because no money after the massacre (because of the arrests).”* (RP-Christian)

If the current governor of Maguindanao district, Toto, does indeed support the BIFF, that may present a problem for the JSOTF-P and AFP. This points to an urgent need to thoroughly document these relationships as networks. In any case, the BIFF is more or less confined to a rugged area of northern Mindanao and its leadership (Ameril Kato in particular) is vigorously targeted by the AFP with JSOTF-P assistance.

#### **JI/AQ:**

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is important because it is the only trans-national VEO and al-Qa’ida (AQ) affiliate known to be operating in the Philippines, having expanded there from Indonesia; continual pressure is maintained on JI to prevent them from mounting significant attacks on Philippine or US interests and to degrade their facilitation networks. It is notable that although there are no known al-Qa’ida operations in Mindanao at this time, the global jihadist group received a few mentions linking them to the local VEOs, such as:

*“JI they are linked with ASG and **AQ**.”* (RP-Muslim)

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<sup>44</sup> Alastair McIndoe, "Behind the Philippines Maguindanao Massacre," Time World, 27 Nov 2009,

*“The radicals? There is MRLF, MILF, Abu Sayyaf and **Jemaah Islamiyah** and **Al-Qa’ida** .” (RP-Muslim)*

Both US and Philippine respondents mention that the two groups are connected and share ideology and radicalization strategies:

*“The **JI** have same belief as **AQ**, and same strategy as the Communists. They use propaganda to generate sympathy and in the madrassas, they teach radical, and they speak to crowds. They still have ideology of jihad. **JI** want Islam to rule everyone—but that is un-Islamic, because the Koran says there is no compulsion in religion.” (RP-Muslim)*

JSOTF-P members mentioned that **JI** personnel had intermarried with local women and were integrated into society; **JI** operatives are involved in sophisticated operations and are terrorist facilitators:

*“Now **JI**, they are still jihadist with ties to **AQ**, and going abroad for stuff. They do IEDs, ambushes, safe havens, staging, training, extortion. They marry local wives to integrate into society here. (US)*

*The **JI** guys here, they have intermarried. This is their safe haven, they are not fighter guys, more like facilitators.” (US)*

#### **MNLF:**

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is a prominent and legally recognized entity which laid down arms in 1996; however, so-called “rogue” elements bearing that name are violent and are said to collaborate with **JI** and **ASG**. For example, one Muslim respondent said:

*“The **MNLF** wants peace, but renegades split off, they do not want peace!” (RP-Muslim)*

Other Muslim respondents asserted that the MNLF is not an extremist group, although they are a separatist group. Some Muslim and US respondents nevertheless referred to MNLF proper as violent extremists and as religious radicals; a US respondent said:

*“They (MNLF and others) are violent separatist groups, supposedly negotiating for peace but they are really negotiating deceptively to gain advantage.” (US)*

**MILF:**

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a Moro separatist group that broke away in 1984 from the MNLF, and adopted a more visibly Islamist posture; after years of insurgency in Mindanao, they are currently in peace talks which have been punctuated by fighting. The MILF rejected the autonomy arrangement brokered between the MNLF and Manila in 1996, and insisted that only a fully independent Islamic state was acceptable. However, some Muslim respondents remarked that the MILF struggle is not about religion, but about separate governance, and that the populace supports the MILF because of grievances:

*And MILF—I do not know why they have “Islamic” in the name, their struggle is not religious, it is about separate government. (RP-Muslim)*

*“The Congress is mostly Christians from Luzon, their laws do not help Maguindanao. That is maybe one reason people support the MILF—the prejudice.” (RP-Muslim)*

US respondents believe that MILF is a violent group—for example they “*use the populace for a shield*” but that “*not all the MILF*” are extreme and that perhaps “*rogue*” or “*lawless*” elements are a problem. US respondents believe that MILF members are “*extremely conservative.*”

**ASG:**

The most-mentioned group is the home-grown terrorist group, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The ASG is a continual menace to the populace because its members raise cash with kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) operations, drug smuggling and gun-running, and commit bombings and ambushes; they are a priority concern of the JSOTF-P, PNP and AFP. The ASG seems to have lost most of its jihadist reputation and any sense of legitimacy with the populace in recent years.<sup>45</sup> Respondents said typically that:

*“They (ASG) are doing crimes, smuggling, drugs, gun running, and ASG, they are doing KFR. It is all about money.” (RP-Christian)*

*“The fanatics, here in the PI, they are not so much preaching jihad or the caliphate any more, I mean the ASG. Now it is about criminality, and they no longer have strong key leaders” (US)*

*“The doings of the ASG is against the teachings of Islam—it is a “grave offense” before the eyes of God” (RP-Muslim)*

Both US and Philippine Muslim respondents, noting the lack of development in the Sulu Archipelago and the dearth of education and jobs, felt that people joined ASG these days mostly because of their “situation” and that it is like a gang—not so easy to leave. Also, one Muslim respondent felt sympathetic that ASG provided the only alternative for people who had no connections (bata-bata) to get jobs:

*The locals, they see the ASG as their only alternative against the politics. Almost all ASG members have criminal records and they are victims of the politicians’ bata-bata system. The ASG guys, 95% are in the group because of their situation, they do not believe in jihad. (RP-Muslim)*

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<sup>45</sup> McKenzie O’Brien, “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror: the Case of Abu Sayyaf’s Kidnapping Activities,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24:2, 320-336

Although respondents did typically agree that ASG is now more of a criminal network than an Islamist extremist group, members of ASG nevertheless do have a reputation for extreme religious conservatism, and are said to use jihadist rhetoric to recruit.

Some quotes mention more than one group, possibly indicating that the groups are linked in that person's thoughts; people did say that the groups have members in common and that some families have members in multiple groups. It would be enormously helpful to conduct formal social network analysis (SNA) of the VEOs, families and tribal groups. The AFP and PNP officers I met were keenly interested in network analysis; they had painstakingly developed knowledge of the people and VEOs but had very limited ability to create electronic databases and had no experience with SNA software tools. This would be an excellent goal for future capacity-building with our partners.

When people spoke about these extremist groups, some of them distinguished between the groups in terms of ideology or motivations, i.e., JI are jihadists-terrorists, ASG are money-making criminal-terrorists and religious extremists, MNLF and MILF are righteous conservatives fighting oppression (and BIFF is a rogue splinter); but some people simply lumped all these groups together as violent extremists.

Some people felt that the groups were all very religiously motivated, some felt that certain groups used religion sincerely as recruitment motivation and that some groups espoused religion as a cover for simple naked aggression or out of political convenience. The sense that terroristic violence is a "grave offense" before the eyes of God is a critical message, but probably best voiced by local leadership rather than JSOTF-P messaging to be deemed authentic and sincere

There are those who believe that people join these groups to earn money, as jobs are scarce, and then become trapped. This is another aspect of the VEO ecology—that their activities provide employment and income—the de facto economic aspect of governance—in the absence of a healthy economy.

*Theme: Violence*

	<b>JSOTF-P (Christian, Jewish or Agnostic; 19 cases)</b>	<b>Philippines (Muslim; 8 cases)</b>	<b>Philippines (Christian 3 cases)</b>
<b><i>Violence</i></b>			
<b>Beheading</b>	2		
<b>Bad</b>	3		1
<b>Fighting</b>	3	6	3
<b>Suicide bombers</b>	3		1
<b>IED</b>	4	1	
<b>KFR</b>	4	1	2
<b>Violent</b>	11	2	1

Table 5. Count by case of sub-themes related to *Violence*.

Table 5 lists the sub-themes related to *Violence* discussed in the interviews, showing the number of cases (each interview is a case) in which the particular terms were mentioned at least once; Table 23 in appendix 6 shows typical and rarer quotes. The respondents tend to use different language when referring to violence; Americans were more likely to use the generic term “violent” or “violence” while the locals used the term “fight” or “fighting” much more. This discussion will start with the less prevalent expressions, and then address the more common sub-themes.

**Bad:**

A few people used the colloquial term “bad” as in bad (violent) people or bad (violent) acts:

*“They (ASG) do KFR to make a living. But not all of them are **bad**, it is like a gang, it can be hard to leave. Some members just got wrapped into it.”*

The only use of the term bad by a Philippine respondent was by a Christian army member, referring to Muslims:

*“They are mostly **bad**. They are the worst ones. They have no school, they do not understand. So they follow what he says. They are easily led, easy to influence by the MILF leaders. There are no jobs.”* (RP-Christian)

**Kinds of Violence (KFR, IED, Beheading, Suicide Bombers)**

Both US and Philippine respondents made pointed references to particular kinds of violent tactics, e.g., kidnapping for ransom (KFR), bombings (IEDs), beheadings and suicide bombers. Kidnapping for ransom is so prevalent that it is the local equivalent of “business” and apparently monopolized by the VEOs:

*“They do **KFR** to make a living.”* (US)

*“**KFR** is a business”* (RP-Muslim)

*“Only the Muslims do like **KFR**, not Christians.”* (RP-Christian)

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is a scourge in the Philippines; it has not risen to the levels it did in Iraq at the time this document was written, but is nevertheless a serious threat. A JSOTF-P member mentioned that it is used to intimidate the populace; during conversations with one of the town mayors on Basilan, he described multiple bombing attempts against him and his family by the ASG.

*They do IEDs as an intimidation tool against the populace, not US forces (US)*

Only Americans mentioned beheading:

*“Extremists are people who **behead you** if you do not follow them.”*

Both US personnel and Philippine Christians mentioned suicide bombing, which has to date not occurred in the country. Martyrdom was mentioned as crazy but a powerful motivator:

*Those **suicide bombers**, they are insane. (RP-Christian)*

*They teach about **martyrdom**, promise that God will reward you if you sacrifice your life and kill evil others--this is really powerful motivation. (US)*

### **Violent/Violence:**

US respondents used the general terms “violent” or “violence” in about half of the interviews, and the context was generally religious violence; they linked devoutness to violence and note that violent groups tend to be in rural, rather than the urban areas. In contrast, Muslims linked radicalism to violence:

*“The more devout, the more into the Koran (that they are) they tend to be more fundamentalist. You know, Islamists. They justify **violence** by the Koran. They believe Sharia should be THE law and so they want to throw out the government.” (US)*

*“The **violent** irreconcilable ones are hiding out in the forest, i.e. they have geographic sanctuary.” (US)*

*“Those who Koran interpretation is radical, hard-core, they are killing (like the ASG) the book is their tool for recruiting. They are **violent**.”* (RP-Muslim)

Some Muslim respondents also mentioned violence in the generic sense that may not have been religiously motivated. This quote gives the sense of the ubiquity of violence:

*“They who did that **massacre**, (it was over an election) they are very rich. The government—there are guns and goons! Everybody has goons!”* (RP-Muslim)

### **Fighting:**

The Philippine informants used the terms “violent” or “violence” less than the Americans did and used the term “fighting” almost universally. This may be because while terrorism looms large in the thoughts of Americans since 9/11, the impact of the fighting on Mindanao, in terms of deaths and internally displaced persons, dwarfs that of other kinds of violence down there. Some respondents express that educated people are “in the middle” both literally and figuratively and do not support the fighting:

*“The educated ones, they are in the “middle” not joining the **fighting**”* (RP-Muslim)

Philippine Christians express that the fighting is fanatical and that not only do the VEOs want their own separate government, but they unreasonably want the Christian residents “out.”

*“The fanatics—they have twisted minds. They are **fighting** for a cause, they are like Osama bin Ladin.”* (RP-Christian)

*“They are **fighting**, they want independence, they want Christians out.”* (RP-Christian)

There is nevertheless a sense that “fighting” is a different kind of violence than terrorism:

*“They said that ASG has “no ideology” and when they pray for courage, it is un-Islamic because they are only doing crimes, not **fighting** for a principle.” (RP-Muslim)*

Also, there is a reminder from the Philippine respondents that Mindanao has never really been pacific—the Yakan and Tausug tribes in particular have a history of conflict. US respondents mentioned this cultural aspect as well:

*“Men: they **fight**; they protect their area—both Yakans and Tausugs. Men of the highlands do this and women work.” (RP-Muslim)*

*“The Tausug—they are fierce, they **fought** for survival, they are allowed in Islam to defend themselves. Sometimes the AFP are afraid of them.” (RP-Muslim)*

*“In the PI, there are particular families that are militant where for generations, **fighting** is handed down to the kids.” (US)*

The concept of “fighting” for worthwhile causes would appear to have great resonance with the Muslim populace in the sense of its legitimacy and with the entire populace with respect to its terrible impact of lives and livelihoods destroyed. It would be more effective for JSOTF-P messaging to address the specific, core theme of fighting both as a cultural heritage and as legitimate resistance, rather than violence in general.

*Theme: Extremists*

<b>Extremists</b>	<b>JSOTF-P (Christian, Jewish or Agnostic; 19 cases)</b>	<b>Philippines (Muslim; 8 cases)</b>	<b>Philippines (Christian; 3 cases)</b>
<b>Islamists</b>	1		
<b>Fundamentalist</b>	2	2	
<b>Rogue-Lawless</b>	3	2	
<b>Fanatics</b>	3		1
<b>Jihadists</b>	3	2	
<b>Terrorists</b>	3	2	
<b>Militants</b>	4	1	
<b>Radicals</b>	5	5	
<b>Extremists</b>	10	4	

Table 6. Count by case of sub-themes related to *Extremism*.

Table 6 lists the sub-themes related to *Extremists* discussed in the interviews, showing the number of cases in which the sub-themes occurred at least once. These subthemes capture several dimensions of extremism and reveal differences in use of language amongst the respondents. The generic term “extremist” is used by about half of both US and Muslim respondents, so it might resonate with the populace if used in communications, but the terms “fanatics” and “Islamists” were never used by Muslims, and it is important to see how they were used by Christians. Philippine Christians, although there were only three respondents, are under-represented in this theme.

**Islamists:**

The term “Islamist” was only mentioned in one case, but this person’s beliefs may not be rare. The respondent equates fundamentalism and Islamism, linking both with violence and revolt to restore full Sharia law in a caliphate:

*“The more devout, the more into the Koran (that they are) they tend to be more fundamentalist. You know, **Islamists**. They justify violence by the Koran. They believe Sharia should be THE law and so they want to throw out the government....they believe in a caliphate...the ones we are fighting, you know, **Islamists**” (US)*

Probably our forces have been exposed to al-Qa’ida propaganda on Sharia and restoral of Islamic rule in a global caliphate, and perhaps there is JI propaganda to this effect in the country. However, it is current US policy to engage peaceful Islamists, and therefore, it would be important for our people to be able to distinguish between non-violent and violent Islamists. There is a substantial body of opinion on what the definition of “Islamist” is, and it is beyond the scope of this study to fully dissect that subject. For the purposes of this study, we simply note that Islamism is an umbrella term commonly applied to both violent and non-violent movements such as al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban, and the MILF. The simplest definition of Islamism would be 'Political Islam', which refers to those movements that treat Islam as their political ideology. This differentiates Islamism from secular political groups and from traditional Islam, which does not treat the Islamic scriptures as a roadmap for political theory.

### **Fundamentalists:**

The term “fundamentalist” is commonly equated with “extremist” by US and Philippine respondents, and often attributed to foreign influences. Also, devoutness is linked to fundamentalism by Americans; this might be offensive to our Muslim partners:

*Well, they are extremist, **fundamentalist**. (RP-Muslim)*

*Well you know, the foreign clerics, they are **fundamentalist**. (RP-Muslim)*

*The more devout, the more into the Koran (that they are) they tend to be more **fundamentalist** (US)*

Additionally, fundamentalism is deemed to be more prevalent in rural areas:

*In Southern Basilan, it is more rural and more **fundamentalist**. (US)*

### **Rogue-Renegade-Lawless:**

These terms seem to be used both as slang for militants, and to express the position that the “real” separatist organizations are not extreme, and to cast an aspersion of illegitimacy (lawlessness):

*“The MNLF wants peace, but **renegades** split off, they do not want peace!” (RP-Muslim)*

*“The MNLF and MILF, they have **rogue** elements (that are lawless).” (US)*

*“On Basilan there are some **lawless** Tausug and Yakan” (RP-Muslim)*

It might be appropriate and useful to use this kind of language to reinforce encourage lawful and moderate behavior on the part of the MNLD and MILF, and/or to challenge any assertions they may attempt to make that they cannot be held accountable for the violence of their so-called “rogue” elements.

### **Fanatics**

No Muslim respondents used this term, and it might not resonate with the populace if it were used in any messaging; fanaticism connotes a rabid craziness that may make people feel defensive. Two respondents, one US and one a Philippine Christian, expressed the view of fanatics being “*fucking psycho*” and “*twisted*” and while these were rare quotes, the sentiments may not be so rare in the attitudes of the respondents. Other US respondents used the term when expressing beliefs that Islam is inherently violent and that “moderate” or “mainstream” Muslims may sympathize with the jihadists, or even actively support them. These perspectives are not rare and seem to indicate a deep cynicism and mistrust of the populace as well of the extremists:

*And these **fanatics**, they could become the violent extremists. Because the sword, that is pivotal element of their religion. (US)*

***Fanatical**, those who take it to the extreme, out of context, or for profit or to make a name for themselves. Their views are from the parts of the Koran about conquering (US)*

*So **fanatics** are conservative and they believe in Jihad. But...I think also mainstream Muslims could support jihad...in their hearts. Chances are, they are unwittingly supporting jihad, because when they fail to speak out (against jihad) that makes them accomplices. (US)*

#### **Jihadists:**

Some respondents noted that extremist groups still have jihadist beliefs and ties—particularly JI-- but others noted that there is waning enthusiasm for the ideology:

*But the leaders use **jihad** to convince, to recruit. A lot will join for religious reasons. (RP-Muslim)*

*They (JI) still have ideology of **jihad**. JI want Islam to rule everyone—but that is un-Islamic, because the Koran says there is no compulsion in religion. (RP-Muslim)*

*Now JI, they are still **jihadist** with ties to AQ, and going abroad for stuff. (US)*

*They use **jihad** to recruit, but the populace losing interest (RP-Muslim)*

The appeal of jihad as a recruitment tool or to maintain popular support may have been eroded by the mainstream view that violent jihad is “un-Islamic” as previously quoted, and here reinforced as the disapproval of Islamic scholars (ulema):

*Many pious of the ulema reject the ASG on the grounds of **jihad**. (RP-Muslim)*

**Terrorists:**

This term seems to be used to refer in particular to JI and especially the ASG, not the MNLF or MILF. Terrorists are said to commit ordinary crimes to fund their terroristic crimes, deceive the populace with false religion, and are associated with foreign radicals infesting the madrassas. Perhaps it would be useful to determine if these references to foreign clerics radicalizing in the hinterland have any basis in fact, and if so, who they are and what might be done about it. Terrorists apparently hate Western education and destroy schools. The link between lack of education, inability to develop, and violence reappears throughout the interviews:

*Most of teaching in madrassas is good, to learn Arabic. But some leaders went Saudi and came back radical. They are pretending to understand Islam and they mislead the younger generation, they use religion to convince good people...they recruit. Some current **terrorists** were madrassas students. For example, they were taught “once you kill a Christian, you enter paradise.” (RP-Muslim)*

*Some Muslims go to Catholic school because the quality of education is good, but the **terrorists** burn down the school. Without education people “stay dumb.”  
There is no progress! (RP-Muslim)*

**Militants:**

This term is used interchangeably with other terms in this theme by Americans; only one Philippine respondent used the word. There is some sense that the populace is tiring of the militants and beginning to assist the JSOTF-P or AFP more often but that they also play both ends against the middle to get money or a development project. US personnel express concern that the populace is either intimidated by the militants or actively supporting them; perhaps the ground truth varies by district or the day.

*People are losing interest in the **militants**, there is less support, less enthusiasm for jihad. (RP-Muslim)*

*The populace is extremely intimidated by the **militants**. They will seem to cooperate with the AFP to get something. Some of the populace is not intimidated but they actively support the militants. (US)*

*However there was a recent case of a kidnapping of a child where the populace reported against the **militants**. It was a big deal. We hope people in other municipalities will follow suit. (US)*

### **Radicals-Radicalizing:**

Variations of the term “radical” were more broadly used by the Muslim respondents than the task force members (and Christian Filipinos used very little of any of the language in this theme.) “Radical” seems to be a preferred vernacular and would likely resonate with the populace if used in communications. Muslim converts are thought to be more likely to be radical, implying that the evangelicals of the religion are themselves more likely to be radical. Radicals are described by Muslim respondents as cliquish people, having their own imams, manner of dress (but not always) and general sense of mental and physical isolation from the regular populace out in the rural areas which hints again at the link between lack of education (here, “complexity of thought”). Foreigners radicalize:

*The **radicals**, they have their own Imams, sometimes they are foreigners. (RP-Muslim)*

*The **radicals**—can easily identify them. They exclude themselves from the main community, they are in the rural areas, isolated, they isolate themselves. They are not in the city—too much complexity of thought there, they avoid that, competition of ideas. (RP-Muslim)*

*Yes, Pakistanis, Saudis, and so forth—we call them “Arabs” they are **radicalizing!***  
(RP-Muslim)

*The **radicals**, sometimes they (the men) wear the old-style clothes (traditional garb) but not always, you cannot always tell them by their dress. The ladies, some wear the head covering and some cover the face, and they cover their hair and arms. (RP-Muslim)*

Both Muslim and US respondents asserted that the radicals’ beliefs are distortions of Islam:

*So the ones called **radical** or extremist Muslims are not Muslims, they are simply **radical** people. (RP-Muslim)*

*The **radicals**, their beliefs are distorted (US)*

### **Extremists:**

This term is used by about half of the JSOTF-P and Muslim respondents. In these cynical remarks, frustration is evident; extremism has no positive attribute; it is linked intolerance, to corruption, power and abuse of the populace; extremists may have grievances but they also create grievances. This suggests that the term may be *carefully* used to delegitimize VEOs without offending the sensibilities of the locals.

However, one Muslim respondent who is also an AFP officer in WESMINCOM declared that there are no extremists in the Philippines because “*extremists are suicide bombers.*” This was an interesting assertion because members of Jemaah Islamiyah who were directly involved in suicide bombings in Indonesia had been or were currently operating in the Sulu archipelago and were collaborating with Abu Sayyaf and rogue elements of MNLF and MILF. However, no suicide bombings had been perpetrated in the Philippines to date. His perspective may be an outlier, but it could be a commonly held

point of view. This is an officer who interacts with the task force and the populace; he may have expressed an important sensitivity that the task force should know about.

The issue of corruption, in the sense of an impenetrable political ecology where, in the *de facto* governance, the elected government and the VEOs may be symbiotic, merits very careful attention. However, the cooperation of local officials is critical and could be derailed with the wrong approach. The linkages of people, groups, and political offices would benefit from detailed analysis including SNA.

*Extremists are less/non tolerant.* (US)

*Extremists have a power agenda, they use fear to motivate their people, they make them afraid of the “other.”* (US)

*The community leaders, they are hypocrites, and they are aligned with the extremists. They play both sides. You know, during a CMO, they will seem friendly to us. But they are doing the dirty work for the militants for sheer greed, not religion. They are keeping people in fear, and they are not stopping the militants. What kind of dirty work? Like extortion and corruption. They take government money but do not benefit their people. How do I know this? Because we have been here ten years (and it has not changed). These community leaders—they are not getting shot—because they are collaborating! They do not feel the militants are a threat.* (US)

*Extremists capitalize on their own people's misfortune to carry out their intentions.* (US)

Muslim respondents feel that a tendency to extremism varies by tribe—certain tribes are more warlike and politically powerful-- and some aver that it is a “homegrown” rather than foreign-contributed phenomenon. Recall that the Tausugs and Yakans were nearly always mentioned first by Muslims during the free-list exercise; in these quotes there are

hints as to why that was so. An updated ethnography of these people would be very valuable.

*Of the tribes, the Tausugs would be most likely inclined to **extremism**, then the Yakans. The Yakans, they are a lot of leaders, high profile, with political power. They know that “without guns you are nobody.” (RP-Muslim)*

*...all **extremists** in the PI are home-grown and no foreigners influence them (RP-Muslim)*

Finally, these one of quotes again link lack of education to gullibility and vulnerability to extremist recruitment:

*So if uneducated, easily convinced to follow **extremist** teachings. (RP-Muslim)*

Theme: “Regular” Muslims

<b>“Regular” Muslims</b>	<b>JSOTF-P (Christian, Jewish or Agnostic; 19 cases)</b>	<b>Philippines (Muslim; 8 cases)</b>	<b>Philippines (Christian; 3 cases)</b>
Democratic-Liberal-Progressive	2	3	
Middle/In-between	3	2	
Non-Violent Peaceful	4	6	
Support Extremists	4		1
Majority	6	1	
Moderate	7	2	
Normal-Regular-Mainstream	8		
Friendly-Nice	9	2	1
Muslims are like us/Westernized	10		

Table 7. Count by case of sub-themes related to “Regular” Muslims

Table 7 lists the sub-themes related to “Regular” Muslims discussed in the interviews, showing the number of cases in which the sub-themes occurred at least once. This theme might have been named “Moderate Muslims;” moderate is a term used frequently by the US respondents to denote people who are not extremists and who are not involved

with political or terroristic violence. However, some Muslims find the term “moderate” offensive because it insinuates that one should be less of a Muslim to not be an extremist; this term was not used frequently any Philippine respondents. The term may be a liability to use in public messaging; that issue deserves careful consideration.

The title “*Regular*” *Muslims* is not entirely satisfactory either, but serves to denote that the US respondents tended to frame moderation as a sense of normal-ness from their Western point of view and as an attribute of the majority of the populace; they tend to mirror-image, in other words. On the other hand, the Muslim respondents, who regard *themselves* as the regular folk, describe what it *means* to be “normal”—i.e., peace-loving, in the “middle” or “in-between” and to enjoy and embrace democratic civil rights. Task force members do seem to assume that other people are like them, in a kindly manner; but this habit could skew their appreciation of the environment. They should be more self-aware about how they view other people. Sometimes, other people are not “just like us.”

#### **Democratic-Liberal-Progressive:**

US respondents mentioned “progressive” as an attribute for Muslims, equating it to being mainstream, liberal, Westernized, and able to make “progress.”

*“progressive Muslims...they have mainstream thinking.”* (US)

*“The progressive ones, government and religion can coexist, like in the UAE, the environment is sort of free. There is economic and cultural progress. Like in Qatar, Dubai, they embrace some Western influences.”* (US)

In contrast, Muslim respondents mentioned enjoying democracy and civil rights:

*He, as a Muslim in the AFP, said he enjoys **freedom of religion**.* (RP-Muslim)

*But here in the PI we have no oppression! Here, we have **freedom**, it is a **democracy**, if we do not like our leaders we can vote. (RP-Muslim)*

*Yes, here women have **full civil rights**, it is far more **liberal**, this is a **democracy**. (RP-Muslim)*

### **Middle/In-between**

These few quotes capture two important senses of what it means to not be an extremist in the Philippines: one is in the “middle” as in the political center, or one is in the middle of conflict and “in-between” dangerous factions and other influences, and therefore vulnerable. Muslim respondents linked education to this attribute, just as they linked lack of education to extremism. This should serve as encouragement that the education-related projects that the JSOTF-P has facilitated for years are worthwhile:

*The educated ones, they are in the “**middle**” not joining the fighting with the MILF. (RP-Muslim)*

*There is a certain group, educated ones (indicating himself) we are the **in-between ones**, do not like the factions. Some youth groups, as college students to lend assistance, humanitarian, to people hurt by conflicts for evacuees. (RP-Muslim)*

*The “**in-between**” Muslims are the majority of the population, they are subject to many competing influences. They are like you and me, doing the best they can. (US)*

### **Non-violent/Peaceful**

The term “non-violent” is used by US respondents and “peaceful” or “peace-loving” is typically used by Philippine Muslims. JSOTF-P members note that non-violent people are more likely to be urban, just as they explained that rural areas tend towards fundamentalism.

*The **non-violent** Muslims in the PI are in more populated areas (US)*

Muslims associate education with being peace-loving, reinforcing the idea of educated people being in the “middle” and illiterates tending to extremism. The Sama people, besides being educated and employed, are said to be temperamentally more genial than the Tausugs:

*Now, the Sama are a **peace-loving** people. Their focus is on education. They are more professional peoples who are Sama. Sama people, they are patient people, not like Tausug. (RP-Muslim)*

“Peace-loving” might be a more effective phrase to use in task force communications because it has a more positive, hopeful sense than “non-violent” and because it is an indigenous vernacular. However, one problem with the term is this: being peace-loving is not very prestigious; the dominant tribes are the warriors and they look down on the peace-loving Samal and Badjao. So the term may resonate with some communities but not with others:

*The Badjao, they are **peace-loving**, abused, they migrate away like to Manila, they sometimes are a problem only for illegal dynamite fishing. They are **peace-loving** and they are afraid, afraid of dogs and ghosts, so they go to sea to avoid the ghosts. Some of them have houses. People look down on them. The Tausug think the Samal and Badjao are 2nd class citizens. (RP-Muslim)*

### **But Maybe They Support the Extremists**

Some US respondents are suspicious that, while the majority of Muslims are sort of like “us,” they also understand and support the “fanatics:”

*The middle ones--the silent majority, they want to worship in peace, be left alone, not you know, be converted to Christianity, they approve of the Western way, but also **understand the fanatics, do not condemn them**, they would not condemn an attack on Israel. They are quiet about their feelings about the fanatics--this is hard to understand. They may **justify the fanatics' actions** to themselves.*

### **Muslims are like us/Westernized**

In half of the interviews, US service members expressed their beliefs that non-extremist Muslims share their values and would want to live the American lifestyle; this is a US-only theme. It is true that American culture is very popular in the Philippines—our movies, music and fast-food restaurants are very much in evidence. It may not be entirely true, however that they admire all aspects of our culture; both Christian (mainly Catholic) and Muslim Filipinos alike tend to be quite conservative, as recent protests of a Lady Gaga concert illustrated.<sup>46</sup> It is good that our soldiers can relate to the populace, but they may not fully appreciate cultural undercurrents if they tend to mirror-image.

*They want to live their life, they want the **American Dream**. (US)*

*But they are just simple people who want to care for their families and have a better future, they have the **same values** as anyone else. You know, universal values (US)*

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<sup>46</sup> Elizabeth Yuan, “Lady Gaga’s Manila concerts face protests,” CNN Online, May 21, 2012, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/21/showbiz/gaga-manila/index.html>

*So there are two kinds of moderates: those who are not really practicing but respect Islam, and the majority who are “like us” they just want to raise their kids, teach their kids in peace, be left alone and have a better future. (US)*

*Here they are far less conservative—they seem to pray regularly but are more open. They are much more **Western**, more modern, I mean they use cell phones, and they are very friendly.*

### **Majority**

The belief that the majority of Muslims are not extreme has appeared in previous quotes, along with the opposite belief that the majority of the populace may be silently or openly supporting the militants. The theme of *majority* was expressed by about one-third of US respondents and only one of eight Muslims, and none of the Philippine Christians. This concept deserves separate mention because popular support for insurgency is a center of gravity for counterinsurgency. The ground-truth with respect to this support is most important to determine and no doubt the task force endeavors to measure it. A very good question would be why some members believe that the populace is mostly moderate or at least non-combative but somehow support the separatists or even the jihadists. If there is any element of truth to this, it needs to be thoroughly understood district by district so the deleterious influences and grievances can be addressed.

*They take religion to the extreme—**most Muslims** are not like that. (US)*

*Independence from Manila—**the majority of Muslims** do not prefer it. (RP-Muslim)*

### **Moderate**

This is another sub-theme expressed more commonly by Americans (7 of 19 cases) than Philippine Muslims (2 of 8 cases) or Christians (no cases). We have already discussed that this term may not resonate with Muslims and, being laden with so many expectations

but so little agreement as to its meaning, might be difficult to use effectively in communication.

In these quotes, Muslim respondents confirm the wearing of hijab by moderate ladies, and aver that some moderates may be more devout than others:

*No, you cannot tell by dress who is radical. Some radicals wear t-shirts and shorts and some wear traditional dress. It is painful for **moderates** like our veterinarian and our director ladies that they wear hijab and someone might think they are radical. (RP-Muslim)*

*The ladies who are **mellows**. They do wear the head covers. (RP-Muslim)*

**Mellows** go to mosque on Fridays. Some are very religious and some are less religious. (RP-Muslim)

American respondents expressed views that moderation is “normal,” that moderates do not dress conservatively, are less observant, and more tolerant. This assumption that moderates do not dress conservatively could lead to an incorrect assessment of the populace:

*Here in the PI the moderate Muslims do not wear conservative dress, they dress **normal**. (US)*

*The **moderate Muslims are normal**. They have routine life, like us, you know go to church, work, raise the family. They don't try to convert you to Islam. Then there is **Muslim Lite**. Like here in the Philippines, they are tolerant, less strict, more integrated with Christians. (US)*

### **Normal-Regular-Mainstream**

The viewpoint that moderation is “normal” is linked to the concept of “mainstream” Islam in US-only statements (about half of their interviews). Task force members view Sharia law as “old-school” and conservative, as opposed to mainstream or normal. The problem is that conservatism may actually be mainstream in the Muslim community; Sharia courts, for example, are used for domestic matters in the ARMM, and respect for Sharia law is not restricted to extremist enclaves.

*The **mainstream** Muslims, they are just **ordinary** people living like anybody else.*(US)

*Non-extremists: “progressive Muslims” they have **mainstream** thinking. Not so much here. Here they are too tied to Indonesia. The old school types want Sharia law. They are conservative.* (US)

### **Friendly-Nice**

More than half of US respondents linked niceness and friendliness to being tolerant and less conservative, “regular,” Western, and even modern. In contrast, a Muslim respondent asserted that his tribe is both religious and friendly, while a neighboring tribe is more pious (he said this in a mocking tone) and unfriendly. This snippet of ethnography is actually a useful piece of atmospheric, even if self-serving; it hints at district variations in religious practices and attitudes towards the JSOTF-P. A Philippine Christian (a young soldier serving in rural Mindanao) averred that the “friendly” Muslims were traitorous and untrustworthy, echoing previous US statements about the populace supporting the extremists and hinting at deep tensions between the AFP and the populace:

*Here they are far less conservative—they seem to pray regularly but are more open. They are much more western, more modern, I mean they use cell phones (implying in other countries they don't have), and they are very **friendly**.* (US)

*The regular populace is very **nice** . (US)*

*First of all we Maguindanao, we are **kind**, we love to have a big cookout to celebrate and to praise God. We, we **love Americans**. The Maranaos, they love to build mosques (snicker) and they love to pray (mocking tone). But they are not kind. They are very pious, they always wear hijab and the (man-dress). They are less **friendly** to Americans. (RP-Muslim)*

*The **friendly** ones? Never, never 100% trust them. They are traitors, even if you help them. (RP-Christian)*

*Theme: Religiousness*

<b><i>Religiousness</i></b>	<b>JSOTF-P (Christian, Jewish or Agnostic; 19 cases)</b>	<b>Philippines (Muslim; 8 cases)</b>	<b>Philippines (Christian; 3 cases)</b>
Many Cultures- Only One Islam	1	4	
Convert	1	1	
Devout	4		
Sharia	4	2	
Convert (verb)	5		
Less Strict	6		
Practicing	6	2	
Conservative- Strict-Pious- Traditional	13	15	

Table 8. Count by case of sub-themes related to *Religiousness*

Table 8 lists the sub-themes related to *Religiousness* discussed in the interviews, showing the number of cases in which the sub-themes occurred at least once. This is an important theme because it was quite salient in the free-listing task and because some people conflate devoutness with extremism. No Philippine Christians expressed any of these themes.

**Many Cultures-Only One Islam**

One of the things that Muslim respondents participating in the free-list task emphasized was that while there are many different kinds of Muslims, and many cultural practices, there is only one Islam. Some task force members share this point of view. Muslims seldom mention sect, but if asked, they indicated that almost all Muslims in the Philippines are Sunni. JSOTF-P members often mentioned sect, usually in some word-

string combination mentioning Sunni, then Shia. The main finding with respect to sect is that it is fairly uniform in the country and there does not appear to be any significant sectarian violence. Also, there is more indication of foreign influence:

*There is only **one religion**. (RP-Muslim)*

*Well they have the **same doctrine** here as there (Saudi), maybe some Saudi practices were brought here. (RP-Muslim)*

*I think Muslims re identified by their culture, like Indonesian, Iraqi, Afghan, Filipino, and also by the Sunni-Shia type. But I think their beliefs are uniform across the world. (US)*

Another valuable piece of information here is that the tribes are insular and these variations in cultural practices are divisive:

*The tribes here have the same Islam, which links them, but different cultural practices and traditions which divides them and causes misunderstandings. The tribes do not mix, generally living in distinct areas, however they are known to intermarry upon occasion. (RP-Muslim)*

### **Converts/To Convert:**

This is an interesting pair of related sub-themes on which the respondents were divided. Converts to Islam, they both said, are more likely to be radical than those born in the religion. This implies that radicals are either more likely to proselytize than moderates, or more successful at it, or both. This hints that radicalization may be a problem where a vulnerable populace is exposed to radicals such as in a prison setting.

*Another kind of Muslim is a **convert**. **Converts** are **MORE** radical, they want to prove themselves to be “true believers.” They are more aggressive to prove “we are the real ones (Muslims)” (RP-Muslim)*

*There are genuine **converts** who hold the pillars of Islam to be true. They are faithful, more involved, enthused, excited, and evangelistic. They will embrace the way of whoever converted them. So if a radical **converted** them, they will be radical (US)*

No Muslims commented on the sub-theme of converting people to Islam; Americans expressed the sense of extremists coercing people to convert; this is an element of the belief that the religion is either inherently violent or distorted by extremism. This likely a very sensitive topic unsuitable for any kind of messaging by the US.

*Their goals? **To convert** everyone to their doctrine. But this is not the core doctrine of Islam. (US)*

*On Basilan, the young males, it is there mission **to convert** everyone or kill them—they are violently missionary. (US)*

### **Devout:**

No Muslims used this term; about one-fifth of the US cases have this theme. Although this term is not common, those who used it equate devoutness to violent extremism, ultra-conservatism and power. So this is an important mental filter that some of our troops have that could impact their appreciation of the environment. It would be important to find out if this simply is not typical local vernacular and what exactly it means to the locals.

*The more **devout**, the more into the Koran (that they are) they tend to be more fundamentalist. You know, Islamists. They justify violence by the Koran. (US)*

*With **devout** Muslims, there is one result: people die. (US)*

*Here in the PI, some Muslims are **devout**. You are Muslim by birth. You take being a Muslim seriously because it relates to power. It is like a fraternity, a social network, like the Knights of Columbus. (US)*

**Sharia:**

About one fifth of US respondents and one quarter of Muslims mention Sharia law. Americans associate it with extremism and the sort of strict oppression of women seen under the Taliban, while the locals say that it is not very strictly observed there but is used in family courts in the ARMM. This is a mistaken appreciation of local custom on the part of the US members easily corrected by training.

*For example, in Saudi Arabia, they have **Sharia** law, and they are very strict about how women dress and so forth. Here Sharia has no teeth (RP-Muslim)*

*The **Sharia** courts, they are only for family matters, not criminal things. (RP-Muslim)*

*They believe **Sharia** should be THE law and so they want to throw out the government. (US)*

*The old school types want **Sharia** law. (US)*

*I don't think they want **Sharia** law here. (US)*

**Less Strict:**

This sub-theme is only from remarks made by US respondents; in 6 of 19 cases, people made observations about Muslims they thought were not very observant. They associate this with being more tolerant and getting along with Christians, smoking and drinking and praying/going to mosque irregularly and perhaps not really being “Muslim;” this is the converse of the belief that devout Muslims are violent, intolerant extremists:

*Some Muslims less/non practicing drink/smoke, less strict, believe in it but go to mosque less. (US)*

*Like here in the Philippines, they are tolerant, less strict, more integrated with Christians. (US)*

*The non- practicing Muslims might not be a “good Muslim” in their own mind because not observant. (US)*

### **Practicing:**

This sub-theme covers the middle ground between “*less strict*” Muslims and those who are said to be *conservative, strict, pious or traditional*. These are “normal” Muslims who are not extremists and who may go to mosque regularly and pray 5 times a day; women are said to worship in separate rooms:

*We go to mosque on Friday. Women go in a separate room (RP-Muslim)*

*Mellows go to mosque on Fridays. Some are very religious and some are less religious. (RP-Muslim)*

*Practicing Muslims, the sincere ones just trying to do right by their religion (US)*

### **Conservative/Strict/Pious/Traditional:**

These three sub-themes were merged because they were so closely related in content; these were the most frequently mention items related to religiousness. Muslims explain a spectrum of practices regarding dress and lifestyle from “hijab optional” to “compulsory;” the more extreme dress, the niqab, is associated with very strict piety, especially in northern Mindanao in the Islamic City of Marawi. Conservatism is linked to extremism by some task force members. In the Philippines, people who dress conservatively are more observant, but the reverse is not always true.

*Her sister “really is a Muslim” she dresses **conservatively** but does not wear a hijab. Their grandma does not want them to wear hijab. Sama “**religion girls**” who were married to Imams who were hajjis would wear a niqab. (RP-Muslim)*

*But the more rural, the more **conservative** the practice, women more wear hijab. (RP-Muslim)*

*Men who wear Arab style dress were those educated in Madrassas here, they are **conservative**. (RP-Muslim)*

*Well hijab is compulsory, compulsory! By the Quran. But niqab it is optional. It is better, the niqab. In the old days women wore the hijab but it did not cover all the hair properly. Then Saudis, Egyptians, Libyans, they came, so now women wear the hijab correctly (made motions to demonstrate complete coverage of the hair over the front of the brow, no bangs showing) Why is it better? It is more **pious**. (RP-Muslim)*

*So fanatics are **conservative** and they believe in Jihad (US)*

*The **strict** ones? They are orthodox, like orthodox Jews, you know, with the special garb and so forth. They pray 5 times a day. They you know, study the Koran. In Indonesia, I mean, they are more religious than in the PI. Except up by Marawi, they are more **strict** up there. A lot of women wear the full niqab up there, especially school girls. (US)*

*Theme: Drivers of Violence*

<b><i>Drivers of Violence</i></b>	<b>JSOTF-P (Christian, Jewish or Agnostic; 19 cases)</b>	<b>Philippines (Muslim; 8 cases)</b>	<b>Philippines (Christian; 3 cases)</b>
<b>Anti-US</b>	1		
<b>Sectarian</b>	1		
<b>Tribal/Cultural</b>	4	2	
<b>Grievances</b>	3	5	
<b>Separatism</b>	3	4	2
<b>Religion/Islam inherently violent</b>	4		
<b>Money</b>	6	3	2
<b>Religion/Islam Distorted</b>	10	6	1
<b>People are misled</b>	10	2	2
<b>Defensive</b>		2	
<b>Revenge</b>		1	1

Table 9. Count by case of sub-themes related to *Drivers of Violence*

Table 9 lists the sub-themes related to *Drivers of Violence* discussed in the interviews, showing the number of cases in which the sub-themes occurred at least once. This theme unifies ideas from all of the other themes and presents all the concepts that people mentioned as contributing to or causing violence in Mindanao. These will present cultural models that people hold that are key, because an understanding what drives violence in Mindanao should inform JSOTF-P policies.

There are several sub-themes that receive very scant mention: *Anti-US, Sectarian Conflict, Defensive, and Revenge*; these shall be briefly summarized. For the American respondents, the most prevalent sub-themes were the religious drivers, *Religion/Islam inherently violent* and *Religion/but Islam distorted*, and *People Mislead*. For Muslim respondents, *Islam Distorted* was the key sub-theme, followed by *Grievances* and *Separatism*. No Muslim respondent ever made any reference to Islam being an inherently violent religion, nor did any of the Philippine Christians; this is a belief that may be shared by members of the task force only. Philippine Christians were sensitized to *Grievances* and *People Mislead*.

### **Anti-US, Sectarian Conflict, Defensive, and Revenge:**

These sub-themes were rare, only one or two mentions each. One US person mentioned that extremists target US personnel; certainly the environment is dangerous but US personnel are not involved in combat and JSOTF-P has experienced only 3 combat-related casualties since 2002. Anti-US sentiment is probably not a significant driver of violence in Mindanao. One US person mentioned sectarian conflict, but did explain that sectarian and tribal violence might get confused. The good news about Mindanao is that sectarian violence is virtually non-existent. Two Philippine Muslims mentioned defending oneself as a motivation for violence; both quotes related to Tausug and Yakans defending their areas. Those will be discussed under the sub-theme of tribal/cultural drivers of conflict. Revenge was mentioned twice, once with respect to cycles of revenge that need to be stopped and once with respect to tensions between the populace and the AFP. The “cycles of revenge” do need to be understood and communities need mechanisms and resources to dismantle them. Mindanao is progressing, slowly; bringing the MILF to peace talks is a huge step. The unreconcilables—JI, ASG, and various rogue elements are steadily being arrested or killed and should be much less relevant in the near to mid-term.

### **Tribal/Cultural:**

Although this sub-theme was only mentioned by about a quarter of the informants, it is terribly important. The Muslims mention the Tausug and Yakan tribes almost universally

as first and second on their freelist exercise. The most troubled areas in Mindanao, the islands of Basilan and Sulu in the Sulu archipelago, are their home territory. The Moros pride themselves on being the only unconquered peoples in all the history of the Philippines, and this history is near and dear to them. Every Muslim that I spoke to wanted to point this out and elaborate on it in great detail, and unfortunately, that was beyond the scope of this study.

A comprehensive and definitive field study of these peoples should be a priority effort; due to a very untoward security situation and extreme terrain, this would be extremely difficult to execute and would require the assistance of the JSOTF-P, PNP and the AFP. The Tausugs and Yakans are regarded as powerful, politically prominent, having a warrior ethos, and most likely to be prone to extremism, while the Sama and Badjao are peaceful:

*Of the tribes, the **Tausugs** would be most likely inclined to extremism, then the **Yakans**. (RP-Muslim)*

*Men: they fight, they protect their area—**both Yakans and Tausugs**. Men of the highlands do this and women work. (RP-Muslim)*

*The **Yakan** they are hard to understand (made spinning motion of hand around head) they have a lot going on. (RP-Muslim)*

*The **Tausug**: they think themselves royal and on top, they have prestige and a personality...they have a bloodline. The Koran says that all are equal in the eyes of God but the **Tausug**, they feel superior. They have arrogant personalities. But if you adjust with them, they are good persons. The ones getting education, they are leveling themselves, but mostly they are hard to talk to. They are easily angry, hot tempered, but if you get their sympathy.....(you can work with them) but if you are strangers, they won't deal with you. They have suspicious personalities. They are impatient. Their local customary practices take priority over religious considerations. (RP-Muslim)*

*But the **Badjao** are the opposite, the boat people. They are fishing. If there is trouble, they just leave. They do not really have guns, they do not fight. They are the same “kind” of Muslim as the **Yakan, and Tausug**, but mostly do not go to school. They are “mellows”. The **Samal**, live near shore in houses on stilts, but the **Badjao** are on boats. (RP-Muslim)*

*There is a cultural-religious link. So the **Samal** people on Tawi they will tell you “we are peaceful.” They are friendly and open to outside influence. The **Yakan** (Basilan) and **Tausugs** are warrior types. It is why the government has been unable to pacify the warrior tribes in the South. The **Badjaos**, they just keep to themselves. (US)*

Tausugs and Yakans also serve in elected offices and are members of the AFP and PNP. There were several references to linking lack of education, lack of economic opportunity and extreme conservatism to isolated rural areas in the archipelago; Basilan is home to ASG and on Sulu there are camps of ASG, JI, and rogue elements of MNLF and MILF living and operating together. Families are large and have members everywhere in this ecology of defacto and de jure governance. Understanding these connections is key to understanding the cycles of conflict in the archipelago. This person was explaining how the founding leaders of MNLF and MILF are from two different tribes; one might ask what sort of connections between them enabled them to collaborate and build this formidable organization:

*“...then Misuari founded the MNLF. With him was Hashim Salamat. Now Misuari, he is a **Tausug** and Salamat, he is a **Maguindanao**, he was born over where we were yesterday.” (RP-Muslim)*

North of the Sulu archipelago, the large island of Mindanao is home to the Maguindanao and Maranao tribes, and MILF. Muslim respondents explain that the Maguindanao support MILF, and give hints that the two main tribes of Mindanao do not get along very

well; one Maguindanao man mocks the piety of his Maranao neighbors to the north and a Maguindanao woman is envious that the Maranao business people are more prosperous than the farmers of her district. These are anecdotes but valuable even so; one ought to find out as much as possible about the Maguindanao people and why they support the MILF, to begin with. The, one might want to find out how the Maranao can be very religiously conservative and yet educated and more prosperous than other conservative tribes (Tausug and Yakan), and perhaps make a comparison to the more moderate Sama who number among their members educated professionals on Tawi Tawi Island to the far south.

*So MILF, their support flows from the tribe of **Maguindanao**, and there are some **Tausug** and **Maranao** who support MILF. (RP-Muslim, a **Maguindanao** woman)*

*The **Maguindnao** ones, they are behind the **Maranao** and **Tausug** in schooling. They don't have money. The **Maranao**, they are merchants, they have more money and education....I do not understand why the **Maranao** are so rich. The **Maguindanao** are mostly farmers and they are very proud. (RP-Muslim, a **Maguindanao** woman)*

*Let me tell you about the **Maranaos**. First of all we **Maguindanao**, we are kind, we love to have a big cookout to celebrate and to praise God. The **Maranaos**, they love to build mosques (snicker) and they love to pray (mocking tone). But they are not kind. They are everywhere in the PI, selling things, like the Chinese people, they never farm. They are very pious, they always wear hijab and the man-dress. They are less friendly to Americans. We, we love Americans. (RP-Muslim, a **Maguindanao** man)*

### **Grievances:**

Grievances were mentioned in five out of eight of the Muslim interviews, but in only three of the 19 JSOTF-P interviews; grievances are part of the long history of Mindanao and ongoing bad governance contributes to the dissatisfaction of the populace and fuels

support for the militants. Grievances essentially relate to bad governance—lack of security, weak, corrupt civic institutions, poor infrastructure, lack of economic development and jobs:

*On Sulu, the conflict now is more about the **grievances**. (RP-Muslim)*

*Well we have a **long history**...the Spanish...the US...Marcos, many **human rights violations**. There are very old hard feelings left over from Marcos, the **massacres** and so forth. So the perception is we are each other's enemies (Muslims and Christians). (RP-Muslim)*

*And I want you to understand that we still experience **racial discrimination** on part of Christians and the Philippine government. We feel **very disrespected**, especially by Christians of Luzon and Visayas—I **hate them!** (RP-Muslim)*

*Remember, all Mindanao was all owned by the Bangsamoro people. During the ILAGA settlers when Marcos had **martial law**, there were **atrocities, rapes, massacres**. The Bolo Battalion was created, the Black Shirts to fight oppressors, (RP-Muslim)*

*Well, there is **bad governance**. When candidates lose an election, the candidates and followers reject the winners, disagree and fight the new government. The sitting government, there is lots of **abuse, corruption**, they have body guards, they can do anything. If you cross them, **they can just kill you**, they control everything. Like the internal revenue allotment money—politicians take it and they **do not get punished**. (RP-Muslim)*

Some US respondents understand the problem with bad governance:

*Muslims in the PI: they believe in their faith, they **do not believe in their bureaucrats**. (US)*

Muslim respondents not only wanted to mention the grievances, but to express their belief that the problems are solvable:

*We hope the US helps us strengthen the ARMM, improve **governance** then the armed groups will die down. With **roads, schools, basic services** we can win the peace in Mindanao (RP-Muslim)*

*If more education, stop the cycle of **revenge, the clan feuds, land disputes, misunderstandings**. Education would mean less extremism, less fundamentalism, less rebellion. Then with better roads...markets, jobs....(RP-Muslim)*

The JSOTF-P directly addresses these underlying factors through its civil-military operations and has sponsored hundreds of infrastructure development projects; notable examples include building schools and roads in remote areas. Task force members also help reform civic institutions; for example, they train police forces in human rights and criminal justice procedures. Grievances should be assessed district by district in the full context of the socio-cultural setting and resources prioritized according to the commander's overarching objectives addressing every aspect of reforming governance. Every task force member should be aware of these grievances and how they motivate the population.

### **Separatism:**

The topic of grievances is inextricably linked to that of the power struggles over separatism and self-determination for Muslims; half of the Muslim respondents mention separatism, but only 3 US respondents did. The ongoing peace negotiations with the MILF involve very contentious issues about the future transition of the ARMM (which is essentially an MNLF body) to a new governing body, the distribution of wealth (tax revenue) and the impact on upcoming elections. MILF was originally formed from a schism with MNLF when the latter negotiated peace in 1996 and was given limited autonomy and the funds to govern Mindanao through the ARMM. Christian and Muslim respondents aver that the ARMM is corrupt and only served to enrich MNLF members;

Christian respondents fear expansion of Muslim governance to Christian-majority areas such as Zamboanga; billions of pesos of tax revenue are involved:

*The ARMM, they are getting all the resources, not helping people. They are getting rich, like Ampatuan. The poor get poorer and poorer. It is **corruption**. We cannot even get travel money to go do our job. The higher up employees can, not us. (RP-Muslim)*

*But the MNLF and the MILF, they **want Mindanao for themselves**. They are trying—they want this peace process—they want Zamboanga! We voted no locally, we did not want Zamboanga to be part of ARMM. (RP-Christian)*

*When the money goes to them, they want power--they do not use the money for development, they enrich themselves. (RP-Christian)*

The cessation of conflict as well as the entire power structure, in other words, is at stake, and will affect every aspect of the task force mission.<sup>47</sup> The struggle now is not just between MILF and the central government, but between MILF, MNLF, Christian stakeholders in Mindanao and the central government.

*They are really **insurgents** now, they want their own society and laws here. (US)*

*They are **violent separatist** groups, supposedly negotiating for peace but they are really negotiating deceptively to gain advantage. They want the benefits of being part of the PI without the responsibility. They want an Islamic state (all the group do). (US)*

So, there are manifold issues driving violence associated with separatism. It is difficult to parse what the real contribution of religious extremism is to the dynamic from the

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<sup>47</sup> Carolyn O. Arguillas, "No Agreement yet on Transition; Peace Panels To Refer Issue to Principals" Davao City MindaNews in English 30 May 12

interviews, but competition over power and money is very salient to the locals. Muslim and Christian respondents repeatedly mentioned power and money; the quotes from US informants illustrate that some were somewhat cognizant of the separatism theme and its role in the violence. Next, the sub-theme of money is examined separately.

**Money:**

“*Money*” is shorthand for the things people said were wrong with the economic aspect of governance in Mindanao. Mindanao afflicted with conflict, so it is underdeveloped and lacks infrastructure and governance is too ineffective and corrupt to create an environment safe for investment, so there are not enough jobs, so criminality and extremism flourish—and Mindanao is afflicted with conflict. Money was mentioned by about one-third of US and Muslim informants, respectively and two of three Philippine Christians:

*There are **no jobs*** (RP-Christian)

*The sitting government, there is lots of abuse, corruption, they have body guards, they can do anything. If you cross them, they can just kill you, they control everything. Like the **internal revenue allotment money**—politicians take it and they do not get punished.* (RP-Christian)

People said of the violence: “It is all about money,” and they were referring to the entire ecology of de facto governance, from the money paid to the VEO’s foot-soldiers, the money earned from the flourishing “businesses” (the violent criminal enterprises) and the billions of tax revenue that is controlled by a few political families.

*Remember the PI culture is about the **haves vs the have nots**.* (US)

*Extremists take advantage of **poverty** (how insurgencies are fueled) and they **motivate people with money** to work for them or they take care of their families.*  
(US)

*Muslims in the PI: don't know that much about them, seems to me it is more criminal type activity than jihad, **more about earning money than religious commitment.** (US)*

*They are doing crimes, smuggling, drugs, gun running, and ASG, they are doing KFR. **It is all about money.** (RP-Christian)*

*The Maranao are business people and they may violently protect their **business interests.** (RP-Muslim)*

*Money, then, is salient to all the respondents as a multi-faceted driver of violence.*

### **Religious drivers of violence:**

#### **Islam inherently violent/ Islam Distorted/ People are misled**

When people spoke of the violence in Mindanao, they expressed beliefs about the role of religion influencing people to join VEOs, commit terroristic acts or join in the fighting. Two strands of thought about religious motivation emerged. First, about one-fifth of US informants (4 of 19) made statements indicating that they believe Islam to be *inherently violent*. No Muslims or Philippine Christians made similar statements.

*And these fanatics, they could become the violent extremists. Because **the sword, that is pivotal element of their religion.** (US)*

***Islamic teachings were founded in a violently strategic fashion, and those who regard Islam as peaceful are grossly deceived** (US)*

***Muslims will do what God tells them to do, good or bad.** (US)*

Second, half of the US cases, three-fourths of the Muslims cases, and one of three Philippine Christians said basically that that extremists cherry-pick Quranic verses out of

context or otherwise falsely interpret the Quran to justify violence; in other words, *Islam is distorted*:

*So the ones called radical or extremist Muslims are not Muslims, they are simply radical people. The radicals take parts of the Quran out of context to justify their deeds. (RP-Muslim)*

*There is only one Islam; we condemn violence, the un-Islamic activities like kidnapping for ransom, bombings, hurting children. KFR is a business. They justify it by their **interpretations of the Quran**. (RP-Muslim)*

*The fringe: they are hard core, they **interpret the Quran** to justify anything. (US)*

*The radicals, their beliefs are **distorted** (US)*

*The “extreme versions” they **violate the tenets of Islam**, they commit violence on innocent people on behalf of their religion (US)*

Now, when people agreed to be interviewed, they were assured of anonymity, and some of them clearly felt free to express controversial beliefs. I never witnessed any negative sentiments about Islam expressed publicly by any member of the task force, and I observed that their public communications were reviewed very carefully to avoid offense. Nevertheless, there was apparently a minority of the task force that believed that the religion is genuinely violent. JSOTF-P leadership must address this during cultural orientation and continue to be vigilant to ensure that no policies or communications ever give the least impression that such views are official—it would offend the populace and give legitimacy to the extremists.

The final aspect to this sub-theme of religion driving violence is what people thought about *why* people could be influenced by religious leaders to be violent: that *people are misled*. The *why* is important because *influence* is fundamental to the purpose of the JSOTF-P. The narrative is that people who are illiterate, who cannot understand the Quran for themselves, are easily influenced, especially by charismatic clerics:

*They have no school, they do not understand. So they follow what he says. They are easily led, **easy to influence** by the MILF leaders. (RP-Christian)*

*They use propaganda to generate sympathy and in the madrassas, they **teach radical, and they speak to crowds.** (RP-Muslim)*

*But due to lack of education, those who are not educated, want the meaning of the Holy Koran simplified. The illiterate ones, they cannot understand the Koran. It is hard even for me to understand. So if uneducated, **easily convinced** to follow extremist teachings. Clerics can **influence** people they can be very charismatic and convincing. (RP-Muslim)*

*See, **most Muslims don't really read the Quran** so they go with what people say is the norm. (US)*

A twist on the narrative is that (particularly in rural areas) people are “primitive” or “unsophisticated” and cannot understand issues. This is a US point of view:

*The regular Muslim people are helpless. They are **fundamentally primitive.** Their life is about survival, about basic needs. They don't evolve to more sophistication or have the luxury of entering modern complex society. They are an easy target for manipulation by outsiders or insiders. But they are more prone to align with internal movements, influences. When **primitive** you can't analyze issues, you don't have the information. You go with the Muslim insider, not the Manila government. (US)*

*And there are **unsophisticated and illiterate** Muslims (e.g., the ones on Basilan). These ones just follow the local guidance that they receive. They make more emotion-based choices regarding peace vs. violence. (US)*

The theme that people are misled, or influenced wrongly, occurred in half of the US interviews, and the general theme that education is an antidote to extremism is woven throughout the interviews and is more salient to the Philippine respondents than the US ones. This raises two policy concerns. First, to what effect does the JSOTF-P conduct influence operations in Mindanao, or assist the AFP to conduct effective influence operations? Second, have school-building efforts had any effect on educational achievement in Mindanao? These are two questions that merit serious assessment.

## Discussion of Phase I

The large range and diversity of characteristics that people use to discuss Muslims and Islam in the Philippines describe a very unfamiliar cultural domain with a vastly different ethnic context than Iraq or Afghanistan. There were several key findings from the free-list task:

- The data from the free-list task suggests stark differences in point of view between the different stakeholders in the area—local Muslims view themselves primarily in terms of their tribal/ethnic identity while JSOTF-P members view Muslims mainly through the lenses of sectarian orientation, religious extremism/moderation and violence.
- JSOTF-P members often referred to their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan when asked about Muslim culture, rather than experiences in Mindanao.
- While the locals referred to the five main tribes of Mindanao almost universally when asked about Muslims in Mindanao, most JSOTF-P members did not. This means that fundamental information about the human terrain is not salient to the task force members. *Note: many members of the JSOTF-P are from non-SOF background, and may not have Asia-specific cultural expertise. Members of the 1<sup>st</sup> Special Forces Group do have specific cultural knowledge of the Philippines; this group has provided personnel and leadership to JSOTF-P since its inception. These SOF individuals did make specific mention of the tribes.*
- Policy recommendation: Provide cultural training to members upon arrival; invite members of the populace to teach

The thematic analysis of the interviews provided extensive content about Muslims and Islam in the Philippines, and revealed that who qualifies as a religious extremist, who is a militant (or even if those are really different things) and who may primarily be criminal is not so easily distinguished in the Philippines. Religion, power, money, grievances and

violence are not to be so neatly divided, and these elements appear throughout the interviews in complicated relationships—an ecology, if you will.

The VEOs are part of an ecology of *de facto governance*, which competes with or substitutes for *de jure governance*. In Mindanao, weak legitimate governance means that security is privatized by the wealthy and rule of law is suborned by money, connections and by rule of private armed power. A few elite families control most of the wealth and elected positions; members of the elected government *themselves* use and manipulate both the official and unofficial elements of governance.

There are those who believe that people join these groups to earn money, as jobs are scarce, and then become trapped. This is another aspect of the VEO ecology—that their activities provide employment and income—the *de facto* economic aspect of governance—in the absence of a healthy economy. The subject of governance merits its own very detailed study; this dissertation can only begin to uncover the signposts of what might be valuable to study first:

- It would be enormously helpful to conduct formal social network analysis (SNA) of the VEOs, families and tribal groups. AFP and PNP officers<sup>48</sup> were keenly interested in network analysis; they had painstakingly developed knowledge of the people and VEOs but had very limited ability to create electronic databases and had no experience with SNA software tools. This would be an excellent goal for future capacity-building with our partners.
- The issue of corruption, in the sense of an impenetrable political ecology where, in the *de facto* governance, the elected government and the VEOs may have family, clan or tribal ties, merits very careful attention. However, the cooperation of local officials is critical and could be derailed with the wrong approach. The linkages of people, groups, and political offices would benefit from detailed analysis including SNA.

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<sup>48</sup> Author interviews with AFP and PNP officers June, 2011

- It would be useful to determine if respondent references to foreign clerics radicalizing in the hinterland have any basis in fact, and if so, determine who they are and how they are supported.
- The JSOTF-P directly addresses grievances underlying militancy through its civil-military operations and has sponsored hundreds of infrastructure development projects; notable examples include building schools and roads in remote areas. Task force members also help reform civic institutions; for example, they train police forces in human rights and criminal justice procedures.
  - Policy Recommendation: Grievances should be assessed district by district in the full context of the socio-cultural setting and resources prioritized according to the commander's overarching objectives addressing every aspect of reforming governance. Every task force member should be aware of these grievances and how they motivate the population.

Different stakeholders hold different cultural models on key themes, particularly with respect to extremism and moderation. People will filter information according to their personal cultural models, so different groups may receive policy messages in different ways. This can skew support for policies for *irrelevant reasons* if policy maker does not have an idea of their own or other people's cultural models. In particular, command messaging and influence operations may go awry because of an imperfect understanding of the target audience. Here are cultural models discovered in the interviews:

Devoutness is linked to fundamentalism and fundamentalism to violent extremism by Americans. Some US respondents used the term "devout" when expressing beliefs that Islam is inherently violent. Muslim respondents do use the term "fundamentalism" when referring to extremism but the term "devout."

- Policy recommendation: The belief that Islam is inherently violent would be deeply offensive to Muslims; JSOTF-P leadership should address this during command orientation.

A link between lack of education, inability to develop, and violence reappears throughout the interviews, mainly from Philippine respondents:

- There are two important senses of what it means to not be an extremist in the Philippines: one is in the “middle” as in the political center, or one is in the middle of conflict and “in-between” dangerous factions and other influences, and therefore vulnerable. Muslim respondents linked education to this sense of moderation, and they linked lack of education to inability to understand the Quran, to believing radical interpretations of the Quran, and then to violent extremism.
- Muslims associate education with being *peace-loving*, reinforcing the idea of educated people being in the “middle” and illiterates tending to extremism.
  - Policy recommendations:
    - Rigorously investigate the links between lack of education and violence to inform policy

US respondents tended to frame moderation as a sense of normal-ness from their Western point of view and as an attribute of the majority of the populace; they tend to mirror-image, in other words. On the other hand, the Muslim respondents, who regard *themselves* as the regular folk, describe what it *means* to be “normal”—i.e., peace-loving, in the “middle” or “in-between” and to enjoy and embrace democratic civil rights.

- Policy recommendation: Task force members may assume that other people are “like them,” in a kindly manner; but this habit could skew their appreciation of the environment. Train the force to be more objective when they assess the populace.

JSOTF-P members say they believe that the populace is mostly moderate or at least non-militant but they may support the violent extremists.

- Policy recommendation: Assess populace on this topic district by district to discern what or who they support; this will clarify deleterious influences and grievances

The theme that people are misled, or influenced wrongly to join extremist groups occurred in half of the US interviews. This raises the question, to what effect does the JSOTF-P conduct influence operations in Mindanao, or assist the AFP to conduct effective influence operations?

- Policy recommendation: Comprehensive study to assess measures of effectiveness for influence operations

The language used by the task force is of utmost importance. Language mistakes could render engagement and influence activities ineffective, whereas effective use of language is more likely to resonate with the populace. Analysis of the interviews revealed that there is particular language that may fail to resonate with, or even offend the populace, particularly Muslims, and there is language that might be useful to use in command communications:

- The sense that terroristic violence is a “grave offense” before the eyes of God is a critical message, but probably best voiced by local leadership rather than JSOTF-P messaging to be deemed authentic and sincere
- Fighting: The concept of “fighting” for worthwhile causes would appear to have great resonance with the Muslim populace in the sense of its legitimacy and with the entire populace with respect to its terrible impact of lives and livelihoods destroyed. It would be more effective for JSOTF-P messaging to address the specific, core theme of fighting both as a cultural heritage and as legitimate resistance, rather than violence in general.
- Rogue-Renegade-Lawless: It might be appropriate and useful to use this kind of language to reinforce encourage lawful and moderate behavior on the part of the MNLD and MILF, and/or to challenge any assertions they

may attempt to make that they cannot be held accountable for the violence of their so-called “rogue” elements.

- No Muslim respondents used the term “fanatic,” and it might offend the populace if it were used in any messaging; fanaticism connotes a rabid craziness that may make people feel defensive.
- “Radical” seems to be a preferred vernacular and would likely resonate with the populace if used in communications
- Extremist: This term is used by about half of the JSOTF-P and Muslim respondents. In these cynical remarks, frustration is evident; extremism has no positive attribute; it is linked intolerance, to corruption, power and abuse of the populace; extremists may have grievances but they also create grievances. This suggests that the term may be *carefully* used to delegitimize VEOs without offending the sensibilities of the locals.
- Moderate: Some Muslims find the term “moderate” offensive because it insinuates that one should be less of a Muslim to not be an extremist; this term was not used frequently any Philippine respondents. The term may be a liability to use in public messaging; that issue deserves careful consideration.
- “Peace-loving” might be a more effective phrase to use in task force communications because it has a more positive, hopeful sense than “non-violent” and because it is an indigenous vernacular. However, one problem with the term is this: being peace-loving is not very prestigious; the dominant tribes (Tausug and Yakan) are said to have a warrior ethos and that they look down on the peace-loving Samal and Badjao. So, the term may resonate with some communities but not with others; this should be investigated.

## **Chapter 3: Phase II, Cultural Consensus Analysis**

### **Measurement: Quantifying Shared Knowledge**

In this phase, quantitative anthropological methods are used to explore the similarity or dissimilarity of the cultural knowledge of different policy stakeholders to determine whether or not different groups hold similar or different beliefs about Muslims and Islam in the Philippines. We are empirically testing if the level of agreement between stakeholders rises to the level where it can be defined as a single shared culture. Our hypothesis is that there is no single consensus—JSOTF-P members have different conceptions of Islam than their partners and the populace.

### **How Cultural Consensus Models Work**

Cultural consensus modeling was developed in the late 1980's by A. Kimball Romney, Susan C. Weller and William H. Batchelder. (Romney, Weller et al. 1986) It is a formal mathematical model for the analysis of informant consensus on structured interview data and it produces three useful results:

- a measure of the degree of agreement among informants about a domain of knowledge, belief, or practice;
- the “culturally correct” information about that domain according to the pooled answers of the informants; and
- a score for each informant representing that person’s knowledge of the domain, or cultural competence (Caulkins and Hyatt 1999)

Unlike psychometric testing, where the researcher has the answer key, this method was developed for anthropologists studying a new culture who may not know either the cultural competence of their informants nor the correct answers to their questions. The culturally correct “answer key” is estimated from the responses.

The model has three key assumptions:

1. Common Truth: There is one right answer for every question.

- This relates to the kinds of respondent variability that may exist; in this model, there are two sources of variance in the responses: culture and the competence of the respondent.

2. Local Independence. Person's responses are independent (across persons and questions), conditional on the truth. If a person does not know the answer, he/she guesses randomly among the available choices.

- This assumption specifies that the only reason people give the same answers is the underlying factor of cultural truth. When people answer incorrectly, their answers are not correlated with each other.<sup>49</sup>

3. Item Homogeneity. All questions are on the same topic, about which a given person has a fixed level of knowledge.

In this research, respondents were given or true-false questions, and if the respondent did not know the answer, it is assumed that he or she guessed without bias. The fraction of questions for which two respondents agree,  $M_{ij}$ , is then calculated with correction for guessing. For the true-false questionnaire, if the probability that person  $i$  answers correctly is  $d_i$ , the respondents  $i$  and  $j$  will agree in these four cases:

<u>Case</u>	<u>Probability</u>
They both know the answer:	$d_i d_j$
Person $i$ knows the answer and person $j$ guesses right:	$d_i(1-d_j)/2$
Person $j$ knows the answer and person $i$ guesses right:	$d_j(1-d_i)/2$
Neither knows, both guess the same:	$(1-d_i)(1-d_j)/2$

<sup>49</sup> Stephen P. Borgatti and Daniel S. Halgin, Consensus Analysis (from Borgatti's website at <http://www.steveborgatti.com/papers/BHConsensus.pdf>)

And, the fraction of questions for which the two respondents agree, corrected for guessing, is the sum of the four cases, which reduces to:

$$M_{ij} = d_i d_j + (1 - d_i d_j) / 2$$

So, the agreement between respondents is shown to depend on their individual competencies. The matrix of observed responses is used to calculate the actual  $M_{ij}$  correlation matrix. The values of  $d_i$  are then estimated by minimum-residual factor analysis of  $M_{ij}$ . Then each informant's input is weighted by competency and the responses aggregated to estimate the most likely answers to the questionnaire.

The model assumes a single underlying factor or culturally correct "answer key" for each set of informants tested, and signals when this assumption does not hold: if the ratio of the first and second eigenvalues is less than 3, the assumption is indefensible because the single factor does not account for sufficient variance. When the assumptions are violated the values of the  $d_i$  cannot be seen as competence because other factors may be accounting for inter-informant variability; in other words, there is more than one underlying culture. In our case, the key research question is whether the informants belong to a single culture or not, and this can be diagnosed by examining the pattern of eigenvalues. The assumptions of the model do not need to hold in order to make this diagnosis.

Here is an intuitive explanation of how the model works. Suppose, for example, there were a questionnaire about dogs, and there were informants with varying degrees of knowledge about dogs. The model expects that dog owners would agree more amongst themselves as to the answers than would non-dog owners; dog owners would tend to have higher competency scores ( $d_i$ ) than non-dog owners. The model estimates of the answer key, or culturally correct answers, would be weighted towards the answers of the dog owners. However, if among the respondents there were more than one "dog culture," – say, some were from the US and some were from England, then they might have

differing beliefs about dog breed standards, care, grooming, and the like. So, in the US, for example, it would be considered correct to dock the ears and tails of certain breeds and in the UK, it would be considered improper. In the case where there is significant divergence of beliefs, or lack of consensus, the model would signal the presence of more than one culture with a first-to-second eigenvalue ratio less than three.

### **How this Model is Applied**

Anthropologists use the model in ethnography when they do not know the correct answers to their questions, or who among their informants is the most knowledgeable. (In this research, we are very interested in the culturally correct answers to the questions, but will not use the information on respondent competence; we will not have any opportunity to re-interview any of the respondents.)

An important application for anthropological research is that the model “signals” when the key assumption of a socially shared information pool does not hold (A. Kimball Romney 1987). If different informants’ answer differently, it means cultural knowledge varies in structure or content between the informants.

The model has been used extensively in health studies; for example, Maria Swora used it to compare differences in sexual risk perception between men and women (Swora 2003). Chavez, et al, discovered that differing cultural models of risk factors for cancer, and differing cultural beliefs about normative and non-normative sexual behavior were associated with differences in the use of cervical cancer-screening tests among Latina women (Chavez, McMullin et al. 2001). The authors showed that both beliefs and ethnographic methods for studying beliefs are important. Another exemplar of this type of analysis is Boster and Johnson’s study of novice and experts’ sorting of fish. Cultural consensus analysis illuminated not only the differences between novices and experts, but differentiated regional subcultures of fishing experts as well.(Boster and Johnson 1989) Environmental anthropologists have also found cultural consensus models useful. Miller, et al studied differences in understanding of ocean fisheries management between scientists and indigenous fishermen to learn how to incorporate aspects of culture in

environmental policies.(Marc L. Miller 2004) The study of folk biology in which novices and experts sorted pictures of fishes revealed that the two groups used different mental models in making their judgments.(Boster and Johnson 1989) When groups sorted fish in similar ways, they often did so for different reasons; one reason is that experts were found to *understand the interrelations between the functional attributes* of fish and novices did not.

In their study of environmentalism in America, Kempton et al compared the beliefs about the environment and values of groups that would be expected to differ greatly: the lay public, Sierra Club members, Earth First members, sawmill workers and dry cleaners operators.(Kempton, Boster et al. 1996) Informants were asked to agree or disagree with 159 statements about the environment. The study found surprisingly broad consensus about environmentalism across all the groups, illustrating quite a few widely shared beliefs and values. Significant disagreements were also found, and to document the nature of those differences the authored compared the responses in detail. This revealed differences in values and different beliefs about environmental models. This understanding about values and beliefs of different groups is valuable in when communicating and seeking support for policies. The authors discovered, for example, that many people have serious misunderstandings about global environmental issues which can skew support for policies for irrelevant reasons.

This exploration of the diversity of environmental values also provides a cautionary lesson about making assumptions about what certain groups believe. The Earth First members, known to be willing to take extreme measures and portrayed by the media as radical, were found to largely hold mainstream beliefs about the environment; they differed from others mainly in their willingness to make personal sacrifices for their beliefs. Sawmill workers showed far less opposition to environmental policies than expected. And Sierra Club members, thought to be “moderates” on environmental matters, displayed more divergence in beliefs than the other groups.

In this dissertation, cultural consensus modeling will be used to show quantitatively to what degree different groups share the same model of what it means to be a Muslim in the Philippines.

### **Phase II Sampling Strategy:**

While traditional test theory begins with performance data, with individual items coded correct or incorrect, cultural consensus theory begins with response data—items coded or sorted by the informant with no assumptions about whether the informant is correct. The model first estimates individual competencies (reliability) and then estimates the answer key and the confidence in each answer (Weller 2007). The correct answers are statistically inferred from the responses of the informants (corrected for guessing).

The Spearman-Brown Prophecy Formula was developed in 1910 to calculate the item reliability for tests where the correct answers to questions are known (Weller and Romney 1988). For item reliability, the assumption is that correlation between two items is the product of their individual correlations with the underlying trait or ability. As Weller (Weller 1987) and Handwerker (Handwerker 1997) discuss, the Spearman-Brown Prophecy formula can be applied to respondents rather than items. In ethnographic studies, where the answers are not known, the central assumption of this method is that the correspondence between any two respondents is a function of the extent to which each has knowledge of the culturally correct answers (Weller 2007). So, we calculate the reliability (also called cultural competence) of informants, rather than the test items. This reliability,  $r_{kk}$ , is calculated from the average intercorrelation among respondents,  $\bar{r}_{ij}$  and the number of respondents,  $k$ :

$$r_{kk} = \frac{k * \bar{r}_{ij}}{1 + \bar{r}_{ij}(k - 1)}$$

The square root of the reliability coefficient estimates the validity of the aggregated responses, or the correlation between the culturally correct answers and the empirically obtained answers. So, to calculate the sample size required for a study,  $k$ , the researcher

assumes a level of reliability for the informants and sets the level of validity (proportion of items classified correctly) and confidence level. As the number of respondents increases, and/or their agreement increases, the reliability and validity of their aggregated responses increases.

The model achieves statistically significant results with surprisingly small sample sizes and is practical for anthropologists who sometimes deal with very small samples of informants. The minimum number of informants needed to describe a cultural domain is a function of the factors in the Spearman-Brown Prophecy Formula. First, the higher the average competence of the sample, the smaller the sample needed. Second, the higher the confidence level is set, the more informants are needed. Third, the proportion of questions one wants to decisively classify affects the number of informants needed (larger = more informants). From Table 3, we see that 9 informants with a mean competence of 0.7 in response to a true-false questionnaire have at least a 0.95 probability of correctly classifying each question with a confidence level of at least 0.99. For this study, we estimate cultural competency conservatively at only 50% and require 0.95 validity, as recommended by Weller (Weller 2007). For a .99 confidence level, we need a sample size of at least 23 for each sub-group (e.g., JSOTF-P, Christians, Muslims, AFP members, PNP members).

PROPORTION OF ITEMS CLASSIFIED CORRECTLY AT 0.99 CONFIDENCE LEVEL						
Cultural Competency		0.80	0.85	0.90	0.95	0.99
0.50		15	15	21	23	>30
0.60		10	10	12	14	20
0.70		5	7	7	9	13
0.80		4	5	5	7	8
0.90		4	4	4	4	6

**Table 10.** Sample Size and Validity Estimates. Cultural Consensus Modeling requires surprisingly small samples.

### Phase II Data collection

We used the information obtained in Phase I, where informants free-listed “kinds” of Muslims and provided the attributes of these kinds of Muslims to create a test instrument. The instrument is a questionnaire with 39 dichotomous responses; respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statements. The questionnaire is available in Appendix 1.

### Phase II Sampling

To sample DOD members, I asked members of the JSOTF-P to fill out the questionnaire. Members of the AFP who were posted to WESMINCOM participated, as did members of the PNP working in the Sulu archipelago (islands of Sulu and Basilan). Law students from Western Mindanao University in Zamboanga participated, as did other civilians living and working on WESMINCOM base. Fourteen of the JSOTF-P members self-

designated as Christians, 2 were Jewish, 6 listed “None” for religion and 9 listed “Other.” The Philippine respondents were mix of Christians (53), Muslim (79), with 15 leaving religion blank, one answering “None” and one answering “Other.” Table 4 represents the Phase II sample.

<b>Nationality/Religion</b>	<b>Christian</b>	<b>Jewish</b>	<b>Muslim</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>None</b>	<b>Blank</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>US (JSOTF-P)</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Philippines</b>							
<b>AFP</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>PNP</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>Civilian</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>Philippines Total</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>149</b>
<b>Grand Totals</b>							

**Table 11.** Phase II sampling.

## Phase II Data Analysis

A software package written for anthropologists (UCINET)<sup>50</sup> was used to calculate the degree of consensus among the informants. An informant-by-informant matrix of the proportion of answer matches between informants, corrected for chance guessing, is created. The matrix represents a system of equations which is solved by minimum residual factor analysis.

The researcher knows whether or not the informants have consensus by examining the factor structure. If the matrix has a single factor structure, a single underlying competence accounts for all the structure in the matrix other than sampling variability. The rule of thumb is that the eigenvalue for the first factor is at three times as large as the next. Also, the first factor has all positive values and must account for more than 50% of the variance in the model, and all other factors are relatively small and diminishing slowly. If these conditions are not met, then more than one underlying competence, or culture, has been tested—*the model signals the lack of consensus (Romney, Weller et al. 1986)*.

UCINET also computes a measure of cultural knowledge for each informant, indicating how closely they agreed with the consensus of the other informants. The software reports the “answer key” or culturally central ordering of the elements. If the domain is not coherent, i.e. there is no single consensus, the data can be subset according to the different groups or even social variables to search for groupings showing consensus.

### Consensus Model Results

The results of consensus modeling are shown in Table 12. Respondents who left 10% or more of the questions blank were excluded, reducing the population from  $n = 180$  to  $n = 161$ ; then, any remaining blank responses were replaced with randomly generated

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<sup>50</sup> Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002. UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.

answers to simulate guessing.<sup>51</sup> Note that *when the model signals consensus*, it also returns the fraction of the questions correctly classified at a .99 confidence level. The model indicated consensus for the JSOTF-P, the PNP (all), Muslims (all), Muslims (civilians), and Muslims (PNP members), respectively.

Table 12 shows that we have a confidence level of 0.99 that the JSOTF-P consensus answers are 90% correct with respect to the beliefs of the JSOTF-P members; the variance is due to intra-cultural variation and differing levels of knowledge (cultural competence). The JSOTF-P “answer key” does differ from that of other groups, reflecting inter-cultural variation. Similarly, the PNP classified 90% of their answers at a 0.99 confidence level; as did Muslim PNP members; for all Muslim respondents combined and Muslim civilians, we have a confidence level of 0.99 that their respective consensus answers are 95% correct.

The model signaled that there is no overall consensus in the total research population, which we know is a mix of several cultures—US and Philippine nationalities, military, police and civilians, both Christians and Muslims, and multiple ethnicities. We cannot discern, however, where consensus may exist from the overall sample; we examine sub-groups to see if any of them exhibit consensus.

When tested on members of the JSOTF-P only, the model does signal consensus; the task force members do have a shared understanding of the culture, even though they are from all over the United States and are members of all the four services. This could mean they received similar cultural orientation training for the assignment, or perhaps achieved similar viewpoints from shared experiences on this or other deployments.

When tested on Philippine nationals only, the model again signals lack of consensus. This is a multi-cultural population from all over the Philippines, is a mix of military, police and civilians, contains both Christians and Muslims, and contains multiple

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<sup>51</sup> Acceptable procedure; Susan C. Weller, “Cultural Consensus Theory: Applications and Frequently Asked Questions,” *Field Methods* 2007 19: 339

ethnicities. When Filipinos are split into Christian and Muslim sub-groups, Muslims show consensus amongst themselves, and Christians do not—even when split out by gender, by education, or by service in the AFP (other splits were not possible due to insufficient sample size).

That Muslims agree amongst each other about their own culture is to be expected, but it is very interesting that Filipino Christians apparently embrace divergent views about Muslim culture. This may be because some of the Christians are from Mindanao, and are very familiar with their Muslim neighbors, while some of them are from other parts of the country. To a person in Manila, Mindanao is an unfamiliar and remote place.<sup>52</sup>

The model indicates that members of the Philippine's armed forces (AFP) do not share consensus, while members of the national police (PNP) do. The AFP members are from all parts of the country, and are both Christian and Muslim. PNP members tend to serve in their own communities, and this sample of PNP individuals was mostly from the Sulu Archipelago and more than two-thirds Muslim. This is very interesting; this indicates that our PNP partners in Mindanao may be regarded as cultural experts, but our AFP partners may not be.

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<sup>52</sup> Author's discussions with people in Manila. People who are not from Mindanao generally expressed a sense of puzzlement about Mindanao and were dismissive of the people and doings of that province.

<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Eigenvalue Ratio</b>	<b>Cultural Consensus?</b>	<b>Fraction of Questions Correctly Classified at 0.99 confidence</b>
All (n= 161)	2.4	NOT SUPPORTED	N/A
<b>JSOTF-P (n= 28)</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>0.90</b>
RP All (n= 133)	2.8	NOT SUPPORTED	N/A
RP AFP (n=51)	1.99	NOT SUPPORTED	N/A
<b>RP PNP (n=38)</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>0.90</b>
RP Christians -- All (n=46)	1.4	NOT SUPPORTED	N/A
RP Christians – Men (n=40)	1.2	NOT SUPPORTED	N/A
RP Christians – College+ (n=37)	1.3	NOT SUPPORTED	N/A
RP Christians – AFP (n=26)	2.1	NOT SUPPORTED	N/A
<b>RP Muslims (n=73)</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>0.95</b>
<b>RP Muslims -- civilians (n = 23)</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>0.95</b>
RP Muslims -- AFP (n=23)	2.1	NOT SUPPORTED	N/A
<b>RP Muslims – PNP (n=27)</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>0.90</b>

Table 12. Results of Cultural Consensus Model.

The model returns a “culturally correct” answer key for each group that shares consensus. We can compare the consensus answers of the JSOTF-P members to that of the Muslim respondents. Table 8 in Appendix 9 refers to 14 of 39 items (36%) for which the two groups provide different consensus answers; the task force and the Muslim respondents

did share consensus on 25 of 39 (64%) items shown in Table 9 in Appendix 9. The difficulty is in discerning any structure in the two tables to understand patterns of agreement or disagreement; with dozens of informants and 39 questions, that is a large multivariate problem. We next turn to Principal Components Analysis as an exploratory technique to find the underlying structure in the questionnaire responses.

### **Principal Components Analysis (PCA)**

Principal Components Analysis (PCA) belongs to a class of multivariate statistical methods whose primary purpose is to define the underlying structure in a data matrix. We will use it as an exploratory technique to analyze the structure of correlation among a large number of variables by finding a set of underlying dimensions, called *component factors*. Unlike the cultural consensus model, in which we assume that a single underlying factor, culture, accounts for most of the variance in the responses, it is not necessary to make any a priori assumptions on the estimation of the components or the number of components to be extracted to account for variance. The analyst examines the solution and determines how many factors to use and assesses the significance and overall fit of the factors.

However, the basic assumption that some underlying structure exists requires that the correlation matrix of the responses have a substantial number of correlations greater than 0.30.<sup>53</sup> Also, the sample should not contain heterogeneous sub-samples, because the resulting correlations may not reflect the structures of each group. Separate factor analyses should be performed and the results compared. In our case, we will separately analyze JSOTF-P, Philippine Muslims, and Philippine Christians. The JSTOF-P and Muslims displayed consensus amongst themselves so should be suitable for separate PCA. The Philippine Christians did not have consensus, but we will scrutinize the correlation matrix to be sure the sub-sample has sufficient homogeneity.

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<sup>53</sup> Joseph E. Hair, Jr., et al, Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings, Fourth Edition, Prentice Hall, 1995

### How PCA works:

PCA transforms a set of correlated variables,  $x_i$ , into a much smaller set of uncorrelated components,  $y_i$ ; this much smaller set of variables, called principal components, is easier to interpret than the original data. The  $p$  components are weighted sums of the  $x_i$ , and the  $a_{ij}$  are the weights, called component loadings; the system of equations is:

$$y_i = a_{1i}x_1 + a_{2i}x_2 + \dots + a_{pi}x_p$$

The first component,  $y_1$ , accounts for the maximum possible of the total variance,  $y_2$  for the maximum possible of the remaining variance, and so on. This distribution of the largest part of the variance onto the first component is achieved by orthogonal rotation of the variables axes, (the axes are kept at 90 degrees to one another). The goal of rotation is to clarify the data structure; orthogonal rotation is used for convenience of interpretation because it produces factors that are uncorrelated.<sup>54</sup> Total variance consists of common variance, specific variance and error. Common variance is that variance in a variable shared with all the other variables; specific variance is that associate with a particular variable, and error is the variance due to unreliability of the data gathering process, measurement error, or some random component in the construct being measured.

The first principal component is in the direction of greatest variance because orthogonal rotation is constrained to minimize the sum of squared perpendicular distances from the observations to the first component. The variance distributed to the second and remaining components is thus fixed; the total variance in the data is accounted for by the full set of principal components. Typically, the first few components account for sufficient variance that the remaining components can be discarded without too great a loss of information; these higher components carry more specific and error variance than the lower components. This decision of which components to retain is made on a case-by case basis by the analyst following procedures to be described below. The first principal

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<sup>54</sup> Oblique rotation produces components that are correlated, and arguably this method results in less loss of information. Because the tool is used here in an exploratory manner, it was decided orthogonal rotation could be used without substantively error.

component is the best one-dimensional summary of the data that can be made, and the first two principal components provide the best two-dimensional summary of the data.<sup>55</sup>

The constraints on orthogonal rotation are that the relative positions of the data points remain unchanged, and the total variance remains unchanged. Mathematically, solving for the  $a_{ij}$  is equivalent to finding the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the matrix for the set of equations for the components,  $y_i$ ; the matrix of  $x_{ij}$  is the correlation matrix of the responses. Standard algorithms are available to determine the eigenvector and eigenvalues (the weights  $a_{ij}$  and the variances). The proportion of total variance explained by each component is conveniently returned by the algorithm.

### **PCA modeling procedures:**

In this study, the correlated variables are the responses to the same questionnaire that was used for cultural consensus modeling; the purpose is to find questions that are similar to each other, then compare the sub-samples' responses on the similar questions.<sup>56</sup> The following procedures were recommended in the text by Joseph Hair, et al.<sup>57</sup> An item-by-item correlation matrix for each sub-group is computed from the questionnaire responses using simple matching; each matrix is inspected to ensure sufficient correlation is present in the responses.<sup>58</sup> Then, an un-rotated factor matrix is computed to examine the variance and determine how many components to retain in the rotated solution. This is accomplished by examining a scree plot of the eigenvalues vs. the number of components; plots typically fall rapidly from the first eigenvalue. Analysts often retain factors just at the elbow because the amount of variance explained decreases rapidly with the number of factors.

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<sup>55</sup> David J. Bartholomew, et al, The Analysis and Interpretation of Multivariate Data for Social Scientists, Chapman and Hall, 2002

<sup>56</sup> This is an R-type factor analysis; a Q-type factor analysis on the person correlation matrix would be used to identify similar individuals.

<sup>57</sup> Joseph E. Hair, et al, op cit.

<sup>58</sup> PCA was accomplished on the entire data set, and as expected, did not yield useful results.

Next, the rotated PCA is calculated to obtain the uncorrelated components. There are several algorithms available; the Hair text recommended VARIMAX to obtain the clearest separation of the components, and that is provided by the UCINET software package.<sup>59,60</sup> The software returns the component loadings which are the correlations of the component with each variable (each question in the questionnaire) the eigenvalues, and cumulative variance accounted for by successive factors. The next step is to examine the component loadings and determine which are statistically and practically significant. Finally, the variables with the highest significant loadings are examined to understand the meaning of the component. This is an intuitive and subjective interpretation process; different analysts would probably give different names to the same components, as might the reader.

The question of which component loadings are significant is addressed statistically and practically. The rule of thumb is that the larger the absolute value of the loading, the more important it is in interpreting the meaning of the factor; the squared loading is the amount of the variables' total variance accounted for by the component. Loadings of 0.5 may be considered of practical significance; those carry 25% of variance. To be somewhat more conservative, one may take sample size into account; Table 13 is from Hair, et al.<sup>61</sup> The sample size needed is based on a 0.05 significance level, a power level of 80%, and standard errors twice those of conventional correlation coefficients. The larger the sample size, the lower the loading that may be considered. We shall use this table as a starting point for considering component loadings; variable with lower loadings may be considered during the interpretation process. Finally, more specific and error variance appears in higher components, so to be conservative, loadings for higher components should be larger to be considered significant.

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<sup>59</sup> Varimax maximizes the sum of variances of the required loadings of the component matrix. In this approach, there tend to be high loadings (close to + 1 or -1) to clearly indicate variable-component correlations, and loadings near 0 to indicate lack of association.

<sup>60</sup> Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002. UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.

<sup>61</sup> Hair, et al, p 385.

Component Loading	Sample Size Needed
0.50	120
0.55	100
0.60	85
0.65	70
0.70	60
0.75	50

Table 13. Guidelines for identifying Significant Factor Loadings

### PCA Results and Interpretation

PCA for the Philippine Muslims shall be our baseline for comparison, since they are the cultural experts. Their “answer key” or culturally correct answers from cultural consensus modeling shall be compared to that of the JSOTF-P. The Philippine Christians did not have cultural consensus, so there is no “answer key” for them; instead we use their response data and find the answers that the majority of respondents chose as a reasonable approximation to consensus. In all three cases, two components were retained after examining the respective eigenvalue scree plots.

### PCA of Muslim Respondents.

Figure 6 is a scatterplot of the all the factor loadings for the first and second components for Muslim respondents; both components correlate positively with the variables. The eigenvalue scree plot is inset; the scree plot shows a sharp drop in eigenvalue from the first to the second component; hence the decision to retain two components. Table 14 shows the variance apportioned to the first three components; the first two account for 68%. The variables in Component 3 were examined, but were not found to contribute practically to understanding the structure.

Component	Eigenvalues	Percent	
		Variance	CUM %
1	21.9	56.0	56.0
2	4.8	12.3	68.4
3	1.4	3.5	71.9

Table 14. Variance apportioned to first three components for Muslim respondents.




Figure 6. Scatterplot of First Two PCA Component Loadings for Muslim Respondents

Labels at the ends of each component in Figure 6 indicate the interpretation of the extreme values of the component scores, which shall be explained next. Table X shows the variables (questions) with the most significant loadings and the sub-groups' answers to the questions (1 = agree, 0 = disagree). In this case,  $n=79$ , so loadings greater than 0.65 were considered most significant.

The questions in Component 1 are mostly to do with whether or not the Muslim populace is militant, whether separatist groups are extremist, and even whether or not Islam is inherently violent. Other questions that correlated with this component include ones about conservative dress, which relate to how normal it is for Muslim ladies to cover their head, for example (conservative dress is thought by some to signal radicalism). Based on the Muslim consensus answers, this component is named *Peaceful, Legitimate but Troubled (Our Story)*. The respondents are expressing elements of the story they tell themselves about themselves--affirming that they are not radical or extremist, that their religion is not violent or terroristic, and that separatist groups, although militant, are not extremist or criminal. Criminal, terroristic acts are committed by rogue, lawless elements. The majority of Philippine Christian responses are the same as the Muslims'; they differed on one question to do with the practices of a particular tribe. JSOTF-P members disagreed on 4 of 17 questions, they share consensus that Islam is *not* peaceful, that the separatist groups MNLF and MILF are extremists and do endanger the populace,

and that conservative dress for women is not considered mandatory, or normal. This disparity in viewpoints, first seen in qualitative analysis of the semi-structured interviews and now quantified, is very important for the task force to be aware of and to manage properly. Conversely, our Muslim partners in the military, law enforcement and community leaders should be aware of how others perceive them.

The second component was named *Rejecting Extremist Stereotypes*, because the questions are related to things people said about radicalism, for example that there are foreign radicals going about wearing skull-caps and man-dresses<sup>62</sup> and they are teaching in the madrassas, that women who dress ultra-conservatively are probably fundamentalists, which is code for “extremist,” and that people join militant groups because they are radicalized. These items were completely rejected by a consensus of Muslim respondents; JSOTF-P members and Philippine Christians differed from Muslims only on one questions, both agreeing that foreign clerics are radicalizing in the mosques. Some Muslim respondents did mention this problem of radicalization in the interviews, so perhaps awareness of it varies by one’s experience. The madrassas are schools where boys are taught Arabic and the Quran; they are considered a normal part of education for those who can afford it, according some Muslim informants. Certainly the issue would need to be addressed as a matter of good governance to mitigate radicalizing influences.

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<sup>62</sup> This is a common item of wear in the Middle East and is called the dish-dash-ah in Arabic; the soldiers and locals called it a “man-dress”

Component Description and Questions (RP Muslims)	Comp. Score	JSOTF-P	Muslims RP	Christians RP
<b>Component 1: Peaceful, Legitimate, but Troubled; Our Story</b>				
• The majority of Muslims in the Philippines are peaceful and friendly.	0.95	1	1	1
• <b>There is no such thing as an Islamic terrorist because real Islam is completely peaceful</b>	0.92	0	1	1
• Truly devout Muslims would prefer to have Sharia (Islamic law) as the law of the land.	0.88	1	1	1
• Most Muslims want peace, not bombings, but they are afraid to criticize the fanatics.	0.87	1	1	1
• Most Muslims are just regular people who want to care for their families and have a better future; they have the same values as Christians.	0.86	1	1	1
• <b>The MNLF is not an extremist group, they are struggling lawfully against oppression for Muslim self-determination and justice.</b>	0.84	0	1	1
• Christians and Muslims in general get along very well in the ARMM.	0.84	1	1	1
• Violence and crimes against civilians are committed by lawless renegades, not the real Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).	0.82	0	1	1
• <b>Hijab (scarf) and long, loose clothing is considered mandatory for Muslim women</b>	0.82	0	1	1
• The majority of Muslims here believe in democracy, civil rights and equality for all.	0.82	1	1	1
• People believe that officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao get a lot of money but do little to benefit Muslim communities.	0.82	1	1	1
• Violence here is not really about religious extremism, it is mostly about money and power.	0.80	1	1	1
• In the Philippines, conflict is simply part of the culture—it is not really about religion	0.78	1	1	1
• Most people here think that Abu Sayyaf members are just criminals and thugs	0.78	1	1	1
• Muslims here think the central government does not care about them and looks down on them	0.69	1	1	1
• Extremists distort the teachings of Islam to justify their violence against innocent people	0.69	1	1	1
• Members of the Maranao tribe are more strict about Islam and more likely to wear traditional dress and hijab or niqab (head or	0.67	1	1	0

full face coverings).

**Component 2: Rejecting Extremist Stereotypes**

• Women here who wear the burqa (full covering) are probably fundamentalists.	0.81744 8	0	0	0
• In the Philippines, most Muslims are Shia and a few are Sunni.	0.80674 8	0	0	0
• <b>Foreign clerics are introducing radical ideas in madrassas and mosques here.</b>	<b>0.80103</b> <b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
• Only foreign men wear the traditional Arab-style dress here in the Philippines.	0.79020 6	0	0	0
• The Sama and Badjao people are traditionally very fierce and violent Muslims.	0.73225 4	0	0	0
• Most Muslims here do <u>not</u> support the MNLF.	0.68533 6	0	0	0
• People join militant groups here <u>mostly</u> because of radical religious beliefs.	0.67089 1	0	0	0

Table 15. Component Description, Loadings and Questions for Muslims

**PCA of JSOTF-P Respondents**

Figure 7 is a scatterplot of the all the factor loadings for the first and second components for JSOTF-P respondents; the first component correlates positively with the variables, while the second component correlates negatively with the variables. The eigenvalue scree plot is inset; the scree plot shows a sharp drop in eigenvalue from the first to the second component; hence the decision to retain two components. Table X shows the variance apportioned to the first three components; the first two account for about 66%. The variables in Component 3 were examined, but were not found to contribute practically to understanding the structure.

Component	Eigenvalue	Percent	
		Variance	CUM %
1	21.0	53.6	53.6
2	4.7	12.1	65.7
3	1.6	4.2	69.9

Table 16. Variance apportioned to first three components for JSOTF-P respondents




Figure X. Scatterplot of First Two PCA Component Loadings for JSOTF-P Respondents

Figure 7. Scatterplot of First Two PCA Component Loadings for JSOTF-P Respondent

Labels at the ends of each component in Figure 7 indicate the interpretation of the extreme values of the component scores, which shall be explained next. Table 17 shows the variables (questions) with the most significant loadings and the sub-groups' answers to the questions (1 = agree, 0 = disagree). In this case, n= 31, so loadings greater than 0.8 were considered most significant.

The first component, *Most Peaceful, Some Militant; Troubled* is similar to the Muslims' first component, but has more questions to do with grievances and fear of the militants, as shown in Table 17. The respondents recognize that mainstream Muslims are peaceful, but the militancy or extremism is very salient.

A majority of Philippine Christians agreed with the Muslim respondents on all of the questions in this first component; JSOTF-P members' consensus matched that of the Muslim's on 12 of 14 items. The two items of disagreement are over whether or not the populace quietly or actively support the extremists (task force members suspect that they do) and the long term goals of Jemaah Islamiyah. The goals of JI may be debated, and mistrust of the populace is probably understandable, but if that became public, it could cause consternation.

The second component only has 4 items with loadings greater than 0.8, so items with lower loadings are included for careful consideration. This component is similar to the Muslims' second component in that it has elements of rejecting extremist stereotypes, but it also includes the item about Islamic terrorism being "Islamic" and the item about MNLF and MILF extremism and violence against the populace, an area of disagreement already discussed---hence the "cynical." Philippine Christians agree with Muslims on almost every item except on "Muslims here see themselves as Sunni or Shia first, then as a tribe member; (JSOTF-P and Muslims both agree) and on whether or not fundamentalists are less likely to be found in rural areas (JSOTF-P and Muslims both disagree).

Component Description and Questions (JSOTF-P)	Comp. Score	JSOTF-P Consensus Answer	RP Muslim Consensus Answer	RP Christian Majority Answer
<b>Component 1: Most Peaceful, some Militant; Troubled</b>				
• The majority of Muslims in the Philippines are peaceful and friendly.	0.95	1	1	1
• Most Muslims want peace, not bombings, but they are afraid to criticize the fanatics.	0.92	1	1	1
• Extremists distort the teachings of Islam to justify their violence against innocent people	0.91	1	1	1
• <b>Muslims do not speak out against the violence because they sometimes agree with the extremists' goals</b>	<b>0.88</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
• People here join militant groups <u>mostly</u> because they need money and can't find work.	0.84	1	1	1
• People believe that officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao get a lot of money but do little to benefit Muslim communities.	0.83	1	1	1
• Most people here think that Abu Sayyaf members are just criminals and thugs	0.83	1	1	1
• <b>Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are foreigners who want to establish a new Islamic Caliphate by violent jihad.</b>	<b>0.82</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
• Muslims here think the central government does not care about them and looks down on them	0.82	1	1	1
• Most Muslims are just regular people who want to care for their families and have a better future; they have the same values as Christians.	0.82	1	1	1
• Violence here is not really about religious extremism, it is mostly about money and power.	0.77	1	1	1
• Support for the MILF flows from the Maguindanao tribe.	0.77	1	1	1
• The Badjao people are looked down on by other tribes who think they are un-Islamic in some ways.	0.75	1	1	1

• Truly devout Muslims would prefer to have Sharia (Islamic law) as the law of the land.	0.74	1	1	1
<b>Component 2: Rejecting extremist stereotypes (but cynical)</b>				
• People join militant groups here <u>mostly</u> because of radical religious beliefs.	-0.89	0	0	0
• Most Muslims here do <u>not</u> support the MNLF.	-0.84	0	0	0
• <b>There is no such thing as an Islamic terrorist because real Islam is completely peaceful</b>	<b>-0.81</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
• <b>Women who are modern and progressive Muslims <u>never</u> wear the hijab (head covering).</b>	<b>-0.81</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
• Muslims here see themselves as Sunni or Shia first, then as a tribe member.	-0.78	0	1	0
• Women here who wear the burqa (full covering) are probably fundamentalists.	-0.75	0	0	0
• <b>Violence and crimes against civilians are committed by lawless renegades, not the real Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).</b>	<b>-0.71</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
• Only foreign men wear the traditional Arab-style dress here in the Philippines.	-0.70	0	0	0
Possibly consider these variables with lower loadings on Component 2:				
People who live in rural areas are less likely to be fundamentalists.	-0.667	0	0	1
In the Philippines, most Muslims are Shia and a few are Sunni.	-0.648	0	0	0
The MNLF is not an extremist group, they are struggling lawfully against oppression for Muslim self-determination and justice.	-0.583	0	1	1
Hijab (scarf) and long, loose clothing is considered mandatory for Muslim women	-0.562	0	1	1

Table 17 . Component Description, Loadings and Questions for JSOTF-P

### PCA of Philippine Christian Respondents.

Figure 8 is a scatterplot of the all the factor loadings for the first and second components for Philippine Christian respondents; the first component correlates positively with the variables, while the second component correlates negatively with the variables. The eigenvalue scree plot is inset; the scree plot shows a sharp drop in eigenvalue from the first to the second component; hence the decision to retain two components. Table 18 shows the variance apportioned to the first three components; the first two account for

about 66%. The variables in Component 3 were examined, but were not found to contribute practically to understanding the structure.

Component	Eigenvalues	PERCENT	CUM %
1	23.4	59.8	59.8
2	2.4	6.1	66.0
3	1.9	4.9	70.8

Table 18. Variance apportioned to first three components for Philippine Christian respondents

The component analysis for the Philippine Christians is similar to that of JSOTF-P. The first components were given the same name, *Most Peaceful, Some Militant; Troubled* reflecting that these respondents also recognize that mainstream Muslims are peaceful, but that militancy or extremism is very salient to them. Philippine Christians disagree with their Muslim countrymen on 5 of 12 of the items in the first component. For example, Philippine Christians as well as JSOTF-P members agreed that Tausugs are warrior-like; this was information provided originally by Muslim respondents. This subgroup also agrees with the JSOTF-P that foreigners are radicalizing in the mosques and madrassas, and that Muslims do not speak out against extremists because they sometime agree with their goals; the topic of foreigners may not be controversial and the mistrust they have of their fellow countrymen is certainly not a secret. As mentioned before, our Muslim partners need to appreciate how other’s view them.

The second component, *Rejecting Extremist Stereotypes*, is quite similar to the second component for the Muslim respondents, and lacking the cynical perspectives of the JSOTF-P. The respondent’s answers agree across the board in this component.




Figure 8. Scatterplot of First Two PCA Component Loadings for Philippine Christian Respondents

Component Description and Questions (RP-Christians)	Comp. Score	JSOTF-P Consensus Answer	RP Muslim Consensus Answer	RP Christian Majority Answer
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**Component 1: Most Peaceful, Some Militant; Troubled**

• The Badjao people are looked down on by other tribes who think they are un-Islamic in some ways.	0.85	1	1	1
• <b>The Tausug tribe is known for being very war-like</b>	<b>0.80</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
• Extremists distort the teachings of Islam to justify their violence against innocent people	0.79	1	1	1
• Most Muslims are just regular people who want to care for their families and have a better future; they have the same values as Christians.	0.78	1	1	1
• People believe that officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao get a lot of money but do little to benefit Muslim communities.	0.76	1	1	1
• Violence here is not really about religious extremism, it is mostly about money and power.	0.72	1	1	1
• <b>Women who are modern and progressive Muslims <u>never</u> wear the hijab (head covering).</b>	<b>0.72</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
• <b>Foreign clerics are introducing radical ideas in madrassas and mosques here.</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
• <b>There are as many kinds of Islam here as there are tribes</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
• Most people here think that Abu Sayyaf members are just criminals and thugs	0.70	1	1	1
• <b>Muslims do not speak out against the violence because they sometimes agree with the extremists' goals</b>	<b>0.67</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
• People here join militant groups <u>mostly</u> because they need money and can't find work.	0.67	1	1	1

**Component 2: Rejecting Extremist Stereotypes**

• Women here who wear the burqa (full covering) are probably fundamentalists.	-0.767	0	0	0
• Only foreign men wear the traditional Arab-style dress here in the Philippines.	-0.736	0	0	0
• Members of the Maranao tribe are more strict about Islam and more likely to wear traditional dress and hijab or niqab (head or full face coverings).	-0.704	1	1	1
• People join militant groups here <u>mostly</u> because of radical religious beliefs.	-0.69	0	0	0
• The Sama and Badjao people are traditionally very fierce and violent Muslims.	-0.67	0	0	0
• Most Muslims here do <u>not</u> support the MNLF.	-0.67	0	0	0
• In the Philippines, most Muslims are Shia and a few are Sunni.	-0.66	0	0	0

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Table 19. Component Description, Loadings and Questions for Philippine Christians

**Summary of PCA:**

This approach reduced the thirty-nine correlated variables for three sub-groups to a manageable two principal components each. The interpretation of the principal components was remarkably similar for the three groups; the JSOTF-P and local Christians were very nearly the same, summarized in Table 20. The differences seem to be due to perspective, i.e., how Muslims view themselves versus how others view them. Non-Muslims seem more inclined to believe that Islam is inherently violent, to “see” evidence of religious extremism in the violence and view the Muslim populace as somehow complicit if not outright supportive. Muslims maintain that they are regular peaceful folk with legitimate political motivations and grievances and troubled by violence that is driven not by the true Islam but falsified religion, by cultural and economic factors, and by criminal elements.

Subgroup	Name of Component 1	Name of Component 2
RP Muslims	Peaceful, Legitimate, but Troubled (Our Story)	Rejecting extremist stereotypes
JSOTF-P	Most Peaceful, Some Militant; Troubled	Rejecting extremist stereotypes (but cynical)
RP Christians	Most Peaceful, Some Militant; Troubled	Rejecting extremist stereotypes

Table 20. Summary of PCA

## **Phase II Discussion**

Major stakeholders in the Southern Philippines *do not* share a common understanding of the culture. This could be an impediment to a proper intelligence estimate of the situation when planning any kind of operation, whether it be a raid, a training event, a community engagement or development project. We cannot necessarily rely on what our AFP partners tell us; they also lack expertise on the culture of Mindanao. We have disconnects within and between major stakeholders where we should have a “three-legged stool.”

Muslim respondents affirm that they are not radical or extremist, that their religion is not violent or terroristic, and that separatist groups, although militant, are not extremist or criminal. They believe that criminal, terroristic acts are committed by rogue, lawless elements. Muslims of the Philippines reject that theirs is an extremist culture, and embrace democracy. Neither sectarian nor tribal conflict appear to be salient factors, unlike Iraq and Afghanistan. This populace yearns to be rid of corrupt and ineffective governance, to be educated and to have legitimate grievances addressed.

JSOTF-P members and Philippine Christians agree that mainstream Muslims are peaceful, but militancy and religious extremism is very salient to them. JSOTF-P members share consensus amongst themselves that Islam is *not* peaceful, and some, but not a majority of Philippine Christians agree. Both groups believe that the separatist groups MNLF and MILF are extremists and do endanger the populace, and that the populace supports the extremists, either out of fear or support for their objectives. Philippine Christians as well as JSOTF-P members agreed that Tausugs and Yakans are warrior-like. This sub-group also agrees with the JSOTF-P that foreigners are radicalizing in the mosques and madrassas.

This disparity in viewpoints, first seen in qualitative analysis of the semi-structured interviews and now quantified, is very important for the task force to be aware of and to manage properly. Conversely, our Muslim partners in the military, law enforcement and community leaders should be aware of how others perceive them.

The good news is that key stakeholders do appear to have shared appreciation, or degree of homogeneity of views and high levels of cultural knowledge—the PNP and the Muslim populace in particular—we should leverage their expertise. This is critically important because the new Internal Peace and Security Plan requires an enormous capacity-building effort for the PNP in the near-term. There are culturally knowledgeable members of the JSOTF-P of all ranks and educational levels, and there is significant concordance with the Muslim respondents.

## **Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusions**

The first phase of the dissertation revealed the richness of perspectives about Muslims in the research population. The large range and diversity of characteristics that people use to discuss Muslims and Islam in the Philippines describe a very unfamiliar cultural domain with a vastly different ethnic context than Iraq or Afghanistan.

The data from the free-list task and thematic analysis of the interviews suggests stark differences in point of view between the different stakeholders in the area—local Muslims view themselves primarily in terms of their tribal/ethnic identity while JSOTF-P members view Muslims mainly through the lenses of sectarian orientation, religious extremism/moderation and violence.

JSOTF-P members often referred to their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan when asked about Muslim culture, and generally did not express detailed knowledge about Mindanao. While the locals referred to the five main tribes of Mindanao almost universally when asked about Muslims in Mindanao, most JSOTF-P members did not. This means that fundamental information about the human terrain is not salient to the task force members. (Notable exceptions: members of 1st Special Forces Group do have specific cultural knowledge of the Philippines; this group is aligned to operate in Asia and has provided personnel and leadership to JSOTF-P Mindanao since its inception.) JSOTF-P members must start with a clean page and assess this environment in order to properly plan and execute population-centric intelligence-driven operations.

The thematic analysis of the semi-structured interviews provided extensive content about Muslims and Islam in the Philippines, and revealed that who qualifies as a religious extremist, who is a militant (or even if those are really different things) and who may primarily be criminal is not so easily distinguished in the Philippines. Religion, power, money, grievances and violence are not to be so neatly divided, and these elements appear throughout the interviews in complicated relationships—an ecology, if you will.

The VEOs are part of an ecology of *de facto governance*, which competes with or substitutes for *de jure governance*.

In Mindanao, weak legitimate governance means that security is privatized by the wealthy and rule of law is suborned by money, connections and by rule of armed power. A few elite families control most of the wealth and elected positions; members of the elected government *themselves* use and manipulate both the official and unofficial elements of governance. There are those who believe that people join these groups to earn money, as jobs are scarce, and then become trapped. This is another aspect of the VEO ecology—that their activities provide employment and income—the *de facto* economic aspect of governance—in the absence of a healthy economy.

The second phase of research complemented the first, allowing us to analyze the patterns of agreement and disagreement between the different stakeholders. We did find that major stakeholders in the Southern Philippines do not share a common understanding of the culture. This could be an impediment to a proper intelligence estimate of the situation when planning any kind of operation, whether a raid, a training event, a community engagement or development project. We cannot necessarily rely on what our AFP partners tell us; they also lack expertise on the culture. We have disconnects within and between major stakeholders where we should have a “three-legged stool.”

Muslim respondents affirm that they are not radical or extremist, that their religion is not violent or terroristic, and that separatist groups, although militant, are not extremist or criminal. Criminal, terroristic acts are believed to be committed by rogue, lawless elements. Muslims of the Philippines reject that theirs is an extremist culture, and embrace democracy. Neither sectarian nor tribal conflict appear to be salient factors, unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan. This populace yearns to be rid of corrupt and ineffective governance, to be educated and to have legitimate grievances addressed.

JSOTF-P members and Philippine Christians agree that mainstream Muslims are peaceful, but militancy and religious extremism is very salient to them. JSOTF-P

members share consensus amongst themselves that Islam is *not* peaceful, and some, but not a majority of Philippine Christians agree. Both groups believe that the separatist groups MNLF and MILF are extremists and do endanger the populace, and that the populace supports these extremists, either out of fear or support for their objectives. Philippine Christians as well as JSOTF-P members agreed that Tausugs and Yakans are warrior-like. This sub-group also agrees with the JSOTF-P that foreigners are radicalizing in the mosques and madrassas.

This disparity in viewpoints, first seen in qualitative analysis of the semi-structured interviews and now quantified, is very important for the task force to be aware of and to manage properly. Conversely, our Muslim partners in the military, law enforcement and community leaders should be aware of how others perceive them.

The good news is that key stakeholders do appear to have a degree of shared appreciation, or homogeneity of views and high levels of cultural knowledge. There are culturally knowledgeable members of the JSOTF-P of all ranks and educational levels, and there is significant concordance with the Muslim respondents. The PNP in particular, having many members from local communities, has cultural expertise which we should leverage. This would better enable USG personnel to discern the cultural implications when engaging Muslim populations in the Southern Philippines during irregular warfare or security assistance activities and inform capacity-building, development and diplomatic efforts.

**Policy Recommendations:**

- Provide cultural training to members upon arrival; invite members of the community to teach.
- It would be enormously helpful to conduct formal social network analysis (SNA) of the VEOs, families and tribal groups. AFP and PNP officers were keenly interested in network analysis; they had painstakingly developed knowledge of the people and VEOs but had very limited ability to create electronic databases

and had no experience with SNA software tools. Training them would be an excellent goal for future capacity-building with our partners.

- The issue of corruption, in the sense of an impenetrable political ecology where, in the *de facto* governance, the elected government and the VEOs may have family, clan or tribal ties, merits very careful attention. However, the cooperation of local officials is critical and could be derailed with the wrong approach. The linkages of people, groups, and political offices would benefit from detailed analysis including SNA.
- It would be useful to determine if respondent references to foreign clerics radicalizing in the hinterland have any basis in fact, and if so, determine who they are and how they are supported.
- Grievances should be assessed district by district in the full context of the socio-cultural setting and resources prioritized according to the commander's overarching objectives addressing every aspect of reforming governance. Every task force member should be aware of these grievances and how they motivate the population.
- The belief that Islam is inherently violent was expressed by some JSOTF-P members; this would be deeply offensive to Muslims. JSOTF-P leadership should address this during command orientation.
- Muslims associate education with being *peace-loving*; they tend to believe that educated people are more moderate and those who are illiterate are more susceptible to extremism.
  - Rigorously investigate the links between lack of education and extremism to inform policy
- Task force members may assume that other people are “like them,” in a kindly manner; but this habit could skew their appreciation of the environment. Train the force to be more objective when they assess the populace.

- Assess populace on this topic district by district to discern what or who they support; this will clarify deleterious influences and grievances
- A commonly expressed belief is that people are misled to support or join extremists; review and assess measures of effectiveness for influence operations.
- The language used by the task force is of utmost importance. Language mistakes could render engagement and influence activities ineffective, whereas effective use of language is more likely to resonate with the populace. The analysis in Chapter 5 provides specific guidance on language might be useful to use or avoid in command communications.

## **Appendix 1 Human Subjects Protection**

All requirements of the RAND Human Subjects Protection Committee have been met using the new RHINO online system, including protection of identities and informed consent of interviewees. All identities were protected and all information identifying participants has been destroyed. All participation in interviews and surveys will be voluntary. Personal data on informants will be collected to include age, gender, occupation or Military Occupation Specialty (MOS), education and religion.

## Appendix 2: Milestones and Resources

Literature Review	October-Dec 2007
Pre-Prospectus Signed	Feb 2008
Human Subjects Protection Committee Submission	Feb 2008
Emergency Leave of Absence	Sept 2008-Oct 2010
Literature Review Update	October 2010
Stage 1 Data Collection: Semi-Structured Interviews	May 2011
Stage 1 Data Analysis	June 2011
Stage 2 Data Collection: Structured Interviews	June 2011
Stage 2 Data Analysis	October 2011-Jan 2012
“Where I’m Stuck” Seminar	17 Feb 2012
Prospectus Signed	27 April 2012
Outside Reader	15 May 2012
Final Dissertation Seminar	25 May 2012
Dissertation Complete/Signed	8 June 2012
<b><u>Resources:</u></b>	
Labor (200 days @ \$310/day)	\$62,000
Tech Services (15 months @ \$7,956/yr)	\$9,945
MS Office, data backup, remote access (\$26.16 biweekly)	\$523
Other Software:	
QDMiner/SIMSTAT/WORDSTAT	\$995
Anthropac, UCINET	\$80
Digital Voice Editor, transcription software	\$250
Digital Voice Recorder	\$100
Books/Materials	\$1,000
Travel	
Zamboanga and vicinity, 60 days	\$5,000
TBD (travel budget remaining)	\$3,000
<b>Estimated Total:</b>	<b>\$82,893</b>

### Appendix 3 Phase I Interviews Code Book

Category	Code	Description	Count	% Codes	Cases	% Cases
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Actors	AQ	al Qaeda	5	0.50%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Actors	ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group,	18	1.80%	12	40.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Actors	BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	4	0.40%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Actors	Jl	Jemaah Islamiyah	11	1.10%	9	30.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Actors	MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front	19	1.90%	13	43.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Actors	MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front	13	1.30%	10	33.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Education	Educated	Attended school; literate	13	1.30%	8	26.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Education	Madrassa	Mosque School	7	0.70%	6	20.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Education	Uneducated	Was not able to attend school; illiterate	19	1.90%	11	36.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Bad	text string "bad"	7	0.70%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Beheading	Any text stream behead, beheaded, beheading	2	0.20%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Extremist	Any text string with extrem, extreme, extremist, extremism	41	4.10%	14	46.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Fanatics	text string fanatic	11	1.10%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Fighting	the verb fight, fighting; armed conflict	18	1.80%	12	40.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Fundamentalist	text string fundamentalist, fundamentalists, fundamentalism; speakers referring to Muslim fundamentalists	6	0.60%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Hostile	perceived hostility of populace to US forces	1	0.10%	1	3.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	IED	Improvised explosive device	5	0.50%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Islamist	text string Islamist	2	0.20%	1	3.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Jihadist	text string Jihadist	9	0.90%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	KFR	Kidnap for ransom	8	0.80%	7	23.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Lawless	text string lawless	4	0.40%	2	6.70%

Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Mean	as in mean people	1	0.10%	1	3.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Militants	text string militant	12	1.20%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Radical	text string radical	24	2.40%	10	33.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Rogue	text string rogue	4	0.40%	3	10.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Suicide bombers	suicide bombers,martyrs	5	0.50%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Terrorist	text string terrorist	6	0.60%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Extremism	Violent	Violent, violence	30	3.00%	14	46.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	14	1.40%	7	23.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Africa	Africa	2	0.20%	1	3.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Basilan	Basilan	7	0.70%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	India	Basilan	1	0.10%	1	3.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Indonesia	Indonesia	9	0.90%	7	23.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Iran	Iran	3	0.30%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Iraq	Iraq	15	1.50%	8	26.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Jolo	Jolo	5	0.50%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Marawi	Marawi	5	0.50%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Middle East	Middle East	4	0.40%	3	10.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Mindanao	Mindanao	7	0.70%	7	23.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Pakistan	Pakistan	2	0.20%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Philippines	Philippines	34	3.40%	16	53.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	4	0.40%	3	10.00%

Reference						
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Sulu	Sulu	3	0.30%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Tawi	Tawi	8	0.80%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Geographic Reference	Zamboanga	Zamboanga	2	0.20%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Islamic Sects	Shia	Shia	23	2.30%	11	36.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Islamic Sects	Sufi	Sufi	2	0.20%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Islamic Sects	Sunni	Sunni	28	2.80%	11	36.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Islamic Sects	Tabligh	Tabligh	1	0.10%	1	3.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Islamic Sects	Wahhabi	Wahhabi	5	0.50%	3	10.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Democratic	believing in Democracy	1	0.10%	1	3.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Friendly	text string friendly	7	0.70%	6	20.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	In-Between	The "in-between" people; an expression for moderates or non-combatants	2	0.20%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Intimidated-Endangered	The belief that the Muslim populace is intimidated and threatened by extremists	5	0.50%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Kind	kind as in nice, not as in "type"	3	0.30%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Liberal	text string "liberal"	2	0.20%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Mainstream	text string "mainstream"	5	0.50%	3	10.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Majority	text sting majority	10	1.00%	7	23.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Middle	text stream middle; refers to moderates, people in the middle	3	0.30%	3	10.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Moderate	text string moderate	19	1.90%	9	30.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Muslims are like us	expressions used by US respondents; expressing belief that people are the same	7	0.70%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Nice	text string nice	5	0.50%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Non-extremist	text string non-extremist	3	0.30%	3	10.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Non-Violent	text string non-violent	4	0.40%	3	10.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Normal	text string normal	3	0.30%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Peaceful	text string peaceful	5	0.50%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Populace	text string populace	7	0.70%	4	13.30%

Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Progressive	text string pgressive	3	0.30%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Regular	as in the "regular" people	3	0.30%	3	10.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Support Extremists	expressions that the populace supports the extremists	8	0.80%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Moderates	Westernized	text string western	8	0.80%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Morality	Corruption	corrupt, corruption	9	0.90%	8	26.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Morality	Criminality	criminal activities	10	1.00%	9	30.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Morality	Drinking	alcohol	5	0.50%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Morality	Hypocrite	text string hypocrite	2	0.20%	1	3.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Morality	Non-sanctioned sex	any sex not sanctioned by marriage, incuding boy-friend/girlfriends, use of prostitutes, incest	6	0.60%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Anti-US	expression that hostility is specifically anti-US	1	0.10%	1	3.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Cultural	Violence is ingrained in the culture	4	0.40%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Defensive	Violence is in defense of homes, land, families	2	0.20%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Grievances	disatisfaction with conditions, resentment of treatment	17	1.70%	8	26.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Islam Distorted	Violence a distortion of Islam	27	2.70%	17	56.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Islam inherently violent	violence is normative to the religious teachings	7	0.70%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Money	text string money	19	1.90%	11	36.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	People are misled	expressions that people who cannot rad the Quran are misled by radicals	17	1.70%	14	46.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Power	text string power	11	1.10%	9	30.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Revenge	text string revenge	2	0.20%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Sectarian conflict	e.g., conflict between Sunnis and Shias	1	0.10%	1	3.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Separatism	Moro separatism; movements to be independent from the central Manila government	10	1.00%	9	30.00%

Codebook Freelist Interviews\Drivers of Violence	Tribal conflict	Conflict between Moro tribes	2	0.20%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Philippine Tribes	Badjao	Badjao tribe	9	0.90%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Philippine Tribes	Maguindanao	Maguindanao tribe	11	1.10%	6	20.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Philippine Tribes	Maranao	Maranao tribe	15	1.50%	9	30.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Philippine Tribes	Sama	Sama tribe	16	1.60%	7	23.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Philippine Tribes	Tausug	Tausug tribe	28	2.80%	11	36.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Philippine Tribes	Yakan	Yakan tribe	16	1.60%	8	26.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Conservative	text string conservative	19	1.90%	12	40.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Only One Islam	Only one Islam, but many cultures and variations in cultural practices	7	0.70%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Convert	as in a person who has converted (noun)	3	0.30%	2	6.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Convert (verb)	as in converting people	5	0.50%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Devout	text string devout	6	0.60%	5	16.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Non-Practicing	text string	4	0.40%	3	10.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Not Strict	text string	4	0.40%	3	10.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Pious	text string	1	0.10%	1	3.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Practicing	text string practicing; caution, this can return "non-practicing"	11	1.10%	8	26.70%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Sharia	Practice Sharia, want sharia	13	1.30%	6	20.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Strict	text string	11	1.10%	7	23.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Traditional	text string	8	0.80%	7	23.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Traditional Attire	traditional attire such as niqab, hijab, burqa, head scarf, loose modest clothing, men's skullcap/dish-dash;	28	2.80%	15	50.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	True Believers	text string	5	0.50%	4	13.30%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Religiousness	Western Attire		11	1.10%	9	30.00%
Codebook Freelist Interviews\Wealth	Poor		14	1.40%	8	26.70%

Codebook Freelist Interviews\Wealth	Wealthy		9	0.90%	5	16.70%
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Table 20. Codebook

## Appendix 4. Thematic Binning of Free-list Data

EXTREMISTS	MODERATES	RELIGIOSNESS	TRIBE-ETHNIC-PHILIPPINES	SECT	EDUCATION	GEOGRAPHIC	TRIBAL-ETHNIC-OTHER	WEALTH
ASG	every-day normal ones	believers who follow the Koran	Badjao	animist	educated	Afghan	Kurdish	poor
bad	friendly	conservative	Bangsamoro	Islamic	sophisticated and educated	African	nomads	wealthy
BIFF	in the middle not fighting	converts	Calagan	Shia	ulema	Arab	Pashtuns	
criminal	in-between ones	devout	Davonigno	Sufi	uneducated	Indian		
criminals	kind Muslims	evangelical	Filipino	Sunni	uneducated-illiterate	Indonesian		
extreme fundamentalists	liberal	hypocritical	Iranon	Tablighs	unsophisticated and illiterate	Iranian		
extremist versions	mainstream	Muslim by birth	Maguindanao	Wahhabi		Iraqi		
extremist-fundamentalists	mellows	non-practicing	Mapulin			Jolo		
extremists	moderates	practicing	Maranao			Tawi		
fanatics	Muslim lite less strict	strict ones	Marawi					
fighters	nice ones	true believers	Sama					
fundamentalist-jihadist	non-extremists		Samal					
fundamentalists	non-violent		Sangil					
fundamentalists we are fighti	non-violent evangelists		Sobayan					
Islamists	peaceful		Subayon					
mean ones	populace		Tausug					
MILF	similar to Westerners		Yakan					
militants	westernized							
MNLF								
radicals								
terrorists								
those who do bad things								
unconquered								
violent								
violent evangelists								
violent extremists								
violent-devout								
violently missionary								

Table 21. Thematic binning of free-list data

## Appendix 6. Tables of Quotes for Theme and Sub-Themes

Theme: VEOs

VEOs	Typical Quotes	Rarer Quotes
BIFF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The people I think are split as to whether they support Kato and BIFF. I think the motivation of Kato is political, not religious. It is not about ideology. The split with MILF, it is political.</li> <li>• (RP-Christian) You know Ampatuan? The massacre? He the ruler of all Mindanao, he killed political opponents and reporters. He was MNLF before. Now (he is under arrest) all his go to Kato, to the BIFF. We believe the current governor supports the BIFF, he is Toto, Magunadato. Kato has more followers now, former followers of Ampatuan. Why? Because no money after the massacre (because of the arrests).</li> <li>• (US) Now there is a new splinter group, you know about the BIFF? Kato, formerly the 105th commander, he's radical, now he recruits and gets former 105th</li> </ul>	(RP-Muslim) Well Kato, he is ustadz (teacher), he has charisma.

	guys.	
AQ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) JI they are linked with ASG and AQ.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The radicals? There is MNLF, MILF, Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah and Al-Qa'ida . JI is from Indonesia and Malaysia.</li> <li>• (US) al-Qa'ida say/believe they are fighting evil.</li> </ul>	(US)There is something called “chosen trauma” where we rally around an event. For Muslims it was the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and/or the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets. AQ uses these to get people to come fight for the cause.
MNLF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The MNLF wants peace, but renegades split off, they do not want peace!</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The MNLF, they are not extremist, they just wanted separate government, but it was very careful to avoid civilian casualties, I know this, my father was MNLF.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Violent groups: JI, MILF, MNLF, ASG. They are all very religious. The radicals want a separate Muslim state.</li> </ul>	(US) They (MNLF and others) are violent separatist groups, supposedly negotiating for peace but they are really negotiating deceptively to gain advantage. They want the benefits of being part of the PI without the responsibility. They want an Islamic state (all the groups do).
JI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) Now JI, they are still jihadist with ties to AQ, and going abroad for stuff. They do IEDs, ambushes, safe havens, staging, training, extortion. They marry</li> </ul>	(US) They have ties to JI, MNLF/MILF does for resource reasons, not because of ideology so much. They use ideology to manipulate the people, the leaders

	<p>local wives to integrate into society here. They are mostly Indonesian, and Malaysian. They have different facial features.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The JI guys here, they have intermarried. This is their safe haven, they are not fighter guys, more like facilitators.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The JI have same belief as AQ, and same strategy as the Communists. They use propaganda to generate sympathy and in the madrassas, they teach radical, and they speak to crowds. They still have ideology of jihad. JI want Islam to rule everyone—but that is un-Islamic, because the Koran says there is no compulsion in religion.</li> </ul>	<p>are not true believers, in my opinion</p>
MILF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP Muslim)And MILF—I do not know why they have “Islamic” in the name, their struggle is not religious, it is about separate government.</li> <li>• (RP Muslim) The Congress is mostly Christians from Luzon, their laws do not help Maguindanao. That is maybe one reason people support the MILF—the prejudice.</li> </ul>	<p>(US) Well come to think of it, something weird, just in the last couple years, the NPA (Communists) and MILF have collaborated. This is unusual because usually it is the Muslims vs. the Christians. This is very unusual.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) And MILF, they are violent they willingly getting between the PI people and the AFP, they use the populace as a shield, they like use children to do grocery runs to the city and justify things for their “holy quest.”</li> <li>• (US) The MNLF and MILF, they have rogue elements (that are lawless). They are extremely conservative.</li> <li>• (US) Not all the MILF are extreme.</li> </ul>	
ASG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Christian) They (ASG) are doing crimes, smuggling, drugs, gun running, and ASG, they are doing KFR. It is all about money.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The doings of the ASG is against the teachings of Islam—it is a “grave offense” before the eyes of God.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) But the ASG, they have no ideology anymore (they are a criminal group)</li> <li>• (US) The fanatics, here in the PI, they are not so much preaching jihad or the caliphate any more, I mean the ASG. Now it is about criminality, and they no longer</li> </ul>	<p>(RP-Muslims)Abu Sayyaf (ASG) they are outsiders!</p> <p>(RP-Muslim) Well, they (ASG) are extremist, fundamentalist. Still, today? Still.</p> <p>(RP-Muslim) The locals, they see the ASG as their only alternative against the politics. Almost all ASG members have criminal records and they are victims of the politicians’ bata-bata system. The ASG guys, 95% are in the group because of their situation, they do not believe in jihad. But the leaders use jihad to convince, to recruit. A lot will join for religious reasons.</p> <p>(RP- Muslim)Many pious of the</p>

	<p>have strong key leaders.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) They do KFR to make a living. But not all of them are bad, it is like a gang, it can be hard to leave. Some members just go wrapped into it.</li> <li>• (US) Here in the PI I know the extremists are the ASG, and the JI. The JI people were trained in Afghanistan, but the ASG were not, I don't think. There is the KFR.</li> </ul>	<p>ulema reject the ASG on the grounds of jihad.</p>
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Table 22. Quotes related to *violent extremist organizations (VEOs)*

Theme: Violence

Violence	Typical Quotes	Rarer Quotes
Beheading	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only 2 occurrences</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) Extremists are people who behead you if you do not follow them.</li> <li>• (US) But there are beheadings</li> </ul>
Bad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) Muslims are not all bad people.</li> <li>• (US) They do KFR to make a living. But not all of them are bad, it is like a gang, it can be hard to leave. Some members just go wrapped into it.</li> <li>• (RP-Christian) Well, some bad, friendly, all mixed together.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Christian) They are mostly bad.</li> <li>• (US) They say “Inshallah” so when bad things happen, it is the will of God.</li> <li>• (US) Muslims will do what God tells them to do, good or bad</li> </ul>
Fighting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The educated ones, they are in the “middle” not joining the fighting</li> <li>• (RP-Christian) The fanatics—they have twisted minds. They are fighting for a cause, they are like Osama bin Ladin.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) In the 1980s, it was the highlander Yakans vs. the lowlander Tausugs, they used to fight on Basilan.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The Tausug—they are</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Christian) If somebody gets hurt, it is the AFP fault no matter what. They will then come and fight you (for revenge) no matter what.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) They said that ASG has “no ideology” and when they pray for courage, it is un-Islamic because</li> </ul>

	<p>fierce, they fought for survival, they are allowed in Islam to defend themselves. Sometimes the AFP are afraid of them.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Men: they fight; they protect their area—both Yakans and Tausugs. Men of the highlands do this and women work.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) And so the MNLF and MILF fight in Cotabato; there is a ceasefire right now.</li> <li>• (US) In the PI, there are particular families that are militant where for generations, fighting is handed down to the kids.</li> </ul>	<p>they are only doing crimes, not fighting for a principle.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) There are...hard-core fundamentalists: they believe that Sharia should be the law of the land, they believe in a caliphate...the ones we are fighting, you know, Islamists</li> <li>• (RP-Christians) They are fighting, they want independent, they want Christians out.</li> </ul>
Suicide bombers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Christian)They have bombs here but not the suicide bombers.</li> <li>• (US)They teach about martyrdom, promise that God will reward you if you sacrifice your life and kill evil others this is really powerful motivation.</li> <li>• (US) In the PI, the extremists are different from Iraq, not very many suicide bombers.</li> <li>• (US) However some do not believe in martyrdom, but still might do terrorism.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Christian)Those suicide bombers, they are insane.</li> </ul>

IED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) They (JI) do IEDs, ambushes, safe havens, staging, training, extortion.</li> <li>• (US) They do IEDs as an intimidation tool against the populace, not US forces.</li> <li>• (US) If they leave and IED and people get hurt, like children or other Muslims, they just say Inshallah.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) There is no foreign Imam saying, “Hey you, go make an IED!” (They were laughing derisively)</li> <li>• (US) We are dealing with “something not right.” I mean 9-10 years of US presence and these people think the AFP set out the IED?</li> </ul>
KFR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The groups, the terrorists are ASG, they commit KFR</li> <li>• (US) They do KFR to make a living.</li> <li>• (US) They commit KFR and other crimes, get money</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) KFR is a business.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Christian) Only the Muslims do like KFR, not Christians.</li> </ul>
Violent/Violence (General)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim)The separatist politicians, they arm their own groups and if a baranguy does not support them, they will go massacre them!</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)They who did that massacre, (it was over an election)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim)The Maranao are business people and they may violently protect their business interests.</li> <li>• (US) The violent irreconcilable ones are</li> </ul>

	<p>they are very rich. The government—there are guns and goons! Everybody has goons!</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim)Violent groups: JI, MILF, MNLF, ASG. They are all very religious. The radicals want a separate Muslim state.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)Those who Koran interpretation is radical, hard-core, they are killing (like the ASG) the book is their tool for recruiting. They are violent.</li> <li>• (US) With devout Muslims, there is one result—people die</li> <li>• (US) The more devout, the more into the Koran (that they are) they tend to be more fundamentalist. You know, Islamists. They justify violence by the Koran. They believe Sharia should be THE law and so they want to throw out the government.</li> <li>• (US) On Basilan, the young males, it is there mission to convert everyone or kill them—they are violently missionary.</li> <li>• (US) He said—he is not sympathetic about Islam. Islamic teachings were founded in a violently strategic fashion, and those who regard Islam as peaceful are grossly deceived.</li> </ul>	<p>hiding out in the forest, ie they have geographic sanctuary</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) On Basilan, the contrast is stark. In Isabella City they are far above the abject poverty out in the rural areas where the road stops and the violent Islamic culture begins.</li> <li>• (US) Either Sunni or Shia can be either violent or non-violent.</li> </ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (US) There are those who advocate/endorse use of violence to spread Islam.</li></ul>	
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Table 23. Sub-themes and quotes related to *Violence*.

Theme: Extremism

Extremism	Typical Quotes	Rarer Quotes
Lawlessness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only 3 occurrences</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) Up around Marawi that is tough terrain. A lot of lawless elements.</li> <li>• (US) The MNLF and MILF, they have rogue elements (that are lawless).</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) On Basilan there are some lawless Tausug and Yakan</li> </ul>
Fundamentalists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim)He said “there are “extremists-fundamentalists” and “mellows” who “don't care.”</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)Well, they are extremist, fundamentalist.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)Well you know, the foreign clerics, they are fundamentalist.</li> <li>• (US) The more devout, the more into the Koran (that they are) they tend to be more fundamentalist.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) There are...hard-core fundamentalists: they believe that Sharia should be the law of the land, they believe in a caliphate...the ones we are fighting, you know, Islamists</li> <li>• In Southern Basilan, it is more</li> </ul>

		rural and more fundamentalist.
Islamists	Only 2 occurrences in one case	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US)The more devout, the more into the Koran (that they are) they tend to be more fundamentalist. You know, Islamists. They justify violence by the Koran. They believe Sharia should be THE law and so they want to throw out the government.</li> <li>• (US)There are...hard-core fundamentalists: they believe that Sharia should be the law of the land, they believe in a caliphate...the ones we are fighting, you know, Islamists</li> </ul>

Rogue-Renegade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The MNLF wants peace, but renegades split off, they do not want peace!</li> <li>• (US) The MNLF and MILF, they have rogue elements (that are lawless). They are extremely conservative.</li> <li>• (US) Extremists are people who behead you if you do not follow them. They are the portion who are renegades in the religion.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) And there are rogue preachers out in the rural areas, that is a problem for the ARMM. But maybe not organized enough and not necessarily lawless.</li> </ul>
Fanatics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) And these fanatics, they could become the violent extremists. Because the sword, that is pivotal element of their religion.</li> <li>• (US) Fanatical, those who take it to the extreme, out of context, or for profit or to make a name for themselves. Their views are from the parts of the Koran about conquering</li> <li>• (US) So fanatics are conservative and they believe in Jihad. But...I think also mainstream Muslims could support jihad...in their hearts. Chances are, they are unwittingly supporting jihad, because when they fail to speak out (against jihad) that makes them accomplices.</li> <li>• (US) The middle ones. The silent majority they want to worship in peace, be left alone, not you know, be converted to Christianity, they approve of the Western way, but also understand the fanatics, do not condemn them, they would not</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) They might turn down booze or drugs but they wouldn't turn down a woman unless they were a true fanatic. You know, that's how you know they are fucking psychos!</li> <li>• (RP-Christian)The fanatics—they have twisted minds.</li> </ul>

	<p>condemn an attack on Israel. They are quiet about their feelings about the fanatics—this is hard to understand. They may justify the fanatics’ actions to themselves.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) But in poorer countries like Afghanistan and here in Mindanao, they have no choice. The power of the fanatics—it endangers the mainstreams due to lack of security and lack of governance.</li> </ul>	
<p>Jihadist</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) Muslims in the PI: don't know that much about them, seems to me it is more criminal type activity than <b>jihad</b>, more about earning money than religious commitment. But there are beheadings.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) People are losing interest in the militants, there is less support, less enthusiasm for <b>jihad</b>. They use <b>jihad</b> to recruit, but the populace losing interest</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Many pious of the ulema reject the ASG on the grounds of <b>jihad</b>.</li> <li>• (US) The fanatics, here in the PI, they are not so much preaching <b>jihad</b> or the caliphate any more, I mean the ASG. Now it is about criminality...</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) They (JI) still have ideology of <b>jihad</b>. JI want Islam to rule everyone—but that is un-Islamic, because the Koran says there is no compulsion in religion.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) But the leaders use <b>jihad</b> to convince, to recruit. A lot will join for</li> </ul>	<p>(US) So if I were trying to talk up going on a Crusade (like in the olden days, to Jerusalem) people would laugh at me. But if we talk about going on Jihad, there are listeners out there. People actually take it seriously, in this day and age!</p>

	<p>religious reasons.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) So fanatics are conservative and they believe in <b>Jihad</b>. But...I think also mainstream Muslims could support <b> Jihad</b>...in their hearts. Chances are, they are unwittingly supporting <b> Jihad</b>, because when they fail to speak out (against <b> Jihad</b>) that makes them accomplices.</li> <li>• (US) Now JI, they are still <b> Jihadist</b> with ties to AQ, and going abroad for stuff.</li> </ul>	
Terrorist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US)They commit crimes to fund their <b>terrorism</b>, they have criminal enterprises.</li> <li>• (US)...some do not believe in martyrdom, but still might do <b>terrorism</b>. Those who do, some of them exist here.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)Most of teaching in madrassas is good, to learn Arabic. But some leaders went Saudi and came back radical. They are pretending to understand Islam and the young generation, they use religion to convince good people. Some current <b>terrorists</b> were madrassas students. For example they were taught “once you kill a Christian, you enter paradise.”</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Some Muslims go to Catholic school because the quality of education is good, but the terrorists burn down the school. Without education people “stay dumb.” There is no progress!</li> </ul>	<p>(US) A lot of them are terrorists.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The groups, the terrorists are ASG, they are the KFR, and the young people recruit. Some groups, and JI. Their objectives are to establish the caliphate, to govern the region, to align with other (local) groups entities or factions for tactical or strategic ends.</li> </ul>
Militant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The populace is extremely intimidated by the militants. They will seem to cooperate with</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) People are losing</li> </ul>

	<p>the AFP to get something. Some of the populace is not intimidated but they actively support the militants.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) In the PI, there are two kinds of extremists: the militants in the jungle, and the collaborators and supporters in the community. The community leaders, the governors, the Imams.</li> <li>• (US) The majority of Muslims here will have sympathies to the militants, they either passively or actively support the extremists, except if money is involved.</li> <li>• (US) I think the militant ones, they don't like us, they are gruff and not polite, they are into power plays, there is a barrier between us.</li> <li>• (US) In the PI, there are particular families that are militant where for generations, fighting is handed down to the kids</li> </ul>	<p>interest in the militants, there is less support, less enthusiasm for jihad. They use jihad to recruit, but the populace losing interest.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) However there was a recent case of a kidnapping of a child where the populace reported against the militants. It was a big deal. We hope people in other municipalities will follow suit.</li> </ul>
<p>Radicals- Radicalizing</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The JI have same belief as AQ, and same strategy as the Communists. They use propaganda to generate sympathy and in the madrassas, they teach radical, and they speak to crowds.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Yes, Pakistanis, Saudis, and so forth—we call them “Arabs” they are radicalizing!</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Most of teaching in madrassas is good, to learn Arabic. But some leaders went</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Another kind of Muslim is a convert. Converts are MORE radical, they want to prove themselves to be “true believers.” They</li> </ul>

	<p>Saudi and came back radical. They are pretending to understand Islam and they mislead the younger generation, they use religion to convince good people...they recruit.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The radicals, they have their own Imams, sometimes they are foreigners.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The radicals–can easily identify them. They exclude themselves from the main community, they are in the rural areas, isolated, they isolate themselves. They are not in the city–too much complexity of thought there, they avoid that, competition of ideas.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)The radicals want a separate state</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)So the ones called radical or extremist Muslims are not Muslims, they are simply radical people. The radicals take parts of the Quran out of context to justify their deeds.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)The radicals, sometimes they (the men) wear the old-style clothes (traditional garb) but not always, you cannot always tell them by their dress. The ladies, some wear the head covering and some cover the face, and they cover their hair and arms.</li> <li>• (US) The radicals, their beliefs are distorted</li> </ul>	<p>are more aggressive to prove “we are the real ones (Muslims)”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The sultanate? The radicals want it, the regular people do not.</li> <li>• (US)There are genuine converts who hold the pillars of Islam to be true. They are faithful, more involved, enthused, excited, and evangelistic. They will embrace the way of whoever converted them. So if a radical converted them, they will be radical.</li> </ul>
Extremist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) They payoff or bribe the government (the AFP). The government “allows” the extremists to exist and function.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) Extremists are less/non tolerant.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The community leaders, they are hypocrites, and they are aligned with the extremists. They play both sides. You know, during a CMO, they will seem friendly to us. But they are doing the dirty work for the militants for sheer greed, not religion. They are keeping people in fear, and they are not stopping the militants. What kind of dirty work? Like extortion and corruption. They take government money but do not benefit their people. How do I know this? Because we have been here ten years (and it has not changed). These community leaders—they are not getting shot—because they are collaborating! They do not feel the militants are a threat.</li> <li>• (US) Extremists capitalize on their own people's misfortune to carry out their intentions.</li> <li>• (US) Extremism is not about Islam, it is about power.</li> <li>• (US) The extremists they distort the message of the Koran.</li> <li>• (US) Extremists, the women dress covering the face and a long robe. The men, they grow beards, dress conservatively.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)Of the tribes, the Tausugs would be most likely inclined to extremism, then the Yakans. The Yakans, they are a lot of leaders, high profile, with political power. They know that “without guns you are nobody.”</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) So if uneducated, easily convinced</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) Extremists have a power agenda, they use fear to motivate their people, they make them afraid of the “other.”</li> <li>• (US) The extremists: cant tell by looking or by their dress. They could be working in the store down the street.</li> <li>• (US) The extremists here in the PI: dissatisfaction with poverty, identity question, are we Filipino or Malay? They resent the loss of the Sultanate, want a sultanate, not to be part of the republic.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)...all extremists in the</li> </ul>
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	<p>to follow extremist teachings.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslims) So the ones called radical or extremist Muslims are not Muslims, they are simply radical people.</li> </ul>	<p>PI are home-grown and no foreigners influence them</p>
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Table 24. Sub-themes and quotes related to *Extremism*.

Theme: “Regular” Muslims

<b>“Regular” Muslims</b>	<b>Typical Quotes</b>	<b>Rarer Quotes</b>
Democratic-Liberal-Progressive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) He, as a Muslim in the AFP, said he enjoys <b>freedom of religion</b>.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) <i>But here in the PI we have no oppression! Here, we have <b>freedom</b>, it is a <b>democracy</b>, if we do not like our leaders we can vote.</i></li> <li>• (US) Non-extremists: “<b>progressive Muslims</b>” like Ramir or Zuhadi Jasser. They have mainstream thinking.</li> <li>• (US) The <b>progressive</b> ones, government and religion can coexist, like in the UAE, the environment is sort of free. There is economic and cultural progress. Like in Qatar, Dubai, they embrace some Western influences.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Yes, here women have full civil rights, it is far more liberal, this is a democracy.</li> <li>• (US) Muslim women are surprisingly <b>liberal</b>, less reserved in their sexuality than I expected. They can be very promiscuous, drink, and party.</li> </ul>
Middle/In-between	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The educated ones, they are in the “<b>middle</b>” not joining the fighting with the MILF.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) There is a certain group, educated ones (indicating himself) we are the <b>in-between</b> ones, do not like the factions. Some youth groups, as college students to lend assistance, humanitarian, to people hurt by conflicts for evacuees.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The <b>middle</b> ones. The silent majority they want to worship in peace, be left alone, not you know, be converted to Christianity, they approve of the Western way, but also understand the fanatics, do not condemn them, they would not condemn an attack on Israel. They are quiet about their feelings about the fanatics—this</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The “<b>in-between</b>” Muslims are the majority of the population, they are subject to many competing influences. They are like you and me, doing the best they can. Here in the PI there is no stigma if you are a Muslim or a Christian. They are neighbors, they socialize, they are not segregated, they have daily interaction.</li> </ul>	<p>is hard to understand. They may justify the fanatics actions to themselves.</p>
<p>Non-Violent-Peaceful</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim)The MNLF wants peace</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)But Islam is meaning <b>peace</b>, from complete submission to Allah</li> <li>• (US) And those who want to spread Islam, but think there are <b>more effective ways than violence</b>.</li> <li>• (US) Either Sunni or Shia can be either violent or <b>non-violent</b>.</li> <li>• (US) The <b>non-violent</b> Muslims in the PI are in more populated areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim)The “mellows” are non-violent</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)Now, the Sama are a <b>peace-loving</b> people. Their focus is on education. They are more professional peoples who are Sama. Sama people, they are patient people, not like Tausug.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The Badjao, they are <b>peace-loving</b>, abused, they migrate away like to Manila, they sometimes are a problem only for illegal dynamite fishing. They are <b>peace-loving</b> and they are afraid, afraid of dogs and ghosts, so they go to sea to avoid the ghosts. Some of them have houses. People look down on them. The Tausug think the Samal and</li> </ul>

		Badjao are 2nd class citizens.
But Maybe they Support the Extremists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) Some of the populace is not intimidated but they <b>actively support</b> the militants.</li> <li>• (US) But...I think also mainstream Muslims <b>could support jihad...in their hearts.</b> Chances are, they are <b>unwittingly supporting jihad,</b> because when they fail to speak out (against jihad) that makes them accomplices.</li> <li>• (US) There are sophisticated and educated Muslims (e.g., the ones in the USA) These are moderate, rational, reasonable, able to discern that some of Islamic teachings are not right, but they believe the deceptive propaganda that Islam is peaceful—however <b>they might turn violent later</b>—it is an individual choice they could make.</li> <li>• (US) Most Muslims—you know, moderates, want peace, not bombings, but I think they are <b>hesitant to criticize the fanatics.</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(RP-Christian) Never, never 100% trust them. <b>They are traitors,</b> even if you help them.</i></li> <li>• <i>(US) The <b>middle ones.</b> The silent majority they want to worship in peace, be left alone, not you know, be converted to Christianity, they approve of the Western way, but also <b>understand the fanatics,</b> do not condemn them, they would not condemn an attack on Israel. They are quiet about their feelings about the fanatics—this is hard to understand. <b>They may justify the fanatics actions to themselves.</b></i></li> <li>• <i>(US) The majority of Muslims here will have sympathies to the militants, they either <b>passively or actively support the extremists,</b> except if money is involved.</i></li> </ul>

<p>Muslims are like us- Westernized</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) So there are two kind of moderates: those who are not really practicing but respect Islam, and the majority who are “<b>like us</b>” they just want to raise their kids, teach their kids in peace, be left alone and have a better future.</li> <li>• (US) <b>Westernized</b> Muslims share our lifestyle, have houses and nice cars like ours, you know...but they feel like “don't tell me how to live or how to raise my kids. They want to be left alone. They want a better future.</li> <li>• (US) But they are just simple people who want to care for their families and have a better future, they have the <b>same values</b> as anyone else. You know, universal values.</li> <li>• (US) Here they are far less conservative—they seem to pray regularly but are more open. They are much more <b>Western</b>, more modern, I mean they use cell phones, and they are very friendly.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) Muslims are <b>similar to Westerners</b>: they have the same wants, same values, they pursue the same things. My best friend was an Afghan immigrant and he was assimilated, Americanized, he drank, he went clubbing, he had sex with girls. But he expected his sister to uphold traditional Muslim standards (of conservative behavior and dress, chastity).</li> <li>• (US) They want to live their life, they <b>want the American Dream</b>.</li> <li>• The <b>Westernized</b> ones, they have adapted to our culture, they get along/go along</li> </ul>
<p>Majority</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• They overwhelming <b>majority</b> of them are not problem, but maybe a little bit aloof because we are alien to them.</li> <li>• The “in-between” Muslims are the <b>majority</b> of the population, they are subject to many competing influences.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim)Independence from manila—the <b>majority</b> of Muslims do not prefer it.</li> <li>• The <b>majority</b> of Muslims here will have sympathies to the militants, they either passively</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• They take religion to the extreme—<b>most Muslims</b> are not like that.</li> <li>• So there are two kind of moderates: those who are not really practicing but respect Islam, and the <b>majority</b> who are “like us” they just want to raise their kids, teach their kids in peace, be left alone and have a better future.</li> </ul>	<p><i>or actively support the extremists, except if money is involved.</i></p>
Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) No, you cannot tell by dress who is radical. Some radicals wear t-shirts and shorts and some wear traditional dress. It is painful for <b>moderates</b> like our veterinarian and our director ladies that they wear hijab and someone might think they are radical.</li> <li>• (US) In the PI, there are less extremists and more <b>moderates</b>. The extremists here, they come from Indonesia, like down on Tawi.</li> <li>• (US) Here in the PI the <b>moderate</b> Muslims do not wear conservative dress, they dress normal.</li> <li>• (US) The <b>moderate</b> Muslims are normal. They have routine life, like us, you know go to church, work, raise the family. They don't try to convert you to Islam.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) <i>The ladies who are <b>mellows</b>. They do wear the head covers.</i></li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) <i><b>Mellows</b> go to mosque on Fridays. Some are very religious and some are less religious.</i></li> <li>• (US) <i>Zamboanga Muslims are more <b>moderate</b> than the ones I met in Iraq.</i></li> <li>• (US) <i>I noticed at the conference (with doctors from the ARMM), they were <b>patriotic and they showed respect for the Philippine flag and country</b>, they identified themselves as Filipinos.</i></li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Then there is <b>Muslim Lite</b>. Like here in the Philippines, they are tolerant, less strict, more integrated with Christians.</li> </ul>	
Normal- Regular- Mainstream	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The <b>mainstream</b> Muslims, they are just <b>ordinary</b> people living like anybody else.</li> <li>• (US) Non-extremists: “progressive Muslims” like Ramir or Zuhadi Jasser. They have <b>mainstream</b> thinking. Not so much here. Here they are too tied to Indonesia. The old school types want Sharia law. They are conservative.</li> <li>• The power of the fanatics—it endangers the <b>mainstreams</b> due to lack of security and lack of governance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) In northern Basilan, they are more <b>mainstream</b>, they don't put it on anybody, they get along with Christians.</li> <li>• (US) So fanatics are conservative and they believe in Jihad. But...I think also <b>mainstream</b> Muslims could support jihad...in their hearts.</li> </ul>
Friendly-Nice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Well, some bad, <b>friendly</b>, all mixed together.</li> <li>• (US) But, here in the PI they are more amenable to non-Muslims</li> <li>• (US) There is a cultural-religious link. So the Sama people on Tawi they will tell you “we are peaceful.” They are <b>friendly</b> and open to outside influence.</li> <li>• (US) Here they are far less</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) First of all we Maguindanao, we are <b>kind</b>, we love to have a big cookout to celebrate and to praise God. We, we <b>love Americans</b>.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The Maranaos, they love to build mosques (snicker) and they love to pray (mocking tone). But they are not kind. They are very pious,</li> </ul>

	<p>conservative—they seem to pray regularly but are more open. They are much more western, more modern, I mean they use cell phones (implying in other countries they don't have), and they are very <b>friendly</b>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The regular populace is very <b>nice</b>.</li> </ul>	<p>they always were hijab and the (man-dress). They are less <b>friendly</b> to Americans.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Christian) <i>Tell me about the <b>friendly</b> ones? Never, never 100% trust them. They are traitors, even if you help them.</i></li> <li>• (US) The Sunni are the “<b>nicer</b>” ones—at least they will try to convert you, as opposed to just killing you.</li> </ul>
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Table 25. Quotes and Sub-themes related to “Regular” Muslims

Theme: *Religiousness*

<b>Religiousness</b>	<b>Typical Quotes</b>	<b>Rarer Quotes</b>
<p>Many Cultures-Only One Islam</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) There is only <b>one religion</b>.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The tribes here have the <b>same Islam</b>, which links them, but different cultural practices and traditions which divides them and causes misunderstandings. The tribes do not mix, generally living in distinct areas, however they are known to intermarry upon occasion.</li> <li>• (US) I think Muslims re identified by their culture, like Indonesian, Iraqi, Afghan, Filipino, and also by the</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) <i>Well they have the <b>same doctrine</b> here as there (Saudi), maybe some Saudi practices were brought here.</i></li> </ul>

	<p>Sunni-Shia type. But I think their <b>beliefs are uniform</b> across the world.</p>	
Convert	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Another kind of Muslim is a <b>convert</b>. Converts are MORE radical, they want to prove themselves to be “true believers.” They are more aggressive to prove “we are the real ones (Muslims)”</li> <li>• (US) There are genuine <b>converts</b> who hold the pillars of Islam to be true. They are faithful, more involved, enthused, excited, and evangelistic. They will embrace the way of whoever converted them. So if a radical converted them, they will be radical</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(US) There are <b>converts</b> who adopt Islam out of convenience, such as Phil ex pat workers over in the Middle East, or they want to be part of the ummah, the community. They want to avoid discrimination, to not pay extra taxes, because discrimination against non-Muslims is acceptable in the Koran.</i></li> </ul>
Devout	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The more <b>devout</b>, the more into the Koran (that they are) they tend to be more fundamentalist. You know, Islamists. They justify violence by the Koran.</li> <li>• (US) With <b>devout</b> Muslims, there is one result: people die.</li> <li>• (US) Here in the PI, some Muslims are <b>devout</b>. You are Muslim by birth. You take being a Muslim seriously because it relates to power. It is like a fraternity, a social network, like the Knights of Columbus.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(US) Muslims, you tell them by their actions....He walks the walk, he is a <b>devout</b> guy, he could have work elsewhere but he stays here to teach and help.</i></li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) But some are <b>devout</b> and I knew one who was a virgin and very afraid of her brother, (what would happen if she dated or had sex.)</li> </ul>	
Sharia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) For example, in Saudi Arabia, they have <b>Sharia</b> law, and they are very strict about how women dress and so forth. Here <b>Sharia</b> has no teeth</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The <b>Sharia</b> courts, they are only for family matters, not criminal things.</li> <li>• (US) They believe <b>Sharia</b> should be THE law and so they want to throw out the government.</li> <li>• (US)The old school types want <b>Sharia</b> law.</li> <li>• (US) They believe in the rule of <b>Sharia</b> law, from the Koran.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(US) I don't think they want <b>Sharia</b> law here.</i></li> </ul>
Convert (verb)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The Sunni are the “nicer” ones– at least they will try to <b>convert</b> you, as opposed to just killing you.</li> <li>• (US) Their goals? To <b>convert</b> everyone to their doctrine. But this is not the core doctrine of Islam.</li> <li>• (US) On Basilan, the young males, it is there mission to <b>convert</b> everyone or kill them—they are violently</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(US) Treat you like friend/family even though you are Christian. Helpful, good friends, socialize with you, show hospitality. It was like this in Turkey. They said Koran or their traditions said to be kind to strangers. No anger or hatred in their eyes. Not trying</i></li> </ul>

	missionary.	to <i>convert us</i> .
Less Strict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) Some Muslims less/non practicing drink/smoke, <b>less strict</b>, believe in it but go to mosque less.</li> <li>• (US) Like here in the Philippines, they are tolerant, <b>less strict</b>, more integrated with Christians.</li> <li>• (US) In this area, the Muslims cross the line a lot between Muslims and Catholics, you know they drink, they don't always fast like they are supposed to. They are <b>not strict</b>.</li> <li>• (US) So there are two kind of moderates: those who are <b>not really practicing</b> but respect Islam, and the majority who are “like us” they just want to raise their kids, teach their kids in peace, be left alone and have a better future.</li> <li>• (US) They pray 5 times a day—well, some do and some don't.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) The non- practicing Muslims might not be a “good Muslim” in their own mind because not observant.</li> </ul>
Practicing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) We <b>go to mosque</b> on Friday. Women go in a separate room</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Mellows <b>go to mosque</b> on Fridays. Some are very religious and some are less religious.</li> <li>• (US) They may <b>pray 5 times a day, go to mosque</b>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) Kinds of Muslims are: peaceful, fanatical, <b>practicing</b>; it depends on their cleric.</li> <li>• (US) <b>Practicing</b> Muslims, the sincere ones just trying to do right by their religion</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) <b>Practicing Muslims: Pray 5 times a day</b>, treat us like family, sometimes traditional dress, very conservative, setting an example for children.</li> </ul>	
<p>Conservative-Strict-Pious-Traditional</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) She said her sister “really is a Muslim” she <b>dresses conservatively</b> but does not wear a hijab. Their grandma does not want them to wear hijab.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) But the more rural, the more <b>conservative</b> the practice, women more wear hijab.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) In the PI, Muslims are free to wear any kind of dress but more <b>conservative</b> women wear the hijab.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The clerics, they expect it, and it is the collective consensus of the people there to live more <b>conservative</b> lifestyle. In Islam, you cannot force your ideas.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) She said that men who wear <b>Arab style dress</b> were those educated in Madrassas here, they are <b>conservative</b>.</li> <li>• (US) Extremists, the women dress covering the face and a long robe.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Sama “<b>religion girls</b>” who were married to Imams who were hajjis would wear a niqab.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) However, it is possible a woman is <b>conservative</b> and does not wear the hijab.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Well <b>hijab is compulsory, compulsory!</b> By the Quran. But niqab it is optional. It is better, the niqab</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) In the old days women wore the hijab but it did not cover all the hair properly. Then Saudis, Egyptians, Libyans, they came, so now women wear the hijab correctly (made motions to demonstrate complete coverage of the hair over the front of the brow, no bangs showing) Why is it better? It is more <b>pious</b>.</li> <li>• (US) The extreme <b>fundamentalism—the extremely</b></li> </ul>

	<p>The men, they grow beards, dress <b>conservatively</b>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) So fanatics are <b>conservative</b> and they believe in Jihad</li> <li>• (US) The <b>strict</b> ones? They are orthodox, like orthodox Jews, you know, with the special garb and so forth. They pray 5 times a day. They you know, study the Koran. In Indonesia, I mean, they are more religious than in the PI. Except up by Marawi, they are more <b>strict</b> up there. A lot of women wear the full niqab up there, especially school girls.</li> </ul>	<p><i>extreme, <b>conservative</b> ones are the Pashtuns.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>
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Table 26. Quotes and Sub-themes related to *Religiousness*

Theme: *Drivers of Violence*

<b><i>Drivers of Violence s</i></b>	<b>Typical Quotes</b>	<b>Rarer Quotes</b>
Anti-US	Only one quote	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(US) The extremists, they are about <b>killing US citizens</b> and those who work for them. They are very good at studying patterns of behavior, they watch who comes and goes, sooner or later they will get the guy that works for US.</i></li> </ul>

Sectarian	Only one quote	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(US) The people on the ground are not so concerned with who is Sunni or Shia. We may mistake a tribal conflict for a <b>sectarian conflict</b>. It is permeable amongst the people, being Sunni or Shia, but not among the imams.</i></li> </ul>
Tribal/Cultural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The mellows tend to be the Samal and Badjao.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The <b>Maranao</b> are business people and they may violently protect their business interests.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) In the 1980s, it was the highlander <b>Yakans vs the lowlander Tausugs</b>, they used to fight on Basilan.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Of the tribes, the <b>Tausugs</b> would be most likely inclined to extremism, then the Yakans.</li> <li>• (US) There is a cultural-religious link. So the <b>Sama</b> people on Tawi they will tell you “<b>we are peaceful.</b>” They are friendly and open to outside influence. The Yakan (Basilan) and Tausugs are <b>warrior types</b>. It is why the government has been unable to pacify the warrior tribes in the South. The</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(US) In the PI, there are particular <b>families that are militant</b> where for generations, fighting is handed down to the kids.</i></li> </ul>

	<p><b>Badjaos, they just keep to themselves.</b></p>	
<p>Grievances</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) On Sulu, the conflict now is more about the <b>grievances</b>.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) We hope the US helps us strengthen the ARMM, improve <b>governance</b> then the armed groups will die down. With <b>roads, schools, basic services</b> we can win the peace in Mindanao</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) If more education, stop the cycle of <b>revenge, the clan feuds, land disputes, misunderstandings</b>. Education would mean less extremism, less fundamentalism, less rebellion. Then with better roads...markets, jobs....</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The locals, they see the ASG as their only alternative against the politics. Almost all ASG members have criminal records and they are <b>victims of the politicians</b> bata-bata system.</li> <li>• (US) Muslims in the PI: they believe in their faith, they <b>do not believe in their bureaucrats</b>. They turn to the Koran for their needs. They do not believe the gov will take care of them.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(RP-Muslim) And I want you to understand that we still experience <b>racial discrimination</b> on part of Christians and the Philippine government. We feel very <b>disrespected</b>, especially by Christians of Luzon and Visayas—I hate them!</i></li> <li>• <i>(RP-Muslim) The Congress is mostly Christians from Luzon, their laws do not help Maguindanao. That is maybe one reason people support the MILF—the <b>prejudice</b>.</i></li> <li>• (US) In the PI the chosen trauma was the Spanish <b>occupation</b>. The Spanish treated its subjects like pets, they converted them to Christianity but did not treat them like equals, did not educate them. Later the US educated them. They <b>resented Marcos</b>. The extremists here in the PI: <b>dissatisfaction with poverty</b>, identity question, are we Philippino or Malay? They</li> </ul>

		<p><b>resent the loss of the Sultanate</b>, want a sultanate, not to be part of the republic.</p>
<p>Separatism</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The <b>separatist politicians, they arm their own groups</b> and if a barangay does not support them, they will go massacre them!</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)The <b>sultanate?</b> The radicals want it, the regular people do not.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Violent groups: JI, MILF, MNLF, ASG. They are all very religious. The radicals want a <b>separate</b> Muslim state.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) But some in MILF hate the army. Some MILF want an <b>Islamic state</b>.</li> <li>• (RP-Christian) They are fighting, they <b>want independent, they want Christians out</b>. But Christians ...improved and developed the province</li> <li>• (RP-Christian) But the MNLF and the MILF, they <b>want Mindanao for themselves</b>. They are trying—they want this peace process—they want Zamboanga! We voted no locally, we did not want Zambo to be part of ARMM.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The MNLF, they are not extremist, they just <b>wanted separate government</b>, but it was very careful to avoid civilian casualties, I know this, my father was MNLF.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US)They are really insurgents now, they want their <b>own society</b> and laws here.</li> <li>• (US) The Wahhabis down there, and in Saudi Arabia, they are at war with the US, the Great Satan. The groups in the PI are the JI, the ASG, there are Wahabbist clerics, there is the MNLF, the MILF. They are <b>violent separatist groups</b>, supposedly negotiating for peace but they are really negotiating deceptively to gain advantage. They want the benefits of being part of the PI without the responsibility. They want an Islamic state (all the group do).</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	
Islam inherently violent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US)And these fanatics, they could become the violent extremists. Because the <b>sword, that is pivotal element of their religion.</b></li> <li>• (US) If I were trying to talk up going on a Crusade (like in the olden days, to Jerusalem) people would laugh at me. But if we talk about <b>going on Jihad</b>, there are listeners out there. People actually take it seriously, in this day and age!</li> <li>• (US) Muslims will do <b>what God tells them to do, good or bad.</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(US) Islam is <b>not peaceful.</b> Mohammed married a six year old girl and consummated it when she was only 9</i></li> <li>• <i><b>Mohammed was genocidal</b> He changed his prophetic visions at every turn He went to Jerusalem in a strategic move to incorporate other religious beliefs The spirit of the anti-Christ is manifest in Islam</i></li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) <b>Islam has “not figured it out” in terms of morality.</b> Just look at the things they do to their children! (referring to treatment of children in Afghanistan)</li> <li>• (US) Islamic teachings were <b>founded in a violently strategic</b> fashion, and those who regard Islam as peaceful are grossly deceived.</li> </ul>	
Power struggles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The Yakans, they are a lot of leaders, high profile, with <b>political power</b>. They know that “without guns you are nobody.”</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim)The <b>separatist politicians, they arm their own groups</b> and if a barangay does not support them, they will go massacre them!</li> <li>• (RP-Christian)When the money goes to them, they want <b>power</b>--they do not use the money for development, they enrich themselves.</li> <li>• (RP-Christian) They who did that massacre, <b>(it was over an election)</b> they are very rich. The government-- there are guns and goons! Everybody has goons!</li> <li>• (RP-Christian) Well, there is bad governance. When candidates lose an</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(US) The people I think are split as to whether they support Kato and BIFF. I think the motivation of Kato is <b>political</b>, not religious. It is not about ideology. The split with MILF, it is political.</i></li> <li>• <i>(US) Extremists have a power agenda, they use fear to motivate their people, they make them afraid of the “other.”</i></li> <li>• <i>(US) You take being a Muslim seriously because it relates to <b>power</b>. It is like a fraternity, a social network, like the Knights of Columbus.</i></li> </ul>

	<p><b>election</b>, the candidates and followers reject the winners, <b>disagree and fight</b> the new government.</p>	
Money	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) KFR is a business.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The ASG guys, 95% are in the group because of <b>their situation</b>, they do not believe in jihad.</li> <li>• (RP-Christian) They are doing crimes, smuggling, drugs, gun running, and ASG, they are doing KFR. It is all about <b>money</b>.</li> <li>• (RP-Christian) The sitting government, there is lots of abuse, corruption, they have body guards, they can do anything. If you cross them, they can just kill you, they control everything. Like the internal revenue allotment <b>money</b>—politicians take it and they do not get punished.</li> <li>• (RP-Christian) When the money goes to them, they want power--they do not use <b>the money</b> for development, they enrich themselves.</li> <li>• (US) They do KFR to <b>make a living</b>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(US) Remember the PI culture is about the <b>haves vs the have nots</b>.</i></li> <li>• <i>(US) They are poor and they want escape, to either die for the cause and get virgins, or to get some <b>money</b>.</i></li> <li>• <i>(US) Extremists take advantage of poverty (how insurgencies are fueled) and they motivate people with <b>money</b> to work for them or they take care of their families.</i></li> </ul>
Islam Distorted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) Well you know, the foreign clerics, they are</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) <i>A <b>true Muslim</b> has a pure heart and submits to</i></li> </ul>

	<p>fundamentalist. You know of course that <b>real jihad means struggle against oppression.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) So the ones called radical or extremist Muslims are <b>not Muslims</b>, they are simply radical people. The radicals take parts of the Quran <b>out of context</b> to justify their deeds.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) There is only one Islam; we condemn violence, the un-Islamic activities like kidnapping for ransom, bombings, hurting children. KFR is a business. They justify it by their <b>interpretations of the Koran.</b></li> <li>• (US) The fringe: they are hard core, they interpret the Koran to justify anything.</li> <li>• (US) The radicals, their beliefs are <b>distorted</b></li> <li>• (US) The “extreme versions” they <b>violate the tenets of Islam</b>, they commit violence on innocent people on behalf of their religion.</li> <li>• (US) The extremists they distort the message of the Koran.</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<p><i>the will of Allah and respects life. So those who commit crimes and are called in reports “Muslim” this is very painful and heartbreaking and we hate the Christians for it.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) They say “Inshallah” so <b>when bad things happen, it is the will of God.</b> If they leave and IED and people get hurt, like children or other Muslims, they just say Inshallah.</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p>People are misled</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) But due to lack of education, those who are not educated, want the meaning of the Holy Koran</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(RP-Muslim) The twisted mind– it is <b>easily persuaded</b>, they are uneducated and illiterate.</i></li> </ul>

	<p>simplified. The illiterate ones, they cannot understand the Koran. It is hard even for me to understand. So if uneducated, <b>easily convinced to follow extremist teachings</b>. Clerics can influence people they can be very charismatic and convincing.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) So they follow what he says. They are <b>easily led</b>, easy to influence by the MILF leaders.</li> <li>• (RP-Muslim) They are pretending to understand Islam and they <b>mislead the younger generation</b>, they use religion to convince good people...they recruit.</li> <li>• (US) Muslims in the PI—they are unsophisticated, poorly educated, and <b>good targets</b> for Saudi missionaries (and they are radical, violent, <b>deceptive</b>)</li> <li>• (US) See, most Muslims don't really read the Koran so they <b>go with what people say</b> is the norm.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (US) They do recruit in the mosques and colleges. Yeah, especially the colleges, young <b>impressionable ones</b> there.</li> <li>• (US) In Iraq, people are killing for religion, there were hundreds of suicide bombers because: they are not educated, they are <b>group thinking</b>, they are poor and they want escape, to either die for the cause and get virgins, or to get some money. They are ignorant. They are <b>drugged by religious motivation. It is cult-like.</b></li> </ul>
Defensive	Only two quotes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) The Tausug—they are fierce, they fought for survival, they are allowed in Islam to <b>defend themselves</b>.</li> <li>• Men: they fight, they <b>protect their area</b>—both Yakans and Tausugs.</li> </ul>
Revenge	Only two quotes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (RP-Muslim) If more education,</li> </ul>

		<p><i>stop the <b>cycle of revenge</b>, the clan feuds, land disputes, misunderstandings.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>(RP-Christian)If somebody gets hurt, it is the AFP fault no matter what. They will then come and fight you (for <b>revenge</b>) no matter what.</i></li> </ul>
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Table 27. Sub-themes and quotes related to *Drivers of Violence*

Appendix 7. Phase II Questionnaire

**Questionnaire for Ms. Dunham-Scott's Doctoral Studies on Beliefs about Muslims in the Philippines**

**No names please, your participation is anonymous! Please circle the applicable information:**

Member of: US Army US Navy US Air Force US Marine Corps AFP  
PNP ARMM

Position: Officer Enlisted Civilian

Citizen of: US Philippines

Gender: Male Female

Highest Education: Primary School High School College  
Graduate School

Location: Zamboanga Basilan Jolo Tawi Tawi  
Cotabato

Religion: Muslim Christian Jewish Other  
None

Tribe (if applicable): Sama Tausug Yakan Badjao Maguindanao Maranao Other  
(specify):

**Please circle "Agree" or "Disagree" for each item:**

1. Agree Disagree: Muslims here see themselves as Sunni or Shia first, then as a tribe member.
2. Agree Disagree: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is fighting to establish an Islamic sultanate here in the Philippines.
3. Agree Disagree: Violence and crimes against civilians are committed by lawless renegades, not the real Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

4. Agree Disagree: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are foreigners who want to establish a new Islamic Caliphate by violent jihad.
5. Agree Disagree: Foreign clerics are introducing radical ideas in madrassas and mosques here.
6. Agree Disagree: The MNLF is not an extremist group, they are struggling lawfully against oppression for Muslim self-determination and justice.
7. Agree Disagree: People join militant groups here mostly because of radical religious beliefs.
8. Agree Disagree: People here join militant groups mostly because they need money and can't find work.
9. Agree Disagree: People who live in rural areas are less likely to be fundamentalists.
10. Agree Disagree: Muslims here think the central government does not care about them and looks down on them
11. Agree Disagree: In the Philippines, most Muslims are Shia and a few are Sunni.
12. Agree Disagree: The majority of Muslims here believe in democracy, civil rights and equality for all.
13. Agree Disagree: Many Muslims in the Philippines want to see a Sultanate restored to Mindanao.
14. Agree Disagree: People believe that officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao get a lot of money but do little to benefit Muslim communities.
15. Agree Disagree: The majority of Muslims in the Philippines are peaceful and friendly.
16. Agree Disagree: There is no such thing as an Islamic terrorist because real Islam is completely peaceful
17. Agree Disagree: In the Philippines, conflict is simply part of the culture—it is not really about religion
18. Agree Disagree: Extremists distort the teachings of Islam to justify their violence against innocent people
19. Agree Disagree: Truly devout Muslims would prefer to have Sharia (Islamic law) as the law of the land.

20. Agree Disagree: Women who are modern and progressive Muslims never wear the hijab (head covering).
21. Agree Disagree: Most Muslims are just regular people who want to care for their families and have a better future; they have the same values as Christians.
22. Agree Disagree: People here are easily influenced by charismatic extremists to support or join militant groups because they are uneducated.
23. Agree Disagree: Most Muslims want peace, not bombings, but they are afraid to criticize the fanatics.
24. Agree Disagree: Christians and Muslims in general get along very well in the ARMM.
25. Agree Disagree: Muslims do not speak out against the violence because they sometimes agree with the extremists' goals
26. Agree Disagree: Violence here is not really about religious extremism, it is mostly about money and power.
27. Agree Disagree: Most Muslims here do not support the MNLF.
28. Agree Disagree: Most Muslims here do support the MILF.
29. Agree Disagree: Most people here think that Abu Sayyaf members are just criminals and thugs
30. Agree Disagree: Women here who wear the burqa (full covering) are probably fundamentalists.
31. Agree Disagree: Hijab (scarf) and long, loose clothing is considered mandatory for Muslim women
32. Agree Disagree: Only foreign men wear the traditional Arab-style dress here in the Philippines.
33. Agree Disagree: There are as many kinds of Islam here as there are tribes
34. Agree Disagree: Members of the Maranao tribe are more strict about Islam and more likely to wear traditional dress and hijab or niqab (head or full face coverings).
35. Agree Disagree: Support for the MILF flows from the Maguindanao tribe.
36. Agree Disagree: The Badjao people are looked down on by other tribes who think they are un-Islamic in some ways.
37. Agree Disagree: The Tausug tribe is known for being very war-like

38. Agree Disagree: The Yakan tribe is known for being very peaceful.
39. Agree Disagree: The Sama and Badjao people are traditionally very fierce and violent Muslims.

## Appendix 8. JSOTF-P and Muslim Consensus Tables

Question (0= Disagree, 1 = Agree)	JSOTF-P Consensus	Muslims Consensus
Muslims here see themselves as Sunni or Shia first, then as a tribe member.	0	1
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is fighting to establish an Islamic sultanate	1	0
Violence and crimes against civilians are committed by lawless renegades, not the real Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).	0	1
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are foreigners who want to establish a new Islamic Caliphate by violent jihad.	1	0
Foreign clerics are introducing radical ideas in madrassas and mosques here.	1	0
The MNLF is not an extremist group, they are struggling lawfully against oppression for Muslim self-determination and justice.	0	1
Many Muslims in the Philippines want to see a Sultanate restored to Mindanao.	1	0
There is no such thing as an Islamic terrorist because real Islam is completely peaceful	0	1
People here are easily influenced by charismatic extremists to support or join militant groups because they are uneducated.	1	0
Muslims do not speak out against the violence because they sometimes agree with the extremists' goals	1	0
Hijab (scarf) and long, loose clothing is considered mandatory for Muslim women	0	1
There are as many kinds of Islam here as there are tribes	1	0

The Tausug tribe is known for being very war-like	1	0
The Yakan tribe is known for being very peaceful.	1	0

**Table 28.** JSOTF-P and Muslims disagreed on 14 of 39 questions.

Questions	JSOTF-P	Muslims
People join militant groups here <u>mostly</u> because of radical religious beliefs.	0	0
People here join militant groups mostly because they need money and can't find work.	1	1
People who live in rural areas are less likely to be fundamentalists.	0	0
Muslims here think the central government does not care about them and looks down on them	1	1

Questions	JSOTF-P	Muslims
Women who are modern and progressive Muslims never wear the hijab (head covering).	0	0
Most Muslims are just regular people who want to care for their families and have a better future; they have the same values as Christians.	1	1
Most Muslims want peace, not bombings, but they are afraid to criticize the fanatics.	1	1
Christians and Muslims in general get along very well in the ARMM.	1	1

In the Philippines, most Muslims are Shia and a few are Sunni.	0	0
The majority of Muslims here believe in democracy, civil rights and equality for all.	1	1
People believe that officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao get a lot of money but do little to benefit Muslim communities.	1	1
The majority of Muslims in the Philippines are peaceful and friendly.	1	1
In the Philippines, conflict is simply part of the culture—it is not really about religion	1	1
Extremists distort the teachings of Islam to justify their violence against innocent people	1	1

Violence here is not really about religious extremism, it is mostly about money and power.	1	1
Most Muslims here do not support the MNLF.	0	0
Most Muslims here do support the MILF.	0	0
Most people here think that Abu Sayyaf members are just criminals and thugs	1	1
Women here who wear the burqa (full covering) are probably fundamentalists.	0	0
Only foreign men wear the traditional Arab-style dress here in the Philippines.	0	0

The Sama and Badjao people are traditionally very fierce and violent Muslims.	0	0	Members of the Maranao tribe are more strict about Islam and more likely to wear traditional dress and hijab or niqab (head or full face coverings).	1	1
Support for the MILF flows from the Maguindanao tribe.	1	1	Truly devout Muslims would prefer to have Sharia (Islamic law) as the law of the land.	1	1
The Badjao people are looked down on by other tribes who think they are un-Islamic in some ways.	1	1			

Table 29. JSOTF-P and Muslims shared consensus on 25 of 39 items.

## Appendix 9. PCA Tables

Question number	Muslims n=79 prefer loadings > 0.65	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4		JSOTF-P Consensus Answers	Muslim Consensus Answers	RP Christian Majority Answers
1	Question 1	0.5006	0.5369	0.0276	- 0.2987	Muslims here see themselves as Sunni or Shia first, then as a tribe member.	0	1	0
2	Question 2	0.2187	0.5045	- 0.2625	- 0.6857	The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is fighting to establish an Islamic sultanate here in the Philippines.	1	0	0
3	Question 3	0.8232	0.1944	- 0.2191	- 0.0642	Violence and crimes against civilians are committed by lawless renegades, not the real Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).	0	1	1
4	Question 4	0.3702	0.4806	- 0.4686	- 0.0137	Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are foreigners who want to establish a new Islamic Caliphate by violent jihad.	1	0	1
5	Question 5	0.2578	0.8010	- 0.0236	- 0.2004	Foreign clerics are introducing radical ideas in madrassas and mosques here.	1	0	1
6	Question 6	0.8371	0.1554	- 0.1773	- 0.2524	The MNLF is not an extremist group, they are struggling lawfully against oppression for Muslim self-determination and justice.	0	1	1
7	Question 7	0.2266	0.6709	- 0.2293	- 0.3572	People join militant groups here mostly because of radical religious beliefs.	0	0	0

8	Question 8	0.5099	0.4789	-0.3762	-0.0696	People here join militant groups <u>mostly</u> because they need money and can't find work.	1	1	1
9	Question 9	0.3776	0.6157	-0.1328	-0.2851	People who live in rural areas are less likely to be fundamentalists.	0	0	1
10	Question 10	0.6915	0.2298	-0.2063	-0.3250	Muslims here think the central government does not care about them and looks down on them	1	1	1
11	Question 11	-0.0215	0.8067	-0.2652	-0.2619	In the Philippines, most Muslims are Shia and a few are Sunni.	0	0	0
12	Question 12	0.8190	0.2373	-0.1380	-0.0831	The majority of Muslims here believe in democracy, civil rights and equality for all.	1	1	1
13	Question 13	0.4028	0.4276	-0.3082	-0.4322	Many Muslims in the Philippines want to see a Sultanate restored to Mindanao.	1	0	1
14	Question 14	0.8157	0.1302	-0.3997	-0.0591	People believe that officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao get a lot of money but do little to benefit Muslim communities.	1	1	1
15	Question 15	0.9451	0.1054	-0.1497	-0.1267	The majority of Muslims in the Philippines are peaceful and friendly.	1	1	1
16	Question 16	0.9223	0.1245	-0.1580	-0.1035	There is no such thing as an Islamic terrorist because real Islam is completely peaceful	0	1	1

17	Question 17	0.7810	0.2907	-0.2144	-0.0598	In the Philippines, conflict is simply part of the culture—it is not really about religion	1	1	1
18	Question 18	0.6875	0.1804	-0.4506	-0.1635	Extremists distort the teachings of Islam to justify their violence against innocent people	1	1	1
19	Question 19	0.8773	0.2584	-0.0156	-0.0322	Truly devout Muslims would prefer to have Sharia (Islamic law) as the law of the land.	1	1	1
20	Question 20	0.1583	0.6155	-0.5804	-0.2002	Women who are modern and progressive Muslims <u>never</u> wear the hijab (head covering).	0	0	1
21	Question 21	0.8588	0.2141	-0.2430	-0.0509	Most Muslims are just regular people who want to care for their families and have a better future; they have the same values as Christians.	1	1	1
22	Question 22	0.4095	0.4556	-0.6021	-0.0639	Most Muslims are just regular people who want to care for their families and have a better future; they have the same values as Christians.	1	0	1
23	Question 23	0.8663	0.1686	-0.1962	-0.1225	Most Muslims want peace, not bombings, but they are afraid to criticize the fanatics.	1	1	1
24	Question 24	0.8365	0.2008	-0.1572	-0.1592	Christians and Muslims in general get along very well in the ARMM.	1	1	1
25	Question 25	0.1568	0.7618	-0.3482	-0.0312	Muslims do not speak out against the violence because they sometimes agree with the extremists' goals	1	0	1

26	Question 26	0.8038	0.2110	-0.1758	-0.1442	Violence here is not really about religious extremism, it is mostly about money and power.	1	1	1
27	Question 27	0.3631	0.6853	-0.3420	0.1953	Most Muslims here do <u>not</u> support the MILF.	0	0	0
28	Question 28	0.3010	0.6093	-0.1532	-0.3398	Most Muslims here <u>do</u> support the MILF.	0	0	1
29	Question 29	0.7786	0.1895	-0.3182	-0.2148	Most people here think that Abu Sayyaf members are just criminals and thugs	1	1	1
30	Question 30	0.3262	0.8174	0.0260	0.0776	Women here who wear the burqa (full covering) are probably fundamentalists.	0	0	0
31	Question 31	0.8223	0.2816	0.1108	-0.0994	Hijab (scarf) and long, loose clothing is considered mandatory for Muslim women	0	1	1
32	Question 32	0.1535	0.7902	-0.1354	-0.1505	Only foreign men wear the traditional Arab-style dress here in the Philippines.	0	0	0
33	Question 33	0.3659	0.5074	-0.1195	-0.5985	There are as many kinds of Islam here as there are tribes	1	0	1
34	Question 34	0.6731	0.3804	-0.0898	-0.1623	Members of the Maranao tribe are more strict about Islam and more likely to wear traditional dress and hijab or niqab (head or full face coverings).	1	1	0

35	Question 35	0.5648	0.2544	-0.5063	-0.2556	Support for the MILF flows from the Maguindanao tribe.	1	1	1
36	Question 36	0.4318	0.3141	-0.5943	-0.2641	The Badjao people are looked down on by other tribes who think they are un-Islamic in some ways.	1	1	1
37	Question 37	0.3315	0.4449	-0.4319	-0.4834	The Tausug tribe is known for being very war-like	1	0	1
38	Question 38	0.3613	0.3477	-0.5509	-0.3706	The Yakan tribe is known for being very peaceful.	1	0	1
39	Question 39	0.0024	0.7323	-0.4409	-0.3379	The Sama and Badjao people are traditionally very fierce and violent Muslims.	0	0	0

Table 30. Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings, Muslim Respondents, n=79

JSOTFP n=31 prefer factor loadings > 0.8	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3		JSOTF-P Consensus Answers	RP Muslims Consensus Answers	RP Christian Majority Answers
Question 1	0.21	-0.779	-0.133	Muslims here see themselves as Sunni or Shia first, then as a tribe member.	0	1	0
Question 2	0.626	-0.342	-0.3	The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is fighting to establish an Islamic sultanate here in the Philippines.	1	0	0
Question 3	0.147	-0.707	-0.438	Violence and crimes against civilians are committed by lawless renegades, not the real Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).	0	1	1
Question 4	0.819	-0.154	-0.335	Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are foreigners who want to establish a new Islamic Caliphate by violent jihad.	1	0	1
Question 5	0.524	-0.406	-0.365	Foreign clerics are introducing radical ideas in madrassas and mosques here.	1	0	1
Question 6	0.176	-0.583	-0.547	The MNLF is not an extremist group, they are struggling lawfully against oppression for Muslim self-determination and justice.	0	1	1
Question 7	0.013	-0.885	-0.131	People join militant groups here <u>mostly</u> because of radical religious beliefs.	0	0	0
Question 8	0.836	-0.076	-0.33	People here join militant groups <u>mostly</u> because they need money and can't find work.	1	1	1
Question 9	0.299	-0.667	-0.145	People who live in rural areas are less likely to be fundamentalists.	0	0	1
Question 10	0.82	-0.258	-0.108	Muslims here think the central government does not care about them and looks down on them	1	1	1
Question 11	0.345	-0.648	-0.262	In the Philippines, most Muslims are Shia and a few are Sunni.	0	0	0
Question 12	0.446	-0.417	-0.444	The majority of Muslims here believe in democracy, civil rights and equality	1	1	1

				for all.			
Question 13	0.687	-0.495	0.04	Many Muslims in the Philippines want to see a Sultanate restored to Mindanao.	1	0	1
Question 14	0.829	-0.206	-0.228	People believe that officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao get a lot of money but do little to benefit Muslim communities.	1	1	1
Question 15	0.946	-0.082	-0.165	The majority of Muslims in the Philippines are peaceful and friendly.	1	1	1
Question 16	0.045	-0.811	-0.345	There is no such thing as an Islamic terrorist because real Islam is completely peaceful	0	1	1
Question 17	0.51	-0.385	-0.271	In the Philippines, conflict is simply part of the culture—it is not really about religion	1	1	1
Question 18	0.906	-0.084	-0.252	Extremists distort the teachings of Islam to justify their violence against innocent people	1	1	1
Question 19	0.735	-0.299	-0.176	Truly devout Muslims would prefer to have Sharia (Islamic law) as the law of the land.	1	1	1
Question 20	-0.043	-0.811	-0.418	Women who are modern and progressive Muslims <u>never</u> wear the hijab (head covering).	0	0	1
Question 21	0.816	-0.142	-0.224	Most Muslims are just regular people who want to care for their families and have a better future; they have the same values as Christians.	1	1	1
Question 22	0.661	-0.205	-0.436	Most Muslims are just regular people who want to care for their families and have a better future; they have the same values as Christians.	1	0	1
Question 23	0.919	-0.145	-0.113	Most Muslims want peace, not bombings, but they are afraid to criticize the fanatics.	1	1	1
Question 24	0.595	-0.355	-0.324	Christians and Muslims in general get along very well in the ARMM.	1	1	1
Question 25	0.881	-0.282	0.004	Muslims do not speak out against the violence because they sometimes agree with the extremists' goals	1	0	1

Question 26	0.769	-0.075	-0.476	Violence here is not really about religious extremism, it is mostly about money and power.	1	1	1
Question 27	0.298	-0.841	0.159	Most Muslims here do <u>not</u> support the MNLF.	0	0	0
Question 28	0.303	-0.31	-0.711	Most Muslims here <u>do</u> support the MILF.	0	0	1
Question 29	0.827	-0.218	-0.099	Most people here think that Abu Sayyaf members are just criminals and thugs	1	1	1
Question 30	0.255	-0.749	-0.157	Women here who wear the burqa (full covering) are probably fundamentalists.	0	0	0
Question 31	0.446	-0.562	-0.19	Hijab (scarf) and long, loose clothing is considered mandatory for Muslim women	0	1	1
Question 32	0.373	-0.695	-0.054	Only foreign men wear the traditional Arab-style dress here in the Philippines.	0	0	0
Question 33	0.514	-0.316	-0.4	There are as many kinds of Islam here as there are tribes	1	0	1
Question 34	0.61	-0.428	-0.205	Members of the Maranao tribe are more strict about Islam and more likely to wear traditional dress and hijab or niqab (head or full face coverings).	1	1	0
Question 35	0.767	-0.3	-0.189	Support for the MILF flows from the Maguindanao tribe.	1	1	1
Question 36	0.745	-0.396	0.05	The Badjao people are looked down on by other tribes who think they are un-Islamic in some ways.	1	1	1
Question 37	0.54	-0.256	-0.649	The Tausug tribe is known for being very war-like	1	0	1
Question 38	0.421	-0.534	-0.275	The Yakan tribe is known for being very peaceful.	1	0	1
Question 39	0.318	-0.452	-0.597	The Sama and Badjao people are traditionally very fierce and violent Muslims.	0	0	0

Table 31. Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings, JSOTF-P Respondents, n=31

Christians n=46 prefer loadings >0.75	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Question	JSOTF-P Only Answer Key	RP Muslims Only Answer Key	RP Christian Majority
Question 1	0.54	-0.61	-0.10	Muslims here see themselves as Sunni or Shia first, then as a tribe member.	0	1	1
Question 2	0.33	-0.62	-0.20	The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is fighting to establish an Islamic sultanate here in the Philippines.	1	0	0
Question 3	0.14	-0.54	-0.61	Violence and crimes against civilians are committed by lawless renegades, not the real Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).	0	1	1
Question 4	0.46	-0.44	-0.37	Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are foreigners who want to establish a new Islamic Caliphate by violent jihad.	1	0	0
Question 5	0.71	-0.41	-0.25	Foreign clerics are introducing radical ideas in madrassas and mosques here.	1	0	0
Question 6	0.11	-0.58	-0.57	The MNLF is not an extremist group, they are struggling lawfully against oppression for Muslim self-determination and justice.	0	1	1
Question 7	0.47	-0.69	-0.09	People join militant groups here <u>mostly</u> because of radical religious beliefs.	0	0	0
Question 8	0.67	-0.39	-0.26	People here join militant groups <u>mostly</u> because they need money and can't find work.	1	1	1
Question 9	0.59	-0.40	-0.34	People who live in rural areas are less likely to be fundamentalists.	0	0	0
Question 10	0.56	-0.47	-0.39	Muslims here think the central government does not care about them and looks down on them	1	1	1
Question 11	0.32	-0.66	-0.25	In the Philippines, most Muslims are Shia and a few are Sunni.	0	0	0
Question 12	0.45	-0.17	-0.79	The majority of Muslims here believe in democracy, civil rights and equality for all.	1	1	1

Question 13	0.47	-0.54	-0.17	Many Muslims in the Philippines want to see a Sultanate restored to Mindanao.	1	0	0
Question 14	0.76	-0.18	-0.51	People believe that officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao get a lot of money but do little to benefit Muslim communities.	1	1	1
Question 15	0.29	-0.28	-0.77	The majority of Muslims in the Philippines are peaceful and friendly.	1	1	1
Question 16	0.42	-0.26	-0.78	There is no such thing as an Islamic terrorist because real Islam is completely peaceful	0	1	1
Question 17	0.55	-0.30	-0.51	In the Philippines, conflict is simply part of the culture—it is not really about religion	1	1	1
Question 18	0.79	-0.16	-0.41	Extremists distort the teachings of Islam to justify their violence against innocent people	1	1	1
Question 19	0.54	-0.41	-0.44	Truly devout Muslims would prefer to have Sharia (Islamic law) as the law of the land.	1	1	1
Question 20	0.72	-0.33	-0.29	Women who are modern and progressive Muslims <u>never</u> wear the hijab (head covering).	0	0	0
Question 21	0.63	-0.14	-0.68	Most Muslims are just regular people who want to care for their families and have a better future; they have the same values as Christians.	1	1	1
Question 22	0.78	-0.38	-0.13	Most Muslims are just regular people who want to care for their families and have a better future; they have the same values as Christians.	1	0	0
Question 23	0.61	-0.20	-0.69	Most Muslims want peace, not bombings, but they are afraid to criticize the fanatics.	1	1	1
Question 24	0.29	-0.37	-0.73	Christians and Muslims in general get along very well in the ARMM.	1	1	1
Question 25	0.67	-0.54	-0.13	Muslims do not speak out against the violence because they sometimes agree with the extremists' goals	1	0	0
Question 26	0.72	-0.23	-0.51	Violence here is not really about religious extremism, it is mostly about money and power.	1	1	1

Question 27	0.09	-0.67	-0.45	Most Muslims here do <u>not</u> support the MNLF.	0		0
Question 28	0.58	-0.43	-0.24	Most Muslims here <u>do</u> support the MILF.	0	0	0
Question 29	0.70	-0.20	-0.52	Most people here think that Abu Sayyaf members are just criminals and thugs	1	1	1
Question 30	0.20	-0.77	-0.23	Women here who wear the burqa (full covering) are probably fundamentalists.	0		0
Question 31	0.51	-0.45	-0.41	Hijab (scarf) and long, loose clothing is considered mandatory for Muslim women	0	1	1
Question 32	0.11	-0.74	-0.37	Only foreign men wear the traditional Arab-style dress here in the Philippines.	0	0	0
Question 33	0.71	-0.28	-0.41	There are as many kinds of Islam here as there are tribes	1	0	0
Question 34	0.39	-0.70	-0.10	Members of the Maranao tribe are more strict about Islam and more likely to wear traditional dress and hijab or niqab (head or full face coverings).	1	1	1
Question 35	0.58	-0.40	-0.34	Support for the MILF flows from the Maguindanao tribe.	1	1	1
Question 36	0.85	-0.24	-0.36	The Badjao people are looked down on by other tribes who think they are un-Islamic in some ways.	1	1	1
Question 37	0.80	-0.38	-0.23	The Tausug tribe is known for being very war-like	1	0	0
Question 38	0.39	-0.42	-0.49	The Yakan tribe is known for being very peaceful.	1	0	0
Question 39	0.37	-0.67	-0.23	The Sama and Badjao people are traditionally very fierce and violent Muslims.	0	0	0

Table 32. Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings, RP Christian Respondents, n=31

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